Guns, Explosives and Weapons Control Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Minister for Home Affairs.

7.04 pm

The Minister of State for Home Affairs (Mr Desmond Tan) (for the Minister for Home Affairs): Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, on behalf of the Minister for Home Affairs, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a second time".

Singapore has consistently been ranked as one of the safest countries in the world. In the most recent Gallup Global Law and Order Report 2020, we were ranked first, for the sixth year running. People feel safe walking alone at night, violent crimes involving weapons are few and far between; and attacks involving guns and explosives are extremely rare.

This did not happen by chance. Our highly safe and secure environment is, in large part, attributable to the stringent laws that we have in place to regulate dangerous activities involving articles such as guns, explosives and other weapons, and the criminalising of unlawful actions involving these items.

The Arms and Explosives Act or AEA, in short, is the primary Act for regulating the handling of guns, explosives, explosive precursors, certain other weapons like swords, daggers and spears, and noxious substances. For simplicity, I shall refer to these items collectively henceforth as "GEW" – Guns, Explosives, Weapons. In addition, for drafting reasons, from here on, by "weapons", I shall be referring only to those weapons scheduled in the AEA or the Bill like swords, spears and daggers, and not guns or explosives which I shall treat as separate items.

Four other Acts, namely, the Arms Offences Act, Explosives Substances Act, Corrosive and Explosives Substances and Offensive Weapons Act, and Dangerous Fireworks Act, also deal with GEW-related crimes.

We cannot take our safety and security situation for granted.

First, the threat of an extremist attack remains very real. There have been serious incidents in countries with strict gun and weapon laws. Many of these incidents were not carried out by military organisations or state-sponsored activists, but individuals with extremist views and sentiments, using guns or knives.

Among others, the series of religiously-motivated terrorist attacks and the beheading of a school teacher in France late last year as well as the Christchurch mass shootings in 2019 by a gunman, where 51 individuals lost their lives and 40 were injured.

We must not presume that these attacks cannot happen here in Singapore. Recently, 37 individuals were investigated by ISD and the Police for inciting violence, stoking communal unrest and making derogatory remarks against Muslims. One of them was eventually arrested under the Internal Security Act. He had bought foldable knives in Singapore, which he claimed he would use for attacks against Hindus in Bangladesh.

Second, technology is posing an increasing challenge to effective enforcement against GEW-related crimes. The Internet has significantly facilitated the trafficking and manufacture of GEW. One can easily get online and access materials and instructions to manufacture GEW. There are lethal forms of GEW that can be purchased over the Internet.

Third, we need to optimise our enforcement resources to better regulate a growing industry. The AEA was last amended in 2007 to introduce regulation for explosive precursors. Since then, the total number of GEW licences has more than doubled, from around 2,000 in 2010 to more than 4,000 in 2020. Every licence requires resources to vet the licensee and to conduct inspections. The Police, who are currently the regulators under the AEA, need to be able to regulate this growing pool of licensees effectively. Otherwise, there is a risk of lapses going undetected, potentially resulting in disastrous safety or security consequences, such as the recent explosion that happened in Beirut which killed more than 200 people.

The Guns, Explosives and Weapons Control Bill before this House seeks to replace the Arms and Explosives Act, the Explosive Substances Act and the Dangerous Fireworks Act, and make consequential amendments to other GEW-related Acts. The Bill reinforces the Government's position that any handling of GEW is a privilege that is conditioned on the overriding need to ensure that we meet the objective of public safety and security, and that strict controls are required to achieve this objective.

In particular, the Bill will strive to achieve two objectives. First, to strengthen our levers to promote safe and secure GEW handling and further minimise the risks posed by GEW, and second, to ensure a more calibrated and coherent enforcement framework for these items.

We have, in the process, consulted industry stakeholders to explain the amendments and also obtained their feedback.

Let me now explain some of the key amendments.

We intend to achieve our first objective of strengthening levers to promote safe, secure and responsible GEW handling and further minimise the risks posed by GEW in two ways.

First, by further tightening controls over high-risk GEW. Today, the maximum fines for unlicensed activities involving explosive precursors (EPs) are $100,000 for entities and $50,000 for individuals. However, the maximum fine for arms and explosives is only $10,000, even though the degree of harm that can be caused is comparable to that of EPs. The Bill therefore raises the maximum fines for guns and explosives to match those for EPs.

In addition, the Bill allows the Minister for Home Affairs to prescribe items as prohibited GEW, offences related to which will attract even higher fines of up to $100,000 for persons and $200,000 for entities. These are items which are identified as particularly dangerous or may be more readily concealed and would be particularly suited to unlawful use. For example, certain types of automatic gun commonly used by terrorists, which are highly dangerous and clearly have no legitimate use. No licence will be granted for the handling of these items.

Next, the Bill criminalises the unauthorised possession of digital blueprints of guns. Today, a person could easily find on the Internet, materials for gun making and manufacture a fully workable gun using a 3D printer and a gun blueprint taken from the Internet. As a case in point, in 2019, a shooter in Germany had brought along guns with components that were manufactured using 3D printing. Those guns were eventually not used in carrying out the attacks, but were his back-up arsenal.

Clause 13 provides that a person who wants to make a 3D-printed gun or major part of a gun by an additive manufacturing process using a 3D printer or electronic milling machine will need a licence. Without a licence, the mere possession of a digital blueprint of a gun or gun part will be an offence. In this context, "possession" includes the scenario where a person in Singapore physically possesses a storage device containing such a blueprint, as well as the scenario where a person in Singapore stores a blueprint outside Singapore, such as in an overseas cloud storage device.

To be clear, the intent is not to target persons who genuinely have no knowledge and could not reasonably be expected to have known, that he or she possessed the digital blueprint for making a gun. For example, a person who merely browses out of curiosity and finds on the Internet a gun blueprint, and the blueprint is only temporarily stored in the browser cache.

Next, we have the threat posed by drones laden with GEW. This is a real and serious threat. In 2018, explosives-laden drones were used during an attack on Nicolas Maduro, the Venezuela President, when he was making a public speech. Several members of the Bolivarian National Guard were injured.

GEW-laden drones can circumvent conventional physical security measures, such as physical fences and CCTVs. Clause 5 addresses the threat by making it clear that a person who has control over or operates a vehicle or vessel carrying GEW, even if via remote control, is treated as possessing the GEW.

The Bill reinforces the 2015 amendment to the Air Navigation Act, which makes it an offence if a person operates an unmanned aircraft and the unmanned aircraft carries a prohibited item, which can be any weapon.

The Bill also introduces powers for the Licensing Officers to authorise third parties to do low-risk compliance checks, to allow the regulator to focus on high-risk GEW.

Currently, all licensing compliance checks are performed by Police officers regardless of the risk posed by the GEW. There is scope to use our limited Police resources more optimally. Our intent is to delegate checks on low-risk items, such as weapons and air guns, to qualified persons. Clause 80 therefore allows the Licensing Officer or LO in short, with the approval of the Minister for Home Affairs, to appoint Compliance Officers to exercise certain powers of the LO, such as the powers of inspection.

Next, while the vast majority of the GEW industry are compliant, we continue to encounter episodes of lapse among licensees. Some happened because the licensees wanted to save costs, or wanted to make compliance more convenient for themselves. In so doing, they compromised safety and security. Any lapse or breach involving GEW can result in catastrophic consequences. MHA has identified areas where we can further improve compliance and enhance regulatory effectiveness.

First, the Bill requires specific periodic reporting of GEWs by licensees and allows for inspections by regulators. There are risks to the community when guns, explosives or lethal weapons are not accounted for.

Clauses 59, 60 and 61 require licensees to update the Licensing Officer on changes to their management and to periodically report on their conduct of the regulated activities. Clauses 70 to 72 grant the Licensing Officer and authorised officers additional powers, such as the powers of inspection and powers to order the production of documents, to determine whether information given to the regulators is correct or whether regulatory action needs to be taken.

Second, the Bill expands the scope of regulation to cover GEW-related activities and items more comprehensively, in a calibrated manner.

In particular, the Bill introduces a class licensing regime for low or moderate-risk users and activities.

Currently, the AEA requires all persons conducting GEW-related activities to be either individually licensed, or to be exempted, which means they will fall outside the Act. But there are certain low or moderate-risk GEW-related activities which warrant some regulatory control, just not to the extent of individual licensing.

For example, students who handle air guns as part of their co-curricular activities (CCAs) in schools, generally do so in the campus, in the compound, which is a relatively secure setting, but some safety and security measures are still needed to prevent misuse or mishandling.

Therefore, clauses 56 to 58 introduce a class licence system that will work in lieu of individual licences. Under these clauses, a person who meets certain criteria, which will be set out in subsidiary legislation, such as being a member of a school air gun club, is automatically treated as licensed and allowed to carry out a GEW regulated activity, subject to the conditions. With class licensing, the person need not be put through security clearance and need not apply or renew for individual licence.

Conversely, under clause 66, the Licensing Officer has the power to suspend or disapply the class licence with respect to a specific class licensee if the LO is satisfied that, inter alia, the class licensee has contravened class licence conditions, is convicted of an offence in a GEW-related Act, or if it is in the public interest or national security of Singapore to do so.

To elaborate, public interest grounds include considerations relating to public order as well as public security and safety. For example, if an air gun class licensee is found to be a gang member, Police can then disapply this person from continuing to handle GEW.

Next, the Bill also revises our regulatory approach towards weapons and gun accessories.

Today, "arms", as defined under the AEA, covers guns and major gun parts and five specified weapons, that is, swords, bayonets, daggers, spears and spearheads. This definition has two issues.

First, the controls and penalties are not calibrated according to the risk posed by the item. The specified weapons pose lower risks than guns and major gun parts. But the way “arms” is defined now, means that these lower-risk items require the same controls, and offences involving these items carry the same penalties as offences involving guns.

Second, other weapons which may pose equal or higher risk as the five specified weapons, such as machetes, are not regulated.

Our policy intent is to have a regime that comprehensively controls GEW, and in a manner which is commensurate with their risk. Clauses 29 to 35 create and set out a distinct set of controls, offences and penalties for the specified weapons, to reflect the lower risk they pose vis-à-vis guns and major gun parts.

The expanded list of specified weapons to be regulated is reflected in the First Schedule, and will include other dangerous weapons like throwing stars and knuckledusters, which are very unlikely to have common day-to-day uses.

In addition, the Bill expands the scope of regulation to cover gun accessories, such as flash suppressors and silencers, which can be used to enhance the performance of guns. However, the penalties for gun accessories are lower than those for guns as they pose a lower risk.

The Bill also allows shooting range operations to be regulated, to ensure safety at the range. Today, operating a shooting range is not an activity that needs to be licensed. However, we want to be able to ensure that safety and security measures at shooting ranges are adequate. For example, the Licensing Officer may need to impose requirements for the deployment of a range safety officer or installation of robust perimeter fencing. Clause 19 therefore makes it an offence to operate a shooting range or paintball range without a licence.

The Bill also confers on the Licensing Officer, or LO, greater operational flexibility, to act swiftly where necessary to deal with new dangers or where there are increased risks.

First, the LO may change the licensing conditions during the tenure of the licence. Today, the LO cannot do so. If the LO needs to impose tighter conditions on the licensee, for example, to deal with changes in the operating environment, the LO must first revoke and then reissue the license. Also, the LO cannot impose tighter conditions on an errant licensee whose breach may not warrant licence suspension or revocation. Clause 54 allows the LO to add, delete or modify conditions during the tenure of a licence, subject to due process.

Second, there will be a new power for the Minister for Home Affairs to issue security directions. Sometimes, a security situation requires a more expedient response than what modifying licensing conditions allows, given the need to provide for due process when licensing conditions are changed.

If there is imminent threat to life or property, for instance, clause 64 allows the Minister to direct licensees, class licensees and even exempted persons to immediately put in place enhanced measures, or temporarily suspend, cease or scale down their activities for a period of time. This is called a security direction. It is non-appealable and is time-limited to six months. Non-compliance is an offence.

The other key objective of this Bill is to ensure a more calibrated and coherent enforcement framework for GEW.

In developing this Bill, we took the opportunity to rationalise the offences and penalties across the various GEW-related laws to achieve greater coherence, consistency and clarity.

There are currently some inconsistencies in penalties for offences with similar offence elements.

For example, section 3 of the Arms Offences Act, or AOA, criminalises unlawful possession of arms or ammunition and the penalties include caning. Section 13 of the AEA similarly criminalises unlicensed possession of arms, but the penalties are lighter and they do not include caning.

In addition, certain offences have similar penalties, even though the egregiousness of the offences differ. For example, under the AEA, the offence of conducting an activity without a licence attracts similar penalties as a breach of licensing conditions, even though the latter is considered less severe.

Moving forward, regulatory breaches like non-compliance with licence conditions or unlicensed activities will be criminalised under the Bill, whereas actions with criminal intent will be offences under the other Acts and will carry heavier punishments.

To this end, clauses 93 and 94 amend the AOA and the Corrosive and Explosives Substances and Offensive Weapons Act, or CESOWA, in short, to clarify that offences made out under these Acts involve criminal intent and therefore attract heavier punishments and penalties, thus distinguishing them from offences under the AEA.

The Bill also repeals the Explosive Substances Act, as there are similar offences relating to explosive substances in the CESOWA, such as possession and use of explosive substances with criminal intent.

Even as penalties are being raised, the penalties are also calibrated to match the egregiousness of the offence. For example, the penalty for the offence of unlicensed possession of explosives for individuals is higher than that for breach of licensing conditions involving explosives, as the former is considered more egregious. This is a fairer approach, to ensure that the penalties are proportional to the offence, while maintaining our tough stance against misuse of GEW.

The Bill also streamlines the regulatory approach for dangerous fireworks.

Currently, dangerous fireworks are prohibited under the Dangerous Fireworks Act, or DFA. However, fireworks are explosives as well, and ought to be regulated as such under a single law. Clause 98 therefore repeals the DFA. All activities involving fireworks including discharge, transportation and storage will be regulated as explosives under this Bill.

Last but not least, the Bill contains provisions that put on firmer footing some existing practices which remain relevant in our new security environment. One of these practices is the current security clearance regime, and which the Bill will apply to licensees and their management, and certain key personnel engaging in regulated activities, called special workers.

Screening requirements, which serve to mitigate the risks associated with GEW, are presently imposed through the "fit and proper" criteria for licensees, or mandated through the licensing conditions for the workers. This has shortcomings as there is no consistency and direct link between the validity of security clearances and the authorisation to engage in the regulated activities.

To lend greater clarity to the industry, clauses 41 to 46 set out the security clearance process and considerations for granting, suspending or revoking the security clearance of an individual. For example, the individual’s physical or mental health and participation in criminal activity are material factors in screening.

The Bill will also make clear the obligations of the licensee and the worker. In particular, clause 47 makes it an offence if a licensee allows a worker who is not security cleared to handle GEW.

At the same time, a special worker of a licensee, who handles GEW knowingly, or with reckless disregard, that his or her security clearance is not valid, will be committing an offence.

To guard against persons who are not licensees but may have significant influence over an entity engaged in GEW regulated activities, clause 48 makes it an offence if a licensee fails to inform the LO within seven days of a person becoming a close associate.

Let me conclude. I cannot emphasise enough that the safety and security that we currently enjoy in Singapore should never be taken for granted. In this regard, the Bill seeks to ensure that our regulatory framework remains robust to deter and prevent the misuse and mishandling of GEW, which can have very serious consequences for our safety and security, while respecting the need to allow legitimate uses for some GEW. Mr Deputy Speaker, I beg to move.

Question proposed.

Resumption of Debate on Question [4 January 2021], "That the Bill be now read a second time." – [Minister for Home Affairs].

Question again proposed.

Mr Speaker: Mr Melvin Yong.

1.32 pm

Mr Melvin Yong Yik Chye (Radin Mas): Mr Speaker, I stand in support of the Guns, Explosives, and Weapons Control Bill, which seeks to review and strengthen our existing regulatory regime governing weapons and firearms, to keep pace with the security risks posed by new technologies.

Mr Speaker, one of the key provisions of this Bill is to outlaw the unauthorised possession of any digital blueprint for the manufacture of a gun or a major part of a gun, to mitigate the threat posed by illegal manufacturing of guns with 3D-printing technology. This is a timely move given the increasing rate of technological advancement of additive manufacturing.

In addition to criminalising the unauthorised possession of digital blueprints for guns, we would also need to proactively cut off the source where such blueprints get downloaded. I would like to ask how the Ministry plans to tackle the issue of criminals downloading digital gun blueprints from the Internet, in particular the Dark Web?

I would also like to ask if there would be any circumstances that a person or an organisation would be authorised to possess a 3D blueprint of a gun, and what would be the obligations placed on such a person or organisation to ensure that there are proper safeguards to prevent misuse of such blueprints.

Mr Speaker, much like trying to stem the influx of pornographic and terrorist-related propaganda on the Internet, I foresee that it will be nearly impossible for us to fully cut off access to digital blueprints of guns online. I would, therefore, urge that we start to think about how we should regulate specific types of 3D printers that are able to manufacture these guns.

As the Executive Secretary of the United Workers of Electronics & Electrical Industries, I have seen first-hand how 3D printers have become more versatile today, and are now able to print different materials, alloys and even carbon fibre.

There are several types of 3D printers currently available on the market, catering to a wide range of customers – from action figure enthusiasts, to start-ups doing rapid prototyping, to aeroplane manufacturers. These 3D printers can use a wide variety of “raw ingredients”, from plastics, to metal, to carbon fibre. Perhaps, the Ministry could consider imposing a licensing requirement on those who import industrial-grade 3D printers, as such devices have the potential to 3D-print a fully functioning gun. Examples would include the Stereolithography printer, the Direct Metal Laser Sintering printer, and the Electron Beam Melting printer.

Mr Speaker, the Bill’s proposal to criminalise the act of loading drones and other unmanned aerial vehicles with weapons and explosives is both timely and crucial. As the Minister of State mentioned in his speech yesterday, drones loaded with weapons can pose a serious threat to safety and security. As early as 2015, there were news reports of a teenager in the United States who had already figured out a way to mount a handgun onto a drone and fire it remotely. To make things more worrying, instructional videos on how to do this, which is to replicate this remote firing process, can easily be found online. As technology progresses and the effective range for drones increases exponentially, it is likely that drones can be controlled beyond an operator’s visual line of sight, and foreign sources can use their drones to enter our airspace with malicious intent.

I would like to ask the Minister of State what will be our defences and countermeasures against such drone attacks, in particular, if the drone is operated remotely by an operator based outside of Singapore? Are there plans to develop our own anti-drone radar and jamming systems? Many Members of this House would recall the drone disruptions that happened at Changi Airport in June 2019, which shows that malicious actors need not necessarily load a drone with a weapon to cause damage in Singapore. The drone itself can be the weapon.

Mr Speaker, another key provision of the Bill is to allow for the outsourcing of compliance checks for low-risk guns, explosives and weapons (GEWs). According to the Minister of State, this is to allow our Licensing Officers to focus their attention on high-risk GEWs. While I can understand the intent and need to optimise our resources, we must ensure that the third parties that are contracted are able to maintain the high standards of the MHA and SPF. I would, therefore, like to ask what will be the training, if any, that will be provided to these third-party licensing officers, what are the standards that will be imposed on them, and how does the Ministry intend to ensure that they adhere to these standards.

Mr Speaker, as we review our existing regulatory regime governing weapons and firearms, we need to also bear in mind that there exists a small but sizable number of replica gun hobbyists in Singapore, who have an interest in collecting gun replicas.

While gun replicas are harmless on its own, the high resemblance to real guns can cause a lot of undue fear and alarm, especially to vulnerable people such as the elderly and children. Many replica gun hobbyists are deeply private and most pursue their passion quietly. However, just as 3D printing technology gives criminals the ability to produce their own guns, it would also allow these hobbyists to 3D-print their own gun replicas.

I would like to ask if the Bill would criminalise the possession of digital blueprints for gun replicas, such as BB guns and Water BB guns. Are there any plans to engage gun replica hobbyists, so that we can allow them some flexibility in pursuing their passion within a safeguarded space, perhaps, through a proper licensing framework?

To conclude, Mr Speaker, the introduction of the Bill is timely as it will allow our enforcement agencies to keep pace with criminals seeking to use new technologies to commit crime and perform acts of terror in Singapore.

While it is important to ban the unauthorised possession of 3D gun blueprints, we need to also prevent the downloading of these blueprints on the Dark Web and regulate specific 3D printers that can use these blueprints to produce a functional gun. As we move into the new decade, drones and other unmanned aerial vehicles will increasingly become a security threat, and we will need to step up on our anti-drone capabilities. I also hope that the Ministry could do more to engage hobbyists, who often keep their hobbies in the dark, for fear of running afoul of the law, as they, too, can use the same additive manufacturing technology to 3D-print replica guns, and even functional ones. With that, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Ms Sylvia Lim.

1.40 pm

Ms Sylvia Lim (Aljunied): Mr Speaker, it is sensible to consolidate the Arms and the Explosives Act, Dangerous Fireworks Act and the Corrosive and Explosive Substances and Offensive Weapons Act into a single piece of legislation. I also agree that there is a need to update the legislation to keep up with new technology and threats. The Workers' Party endorses the strict stance of weapons control and I am in general support of the Bill.

Nevertheless, I would like to seek some clarifications on the provisions relating to security clearances and licensing and on the appointment of Compliance Officers.

First, on the issuing of licences. Clause 43 of the Bill provides that licences may be issued to individuals as well as non-individuals, such as corporate entities. For individuals' licence to possess firearms, I believe there was a historical practice where wealthy individuals and/or their security personnel were permitted to carry firearms for protection. This was because they were considered to be at risk of being kidnapped for ransom. Could the Ministry clarify whether such considerations still apply today and, if so, how many licences have been issued to individuals for this purpose of private defence?

As for licences issued to organisations, clause 43 states that security clearances must first be obtained for all individuals who are responsible executives as well as at least one close associate of the entity. While it is quite logical that responsible executives, such as the CEO, president or general manager, would need security clearances, the additional requirement for the close associates to also have security clearance needs further explanation. A close associate of an entity is defined as a person who either holds 5% of equity or voting rights or is a person who will be managing the business. Why is it necessary to have security clearance for a 5% shareholder who may not be participating in managing the business? And, if it deemed relevant to clear shareholders, why is the bar set at only 5%, meaning that the remaining 95% of shareholders do not need security clearance? Is this meant to cater for companies whose shareholders are mainly corporations?

Next, I move on to the factors considered by the Licensing Officer in deciding on security clearances. It is stated in clause 45 that the Licensing Officer must consider various factors, including whether the applicant has participated in any criminal activity, has a history of violence or threat of violence and whether clearing the applicant is contrary to the public interest or national security. The explicit listing of the factors is welcome for transparency.

At this juncture, it would be useful for the Ministry to clarify whether the Licensing Officer still has discretion to grant the security clearance to an applicant who fails on one or some criteria, say, the applicant has an old conviction in the Youth Court when he was a teenager.

Another question on security clearances is how the Licensing Officer would access information submitted to him in such applications. Clause 45(2) provides that to assist the Licensing Officer, the Commissioner of Police or a law enforcement agency may provide a report to him to help assess applications for security clearances. Thus, the Licensing Officer can verify whether the applicant is known to have participated in criminal or violent acts and so on.

In this regard, I believe the Ministry expects to receive applications from foreigners, such as those who need short-term licences for trade fairs. How will be Licensing Officer verify the background information of foreign applicants? I hope there will be no compromise in ensuring that foreign persons are subject to the same standard of checks as resident applicants.

Finally, I have one clarification on the appointment of Compliance Officers. Clause 80 of the Bill provides that the Licensing Officer can appoint an individual who is not a public officer to be a compliance officer. According to the Ministry’s press release of 3 November, the investigation and enforcement of breaches will still be handled by Police officers.

I also note some restrictions on the powers of a Compliance Officer under clause 80(7). Nevertheless, under Part 6 of the Bill, compliance officers will be empowered to check licensees for compliance including inspection of premises, asking for information and explanations, stopping vehicles in transit and so on. These are potentially confrontational situations at locations where guns and weapons are kept. Failure to comply with a Compliance Officer’s directions is also an offence punishable with a fine of up to $10,000.

As the powers and responsibilities of Compliance Officers are thus not trivial, could the Ministry explain why it decided to set the minimum age for Compliance Officers at only 18 years?

1.46 pm

Mr Gan Thiam Poh: Mr Speaker, Sir, when I learnt about this Bill, I wondered at first if it was necessary to regulate guns, explosives and weapons through a new piece of legislation. Upon further reading and consideration, I am convinced that we need to do so.

Our environment has changed and technology has evolved tremendously. The threat of terrorism is still high. Information on weapons and explosives can be more easily retrieved these days from the Internet, particularly from the dark web; new technology, such as 3D-printing, enables customised creation and manufacture of guns and other weapons.

Updating our legislation to take into account the advent of technology is timely, and a constant reminder to ourselves to keep up with changes. While we welcome and embrace the benefits of new technology such as 3D printing, we need to guard against the pitfalls it can bring.

With today's technology, manufacturers could produce toy guns almost as good and functional as the real guns, which can pose a genuine threat to our lives too. Hence, there is also a need to protect our people against such threats. I would like to ask the Minister how many cases of armed crimes involved the use of fake and toy guns in the last 10 years.

Security and safety must remain top priorities for our nation. We are fortunate to be able to provide a fairly secure environment for Singaporeans and residents so far. Even so, there are still cases of violence and unauthorised use of fireworks. Our tight control over guns and weapons has helped minimised the destructive impact of such events. However, we must not take things for granted.

It is of the utmost importance that we continue to remain vigilant and stringent on security measures. There have been many incidents and tragedies in countries that had legalised arms possession. We must continue to have zero tolerance towards guns and weapons, just as we do not tolerate drugs in our jurisdiction. We must continue to educate Singaporeans that such a stand has been key to our secure and safe living environment.

Therefore, the deterrence penalties, in line with other relevant legislation, including capital punishment, must be upheld. We must continue to send a strong signal to all in Singapore and to others beyond our shores that we have zero tolerance for any action that could threaten our peace and security.

In addition, we need to tighten the surveillance of potential influence and threats in social media. We will need the support and technical expertise of social media service providers to help us defend against perpetrators who use social media to advance their interests and promote the use of violence and weapons of mass disruption in Singapore.

In this challenging digital environment, how would the Ministry use artificial intelligence or AI to take pre-emptive measures and strengthen our defence against terrorism and the use of guns, explosives and weapons?

Last but not least, it is important that we continue to promote tolerance and acceptance among our multiracial, multilingual, multi-cultural and multi-religious community members. Singapore is and will be a fair and equal society for all Singaporeans with zero tolerance of extremism. Religious and racial harmony must always be our core value. I would like to conclude with my support for the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Assoc Prof Jamus Lim.

1.51 pm

Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim (Sengkang): Mr Speaker, the Guns, Explosives and Weapons Control Bill of 2021 comes at an appropriate time, as advances in additive manufacturing technology mean that the accessibility of firearms is now simpler than ever before. While the key objective of the Act is to consolidate a number of older pieces of legislation, it also introduces a number of updates that are designed to accommodate the reality of weapons in the modern world.

Historically, our ability to successfully control the distribution of weapons was premised on the combination of managing supply and demand. On the supply side, we have been able to tightly control the inflow of goods and people due to our small, island geography and sophisticated policing of porous points along our borders. In terms of demand, we have instituted some of the world's most severe gun control laws – with punishments for unlawful possession, trafficking and use stipulated in the Arms Offences Act of 1973 and 2008, and Arms and Explosives Act of 1913 and 2013. We have supported these sticks with the carrot of an efficient, uncorrupt Police force.

This largely airtight control is now being undermined by the advancement of technology. Worldwide, there are currently an excess of 1.4 million 3D printers, and the figure is estimated to rise to more than eight million units by 2027. The ease of obtaining, securing and subsequently deleting electronic blueprints for weapons means that for a digitally-sophisticated population such as ours, the ability to independently print guns, if one chooses to do so, will increasingly be trivial. Moreover, if printed with non-standard materials, such 3D- printed guns will become increasingly undetectable with our usual screening devices.

While the printing of ammunition remains rudimentary and generally impotent at the moment, clause 4 of the bill will appropriately ensure that, if the technology to do so does emerge in the future, these will thereafter fall under tight legislation. Still, it appears only to be a matter of when, not if, technology catches up.

The basic principles of deterrence are straightforward and, I am certain, well understood by Members of this House. An individual with the proclivity to exercise violence may choose not to do so, if he or she believes that there will be a credible threat of a possibly disproportionately large retaliatory response.

Termed "mutually assured destruction", this threat of a response was what characterised the Cold War and what kept the United States and Soviet Union from pursuing outright war, with most conflicts pursued by proxy.

Same arguments are often made in the context of defenders of the right of individuals to carry weapons in self-defence. Now, the problem with this simple logic of deterrence, and the reason why strict weapons control is generally preferable, is that the deterrent effect is no longer applicable when we relax some of these basic assumptions. In particular, brandishing a gun on an unsuspecting victim confers first-mover advantage to the aggressor, which nullifies the threat of a retaliatory response. A gun in one's backpack is of no use if an erstwhile robber has one pointed at your face.

And the simple rationality that undergirds deterrence theory also breaks down when one agent is viewed as particularly susceptible to emotional response. This is, for example, why some observers have argued that dealing with North Korea may require actions beyond simple deterrence.

Nevertheless, it is our responsibility to at least consider how, compared to the past when tight monitoring and policing was often sufficient, future attempts to control the spread of firearms will be that much more challenging. Thus, even when we widen the scope of controlled goods, as clauses 12 and 13 seek to do, by designating the manufacture and possession of unauthorised digital gun blueprints as illegal, we need to recognise that the act of simply banning such items will be more limited than before. Yet, the majority of the subsequent clauses, such as clauses 17 or 20 or 27, prescribe penalties for violations; relying, as it were, on the stick rather than the carrot. My argument is that we need to be more creative about our use of deterrence.

The crux of the matter is this: We should be willing to consider the efficacy of a blunt reliance on strict weapons control as our central tool for containing violent crime and take efforts to address the underlying motivations for crime more seriously.

Of course, crime is a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon. Criminologists point to factors as varied as the thermal climate, urban density, inhabitant characteristics and psycho-social risk. But two important drivers have emerged recently and stressed the effects of poverty and income inequality. Of course, I am not suggesting that the Government has not made any efforts at addressing these more fundamental drivers.

What we should not forget though is that an important spillover of our policies to diminish inequality and eliminate poverty is that we yield the payoff of reduced crime too. If we believe this to be true, then we should be prepared to resource our agencies accordingly, to examine whether there is room to increase our expenditure for welfare and social services, and if budget considerations preclude otherwise, to re-examine our existing expenditure on publicly-funded domestic security services. On that note of general caution, I assert my support for the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Sharael Taha.

1.58 pm

Mr Sharael Taha (Pasir Ris-Punggol): Thank you, Mr Speaker, Sir. I applaud the effort to keep legislation concerning guns, explosives and weapons – referred to as GEW by Minister of State Desmond Tan – updated especially given the fact that advancements in technology and open borders have made it significantly easier to procure and manufacture GEWs.

We in Singapore are fortunate that our law enforcement agencies and supportive citizenry has kept our nation safe and free from the proliferation of GEWs. However, we must not rest upon our laurels in the face of recent developments.

3D printing is certainly an exciting and revolutionary technology as the designs you can manufacture now are effectively limited only by your imagination. As someone who is exposed to 3D printing at the workplace, I can assure that whatever that you can think of, it is highly likely that the 3D printer can print it out for you.

3D printing is also relatively cheap compared to traditional manufacturing with lathes and milling machines. Printers are readily available under $1,000. For the more serious hobbyist, a sophisticated 3D printer can be purchased under $5,000 for all your DIY needs from online portals such as Lazada and Amazon – and you can even have it delivered to your doorstep within a week. These 3D printers can print many different kinds of materials – from plastics to carbon fibre reinforced thermoplastics, to even different metals for the more complex and sophisticated machines.

In the industry, the use of 3D printing – or what is known as additive manufacturing or AM – is becoming more prevalent. AM has revolutionised how we design and manufacture components where there is little or even zero waste, unlike traditional subtractive manufacturing. AM is forcing us to rethink supply chain and manufacturing strategies because now, anyone in any part of the world can manufacture a 3D component if he has the design and a 3D printer capable of doing it.

In addition, there is also a lot of online resources available for free. GrabCAD, an open source forum for 3D models has more than 4.5 million computer aided design models – more commonly known as CAD models – and a number of these designs are for guns or weapons as defined by the Bill, which includes knuckledusters, daggers, swords and nunchakus.

3D printing brings exciting opportunities in manufacturing. However, there is an increasingly worrying global trend on the irresponsible use of 3D printing guns and offensive weapons. These designs are also increasingly downloaded. One of my residents even showed me the design of a "Gutbuster" – a knuckleduster integrated with a dagger and a revolver. This is indeed a worrying trend given our objective of becoming a digitally connected nation.

There is also a strong online community of advocates pushing for the digital design of guns to be made available to all for free as an extension of the United States' second amendment on the freedom to bear arms. As an example, Cody Wilson, described as a crypto-anarchist, had designed and successfully tested his first 3D-printed gun, which he named "The Liberator". He proceeded to upload it online for others to access for free. When the US authorities got wind of it, they managed to shut the site down but not before the gun design had been downloaded a total of 100,000 times.

A quick Google search also shows many examples of organisations distributing blueprints for guns and weapons with the intent of arming civilians to protect themselves and rise up against authorities.

To further complicate these worrying trends, 3D printed guns are unserialised and therefore untraceable. They can also be made using plastics, making them undetectable by metal detectors at security points such as in our airports and other sensitive installations.

All these lead to the simple fact that there are low barriers of entry for anyone who has the interest to 3D print a gun or weapon. Low printer cost, free downloadable software and blueprints open the gates to the proliferation of these 3D printed guns and other offensive weapons. Just some examples of the designs of guns that are available online: flying swallow revolver, zig-zag gun, AR15, FGC-9. Some are revolvers and some are semi-auto weapons.

Any person with very modest means and a broadband connection can effectively print his own gun in the comfort and privacy of his own homes. In fact, there are many YouTube videos that show just this. The situation becomes increasingly dangerous when we take into consideration the instances of self-radicalised individuals on our shores. Easy access to such technology seems like the perfect opportunity for a lone-wolf operative aiming to commit acts of terrorism.

It is therefore imperative that we pass this Bill. We need to keep up with the advancements in 3D printing technology and deal with the low barriers to access blueprints, especially in the current global and societal context. Like it or not, 3D printing of guns and other weapons is here with us and when it is misused, presents a clear and present danger to the safety and security of the general public.

Given its importance, I would like to suggest the following considerations.

In clause 13, I support the unauthorised possession of digital blueprints for guns and major parts of a gun. In addition, I suggest that it should also consider gun modifications and attachments that can be used with malicious intent such as silencers, scopes and so on.

I also note that digital blueprints for offensive weapons such as knuckledusters and daggers are not covered. As someone who is excited about the benefits of 3D printing, I do understand that we do not want to stifle creativity and innovation and we also do not want to over-criminalise 3D printing. However, how do we keep to the spirit of the law and prevent such offensive weapons from being used in our country?

One of our Pasir Ris residents came to see me to appeal against the fine he received – including the confiscation of the item – from Singapore Customs for buying a knuckleduster online from an overseas source. Of the hundreds of thousands of parcels crossing our borders, I am glad and I am thankful that our Singapore Customs have the capability to detect, intercept and prevent such offensive weapons from crossing our borders. How do we continue with this intent in this new world where we are unable to rely solely on the control at our physical borders to prevent these offensive weapons from appearing on our shores?

How do we get people to practice responsible 3D printing without over-criminalising it?

As a deterrent and to ensure responsible 3D printing, I would like to propose that if 3D printed items are found to be used as weapons in Singapore, we should consider options to charge the person or company for supplying the weapons together with the individual that uses it.

Since it is impractical to prevent people from having the blueprint of non gun-based weapons, at least, this will force those that are responsible for 3D printing to think twice on the use of 3D printed items, especially if it is used to cause harm in our society.

On enforcement, I would like to understand how MHA intends to enforce the unauthorised possession of the digital blueprints of guns.

Can we explore the banning of websites that advocate gun blueprint sharing?

How can MHA make non-intrusive checks on residents to ensure that they do not have gun designs stored on their hard drives? Do we have the right resource, skillset and organisational capability in MHA to tackle this threat?

I believe the community also has a wider role to play too. How do we co-opt the community to understand the urgency of this issue and the threat that it poses to public security and safety? Can we educate the public to be vigilant and be on the lookout? Is there a role family members should play, especially in our objective to identify early radicalised individuals who may turn out to be lone-wolf operatives? Do we provide safe, anonymous whistle-blowing channels for the public or family members?

How do we also ensure that the ease of access to 3D printers in schools and other agencies are not abused?

It is great that many of our kids are exposed to 3D printers in schools nowadays. However, anyone with computer aided design skills – which is now taught in schools – is able to design a simple, sharp-ended knuckleduster and have it printed in hours. They do not even need to wait for weeks for shipment from overseas.

Given the changing circumstances on making GEWs using 3D printers, I would like to propose a holistic approach of not only enforcement but also education to instill responsible 3D printing practices to the users and institutions that acquire these devices.

Another consideration is on the declaration and serialisation of some highly sophisticated 3D printers.

Some five-axis computer numerical control (CNC) machine centres are classified under export control, are serialised and also have yearly declarations as they are capable of manufacturing components for the centrifuge in building nuclear devices or ballistic missiles.

I would like to propose that we extend the same need for serialisation and yearly declarations to certain types of 3D printers. This would help to monitor its use and ensure it is not in the hands of individuals with ill intent and forces the 3D printing contract manufacturers to be aware of the downstream usage of their manufactured products.

Lastly, while we protect ourselves internally from the possession and manufacture of 3D printed guns, how do we protect our borders from the importation of 3D printed guns or weapons, especially those made from thermoplastics that can escape metal detection at our borders? The dangers of not detecting such guns and weapons cannot be underestimated. Mr Speaker, Sir, in Malay, please.

(In Malay): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] The advancements in 3D printing technology present us with exciting and promising new opportunities. 3D printing technology is transforming the manufacturing world and forcing us to rethink supply chain strategies.

3D printing is capable of creating any product that can be made anywhere in the world. The usage of 3D printing is now growing. It augments and sometimes replaces traditional manufacturing processes such as "lathe" and "milling machines". Therefore, it is important for our people to explore, understand and possess the competence in this technology that is increasingly becoming the norm in the new economy.

Last month, the M3@Pasir-Ris Punggol organized a 3D printing course. The course was held for people of all ages; young and old. The course participants were able to learn about 3D printing, and they were excited about the potential of this technology.

Although 3D printing brings a lot of benefits, we also need to be aware of the threats posed by this technology. As 3D printing technology and weapon blueprints are readily available online, coupled with the negative online elements that promote terrorism, there are individuals who have started to produce weapons using 3D printing in their own homes. Therefore, we need to be vigilant towards those who may be using them with dangerous intentions.

As concerned members of the community and family members, we need to know the tell-tale signs of such individuals and contact the authorities so that Singapore continues to be safe and secure.

(In English): In conclusion, Mr Speaker, Sir, our zero tolerance for gun and weapon possession has been instrumental in keeping Singapore safe and keeping gun and weapon crimes to as low as possible. However, our safety and security is now threatened by the unscrupulous use of the latest 3D printing technology. We need to move quick and catch up with the technological threat that 3D printing poses without over-criminalising it and stifling 3D printing activities while continuing to maintain zero tolerance for gun or weapon possession in our country.

Not withstanding the considerations I have proposed, I stand in support of the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Ms Joan Pereira.

2.12 pm

Ms Joan Pereira (Tanjong Pagar): Mr Speaker, Sir, I welcome this Bill, which has introduced important amendments to cover new areas of risks and to enhance the enforcement powers of our Police force.

Twenty-twenty had been a particularly difficult year for all. In addition to the COVID-19 health crisis, many parts of the world also experienced political turmoil and upheavals in their streets. Situations escalate quickly in territories where guns, explosives and weapons are accessible.

Hence, I strongly support measures to tighten control over guns, explosives and weapons which pose higher risks as well as increasing the maximum fines for unlicensed activities fivefold to $50,000 for persons and $100,000 for entities.

What has stood out for me in this Bill is the criminalisation of the unauthorised possession of digital blueprints for the manufacture of guns or major gun parts. This is necessary with the rapid advancement of 3D printing technology, which has been improving by leaps and bounds. It is frightening and sobering to see how the Internet has enabled the world to connect and share all good and bad. Information and videos on how to make and assemble many items are shared freely or for a fee on the web.

We have to be especially wary of digital printers being used to make guns, weapons and explosives that could be assembled in installments and shipped here without anyone knowing their purpose.

A concern I have is how the Singapore Police Force is going to spot and identify gun or weapon parts which can imported into Singapore in hard-to-detect bits and pieces, deceptively mislabeled as something else. These could be shipped in different batches and assembled here.

Would the Minister share how we can counter this threat? Is there a guide being drawn up to help enforcement officers identify and keep a lookout for items that could be suspicious as they would be used to assemble illegal items? Sir, in Mandarin.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] We have to be especially wary of digital printers being used to make guns, weapons and explosives that could be assembled in installments and shipped here, without anyone knowing their purpose.

A concern I have is how the Singapore Police Force is going to spot and identify gun or weapon parts which can be imported into Singapore in hard-to-detect bits and pieces, deceptively mis-labelled as something else. These could be shipped in different batches and assembled here. Will the Minister share how we can counter this threat?

Is there a guide being drawn up to help enforcement officers identify and keep a look-out for items that could be suspicious as they would be used to assemble illegal items?

(In English): Lastly, I would like to ask for more details and updates about how the Ministry intends to control and regulate 3D printers to prevent their misuse, while keeping a balanced approach so as not to stifle innovation for other engineering purposes. Sir, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Louis Ng.

2.16 pm

Mr Louis Ng Kok Kwang (Nee Soon): Sir, this Bill seeks to consolidate and update our laws relating to guns, explosives and weapons. The regulation of guns, explosives and weapons is important to the safety and security of Singaporeans, and our regulatory framework should be updated to account for changing technologies and threats. I have four clarifications to raise on this Bill.

My first clarification is on the proposed definition of “store” and the four limbs of the definition. The definition first sets out the first and second limbs, followed by the phrase “and includes”, then the third and fourth limbs. Can the Minister clarify if this should be interpreted to mean that the first and second limbs are broad definitions, and the third and fourth limbs are specific examples of the first and second limbs? Can the Minister also clarify if the third and fourth limbs are examples and do not exhaustively set out situations where a gun or major part of a gun is deemed to be stored?

I seek this clarification because the third limb refers very specifically to being in possession of any explosive or explosive precursor for more than 24 hours. The fourth limb refers specifically to controlling or managing 12 guns or major parts of a gun. These very specific numbers seem to provide an opening for someone to circumvent the law by possessing an explosive for only 23 hours or controlling only 11 guns.

My second point is on the definition of "weapon". The Bill defines weapon in the First Schedule, which comprises a detailed list, such as arrows, knives and swords. The First Schedule does not provide any exceptions for imitation, replica or ornamental weapons. By contrast, the definition of gun or explosives in the Bill does provide exceptions for imitation guns and explosives. The result appears to be an expansion of the law, with the proposed Act requiring licences for imitation, replica and ornamental weapons, while existing laws do not. For instance, under section 13(6) of the existing Arms and Explosives Act, a licence is not required to possess a sword or dagger kept in a dwelling for ornamental purposes.

While clause 94 of the Bill deems ornamental or theatrical weapons as lawful purpose for possessing an offensive weapon under the Corrosive and Explosive Substances and Offensive Weapons Act, it is not clear how imitation, replica or ornamental weapons are treated under the new Guns, Explosives and Weapons Control Act.

Can the Minister clarify if the term “weapon” is intended to cover imitation, replica or ornamental weapons? If so, can the Minister share how it intends to address the enforcement issues that may arise because of the over-inclusiveness? Would the Ministry consider, for instance, issuing class licences for activities involving objects that fall within the definition of weapons but would not ordinarily be used to cause harm, such as imitation, replica or ornamental weapons?

My third point is about variation orders for class licences. Section 57(1) of the Bill allows the Minister to vary a class licence by order in the Gazette. However, the Gazette is not necessarily accessible to the layperson. To propose to vary a class licence, the Minister is required to publish a notice on a website or in other forms readily accessible to the public. While the proposal to vary a class licence must be published, the order to vary itself is not subject to these requirements. For consistency and transparency, will MHA ensure that the variation order itself be published in forms readily accessible to the public?

My fourth and final point is about the enforcement powers of compliance officers. The Bill empowers the Licensing Officer to appoint compliance officers to assist the Licensing Officer in the exercise of its enforcement powers. These compliance officers are private contractors, not public agents. Despite not being public agents, compliance officers may exercise a range of enforcement powers under the Bill.

Can the Minister clarify how compliance officers will be supervised in the exercise of these powers? Will compliance officers be held to the same standards of accountability as public servants? Sir, notwithstanding my clarifications, I stand in support of this Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Derrick Goh.

2.21 pm

Mr Derrick Goh (Nee Soon): Mr Speaker, Sir, the Guns, Explosives and Weapons or GEW (Control) Bill is a good step forward. This effectively harmonises and updates the laws against new trends and threats and will strengthen the existing enforcement framework which will, in turn, minimise risks posed by GEW going forward.

Having had the experience of being a former National Service Police Commander, I can see that this Bill has taken a holistic approach. Not only has it appropriately increased the deterrence for offences with the intent to cause harm, it has also included proactive features in two key areas, namely: one, upstream preventive measures; and, two, the use of class licensing regime. These steps allow for better risk management without increased regulatory burden, of which, I have a request and one clarification for the Minister.

Relating to the first point, a few years back, I previously practised at the National Shooting Centre at Choa Chu Kang under the oversight of a coach. At that time, I noticed that the procedures of the range were not as tight as now. It did cross my mind then that a range user could leave the range with arms and live ammunition – in this scenario, the severity would be high, and the probability is low, although not zero.

This Bill will now address this gap and require, for example, the National Shooting Centre, which is now not a licensable activity, to operate more securely under licence, such as tighter control of ammunition storage and issuance, for example, armed security at the range’s control points and better security measures in place to prevent firearms and ammunition leaving the shooting range.

This measure is more reassuring for all range users as well as the public. However, in view of the tightened level of security and licensing requirements, I hope that the Ministry will keep the inconvenience to impacted stakeholders to a reasonable level in terms of, for example, wait time for licence registration and approvals, lead time for range and arms booking, as well as keeping the associated costs manageable.

On the second point, the Bill’s calibration is evident by the inclusion of the new class licensing regime. This class of licensing will facilitate the development of Shooting sports which is an area where Singapore has done well, with world-class athletes. Examples include in the international arena, such as the SEA Games, ASEAN Games and at the International Shooting Sports Federation World Cup. I am heartened that the Minister has highlighted that this Bill will mean that student members of a school’s Air Gun Club would now not be required to apply for individual licences, as this has always been a good source for scouting of young talent. In this way, class licensing will facilitate legitimate users and stakeholders. However, as we have noted, the risk of GEW is low but not zero. I hope the Minister can give us the continued assurance that the Class Licensing regime will not apply to the higher risk GEW categories or situations.

In concluding, Mr Speaker, Sir, this Bill is holistic in its approach and balanced. I support this Bill.

Mr Speaker: Ms Yeo Wan Ling.

2.25 pm

Ms Yeo Wan Ling (Pasir Ris-Punggol): Mr Speaker, Sir, given my background at the Singapore Economic Development Board and as a start-up founder, I am always excited by the proliferation of innovative technologies in Singapore. It is this appetite for and dedication to innovation that has put us on the map for seven consecutive years as the Asia Pacific’s most innovative nation, according to the Global Innovation Index.

Imagine, Mr Speaker, Sir, being able to speak into existence virtually any object the mind can conceive. This is the enormous potential of the innovative technology we know as 3D printing. It has birthed communities fascinated by 3D printing’s ability to unleash their creativity with endless practical applications.

Other than formal settings, such as professional manufacturers and designers or even academic institutions, 3D printing has found a place at the heart of several interest groups that tap on its versatility. Those passionate about drones, e-scooters, Nerf, Warhammers, even baking, and so many more, have found 3D printing to add incredible value to their hobbies and passions. Beyond its obvious economic benefits and industrial uses, 3D printing has also been an added catalyst for hobbyists resourceful enough to tap on it.

For example, the Nerf community in Singapore, they have been around for many years, and this, traditionally, has been a competitive game involving the use of foam-based weaponry fired from primarily foam-based blasters. Hobbyists seek out and improvise their own arenas of play in parks or other spaces, where games are hosted and played by those within the Nerf community. Those who participate find this an exciting way to keep active and creative.

In the past couple of years, 3D printing has made itself a staple in the Nerf community, where about half of those in the estimated 5,000-strong community own a 3D printer. The technology allows hobbyists to forge more powerful blasters that greatly enhance their game. While store-bought blasters typically fire at about 80-100 feet per second, our resourceful hobbyists are known to modify blasters that propel their foam darts up to 150-200 feet per second. Also, modifications to the aesthetics and performance of blasters are shared among the community to encourage innovation and celebrate each other’s achievements.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I am not sure about you, but as I learnt about this, I was delighted! The Government spends years and pours loads of resources for Singaporeans to pick up new technologies. But here we have a community that has eagerly adopted the exciting technology of 3D printing as an integral part of their interest.

More than that, I am heartened by the community spirit they display in wanting to be responsible citizens as well. For example, modifications to blasters’ aesthetics that paint them black are frowned upon, as such realism might cause panic to the public. Hobbyists actively and responsibly refrain from such realism so as not to put the wider Nerf community’s interests at risk. And that is, indeed, thoughtful of the community.

The 3D printing community has also come under the spotlight for good reason during the pandemic. I would like to raise the example of one Gerald Yeo from my constituency. Gerald’s interest in 3D printing began when he had to print parts for a robotics competition in school and, since then, during the pandemic, he has put his 3D printing skills to good use as he printed face shields in bulk that were donated to our constituency to help reduce the spread of the virus.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I wish to make the case for the 3D printing community and, indeed, the passions of researchers, inventors and adventurers, that even as we ramp up regulations on this versatile technology, we are careful not to set a precedent for further restrictions that might stifle the creative winds taking their community by storm.

It is easy to be afraid of the unknown, as with exciting new technologies such as 3D printing. So often, in the face of uncertainty and "what if's", our first foot out the door is to come down hard with regulation.

When I consulted those in the 3D printing scene, from researchers, inventors to hobbyists, I found that many felt that the idea that one with malicious intent would resort to using home-based 3D printing to produce dangerous weapons such as guns would be a pretty distant one. Many pointed to lower hanging fruit such as pipe guns, given the impracticality of using a household-appropriate 3D printer to print functional weapons.

Not only would important aspects of a functional weapon, such as ammunition, be impossible to forge using such 3D printers, 3D printed weapons themselves – according to the experts – would be unable to withstand the pressure of firing a bullet due to the way the plastic is layered in the 3D printing process. One researcher from the 3D printing community even remarked, "they had better chance making a bow and arrow", when asked about those with malicious intent.

At this juncture, I would like to assure everyone that I am not playing down the possibility that on an off-chance, someone might indeed 3D print a weapon and use it for harm. However, while such fears are warranted and everything should be done to curb any instances of such behaviour, it must be asked, are there better ways to do so?

As hon Members, Mr Sharael Taha and Mr Melvin Yong had mentioned, not only would it be extremely challenging to monitor the Internet traffic of those with 3D printers, an implausible response time of mere hours, if not minutes, would be required to intervene between the download of a 3D weapon's blueprint to its production.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I reiterate that it is with great caution that we must proceed with the regulation of 3D printing lest we produce an unwanted chilling effect on the use of such innovative technologies. Proposed controls on 3D printing activities reminded me of the controls we placed on colour copiers from 1979 to the late 1990s. Yes, colour copiers. This is too familiar a tune. These same controls on colour copiers were lifted also because of their onerous restrictions, making way for innovation in counterfeit-resistant currency notes in Singapore. With the imminent difficulty of enforcement, potential futility of regulation and stifling of a vibrant community with controls on 3D printing, we must consider alternatives.

In this vein, I must inquire, even as we move to enact heavier regulations from above, have we been conscientious to fly low to the ground and explore community alternatives?

With an already active community eager to facilitate the free flow of ideas and pool resources for the furthering of their hobbies, initiatives toward visibility sharing of designs and builds would not be too far-fetched. We have already seen several maker spaces, which are public workshops with 3D printing capabilities, where people can come and realise their designs in community, tapping on one another's experiences and resources. These spaces are also good opportunities for the education of budding 3D printing enthusiasts to uphold community guidelines such as the Nerf community's compromise on the realism of their blasters to prevent panic.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I would like to end off my speech with fair warning that regulation, without education and awareness, puts us on a slippery slope. Should this Bill fail to provide an answer for the actual threat it is seeking to defuse, we set a precedent for shackling any novel community at the slightest hint of danger. This Bill must live up to the responsibility it seeks to hold over the 3D printing community, lest we end up fighting a battle that simply did not exist in the first place. This concern notwithstanding, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Zhulkarnain.

2.35 pm

Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim: Mr Speaker, Sir, this Guns, Explosives and Weapons (Control) Bill will strengthen our existing regulatory regime and minimise the safety and security risks posed by GEWs. It will harmonise the application of various legislations like the Arms and Explosives Act (AEA), amongst others. Given that the last review of the Arms and Explosives Act occurred in 2007, this review and introduction of this Bill is timely and welcomed.

Singapore is known for its zero tolerance for the misuse or mishandling of GEWs. Singapore also has one of the most effective gun control legislation in the world; with the number of privately owned firearms remaining relatively constant from 2007 to 2017 and no homicides committed with a gun in recent memory.

However, now we are faced with newer challenges and different threats to our security and public safety. Hence, I welcome the changes to tighten the control on high risk GEWs and improve the overall compliance and Police's operational effectiveness. In this regard, I would like to highlight the refinements which show that the law is also sensitive to the circumstances of each case that an individual may face.

Firstly, on the Arms Offences Act (AOA) which will be consequentially amended through this Bill. Previously, section 3 of the AOA makes no distinction between possession of arms or ammunition whether with or without criminal intent. The AOA will now recognise the offence of an unlawful possession of gun with criminal intent and impose aggravating circumstances for scheduled offences such as rioting, kidnapping and robbery. I welcome such clear distinctions and refinements to the law.

Secondly, in relation to the offence of unauthorised possession of blueprints of 3D printouts of GEWs, it is a defence if the person came into possession of such blueprints without any solicitation or malice and/or that he or she reasonably would not have known of such blueprints. This may go some way to assuage the concerns of some parents, who are worried of the kind of information that our children may be exposed to on the Internet. In this regard, I would humbly suggest, that perhaps MHA could work together with MOE to increase the awareness in schools and our IHLs so that our youth will understand and appreciate the dangers or consequences of having access to such dangerous information.

I have some clarifications to seek though. Section 64(2) of the Bill curtails the powers of the Minister to issue a security direction for regulated activity and limits it to cases where it is impracticable in the circumstances of the particular case for the Minister to make or amend any regulations to effectively address any issue or perceived issue of public safety.

My first question, can the Minister clarify the circumstances in which such impracticality will arise?

My second clarification, I understand that the security direction is given to the person – would this also cover "close associate" of such persons as defined under section 41 or otherwise?

My third clarification, given that the security direction is non-appealable and that there is no automatic right to be heard under section 64(4). Would it nevertheless be possible for any aggrieved party to seek judicial review of the process or perhaps, allow a party to seek interim relief for preservation of any asset which may fall under the said security direction. Mr Speaker, Sir, in Malay please.

(In Malay): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Our world faces various terrorist threats and extremist ideologies that threaten our security. We saw how, in 2019, the world was rocked by a shooting case that killed 51 worshippers at a mosque in New Zealand.

Even though our situation in Singapore is very different due to our already very tough laws, we must continue to monitor emerging new threats. Our world, which is plagued by the COVID-19 outbreaks and economic slowdown, will make more people feel pressured and this may lead to disputes or even domestic violence.

For example, in my earlier parliamentary speech, I have shared that police reports relating to domestic violence in Singapore had increased by 22% since last April during the circuit breaker period in Singapore. On average, trends around the world show that social pressure and social isolation will result in more cases of domestic violence.

In domestic violence cases in countries such as the United States, Britain and South Africa, nearly 70% of the deaths involve women and the perpetrators are usually their spouses or ex-spouses. Within these, about one in three murder cases is committed using firearms.

Therefore, we need to continue providing protection to those who are more in need and should not allow any dangerous weapons that can be used to create violence in our society.

A research paper published by the RAND Corporation in 2018 stated that 3D printing technology will accelerate the proliferation of dangerous weapons and could result in more crimes and violence. The situation becomes more high-risk because of the unemployment rate and the alienation of workers who face more pressure due to the declining global economy.

Therefore, I agree with the Bill, which will further tighten surveillance and ownership of any details or plans that can be used to produce dangerous weapons through 3D printing technology.

I welcome the amendments to the Bill that will safeguard our plural society in Singapore and eradicate violence in any form.

(In English): With that, Mr Speaker, Sir, suggestions and clarifications notwithstanding, I support this Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Vikram Nair.

2.43 pm

Mr Vikram Nair (Sembawang): Mr Speaker, I speak in support of this Bill. Singapore is well known for its no nonsense approach to weapons possession. The possession of guns and firearms by members of the public is prohibited, and the usage of firearms is heavily restricted and generally limited to the armed forces, police and a few private gun clubs. The possession of other weapons, including items that might be used as weapons such as knives, is also controlled and people are not permitted to be in possession of such items in public without good reason.

Strict laws like this have played an important part in keeping Singapore safe and we do not have horror stories of shootings and gun violence. While we do have other weapons being used in incidents like gang fights, the strict laws against improper possession have also permitted police to move pre-emptively in such cases, arresting individuals in possession of weapons without good reason even if they have not used it for violence yet. As such, violent fights with weapons are also few and far between.

Against this backdrop, these latest changes to legislation and harmonisation of several different Bills tighten and expand the laws to cover developing areas of potential threats. One example of such a potential threat is the 3D printing of gun parts. While smuggling guns or gun parts into and around Singapore is not easy and subject to the strictest of penalties, it has now become possible to manufacture gun parts with 3D printers, which are becoming more widely available. The blueprints for such weapons may be found on the Internet, or more commonly, the Dark Net. With such blueprints and a 3D printer, individuals could 3D print usable gun parts.

The new rules will make it an offence for people to possess the blueprints required to 3D print gun parts. Now, this is a tough measure, but one which I welcome as the more easily something dangerous is readily available, the tougher the rules must be to discourage its possession and use. This sends a clear, no nonsense signal that we are remaining tough on the possession of weapons, even if all that one possesses is a blueprint to 3D print such parts.

While the use of guns by military and the Police are heavily controlled, one area where members of the public may access weapons is at private shooting ranges. A few years ago, in 2017, the Police already had imposed measures to better control activities at these premises, including measures to make such premises more secure and to better control the type of weapons being used. This Bill allows the Police to issue licences for ranges, which allows Police more flexibility to regulate how they will operate through the imposition of licence conditions and they would be able to ensure the most stringent conditions for the use of firearms in Singapore and to ensure that such firearms are not easily available outside.

The introduction of a class licensing regime for lower risk activities balances the generally tough approach with practicality. There are some people who participate in lower risk activities such as the use of air rifles for sport. The introduction of a class licensing regime to deal with these is a clever method and saves each person the hassle of getting an individual licence.

Class licences have been used in other areas too, for example, in legislation by MCI in relation to the media, although in this case, given many of the class licensees will be individuals, it will be important for them to know the relevant rules that will apply. I will be interested to know what steps the Government will take to keep the class licensees informed of such rules. While the mechanism being used is that of a licence, in substance, what needs to be done is for the individuals in possession of such weapons to know exactly what is permitted and what is not to stay out of trouble.

The other changes largely involve the rationalisation and harmonisation of offences that existed across many different pieces of legislation. There were some inconsistencies in these previously, as different offences were covered by different rules and developed at different times, but the overall changes in this new legislation rationalises the penalties based on degree of culpability, which means that there will be higher penalties for intentional offences and less for unintentional ones, as well as seriousness of the harm, which means higher penalties for more dangerous weapons and where weapons are used to cause harm. These are, of course, very sensible and the general principles on which all criminal legislation is based. I therefore support this Bill.

Mr Speaker: Minister of State Desmond Tan.

2.48 pm

The Minister of State for Home Affairs (Mr Desmond Tan): Mr Speaker, I thank Members for their views and for their strong support for this Bill.

There are many questions that have been asked. I shall address them in turn, first, on the 3D printing of guns, given the strong interest among Members on this topic. Following which, I shall address issues raised by Members thematically.

Many Members raised questions about clause 13 which is on the new offence of unauthorised possession of 3D blueprints for the manufacture of guns or major gun parts. The divergence of views among Members shows that there is no straightforward answer to achieving an appropriate regulatory balance on this matter.

On the one hand, Mr Sharael Taha asked if the offence should be widened beyond guns and major gun parts to also cover gun modifications and attachments and offensive weapons. Mr Melvin Yong also took the view that clause 13 should cover possession of digital blueprints for gun replicas. On the other hand, Ms Yeo Wan Ling was of the view that 3D printed guns are unlikely to work in practice and that clause 13 could have a chilling effect on innovative applications of 3D printing.

To be clear, under present law, if you produce a gun using a 3D printer without a licence, you are committing at least two offences: unlicensed manufacturing a gun and possession of an illegal gun. The Bill does not change this basic position. What the Bill does is to address the new phenomenon where it is increasingly easy for anyone to seek out and acquire online designs and directions on how to make a gun, and using a technology that is increasingly accessible.

But we are also careful to ensure the law is not over-reaching. We have limited clause 13 to guns and major gun parts as we have assessed these to pose the highest risk, necessitating such strong controls.

Major parts of guns are essential to the operation of a gun, such as the barrel or the trigger mechanism and which can be assembled to create a functioning gun.

On the other hand, gun accessories are designed to be fitted to or attached to a gun for various purposes, such as to conceal its fire, like a silencer or flash suppressor, or it cannot work except in connection with an operative and functioning gun. They therefore pose a lower risk.

As for weapons like swords and knuckledusters, they are less lethal and dangerous than guns, and therefore, we think there is no necessity at this juncture to also control the possession of 3D blueprints for the manufacture of these weapons.

On replica guns, while we agree that they can potentially be used to cause alarm, they cannot be used to cause physical harm per se and therefore similarly pose lower risks. But if such guns are used while committing certain offences, such as robbery and extortion, an offence would be made out under the Arms Offences Act, along with the Penal Code offences for the main criminal act.

To address Ms Yeo Wan Ling's point that 3D-printed guns are unlikely to function and her concern on inhibiting innovation, as I mentioned in my Second Reading speech yesterday, the threat posed by the 3D printed guns and gun parts is real. This point was echoed by other Members as well. There have been genuine cases and online videos demonstrating the use of 3D printed guns or gun parts, especially the metallic ones.

In this regard, we are not alone in addressing this new phenomenon. Other jurisdictions have also passed legislation that deal with the threat of 3D printing of guns. For example, New South Wales also passed laws in 2015 to criminalise the unauthorised possession of 3D blueprint for the manufacturing of firearms.

Licensing the possession of such blueprints will enable the authorities to know who are involved in 3D manufacturing of guns, to ensure that proper security and practices are in place for handling dangerous articles that may potentially be produced as a result.

But I also want to emphasise that items which do not fit the description of a gun under clause 3 of the Bill will not require a licence to possess or 3D print. Clause 3(4)(c) also makes clear that imitation guns are not considered guns for the purpose of the Bill. Therefore, the possession of 3D blueprints for the manufacture of such items will not require a specific licence under clause 13.

On the impact on the NERF gun community, off-the-shelf NERF guns are clearly meant for recreational purposes and present little risk, given that the projectiles are foam-based, and are unlikely to cause injury if used properly. MHA does not regulate NERF guns today, and does not plan to do so at this juncture. Correspondingly, the possession of any blueprint of NERF gun parts will not be regulated.

We will continue to assess how best to apply the right regulatory tools for the various items, in a way that is calibrated to the risks involved, so as not to hamper innovation unnecessarily.

Mr Sharael Taha and Mr Melvin Yong raised questions pertaining to the enforcement of this offence.

Police will enforce in a practical and reasonable manner, based on information that is received, for example, from members of the public.

In this regard, we agree with Mr Sharael Taha that the community and family members and friends play an important role, such as flagging out potential lone wolves 3D printing guns illegally with intent to cause harm. Information can be provided to the authorities and will be treated with strict confidence.

I also acknowledge at this point Assoc Prof Jamus Lim's point about addressing the underlying motivations behind criminal activity. The Government never loses sight of the need to do so and I thank the Member for his views.

Members also raised questions on the import of guns: how we deal with 3D-printed guns that can escape metal detectors, and the threat of guns and weapon parts imported into Singapore via parcels which are deceptively mislabelled as something else.

First, to clarify, the import of a 3D-printed gun, whether metallic or not, still requires a licence. Our postal regulations also make it unlawful for a person to send by post or to deliver by post any gun or weapon.

There are robust checks at our checkpoints to detect threat objects, including gun or weapon parts and 3D-printed guns, and Mr Sharael Taha shared an example earlier on.

Incoming parcels are inspected, with the help of technologies other than metal detectors, such as X-ray machines. Certain persons of interest, such as those flagged up by intelligence agencies to be of security threat, may also be subject to further checks. Enforcement officers at the checkpoints may also conduct random checks, to deter and detect any security threats.

Notwithstanding, we recognise that there is no fool-proof system to fully prevent the import of gun and weapon parts. To complement the already robust measures at the checkpoints, we have a stringent enforcement and regulatory regime inland, as well as severe penalties under the Bill for unlicensed supply, storage and possession of GEW. This will be a strong deterrence against potential offenders.

Mr Melvin Yong asked for the circumstances under which a person or an organisation would be authorised to possess a 3D blueprint of a gun.

We recognise that there are legitimate reasons to possess digital blueprints of guns in Singapore, such as conducting scientific or law enforcement research. And the Bill is not intended to impede such activities.

Parties that wish to undertake such activities can apply for the appropriate licence or seek special approval from the Minister for Home Affairs under clause 13(2)(c). They will then have to adhere to licensing or approving conditions, such as, requiring that the blueprints are securely handled and not be left easily accessible by uninvolved persons.

On the questions raised by Mr Sharael Taha on the need to impose export controls on certain types of 3D printers, and by Ms Joan Pereira and Mr Melvin Yong on whether MHA intends to regulate 3D printers, these issues fall beyond the scope of this Bill, which does not deal with 3D printing in itself or 3D printers per se. I seek the Members' understanding that this will have to be studied in detail, wider, with the relevant agencies and dealt with separately.

Having addressed Members' queries on 3D printing, I will now move on to Members' comments on other clauses. Mr Louis Ng asked about the definition of "store" in clause 2, which is one of the regulated activities covered by the Bill.

Paragraphs (c) and (d) in the definition are extensions beyond what would be the exhaustive paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of "store". They are meant to clarify the situations under which the possession of a certain number of articles or for a certain period for purposes outside of what is in paragraphs (a) and (b) will constitute storage, and not possession, for the purposes of the Bill.

The thresholds of 12 for guns and major gun parts, and 24 continuous hours for explosives and explosive precursors, were determined based on MHA's operational assessment of the increased risks associated with these higher quantities or longer time of GEW being held in one's possession.

The thresholds are necessary for regulatory certainty. Otherwise, there is no difference between storing and possession of these items, which has to be regulated differently because of the appreciable risk difference of these activities.

To elaborate, if the thresholds are exceeded, the licensee may be required to implement more extensive storage-specific safety and security measures, such as CCTV requirements and hardened walls. These are over and above the requirements typically placed on licensees who possess a single gun, or handle explosives or explosive precursors for a very short period of time.

We acknowledge that with any defined threshold, persons may seek to operate at the margins to avoid taking on additional regulatory burden. But this is a necessary trade-off between meeting our security objectives and providing stakeholders with clarity on the rules. To assure this House, regardless of the quantity or duration of possession of such items, a licence will already be required for the possession of these items, setting out basic safety and security conditions that must be adhered to.

If these quantity or time thresholds need to be revised subsequently due to changes in threat assessment, clause 2(2) of the Bill allows downward adjustments to be made through Regulations.

Next, on the definition of "weapons", Mr Louis Ng also asked if the term is intended to cover imitation, replica or ornamental weapons.

3.00 pm

Imitation or replica weapons are not regulated under the Bill, as these are unlikely to be effective in causing injuries or death, and therefore pose too little risk to warrant tight regulation. The way the Bill has been drafted places only an exhaustive list of actual weapons to be regulated in the First Schedule.

Conversely, "gun" has a broad, descriptive definition in the Bill, and therefore to avoid doubt, the Bill makes clear that imitation and replica guns are excluded.

Notwithstanding, the use of an imitation weapon to threaten or cause fear of injury or death to others would likely be an offence under other Acts, such as the Penal Code.

Ornamental weapons, however, are covered under the Bill. These include ornamental swords and daggers. These items have potential to be misused to cause harm due to their sharp tips or blades. But we also recognise that the overall safety and security posed by these items is low, as long as they are kept safely and securely within dwelling places for the purpose of display.

Therefore, possession and storage of these items will be considered for class licensing. This would be a light-touch approach that mitigates the risk of misuse of such items, without being overly onerous.

Moving on, I will touch on licensing of shooting range operations and costs to stakeholders. We note Mr Derrick Goh’s suggestion to manage the inconvenience and costs to stakeholders.

I must reiterate that, when designing the regulations and processes, safety and security will remain our topmost priority. But within this objective, we are also mindful to minimise regulatory burden as far as possible.

Specifically, prior to granting or renewing a shooting range operation licence, there are certain procedures which are fundamental to ensuring the safe conduct of activities that need to be carried out. These include inspecting the range premises to ensure the robustness of safety and security measures, and security vetting of key persons. These inevitably take some time.

Where possible, Police have streamlined procedures and processes to make things easier on licensees and applicants. For example, Police have digitalised the entire licensing application and renewal process, reducing administrative burden and unnecessary waiting time. However, activities such as range time slot booking are managed by the range operators, and are not within the control of the regulator.

On the issue of compliance cost, range operators have generally implemented most required measures on their own accord, even today, such as the installation of CCTV systems and setting up access controls into and out of the range premises. We therefore do not expect the introduction of shooting range licences to impose significant additional costs in the immediate term on these operators.

In addition, to help manage costs for operators, we will introduce a new licensing model, where if an applicant seeks to conduct related activities, he will only need to make one application to the regulator, to obtain the set of different licences for these activities. The cost of this one application will be lower than the total of having to apply individual licences for each regulated activity.

Next, on class licensing, Mr Derrick Goh asked for assurance that class licensing will not apply to higher risk categories or situations. Mr Vikram also asked about the steps that Government will take to keep class licensees informed of requirements under a class licence. Relatedly, Mr Louis Ng also asked if variations to class licences will be published in forms more readily accessible to the public, than the Gazette.

To Mr Derrick Goh's question, as class licensing is less stringent than individual licensing from a security standpoint, MHA’s intent is to apply class licensing only to lower-risk activities, such as air gun shooting in school settings.

To Mr Vikram's question, under clause 56, class licensing conditions will be published in the Gazette, which is publicly accessible. Police will also reach out to groups that will be class licensed to make them aware of their regulatory obligations.

To Mr Louis Ng's question, the short answer is yes.

Variation of class licences will also be published on Police's website; and Police will reach out to affected class licensees, where feasible, to inform them of the changes.

On the issue of appointment of Compliance Officers raised by Mr Melvin Yong, Mr Louis Ng and Ms Sylvia Lim, to assure this House, Compliance Officers will be required to undergo training and assessment by the Police Licensing Officer. Only qualified Compliance Officers will be authorised to conduct site inspections on behalf of the Licensing Officer.

In addition, they will not be allowed to exercise more intrusive enforcement powers such as seizure, search and issuance of composition.

The Police Licensing Officer will also conduct audit checks on Compliance Officers to ensure that they are proficient in carrying out their duties.

Given these safeguards, and in line with the minimum age for other security-related work such as security officers, MHA has assessed that the minimum age of 18 is appropriate, and there is no need to set a higher minimum age at this juncture.

Ms Sylvia Lim raised several questions regarding the security clearance regime, under clauses 43 and 45 of the Bill.

First, on the need to security clear close associates. While close associates may not handle GEW directly, they need to be security cleared because of the security risk associated with the indirect influence they can exert over the operation of the entity and on the regulated activities the entity conducts.

The threshold of 5% equity interest or voting rights to qualify as a close associate is similar to that for determining a "substantial shareholder" under the Companies Act, and is currently used by the Police for the purpose of evaluating the fit and proper criteria. As setting a lower threshold would make it more onerous for businesses, MHA assesses that the 5% threshold is sufficient and balanced, based on the current circumstances. The threshold can be reviewed from time to time, depending on the threat environment. So, shareholders who hold 5% and above will have to be security cleared.

Second, on whether the Licensing Officer (or LO) has discretion to still grant security clearance if a person fails one or more criteria under clause 45(1).

The answer is yes. The clause does allow the LO to give such weight to the factors, as he considers appropriate, when assessing the security clearance of a person.

Third, on the security clearance for foreigners, such as arms dealers for short-term trade fairs. The Police Licensing Officer performs security vetting on all licence applicants, whether foreign or local. Specifically for foreigners, the Police Licensing Officer will request for relevant documents to show proof that they have been duly licensed or authorised by the source countries to handle the GEW.

To further mitigate the security risks associated with imported guns and explosives, all movement of such high-risk items in Singapore must be escorted and guarded by armed auxiliary police officers, thereby minimising the chances of the items being misused or mishandled.

Mr Zhulkarnian asked about security directions under clause 64. First, on the circumstances for which security direction may be issued. As mentioned in my earlier speech, security directions issued by Minister can be used where there is imminent threat to life or property.

A possible scenario is where there is an on-going suspected terrorist incident, such that for public safety reasons, licensees and even those who are exempted from holding GEW licences must immediately enhance their security posture or completely shut their premises for a specified period to prevent the terrorists from getting their hands on guns and explosives.

In such a scenario, issuing a security direction would be critical to mitigate the threat first, given that the matter is of such urgency and magnitude that there is not enough time for regulations to be amended or new regulations to be made, and for the due process under clause 63 or licence conditions to be modified.

Secondly, Mr Zhulkarnain also asked if a security direction would apply to a "close associate" of a licensee. The answer is no. A security direction can only apply to a licensee, class licensee or person exempted from the Act.

They are ultimately responsible for the regulated activity and are best placed to take necessary action to comply with the security direction. It would be ineffective and disproportionate for a security direction to apply also to a close associate.

To Mr Zhulkarnain's question on whether it is possible to seek judicial review against a security direction, given that a security direction is non-appealable under the Act, the Bill does not contain a privative or ouster clause, and so yes, a person who is aggrieved by exercise of power can seek judicial review.

On the need for asset preservation, the Member need not be concerned because the security direction is aimed at dealing with a particular situation and is valid only for a period of up to six months. Asset disposal or destruction will not be an appropriate response in a security direction.

I will now progress to other issues raised. Mr Gan Thiam Poh asked for the statistics on crimes involving imitation guns.

There are only a handful of such cases – nine cases were reported in the last 10 years, of which seven resulted in conviction for offences under the Arms Offences Act or the Penal Code.

Using imitation guns to commit certain scheduled offences such as robbery and extortion continues to be a serious offence under the Arms Offences Act. The offender can be jailed for up to 10 years and be liable for caning of no fewer than three strokes.

Ms Sylvia Lim also asked the question for the number of gun possession licences issued for self-defence that are still in force.

There are currently 19 gun possession licences in force, issued to personal security officers of certain embassies, for security reasons and protection. In the past, the Police used to issue gun possession licence to private individuals, such as arms dealers, for self-protection; but this is no longer practised today.

Mr Melvin Yong asked on the defences and counter measures against drone attacks. SPF will work closely with CAAS to deal with the threat of weapon-mounted drones. This is because section 7B of Air Navigation Act today makes it an offence to operate a drone with prohibited items carried on it. Weapons, guns and explosives are prohibited items. Clause 97 updates the reference in the Air Navigation Act to refer to this new Bill.

We have developed some capabilities, and are testing more methods to counter drones used for illicit purposes. However, I will not be able to share more due to the sensitivity of the operations.

Lastly, Mr Zhulkarnain and Mr Gan Thiam Poh raised the concern of access to harmful online content relating to GEW, terrorism and other materials.

I agree these are important issues raised.

However, preventing terrorism use of GEW is but one aspect of the Bill. There are more specific and focused laws like the Terrorism (Suppression of Bombings) Act and the United Nations (Anti-terrorism Measures) Regulations to address the threat of terrorism.

This Bill works alongside other laws to keep the threat of online harms at bay. That said, the threat of online influence lies outside of this scope and Members may consider filing specific parliamentary questions for this to be addressed holistically.

Mr Speaker, I hope I have addressed Members’ concerns. The Bill is a crucial piece of legislation that will go a long way to continue to ensure safe, secure and responsible GEW handling in Singapore. Once again, I thank Members for their strong support for this Bill. Sir, I beg to move.

Mr Speaker: Clarifications?

Question put, and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House.

The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. – [The Minister of State for Home Affairs (Mr Desmond Tan)].

Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed.