Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

12.48 pm

Mr Leong Mun Wai (Non-Constituency Member): Mr Speaker, point of order, please.

Mr Speaker: Mr Leong Mun Wai, your turn to speak will come up soon.

Mr Leong Mun Wai: I understand that, Mr Speaker. I am proposing an amendment to the question.

Mr Speaker: Mr Leong Mun Wai, you can raise it when your turn comes. Thank you. Minister.

The Minister for Home Affairs (Mr K Shanmugam): Thank you, Mr Speaker. I beg to move —

Mr Speaker: Leader of the House.

Debate resumed.

12.50 pm

The Minister for Home Affairs (Mr K Shanmugam): Thank you, Sir. Mr Speaker, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."

This Bill covers two aspects.

First, dealing with Online Hostile Information Campaigns – we call them HICs – conducted by foreign parties. I will refer to that as the HIC part.

And the second part dealing with foreign interference through local proxies. The second part, I will refer to it as the Politically Significant Persons, or PSP part.

The second part is about slightly more than half of this Bill. There is existing law, the Political Donations Act (PDA), and we have ported over the existing PDA and updated it. Members of Parliament will be familiar with the PDA. So, it is the PDA which has been brought into the PSP part of the Bill, with updating.

I will set out the reasons for this Bill, deal with some of the concerns that have been raised and deal with the proposed amendments by the Workers' Party. My colleagues, Ministers of State Desmond Tan and Muhammad Faishal Ibrahim, will take the Members through the detailed provisions of the Bill.

First, on the PSP part of the Bill. The philosophy is that our politics is for Singaporeans to deal with. We can argue, disagree, but, ultimately, it is for us to decide.

If I can quote what the former Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) director James Comey told the House Intelligence Committee in March 2017, "One of the things we radiate to the world is the importance of our wonderful, often messy, but free and fair democratic system and the elections that undergird it. And so, when there is something by a foreign nation state to mess with that, to destroy that, to corrupt that, it is very, very serious and threatens what is America." The very idea of America.

We do not put it in the same grandiose terms but Singapore is important for us and we take the same approach. We say it is not for the Americans to tell us what to do, as they have tried, and it is not for anyone else to tell us what to do either.

This was expressed in 1973 in the President's speech and expressed in law through the PDA, which sets out rules for interactions with foreigners for election candidates, election agents and political associations.

The PSP part, as I said, is based on existing legislation, the PDA, ported over.

Over the years, subversion has become an even more serious issue. Modern ease of communications, increased interactions and travel have made it inevitable that traditional spying and subversion increases in scope and intensity. This is happening in Singapore and elsewhere.

Just to give some examples from the last few years.

In 2017, an Australian former senator apparently received donations from an individual with connections to the People's Republic of China (PRC) government. He then advocated for China's position on the South China Sea.

A former chairman of a European Union foreign friendship group was sponsored flights and hotel stays by a foreign government and, subsequently, voiced views that supported that government's policies on various issues.

In 2019, leaked documents revealed that the Russian government was allegedly planning to provide financial and public relations assistance to the election campaign of German politician Markus Frohnmaier, who was known to be very outspoken in favour of ending sanctions and recognising Russia's annexation of Crimea.

This has also happened in Singapore. Members would be familiar with the expulsion of academic Huang Jing in 2017 for collaborating with foreign intelligence agents. It was an attempt to influence senior decision-makers in Government.

Moving on to the HIC part of the Bill. The reasons are straightforward.

Spying and subversion in another country are age-old. Using spies, agents, locals and useful idiots is all part of subversion.

As technology developed, the subversion increased and adapted new technology: phone tapping, cameras, recording, microfilming and so on.

Now, technology has evolved again. The Internet has created a powerful new medium for subversion. Countries are actively developing attack and defence capabilities as an arm of warfare equal to and more potent than the land, air and naval forces. It is often seen as the fourth arm of service.

The Gerasimov Doctrine, named after the Russian chief of staff, identifies issues of "protest potential" in another country, uses information operations to polarise that society and incite public disorder and keeps the target country in a constant state of turmoil. Aggressors can more easily achieve their political and military outcomes.

New communication tools facilitate non-kinetic forms of attack and make these harder to detect.

For example, bots and digital ads can easily be bought to spread harmful information. Foreign actors can blend their activities with other authentic online users, which give readers a false sense of reality.

We have an annex that sets out more details of the Gerasimov Doctrine, the new communications tools and HIC tactics used by foreign state actors. Mr Speaker, Sir, with your permission, can I ask for the distribution of a folder which contains annexes A to I that I am going to refer to? And we distribute them together, so that it is easier.

Mr Speaker: Yes, please. [Handouts were distributed to hon Members. Please refer to Annex 2.]

Mr K Shanmugam: May I proceed as the annexes are being distributed?

Mr Speaker: Yes, please.

Mr K Shanmugam: If Members were to look at annex A, paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4, they refer to the Russians developing a military doctrine for the Internet age.

The doctrine took tactics developed by the Soviets, blended them with strategic military thinking about total war and laid out a theory of modern warfare. It specifies that its objective is to achieve an environment of permanent unrest and conflict within an enemy state. It includes harnessing the protest potential of the population of a target country, deepening the divisions within that, increasing hostility among different groups and getting them to distrust institutions.

With this doctrine, the rules of war have changed. Non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals without using the force of weapons, including utilising a range of actors and tools, hackers, the media, businessmen, information leaks and misinformation, are all part and parcel of new warfare.

The Russians are said to have done this. We have no way of verifying that. The following examples, which I will refer to, are based on reports.

Ukraine is said to have suffered extensive intervention. Russia allegedly deployed this doctrine for many years.

One example. During the 2014 protests, sensitive fault lines were targeted to paint the Ukrainian government as a fascist, racist, xenophobic junta. They claimed that Jews were being terrorised and beaten and asserted that local Jewish leaders were appealing to international bodies for help. They tried to weaken the resolve of the armed forces and the population to build popular support for Crimea to join Russia. Eventually, of course, we know Crimea was annexed.

Czech Republic. Our 2018 Parliamentary Select Committee received evidence that Russia had targeted extremists and fringe politicians to spread propaganda, undermine support for Ukraine and cause one-quarter to one-third of the Czech population to believe that the Ukrainian government was fascist. And it resulted in the Czech government being unable to support the Ukrainians. So, the HICs managed to change Czech foreign policy.

Netherlands. During the Dutch Referendum on the EU-Ukraine FTA, Russians pretended to be Ukrainians, inflamed local debates, supported by online disinformation campaign involving fake stories about Ukraine and Dutch voters, eventually, voted against the FTA.

Annex B sets out some of the details. If Members were to see annex B, page 8 refers to Ukraine – look at item 3 of page 8. Item 4, the use of tools. Page 10, paragraph 6, the consequences as a result of the campaign. Page 11, the interference in Czech Republic, paragraph 2 sets out how it has been successful, that 53% of the Czechs believed there is propaganda both for and against a foreign country in the Czech public space and therefore, they cannot trust anything. That is another objective that people try and achieve: make you distrustful of everything. And page 12, interference in Netherlands. The box sets out the reference to the FTA referendum.

More recently, Russia was allegedly engaged in campaigns to erode trust in the EU’s COVID-19 strategy and to spread scepticism of Western-developed vaccines. As I said earlier, Russia is repeatedly mentioned. I am repeating what others have said and Singapore does not take a position on this.

Countries other than Russia are also said to have been using these strategies.

In May 2019, a disinformation network was traced to Iran. This comprised fake persons who sought to influence US policymakers and also reporters and academics to carry their views. Some of these were, eventually, published in legitimate publications. Annex C sets out more details of reports that have identified Iran as a foreign state actor.

In December 2020, the BBC reported on a vast 15-year global disinformation campaign to serve one particular country’s interests. This campaign spread over at least 116 countries, more than half of the world's countries, and targeted members of the European Parliament as well as the United Nations. It involved the use of stolen accounts and at least 750 fake media outlets, which were amplified with the help of a legitimate foreign wire service. So, you can see the use of legitimate news organisations.

In February 2021, the social media analysis firm, Graphika, released a report on a propaganda coordinated network in favour of one country called “Spamouflage Dragon”, using a mixture of bots, fake accounts, stolen accounts and so on to push and amplify videos and media targeting issues, such as the safety of Western-made vaccines and discrediting the United States.

A 2020 study by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute found that there has been a significant increase worldwide in foreign interference. Between 2015 and 2020, at least 38 Elections and six Referendums were impacted.

The international media regularly names Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. I do not know whether these countries, in fact, did what they are said to have done. But few doubt that they have the capabilities. It is notable that the US and other Western countries are not mentioned, generally, in these reports because they are Western media reports. But anyone sensible will know that the United States, UK and Western countries have similar or, perhaps, in the case of the United States, even superior capabilities. Really, there are no angels in this game.

The Washington Post reported on 11 February 2020 that a Swiss encryption communications provider had sold devices to more than 120 countries. That company was, actually secretly owned by CIA and German Intelligence. They had rigged the devices to read the encrypted communications of all the countries, 120 odd countries, that had bought the system. Reading secret, most confidential communications, of their own allies and, of course, adversaries.

The story was then released years after, after everything has been done and closed. The Washington Post wrote up the exposé based on a CIA internal history of the operation in 2004. So, CIA history was in 2004; the Washington Post released the story in 2020. And they also based it on an internal oral history project by German intelligence in 2008. But everything was kept under wraps, until simultaneously published by the Washington Post and a German broadcaster on 11 February 2020.

So, it has all the hallmarks of a deliberate, planned leak. Members might recall that at about the same time, a bit before that, but through that period, the US government was very seriously warning everyone about the dangers of relying on technology from China. So, basically, without embarrassment, this leak came out saying we did it, and now be careful about the Chinese. Have the Americans actually stopped? We can only guess. But it has now got to be taken as a given that this sort of thing will be done regularly and everyone will face this.

It has become very easy and inexpensive to do. The Select Committee in 2018 heard one million Instagram "Likes" cost US$18; to get 100 Twitter follower likes or re-tweets costs 34 US cents; and to organise a street protest in the US through online costs about US$200,000. These details are in annex D. It also gives examples of HICs targeting democratic processes, if you look at annex D.

And it is a cottage industry as well because there are reports of an active Macedonian disinformation industry. Young Macedonians have Internet access, some basic training to create fake news websites. In the final weeks of the 2016 US Presidential Elections, over 140 "fake news" US politics websites were traced to Macedonia, and these overtook mainstream news producers in their share of election stories shared on Facebook. The details are in annex E.

Singapore – A few days ago, the French Military School Strategic Research Institute published a Report on Influence Operations. Singapore was among the countries featured as case studies. The report noted that there were several factors which made Singapore vulnerable: our size, hyper-connectivity, multi-ethnic and multi-religious society. The report said we were resilient through a counter-narrative of our Singaporean identity and by our swift reactions against hate speech. It concluded that we, along with Sweden, were one of the best prepared states in the fight against information manipulation and hybrid threats in general.

I am not so sanguine as the people who wrote this report. Our racial and religious mix is easily exploitable by different countries and we see a steady build-up of different narratives which is being very cleverly done. It is not obvious propaganda but it conditions people to think in certain ways, particularly on foreign policy issues, often appealing to a larger racial identity beyond the Singaporean identity.

In my view, this is one of the most serious threats we face. Our population, and I think most Members of Parliament, are not really aware of this.

Singapore has been subjected to attacks in recent times, both cyber attacks as well as cyber manipulation.

In the cyber attack in 2018, hackers targeted SingHealth’s databases and stole the particulars of 1.5 million patients, including the Prime Minister's data.

Cyber manipulation, I will give a couple of examples. During a period of tension with another country between 2016 and 2017, we experienced a coordinated HIC that attempted to undermine our foreign policy position. Online commentaries and videos were uploaded by social media accounts which had lain dormant for many years. Many of these were in Mandarin and targeted our Chinese-speaking population. These contents were also widely circulated via chat apps and aimed to influence sentiments among Singaporeans.

In another case, during a period of bilateral tension with a country in 2018, we saw a large spike in online comments critical of Singapore and many came from anonymous accounts. They sought to give an artificial impression of widespread objection to Singapore’s position.

I will say, so far, these have been relatively low level except for the strategic move, the attempts to condition our people's thinking, which are going on.

Before I deal with some of the substantive points of this Bill, let me also deal with the issue of timing.

Some have said there have been no discussions, why is this Bill being put through so quickly?

Have there been no discussions? We have been talking about this very seriously for more than three years; extensively. The Select Committee heard extensive evidence in 2018 on this. The evidence, the reports that I have been referring to so far in the various annexes, most of them come from the evidence given in 2018 to the Parliamentary Select Committee.

I would like to refer Members to annex F. It sets out the discussions that have taken place and the summary of the testimonies given at the Select Committee. Twenty different types of evidence – persons, organisations, including experts, gave evidence on the seriousness of the foreign threat. I will touch on some of the evidence that was given at the Select Committee.

Disinformation expert, Mr Ben Nimmo, testified on the Internet Research Agency (IRA)'s various tactics, said to be controlled by Russia, tactics to boost support for Mr Trump, as he then was, and opposition to Mrs Clinton during the 2016 US Presidential Elections and to widen the divide in the US between the Black Lives Matter movement and the Police.

Dr Kevin Limonier, a French cybersecurity expert, spoke of an alleged Russian HIC that tried to sway the 2017 French Presidential Elections using a combination of state media, social media platforms and bots, including by attempting to spread leaked emails on the eve of the election to discredit the Macron campaign.

Experts also highlighted that Singapore has been targeted and is especially vulnerable when race and religion are used as an issue of protest potential.

Dr Shashi Jayakumar said that it would be a mistake to assume that foreign HICs were not already happening.

Dr Gulizar Haciyakupoglu gave testimony behind closed doors, because of the sensitivity, and said there were indicators of information warfare being practised against Singapore.

Dr Liew Kai Khiun highlighted the barrage of comments by seemingly Myanmar-based user accounts on social media news portals of Singapore’s mainstream news networks. These were inflammatory, with Islamophobic tones, and incited backlash from Singaporean Muslims.

Dr Michael Raska highlighted that foreign states could engage in information operations that target our fault lines as a means of asymmetric warfare, given Singapore’s traditional military strength.

This is an important point that I will ask Members to take note of. I once heard our then Defence Minister, Dr Tony Tan, describe our defence strategy in the following terms. Singapore’s defence strategy is predicated on the superiority of our military in the region. Our conventional military strength has got to be clearly superior; and it is clearly superior.

The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) is very well-regarded both in the region and globally for its professionalism, technological edge and the interoperability of our systems – what Mr Lee Kuan Yew said, the vision of a "poisoned shrimp". But what that means, as Dr Raska pointed out, is that the Internet becomes a particularly attractive theatre for our adversaries who would seek to do us harm. I will ask Members of Parliament to register this point, in particular, because our conventional military superiority, ironically, means we become an even bigger target online.

This topic was also quite extensively referenced in the Select Committee Report and discussed several times in Parliament. And if you look at annex F(2), that sets out the discussions that had taken place in Parliament. There were Parliamentary Questions and answers that emphasised our vulnerability. The Select Committee recommended that measures be taken and we have said in Parliament that legislation will be considered and legislation will be necessary. I had made speeches in the Committee of Supply (COS) 2019 as well as COS this year, and made it clear that legislation was needed.

You can also refer to my speech at a major international conference in September 2019, pages 26 and 27. I did, at that point, referenced Mr PJ Thum and Ms Han. I will come back to this, but I made it clear that legislation is going to be needed. That conference was held in Singapore on 25 September 2019, with 10 international and local speakers, experts.

Prof Allan Rock, a former Canadian Cabinet Minister at that conference, noted that tools of interference were well-known: dissemination of false information, hacking and leaking. And he said governments have got to take this seriously and take counter measures that protect the electoral system and candidates, political parties and voters from information manipulation.

This topic of foreign interference has been extensively covered in the media as well. That is set out in annex F(3). If you look at the headlines on some of them, it says, "Stronger laws planned to combat foreign interference" and "Singapore to have legislation to combat increased risk of foreign interference."

Annex F(4) shows – and I am giving a small sample of extensive studies internationally – Brookings Institute, RAND Institute and the Council for Foreign Relations have all commissioned and published studies. So, this topic has been extensively discussed and debated for over three years.

The other comments made: it is a very long Bill. Members of Parliament are used to lengthy Bills, you understand the structure, you understand which are the key provisions, you understand the Explanatory Statement, you take a view and then you go through all the provisions again, look at the accompanying statements, infographics and get a better sense.

As I have said, more than half of this Bill is based on PDA, which Members will or should be familiar with. The rest on HIC, and it is set out fairly comprehensively.

I think the threat of foreign interference and its seriousness are not disputed by most people. Most people also agree that something needs to be done. So, this is the context in which we are moving this Bill.

Before we go into the Bill, it is useful to first consider the current powers to deal with subversion.

Today, assume a person X is suspected of being a foreign agent or acting for a foreign agency against Singapore's interests. Such a suspected foreign agent can be detained without trial under the Internal Security Act (ISA). Investigations can be conducted. Section 20 of the CPC allows the Police to ask anyone in Singapore, individuals as well as companies, for information. Not just under SA, under any legislation if there are investigations. Ask anyone in Singapore, individuals as well as companies for information and require them to produce any document or item for investigation.

So, under current laws, suppose there is an online campaign and there is a basis to believe that this is foreign agency or entity-inspired and it is prejudicial to our national security, then investigations can be conducted under ISA. Information, including the writer's identity, will have to be made available under CPC. The writer and anyone else suspected of subversion can be detained. Any challenge will be heard by the ISA Tribunal, not by the High Court. And it is not public, unless the ISD decides to make it so. This applies equally, whether the subversion is done online or in the physical world.

One of the pieces of misinformation that are being put out is that the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act, or FICA, would now allow the Government to get any information and that this is a new power. Section 20 of CPC has been used all these years and it is in broad terms to get any information for investigations.

When we talk about powers, the powers to detain, to investigate, I will refer to them as "Substantive Powers".

The powers to enforce, like requiring the taking down of material, I will refer to them as "Executory Powers".

There are several Executory Powers now available, including under the Broadcasting Act, which allow the Government to deal with objectionable content in the Internet space. It allows for directions to be issued to broadcasting licensees and for content to be taken down or blocked.

The Telecommunications Act gives powers to allow for directions to be issued to telecommunications licensees in the public interest, including the stopping, delaying and censoring of messages.

The Public Order Act allows the Government to regulate physical assemblies and processions. The Commissioner of Police may deny permits for such events that are "directed towards a political end" and involve foreign entities or individuals.

So, the issues of what directions might call the "protest potential" are regulated in the physical world. Logically, similar rules should apply in the online space.

The current Political Donations Act requires those that are directly involved in our political processes, be they political parties, election candidates and their agents, to declare their political donations. The Act prohibits the receipt of foreign funding and has a cap on anonymous donations.

So, I have taken the House through the current legal landscape. What does FICA add to the current powers?

Take the example I gave earlier, say, X is acting for a foreign agency. He has an agenda to subvert our political process, subvert our sovereignty and he conducts an online campaign.

Today, as I have explained, action will be taken under the ISA. And bear in mind that foreign agencies will often use legitimate-looking fronts. Annex G sets out the examples of such legitimate-looking fronts.

If FICA is passed, then we can proceed under FICA if we can show that online communications activity has been prepared or planned, by or on behalf of a foreign principal, and it is in the public interest to give one or more directions.

Example of directions that can be issued include for a communicator to take down his content, for an Internet intermediary to take down the content and for an Internet intermediary to suspend or terminate the account. The person can also be arrested and prosecuted if an offence of clandestine foreign interference is made out. But under FICA, there is no detention without trial.

Public interest is defined as including activities "directed towards a political end". This is taken from the Public Order Act to prohibit foreigners from organising or taking part in public assemblies directed towards such ends, and FICA applies this definition to the online space.

The Executory Powers under FICA are more calibrated. I referred earlier to the Broadcasting Act and directions can be issued. Under the Telecommunications Act, directions can be issued to telecommunications licensees. And, in both Acts, there are limits to judicial review.

So, what in the HIC part of FICA goes further than the current laws? Mainly, in extraterritorial application. Because it now explicitly includes global platforms which are often vectors for HICs. So, that updates the analogue powers for the Internet age. For example, in the analogue world, you have the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act (NPPA) and the Broadcasting Act. They provide powers to proscribe foreign newspapers and broadcasting services. The digital equivalent under FICA is a Proscribed Online Locations App Removal. In the analogue world, the Broadcasting Act provides the power to order a TV station to carry a message. The digital equivalent under FICA is a must-carry direction, issued to communicator, social media services.

I will ask Members to refer to annex H which has two charts.

First, Chart 1, and this is quite important. If you look at Chart 1, the existing powers are in light green and the updated powers under FICA are in darker green. So, on the left, what is headed "Substantive Powers". Today, you see the existing powers of investigation and of arrest and detention, in light green. It can be seen that FICA is an update to ensure that our laws can deal with online HICs, by allowing for disclosure of information by global platforms, and new offences which have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt in Court for perpetrating HICs in a clandestine way. If you look at the top right-hand side, it shows how existing laws cover foreign interference via traditional media – the Broadcasting Act and the NPPA. And the bottom right, the light green boxes show how online, there are powers to intervene under the Broadcasting Act and the Telecommunications Act. What FICA does, in the dark green boxe, are targeted and more calibrated directions.

If you look at Chart 2, the existing PDA is in green; FICA in pink or red. On the left, the green box shows what PDA provides today. All the measures in that box apply to gazetted political associations. Under FICA, at the first instance, the only measure that applies to a designated PSP is in the first red box in the second column which is annual declaration of donations. If there is heightened threat of foreign interference, then, the other red boxes can be applied by the Competent Authority.

To use another example, suppose we discover that a Singapore company has been secretly hired by a foreign intelligence agency to put out memes and videos on social media and to spread the view that a particular ethnic group is persecuted. And the aim, let us say, is to drive a wedge between ethnic groups in Singapore. What would we do today? The company’s officers can be detained under the ISA. Other laws can also, potentially, be used. This can be reviewed if their detention is under the ISA by the ISA Tribunal. There is no judicial review except in relation to compliance with procedural requirements under the Act.

Where the content crosses the threshold of other laws like the Penal Code, of course, criminal investigations can be initiated. The CPC comes in – that will allow any information about the company's activities or that of its staff to be obtained. And there is a legal obligation for the information to be provided by anyone in Singapore when the Police ask for it, including Internet companies. And these actions can be pre-emptive.

Under FICA, directions can be issued to tech companies to disable access to the content or restrict those accounts from view of end users in Singapore, if the thresholds are met. These can stem the HIC without having to block the entire platform.

Social media platforms can also be asked to provide information to support an investigation into an HIC. Today, if this data resides abroad, we cannot do so, under the CPC.

The Government would also have the option of charging the company and its officers under FICA for clandestine foreign interference and prosecuting them in open Court. So, that deals with the HIC part of FICA.

There has been some degree of misrepresentation on FICA, that this Bill seeks to curtail normal interactions with foreigners. That is not true. Singapore depends for its success and vitality on being open, and a government that seeks to close down that will lead Singapore to ruin.

I actually want the House to see how our approach compares that with the US and Australia.

In the US, under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), it covers people and organisations that are under the control of a foreign government or organisations or persons outside of the United States. Under the US' FARA, a "foreign principal" is defined very broadly, and any political activity that is designed to influence government decision-making on behalf of a foreign principal will require or trigger registration.

For instance, take something that we take as normal. An American citizen meeting a US Congressman and advocating for his company's product. If the company was a foreign company, an MNC, that will trigger registration. So, the American provision is quite broad. That scenario will not meet the thresholds for designation of PSPs under FICA.

On the HIC part and how it applies, I will deal with it later.

Let us also look at Australia. The Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme (FITS) covers government-related entitles and individuals who have arrangements with foreign principals or undertake certain activities on behalf of foreign principals. Under Australia's FITS, any activity by a former Commonwealth politician would trigger the threshold for registration. So, you could be an ex-Minister or an ex-Member of Parliament of any political party and, if you did this, it will trigger.

Singapore, under FICA, the PSP part only covers Defined and Designated PSPs. So, a much, much narrower group. Why have we taken this approach? Because we are not the US; we are not Australia; we are Singapore; we are an international hub. Interactions with international counterparts, business people, siting of MNCs in Singapore – all of these are vital for us.

In this Bill, action can be taken in respect of HIC if the following conditions are satisfied.

Internet activity by or on behalf of a foreign principal and public interest in Singapore is affected. I am paraphrasing, but, in essence.

A PSP designation is possible if the activities are directed towards a political end and it is in the public interest that countermeasures should be applied. So, one of the key points for both areas is the phrase "Public Interest".

The definition of "Public Interest" includes the requirement of "proportionality", which the Minister or Authority will have to consider in arriving at a decision. The "Public Interest" test imports a built-in requirement of proportionality for the Minister before deciding on a Part [3] direction.

The definition of "Public Interest" refers to "necessary or expedient"; that is clause 7. So, if a decision has to be made on the basis of "necessary or expedient", you have got to look at the facts carefully and the actions you want to take must be proportional.

Take an example. Two academics, one of them foreign, collaborate on a paper on LGBT issues. It will be difficult to say it is necessary or expedient to issue Directions under FICA and, really, try explaining that to a Supreme Court Judge, who will chair the Tribunal, that it is necessary or expedient.

The vast majority of collaborations, linkages will not meet the required conditions. And they will also not meet the requirement of proportionality.

As an aside – and this has been raised by Member of Parliament Assoc Prof Jamus Lim – if a foreigner writes articles on controversial issues using his own name, or is clearly stated to be a foreigner, people can assess the value, credibility and weight, and it is generally unlikely to be necessary or expedient to issue directions. But it depends on the facts. If there is a basis to believe that he is doing so, for example, as part of a hostile campaign, or is acting for a foreign agency, with the intent of causing damage to Singapore, then directions could be given, subject to the test of proportionality. And if he disagrees, he can appeal to the Tribunal.

Likewise – and, again, I think this arises from Assoc Prof Lim's proposed amendments – if the Economist or New York Times publishes the articles, it would not be possible to invoke FICA. However, if there is more to it, if a foreign newspaper is being used as part of a campaign targeting Singapore, that may be different. But again, it comes back to proportionality, the nature of the actions, the likely effect, the likely intent, several other factors.

Newspapers – it does not mean, automatically, they are all kosher. They have often been used as a front for such activities, which is why I put annex G in. Legitimate newspapers, newswires have all been used as fronts. So, you cannot give a carte blanche exception but it is most unlikely that many of these would be a front unless we have very clear other evidence.

If some deception is involved in the campaign, if a foreigner hides his identity or masquerades as a local, we could, under FICA, give orders for them to be transparent, just disclose who you are, so that people can judge for themselves.

Collaboration and partnership with a foreign person, by itself, is not the trigger. You have to go further and look at the facts. As I said, is there a hostile campaign, is there damage to Singapore, is there a foreign agency involved, what is the extent of possible damage? These are non-exclusive factors nor must they all be present or any one of them present. You really got to look at the facts, assess based on what you know and assess the proportionality as well.

I have referred to proportionality. I said this is my view. But this is what the Government has been advised by AGC and that is one of the reasons for my view. I am capable of forming my own views but we go by the advice of AGC. And this is the intent behind the legislative approach which we are setting out clearly for reference, so that if this Bill becomes law, and if it needs to be interpreted, it will be interpreted in the light of what the Government has said is the legislative intent and how the phrases are intended to cover these things.

It has been suggested by some that case law means that the test of proportionality cannot be applied. The advice I get from AGC is that it is different for this legislation because we are making clear the legislative intent for this specific Bill. I have made similar points in respect of other legislation as well, as part of the Second Reading speech.

I will, in this context, invite Members to look at annex I. Sorry, I made a mistake. Annex I is not in a hard copy. Sir, with your permission, it will be emailed directly to Members in soft copy. Part of annex I is there but the part that I wanted to refer to, we did not have time to put that in.

One suggestion was open non-clandestine collaboration between Singaporeans and any ordinary private foreign citizen to improve any aspect of our laws and public policies constitutes foreign interference, notwithstanding the absence of any foreign state manipulation or foreign funding.

Let me put it this way. On the one side, if there is manipulation with a foreign agency involved, I think everyone will agree, it is quite clear. On the other side, there is foreign collaboration, bona fide work, everyone will agree that cannot be. And then, there is the in-between. There could be a group of foreigners working with Singaporeans, exchanging viewpoints, writing papers and so on, we have indicated that that would not be covered. How does that become necessary or expedient? How is the test of proportionality satisfied?

But, supposing, the group comes together and the motive is to effect a change; or take a different example, there is money involved or, let us say, there is materiality, and the entire focus is political change; then, again, Members of Parliament will say that is a very different kettle of fish. Or, for that matter, the range of public policy issues that are currently or which may in the future become subject to political debates, where there is legitimate reason for concerned Singaporeans to collaborate with international experts, researchers, NGOs; on the face of it, that would not be covered. But if it changes along the lines of what I have said earlier, then there is a case for looking at it carefully.

So, one has got to look at the facts, test materiality.

Another point that has been made is that presenting research at overseas conferences, writing for international journals, multi-authored book projects, publishing in and reviewing for prestigious academic presses, participating in international collaborative research projects, partaking of fellowships, visiting appointments, training programmes, participation in international funding opportunities, any of these may be subsidised or fully funded by foreign universities, foundations and states. None of that, on the face of it, as it is described, will fit within FICA, for the reasons I have already explained. But if there is a step-up to try and turn the person into an agent of influence, or there is an orchestrated campaign, then, again, it becomes different.

So, some of these doomsday scenarios, that FICA is going to close off foreign collaborations, if that is correct, we, as a Government, must have suddenly gone mad. Because in a country like Singapore, which depends so much on the flow of ideas and international collaboration, is that even thinkable? The difficulty we face at MHA, and which many other countries face when dealing with this foreign interference issue, is that out of 10,000 interactions, one might be the sort that we are interested in, where there is an attempt to interfere.

Foreign agencies, and even non-agency, NGOs, others, will try and present a legitimate front. So, the language has got to be broad enough to cover that: that what is apparently normal but it is actually not normal.

And it is not only the classic foreign state agency subversion sort of thing. It could be foreign associations, NGOs, even individuals, who want to change our laws, for example. So, you got to look carefully at what they are doing, what are all the factors taken in overall, using the proportionality test, what sort of issue are they focusing on, what is the possible impact, is there funding involved, but with the central guiding principle that Singaporeans should primarily decide on issues of importance to ourselves.

If you turn specifically to academics, questions have been raised about their collaborations with non-Singaporeans. They collaborate, create, partner, pursue their research interests professionally. No HIC, it does not come within FICA.

So, the Bill will not affect the vast amount of academic work that is being done. We value the intellectual output, collaborations, exchange of ideas, the work our academics do. And they need to link with the rest of the world; for work, bona fide and professional work, not affected; it is important for Singapore.

But in some situations, there are academics who go into a different realm around the world and they are dealt with, like we did with Huang Jing.

There is another thread to some of the points made, underlying all of these explanations and illustrations, that the Government's position and explanations are good but the powers can be abused, they can be used for a wrong purpose. The worry is that the Government will abuse its power and shut down legitimate cooperation because it does not like it.

So, there are two points here. One, the powers that are necessary to deal with the threat. Second, the possibility of abuse of these powers. So far, I have explained why the powers are necessary and why these powers are no greater – in fact, less so – than powers that already exist, and is more calibration for the Internet age. So, bearing that in mind, I will deal separately, later, with abuse of powers.

The fundamental principle is the intention – and we do not believe that legislation prevents bona fide exchange of ideas.

Can a government abuse the power? Any government can abuse this power and any power. So, we will come to that and what should be the checks and balances for that.

There have also been others, beyond these concerns, who have been actively trying to put out misinformation about the Bill. Chief amongst them are Mr PJ Thum and Ms Kirsten Han. Thum and Han, as I said in 2019, in the conference, take money from George Soros. Some of you may recall, Soros' Open Society Foundations (OSF) has a history of getting involved in the domestic politics of sovereign countries.

In 2018, ACRA rejected Thum and Han's attempt to register a company funded by OSF to organise "democracy classroom" sessions in Singapore. They have set up an organisation called New Naratif, which receives significant foreign funding. New Naratif organised a series of "Democracy Classrooms" focusing on Malaysia and that was supported by the US Embassy in Kuala Lumpur.

Make no mistake about it. We will say no to that in Singapore. You can organise democracy classrooms. We have no issues. Anyone can organise, anyone can criticise the current state of democracy, but it cannot be funded by Soros or the US Embassy or any other Embassy. The nature of activity and who the funding is from will have to be considered in this context.

I will say a bit more about Thum and Han before I go on to discuss their objections. Thum wants our Independence Day to be 16 September, which is Malaysia Day. He regrets that Singapore separated from Malaysia. On several occasions, he has publicly said that Singapore should become part of Malaysia again and celebrate Independence on 16 September. Thum and Han and some other activists met with Dr Mahathir on 30 August 2018. They asked Dr Mahathir to bring democracy to Singapore. I suppose Malaysian style democracy.

Han described a social movement as "the work that goes into potentially one day having 500,000 people on the streets." She has also said, "When the government says foreigners should not influence domestic affairs, or foreigners should not bring their country's politics into Singapore, we should push back on that as well, because why not, because solidarity is important." Her view is that Malaysians can influence our politics. She says so openly.

I believe, I have not seen it, but I assume the Petition that the Progress Singapore Party (PSP) is presenting in Parliament is one that is inspired by Ms Han. So, I would like to know whether they agree with this statement that Singaporeans should push back and say foreigners should be able to influence domestic affairs in Singapore.

So, Members can see why the two of them are very concerned that FICA will focus on foreign funding and have been mounting their own disinformation campaign.

Han has been posting on social media extensively – I am told, over a hundred tweets, posts and so on – organised a petition, sent around email templates for people to write to their Members of Parliament. Thum has, meanwhile, written a commentary calling this Bill a "stealth coup" by me. Basically, that I am personally going to take over Singapore and all my colleagues have to be very concerned. I suppose a coup means that I take over from the Prime Minister. A coup in Singapore. The Prime Minister needs to be very concerned too.

It requires a turn of mind, completely at odds with reality and living in fantasy, to think of a coup in Singapore.

Mr Thum forgets that if there is this fear that I am going to mount a coup, then I or any Minister for Home Affairs has far more powers under other legislation: the Internal Security Act (ISA), the Criminal Law Temporary Provisions Act (CLTPA), the Maintenance of Racial Harmony Act (MRHA), including the powers of detention. FICA, in contrast, is a toy gun. It gives powers to give directions.

So, Members can see there is no limit to the absurdities and fantasies that some will put out and an Oxford education, in itself, does not immunise one from spouting such nonsense.

But I can see that they are concerned. Han has said, in arguing against this Bill, that it is difficult to get money for these causes in Singapore, so foreign funding is necessary.

So, you can see. If Singaporeans are excited about it, interested, they will contribute. But because they will not contribute, I need foreign funding.

Mr Terry Xu has joined Han in starting the petition, which some groups have signed up to. I am not sure how many of these groups know what Thum and Han's objectives are. We will look at the Petition that is being put up in Parliament by the PSP. I think Members can look at it in the context of who inspired them and how today's PSP is completely aligned, it appears, with what Thum and Han want to achieve.

Mr Speaker, Sir, the points raised in the Petition, assuming it is the same petition that we see online, I have dealt with most of them, I am dealing with them, we can debate the points today and I would say Parliament can fully consider and debate the points today. There is no need to do it at another session.

Mr Terry Xu, as many of us know, and as I said in my September 2019 speech at the conference, uses Malaysian and other foreign writers to write incendiary articles on Singapore without bylines and without identification. The articles include a call for Singaporean civil servants to march on the streets like their Hong Kong counterparts.

So, you read the articles and what would readers think? These are from local writers writing about Singapore in these terms. But the articles are often by foreign writers who are paid to write these stories. The more incendiary, the better.

Mr Xu and others can continue to do this even after FICA. But a direction can be given to them to make it clear that the article is by a foreigner.

We all want transparency, right? So, it would be useful for Singaporeans to know whether the writer of the article is local or foreign. FICA will allow us to issue a transparency directive requiring that Singaporeans be told upfront who the article is written by and what nationality the author has.

Sir, moving on to a slightly different topic. For HIC directions, appeals go to an independent reviewing tribunal, which has the power to overrule the Minister. The tribunal is headed by a Supreme Court judge. Appeals are made to this tribunal and not the Court so as to protect sensitive information that may be relied on to make a decision.

For example, we may determine foreign interference based on a tip-off or sensitive information shared by a foreign counterpart security agency. The consequences of a leak would be very serious. Most Singaporeans understand the need for this legislation.

Sir, I will now deal with the proposed amendments put forward by some Members of the Workers' Party.

The Workers' Party has stated that they believe in the "legitimate need to counter malign acts of foreign interference". They also realise the "Purposes" provision of the Bill is important – that is, clause 2 – and obviously so.

So, with your permission, Mr Speaker, may I distribute a second folder which contains annexes J to L that I am going to refer to now.

Mr Speaker: Please do. [Handouts were distributed to hon Members. Please refer to Annex 3.]

Mr K Shanmugam: If I may carry on while it is being distributed, Sir?

Mr Speaker: Yes, please.

Mr K Shanmugam: It is to be welcomed that the Workers' Party has set out what they disagree with in the Bill. They are, looking at the amendments, in agreement with most of the Bill. And the details are in annex J.

Their disagreement with the Bill can be itemised into five categories. Two of the categories are somewhat process-related.

The first one is by Mr Leon Perera. He has put in suggested amendments to clauses 47, 48, 78, 79, 81, 84 and 85. He wants the Government to maintain a public registry of all individuals and entities designated as PSPs and persons with declared involvement in foreign "policy" organisations. Now, I would say the Bill does not use the term foreign "policy" organisation. I assume he was referring to a foreign "political" organisation instead.

He also wants the Government to make publicly available the following information: (a) all reportable arrangements; (b) all transparency directives, disclosures, reports and explanations for these decisions; and (c) all directives to PSPs to end their affiliation with a foreign principal or to prohibit foreign volunteers.

It is unclear to us why he only wants to make public these two stepped-up countermeasures and did not include the other stepped-up countermeasures on prohibition of donations and foreign memberships.

The Bill, in clause 116, states that we may make public any designation and the issuance of any stepped-up countermeasures on PSPs and transparency directives issued.

The media had asked us about this previously and we said while the Bill says "may", our intention though was to make public the designations and stepped-up countermeasures on PSPs, as well as the directives to counter a HIC. Our response was carried in the mainstream media on 25 September.

Mr Leon Perera wants to have this as an obligation for the countermeasures that they have identified.

The Government can agree to this. We will make public all designations, stepped-up countermeasures on PSPs, transparency directives and HIC directives, except the technical assistance requirements (TADs) because that would be in the course of investigations and we do not want to tip off hostile actors about the investigations that are going on.

There is one issue on the suggestion to make public the names of citizens involved in foreign political and legislative organisations. A substantial number of these citizens may not be PSPs. This reporting requirement under clause 79 applies to non-PSPs, ordinary citizens.

If they are a member of, say, the Russian Communist Party, we want to know. They may not be PSPs in Singapore. There are also other communist parties. If they are a member of the Cuban Communist Party, we also want to know. Likewise, if they are a member of the UK's Conservative Party.

It could become quite wide and we have to be mindful when making disclosures relating to this group. We are studying that particular issue, whether we should make all these non-PSP reports public.

Our previous intention was "no". We should let them have their privacy on this. Reporting to the Government is enough. But given that Mr Leon Perera has raised it, we will relook at that particular point and, if we agree with him, we could make that amendment at a future point in time but not now.

Mr Leon Perera also wants a list of all reportable arrangements. I do not think that is necessary. The Bill sets out clearly the conditions where an arrangement is reportable, for example, when the PSP is obliged to act in accordance with the instructions of a foreign principal.

The second category where the Workers' Party wants to make some amendments, Mr Gerald Giam wants to add the following to categories of PSPs: members of Central Executive Councils or equivalent of registered political parties in Singapore, senior public servants holding office of Deputy Secretary (DS) or above or equivalent, board members or chief executives of a Statutory Board or a Government company listed in the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution. I will come back to this.

The third category of amendments, Mr Giam wants to amend the definition of what amounts to "directed towards a political end".

The fourth category of amendments is to clause 17. Assoc Prof Jamus Lim wants to remove the phrase "likely to be" from "is or likely to be prejudicial"; and he proposes similar edits to clause 18. He also wants to amend clause 17(2) to remove a caveat.

The fifth category of amendments, the Bill provides for challenges to some Directions issued by the Minister to be dealt with by a Tribunal, headed by a Supreme Court Judge. Ms He Ting Ru wants this to be dealt with by the High Court, rather than a Tribunal headed by the Supreme Court.

So, I will now turn to the specific amendments proposed and set out our views.

On Mr Leon Perera's amendments on clauses 47, 48, 78, 79, 81, 84 and 85, we can agree to several of them. I have set out my position.

On Mr Gerald Giam's amendment to clause 14 on amending the definition of PSP. Now, once you are designated as a PSP, there is a baseline set of obligations. Declaration of foreign affiliations, declaration of migration benefits, anonymous donations cap of $5,000, declaration of donations of $10,000 or more from permissible donors, no foreign volunteers and so on. So, if you take a CEC member or equivalent, we can agree to this. We can add them today at the Committee stage.

I will seek to move a set of amendments to the Bill during the Committee stage of proceedings and for these to be debated alongside the other proposed amendments filed by the other Members of Parliament on the Bill.

Insufficient notice has been given for these amendments from my Ministry necessarily, because we are dealing with amendments in turn proposed by Mr Leon Perera and Mr Gerald Giam.

So, I will be seeking your consent, Sir, Mr Speaker, as well as the general assent of Members present to waive notice. Copies of these proposed amendments will be distributed to this House so that Members can read them ahead.

Mr Speaker, Sir, with your permission, may I ask the Clerks to distribute the proposed amendments?

Mr Speaker: Please do. [Handouts were distributed to hon Members. Please refer to Annex 4.]

Mr K Shanmugam: May I continue, Sir?

Mr Speaker: Yes, please.

Mr K Shanmugam: On the CEC members, one of the reasons why we left it out is that we did consider CEC members as well as branch secretaries to be included. But we left it out because on the side of the PAP to comply with this, it is not going to be difficult because all except two of the CEC members are PSPs anyway. So, the obligations are more onerous for the other registered political parties because many, in some cases, none, of the CEC members are PSPs. But as I said, we can agree to it if that is what Mr Gerald Giam wants.

Mr Giam also wants DS and officers above the DS level to be included as PSPs. What is the status of DSes and Permanent Secretaries (PSes) and what rules are they subject to? They are all subject to various tight rules and requirements which are tighter than FICA requirements on PSPs. They have to hold valid security clearance throughout their appointment. They have to make annual declarations, including on investments, ownership, financial embarrassment, declarations on a variety of matters, going well beyond what PSPs have to do.

They have to declare all gifts and entertainment and they cannot work for other employers or engage in trade or business without explicit permission. They can be directed to cease outside activities or divest investments if there is any conflict. A list of their key obligations is set out in annex K.

The rules for PSPs are not as tight. PSPs cannot accept anonymous donations over $5,000, which really means they can accept anonymous donations under $5,000 and they can also accept above $5,000 from identified persons. Any DS or PS who accepts that will not remain in service for much after that, and they would be subject to severe disciplinary action if they contravene any of the rules.

Politicians and others who may be PSPs play by different rules, compared to senior civil servants. If we impose on PSPs the rules that senior civil servants are under, I think it will be very difficult.

Ministers are also subject to strict rules, except that political donations are possible.

Mr Giam and Mr Pritam Singh would be aware of these requirements, having both been public servants themselves in the past. I also do not think it is appropriate to classify them as PSPs. These senior civil servants are non-political, so, we cannot agree to this proposal.

Mr Gerald Giam also wants to include board members, chief executives (CEs) of Statutory Boards, CEs of Fifth Schedule companies.

CEs of Statutory Boards, as public officers, are subject to the same rules as DSes and above, and the points I have already made apply equally to them.

As for Board Members, it would not be feasible to automatically define them as PSPs. It is preferable to use powers of designation instead.

On board members. They will often have foreign members. You ask them to declare all donations received in home countries, migration benefits, all their foreign affiliations? It does not make sense. If we went out and asked not just these companies, but any other listed company, ask them if it will be feasible to impose these requirements on their foreign directors, they will tell you it is too onerous. They will have difficulties getting good people.

And if you take banks and you impose these obligations on the Schedule companies, but you do not impose these obligations on their competitors who might be in the same business, then you make it difficult for the Schedule companies to get good people.

It is the same for Fifth Schedule companies. So, leave it to the companies to choose people of integrity and our security agencies need to be alert. Not just about them, but other directors of major companies in Singapore. So, these additional proposals are impractical from a market point of view.

Now, I move to clause 8 as proposed by Mr Gerald Giam. He wants to amend the definition of “directed towards a political end in Singapore”.

The context is HIC directions can be issued if there is online communications activity where material is published in Singapore, it is undertaken by or on behalf of a foreign principal, and it is in the public interest to issue a direction, such as to prevent foreign interference directed towards a political end.

And for a PSP to be designated, that person or entity’s activities must be directed wholly, or in part, towards a political end; and the Competent Authority must additionally assess that it is in the public interest for countermeasures to be applied.

So, changing this definition will affect how we can act against foreign interference. The meaning of “directed towards a political end” in the Bill has seven parts. Mr Speaker, Sir, with your permission, may I display a slide with the definition on screen, please?

Mr Speaker: Yes, please. [Slides were shown to hon Members. Please refer to Annex 5.]

Mr K Shanmugam: The first five, I think it is not the easiest to read. I think it is also in the Schedule that I have handed out, after annex M. Pages 1 and 2 with what is proposed to be struck out.

For those of us who cannot read this slide,

the first five are: (a) to promote the interests of a political party, or a politically significant entity, in Singapore; (b) to seek to influence the outcome of any election or referendum; (c) to seek to influence Singapore Governmental decisions, including by trying to influence the public; (d) to seek to influence any aspect of proceedings of key public institutions, including Parliament, Presidential Council for Minority Rights, and so on; (e) to seek to bring about changes of the law or otherwise influence the legislative process.

So, Mr Gerald Giam accepts all of this as legitimate, meaning legitimate for the purpose of defining what is "directed towards a political end", and that these are necessary. But he wants to remove the last two paragraphs.

Mr Speaker, Sir, with your permission, may I ask for slide 2 that highlights these changes to be put up?

Mr Speaker: Yes, please.

Mr K Shanmugam: Again, it is in page 1, after annex M of the handout that has been given.

Mr Gerald Giam wants to remove two sub-clauses, first of which reads: "(f) to seek to influence public opinion on a matter which, in Singapore, is a matter of public controversy; (g) to seek to influence any aspect, or to promote or oppose political views, or public conduct relating to activities that have become the subject of a political debate in Singapore."

This is a little difficult to understand. Let me explain.

Members will recall that I have said a number of times that there are three conditions for a HIC direction and two for a PSP designation.

For HIC directions, to refresh Members' memory, there has to be online activity where material is published in Singapore, it has to be done on behalf of a foreign principal and public interest in Singapore is likely to be affected.

For a PSP designation, the person's or entity's activities must be directed wholly or in part towards a political end; and the Competent Authority must additionally assess that it is in the public interest for countermeasures to be applied.

With Mr Gerald Giam's proposal, if an issue is only within (f) or (g), then no counter-HIC directions can be issued and no PSP designation is possible.

To put it in the form of an example, in other words, his position is that we should not stop foreigners from interfering to shape public opinion on matters of public controversy; or to influence public views on a political debate, and this is so, regardless of whether deception is involved.

There are numerous scenarios that could fall under limbs (f) and (g) that may not be covered by one of the other limbs.

For example, promoting some types of solidarity among members of one race or nationality, with the aim that this can eventually help them to have negative feelings towards other races, or promoting some types of religious piety, with the aim that, eventually, they may take different views on matters of political debate in Singapore.

If we believe that is being done, for example, at the direction of a foreign intelligence agency, with the ultimate purpose of creating divisions within Singapore, should we not be able to act?

If an intel agency in another country regularly pays someone in Singapore to write about these matters or support the policies of the Workers' Party, or the PAP, and gradually deepen divisions, enhance the "protest potential", as General Gerasimov might have said, that would not be covered. Frankly, Sir, that goes against common sense.

When we had the debates on CECA, were we not having a political discussion? Under Mr Gerald Giam's proposal, any foreigner trying to influence such a debate in Parliament would be covered by FICA. But any foreigner trying to influence the wider public on the same topics will not be covered when that discussion takes place outside, unless it can be shown that that was done in order to influence Government policy.

But Members would have seen from the examples that I have put in the annexes on foreign influence, influencing public opinion is a key aspect of foreign manipulation. Realms and realms of examples, and look at the modus referred to in paragraphs 200 to 206 of the Select Committee report – I do not have it here but Members can check it out – where the Select Committee report says "...Russians built up internet presence in the US to influence..." and this has been done regularly in other countries.

As an example, the Guardian reported that YouTubers, bloggers and influencers in France and Germany were offered money by a PR agency with apparent connections to another state to spread falsehoods about COVID-19 vaccines. For example, "death rate among the vaccinated with Pfizer is almost three times higher than those vaccinated by AstraZeneca." They were asked to "act like you have the passion and interest in this topic" and avoid using the words "sponsored". They were instructed that "the material should be presented as your own independent view".

Sir, I would say it is not logical, if you look at this: we agree that (a) foreigners should not influence; and (c) is wrong, we should not allow foreigners to influence or seek to influence Singapore Government decisions; (e) is wrong and should not be allowed. But foreign-inspired subversion on (f) and (g) are okay.

But, if you look at (a) "to promote the interest of a political party" and if you look at (g) "to influence or seek to influence any aspect or to promote or post political views or public conduct relating to activities that have become the subject of a political debate in Singapore", you can do (a) in a different way under (g), that was what I meant earlier. And you could argue I was doing (g) and not (a).

So, foreign-inspired subversion on (f) and (g) are not okay and this is exactly what the Gerasimov Doctrine seeks to exploit. It seeks to identify issues of “protest potential”, use info operations to polarise society, incite public disorder along these issues and keep the target country in a constant state of turmoil.

Or, take another example, the Explanatory Statement to the Bill. Say, there is a humanitarian crisis in Country Z, it becomes a hot political topic in Singapore. Country Z then sets up Company Y, in Singapore in a bid to sway public opinion. Company Y pretends to be a private local trading enterprise. But it is really just a front for Country Z to influence Singaporeans. To do this, Company Y sets up multiple personas online. It puts out many commentaries online, pretending to be "a freelance journalist" or "experts" in foreign politics, trying to manipulate Singaporeans to take a particular view of the matter. This is taken from real-world happenings.

With the deletions that Mr Gerald Giam has proposed, such conduct may fall outside of FICA, unless it can be referred back to one of the earlier limbs. I think it is not acceptable for us to allow such foreign interference and allow such manipulation of Singaporeans. Eventually, it will weaken our society. The shareholders of the sham company may even get paid for their actions and there would be no offence and no Part 3 directions can be issued, however pervasive the online campaign.

You will also have situations, where (f) and (g) may overlap with the other limbs. Limb (c): "influencing governmental decisions" is defined in section 9 to include influencing the public on a process in respect of the Government decision. If this is a matter of public controversy, then it will overlap with (f). As I said earlier, insofar as (g) covers the influence of political views, this may overlap with matters under (a) which promote the interests of a political party; or (e) which aims to bring about changes in the law.

In this context, let us also look at the exemptions proposed by Member Assoc Prof Jamus Lim. He proposes to exempt "any activity undertaken by Singaporeans to exercise their right to discuss politics by expressing their own views on political matters, unless they are agents of a foreign principal".

Second, he proposes to exempt "an activity undertaken by foreign individuals or foreign publications reporting or commenting on Singapore politics, in an open, transparent and attributable way, even if their comments may be critical of Singapore or the Government". Both proposals are modelled on my Ministry's press release of 13 September 2021, which was issued after the First Reading of the Bill, where we set out the powers under the Bill and explained that it will not apply to these two situations, in the context of clause 120.

It is unnecessary to write this in. It is not covered by the Act. I have said this in Parliament, the MHA statement has stated it and the Explanatory Statement to the Bill, clause 120, explains this. Sometimes, there may be a need to, but you cannot regularly be writing into legislation both what is covered and now also what else is not covered. Because the above two situations are not the only ones not covered; many other issues are also not covered. We clarified those in the press statement because people may have had these questions in mind.

Let me move to clause 17, which is clandestine publishing and this is proposed by Member Assoc Prof Jamus Lim – and I should say it as an aside, the Prime Minister is back, he missed the part about the coup and taking over his powers. But I am sure he will read them.

Clause 17 is now sought to be amended. The current wording is that: "the offence is committed if A publishes in Singapore, he does this on behalf of a foreign principal and A has reason to believe that what is published is likely to be prejudicial to Singapore's interests, in one of various ways and he does this covertly and deceptively". Assoc Prof Jamus Lim wants to remove the phrase "is likely to be".

Mr Speaker, Sir, with your permission, may I ask the Clerk to display slide No 3, which contains this amendment.

Mr Speaker: Please do.

Mr K Shanmugam: Again, for those who cannot read it, you can look at the handout in the grey file that has been handed out.

This proposed amendment will narrow the mental state. The phrase, "is likely to be", is sought to be struck out. If this edit goes through, the prosecution must then prove that a person knew that it would likely be prejudicial. Taking one step back, I would say we are using a slide rule here to try and measure and assess people who are going to come with bazookas. This will not work in the real world. Even more so, when it comes to clandestine foreign interference. Any decent intelligence service would know how to cover its tracks, conceal its linkages and disavow knowledge.

So, under these proposed amendments, someone could take money from a neighbouring country, attack us, publish allegations against the Police or SAF or other institutions, cause unhappiness and unrest amongst our local ethnic communities. This can be done covertly and not disclose that he is taking money. Yet, if the proposals are accepted, the person cannot be charged in Court because the prosecution has to show that the person knew or had reason to believe that his actions would be prejudicial. The person could claim, for example, that he did not realise that his post would be picked up by others and shared around. He did not know it would be prejudicial and he had no reason to believe so. This is so, even if we can prove that he took money from a foreign agency to put up the posts with the purpose of damaging Singapore. It is really like taking knives to a gunfight.

Common sense is, if you had reason to believe that your actions are likely to prejudice Singapore's interests and you are acting for a foreign agency, you are acting covertly, secretly, it should be an offence.

I make broadly the same points for the proposed amendments to clauses 18, 40 and 75.

Related to this, Assoc Prof Jamus Lim wishes to amend clause 17(2), to remove a caveat that "Y does not need to have in mind a particular foreign country or foreign principal in order to be considered to have committed an offence". This, similarly, narrows the mental state for the offence and means that the prosecutor must prove that the person is acting for a specific foreign principal and it is impractical for the reasons I had already given.

As matter of principle, knowledge that there is "a foreign principal" and "acting on his behalf" should suffice, even if the person does not know which foreign principal it is. It does not matter whether you are acting for country X, Y or Z as long as you know you are acting for some country.

If I may move to clause 20, also the amendment proposed by Assoc Prof Jamus Lim. The current wording is that the Minister may authorise directions where, in the opinion of the Minister, those conditions for HIC are satisfied. The Member wants to remove the phrase "or is suspected of being or having been undertaken".

In practice, suspicion of links to a foreign principal would likely arise from a lead, an intelligence tip-off or other kinds of tip-off. If there is such a suspicion, security agencies would probe further, gather data, try to corroborate the information, ascertain if the lead is reliable and they would require triangulation from different sources.

If you recall the earlier example of a state that apparently worked through a PR agency to get social media influencers to discredit vaccines, people eventually got suspicious due to a combination of indicators: suspicious instructions from the company to mask that they were being paid to push their messages; the company claimed to be based at an address in London, but turned out not to be registered there; company management from Moscow; online presence that disappeared once people started raising suspicions. None of these indicators, on their own, proves a conclusive link to a foreign principal. But, collectively, they paint a suspicious picture.

So, if a foreign publication strongly attacks a Government policy and a local person is actively helping them and pushes out that content while accepting donations from them and taking effort to conceal the funding, consistently, over time, circumstances look suspicious, but nothing can be done if we cannot prove that the person was actually acting on behalf of a foreign principal. I think we must be able to act on reasonable suspicion, which is a threshold well-established in law.

Under FICA, the Government would be able to take some measures: issue directions to take down the harmful content, or a must-carry direction to inform the public that a HIC is going on and these are executory in nature. Thresholds above do not relate to an offence. If the person receiving the direction is aggrieved, he can appeal to the Tribunal.

Clause 21, Assoc Prof Lim wants to add in the phrase "rely on actionable intelligence”. So, we now call this agency to come and prove the actionable intelligence or we get documents and produce them? There is a process. You cannot just produce a document. And added on to that, Assoc Prof Lim and his colleagues want this to be in Court. How do you even prove these documents? How do you put any foreign intelligence agents on the stand? What is actionable intelligence?

In the real world, tip-offs come from intelligence agencies, from certain activities, associations, sometimes, it can be definitive, a "smoking gun", but in the vast majority of cases, it is less definite. Links to a foreign state could be through ownership, funding, other associations. It requires a piecing together of different data points.

I can tell Assoc Prof Lim from experience, if ever we said that we are going to refer what they said to us publicly, immediately they will disavow all knowledge and, thereafter, they will refuse to have contact with us. That is the real world. So, we need to be practical, not theoretical in this, with an understanding of how intelligence operations work.

There is another problem which lawyers will understand – what is the legal standard for actionable intelligence? It will replace "suspects or has reason to believe", which is a concept which lawyers know and is well-defined; at least, there is case law. You have replaced that with "actionable intelligence".

Essentially, the tribunal will have the right to consider the information available, which the Government makes available, and decide whether the conclusion that the Government has come to was justified.

Let me now move to the final set of amendments.

Clause 104, an amendment proposed by Ms He Ting Ru. She wants to replace the tribunal with proceedings in the High Court. This is in respect of appeals against our counter-HIC directions, any Part 3 direction or declaration as a Proscribed Online Location.

The question is, should the appeals relating to HIC Directions go to Court and should there be public hearings? In a Court process, the Government may be required to set out its case in public, months in advance of the trial, documents have to be exchanged, witnesses must be available to give evidence, there will be cross examination and then the Judge decides.

Going back to my earlier example, assume we get an intel tip-off. Foreign agency tipping us off about someone, which has happened even quite recently, and which then led to us exercising powers under the Internal Security Act. There are no documents. Will we be able to get the foreign intel contact to come to Court? As I said, they will just not hear us. We would not even get a response and that will be the end of the cooperation.

If we think the tip-off has some merit, we do our own investigations and then issue Directions. If the person is not happy, he appeals to the tribunal. The tribunal members have the same immunity and protection as High Court judges. They will consider any appeal brought under section 92.

Let me give you another example. Some countries – I am not saying we do – but some countries have human assets in other countries. Let us say the information is obtained through such a human asset. You want to reveal that in Court? Depending on the country that the human asset is in, he may not live for very long after that. And even if he lives, he would not be free.

One could ask: can you have the case in-camera in Court? That would not solve the problem.

You have to file the evidence in Court. A lot of parties get to see the file. Some of this information, frequently, is often known only to two to three persons who need to know, even within the security agency. The Minister does not get to see it or know about it, unless it is necessary to brief the Minister.

Let me give you a simple illustration of the real world by referring to a case that is before the Courts now, which is not anywhere in the category of cases we are now talking about in terms of sensitivity.

There is a case pending, an application by 17 prisoners awaiting capital punishment. They are making an application against the Attorney-General. They seek various reliefs against the Attorney-General. Various allegations have been made which the AGC considers to be completely scurrilous and without basis and being made to simply throw mud and stirred. That is the AGC's view.

They are represented by a local lawyer. The hearing is in chambers. The lawyers will know the hearing is in chambers. It has not been published yet. Details of the affidavits, everything cannot be published. But details of the plaintiffs' affidavits appeared in a Malaysian news portal within a month of the application being filed and the allegations relate to, well, I was going to say there were very strong racial undertones. In fact, they are about race.

Someone wanted to make these assertions in Court and then make sure they were published outside, which AGC considers absolutely scandalous. The info should not have been made public. It is a possible breach of rules. The lawyer claims that his “instructing solicitor” is from Malaysia, for one of the plaintiffs. So, now you investigate and even if you take action for breach of the rules, the info is public.

In this case, the info is not security-sensitive.

But let us say you have highly secret intel information. First of all, does it make sense to hand it over to the very person who is a suspect or to his lawyers? And how do you have a Court process?

So, the theory has to fit the practice.

That is why we thought long and hard, and then, said let us have a Tribunal headed by a Supreme Court Judge who can overrule the Minister. The Courts still have a role to play and that is in the Explanatory Statement. They will ensure procedural compliance, proper exercise of jurisdiction, but they will not review the merits, other aspects of executory decisions taken under the Bill.

As the House considers this, we must also look at this in the context of some other pieces of legislation we have in Singapore and what our approach to governance is. Mr Speaker, Sir, with your permission, may I display a slide which compares different legislation.

Mr Speaker: Yes, please. [A slide was shown to hon Members.]

Mr K Shanmugam: We have legislation that provide for tribunals and limit the Courts power of judicial review to achieve a variety of different objectives. And, so far, Singapore has been successful in this balancing exercise. Let me explain.

The starting point is always Rule of Law. It is fundamental, both for the well-functioning of society and to build a modern, economically vibrant society. At the same time, we recognise the normal judicial process is not best suited for specific matters; that is an exercise that requires careful consideration. Let me give a few examples. This is in annex L.

If you look at the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (MRHA), the Minister can issue Restraining Orders. They are considered by the Presidential Council for Religious Harmony, which, in turn, makes its recommendations to the President to confirm, vary or cancel the order. All orders and decisions of the President and the Minister, and the recommendations of the Council, are final and not subject to judicial review.

During the Second Reading of MRHA, I explained that where religious issues are concerned, the trial process may not be the best way to deal with it. It can deepen the fault lines, encourage martyrdom and inflame tensions even more.

The Restraining Orders can impose a significant restraint on normal freedoms. The Restraining Order can restrain the person from addressing orally or in writing any congregation, require the person to stop communication activity, stop contributing to any religious publication, and restrain the person from holding office in an editorial board or committee of a religious publication.

The Orders can be made against religious groups, to prohibit a group from receiving donations from specific or all foreign donors; require the entire governing body of the group to be Singapore Citizens; or require the group to suspend or remove specific foreigners from office. So, you can see the underlining philosophy there again – concern is foreign influence.

In some ways, these Orders are more serious than what can be made under FICA. The religious groups were initially concerned. We talked to them, we explained how our powers can be exercised and they understood and they accepted.

Second, if we look at the Land Acquisition Act. This is your house, you are living there. You could be living there all your life. The Government can acquire under the Land Acquisition Act. Any appeal against the Collector’s awards have to be heard by an Appeals Board.

Good reason: we learnt from the experience of other countries. A small country: we decided if we want to reshape and develop Singapore, the Government must have the power to acquire land quickly, develop it and not be tied up with the normal litigation process. In fact, the inspiration and one of the places we looked at was India, and when it was taken, the then Prime Minister decided the constitutional protection for land which is in the Indian Constitution should be removed from our Constitution.

So, a person's property can be acquired and it is the tribunal that decides on the value.

The approach to land acquisition, the policy on land acquisition, underpins our entire public housing policy, HDB policy. It underpins our entire industrial land policy and many other aspects, just based on this unorthodox approach.

If you look at the Immigration Act, section 39A, no judicial review for any decision made by the Minister or Controller under the Immigration Act, save in relation to procedural compliance.

If you look at the Employment of Foreign Manpower Act, financial penalties can be imposed, other Orders can be made, appeal is to an Appeals Board, chaired by a person qualified to be a Judge of the Supreme Court. May not even be a Judge. A person qualified to be a Judge. And the Appeals Board determines its own procedures and its decision is final.

Decisions of the Controller relating to the issuance or cancellation of work passes, variation of its conditions, these are not subject to judicial review, save in relation to procedural compliance.

The Internal Security Act (ISA) has been instrumental in ensuring our safety and security. It provides for detention without trial, on Executive Order. Singaporeans understand and accept the ISA. It allows us to pick up would-be terrorists, pre-emptively.

In 2017, we picked up a 22-year-old kindergarten teacher. Young and our first female detainee. Do we wait until she does something, perhaps to the kindergarten children? She went through rehab and is now released.

In any other country, she could not have been picked up and there are countries where she could have been picked up, but I am referring to the countries that we normally refer to. If she is not picked up and she goes overseas to one of the war zones, she might well not be alive today. But now, she has the prospect of carrying on with her life and achieve her full potential.

In the last couple of years, amongst those picked up were two teenagers. One wanted to carry out a knife attack in a mosque and the other wanted to carry out a knife attack in a synagogue. Do we wait until they actually attack? What would be the harm to our social fabric? So, the ISA has helped us avoid the bad incidents and hypocrisies we see elsewhere.

Recall the incident in New Zealand on 3 September 2021 where an extremist stabbed shoppers at the supermarket. You wake up in the morning, you go the supermarket. Suddenly, someone comes and stabs you. The attacker was known to the security agencies. He was under surveillance since 2016 because of his support for the Islamic State ideology. But under New Zealand's laws, he could not be picked up. There have been other similar cases in the UK and in France. Annex M sets out the details.

The global security think- tank GLOBSEC examined 22 terror incidents in France since 2012 and noted that nearly 80% of the people behind those attacks had been on a terror watchlist and 97% had been on the radar of authorities. With the ISA, 97% of those incidents could have been avoided and many lives saved. This included Said and Cherif Kouachi, who were career criminals who killed 12 people in January 2015 in the Charlie Hebdo office in Paris.

If you turn to the US, President Obama took office in 2008. He campaigned on the promise to close down Guantanamo Bay or Gitmo. He did not do so during the eight years of his Presidency. One reason: closing Gitmo could mean that several of these hardcore detainees could be moved to the United States and many Americans were opposed to that idea. To date, what we can check – we may be wrong – is that only one Gitmo prisoner has been transferred to the US for prosecution in the federal courts. We may be wrong about the exact number but I think it is a very low number.

What is the theory? The theory, and the Americans have been preaching this to us on the ISA, there must be due process, you must not have detention without trial and the State Department will tell us and publish a list. But when it comes to the US, there is due process in the US. They have all these hardened criminals, terrorists picked up from around the world. So, they put them in Gitmo, which is in Cuba, and then they say, well, since this is outside of the US, the US due process laws do not apply, and therefore, we can detain them without trial and they do not get the benefit of US due process. On top of that, basically, Members know about the atrocities that were committed on the prisoners.

Which is why I said we look at the world as it is and we avoid hypocrisies. We deal with it in a practical way. Doctors look at the ISD detainees. Justices of Peace go there, see them. We give them religious rehabilitation. We do not throw away the keys. And, after a while, many of them are released, when they are rehabilitated. We do not allow ideology to stand in the way of doing right for society when that ideology does not make sense. The ideology must be to do what is right for Singaporeans.

If you go to the CLTPA, it also provides for detention without trial. And I am well aware that the Workers' Party has a different view both on the ISA and the CLTPA, though I do not know what will be the substance of the provisions they will replace the ISA with. But anyway, and, therefore, it may be difficult for them to philosophically agree with this. But I am setting out the approach the Government has taken.

The CLTPA provides for detention without trial. It is a practical approach by then Prime Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew. Evidence will often not be available; people too frightened to give evidence. In fact, we inherited this from the British and then changed it. People will be too frightened to give evidence. In the longer term, more harm to society, by leaving gangsters out in society. So, better to give to the Executive these powers to deal with some types of pernicious criminals. It has helped to keep our society safe.

If we had stuck to the approach of looking at everything on the basis only of the rights of the persons accused in the way that, say, the US or UK looks at it, and without balancing the rights of the society, we will not have the safe and crime-free society we have today. And the rights of the accused or detainees, both under the ISA and CLTPA, are protected. They are dealt with by tribunals.

So, the question for this House is: how do we view the risks of foreign interference? How do we place the risks in the context of the other legislation that I have referred to? Would it be possible to deal with these issues of foreign interference through a normal Court process? Often, we do not even name the countries involved. Can you imagine naming one of our neighbours in Court? Or a larger country? When we asked Huang Jing to leave, we did not say who he was acting for. Why?

The foreign policy and national security implications are too serious. The US can name any country that it wishes. But we are a price taker in this business of international relations. Also, how do you have a Court process without leaks?

So, if you look at what can be done through Executive Order under FICA, directives can be issued for greater transparency. The Government might ask some to disassociate themselves from foreigners if there is an increased threat of foreign interference, but we should compare that against Land Acquisition, against the Orders that can be made under other legislation that I have referred to. And also, it is not as if it is either a Court process or nothing. There is a tribunal, fully empowered, headed by a Supreme Court Judge, and they can consider any appeal brought under section 92.

On a separate point, generally, in legislation, the usual rules for judicial review limit review of the Courts to reasonableness, legality and propriety. That has been so in POFMA as well as in other legislation.

Members can see, therefore, various pieces of legislation have conferred the Government with generally-worded discretion. Philosophically, the Government has seen that as part of good governance to ensure our laws are effective so that the Government can act when it needs to. You need checks and balances, but the checks must be suited to the task and balanced against the risks.

What are the risks? There are risks with giving any government any power, whether or not it is appealable to a Court. There are always risks. It is a degree of risk. There are also risks in not giving power. The real issue is what powers should you give. What are the risks? And what are the risks in not giving the powers?

The risk here, which underlies some of the concerns that have been raised and some of the illustrations because the Government says these illustrations do not come within FICA and then you will say, what if the Government abuses its power. I referred to it briefly earlier. And what if the Government interferes with perfectly normal collaboration with a foreigner? it will be an abuse of power. But what if the Government abuses its power?

So, you have to weigh the risks of a rogue Government doing that versus a rogue foreign interference. The latter, is a far greater risk.

The risk of a rogue government abusing its power. First of all, what is the power, compared with the powers in other legislation? Second, it can be looked at by a tribunal headed by a Supreme Court Judge. All the decisions published, people can see and assess themselves. And, ultimately, people have the final say in a highly literate population like Singapore. A final say of both public opinion and public opinion expressed through elections. People in Singapore would not stand for a rogue government.

The risk of not giving the power or requiring a Court process, in the context of the risks I have outlined, will severely compromise the Government's ability to deal with the real risk of foreign interference which has actually happened.

I, like some of those who could have made comments, and I am sure everyone here, wish that there is a world where the Government has the power to act and, at the same time, there is a complete check against abuse. If we can find that formula, we will gladly take that because that is ideal. But there is no such formula.

Then, we have to, first of all, admit that there are trade-offs whichever route you take. If you go to Court, there are trade-offs; if you have a tribunal, there are trade-offs. And I agree that, with a rogue government, there is a risk of abuse, as I have said, not just of this power but several other powers; and not just the Executive powers but also even powers which can be looked at or appealed to the Courts. Just as there is a risk of an order made under MRHA against preachers on religious groups that we do not agree with, or detentions under the CLTPA, or land acquisition.

In many countries, the population would not support this kind of land acquisition powers because it only leads to some very wealthy Ministers or not much public benefit. But in Singapore, the population trusted the Government and Singapore has developed in a way which could not even have been dreamt about in 1965. Along the way, we have had to make these choices in a number of areas, as I have shown to Members. And over time, people have seen how our approach proved to be good for the majority of people.

And over the same period, Singapore's reputation for Rule of Law, its judicial system, legal system, institutions, both in and outside of the legal field, were all enhanced and they were built up.

So, I say to this House: this law gives the Government a set of tools that can help. It is not a complete defence against foreign interference but they can help.

The Bill represents the best balance that we can find between dealing with the risks and providing checks against abuse.

Ms He Ting Rualso proposes to remove the immunity provision in clause 119. The reason for this suggestion is not clear. We recently amended the Police Force Act to provide that no liability shall lie personally against any enforcement officer who acts in good faith and with reasonable care in the execution of the Act or any other written law. That is clause 119. This provision simply extends the same protection to a competent authority or an authorised officer who assists a Police Officer in the execution of powers under the Act.

Sir, in conclusion, I have articulated the need for the Bill and addressed the misconceptions that have surfaced in the past few days. This Bill is a calibrated piece of legislation that enables us to act surgically against threats that have come and continue to loom over us. Mr Speaker, I beg to move. [Applause.]

Question proposed.

Mr Speaker: Minister of State, Faishal Ibrahim.

3.00 pm

The Minister of State for Home Affairs (Assoc Prof Dr Muhammad Faishal Ibrahim): Mr Speaker, the Minister for Home Affairs has explained the outline and reasons for the Bill. I support the principles of the Bill as outlined by the Minister and would like to advocate the importance of having such a law to deal with hostile information campaigns (HICs).

I will discuss Parts 2 and 3 provisions pertaining to HICs.

Foreign actors have leveraged digital technologies to carry out HICs. We have observed that these tend to be deliberate and coordinated attempts to use information to manipulate public opinion and harm a country’s interest. In addition, they are often clandestine and seek to mislead the public under false pretences.

This Bill does so by providing a set of offences and empowering the Government to issue directions to counter HICs.

The new offences in Part 2 of the Bill are aimed at acts of foreign interference by covert means using electronic communications. Clause 10 defines electronic communications activity as the communication or distribution of any information or material through means of SMS, MMS, a social media service, a relevant electronic service or an Internet access service.

Clause 17 introduces the offence of clandestine foreign interference by electronic communications activity. There are three elements.

First, the person acts on behalf of a foreign principal, or on behalf of a person acting on behalf of a foreign principal. He undertakes electronic communications activity that results in or involves publishing in Singapore any information or material.

Second, any part of the person’s undertaking or electronic communications activity is covert or involves deception.

Third, the person knows or has reason to believe that the electronic communications activity or the information or material published in Singapore is against Singapore’s public interest.

The offence clearly deals with persons covertly and knowingly acting against the public interest on behalf of a foreigner. The mere fact that communications were private, for example, an online video call between two people, would not make them covert.

For an offence to be made out, there must be an element of secrecy or a lack of transparency surrounding the person’s conduct. For example, a Singaporean is paid by a foreign intelligence agency to publish a number of articles criticising Singapore’s foreign policy towards that country. He does so but presents it in his personal capacity as a citizen without disclosing his links to the foreign agency. This would be considered covert.

Clause 17 does not cover Singaporeans acting on their own accord or foreigners making open and attributable comments. Nor does it cover unintentional acts.

For example, an article by a foreigner who openly declares his identity, published in a foreign publication, such as the Economist or the Wall Street Journal, would not be an offence under FICA. The same applies to foreign political observers or political commentators publishing on a social media platform or a blog, if they make no attempt to mislead Singaporeans as to who they are.

A Singaporean shares an online video propagated as part of a foreign HIC on his social media account. However, he does so unwittingly and was not aware that the content is part of a HIC nor did he receive any support or instruction from a foreign principal. The Singaporean also has not committed an offence.

Clause 18 introduces a separate aggravated offence of clandestine foreign interference of a target using electronic communications activity. This offence would apply if a few conditions are fulfilled.

First, a person undertakes electronic communications activity on behalf of a foreign principal.

Second, the person does so to influence another person to undertake activity or engage in conduct in Singapore that is prejudicial to Singapore’s public interest.

Third, in doing so, the person does not disclose his links to the foreign principal.

This is an aggravated offence because it involves a greater degree of duplicity in targeting another person to act against Singapore’s public interest. Such acts are calculated and more likely even harder to detect, and, consequently, have the potential to cause greater harm. The offence thus carries higher penalties commensurate with the greater harm.

Clause 19 introduces an offence of preparing or planning for the above offences and clause 115 clarifies that these offences will have extra-territorial application.

These offences will be investigated by the Police. For offences involving SAF installations, assets and personnel, Police will work with SAF.

The Bill contains customised powers for the Government to act against HIC content online. Part 3 of the Bill empowers different directions: (a) to obtain information about HICs before they happen; (b) to detect and prevent HICs taking place; and (c) should they occur here, to contain the HIC.

As the Minister has stressed, the basic architecture of our counter-HIC measures is that directions can be issued only when the Minister assesses that all of the following three conditions in clause 20 are met: (a) online communications activity is undertaken, or suspected to be undertaken, by or on behalf of a foreign principal; (b) the online communications activity results in content that is published in Singapore; and (c) it is in the public interest to issue that direction.

Clause 7 sets out non-exhaustive illustrations of what would cross the public interest threshold. For example, in the interest of the security of Singapore, to protect public health or public finances, to prevent incitement of feelings of enmity among different groups in Singapore, or to prevent foreign interference directed towards a political end, which would include interfering in our domestic politics.

These illustrations reflect the context of HICs. They are not meant to constrain the interpretation of public interest found in other laws, which should be read in their respective contexts.

To improve the Government’s ability to investigate potential HICs, clause 36 introduces the Technical Assistance Direction to request various forms of assistance from social media services, relevant electronic services, hosting services, Internet access service providers and proprietors of online locations. The intent is for these parties to provide information or data that is useful in investigating if there is an ongoing HIC and the source of the HIC content, in particular, whether it originates from a foreign source.

This information includes basic subscriber information that is provided when accounts are set up, such as IP addresses, or aggregated geolocation data. It is not MHA's intent to demand assistance that is not reasonably practicable or information beyond what is necessary. Nor will we demand information for purposes beyond investigating a suspected HIC.

Technical Assistance Directions are subject to a non-disclosure requirement to prevent tipping off a suspect of an ongoing investigation and prevent any unauthorised external party from undermining investigations. Recipients can specify that they received the direction but cannot disclose the substance of the direction. Breaches of any non-disclosure requirement constitutes an offence under clause 46.

Other Part 3 directions are designed to provide targeted powers for the Government to contain the propagation of HICs and mitigate the harms caused.

Clause 32 introduces the Must Carry Direction that will require the recipient to publish, post, display or include a message about the HIC content in a manner prescribed by Regulations. The intent of such directions is to warn the public that the content is part of a HIC. There are four classes of directions for different recipients.

A Class 1 Must Carry Direction can be issued to the communicator of the HIC content to publish a mandatory message.

A Class 2 direction can be issued to relevant electronic services and social media services to publish a mandatory message with respect to specified information or material, or identical copies of it. For example, if a foreign state-run media outlet posts videos on social media and these videos are part of a HIC campaign, then the Government may issue a Class 2 direction to the social media platform, to require the platform to publish a notification tagged to the video to notify the public that this video is part of a HIC campaign.

A Class 3 direction requires providers of social media services, relevant electronic services, telecommunications services, newspapers or licensed broadcasting services to publish a general notice to end users in Singapore. It is not necessary for HIC content to have been communicated on the service in order for a direction to be issued. This class of directions is intended to alert Singaporeans that a HIC is ongoing.

A Class 4 direction requires proprietors of Proscribed Online Locations to put up a notice about its proscribed status so that any visitors to the online location are aware that it is a HIC vector.

There are two directions to remove specific HIC content from being accessible by end users in Singapore.

Clause 30 introduces the Stop Communication (end-user) Direction, which will require communicators to take down information or material that is published in Singapore and to stop publishing similar material in Singapore; and clause 31 introduces the Disabling Direction, which will require relevant electronic services and social media services to take down specific content from the view of Singapore end users.

Clause 34 introduces the Account Restriction Direction, which can be issued to relevant electronic services and social media services and is intended to prevent specific accounts from communicating with Singapore end users.

Clause 35 introduces the Service Restriction Direction, which can be issued to relevant electronic services, social media services and Internet access service providers to stem the virality of HICs and restrict Internet service functionality respectively. Each Service Restriction Direction will specify the actions required of the recipient. For example, restricting a certain function of their service, preventing harmful content from being actively recommended to end users in Singapore, or slowing down or stopping Internet access. MHA will work with the industry on how such directions are to be operationalised and identify reasonable and practicable interventions, given the potential significant impact on the services.

Clause 37 introduces the App Removal Direction to stop the further distribution of an app to Singapore end users, if the app is being used to spread HIC content. This can be issued only if at least one direction that is not a Technical Assistance Direction or another App Removal Direction had been issued with respect to that app.

Clause 24 provides for the Minister to declare an online location as a Proscribed Online Location or POL, if one Part 3 direction, other than the Technical Assistance Direction, has been issued. Once proscribed, it is an offence to operate this POL, provide support to it or have advertising dealings with it. Clauses 39 to 41 give effect to these restrictions. To ensure that the public is aware of its POL status, a Class 4 Must Carry Direction can be issued to require the owner to put up a notice about its proscribed status. The intent of this POL regime is, hence, to reduce the impact of the POL by: firstly, reducing its visibility via advertising; secondly, warning Singaporeans to the threat posed by the POL; and thirdly, cutting off its revenue streams and preventing it from profiting from its operations.

We also need to be able to take action against non-compliance of directions. Clause 33 introduces the Access Blocking Direction. There are two classes.

Class 1 can be issued to Internet access service providers to disable access by every end user in Singapore to the website or service that had not complied with the direction.

Class 2 can be applied to Internet access service providers, relevant electronic services and social media services to disable access to a POL if paid content on the POL is published in Singapore or the POL fails to comply with the Must Carry (Class 4) Direction to notify Singaporean users about its POL status.

Clause 38 introduces the Disgorgement Direction. This can be issued to any Singaporean, resident in Singapore or locally registered entity that has supported the HIC and it will require them to return to the foreign source any funding or material support provided.

Non-compliance with these directions will be an offence under clause 45. If charged, parties may raise the defence that it was not reasonably practicable to do more than what was done or that there were no better practicable means of complying, for example, due to technical impossibility.

Mr Speaker, HICs can cause devastating harm, including erosion of the country's sovereignty, undermining of social cohesion and loss of public trust. The Minister has provided a detailed account and these cases are well-publicised. In addition, threat actors are improving their tactics all the time.

Therefore, we cannot wait for harms to occur before taking action because severe damage may already be done. Should there be credible information about a potential HIC threat, the Government must be able to act to prevent it.

Our authorisation thresholds must, therefore, be calibrated to allow certain directions to be issued even before any harmful communications have commenced. Clause 21, therefore, provides for two specific directions – Technical Assistance Direction and Account Restriction Direction – to be authorised before harmful communications activity has taken place.

Let me illustrate how we intend to use these levers.

Take the following scenario, which is illustrative but not exhaustive. It is not hypothetical because we have seen this modus operandi in HICs conducted against other countries.

On a social media service, a set of accounts amasses followers by first posting popular content on lifestyle matters, such as cute animal videos or funny memes. There are multiple accounts and the accounts act in coordination. For example, account A actively tries to increase account B's visibility by sharing its content and so on.

At the opportune moment, such as election season or during a period of tension with another country, these accounts start to pivot to social and political commentaries, hoping to sway how Singaporeans vote or react to a foreign policy issue.

Assuming this happens here and our monitoring agencies detect these accounts gaining traction. We can issue a Technical Assistance Direction to investigate the origin of such accounts.

If we have sufficient reason to believe that these are foreign accounts and are planning to undertake an HIC against Singapore, we can issue Account Restriction Directions to prevent them from propagating their HIC content to end-users in Singapore.

Mr Speaker, MHA has studied international cases and reviewed testimony from the Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods to come up with these directions. Let me reiterate that MHA will use these powers judiciously and will calibrate our actions based on the specifics of each case.

In assessing whether a HIC is afoot, the primary determinant is the behaviour of the actor involved and the entities behind the content. It is clear, therefore, that Singaporeans who are simply expressing their own views or engaging in the political process on their own accord are not covered and neither will the vast majority of communications involving foreigners, be it journalism or academia or online advocacy.

MHA has also consulted the major stakeholders on the operationalisation of these directions and will continue doing so, to take into account the industry's constraints, from the technical to the legal, as we work together to counter HIC threats on their platforms.

I have set out the clear conditions that must be met before directions can be issued and the defences inscribed in the Bill. I will now set out the avenues for appeal.

This Bill will provide the right of appeal to recipients of counter-HIC directions and proprietors of POLs. Appeals will be heard by a reviewing tribunal.

Clause 23 clarifies that recipients of counter-HIC directions and proprietors of POLs must first apply to the Minister to reconsider the Part 3 direction. Should the Minister reject the application, the appealing party may then appeal to a reviewing tribunal, which is constituted under Part 8 of the Bill.

The appeal to the tribunal must be submitted within 30 days from the outcome of the Minister's reconsideration. This tribunal can then dismiss the appeal, confirm the direction appealed against or revoke the direction. Decisions would be determined by the tribunal and are final. These are set out in clause 97.

The Minister has explained the reasoning behind the reviewing tribunal. The difficulty that confronts us is the suitability of making the Courts serve as an oversight body for decisions taken under the Bill, which involve issues of national security, defence and foreign policy and information from intelligence sources, not necessarily only of our agencies. Our own Courts have said that they have limits in these areas.

The reviewing tribunal structure thus recognises the need for checks and balances while protecting sensitive intelligence that is relied upon to counter a HIC. The tribunal, in fact, goes further than judicial review in some ways in that it is able to assess the initial decision on its merits, whereas the Court in judicial review proceedings focuses only upon the legality of the administrative decision.

Mr Speaker, allow me to continue my speech in Malay.

(In Malay): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech on Pg xxx.] Mr Speaker, we are facing a severe and evolving threat of foreign interference, which can be carried out online through HICs or through local proxies involved in our political processes, also known as Politically Significant Persons or PSPs. The Minister and I have outlined the threat of HICs, and Minister of State Desmond Tan will speak on the threat of PSPs. It is clear that we need to take steps to counter it.

We have been discussing these issues in Singapore over the last three years. At least 18 representors spoke on the threat of foreign interference at the Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods in 2018. There was a major conference in 2019, and discussions at our Committee of Supply (COS) debates. So, this is not a Bill that has come in haste.

This Bill does not significantly increase the substantive powers from existing laws, such as the Internal Security Act, Criminal Procedure Code, Broadcasting Act and Telecommunications Act. In fact, a significant portion of the Bill is simply the Political Donations Act ported over.

So, what the Bill does is to provide more targeted and calibrated levers against HICs, which are narrower than existing powers, such as in the Broadcasting and Telecommunications Act. I have brought the House through these levers and provided some illustrations of how we intend to use them in a judicious and proportionate manner.

In addition, this Bill ports over the requirements for PSPs from the Political Donations Act and introduces a more robust framework of designations and executory powers to deal with interference through PSPs, which Minister of State Desmond Tan will elaborate on.

There are comparable levers and requirements in other foreign jurisdictions.

Let me also reiterate that this Bill does not target Singaporeans participating independently in our domestic political discourse nor the very vast majority of interactions with foreigners. It is primarily concerned with covert and clandestine activities to manipulate our domestic politics and undermine our political sovereignty, and not open, transparent and attributable activities, transactions, relationships or even criticisms. There are also various safeguards, such as clear criteria for offences, clear authorisation thresholds for directions and avenues for appeal.

Mr Speaker, this Government has always taken the firm stance that our domestic politics are for Singaporeans to decide and that we should not allow foreign actors to interfere in them. This Bill ensures that we can continue to take this stance and that Singaporeans can continue to make our own choices on how we should govern our country and live our lives.

Mr Speaker: Minister of State Desmond Tan.

3.29 pm

The Minister of State for Home Affairs (Mr Desmond Tan): Mr Speaker, on behalf of the Minister, I will now take Members through the second part of the Bill that empowers us to counter foreign interference through local proxies.

Despite the proliferation of foreign interference attempts in the digital space, we still see many instances of interference by hostile foreign actors in the physical world through compromising local proxies.

One example that was raised in the Minister's earlier speech took place in Australia, where a former senator received donations from an individual with connections to a foreign government. The former senator then advocated for the foreign country's position on the South China Sea despite it being contradictory to his party's position.

Another example took place in 2015, where Reuters reported that a state-linked company was covertly backing at least 33 radio stations in countries across the Asia Pacific region to form a global network broadcasting news that placed that particular state in a positive light.

Closer to home, Singapore is not immune. In the 1980s, the First Secretary of the United States Embassy in Singapore, Hank Hendrickson, cultivated a group of Singaporean lawyers to join Opposition politics and contest the 1988 General Election. The lawyers were offered funding, and one of them was even offered refuge in the US should he subsequently run into difficulties with the Singapore Government.

We should update our laws to address the new ways that foreign actors can influence local political individuals and entities.

We currently have the Political Donations Act (PDA) that prohibits political associations, as well as election candidates and their agents, from accepting monetary donations from foreign sources.

However, PDA does not cover other individuals who are directly involved in our political processes, such as our Members of Parliament. Also, PDA only covers monetary donations and does not cover other possible vectors of interference, such as through formal affiliation with a foreign organisation and provision of volunteer services by foreigners.

To strengthen our safeguards, this Bill will repeal PDA, bring the existing PDA obligations into this Bill, and introduce some additional countermeasures.

First, let me go through the individuals and entities that this Bill aims to cover.

Clause 14 of the Bill defines individuals and entities, who are formally involved in our political processes, as Politically Significant Persons (PSPs). These are listed in the Bill and are, namely: political parties; Political Office Holders; Members of Parliament, which include elected Members of Parliament, Non-Constituency Members of Parliament and Nominated Members of Parliament; Leader of the House; Leader of the Opposition; election candidates; and election agents.

The Bill also empowers the Competent Authority, a civil servant in MHA appointed by the Minister for Home Affairs, to designate other individuals and entities as PSPs, if certain conditions are met.

Clause 14, read with clauses 47 and 48, empowers the Competent Authority to designate entities and individuals respectively as PSPs if: (a) they are members of foreign political or legislative bodies, or their activities are directed, in part, towards a political end; and (b) the Competent Authority assesses that it is in the public interest that countermeasures be applied.

It is important that we have levers to designate and impose countermeasures on individuals and entities who may be at risk of foreign interference and have exhibited behaviour that points to such risk. It also has the effect of promoting transparency and deterring would-be foreign actors with malicious intent from trying to influence Singapore’s politics through these local proxies.

I will now talk about the different countermeasures that will be imposed on both defined and designated PSPs.

All PSPs will have to comply with a baseline set of obligations and countermeasures.

We will apply the most stringent countermeasures on defined PSPs as they are directly involved in Singapore’s political processes.

For designated PSPs, in the first instance of designation, their obligations only pertain to disclosure. However, clause 88 provides for countermeasures to be stepped-up, if conditions are met, potentially, to the same level as those for defined PSPs.

The countermeasures on PSPs are detailed in Chart 2 that was earlier distributed.

First, let me talk about donations.

Clauses 62 to 65 require all PSPs, both defined and designated, to disclose donations to the Competent Authority. Donations need to be disclosed if they are $10,000 or more. Smaller donations from the same donor that, when aggregated during the same reporting period, amounts to $10,000 or more, also have to be disclosed.

Donations that need to be disclosed do not only cover those that are made in cash. Clause 51 articulates the types of donations that the Bill will cover, including donations made in kind, or the provision of goods and services for a fee below the fair market value.

That said, the Bill does not cover all kinds of donations, only donations that are directed, wholly or in part, towards a political end.

The disclosure requirements do not cover personal gifts, for example, as the intent of the Bill is to safeguard against foreign interference in our domestic politics. Certain other donations or gifts may be handled by other laws.

Defined PSPs are subject to more stringent donation controls. For example, defined PSPs are: (a) prohibited from receiving donations from impermissible donors, such as foreign donors and Singapore Citizens below the age of 21; (b) not allowed to receive $5,000 or more of anonymous donations; and (c) are required to maintain a dedicated bank account to hold their political donations.

Designated PSPs are not subject to these restrictions at the onset of designation. Members will see from the annex that most of these requirements already exist in PDA today.

Influence can also come about through volunteers, apart from donations. Clause 56 prohibits defined PSPs from accepting volunteer labour or services from foreigners. The Bill is not concerned with all types of voluntary services, and only prohibits defined PSPs from accepting voluntary services that relate specifically to the duties and responsibilities of the PSPs in question. For instance, a Member of Parliament cannot allow foreigners to volunteer at Meet-the-People Sessions or any other programmes that are organised by the political parties.

For designated PSPs, there is no prohibition on foreign volunteers in the first instance.

However, if there is an increased risk of foreign interference, clause 85(2)(b), read with clause 88, empowers the Competent Authority to require that the designated PSP report voluntary labour and services that are rendered by foreigners.

Next, disclosure requirements on foreign affiliations. The Bill does not cover all kinds of affiliations. For example, personal friendships or co-workers are not covered by the Bill. The Bill does not restrict association with a foreigner and is not intended to reduce foreign partnerships or businesses.

An example of what the Bill is concerned with is foreign affiliations where the foreign principals are in a position of control over the PSP and the PSP is taking direct instructions from the foreign principal. For example, being an employee of a foreign company would be one such arrangement that will need to be disclosed if you are a PSP. These reportable arrangements are defined in clause 78.

If there is an increased risk of foreign interference, clause 84, read with clause 88, empowers the Competent Authority to require the PSP to terminate its foreign affiliations.

Clauses 78(3) and 78(4) will require defined and designated PSP individuals to declare if they have been granted migration benefits by foreign countries. Examples of migration benefits will include a foreign passport, travel identification documents, an entitlement or privilege or status to work or reside in the foreign country, or an honorary citizenship. The purpose of this declaration is simply for transparency. There would be no stepped-up countermeasures to prohibit the acceptance of migration benefits.

Next, on leadership and membership. The Societies Act already disallows foreigners from being members of political parties. This will continue.

Designated Politically Significant Entities (PSEs), in the first instance, are not prohibited from appointing foreigners to leadership positions or accepting foreign memberships. If there is an increased risk of foreign interference, clause 83, read with clause 88, empowers the Competent Authority to prohibit the PSE from accepting foreigners as members or appointing them as responsible officers within the entity.

There may be instances where the Government will need to act even before we designate an individual or organisation as PSPs. The Bill provides for countermeasures in two of such cases.

First, foreign states may attempt to cultivate Singapore citizens to influence our domestic politics through their involvement in foreign political and legislative bodies. Examples of these would be a foreign political party or political advisory body.

Clause 79 will require Singapore Citizens to declare their involvement in foreign political or legislative bodies.

MHA recognises that there may be innocuous instances where Singaporeans living abroad join foreign political bodies, such as Singaporean students joining foreign political parties while they are studying abroad, out of their own personal interests. However, this can, nonetheless, still pose a threat, as such Singaporeans may be cultivated, approached or influenced, even unknowingly, and, subsequently, made use of to affect our local politics. As such, it is necessary to require them to disclose their involvement in such bodies for transparency purposes.

Second, based on our experience of seeing foreign writers masquerading as local writers in penning articles relating to Singaporean political matters, we felt that it was important for Singaporeans to be aware of the origin of such articles and perspectives.

If there is an increased risk of foreign interference, clauses 80 to 82 will allow the Competent Authority to issue a transparency directive to direct any newspaper, media outlet which includes online media, or any defined or designated PSP that publishes matters on political issues relating to Singapore, to disclose the particulars of any foreign author or foreign principal for whom or at whose direction the article or programme is published, if the article or programme is a political matter concerning Singapore.

To be clear, this will only apply to entities that are issued with the transparency directives.

There is no fixed expiry date for the designation and countermeasures imposed on PSPs. This approach is the same as that under PDA.

But the process is transparent when we designate PSPs.

Clause 49 of the Bill states that when we designate a politically significant person or entity, the Competent Authority must, without delay, give the individual or entity notice of the designation.

Moreover, if a PSP wishes to challenge its designation for the stepped-up countermeasures imposed on it, it may submit an application for the Competent Authority’s reconsideration or an appeal to the Minister for Home Affairs.

Clause 102 allows the Minister to consult an advisory body before arriving at a determination on the merits of the appeal.

Unless a Singaporean or entity is acting as a foreign agent or working with foreigners to affect our public interest, they will not be covered. Academic research, business partnerships, creative collaborations, cultural exchanges – such interactions will not be designated. An employee working for an American tech firm that is openly advocating for American technology as part of their business will not be designated as there is no public interest in doing so. It is also not within the Bill’s intent to prevent local NGOs from freely working with foreign businesses on their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) projects. The Bill also does not seek to stop businesses and organisations from building overseas partnerships or soliciting for overseas business, networking with foreigners, going to conferences or seminars, or engaging in cultural exchanges.

These types of activities and dealings will not be constrained in any way by the proposed Bill. It will be business as usual as we know it for the vast majority of Singaporeans and residents in Singapore.

Allow me to give an example of how the PSP measures will apply.

Let us take a case of a Singapore-registered entity which has been actively commenting on Singapore’s politics in advocating a potentially divisive social issue. The Competent Authority has reason to believe that the entity may be receiving support from a foreign state-linked agency. This entity may be designated by the Competent Authority as a PSE.

To ensure transparency of its activities, the PSE will have to submit donation and foreign affiliation disclosures in the very first instance.

This is, in fact, less stringent than PDA of today. Under PDA, if an entity is designated as a political association, the controls are the same as those imposed on a political party. This includes not being allowed to receive foreign funding and a cap on anonymous donations.

If the Competent Authority assesses that there is a heightened threat of foreign interference, the PSE may be issued with stepped-up countermeasures.

For example, if the PSE is suspected to be receiving funding from the foreign agency to organise a petition against the Government calling for a change in our laws on the issue that the group is advocating for, the Competent Authority may issue a directive prohibiting the PSE from receiving foreign donations.

If the PSE is affiliated with a foreign group which is suspected to be taking instructions from a foreign state, the Competent Authority may direct the PSE to end its affiliation with the foreign group. If the PSE has been publishing articles related to Singapore politics, it may also be issued with a transparency directive to disclose the nationalities of contributors of the articles.

Finally, it is useful to highlight that a substantial portion of the Bill that deals with local proxies was ported over from PDA. Where it is new, it is meant to address the gaps. Our approach is also narrower than the Australian or US approach.

Mr Speaker, allow me to now speak and conclude in Chinese.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech on Pg xxx.] Mr Speaker, Sun Tzu's Art of War has a saying, "it is better to win the heart of people than to capture the city." This saying encapsulates why we need a Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Bill.

Historical thinkers have warned us against overlooking psychological defence in warfare. As the saying goes, "the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting." In today's context, the best strategy in warfare is to win the war without the firing of a single bullet.

History is full of such examples. One such example is Ukraine, which is said to have suffered extensive intervention during the 2014 Crimean status referendum, where sensitive societal fault lines were targeted by a hostile information campaign orchestrated by the Russians to build popular support for Crimea to join Russia. This, eventually, led to the annexation of Crimea.

If we were to allow foreign interference in our domestic politics, Singapore may similarly be subject to such divisive forces. This may result in us losing our autonomy and becoming a vassal state of a foreign power, or a puppet of foreign forces. This is certainly not the desirable outcome.

The PAP Government has always taken a firm stand that our domestic politics are for Singaporeans to decide and that we should not allow foreign actors to interfere in them.

However, this is easier said than done. Being a small open economy and a multicultural society, Singapore is highly susceptible to foreign interference. To ensure that we keep step with the evolving tactics of hostile actors, it is timely for us to update our laws to address the threat of foreign interference.

In addition, I must point out that, contrary to what some commentators have been saying about FICA, the Bill is not intended to target businesses, academic institutions, trade associations, clan associations or other cultural, religious, community or charity groups in their legitimate dealings with foreigners. Singaporeans will still be free to express their views. In fact, the Government's wish is that, with FICA, Singaporeans will be able to freely voice their opinions on Singaporean matters and not the perspective of others.

I want to remind the public that the foreign interference threat is an invisible one, and the threat that the passage of FICA aims to mitigate is one that is hard to guard against because it insidiously targets our world view. And once these perspectives are allowed to fundamentally alter our belief systems, it will be too late for us to take remedial action.

The Bill provides Singapore with the basic levers to defend ourselves, but we hope FICA will raise Singaporeans' awareness about the threat of foreign interference, so that we will not, unwittingly, become vehicles for hostile foreign actors to undermine our national interest. My wish is for Singaporeans to commit to working together to ensure that our affairs will be for Singaporeans only to decide.

(In English): Mr Speaker, this Government has taken a firm stance against foreign interference since our Independence. This Bill ensures that Singaporeans retain the freedom to decide how we should govern our country, how we should live our lives.

Mr Speaker: Mr Pritam Singh.

3.49 pm

Mr Pritam Singh (Aljunied): Mr Speaker, I rise to speak on the Bill. Before I begin, I do not recall coming across a Bill that is understood in such diametrically opposing ways by, on the one hand, some members of the public, including at least two Senior Counsels, many civil society activists, former Nominated Members of Parliament and journalists, and by the Executive on the other.

This anomaly in our public discourse regarding this Bill is significant and it bears deep reflection on how our laws are made and communicated to the public before they are passed in this House.

Sir, my speech has four parts. One, is a summary of the amendments filed by the Workers' Party's Members of Parliament; two, is on how exceptional executive power requires robust judicial oversight to ensure accountability; three, is on how the Government should have sought public feedback on this Bill; and four, is on how the Government has been largely muted as to the non-legislative measures to combat foreign interference and why this needs to be corrected urgently.

Let me first summarise the amendments proposed by the Workers' Party's Members of Parliament who will explain the substantive basis of their amendments in their respective speeches.

Ms He Ting Ru, Mr Leon Perera, Mr Gerald Giam and Assoc Prof Jamus Lim filed amendments to the Bill on 27 September 2021 by 4:30 pm, which is the deadline for filing any amendments to Bills for this particular Sitting. The thrust of the amendments is in four areas: accountability, fairness, transparency and effectiveness.

The first area is accountability. The Government must be accountable when it implements this law and uses executive power against individuals and entities. There should be robust oversight of executive action by the Supreme Court. This must be the default position for parliamentary democracy that recognises the centrality of the separation of powers under our Constitution.

The second area is fairness. The law must more precisely scope the extent of executive powers to minimise the prospect of abuse of power. Phrases, such as "is likely to" and "where the Minister suspects" create low thresholds of proof that could be unfairly used against entities and individuals if power is in the wrong hands. While the Bill targets foreign interference, Singaporeans are the central focus and it is important that their constitutional rights are respected.

The third area is transparency. There has to be greater clarity and transparency on the entities and individuals affected by this Bill. I note in this regard that MHA has made a statement in the middle of last week – I think there have been a few statements and comments made by the Ministry – that it will publish details of designated persons or entities, but the point is, surely, this should have been made more explicit in the Bill.

The fourth area is effectiveness. The Workers' Party has no objection to the additional requirements that are ported to this Bill in connection with the porting over of the Political Donations Act into FICA. However, we do question whether the list of Politically Significant Persons is far-reaching enough. I note the Minister's comments in his Second Reading speech. But the point is our Civil Service has a significant footprint in the success of Singapore, with its central role in influencing Government policy. As key nodes in decision-making, civil servants from Deputy Secretary upwards, in our view, should be designated like Politically Significant Persons.

As MHA's press release on the First Reading of the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Bill shows, the danger of elite capture is an insidious threat. It would be unwise to assume that only politicians, civil society activists and journalists are vectors for foreign influence. To this end, it would be important for the public to understand that the Government did not think it necessary to designate such individuals as PSPs in the original Bill. I will leave Member of Parliament Gerald Giam to speak more on this subject.

Of the four areas of amendments, foremost is accountability of the Executive, because, without that, fairness in scoping powers and greater transparency are but shadow puppets.

This is why the second part of my speech is on how exceptional executive power requires the strongest of oversight to ensure accountability.

Mr Speaker, the starting position of the Workers’ Party is that the ubiquity of the threat of foreign interference and its low-cost ecosystem, particularly online, is neither a figment of the imagination, nor can it be wished away. It follows that the Government must have powers and, in some cases, even potentially intrusive powers, to intervene in the appropriate case. However, if we accept that such broad-ranging, broadly defined powers should be legislated to deal with foreign interference, then this House must ensure the legislation of equally robust oversight mechanisms to prevent abuse of power.

If a poll were to be conducted among ordinary Singaporeans on concepts like the separation of powers doctrine and its centrality to our system of Government, such a poll, I would hazard, would likely elicit quizzical looks. One can hazard a guess that not a small number of our citizens would be unsure of how important such principles are to our political system.

Let me add a historical dimension. Members of this House may have noticed a compact wooden bookcase at one end of the Parliament library. This bookcase and a number of books on parliamentary and constitutional subjects were presented by the UK’s House of Commons to the then-Speaker of Parliament P Coomaraswamy on 16 November 1966 to mark Singapore becoming the 22nd nation of the Commonwealth to gain Independence.

This House passed a resolution recognising the receipt of these gifts on 5 December that year. One of the famous books in this bookcase is the Law of the Constitution by Albert Dicey where that hallowed phrase central to the separation of powers in all parliamentary democracies is found, and I quote: "Powers, however extraordinary, which are conferred by or sanctioned by statute, are never unlimited, for they are confined by the words of the Act itself, and, what is more, by the interpretation put upon the statute by the judges." Unquote.

The separation of powers doctrine and its close relationship with the rule of law was affirmed in the recent Court of Appeal judgment in Nagaenthran a/l K Dharmalingam v PP. The Court of Appeal observed that the separation of powers is, and I quote, "embodied in the Singapore Constitution by virtue of Article 23 (which vests the executive authority in the President and the Cabinet), Article 38 (which vests the legislative power in the President and Parliament) and Article 93 (which vests the judicial power in a system of the Courts)."

The Court of Appeal also observed, and I quote again, "any society that prides itself in being governed by the rule of law, as our society does, must hold steadfastly to the principle that all power has legal limits, and the rule of law demands that the Courts should be able to examine the exercise of discretionary power."

In stark contrast, the Bill before us today envisages the creation of a Reviewing Tribunal within the Executive branch with quasi-judicial powers with regard to the right of appeal against authorisation for Part 3 directions, or against the decisions of a Competent Authority. Clause 99 appears to go so far as to completely displace natural justice from the oversight process as drafted in the Bill. One of its paragraphs states that the Rules may enable or require a Reviewing Tribunal to hear or consider any proceedings or appeal without the person who brought the appeal having been given full particulars of the reasons for any conduct which is the subject of the proceedings or appeal.

Many members of the public have read it carefully and I would forward that it shocks the sensitivities of many, and it goes some way to explain how this Bill has been framed and understood by the public since its First Reading three weeks ago.

Mr Speaker, the Workers' Party rejects such an appeal mechanism. We propose an amendment of clause 104 to allow, first, for an appeal to the Minister and, thereafter, to the High Court with full judicial scrutiny. Of course, there is a provision for a private hearing where national security is at risk. Workers’ Party Member of Parliament for Sengkang GRC He Ting Ru will go through these amendments.

Mr Speaker, the books presented to Speaker Coomaraswamy in 1966 and their subject matter may only be familiar to a small class of Singaporeans. But ask Singaporeans, generally, about checks and balances and a clear majority would agree that they are important for Singapore. Power and responsibility must be divided, to empower each branch of Government, and ensure the exercise of power is not unlimited.

Which brings me to the third part of my speech on how the Government should have sought public feedback on the Bill.

Mr Speaker, there has been considerable disquiet in some quarters at the speed at which this Bill has been presented to Parliament. In March this year, at the Committee of Supply debates, Deputy Speaker Christopher de Souza enquired what MHA would do to deter foreign influence in Singapore’s domestic affairs.

The Second Minister for Home Affairs, hon Mrs Josephine Teo, addressed the query and announced that legislative levers may be needed. I quote, "Given the recent experience of other countries, we need to consider further measures to guard against foreign subversion of politically significant individuals and entities. For example, what levels of transparency in funding support and leadership are appropriate and for whom."

More significantly, the Minister then went on to say, and I quote, "The public has a big part in this to shape proposals and to give the eventual safeguards their stronger support. It is the only way we can effectively deter bad foreign actors from exploiting our vulnerabilities."

Let me say that again. "The public has a big part in this to shape proposals and to give the eventual safeguards their stronger support."

In the six months between Minister Josephine Teo's statement and the First Reading of this Bill, the Government did not hold any public consultation on this Bill and nor can it be said that the public played a big part in shaping this Bill.

This omission contradicts the position on record of the Second Minister for Home Affairs, which was to lean on the public to shape the Bill, which must surely include its safeguards.

In March this year, in his Adjournment Motion on Judicial Review and ousted clauses like clause 104 of this Bill, the hon Member for Bukit Batok and Government Parliamentary Committee (GPC) Chair for Home Affairs and Law, Mr Murali Pillai, stated that it was important for each generation of political leaders and the people to find their own equilibrium of what our people would accept without question.

This is a position I accept and welcome.

The hon Member then quoted his party Secretary-General's speech at the 36th PAP Party Conference held in November last year, when Prime Minister Lee said that Singaporeans have expressed the desire to have greater checks and balances, and that the PAP Government must change and respond to these desires and expectations.

Taking the words of the Minister and the GPC Chair together, it is wholly incongruous for the Government to accept that the public of today desires greater checks and balances, then omits to seek public feedback on a Bill that does away with substantive judicial review.

Mr Speaker, I believe I would not be too far off in speculating that if the public had been surveyed on this Bill, most Singaporeans would have readily supported the use of executive power to curb foreign influence.

However, I am also sure that, if asked, most Singaporeans would be in favour of our Courts acting as a check to ensure that executive power is exercised lawfully, appropriately and fairly.

Mr Speaker, in the national language.

(In Malay): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Mr Speaker, there has been some disquiet among certain quarters about the speed at which this Bill has been tabled in Parliament. In March this year, during the Committee of Supply (COS) debates, Deputy Speaker Christopher De Souza asked MHA about the measures that will be taken to prevent foreign interference in domestic affairs.

The Second Minister for Home Affairs replied by highlighting the need for legislative levers. She said, "Given the recent experiences of other countries, we need to consider further measures to guard against foreign subversion of politically significant individuals and entities. For example, what levels of transparency in funding, support and leadership are appropriate? For whom?"

More importantly, she also said, "The public has a big part in this to shape proposals and to give the eventual safeguards their strongest support. It is the only way we can effectively deter bad foreign actors from exploiting our vulnerabilities."

In the period of six months from Mrs Josephine Teo's statement at this year's Committee of Supply, to the First Reading of this Bill last month, the Government has not conducted any public consultation about this Bill, or obtained public feedback as it is usually done. This is very different from the statement made by the Second Minister for Home Affairs in Parliament, which intended to take heed of the views of the general public when drafting this Bill and its assurances.

In the same month, March this year, the Member for Bukit Batok, Mr Murali Pillai quoted a speech by the Secretary-General at the 36th PAP Party Conference. Referring to the Prime Minister's speech, he said that Singaporeans have expressed a desire to re-examine our basic assumptions, try new approaches and have greater checks and balances. This was preceded by the hon Member's statement that it is important for each generation of leaders and people to find their own equilibrium of what people would accept without question, under what circumstances and towards what ends. This is a position that I accept.

Looking at this as a statement by a Minister and a PAP member, it can be said to be highly contradictory if the Government acknowledges the desire of the people for more checks and balances but avoids public consultations on a Bill that will surely limit the civil rights of the Singaporeans, if it is passed by this Chamber and misused by the government of the day.

(In English): Mr Speaker, the fourth part of my speech is on how the Government has been comparatively muted on the non-legislative measures to deal with foreign interference. Such measures should include educating the public to resist malignant information efforts and how to be vigilant against such interference that is commonly effected through business clans and cultural conduits, where the prospects of plausible deniability are high.

Sir, this Bill is the final instalment in the series of legislative changes that arose out of the work of the Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods. It was to be expected from the Committee's report that legislation would be used to address the problems identified. What is more difficult to grasp is the comparative lack of public knowledge on the non-legislative levers to address foreign interference.

The Select Committee went through these non-legislative measures in a significant way. There have been a number of recommendations but the Government's response appears to have been focused on POFMA and, now, FICA.

The S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) published a policy report in April this year on countermeasures against foreign influence. This has been circulated to Members by Parliament Library staff.

The report said that to combat foreign interference, it is critical to build resilience, or, in our Total Defence parlance, psychological defence – by raising awareness about information manipulation in both the Government as well as amongst the public.

The paper noted that foreign campaigns to sway public opinion during the 2017 presidential campaign in France were unsuccessful. This was because the French government created awareness about information manipulation, built strong central organisations to counter disinformation and undertook a strategy to push counter narratives that blunted the effects of disinformation, such as focusing public attention on the perpetrators.

Coming back to the Singapore Government's approach, the examples raised about foreign interference focused largely on long past attempts, such as the Singapore Herald and Eastern Sun episodes and the Hendrickson affair.

In a Straits Times article on 25 September, there were references to the impounding of SAF Terrex vehicles in Hong Kong and to reports of China's soft power efforts in Singapore through clan and business associations. This begs the question: how will this Bill, in particular, if enacted, address such examples of alleged foreign interference?

The Straits Times, our newspaper of record, does not make this very clear. What must Singaporeans do to heighten our sensitivity to such interference? And how is this Government ensuring that the message flows to the masses and new generations of Singaporeans, including new citizens, given that Singapore's destiny as an immigrant nation is almost certain?

At best, the messaging is a bit unclear.

In her Committee of Supply speech, Minister Josephine Teo spoke of a curious spike in 2018 and 2019 of online comments critical of Singapore, many from anonymous accounts, when there was a bilateral spat with Malaysia.

This spike in online chatter sought to give the artificial impression that there were significant and fundamental objections to Singapore's position. This episode was also covered in the 25 September Straits Times story.

Mr Speaker, this was a highly opportune moment to share the nature of the threat and to engage in a conversation with the public on foreign interference. But beyond these scanty details, no further clarity and communication on foreign interference have followed.

More fundamentally, how does the Government distinguish between a genuine groundswell of sentiment and a dedicated hostile information campaign?

I note that the MHA press release of the First Reading of the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Bill dated 13 September 2021 anonymised this example, although it was clear that the MHA press release was referring to the same episode highlighted by Minister Josephine Teo in her parliamentary speech.

Sir, the Government has placed such a high priority on combating foreign interference to the extent of introducing a Bill which, in some important ways, has no substantive judicial safeguards. But what does it say about the Government when it takes an arguably unclear approach to non-legislative responses?

Surely, non-legislative responses that promote a more participatory and educated citizenry would inoculate the population in a whole-of-society way far better against foreign interference.

This is an area I believe the Government needs to look into in a deliberate fashion across all levels of society. It is my argument that the Government needs to work with the public in a far more participative way so as to strengthen the resolve of the population against foreign interference. This apparent lack of integration of legislative and non-legislative measures to address foreign interference, in my view, is a critical omission in our public discourse on this subject.

The conclusion of the RSIS paper is prescient insofar as the discussions we have undertaken today and, more importantly, the public response to this Bill.

I quote the RSIS paper, "The manner of application of these countermeasures must be fair and necessary both in terms of process and perception without perpetuating the image of an Orwellian state. Singapore must not appear to be taking sides in geopolitical rivalries or using foreign interference as a pretext to clamp down on local political discourse and responsible activism. Ultimately, Singapore's survival depends on both its foreign policy principle of neutrality and reputation of openness to global trade, talent, investment and ideas."

As things stand, particularly on the grounds of perception and fairness, this Bill falls short. That is why the four Workers' Party Members of Parliament have filed amendments to this Bill.

Mr Speaker, let me conclude. Public feedback should have been sought on this Bill. The Government failed to do so and does not appear minded to postpone this debate.

There is an opportunity to commit the Bill to a Select Committee for public input and to review oversight mechanisms, amongst others. The Government should not close the door on this.

What is more perplexing is that we know that the Government had been mulling the introduction of this Bill for many months. Why was it so difficult to undertake a period of public consultation before it was tabled for First Reading?

The Government must also take immediate steps to implement non-legislative measures to tackle foreign interference, such as education and engagement of the public. Hopefully, the Government will introduce such measures with the same alacrity with which it introduced this Bill.

Finally, the most critical issue today is the high level of Executive power introduced by this Bill, which demands that there must be strong oversight mechanisms, namely, our Courts.

I call on the Members of this House to seriously consider the proposed amendments and ask yourself whether you would want these amendments in place if the PAP was not in power. The amendments are in the best interest of Singapore and Singaporeans, regardless of who is in charge now or in the future. Say "Aye" to all the 44 amendments proposed by the Workers' Party.

Mr Speaker: Mr Louis Ng.

4.13 pm

Mr Louis Ng Kok Kwang (Nee Soon): Sir, foreign influence is the norm in Singapore. Whether you are reading the news, watching a TV show or doing your job, there is no escaping the influence of foreign ideas, foreign innovations and foreign interests.

This is the reality we, as a cosmopolitan and small nation, have no choice but to embrace.

Today's Bill aims to push against this tide. It gives the Government new powers, first, to deem individuals and groups as politically significant and, second, to monitor and restrict these people's activities. The goal is to reduce foreign disruption of our domestic politics.

I agree that we should be concerned about such disruptions and I believe most people are. But at the same time, it is essential to be fair and transparent in how we restrict the activities of fellow Singaporeans. Designing and imposing restrictions the wrong way can itself worsen the trust and stability of our domestic politics.

With the goal of ensuring fairness and transparency, Sir, I have four points of clarification to make.

My first point is on the consultation process for this Bill. Some residents have shared their concerns with me on this and it would be good for the Minister to clarify some of their doubts.

Can the Minister share the consultation process for this Bill and whether it has integrated productive feedback from the consultation into this proposed law? Can the Minister also share how does the Ministry decide how much public consultation to hold for any proposed legislation?

Sir, there were also some concerns about the interval between the First and Second Readings of the Bill. Some felt that the interval was too short and, again, it will be good for the Minister to provide some clarifications on this as well.

My second point is on what it means to act with covertness, deception or concealment. This Bill makes it an offence to undertake clandestine electronic communications activity on behalf of a foreign principal. The emphasis here is on "clandestine".

Subsection 1(d) of section 17 requires that the person's action is "covert or involves deception". Similarly, subsection 1(d) of section 18 requires that the person's action "conceals from or fails to disclose" their relationship with a foreign principal. Can the Minister shed light on how an organisation can avoid being considered as having been covert, deceptive or otherwise opaque? If they receive a grant from a foreign principal, would it suffice to state on their website with the dollar amount received, the name of the grant -maker and the terms of the grant?

Would they need to print this material on all marketing material? Would it need to be in their Facebook posts and their Twitter profile?

We should expect transparency and honesty. But this expectation is only fair if we make clear what reasonable compliance looks like. Will MHA release guidelines and illustrations that can help facilitate compliance by good faith actors?

My third point is on the appeals process in this Bill. Section 48 allows individuals the opportunity to be heard before being designated as a politically significant individual. The exception is when the Competent Authority considers it not practicable or desirable to do so.

Can the Minister elaborate on when it would not be practicable or desirable for individuals to have the opportunity to be heard? It seems odd that an individual might be denied even the chance to present their side of the story.

In addition, will the individual receive written reasons to explain decisions made by the Ministry and by the Competent Authority?

There are three scenarios where written reasons should be provided: one, when the Ministry designates an individual as politically significant; two, when the Competent Authority decides that it is not practicable or desirable to hear an individual before they get designated as politically significant; and three, when the Minister determines an appeal under section 101.

Providing written reasons to the politically designated person in all three scenarios would make clear that our process is transparent and fair.

My fourth and final point is on Reviewing Tribunals. Can the Minister share more about the considerations that the Cabinet should take into account when recommending the appointment of members of the Reviewing Tribunal? What is the profile of members envisioned for appointment to the Reviewing Tribunal?

This is important to clarify, as members of the Reviewing Tribunal may themselves be politically significant or otherwise at a heightened risk of hostile foreign influence.

In addition, section 99 allows the Minister to prescribe the practices and procedures for proceedings and appeals before a Reviewing Tribunal. Can the Minister share if these practices and procedures will be derived from the Rules of Court, practices and procedures for Court proceedings? Will these practices and procedures follow the same principles for a fair hearing in the Rules of Court, practices and procedures for Court proceedings? Finally, when the Reviewing Tribunal determines an appeal under section 97, will the Reviewing Tribunal provide written reasons for their decisions?

Sir, in conclusion, I do stand in support of the Bill. I believe there is a strong need to tackle foreign disruptions of our domestic politics but, at the same time, there needs to be safeguards in place and it is essential that we are fair and transparent in how we restrict the activities of fellow Singaporeans.

4.19 pm

Mr Leong Mun Wai (Non-Constituency Member): Mr Speaker, the Progress Singapore Party (PSP) is strongly against foreign interference in our country's affairs. But the PSP cannot support the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act, which I shall refer to as FICA, in its current form because of the insufficient evaluation by both parliamentarians and members of the public of its far-reaching implications. So, PSP calls upon the Government to delay the passing of the Bill, hold public consultations and appoint a Select Committee to scrutinise the Bill closely.

The Minister has just got through two hours in this Chamber on the possible amendments. These are exactly what should have been done in Select Committee. Is it realistic or fair to expect parliamentarians to understand the pros and cons of the amendments in just a few hours of debate?

So, our recommendation is based on three considerations.

One, for such an important Bill, it should not be rushed through Parliament, disregarding proper legislative processes and the feelings of Singaporeans suffering under a worsening COVID-19 crisis.

Two, countering foreign interference is an ongoing task and sufficient resources have already been deployed to it. Do we need to restrict our citizens' freedom further to achieve better outcomes?

Three, is it wise to pass a legislation giving extensive power to a Minister without any judicial oversight? The possibility of abuse cannot be ruled out.

FICA is a complex Bill with 127 sections over 249 pages and the content difficult to make sense of, even for senior lawyers. In spite of that, the Bill was only tabled at the last Parliamentary Sitting on 13 September, barely three weeks ago and we are already rushing through its passage today. Many Members of this House are probably not adequately prepared for a thorough debate today.

It is difficult to understand why the Government is trying to rush the passage of this Bill or why the debate on this Bill cannot be postponed by three to six months to allow for proper scrutiny and consultation involving a wide range of stakeholders.

Just earlier this year, the Government established a two-month-long public consultation process for the Copyright Bill. The POFMA Bill also went through a long consultation, lasting more than a year and, in addition, through a Select Committee, before it was passed into law.

So, where is the Select Committee for FICA which, arguably, should be held to even greater scrutiny in light of the removal of judicial supervision of the Government's usage of FICA's powers and our citizens' constitutional rights?

We should also delay the reading of this Bill because we should be now focusing our resources and attention on the worsening COVID-19 situation in our country. The number of infections has shot up exponentially and there are more and more distressed situations amongst many of us Singaporeans. This is a time when Members of Parliament should be busy helping constituents get through the many challenges in their lives due to the current COVID-19 crisis, instead of being distracted to mull through and digest this draconian Bill.

On the other hand, the Government is not new to dealing with foreign interference for which it has been well-equipped to deal with after many years of experience.

PSP recognises that foreign interference had existed in the past and will continue to exist. But countering foreign interference is an ongoing task and this Government already has substantial resources to deal with it. As I said, do we need to restrict our citizens' freedom further to achieve better outcomes?

We deploy substantial resources to national security every year. For FY2021, we are spending $15 billion on defence; $6.5 billion on home affairs and $0.5 billion on foreign affairs, all for the purpose of upholding and protecting our sovereignty. This makes a total of $22 billion accounting for more than a quarter of our operating Budget.

There are also tough laws in place to deal with internal security and public issues.

To start with, we have the Internal Security Act (ISA) which was passed in 1960 when we were still part of Malaysia. The Court of Appeal's ruling that the ISA was subjected to judicial review was already overruled in a legislative amendment in 1988, giving the Government wide powers in administering the ISA. Incidentally, Malaysia had repealed its ISA in 2012 while our ISA is still in force.

Then, we have the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act (NPPA) since 1975, which is designed to ensure there is no foreign control on Singaporean newspapers and limits the circulation of foreign printed media. There is also the Broadcasting Act 1994 which requires online sites discussing Singapore's political issues to register for a licence with conditions covering foreign funding and interference.

The NPPA and Broadcasting Act allowed the Government to have almost monopoly control over the narrative on major policies and issues through the mainstream media. That was until the rise of social media as a strong alternative platform from around 2010. As a result, the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) came into being in 2019 to allow the Government to tackle the spread of fake news and false information online.

Between the ISA, NPPA, Broadcasting Act and POFMA, this Government already has extensive powers to deal with any internal security threat, manage public opinion and prevent the spread of false information online. So, is there a need to give this Government further powers to deal with foreign interference at the expense of our citizens' constitutional rights?

As there is no urgency but ample reasons why we should delay the Bill, we should then make best use of the opportunity to evaluate the implications of FICA properly.

We understand all that has been said about combating foreign interference. But we cannot ignore the basic principles of democracy, which is not based on a benevolent ruler but on separation of powers and checks and balances. A law like FICA, which ignores those principles, ought to be considered carefully and over a long period of deliberation.

Just look at some of the frightening implications on people, on an accused person under FICA. It is possible that you may inadvertently commit an offence because the definition of an offence is broad and vague. There is no need to give you a reason to arrest you and, if evidence is offered later, the Government does not need to reveal the source, and detention is non-bailable. You cannot choose your own legal Counsel and can be tried in absence. And to cap it all, there is no judicial review for all the actions that are taken against you. Thus, FICA appears even worse than the Internal Security Act.

There are many more provisions and, to me, all sounded like a joke for someone living in a modern democratic society, based on the rule of law. FICA can be described in Singlish. This also called law? Or, in more accurate English, tyranny in the name of law. Mr Speaker, in Chinese, please.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] My Singapore compatriots, FICA, in name, is a law to prevent foreign interference, but, actually, it is a tiger in sheep's skin and may severely infringe on our democratic and civil rights.

National security is, of course, something that we are very concerned about and we also support giving the Government enough resources to deal with it. For example, in Financial Year 2021, $22 billion was allocated to maintain domestic and external security, accounting for a quarter of the total Budget. Through the Internal Security Act, the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act, the Broadcasting Act and POFMA, the Government has, basically, controlled threats to domestic security, public opinion and the transmission of fake news online.

Hence, FICA is really a law that is unnecessary. It gives the Government the power to deal with citizens who hold dissenting views. We should learn from history, such as the lessons of militarism in Japan and Germany. Every time a government moves towards authoritarianism, it can bring about disastrous consequences for the country. The country needs checks and balances between the Government and the people in order to have lasting peace and stability.

FICA is a law that could suppress public opinion and civil rights. We must guard against it. Do not think that FICA has nothing to do with our everyday life. This is because without freedom of speech, even discussions on employment and livelihood issues could be restricted. Therefore, PSP feels that the Bill should be postponed to give the people and the Special Committee sufficient time to scrutinise it thoroughly.

(In English): Mr Speaker, the excessive controls of FICA over civil rights would not stop a determined foreign state from conducting foreign interference. While our capable security agencies and diplomatic channels are dealing with it, the best defence against foreign interference is not more laws to control our own people but to raise the awareness of our people towards national security threats. Hence, the anti-terrorist awareness campaign, SGSecure, which is aimed at all Singaporeans, is a wise move.

Like what the Leader of the Opposition has commented just now, this Government should be more proactive in educating Singaporeans on what is online foreign interference, so that every citizen can be its eyes and ears. Accordingly, we should not have laws to restrict and control Singaporeans' interaction with foreigners. But we should encourage more interactions so that we know first-hand if there are developments of concern to the interest of Singapore.

Mr Speaker, all things said, and to reiterate, is it wise to hastily pass a legislation giving extensive power to a Minister without judicial oversight? I, as do many Singaporeans, urge you and all Members of this House, to delay the passing of this Bill and allow for public consultations and the appointment of a Select Committee to scrutinise the Bill. You have the power to do so, Mr Speaker, under Standing Order No 68. It can be done.

And how each Member votes on this Bill will represent his or her legacy to the present and future generations of Singaporeans. All Singaporeans are watching you. A yes vote means the Member is willing to sacrifice the rule of law, which is the foundation of all democratic nations. For the sake of Singapore and Singaporeans, Mr Speaker, I urge you again to exercise your power, under Standing Order No 68 to refer the Bill to a Select Committee.

Sir, I oppose the Bill. Singaporeans deserve better. And I just received a message from a Singaporean through my handphone which says, "I want freedom of information. I don't want FICA."

Mr Speaker: Ms He Ting Ru.

4.35 pm

Ms He Ting Ru (Sengkang): Mr Speaker, we have today, before us, a mere 21 days after its First Reading, a 249-page wide ranging Bill which grants sweeping powers to the Minister and the Competent Authority to counteract foreign influence in our polices and direction. As my Workers' Party colleagues will point out, we believe in giving relevant authorities clearly defined and effective tools to counter actual acts of foreign interference. Our objections, however, are raised in both the drafting of wide-ranging powers, the problems with oversight mechanisms and also the way the Bill has been presented.

Outside this Chamber, Singaporeans are just starting a second week of yet another set of tightened COVID-19 rules while navigating a system of confusing quarantine and testing programmes and regulations, scrambling to adapt to more home-based working and learning. Our healthcare workers are strained and we have resorted to activating SAF to assist the system that was overwhelmed only one month after we further loosened restrictions.

Most of us are also receiving numerous requests for assistance from residents in dealing with the confusion of Quarantine Orders, the new Home Recovery Programme and also with pressing economic hardship suffered because of the latest round of tightened restrictions.

And in the midst of many Singaporeans being preoccupied with such pressing concerns, this Bill has been tabled and put up for Second Reading within three weeks with no public consultations nor Select Committees convened for the purposes of scrutinising the powers that it gives the Minister. This is in stark contrast to POFMA, where a cross-party Select Committee convened public hearings over eight days, which saw 79 individuals and organisations testify. I also note that the Bill is 168 pages longer than the POFMA Bill and contains, on the face of it, even broader powers which should, logically, mean that more scrutiny must be given before it is passed.

I would therefore, like to seek clarification from the Minister about why the pressing need to forge ahead with this Bill now.

While I reiterate that the Workers' Party agrees that appropriate measures need to be put in place to counter the threat of foreign interference, we would like to understand what is the real and imminent threat that Singapore faces that warrants such a rush in passing the Bill. How many instances of suspected foreign interference have there been in each of the last 10 years? And more crucially, why are the specific powers and tools contained under the Bill so urgently required by the Minister and various Competent Authorities that would mean the Bill needs to be rushed ahead and passed into law without further delay at this particular juncture?

I also want to stress that this Bill is not an obscure one that, once passed, will have minimal impact on the lives of Singaporeans. Already, we have seen numerous voices from a Senior Counsel, various NGOs, Singaporean academics, including a senior research fellow at IPS, speaking up to voice their grave concerns not only at the speed at which the Bill is to be passed, but also about the substantive provisions contained in the Bill. There is a fear from many that in the rush to pass the Bill to counter foreign interference, we may be throwing the baby out with the bath water and end up catching many legitimate and innocent people, entities and projects in the dragnet. A fear that has been repeated by numerous voices including those of, in particular, my colleagues Assoc Prof Jamus Lim's and Mr Gerald Giam's amendments.

The impact of the Bill is not reserved just for the few who are active in politics. The way it has been drafted and passed has the potential to adversely affect ordinary Singaporeans in ways that may not be initially obvious. It is like a trojan horse that appears benign at first, but unravels upon passage in two main ways.

Firstly, any uncertainty will create a chilling effect on political discussion and engagement. As a specific example, the wide discretion allowed by the drafting of the Bill to designate who is a Politically Significant Person (PSP) runs the risk of encouraging many to step away from conversation in the public space to avoid the onerous countermeasures that come with being a designated PSP. This means local content creators, local activists, local academics, their retraction from our public spaces will mean that we will be worse off, and this will dampen the richness of thinking and dialogue on issues that matter to all Singaporeans. It will also be damaging to our standing connection to the global commons, which has recently already been called into question with concerns raised over the closure of Yale-NUS College.

Secondly, many have echoed our fears that this Bill represents power given to the Government which is not subject to the oversight of the Courts. It provides the Minister wide-ranging powers that are largely unfettered, with the only exception being a reviewing Tribunal that has a narrow scope. Could this be a slippery slope that would lead to less checks on how these powers are wielded? And ultimately, in the hands of possible future rogue Ministers and officials, damage Singapore's reputation as an open global business hub where enforcement and application are predictable and certain.

Together with the hasty passage of significant Bills, such as this, with limited or rushed debate, these would risk chilling investment and job opportunities in the process. I must also sound a note of caution. We must ensure that we do not end up being so shrill and fearful of the threat of foreign interference that we end up neglecting an even more insidious threat, one where domestic players could seize an easy opportunity to whip up nationalism and anti-foreign sentiment to further their own political goals, nefarious or otherwise, in the flimsy name of protecting national interest and sovereignty.

We have seen this happening since 2016 in movements and campaigns like Brexit, Pegida and Make America Great Again. There has been a rise of far-right governments from Brazil to central eastern Europe; formerly fringe parties, such as the Front National and the Alternative für Deutschland, have acquired national platforms. All of them have built their success on twisted versions of patriotism and national identity and sovereignty. If similar homegrown ideas and movements are allowed to take root here, whether from the ruling government of the day, opposition parties or otherwise, the damage done to a small society like ours could be catastrophic.

Moving on to the proposed amendments by the Workers' Party, I will speak on those standing in my name, which are amendments to clauses 92 to 104, which fall under Part 8, Oversight Arrangements. These relate to two main points.

First, the rights of appeal; and second, the judicial review of the clause.

I turn, first, to clauses 92 and 93 which deal with the rights of appeal against decisions made under the Act by both the Minister and the Competent Authorities. This section is important as it prescribes the methods and processes in place to protect citizens against an abuse of power by the government of the day. Clause 92 provides for the setting up of a Reviewing Tribunal which comprises three individuals who each has to be Singaporeans and will serve a term of three years. The Government appoints these individuals, and the chair of the tribunal has to be a Supreme Court Judge. There are no other specific requirements in the Bill relating to the remaining two members of the tribunal. The renumeration and expenses of the tribunal are paid for under money provided by Parliament, but the rules for tribunal proceedings are, under clause 99, made by the Minister and are only presented to Parliament after being gazetted.

The tribunal can hear appeals on too narrowly and clearly-defined circumstances for a person issued with a Part 3 direction, that is, a direction to counteract harmful foreign online communications activity of the proprietors of a Proscribed Online Location, which are locations that are declared by the Minister to be purveyors of hostile information content. It is notable that the drafting of this section shows that the draftsperson is able to very narrowly and precisely define parameters when it is desirable to do so.

Additionally, all appellants must have first requested the Minister to reconsider the earlier decision before they can be taken to the tribunal. In particular, it is not clear how, or even whether the tribunal will be able to consider appeals on the substance of the exercise of the Minister's powers to issue Part 3 directions, given that there is no obligation in the Act for the Minister to explain how he exercises his powers of considering Part 3 directions issued by the Competent Authority under the Act.

Also, I note that the tribunal is only empowered to either dismiss the appeal or revoke the decision. It is not within the tribunal's power to make any amendments. Finally, the decision of the Reviewing tribunal is final and there are no further rights of appeal.

Individuals designated a Politically Significant Person under Part 4 or issued directives under Part 5 or 6 around countermeasures for foreign donors and activities that are not donor activities but may involve a foreign principal in Part 6 have no route of appeals through the tribunal. Their only route is through the Minister himself and the Minister's decision is final.

I also note that our proposed deletion of clause 119(2) is a consequential amendment of having deleted the provisions relating to the Reviewing Tribunal.

The Workers' Party's position to the approach taken above is that oversight mechanisms proposed are insufficient to ensure the Act is not abused. First, the Minister is in almost all cases the final decision-maker. Only a limited and very narrowly defined subset of cases are subject to appeal to the Reviewing Tribunal. Second, even the small number of cases which are eligible to appeal to the Reviewing Tribunal, are subject to further restrictions, including the provision under clause 99(b) which states that the Minister may prescribe tribunal rules that enable a Reviewing Tribunal to decline to give the appellant the full particulars of the reasons why a decision was made. This would mean that he would, effectively, be asked to make his appeal partially blindfolded.

In view of this, we propose that in line with the doctrine of the separation of powers, the judiciary is the appropriate organ of state to exercise oversight over the broad powers granted under this Bill. This proposal means that any person who is subjected to a determination order or decision under the Bill has a right of appeal to the judiciary, that is, to the High Court.

The Reviewing Tribunal is clearly not an effective substitute for the Courts. Firstly, the composition of the tribunal is decided by the Government and only one of them is a Supreme Court Judge who is qualified and experienced in scrutinising and determining such appeals.

This is also problematic as the tribunal effectively is appointed by the Cabinet, in what is effectively a check, by the Executive, on an Executive decision. This is a classic case of, in the words of the Leader of the Opposition, “Ownself Check Ownself”. The tribunal is also, unlike the Courts, not part of the Judiciary established under our Constitution, whose independence is also enshrined in our Constitution.

Under our Constitution, judicial power is vested in the Courts. Carving out matters that should be properly determined by the Courts for review by a tribunal that cannot be held to account is deeply problematic.

Additionally, decisions of both the Reviewing Tribunal and the Minister are not subject to correction by any higher authority, especially as the proposed clause 104 purports to oust judicial review on all but procedural grounds. There is also no mention of either the tribunal or the Minister being guided or bound by precedents of previous decisions which are often instructive and valuable.

To address concerns that judicial trials may compromise national security because of the sensitive nature of a matter, our proposed amendment also allows for such hearings to be held in-camera, without the public being allowed to attend, if the Court is satisfied that it is in the public interest to do so.

Next, I turn to the proposed clause 104, which is what is known as a judicial review ouster clause. The substance of this clause is that the Government seeks to protect the Minister’s decisions under FICA from review by the Courts. This offends Article 93 of the Constitution, which expressly states that "judicial power of Singapore shall be vested in a Supreme Court and in such subordinate Courts as may be provided by any written law for the time being in force".

The ouster clause is a breach of the principle of the separation of powers: the Government should not be using its legislative authority to oust the rightful constitutional oversight of a co-equal institution in the Singapore system.

It means that no decision under FICA should be challenged through the process of judicial review, apart from the very narrow grounds of purely procedural compliance with the Act not being properly followed.

Many of our leading jurists have also expressed their discomfort with ouster clauses. The Court of Appeal has expressed concern in Per Ah Seng that ouster clauses “can be regarded as being incompatible with the rule of law because it should be within the Court’s purview to declare the legal limits of discretionary powers”.

Our former Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong, too, has suggested that ouster clauses, "may be inconsistent with Article 93 of the Constitution, which vests the judicial power of Singapore in the Supreme Court".

Crucially, for our purposes today, the ouster clause does not allow for the Courts to consider applications for judicial review of decisions taken by the Minister and Competent Authorities on the grounds of illegality and irrationality.

The latter two limbs of judicial review are key in ensuring that, as captured in Chng Suan Tze v Minister for Home Affairs, "All power has legal limits and the rule of law demands that the Courts should be able to examine the exercise of discretionary power". And we must, as legislators, have the rule of law in mind as we consider the balance of, amongst others, natural justice, national security and the separation of powers as we decide whether or not a judicial review ouster clause should stand.

For illegality, this arises when a decision-maker exercises a power wrongly, or improperly purports to exercise a power that it does not have. The Courts, in their role to check and balance powers granted to bodies, ensure that nobody overreaches and goes beyond the powers given to them. For irrationality, it allows a party to challenge a decision by a public official or body if “it is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it”.

Disallowing judicial reviews on the grounds of illegality and irrationality takes away an important check on the powers granted to the Government. Imagine, if one day, the Competent Authority designates a six-month-old baby a PSP under Part 4. This decision is final and cannot be set aside if the Minister upholds this upon appeal. It will not be allowed to be set aside on the grounds of irrationality since judicial review on these grounds are not possible! While this situation may be dismissed as outlandish and would never happen, it is theoretically possible under the provisions of the Bill. Stranger things have happened.

While we might say that we have confidence in current policy-makers' intentions and policies, yet, no one can guarantee the conduct of future Ministers and competent authorities and their commitment to acting rationally and legally. In fact, were we not told that the logic for the constitutional amendments surrounding the establishment of the Elected Presidency and, in 2016, changes in the remit of the Council of Presidential Advisers, have to do with putting in safeguards in place against the possibility of irrational or unreasonable behaviour by top decision-makers? Why do these safeguards not apply here, especially as we are granting wide-ranging powers to the Minister?

I wish to also point out that judicial review does not review the merits of cases. Instead, it is a process by which the Courts exercise supervision over decisions made by Ministers and other public officials and bodies to ensure that legal limits are enforced where public power is exercised. It is an important part of the checks and balances to ensure that powers are wielded judiciously by the state.

We cannot repeat enough our position that greater powers need greater oversight and it is, therefore, with this in mind that our proposed amendments do away with the ouster of judicial review.

In other words, we believe that the "sunlight of scrutiny", to use the phrase of our esteemed colleague Mr Murali Pillai, is more crucial than ever in needing to be applied to this Bill and the broad and alarming powers it purports to introduce. This sunlight is what helps both shine a light on malicious foreign activity and, at the same time, assures all of us that we do not need to worry about the over-expansive use of Government powers.

4.53 pm

Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim (Sengkang): Mr Speaker, the proposed Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act (FICA) is an important Bill that could, potentially, better equip our nation to face up to the evolving nature of external threats in the 21st century. In particular, the Bill seeks to better protect Singapore from the risks of foreign principal interference in our domestic affairs. This principle of non-interference per se is unobjectionable, and the Workers' Party stands behind the notion that domestic political matters should, indeed, be determined by our own people.

But the proposed language in a number of areas spelled out in the Bill are troubling. In this speech, I will provide justifications for the amendments that the Workers' Party has proposed in my name. These pertain to clauses that leave the scope of foreign interference troublingly vague and, relatedly, proposed an insufficiently steep hurdle for the applicability of the law, one that we believe begins to border on the policing of thought. The common thread among these amendments is that we need to satisfy a reasonable standard of proof and intent when we claim that an individual has acceded to the influence of foreign principals.

Let me begin by stating a few propositions that I believe all in this House will have little difficulty agreeing with. We can all accept that there are threats out there that have to be dealt with. We can all accept that some threats are subtle and, by design, evasive, and, hence difficult to identify and prove with absolute certainty.

And we can all accept that establishing facts, even by the strict legal standards upheld in a Court of law, will seldom be definitive. Memories may be hazy. Claims may be contradictory. Even eyewitnesses could easily differ in what they perceive – or believe to have observed – from an event. Film classics like Rashōmon and Virumaandi, and parables like the Blind Men and the Elephant, remind us that objectivity may be elusive, even in fair, carefully-litigated circumstances.

Consequently, society – and the legal system – have allowed for a comparatively high burden of proof for claims and accusations, which (at the very least) requires a comparatively high probability of an outcome or event being true. We also have well-understood channels of appeal, to allow for the possibility of overturning rules that subsequently turn out to be false positives.

But this does not appear to be the case in a number of clauses in this Bill, notably, the amendments we have proposed to parts of clauses 17 through 18, 40, and 75. Clause 17(1)(c)(iii) of the Bill, for example, will charge an individual with an offence if he or she engages in electronic communications that involve activity that, I quote, “is or is likely to be prejudicial to the friendly relations of Singapore with other countries”.

But what is "likely"? The dictionary definition only states that something that is likely “will probably happen or is expected”; it does not attribute any probability to this likelihood. Statistically, any outcome that has the greater probability of being realised could be anything ranging from 51% to 99%.

Thus, establishing that a given action will amount to an offence will require an estimation of a likelihood. While courts have a long history of attributing just cause based on strong, credible evidence, this is an enormous leap of faith for any single, largely unchecked individual.

Mr Speaker, nobody denies that foreign interference can occur, facilitated by the medium of electronic communications that could be prejudicial to the security, public good, domestic harmony and international relations of Singapore. The desire to draft a law robust enough to capture such possibilities is a sound motivation.

But at the same time, we cannot deny that the vast majority of such communications activity – even when framed in a manner that is potentially incriminating to its sender – could well be innocuous; the frivolous or unfiltered rantings of a troubled mind. Possibilities are insufficient, especially when they call for predictions of an uncertain future.

Were this Bill be passed into law as it stands, we will require not just that our Ministers or relevant Competent Authorities speculate on the likely mindset and possible actions of individuals, but that such individuals themselves possess the ability to predict whether the information they communicate will affect security, public good, domestic harmony or international relations. Experts can barely venture such forecasts successfully, much less an average person.

Finally, it is worth adding that by further requiring, as in clause 17(1)(c) that an individual "knows or has reason to believe", already rules out the possibility of wilful ignorance; piling on the need for this selfsame individual to be speculative is excessive.

In clauses 20 and 21, amendments were proposed to raise the level of proof required: from mere suspicion or belief, to at least some degree of evidence or actionable intelligence. This is justice on the basis of pre-crime, virtually straight out of the film "Minority Report". It is the policing of thought.

As much as I may be a fan of Tom Cruise, Stephen Spielberg and Philip K Dick, "suspicion" or a "reason to believe" does not rise to the level of actual crime, but represents anticipatory action. At its best, it runs the risk of abuse and misuse, short-circuiting the free will of individuals to change their minds before they act. At its worst, it rises to the level of thought policing, pinning on suspects actions that they have yet to be realised. Even conspiracy – a very indirect attribution of potential involvement in illegal activity – requires solid evidence.

To be clear, the world can be an unpleasant place and there may well be instances where the risk of subsequent malicious activity would justify the execution of pre-emptive actions that would preclude the possibility of even more insidious outcomes.

But the threshold for us to engage must, at least, be one where we possess evidence or, as we called for in the amendments to this Bill, actionable intelligence and a reasonable assessment of imminent harm. Short of this, we are relying on gut feeling and instinct to play with people's lives.

One potential objection to this set of amendments is that the Minister or the relevant Competent Authority will always act judiciously and with care. This claims that, bereft of the flexibility to act on their suspicions, we will compromise the ability of our authorities to properly protect our citizens.

But this calls for us to enshrine into law the propensity of a political office holder to always act in the public interest.

This could well be the case today. But would it be always? What if, God forbid, an irresponsible party forms the government or someone in the government goes rogue? We are walking dangerously close to Manchurian Candidate territory here – and I know I am citing a lot of movie references.

The purpose of the law in any society guided by rule of law is to bind the hands of policymakers, regardless of their benefactions, from the most egregious exercises of arbitrary decision-making. Do these specific sub-clauses satisfy that standard or should the language of the law be rendered as clear as possible?

Furthermore, we cannot exclude the possibility that even an entirely well-meaning officeholder may carry suspicions, even firmly held ones, that could well turn out to be erroneous.

In the press release accompanying the First Reading of this Bill, MHA cited the example of "an abnormal spike in online comments critical of Singapore on social media in late 2018 and 2019". Yet, two executives at one major social media platform, Facebook, have publicly stated that it has uncovered no cases of coordinated, inauthentic behaviour by foreigners targeting Singapore since 2017.

Given the apparent contradiction, would MHA share with this House why it believed that social media activity during that period was foreign influence?

The proposed amendments to clauses 17(2) and 18(2) are meant to refine intent. While we agree that clandestine foreign interference may well involve multiple principals, expanding the applicability of the law to include instances where individuals "need not have in mind any particular foreign country or principal" veers uncomfortably into territory where we criminalise those who may have been deceived or misled.

Yet, the explanatory notes of the Bill clearly expressed that covert activities are "not intended to cover circumstances where a person undertakes an activity with no knowledge, awareness or direction from the foreign principal or where the relationship between the person's activities and the foreign principal's interest are merely coincidental".

Indeed, many disinformation campaigns operate via deception. Will we then charge those who have been unwittingly made to operate as pawns of a more sophisticated principal?

Lest we rule out as the domain of the naive and, hence, inapplicable to PSPs, it is useful to remind ourselves of how often even sophisticated experts may end up being duped. Just think of the victims of Bernie Madoff's Ponzi scheme, the Envy Global nickel investment scam or Elizabeth Holmes' Theranos, currently playing out in US Courts. In the first half of this year, Singaporeans collectively lost a total of $168 million to con-men.

To compound matters, allowing for such possibilities would be extremely costly in terms of resources. Think of the time, energy and resource that would have to be expended to investigate and prosecute cases where it is unclear whether any specific foreign actor is even involved.

It could also give rise to either an excessive number of frivolous accusations or, conversely, inhibit actual victims from stepping up to alert authorities if they suspect they may have been manipulated.

The Workers' Party believes that it is far better to strike the balance between efficiency and accountability by eliminating the most ambiguous language from the law while subjecting cases corroborated by actionable intelligence to judicial scrutiny.

The coincidence of interests, another dimension highlighted as notes, remains poorly excluded by the overall language of the Bill.

Part (iv) of clauses 5 and 48, where we have not proposed amendments, refers to the term "collaboration", which is undefined but as the notes explain, takes on its "ordinary meaning".

While we understand that the purpose is to capture nefarious collaborations, perhaps inspired by the case of former Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy professor Huang Jing, such broad language raises both theoretical and practical concerns.

For starters, there is very little reason why the simple act of working together, the dictionary definition of "collaboration", with a foreign entity need give rise to subservience or, for that matter, even mild influence.

I am certain we all have had colleagues with whom we disliked but, yet, we are forced to work together on projects and would never imagine nor wish to emulate or even learn from. Hence, there is little logical reason why one would link collaboration with influence or, more intrusively, interference.

Moreover, in any collaborative relationship, especially when parties carry equal standing, it is frequently impossible to attribute who actually exerts control.

By a similar token, it would not be unusual for working relationships dealing with public policy to venture into politically sensitive, controversial – this is the wording in the Bill – issues. Think matters, such as climate change, vaccinations, free trade and gender issues, all of which are controversial and often evoke partisan leanings, regardless of whether there may have been any intent to direct such effort towards a political end.

This could have a chilling effect on already guarded national discussions by constraining the ability of our citizens to work with foreigners on matters of national importance so long as they happen to be politically controversial.

Taken together, including the exceedingly vague term "collaborations", into the scope of activities subject to FICA, it becomes inherently problematic.

Is it sufficient for us to claim that casual transparent interactions do not entail collaboration but deep engagement does? How much must one actually work with another before they are deemed to have collaborated?

In his response to Parliamentary Questions filed by then Nominated Members of Parliament Anthea Ong and Walter Theseira on foreign influence, Minister K Shanmugam explained that there is nothing to prevent politicians or political parties from engaging with foreign parties but you cannot take money from them.

To engage, however, includes the possibility of working with and, indeed, even working for somebody else. Surely, it must bother us that we are choosing to define into our laws the possibility of catching, in Minister K Shanmugam's words earlier on, a one in 1,000 chance but glossing over the far greater likelihood of throwing up many, many more false positives.

These theoretical observations are further compounded by the fact that, in practice, Singaporeans routinely collaborate with non-Singaporeans on all manner of critical and non-critical operations.

Top generals conduct joint military exercises on a regular basis and we often send our best civil servants on overseas assignments where they may gather knowledge and experience from citizens of other nations. Our political officeholders are often called to perform global public service, serving on committees in international organisations where they collaborate with high-level officials from other countries.

Mr Speaker, there are additional instances where intent on the part of the alleged agent remains uneasily vague.

For example, clause 5(3) states that activities will be covered as long as "both the person and the foreign principal knew or expected that the person would or might undertake such an activity".

Surely, it is possible that an individual might independently choose to pursue a given course of action, bereft of external influence. Yet, this choice could still be common knowledge.

By a similar token, the definition of foreign principals may be excessively broad. While we do not wish to constrain the Government's ability to act on a wide range of potential actors, the existing definitions of "foreign business" and "foreign political organisation" could encapsulate perfectly innocuous ties.

While we understand that malicious intent is subsequently captured by clauses 5 through 7, exclusionary language, especially for these two very general categories, may be warranted – something to the effect of a sub-clause that explicitly spells out how these entities are engaged in political activities. Alternatively, examples and counter examples could be provided of businesses and political organisations that would be captured or not by said definition.

Mr Speaker, up till now, the proposed amendments we have flagged speak to what we, as a party, believe to be flaws of commission, notably, instances where we believe the Bill overreaches in its attribution of perceived risk, unwarranted suspicion and intentionality behind motivations.

In contrast, the amendments we have proposed for clause 120 are one of omission, namely, the fact that the law fails to incorporate public assurances by MHA. The purpose is to ensure that these assurances are actually written into the law.

This is notwithstanding how clause 105(5) does provide accommodation for this by stating that competent authorities "must not exercise any power under this Act for the purpose of furthering or harming the interest of any particular political party". Yet, there is, simultaneously, language in the Bill that will criminalise the "diminution" of Government.

Given how there is always, by definition, at least one political party in Government, these proposed amendments serve to clarify some of this distinction in the text of the law, not with this current administration or Minister, but, potentially, with future ones.

Ensuring that political speech is legally protected goes beyond guaranteeing that citizens can speak freely about political matters that are near and dear to their hearts.

As a child, I learned how "boh sompah, buay pasah". Children, evidently, intuitively, understand the importance of codification of promises.

The proposed amendments to clause 120 essentially do the same for the guarantees promised by MHA rather than leaving it to the vagaries of enforcement by the government in power.

I shall close, Mr Speaker, with a more general reflection of what FICA could mean for a globalised city state, such as Singapore.

In our Sitting just a mere three weeks ago, we spent enormous amounts of time debating on the merits of economic openness, both historically and for the future of the survival of our nation. This openness comes at a cost, of course, and it is one that we must surely manage.

Mr Speaker: Assoc Prof Jamus Lim, if you can wrap up. Half a minute.

Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim: Yes, I have 30 seconds, thank you.

This month, as we debate how to manage threats from foreign interference, we must, likewise, not lose sight of the bigger picture, one where our people, companies and policymakers are deeply and inevitably embedded in the rich mesh of cross-border relationships.

I suspect and have reason to believe that FICA, as it is written, is likely to be inadvertently detrimental to our public interest.

Mr Speaker: Mr Seah Kian Peng.

5.13 pm

Mr Seah Kian Peng (Marine Parade): Mr Speaker, Sir, this is a Bill which guards Singaporeans against interferences and influences which are unseen and mostly unknown.

It does not engage in petty partisan politics. It leaves aside all disagreements among ourselves. It leaves undisturbed poor ideas, ignorant views. It respects the naive and the mistaken. Any harm arising from these are of our own making. After all, it is the mark of all free societies that we take this form of the rough with the smooth.

Accepting these rough edges, we must, therefore, accept that we will continue to make mistakes. There will be those who believe their ideas are good when they are poor.

The Bill is no arbiter in this contest. What it will do is to make sure that all ideas to come into our political arena do so through the front door, through an open political contest and that they cannot sneak in through the back, under technological cover, wearing a false face and pretending to serve the public interest when they are in the back pocket of foreign or private actors.

This Bill stands against those who are knowingly malicious and against those who have been unknowingly used. It is the latest in a long line of efforts to keep Singapore free.

"Freedom" is a word not used lightly in Singapore. The idea of freedom means something specific to a small country in a volatile neighbourhood. It means an often taken-for-granted, but still slightly cherished power to decide our own fate, because this freedom is hard-won and because the battle remains as fierce today, as it did in 1965. We must see what laws can best serve to protect it.

This Bill targets the enemies of this freedom so that we can fully exercise the larger internal freedoms that I spoke of earlier – to ensure that our civil liberties and our political contests remain our own.

Sir, to recognise the hidden hands requires no small skill because the seduction is so slight, the pushes so subtle. We might sometimes think we are exercising free will, when we are mere catspaws.

I speak today with some experience of POFMA, having been a member of the Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods which was formed in January 2018. So, that is more than three years ago, where we considered 169 written representations and oral evidence from 65 individuals and organisations. Some of these were shared by the Minister earlier in his speech. There were also public hearings held from 14 to 29 March 2018. In fact, it lasted eight days in all. So, when the hon Mr Leong Mun Wai says there was not enough evidence gathered or consultations done, I am not sure what he makes of these 169 written representations and the 65 oral evidence from individuals and organisations.

The issue of foreign interference is a complex and enduring one, made more powerful in recent years by technological platforms. We must be clear that these technologies are not neutral between public good and harm. We cannot leave these untended and expect ordinary citizens, who already have so much cognitive tax in their daily lives, to be inoculated against these malicious campaigns.

Our digital lives have opened many new possibilities, but, along with the sunlight, we have an infestation of lies.

In 2019, then Senior Minister of State for Law Mr Edwin Tong foreshadowed this Bill when he said that the Government was considering legislation against foreign interference. Let me quote him. He said, "Today, information can easily be weaponised by foreign actors, at low cost, and with anonymity and impunity. No country is immune. This is asymmetric information warfare, fought in a theatre and era with no distinction between war and peace. In this battlefield, Singapore, an open, democratic, digitally-connected and diverse country, is especially vulnerable. We are a young country with sensitive fault lines that foreign actors can exploit to foment distrust and ill-will among our various communities."

Sir, at the time, Mr Edwin Tong was responding to a Parliamentary Question. This was again, let me repeat that, 2019. But the stage had already been set a few years earlier.

We have heard these issues discussed deeply at the Select Committee hearings. We have heard evidence from experts during the Select Committee hearings that hostile information campaigns are becoming cheaper to mount and becoming more prevalent. The point of these campaigns is to weaken the target country, turn brother against brother, countrymen against one another, race against race, undermining social cohesion with fights constructed with false sticks and stones.

The Select Committee also received evidence, including through private hearings, that state-sponsored information operations have been carried out against Singapore.

A third foreshadowing of this Bill happened at the Committee of Supply in 2019 and again in 2021. Government Ministers then spoke about how foreign interference laws would need to be introduced and its efforts in tracking the legislative response in other countries.

Fourth, this has been a hot issue discussed among our think tanks and at the Universities – most notably, at the Foreign Interference conference organised by Nanyang Technological University (NTU)'s RSIS in September 2019.

This topic has, certainly, long been on the radar of both the Government and the people. It is not new and certainly does not lack airing or consultation.

So, for those who ask why are we "rushing" through this Bill and ask for more consultation, I hope we realise this Bill has been in the works for some time already, a few years in the making actually, and there has, certainly, been no lack of consultations and feedback.

To the Leader of the Opposition, hon Mr Pritam Singh, who referred to Mr Christopher de Souza's Parliamentary Question in March this year and Second Minister for Home Affairs Josephine Teo's reply, let me remind him that this was at the Committee of Supply 2021 debate. I should reiterate that this process started way before March 2021 and this was also not the first time that MHA has stated the need for such a Bill.

My second point has to do with the signature of our defence against external threats. Unity has been our clarion call since the nation began. Against the call of race, religion and the multiplicity of the Babel Tower of languages, we formed our own tribal instincts.

Today, we have more need than ever for such instincts – this communitarian commitment, which is not natural, but chosen by all of us who have decided to call this place home. This injunction to think beyond oneself, this seeking for things that matter, this Singaporean spirit is one that we must seek to grow and nourish.

We cannot do this if we keep using the infantilising versions of these words of "safety and protection", which can degenerate into nothing more than an entitled demand for special accommodation, for "care” for oneself and a refusal to follow the same rules that apply to everyone else.

To see what true public interest comprises, against a private, self-regarding clamour, we must have space for open, transparent and accountable debates. We must see that all disagreements among ourselves are taken seriously and welcomed, and that it is our joint duty to ensure that such debates reflect our own views, rather than those of outside agents.

This Bill is not a molly-coddle of resources to "protect" and bubble wrap Singaporeans, but a sword, so that we are armed against those who seek to harm us. It is a true countermeasure, a necessary response to attacks – attacks, which I am quite sure, will come. So, the earlier we are prepared for it, the better.

FICA does not increase the reach of the law in substance. It merely provides the adaptor allowing the law to operate in a more targeted and precise manner. In this way, its reach is narrower and would, in fact, increase freedoms.

FICA is not more authoritarian than other similar laws, for example, those in the United States now.

FICA is a sword that stays in its sheath most of the time. It has a high threshold which will not be awakened until activities attack the public interest of Singapore. This Bill gives us the power towards early detection and exposure. We have always relied on this sunlight in the past and we must do so again.

As for the criticism of this Bill from activists and academics, MHA, the Minister himself, have already responded to some of these. As a Member of Parliament in this House, let me say this with ample evidence from our own history – there can be no civil liberties if activists can be bought or sold; and there can be no academic freedom if our Universities are homes for foreign agents. It will be naive to believe that all activists are high-minded patriots, just as it is mere pretence that all academics are cultivating young minds for the good of Singapore.

In the real world, there are active, hostile and intentional actors working against the public interest of Singaporeans. All of us, on both sides of this House, would have failed in our duty if, in the face of such clear and present danger, we stand by and fold our hands. Sir, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Order. I propose to take the break now. I suspend the Sitting and will take the Chair at 5.45 pm.

Sitting accordingly suspended

at 5.25 pm until 5.45 pm.

Sitting resumed at 5.45 pm.

[Mr Speaker in the Chair]

Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Bill

Debate resumed.

Mr Speaker: Dr Tan Yia Swam.

Dr Tan Yia Swam (Nominated Member): Mr Speaker, Sir, Members of Parliament, preparing to debate on the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Bill was a challenge. I am a doctor. I do not know much about espionage other than what I read from newspapers or see in James Bond movies.

I had not intended to speak, until a few doctors and the Singapore Medical Association (SMA) staff approached me privately and separately to raise their concerns. So, how could FICA affect those of us in medicine?

Firstly, many doctors volunteer or lead various NGOs, mostly on medical and humanitarian missions, but also for social goals. Some doctors have patients who are political officeholders in other countries. SMA is part of the Medical Association of South East Asian Nations (MASEAN), Confederation of Medical Associations in Asia and Oceania (CMAAO) and the World Medical Association. SMA also works closely with MOH on local healthcare decisions.

As many of you here would know, Dr Poh Soo Kai was one of the founders of SMA and served as its first Honorary Secretary from 1959 to 1961. He was also arrested and detained without trial during Operation Coldstore in 1963 and under the Internal Security Act in 1976.

I was born in 1980 and grew up without much knowledge of such matters. What is past is history and I do not question it here. My being here now, as a Nominated Member of Parliament and being the current President of SMA, has made the wearing of multiple hats complicated. I state for the record that I speak now, as an individual, to seek clarity on the intent, and the extent of FICA.

I agree that there should never be foreign interference in a country’s politics. As an ordinary citizen, I have remained blissfully unaware of how threats to Singapore have manifested, except for what is reported in mainstream news. Arresting a human agent with proof of radicalisation or obvious threats to the stability of Singapore is easy for us to accept. But in the modern world, it is scary to learn that modern threats can be subtle, through social media, bots, ads, sponsored articles and posts to erode trust in the Government and take advantage of social fault lines and sow discord.

This is a real threat, and we, as a nation, have to learn to defend ourselves against these threats.

Where my opinion differs is how best to tackle it. The Bill grants extensive powers to the Minister to enforce and regulate anyone or any organisation with an online presence, from the content produced down to the operations. While this may scare off the malicious, I am afraid that it may also scare away people who are genuinely interested in improving our nation. How can we recognise the difference between an activist for human rights from one whose motivations are political in nature?

I list three key concerns: one, regulating and restricting the political space further may deter genuine individuals; two, organisations may want, or even need, collaborations and support with other foreign entities to survive and thrive; three, the Minister will be granted extensive discretion, in addition to existing powers under ISA and POFMA.

Section 8 provides a very broad definition of what activities "directed towards a political end in Singapore" means. This is of concern as any organisation engaging in such could be designated a Politically Significant Person under Part 4 of the Bill and will be subject to multiple additional requirements, such as the reporting of foreign donations and being subject to declare, and may be directed to stop taking in foreign volunteers.

This brings me to my first concern that we need to leave some space for people to participate as active citizens in shaping our future. Desiring to influence public opinion or decisions is part and parcel of advocacy. Increasing reporting requirements opens up a small organisation to potentially being targeted and increases the barrier for a citizen who wants to participate and contribute, or just to simply air their views. Ground-up initiatives may think twice.

My next concern is about how Singapore relates to the wider world. The Bill empowers the Minister to direct a person to account for all donations, possibly return donations and even stop taking volunteers who are not Singapore Citizens.

I feel this is unrealistic. Singapore is an open country with organisations forming many collaborations, especially NGOs that might need the scale to ensure that their services are accessible to others. It seems impossible to expect that people should be deterred from seeking sponsorships beyond Singapore and also that volunteers and manpower should only be limited to Singapore Citizens. Singaporeans may, ourselves, shy away from working for NGOs for fear of being unwittingly implicated, real or imagined. I would like to believe that for every malicious person out there, there are way more well-intentioned people who want to support Singapore in its growth, not hinder it.

But this requires a lot more trust and faith in the people to do the right thing. This Bill equally asks for a lot of trust and faith in the Minister to do the right thing.

There is great discretion given to the Minister on how to exercise the extensive powers under the Bill. It is a lot of power in one man’s hands. How can we protect it from future abuse? Could it be spread out? Not just to the different branches in the judiciary, but also across the people. Let them call for accountability and transparency in the organisations they work with. Let organisations regulate amongst themselves who are the right people to seek sponsorships or volunteer work from. Let safeguards be what they are: limited protections for the worst case scenario, not pre-emptive strikes against people who may be just trying to do the right thing.

Quoting the MINDEF website, Total Defence involves every Singaporean playing a part, individually and collectively, to build a strong, secure and cohesive nation. The six pillars are military, civil, economic, social, digital and psychological defence. In this digital age, foreign interference is no longer a problem that should only be left to the Government to guard against. Every citizen should be empowered to step up to be vigilant and to hold one another accountable.

I believe that public education is essential. An educated population will be able to better discern right from wrong, facts from myths.

Before this Bill is passed, I ask the Minister to give us some assurance on the appropriate use of FICA, so that ordinary citizens like myself can serve and work for the betterment of Singapore, without undue fear.

Mr Speaker: Minister of State, Sun Xueling.

5.53 pm

The Minister of State for Education and Social and Family Development (Ms Sun Xueling): Mr Speaker, Sir, in Mandarin please.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Like many Singaporeans, I also desire world peace. Most of us have no quarrel with the rest of the world and try to be kind to others. However, we live in a complicated world. The adage that one does not hurt others, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that others will not seek to hurt us.

Across the span of history, there has always been strife between different countries. Even in relatively peaceful times in the world today, foreign forces do often seek to influence the policies and affairs of other countries for their own political, economic, or military purposes. With the development of science and technology, these interference methods have become more sophisticated, and have the potential to cause significant and destructive impact in a short period of time. I think the comparison made by Mr Leong Mun Wai just now is rather inappropriate. The Nazis were a totalitarian government, whereas ours is an elected government; what the Nazis did was ethnic cleansing, whereas we have been advocating racial harmony all along.

Singapore is a democratic, independent and autonomous country. To have autonomy means to be able to make decisions freely and independently without being coerced or influenced to do so. The Bill before us today is to ensure that Singapore's affairs should be decided by Singaporeans.

However, foreign forces can use various hidden tactics to manipulate our country’s policies, public opinion and exploit existing faut lines amongst our people. As the saying goes "It is easy to dodge a spear from the front, but hard to avoid an arrow from behind." These actions directly jeopardise our ability to make independent and autonomous decisions. To protect our basic rights, we must consider ways to effectively resist foreign interference.

Today, I will give my opinion on the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Bill.

Singapore's geographical location is a unique one. It exists in a zone that has seen perennial disputes among major and regional powers. Located in the Straits of Malacca, Singapore is an important international waterway connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans. It operates the most important energy supply line in the world and is, therefore, one of the most strategically significant cities in the Pacific.

Today, with globalisation, Singapore has become an important transportation, trade, financial and information hub in Asia. In today's international environment where competition among major powers is intensifying, Singapore is inevitably a contested space and platform among major powers jockeying for strategic superiority. Holding Singapore under control is tantamount to holding the lifeblood of Asia's transportation, trade, finance, and information.

In recent years, disputes over territorial sovereignty and hegemony in the Pacific have been common and countries involved have been looking to meet their own needs. Against this backdrop and in this complex international environment, other countries will pay attention to the attitudes and propositions held by Singapore and will even influence or interfere through various ways.

Therefore, we must defend our country’s autonomy. Only in this way, can we independently and freely determine our future.

There are various forms of external intervention and the new Bill covers two of them: first, the practice of interfering in internal affairs through local agents; second, hostile information propaganda.

These practices are not mere imaginations, they have been happening in fact. For instance, in 2017, an Australian senator resigned because he was found to have accepted donations from foreigners. He disclosed confidential state information to them and advocated the positions of other countries on sensitive issues of national security.

In Singapore, in December 2018, tense bilateral relations between Singapore and our neighbours became a hot topic. During this period, we noticed a sudden surge in online comments posted on social media from accounts with fake avatars, which were anonymous accounts that did not show the users' real faces. Most of these anonymous comments were critical of Singapore. Clearly, these anonymous users were attempting to create and spread the illusion of popular opposition by our own people to Singapore’s position, at a time of bilateral tension.

Covert foreign intervention efforts can change individuals institutions and even entire societies, in an unnoticed manner. The cohesion of a nation, the fighting spirit of a people, can be corrupted and defeated without a fight.

Let us imagine what would happen, if Singapore allows other countries to interfere in Singapore’s affairs and influence public opinion, and our autonomy was really manipulated by foreign forces.

Singapore would very likely become a puppet at the mercy of foreign countries’ manipulation. Our nation-building philosophy, lifestyle, safety and interests may all be weakened or subverted.

For example, if foreign forces intentionally drive a wedge along racial lines, can our racial harmony be maintained? Would our racial and religious equality still be possible? If foreign forces were to use Singapore’s land and resources to meet the needs of their own countries, could we then continue to protect the interests of our people? If foreign forces try to involve Singapore in geopolitical disputes or become a battlefield for wars between other countries, would our children not also get involved and be sacrificed?

Just now, some Members said that there was no need for a new law to counter foreign interference. I hope that these Members can realise that Singapore’s unique characteristics make us more vulnerable to external interference.

First, Singapore is a multiracial, multireligious and multicultural society. Instigating inter-ethnic, inter-religious and inter-cultural relations is a likely avenue of intervention by foreign forces. At the same time, people of different races or religions may have stronger cultural and historical ties with some countries. They may have a sense of friendliness or belonging to a certain country or a spiritual leader, which makes it easier for other countries to target these people and make use of them.

Second, Singapore is a very open society and maintains a high Internet penetration rate, which allows other countries to achieve their propaganda purposes through anonymous, fast and efficient information dissemination. Many countries have the technological and financial capability to expertly create misleading information, incite intimidation and sway the minds of men. Through highly paid mercenaries and the use of sophisticated tools, such as software and hackers, they are able to penetrate into our society and sow discord.

Third, Singapore is a small country, which is like a small boat in the sea. If we do not pay attention and endeavour to resist foreign interventions, it will be as if someone is jumping around, and our boat can be easily overturned.

What preventive measures should we take to minimise the risks of foreign intervention?

First, the Foreign Interference Countermeasures Act (FICA) will strengthen existing management measures for politically significant individuals and organisations and also make them public. Since foreign influence is often covert and executed secretly through proxies, the way to deal with it is to be transparent and open.

"Politically significant" mainly refers to political parties, public officials, Members of Parliament and other people who have influence on national policies, as well as those individuals and organisations who are classified as "politically significant." This Bill does not target ordinary people. As such, there is nothing to worry about for most people and entities, as the Bill will not affect their daily activities.

Obviously, political parties, people holding political office, and Members of Parliament are defined as "politically significant". Their actions can directly influence national policies and public opinion. However, we also cannot rule out the possibility that some individuals and organisations whose main activities involve political goals and public interests, may be under the influence of foreign powers and may harm Singapore’s interests. These individuals or organisations may also be listed as "politically significant."

Even if they are listed as "politically significant", they can still accept foreign donations, provided that their source of funding is transparent.

As the saying goes, "One who stands upright does not fear a crooked shadow." Such persons and entities should have nothing to worry about if they do not harm Singapore’s public interest.

Second, the Bill is not intended to prevent individuals, companies, and organisations from establishing international relationships.

Singapore is a global city. We strongly encourage individuals, companies and organisations to participate in international exchanges and international cooperation to make our country more dynamic. I used to work for Business China. It organised cultural exchanges, education and training activities throughout China, Southeast Asia and other regions, reflecting the importance we attach to overseas connections. We continue to encourage companies, associations and social organisations to visit overseas and conduct cooperation projects with other countries.

To do business abroad, our companies will, inevitably, deal with local governments or government-related organisations. The building of such relationships is important. Of course, we should also abide by their local rules when dealing with them.

If a Singaporean businessman interacts with a foreign government or government-related organisation and discusses national policies, that is not an issue. However, if the other part tries to get the businessman to lobby a Singaporean Member of Parliament or asks the businessman to widely spread the other side’s position in Singapore, then the businessman ought to be more vigilant.

In addition, if a Singaporean organisation organises an exchange event and receives sponsorship from a foreign party, the general approach should be to be transparent about the sponsorship in the event materials, so that the process is transparent. Some local individuals may also accept titles granted by overseas governments and institutions. Where these titles directly involve political positions, they would need to be disclosed.

The purpose of this Bill is to prevent foreign interference and protect Singapore’s interest. It does not target personal, business and cultural exchanges outside of these areas.

Third, the Bill will not affect free speech.

True freedom of speech is when people can speak freely without interference. Free speech is undermined if foreign actors use hostile information to manipulate and influence public opinion.

Singaporeans can still express their personal opinions about our politics. For example, if a businessman is dissatisfied with Singapore’s policies and believes that it has affected the industry he is involved in, he is free to express his views and provide feedback to the Government. In this case, the new Bill does not apply.

The Bill is not aimed at personal opinions and is not meant to curb freedom of speech. Its purpose is to ensure transparency of information and create an environment where discussions in the public sphere is free from foreign interference and manipulation.

Fourth, the Bill targets hostile information.

Malicious foreign forces may incite controversial debates in order to sow discord between different groups, sway public opinion towards their intended narrative on sensitive issues, confuse people or weaken the public’s trust in the state’s institutions, thereby undermining the security and stability of the target country.

Hostile information can sometimes involve Singapore’s national defence, security and diplomatic issues through intelligence and other means. Therefore, it is necessary for us to protect sensitive information needed for Government decision-making and we cannot make hasty conclusions through common legal procedures. We must formulate a customised legal framework to protect sensitive information and the individuals who provide the information.

The Bill proposes to establish an independent tribunal to hear appeals. Compared with the High Court, it is more appropriate for appeals to be heard by the tribunal as this includes a Supreme Court judge and others who have expertise in the security and technology sectors. The members of the independent review tribunal have the necessary expertise and security clearances to deliberate on issues concerning our national security.

For issues involving national security, state secrets and diplomatic relations, we should all focus on the broader context.

Singapore is not the first in putting national security matters outside the court system for independent review. For example, in the United Kingdom, the review of investigations by British intelligence agencies is placed in a review court independent of the court system to protect sensitive evidence from being disclosed. Israel also has an appeal procedure hosted by a special court to protect sensitive evidence provided by the state during the review of administrative detention.

The discussions on how to effectively guard against foreign interference have been discussed for quite some time.

One of the two main features of the Bill is to prevent hostile information campaigns. An important means of hostile information campaigns is false information on the Internet. In fact, as early as January 2018, the Government commissioned a Select Committee to study the dissemination of online falsehoods. I was also a member of the committee then. We invited the public to submit feedback and nearly 200 people submitted written feedback. In March 2018, we held an eight-day hearing to listen to public feedback. Among the 65 people who came to the Select Committee hearing, 18 spoke about the use of hostile information campaigns intervening in domestic affairs. For more than three years since, different institutions and scholars have participated in discussions on foreign interference. There have also been frequent discussions in the newspapers. At the same time, other countries are also actively enacting legislation.

After such lengthy discussions, we need to take action. I hope everyone will be united in our efforts to guard against foreign interference.

In the face of foreign interference, it is important that we stick to our principles and put the interests of the Singaporean people first. If we were to learn from the history of other countries, the most important lesson will be to counter foreign interference and extreme ideologies. Singapore, as an independent country, must stay clear-headed, focus on the big picture, learn lessons from history, and resist all forms of foreign interference.

Not only should we stress the importance of personal ethics and responsibility so as not to be used by external forces, but we must also ensure that our Government, social organisations, and individuals will not be tempted or misled by foreign forces to harm our independence and the foundation of our democracy.

I hope that everyone can unite and support this Bill, as we defend our sovereignty and resist foreign interference.

6.11 pm

Mr Leong Mun Wai: Mr Speaker, Sir, I have a question for the Minister of State. Is it okay?

Mr Speaker: Yes, you have a clarification, Mr Leong?

Mr Leong Mun Wai: (In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Here, I would like to ask Minister of State Sun Xueling two questions.

First, the Government has been scaremongering. Can you give an example where a country in Asia was affected by strong foreign interference?

Secondly, what kind of principle is it? If you have no intention to commit a crime, then no matter how harsh the law is, it does not concern you. The Minister has been talking about this principle, and now the Minister of State is also talking about this. May I know what kind of legal principle it is?

Ms Sun Xueling: (In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Earlier in my speech, I gave an example. In December 2018 when bilateral relations between Singapore and a neighbouring country became tense, we noticed a surge in online comments posted on social media from accounts with fake avatars, and the comments were all critical of Singapore. They were attempting to create an illusion of popular opposition by our own people to Singapore's position. This is to answer the Member's first question. Can the Member repeat his second question, please?

Mr Leong Mun Wai: (In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] My second question is: is there such a principle in law where if you have no intention to commit a crime, then even if the Government introduces harsher laws, it does not concern you. What kind of principle is that?

(In English): Okay, the saying that if you had no plans to be against the law, so the law should not concern you. What reasoning and what principle is that?

Ms Sun Xueling: (In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] I have already mentioned that the impact of foreign interference can be wide-ranging and deeply damaging. We must pre-empt. If we only act after the damage has been done, then it is too late. I hope that all the Members here will consider the big picture.

Mr Leong Mun Wai: Mr Speaker, can I —

Mr Speaker: I am calling Mr Gerald Giam. Can you make it later?

6.13 pm

Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song (Aljunied): Mr Speaker, since the FICA Bill was tabled just three weeks ago, we have seen a flurry of criticism by lawyers, NGOs, academics and journalists, with some wondering if it will affect perceptions of Singapore as a global hub. Some of my constituents have written to me expressing their concern with the Bill's over-reach.

These criticisms are not unfounded. They are reflective of the disquiet felt by many. The root of this disquiet is that FICA enacts many broad and sweeping measures in an attempt to prevent Singaporeans from being misled by hostile information campaigns over the Internet. If these draconian measures are not properly limited, they could have a chilling effect on freedom of speech and the exchange of information among Singaporeans.

At the same time, FICA seems to be lacking a sharper approach to deal with real threats that Singapore might face. The Bill does not provide enough countermeasures against elite capture, which is the clandestine foreign lobbying of Singaporeans holding positions of influence. Elite capture can, potentially, have a far more negative impact on public policies than influence campaigns on the general public.

Fundamentally, no legislation can effectively counter foreign interference in our politics by itself. Public education and a freer press are also needed to inoculate our population against these risks.

Let me now elaborate on these three points.

First, on protecting public debate. The definition of public interest in clause 7 includes the prevention of any foreign influence or interference directed towards a political end in Singapore. In turn, clause 8 defines an activity to be directed towards a political end in Singapore if its purpose includes influencing public opinion on a matter of public controversy or if it promotes or opposes views on a subject of a political debate in Singapore.

Public interest is one of the basis for the Minister to authorise Part 3 directions, anticipatory directions, designations of Politically Significant Persons (PSPs) or entities, Technical Assistance Directions or directives regarding donors.

With the inclusion of clause 8F and G, the Bill's interpretation of political end covers an extremely wide variety of policy matters and issues which may be discussed by Singaporeans. Public discussions on these issues, invariably, involve the views and voices of foreigners.

FICA sets a low bar on what constitutes public interest. It empowers the Minister to block public discussions if it is, in his opinion, in the public interest to take action. This gives the Minister for Home Affairs a very wide discretion to authorise Part 3 directions or designate PSPs.

It could stifle genuine political debate by discouraging Singapore Citizens or local non-government organisations (NGOs) from speaking up, even in good faith, for fear of being issued a directive under FICA or designated as a PSP.

While the Government might argue that having a directive issued against, say, a Facebook post, is not a death warrant, it carries a reputational risk to the target of that directive. It would be very unfortunate if an NGO engaged in advocacy work, for example, speaking up on migrant workers' rights, is designated as a politically significant entity.

I note that MHA has tried to give assurances that this type of activity will not be stopped. But these assurances are not in the letter of the law. This is why the Member of Parliament for Sengkang, Assoc Prof Jamus Lim, tabled amendments to clause 120, to codify MHA's assurances in this Bill.

I tabled amendments to subsections F and G under clause 8 to be removed. Removing these two subsections will not hinder the Minister from applying the brake on hostile foreign influence operations that could harm Singapore.

Clause 7 already has a list of actions that are contrary to the public interest which the Minister is empowered to authorise Part 3 directions against. These include threats to public health, finances, safety, tranquilly, peace and order as well as incitement of feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different groups of people in Singapore which may endanger the public peace and public order of Singapore.

Let me address the scenarios given by the Minister in his speech earlier.

Setting one race against another or using religion to drive a wedge between religious groups could be considered incitement of feelings of ill-will between different groups of people in Singapore and will already fall under clause 7D. A foreign agent promoting harmful falsehoods, for example, about approved vaccines, could be reined in to protect public health under clause 7B.

In short, our amendments to the Bill will not prevent the Minister from acting against foreigners seeking to do harm to Singapore but they will go some way in preventing genuine political discussions from being stifled either deliberately by the government of the day or, inadvertently, due to their mere presence.

Next, I wish to highlight an area where the Bill does not do enough of, which is preventing elite capture.

While high-profile influence campaigns tend to hog the limelight, clandestine foreign lobbying of individual elites is, by definition, done in secret. The most likely targets of this secret influence operations are our political elites.

Many democracies have countermeasures in place to deal with the risk of such influence operations.

The US has the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) enacted in 1938, which requires agents of foreigners to register or risk prosecution under federal law. These agents must disclose their agreements with foreign principals, report the funding they have received and provide a log of all activities performed on behalf of the foreign principals.

The Singapore Government would be familiar with FARA because agencies like EBD, STB, Temasek Holdings and the Government itself have already been registered as foreign principals. These registrations are transparent to the public and can be downloaded from the FARA website.

Australia has the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act, which has a Registry of Interests. Taiwan has the Sunshine Acts, which require public officers from the President all the way down to the Administrator for Company Registrations and their immediate family members to make public declarations of their assets, which help combat both graft and foreign influence operations.

In addition, most of these democracies provide for independent legislative review through regular select committee hearings.

Policy-making in Singapore is highly concentrated in the top ranks of the Government and the civil service. Many policymakers regularly exchange ideas with one another in informal settings like golf courses and exclusive clubs like the Pyramid Club. These are places where informal discussions on policies may take place well before they are discussed in the media or drafted into law.

Yet, in the Bill, the list of defined PSPs excludes senior public officers. This could make it easier for malign foreign actors to co-opt local elites to use their influence either wittingly or unwittingly for the benefit of foreign powers.

This is why I tabled the amendments to the Bill to add several more classes of people to the list of defined PSPs under clauses 14 and 78.

My proposed additions to the list include Permanent Secretaries (PSes) and Deputy Secretaries (DSes) in Government Ministries.

These officials lead the formulation and drafting of legislation. They are the subject matter experts who provide important policy advice to Ministers almost on a daily basis. The Minister has argued that civil servants are subject to the Instruction Manual and various rules and declaration requirements, which are, cumulatively, stricter than the FICA requirements on PSPs.

This is even more reason to include PSes, DSes and Statutory Board CEOs as PSPs. FICA will provide a stronger layer of public transparency, accountability and oversight without making it more onerous on them. Their names will be made public on the register of PSPs and any foreigner dealing with them will know that they are PSPs and vice versa.

The chairpersons, board members and chief executives of Statutory Boards also have important roles in influencing and implementing Government policies. I cannot agree with the Minister that it is impractical to define this group as PSPs just because some of them are foreigners.

Statutory Boards are not private firms. The fact that many Statutory Board members are foreigners is even more reason to impose transparency requirements so that the public and the Government can be more confident that they are acting in the best interest of Singapore.

Our list also includes the board members and chief executives of Temasek, GIC, MAS and CPF Board. These individuals provide directions on policies and long-term asset allocations that involve hundreds of billions of dollars of our national reserves. Surely, we can all agree that these decisions must be guarded against any malign foreign influence.

All these influential individuals should be subject to the same level of scrutiny of their foreign connections as election agents and candidates, the latter of whom are already on the list of defined PSPs but are much less influential in policy-making.

Lastly, central executive committee members of registered political parties are included because they have a role in setting the policy and political positions that parties take into elections and Parliament.

While this expanded list of defined PSPs does not cover every possible person who can influence policies, it provides for additional scrutiny over interactions between Government elites and foreign principals. It will require them to disclose foreign affiliations, reportable arrangements and migration benefits with foreign principals, all of which have the potential to colour their decisions on domestic and foreign policies, which affect all Singaporeans.

The last part of my speech will focus on the other actions that are essential to our efforts to combat foreign interference and protect our core national interests.

We need to focus much more on public education and avoid over-relying on legislative measures to curb hostile foreign interference. This is a point made by the Leader of the Opposition earlier.

Back in 2019, Minister Chan Chun Sing also said that a discerning electorate is the best defence against foreign influence. I could not agree more.

Given the growing sophistication in the way foreign powers conduct their influence operations, which Minister K Shanmugam has taken us through in his handouts, we need a whole-of-society approach to counter them.

Sustained public education of both the young and old will help remind us that we are a sovereign nation with our own core interests. This requires a consciously planned and sustainable approach so that Singaporeans are aware that other countries have their own agenda and our national interests are not necessarily aligned with theirs.

For example, some countries, to further their own agenda, may insidiously play up their cultural affinity card. They may, for example, appeal to Singaporeans of a particular ethnicity to share with their friends their pride in that country's military and economic progress and they might even chastise their own Government for not showing sufficient deference to them.

This goes against our national interest. Yet, the vectors of this campaign may not even realise it. Issuing directions under FICA to block the transmission of their messages may be like cutting off the head of the mythical hydra. A new head will grow again until these Singaporeans are convinced that they have been deceived.

This is not something that a legislative hammer like FICA can easily achieve. We need more frank and open discussions about the tactics used by foreign powers to influence our population so that Singaporeans will recognise them and will not unknowingly spread foreign propaganda without realising their goals and origins.

As a small country which seeks to be friends with all countries, large and small, it is sometimes inconvenient for the Government to front public discussions and education of this nature. Some countries might bristle at being called out by the Singapore Government and this could impact diplomatic relations.

Academic institutions, NGOs, researchers and even school teachers should step forward to play a greater role in this national effort.

These independent organisations and individuals will have more freedom to educate the public or their students without being seen by foreign powers as Government spokespersons. They can, therefore, be more candid in sharing their views, even in public forums, without Singapore incurring the ire of other countries.

Government agencies, especially MFA, MINDEF and MHA, should regularly engage these groups and individuals in closed-door sessions to share the Government's perspectives on our core interests, but without dictating what they should or should not do.

Many incidents of foreign influence operations in other countries like Australia, Sweden and the US came to light because of investigative reporting by their free press.

A former US National Security adviser resigned after journalists investigated and reported about his contacts with Russia. He was later charged and pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI.

Sweden's ambassador to China was recalled and investigated after the daughter of a Chinese-Swedish bookseller, jailed in China, made a blog post, which was reported in the media revealing that the ambassador had commissioned businessmen to negotiate a sensitive case involving her father without the knowledge of the Swedish ministry of foreign affairs. The ambassador was later prosecuted in Sweden but acquitted due to insufficient proof.

The PAP Government has rejected the notion of the press being the fourth estate which scrutinises the actions of public officials and public institutions in the public interest, calling for accountability for their actions. This could handicap our efforts to weed out hostile foreign influence.

We cannot rely only on legislation or law enforcement or intelligence agencies to stem foreign influence. Given the risk that foreign interference poses to a small and open country like Singapore, we need to use more tools in our arsenal to counter it by drawing on a wider range of intelligence, including research and exposure by the press.

We are made more secure, not less. A free press which invests in investigative journalism can shine the light on shady activities as well as inform and educate the public and policymakers about hostile information campaigns taking place on our shores.

Mr Speaker, the approach taken by FICA amounts to using a sledgehammer to crack one bad nut at the expense of perhaps a dozen good ones. Yet, in the area of preventing elite capture, it falls short, compared to foreign lobbying laws in other countries.

My Workers' Party colleagues and I have proposed some very reasonable amendments to the Bill to prevent over-reach, ensure greater transparency and provide more judicial oversight.

With these amendments, FICA will retain all its teeth to keep foreign interference at bay while assuring Singaporeans that its fangs will not be used unjustly on our own citizens. I appeal to this House to seriously consider these amendments and approve them for the benefit of all Singaporeans and our future as a country.

Mr Speaker: Leader.

Debate resumed.

Mr Speaker: Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim.

6.31 pm

Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim (Chua Chu Kang): Mr Speaker, Sir, I declare my interest as a practising lawyer. In 2018, I submitted written and oral representations to the Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods. I raised the need for us to be mindful of the power of lobbyists with political or commercial objectives, who may fund the spread of falsehoods online and cause divisions in our society.

I expressed that social media and online news websites should be transparent on their funding and/or political affiliations.

I was concerned about sinister campaigners meant to spread disinformation, evoke emotions and provoke reactions to advance a certain agenda.

Intrinsic in what I said, was how easy it was for any foreign principal to interfere in our social compact and political institutions if there are no checks on transparency or accountability. This Bill seeks to address that.

There have been many discussions on this Bill outside this Chamber. However, I think, as Singaporeans, all of us can agree on the following two fundamental principles: first, that Singaporean politics must be determined and decided by Singaporeans alone; second, Singaporeans all want open and transparent discourse in politics, one that is accountable to Singaporeans and not motivated or interfered in a covert or deceptive manner.

In this speech, I will focus on foreign interference by electronic communications activity. My speech will be in three parts: first, my thoughts on the threshold proof required to best protect our national interests; second, my clarifications in relation to the mechanism to safeguard our collective interests; and third, the importance of maintaining trust and defending the institutions of our country, which I will deliver in Malay.

The foreign interference threat that Singapore faces can take various forms and employ different tactics. These tactics evolve over time and are difficult to track.

In New Zealand, the ministry of justice in a statement on mitigating foreign interference stated that: "… due to its covert nature, direct evidence of foreign interference on our democratic system, and its impacts, can be difficult to obtain, and often emerges post-facto."

The situation in Singapore is no different. By the very nature of foreign interference, direct evidence of the same is very difficult to find, much less to prove. Often times, if we wait for such direct evidence, it would be too late.

Against this backdrop, I am concerned about the amendments proposed by Member Assoc Prof Jamus Lim as I fear that in actual reality and practice, these amendments may potentially blunt the protection under the Act and weaken the steps that our civil servants can take to protect Singapore and Singaporeans from covert foreign interference.

There are two main categories of amendments which I am concerned with.

First, the amendments relating to the mental state of mind of the perpetrators in clauses 17, 18, 20, 40 and 75 of the Bill; second, the proposal to introduce a new threshold of proof in clause 21.

On the proposal to amend the mental state of mind in the offences to require actual knowledge, it would be difficult to prove that a person actually knows that his action is prejudicial to Singapore’s national interests. It will be too easy for perpetrators to just disclaim knowledge that something is, for example, prejudicial to the security of Singapore. This may have the unintended effect of weakening the protection of our national interests under the Bill. Such knowledge or belief must be pegged, I think, to an objective standard of likelihood which any reasonable person ought to have in the circumstances, which is what the current wording in the Bill suggests.

Specifically, on the proposal to remove clause 17(2)(a) and clause 18(2)(a), this effectively means that a perpetrator must have in mind a particular foreign country or principal during the activity. However, in reality, foreign state or principals are likely to disavow any links to Hostile Information Campaigns (HICs). I think it matters less who that foreign principal is, so long as we know that the perpetrator is acting on behalf of a foreign principal. The fact that one is a puppet on a string is enough; without needing to know or prove who the puppet master is.

In relation to the powers of the Minister to issue anticipatory directions, I can understand that given the urgency and covert nature of foreign interference, the authorities may require action to be taken on the basis of reasonable suspicion, which is a standard well established in law. This means that the Reviewing Tribunal or the Courts can be guided by past case law and decisions to assess if, indeed, the Minister has fulfilled the legal threshold to issue such anticipatory directions.

On the contrary, there is no established standard for an “evidence or actionable intelligence” test in the common law or Commonwealth jurisdiction. Ultimately, I think the Member and all of us here want the same thing – which is, greater certainty and clarity before the issuance of such directions.

In practice, the test on reasonable suspicion is objectively met if there is a reasonable suspicion or belief and that it is in the public interest to do so. This is based on Court of Appeal cases that have construed the meaning of reasonable suspicion test. This is not Hollywood. This is based on case law with a judiciary that carries out its duty with no fear or favour.

I now move on to my second part on the clarifications to further safeguard our national interest and Singaporeans. I have five clarifications in this regard.

First, in relation to clauses 17 and 18 of the Bill, is it a requirement for the perpetrator or accused to actually know that the proxy was indeed acting on behalf of a foreign principal? What if he or she does not even know that the proxy was acting for a foreign principal? Alternatively, he or she may not know that the proxy was acting on behalf of an undisclosed principal. What would the approach be then?

I ask these questions because it should not be made easy for perpetrators to disclaim actual knowledge in situations when they could or ought to have made reasonable enquiries with the proxy regarding the principal.

This is not an ordinary crime or offence we are talking about here. The stakes are too high given the harm and prejudice that can be caused to our country.

Second, with regard to clause 16 on determining the purpose of an activity or conduct having regard to the intention or belief of the persons involved, what is the threshold of determining such intention or belief? Does such belief need to be objectively ascertained on a reasonable basis? Also, what is the approach, assuming there is more than one or competing beliefs or intentions?

Third, on what is to be determined as covert or clandestine, may I ask the Minister what about communications over WhatsApp or other end-to-end encrypted messaging platforms or communications through VPNs? These are widely available and are platforms commonly used.

Do we consider the varying degrees of concealment? On the flip side, if there was no attempt at all to hide the prejudicial interference, then I think the perpetrators should still not be allowed to get away with it.

Fourth, on the Reviewing Tribunal and judicial proceedings, clause 112 makes every offence in Part 3 arrestable and non-bailable and the rest of the offences arrestable. In this regard, what are the measures that will be in the subsidiary legislation or otherwise to ensure that the Reviewing Tribunal proceedings can be concluded expeditiously?

Also, given that such proceedings will touch on matters of national security and interests, what are the safeguards in place to ensure the confidentiality and secrecy of the information or any evidence produced in those proceedings, whether under the Official Secrets Act (OSA) or other applicable legislation?

Fifth, I feel that it would be useful for the public to know on a periodic basis the types of threats and attempts of foreign interference made. I can understand that full disclosure would be extremely sensitive to the mission success of any intelligence operations. However, perhaps MHA can consider, from time to time, giving a report on the FICA offences or directions without the need to go into the specific details or naming the individuals or foreign principals involved.

In this way, Singaporeans and the public can appreciate the good work done behind the scenes by the men and women of in our Public Service to protect our national interests and, at the same time, maintain and increase public confidence in the Public Service and the Government.

Mr Speaker, Sir, for the final part of my speech, in Malay, please.

(In Malay): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Every country takes part in activities to influence, shape perceptions and make decisions in other countries. This is the nature of international diplomacy.

However, these activities reach the level of interference when it is deliberately done in an irresponsible manner to damage the sovereignty of other nations.

In a study by the Strategic Research Institute at the French Military College, or IRSEM, which was published just last week, Singapore was found to be highly exposed to foreign interference. First, our country’s high level of digital literacy means that online intervention campaigns can be carried out very easily. Secondly, because we are a plural society, those with nefarious intentions can attempt to divide us.

Therefore, it is right that we, as one country, seek to further strengthen our solidarity and our mutual trust with the Government by reviewing the legal framework to combat elements that want to divide us. The Bill seeks to achieve this goal.

In my English speech, I recounted my experience as a community leader and lawyer when I was providing evidence at the Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods in 2018. I stated my concern that social media and online news websites should be transparent in their sources of funding or political links. What was inherent in my evidence was my worry that any foreign actor can easily interfere in our country’s politics and disrupt the stability of our social and political institutions. In fact, many other observers and individuals have voiced similar concerns to the Select Committee, as what was listed by the Minister earlier.

In my role as Vice Chairperson of the Government Parliamentary Committee for Home Affairs and Law, I have also been involved in various discussions and consultations on the issue of foreign interference as reflected in this Bill. Therefore, the discussion on the threat of clandestine foreign interference has been going on for more than three years and not just recently, as portrayed by the hon Leader of the Opposition, Mr Pritam Singh. In fact, Mr Singh was also a panel member of the Select Committee in 2018 and he was present during my testimony on 27 March 2018.

Mr Speaker, this Act will allow the Ministry to take strategic measures against the mastermind or proxy, who is like a snake in the grass within our country. Their activities or plans are difficult to detect and sometimes we should take immediate action before it is too late.

This is not new. As a lawyer in international cases in Court and arbitration, I had to often accept urgent orders to preserve certain evidence or assets temporarily before the case goes to Court for trial. As for this Bill, in order to balance the rights of an individual with our public and national interests, the Bill provides the space and opportunity for the accused to submit appeals and provide evidence to the Reviewing Tribunal that reviews MHA's orders.

I feel that the proposed process in this Act is reasonable. This is in view of the pressing situation to prevent interference by foreign parties and the adverse consequences to our country and citizens if such interference is implemented successfully. In this way, no clandestine enemy can divide our plural society.

The Ministry must also meet the prescribed conditions before it can issue an order through this Bill. This is based on the definition grounded in previous case laws. In fact, the Court still has the power to establish a judicial review in certain cases according to the existing Court's inherent jurisdiction.

Singapore also has an excellent reputation and high degree of trust in the Police and Government, a robust legislative system and an independent judiciary. If an individual is truly not involved, it is very easy for him to refute the accusation with strong evidence. But in my experience, for serious criminal cases especially against the country and our entire society, the Ministry will not simply accuse a person without any reasonable cause or proof. There is no smoke without fire.

We have gone through decades of independence. However, the battle to colonise the minds of our people still exists. Let us unite and strengthen the trust between us and within our institutions.

(In English): Mr Speaker, Sir, in conclusion, the law and our public officers operate in the light to protect us, while sinister, clandestine actors operate in the shadows against our collective interest and our country.

Hence, we should even the odds in this fight. Let us put our trust in the men and women of our Public Service and grant them the tools that they need to uphold their sworn duty to protect our lives and our Singaporean way of living.

Notwithstanding the clarifications, I stand in support of this Bill. [Applause.]

Mr Speaker: Mr Darryl David.

6.47 pm

Mr Darryl David (Ang Mo Kio): Mr Speaker, Sir, the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act (FICA) broadly aims to counter foreign attempts to influence the domestic politics of Singapore through information campaigns that shape the public’s opinion on topics of interest to Singapore and the use of local proxies to influence political outcomes.

Given the nature of FICA, there are, expectedly, numerous questions from various quarters on what FICA is, what does it cover or not cover, who or what is affected by it, how will it change the current operating models of NGOs that are part of a larger global body, or whether FICA will end up as a political muzzle on active citizenry and citizens’ participation in politics. These questions are clearly important and should be thoroughly addressed and debated so that all Singaporeans will have a clear understanding of what the Bill entails.

Mr Speaker, Sir, the interference of foreign actors in the affairs of other countries is not new. History is replete with examples of how different states and state-sponsored actors had tried to influence the course of political and social development in other states.

In modern times, foreign influence might take the overt form of Embassies and Foreign Chambers of Commerce lobbying and advocating for their interests. It may also take the covert form of actions, such as state-sponsored actors conducting black ops and clandestine disinformation campaigns, that sow discontent and distrust between the government and people and discord among citizens on contentious social issues. Such operations can also create an impression of mass support among the country’s citizens for a foreign country’s position on important bilateral issues.

Such pernicious foreign influence creates a drip effect that can change the attitudes of citizens towards their own government and even towards their own fellow citizens, leading to the destabilisation of the country in the long run and the weakening of its position vis-à-vis that of the foreign country that could be behind, exerting the covert influence. This is why an open economy and a small country like Singapore needs intelligence and counter-intelligence resources to help manage such threats.

In the hyperconnected world that we are in today, everyone, individuals, organisations and governments, are susceptible to online attacks. Such attacks can be conducted by hackers who are motivated by monetary gains or by state-linked groups that are trying to make a political statement. For example, the hacking of Sony Pictures, an entertainment company, in 2014 by the “Guardians of Peace” who supposedly had links with a North Asian nation. Cyber attacks can even be sponsored by foreign states as part of political espionage to retrieve embarrassing information about politicians or classified government information from rival states.

Of course, we all know about the biggest attack that Singapore was subject to in 2018 where the personal particulars of more than 1.5 million patients were stolen and the health records of Prime Minister Lee was also targeted specifically by hackers.

While it has never been officially reported, it was hinted, Mr Speaker, Sir, that the cyber attack then was likely to have been orchestrated by state-linked hackers. So, my question is, if there is sufficient evidence that a foreign entity, be it a government or organisation, is behind certain activities that are deemed harmful or detrimental to Singapore, how transparent will the Government be in making that information known to Singaporeans?

I know that Singapore has always tried to be diplomatically sensitive when disclosing information on foreign influence. I do understand the need to be diplomatically sensitive, but if we were to act against the agent of that particular foreign entity, then should we also not make that entity’s identity and activities known so that we can, as a country, take a particular united position against that particular other country?

For example, if Country X is behind certain activities that could be deemed detrimental to Singapore and Country X is known to be popular with Singaporeans, either as a tourist destination or perhaps a country that Singaporeans tend to purchase goods and services from, then exposing this country as a country that does not have Singapore's and Singaporeans' interests at heart might allow us, as Singaporeans, as one people, to take a stand of solidarity and take a position against Country X.

After all, why would we want to contribute to the economy of a country which is determined to affect Singapore negatively? I said earlier that Singapore is a small country, and, as a small country, we might not have much of an impact on that particular country’s economy, but it is important to take a principled stand, in a show of collective Singaporean solidarity that you cannot mess with us, you should not mess with us.

[Deputy Speaker (Mr Christopher de Souza) in the Chair]

My next point is countermeasures for donor activities funding from overseas sources for NGOs.

Overseas funding for Politically Significant Persons (PSPs), political parties or for organisations involved in political activities is clearly undesirable. They are clearly undesirable. Clearly, we should not allow foreign entities to indirectly influence or get involved in Singapore’s politics via donations they make to PSPs. I believe every Member of this House would agree with me broadly on this point.

However, I would like to seek clarifications from the Minister on the position regarding NGOs, especially if these NGOs are local chapters of a global NGO. What would the Government’s position be if the local chapters of global NGOs happen to be supporting a particular cause that might be regarded as not being fully in alignment with what is best for Singapore? Because, sometimes, those issues are a bit grey, they are matters that are open to debate and interpretation. With FICA in place, would these NGOs be classified as agents of influence and be ordered to cease their operations here?

I would also like to seek clarifications on the Government’s position regarding local chapters of global NGOs that are currently receiving regular funding support from overseas donors and their parent NGOs. With FICA, would these NGOs then be forbidden from accepting funding from those channels, thus affecting the ability of these local chapters to operate in Singapore?

I ask this, Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, because there are NGOs that might be receiving overseas funding or support that are doing work, good work, that is beneficial to Singaporeans and the Singaporean community as a whole, and we would not want them or the work they are doing to be inadvertently affected by this Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, the threat of foreign interference is real, more so in today’s hyperconnected world where we are bombarded every day by an overwhelming amount of information on social media and digital media. Some of this information could be deliberate attempts by nefarious foreign entities to shape and influence our opinions on certain social and political topics.

In an ideal world, we would be discerning enough to differentiate between genuine information versus attempts to influence. But sadly, we are living in a less than ideal world. Although not perfect, FICA is still useful legislation to help safeguard Singapore against foreign interference.

Mr Deputy Speaker, the debates over FICA could be polarising. However, we must not let the debates over the form of the Bill or partisan politics detract us from the spirit of what the Bill intends to do. We need to acknowledge that the core spirit of the Bill is aimed at protecting our country from foreign influences that might destabilise our society or undermine the national interests of Singapore. With that in mind, I end my speech in support of the Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Leon Perera.

6.55 pm

Mr Leon Perera (Aljunied): Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, five Workers' Party Members of Parliament are speaking on the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures)Bill and four have filed amendments to the Act to bring balance to this Bill. Why?

Some Singaporeans might think that this is an arcane and obscure Bill that will probably only impact those politicos who comment on or get involved in politics. Should we not be spending the time talking about COVID-19 jobs and other bread-and-butter matters? We should talk about bread-and-butter matters and Workers' Party Members of Parliament make parliamentary interventions on these matters even during the Sittings, such as Parliamentary Questions on COVID-19. But this Bill is important, too. It is important not only because there have always been malicious foreign actors who seek to twist our politics to their own ends and always will be, it is also important because the Bill the Government has placed before Parliament today promises to give yet more levers of power to the Ruling Party, which can potentially be abused for partisan purposes, to limit criticism and disadvantage political opponents, plus corroding the very functioning of our hard-won democratic society.

Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, since entering this Chamber in 2016, I have had the privilege of participating in debates on the Constitution Amendment Bill, the Administration of Justice Bill and POFMA, all of which altered the rules of our politics in significant ways to increase broad discretion held by the Government to affect political outcomes. Sir, sometimes, in life, changes happen bit by bit.

They are subtle and we do not notice them and, like the proverbial frog boiling in water, one day, after many of these changes, we will wake up and find that we are no longer living in a democratic society envisaged in that most Singaporean of documents, our Pledge.

If our rules become more and more tilted, biased and skewed towards the Ruling Party, the government of the day, against critics, alternative parties, or even independent-minded citizens who simply have a point to make in the public square, even at a time when our citizenry is more educated and politically aware than ever before, wither Singapore? What will happen is that our politics will become less accountable, less contestable, less meaningful. The ideas that get raised in the public square may become more and more limited to a narrow field of opinion. Abuses or mistakes may not come to light or will get glossed over in public debate when they do. Fear of the enormous discretionary power of the Government may poison political discourse. And if all of these things happen to our politics then that will affect our policy outcomes on COVID-19, on jobs, on HDB lease decay, on retirement adequacy, reducing inequality and much else.

Sir, the Minister for Home Affairs earlier spoke about the political philosophy behind such legislation that the risk of a rogue government is perhaps less than the risk of foreign interference or words to that effect, among other arguments. The thing about giving the Executive government more and more power in exchange for stability and economic benefits is this: it is that if that government turns rogue one day and that stability and those benefits no longer get delivered, well-meaning patriots and alternative parties may struggle to change that entrenched government because the legal and institutional tools to bring about that change are all stacked against them and, by then, it will be too late.

Some may say that such new laws, like POFMA, have not stifled debate. There is still debate and criticism of the Government in the public square. Sir, I will make two points here. It is hard to know what the effect of these laws has been in the past on the quantity and quality of debate versus if these had not been passed. Secondly, hobbling genuine debate is something that could still happen if future governments decide to use these laws to a greater extent than has thus happened. That could well happen one day if a Ruling Party in the future, for example, faces a political crisis of confidence and decides to use the most draconian provisions latent in these laws to suppress criticism so as to stay in power.

Sir, when we face a danger, fake news, foreign interference, whatever, the first impulse should not be to simply give more and more discretionary power to the government of the day. That could well backfire and create ammunition for those who want to disrupt our society, those who want to turn people against the state, those who want to turn people against one another. No, the first impulse should be to build independent institutions and education amongst our citizens so that we respond as a society to meet that threat, as the Leader of the Opposition alluded to, and he spoke of non-legislative measures.

Sir, let me move on to the provisions of the Bill. Overall, as my colleagues have elaborated on, this Bill fails on three counts, the three "overs", if I may, namely, insufficient oversight, Executive over-reach and overlooking some areas of policy where foreign interference could act, but which this Bill does not provide clear remedies for.

Firstly, it provides no independent oversight of the Government, save for the flawed mechanism of a Government-appointed Tribunal that does not meet the standard of independent oversight that is seen to be independent, a standard that is embodied in our judiciary. The Leader of the Opposition and my colleague, Sengkang Member of Parliament Ms He Ting Ru, had elaborated on this and explained why we propose to allow High Court appeals and judicial review on FICA matters.

Secondly, it over-reaches by giving the Executive government too much power to act, based on suspicions about likely eventualities rather than evidence and with no obligations to state reasons publicly. This creates the potential for abuse of power, especially when we recall that the Minister, like all Ministers regardless of party, is still a political partisan at the end of the day, with a vested interest in winning arguments over critics and opponents and winning elections. The Minister is also subject to error, even with the best of intentions, as are all of us. I am not singling out any party or Minister for blame here. My point is about system design.

The Government may respond to such arguments by providing assurances that they will not use the broad powers in FICA in ways that are inappropriate. Sir, that is unsatisfactory. It is a bit like saying that I should give you a blank cheque but I assure you that I will not write a figure on that cheque that is more than what you agree to pay. The fact is you can. The language of the Bill should reflect intent; language of the Bill, not assurances given outside of that language.

Thirdly, Sir, it overlooks the potential for foreigners to interfere by influencing senior government figures or even a Minister for Home Affairs himself or herself one day. Who checks the checkers? Or to follow the Latin expression "quis custodiet ipsos custodes", who watches the watchman? Surely, foreigners with malicious intent would seek influence over those holding more power, first of all, and that means Ministers.

Oversight, over-reach and unmet needs overlooked are what the Workers' Party’s amendments and speeches seek to address today.

In the rest of my speech, Sir, I will touch on three broad themes.

Firstly, on the theme of overlooking needs. What redress does Singapore have in cases where malign foreign influence succeeds in influencing Government Ministers or even the Prime Minister, and Minister for Home Affairs himself or herself?

Secondly, on the theme of over-reach, a number of miscellaneous clarifying questions.

Thirdly, on the theme of oversight, I shall explain the rationale for the amendments I am moving to this Bill.

First of all, Sir, I would like to speak on the danger of foreign interference, or FI, successfully directed at Ministers or even the Prime Minister or Minister for Home Affairs. Of course, I am not suggesting that that has happened in the past or is happening now, but it could. How does this Bill address that? What recourse do Singaporeans have were that to happen? And this is a subject my hon colleague Mr Gerald Giam also spoke about.

This Bill does not create an independent investigative authority that could look into all cases of malicious FI, whether directed at the Ruling Party or the Opposition, nor does it specify a clear route of complaint and follow-up action in cases where a member of the public, be it an NGO, a researcher or an ordinary citizen, has formed suspicions that a Minister is under inappropriate foreign influence. Instead, the Bill, like other Bills in the past, vests broad discretionary powers with the Minister for Home Affairs to act against FI directed at others. What is to be done if the FI is directed at him or her and succeeds?

Some academics refer to such a scenario as elite capture. It is not hard to understand why this can happen. A malicious foreign actor bent on interference may find that they have more power to influence Singapore’s politics if they can bring a Minister or even the Minister for Home Affairs himself under their influence rather than an Opposition politician. For a malicious foreign actor, influencing the Prime Minister and his or her Ministers brings more bang for the buck. This scenario is not academic, arcane or improbable. In the USA, one popular narrative that became a significant political issue, and I am not stating that this is ever true, was that the previous President of the United States had been suborned by a foreign power.

I would like to ask the Minister, how does this Bill enhance Singapore’s ability to check FI directed at Ministers, Minister for Home Affairs and the Prime Minister? This unpacks itself into a few distinct questions.

Firstly, can the Minister for Home Affairs under this Bill apply prescribed actions like transparency directives to his Ministerial colleagues and even the Prime Minister, notwithstanding the fact that the Prime Minister, could, presumably, remove him from his job as a consequence, but at least the public would see that action before that happens?

Secondly, what is the recourse if the Minister for Home Affairs himself falls under foreign influence?

Thirdly, is there going to be a FICA Office under this Bill, along the lines of the POFMA office, staffed by trained professionals who could, in theory, investigate Ministers? And if so, how would their independence be established in cases where MHA office holders are themselves the target of investigation?

I would like to conclude on this topic by suggesting that the answer to all of these questions could lie in a proposal that has been put forth to this House in the past by Workers' Party Members of Parliament – the creation of the office of an independent Ombudsman. I do not have the time to elaborate on this here but this is a Workers' Party Manifesto proposal and I spoke about it at length during the debate in this House last year on access to justice, including rebutting objections to the idea.

The office of a public Ombudsman would, if properly designed and resourced, be a good receptacle for public complaints of FI directed at Ministers and would have the organisational independence and separation from the government of the day to be able to investigate Ministers credibly.

Before I leave this subject, I would like to pose two very distinct questions to the Minister for his reply during this debate.

Firstly, does the Minister, in the exercise of his powers under FICA as the Bill stands, agree that he and his office will apply FICA directives and actions equally to foreigners who improperly intervene in domestic partisan politics whether they intervene on the side of the Ruling Party, the Opposition or other parties?

Let me offer an illustration. Media reports have described the work of a gentleman residing in Europe who runs a Facebook page that makes frequent interventions concerning partisan politics in Singapore, often to defend the Ruling Party and criticise the Opposition in Singapore. Just a short quote from one of his more recent posts: “People often accuse me of bias because I never criticise the Government in Singapore. As I explained many times, it would be a bit like criticising Usain Bolt for not running fast enough.”

To be sure, I am not calling for action to be taken against this person under FICA and I would argue for a more liberal approach towards debate in general, so long as there is transparency. However, does the Minister agree that he will apply FICA directives and actions equally to foreigners who improperly intervene in our domestic politics whether on the side of the Ruling Party or the Opposition?

Secondly, the Bill allows for the Government to require reports on foreigners volunteering in political capacities. Does this extend to volunteering for the People’s Association, or PA? The PA works with grassroots advisors who are Ruling Party Members of Parliament or individuals associated with the Ruling Party. It does not formally work with Opposition Members of Parliament. Much of the work of the PA serves to build political capital and visibility for the Ruling Party by way of the Ruling Party Member of Parliament or individual gracing events as the Guest of Honour, being featured in publicity materials and so on. Given these political connotations and corollary political effects associated with some of the PA’s activities involving Ruling Party figures, will foreigners volunteering for the PA also be subject to foreigner volunteer reporting? This could be one route along which foreign interference directed at the Ruling Party travels.

I would like to move to the second broad theme of my speech, Sir, which is clarifications on miscellaneous points, and I would like to pose four clarifying questions for the Minister's replies and, hopefully, assurances.

Firstly, the subject of a Part 3 direction or POL declaration can apply, within a 30-day timeframe, to the Minister for a reconsideration of his or her decision under clause 23(1). That is as the Bill stands. However, it appears that the Minister does not have a corresponding deadline against which he or she has to come to a decision on the application for reconsideration. This is problematic, given the potentially deleterious effects which such a Part 3 direction could have on the reputations of individuals and entities. Will the Minister commit to such a timeframe?

Secondly, clause 76(1) requires that all PSPs disclose every reportable arrangement during a reporting period to a Competent Authority. These reportable arrangements are defined broadly and could cover arrangements where the PSP, in her private sector capacity, secures a new foreign client for her business, for example. The language of the Bill repeatedly states that such arrangements are reportable even if not directed at political ends. This would be very onerous to PSPs who depend on doing business with foreigners for a living or for certain individuals who work with foreigners frequently, like academics, for example.

What will the Government do to minimise the onerousness while maintaining the flow of information that is potentially actionable?

For example, can the reporting arrangements be made to report on classes of foreign clients and partners, such as, for example, multinational companies in France or academics in Italian business schools, rather than being required to specify each and every one of the names of the foreign individuals or entities which the PSPs have dealings with? This still flags out the countries that the PSP has dealings with. At this point, I declare my interest as the CEO of an international research consultancy.

Thirdly, pursuant to clause 93, those who are designated as PSPs or PSEs or issued directives under Parts 5 and 6, may only appeal against that decision to the Minister. They have no right of appeal to the Tribunal, unlike those who are issued Part 3 directions. What is the basis for this? I ask this question notwithstanding the fact that my colleague, Sengkang Member of Parliament Ms He Ting Ru, has argued for replacing the Bill’s Review Tribunal mechanism with appeals to the Courts, a proposal I agree with.

Fourthly, in the Explanatory Note on page 205 on defining the offence of clandestine acts of foreign interference by electronic means, one example cited might suggest covert links to a foreign principal would be if the person moves communication with the foreign principal to an encrypted communication platform. Sir, many communication platforms nowadays are encrypted end-to-end, such as WhatsApp, Telegram, Facebook, Messenger and Signal. Does communicating with a foreigner on such a platform like WhatsApp, for example, in and of itself, constitute proof that the communication is covert and clandestine?

To turn to my third and last broad theme, Sir, I am moving amendments to this Bill, specifically clauses 47, 48, 78, 79, 81, 84 and 85. I do not propose to repeat these amendments here word for word. These are set out in the Order Paper Supplement.

The overall thrust of these amendments is to require the Government to publicise all of its decisions under this Bill, in terms of designating PSPs, issuing directives and taking other actions. The amendments also require that the Government publish the reasons why decisions are taken, including reasons for designating persons or entities, PSPs as dealt with in clause 48 or PSEs as dealt with in clause 47. This will allow the public to understand the reasons behind the Government's actions to form their own conclusions about the justifications for those actions. This is important because how FICA's powers are used is a matter of public interest and deserves scrutiny.

These amendments require the Government to publish this information over the Internet in a searchable, sortable and downloadable manner without charge, in the words of my amendment to clause 81 to which other amendments make reference, and this is for the sake of transparency and should be self-explanatory. An exception to transparency in publicising the register of PSEs and PSPs is made on national security grounds, but under the amendments moved by my colleague Ms He Ting Ru, this would be subject to appeals to the High Court and judicial review.

In clause 48(1)(b), I am moving an amendment to add the word "reasonable" for the Government’s ability to designate someone a PSP if their employment and activities are not obviously political. This enables a person to apply for judicial review of executive action taken against them under clause 48(1)(b).

The amendment to clause 78 requires reportable arrangements to be made public. I would add that our call here is for such publicity to be made with due cognisance taken towards commercial sensitivities and individual privacy. This call should be seen in conjunction with my earlier suggestion to make these reportable arrangements less onerous.

In general, published information should be concise and focus on key types of foreign interests associated with PSPs and PSEs.

Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, the Government has previously said that it would publish some of these details. So, why am I moving these amendments? Are they redundant? No, for a few reasons.

First, the Government did not say that it would publish the reasons behind their FICA decisions, which my amendments to clauses 47, 48, 81, 84 and 85 require the Government to do.

Second, there is an amendment to clause 48 that requires the Government to exercise its executive discretion in designating PSPs reasonably.

Third, the amendments call on the manner of publishing to be over the Internet in a searchable, sortable and downloadable manner without charge, centralised for ease of use by stakeholders and for accountability.

Fourth and, most importantly, Sir, notwithstanding the Government’s public assurance that it would publish information about FICA, we believe that this should be codified in law, so that this Government and future governments are obligated to do this under the law. There must be rule of law, not rule by law.

In conclusion, Sir, I have no doubt that there is a need to safeguard Singapore against foreign interference and I think we are all in agreement on that. However, the Bill, as it stands, has insufficient independent oversight, enables government over-reach and overlooks real dangers like foreign interference directed at Ministers.

Like all dangers Singapore faces, the solution should never be to simply give the Government more and more broad discretionary powers that can be used against citizens, critics and Opposition parties, among others.

By staking so much on strengthening state discretionary powers in this manner, we diminish the role of education and trust in the political maturity of our citizens, who are better educated than ever.

We also risk Executive over-reach and abuse, and the risk of that over-reach or abuse diminishes trust in our institutions potentially, turns our citizens against one another potentially and harms national unity in the face of these foreign threats potentially.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Perera, could I invite you to wrap up your speech, please.

Mr Leon Perera: Mr Deputy Speaker, you are just in time, so, my last sentence. Sir, I beg to move my amendments as described in the Order Paper Supplement.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Xie Yao Quan.

7.15 pm

Mr Xie Yao Quan (Jurong): Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, youths in Singapore are concerned about FICA. I wish to speak about their concerns today. I will focus instead on two issues: one, the apparently sweeping scope of powers provided in this Bill; and two, the desire for transparency in the Government's administration of these powers.

Zooming straight into clause 5 of the Bill, there are concerns that this clause defines activities or conduct "on behalf of a foreign principal" too broadly, to include those "in collaboration with" a foreign individual or entity.

Youths are understandably worried if their everyday interactions with foreign friends will run afoul of this Bill. And more precisely, whether any activity or conduct critical of the Government or Government policies and with any shade of foreign involvement, will be hit by FICA. If one reads the proposed legislation with its plain meanings, one can, quite naturally, come to these conclusions and concerns.

But at the same time, a foreign principal with malicious intent to interfere with our affairs can very well exploit, or may already be exploiting, the cover of seemingly innocuous day-to-day activities or conduct, to achieve its insidious objectives. That is the whole point of artful interference and manipulation: to operate under cover. And this could certainly involve a seemingly innocent collaboration with another party.

Let us take an example, a foreign principal can collaborate on a song about vaccines. We already have a song, a collaboration, may I add, about 菜饭, "Economical Rice". So, I think we can all agree that a song about COVID-19 vaccines is entirely conceivable. The song could be about the supposed superiority of certain vaccines and/or the alleged risks of certain other vaccines. If the song is catchy, if it is funny, engaging and sung with passion, it will have the potential to viral, no pun intended. And the foreign principal can very well do this in collaboration with some other parties. A foreign principal can also exploit the pretext of collaboration to create memes, videos, articles, even games, essentially, any number of platforms, to achieve its sinister objectives.

[Mr Speaker in the Chair]

And so, herein lies the central paradox that we have to deal with when we discuss our approach as a people to counter foreign interference. Because the tactics of foreign interference can be so sophisticated, so clandestine, these efforts slide themselves effortlessly into our everyday lives and can so easily masquerade as normal activities and conduct. So, to counter these, we really need to fight these forces where they are, in other words, our laws and actions will have to operate within the realm of everyday activities and conduct in order to be effective. But this grates against our basic sensibilities. It touches a raw nerve and it causes worry, rightly so.

But the basic point I am making is that, ultimately, we are contemplating laws like FICA, which can intersect so much with the realm of our daily lives, only because the very threats that FICA seeks to counter have invited themselves into our daily lives first, whether we want it or not, and the powers of FICA scoped on the basis of this fundamental reality.

I would like to suggest three key principles as we contemplate what is the right balance in the scope of powers.

First, the enemy is without, not within. The real and only threat is insidious foreign interference from overseas, not alternative voices, whether domestically or abroad. Second, to deal with this external enemy, the purpose of FICA is, in fact, very narrow, even if the range of tactics provided for in this Bill is, indeed, quite broad. So, there is a whole toolkit of directions, directives and countermeasures, but all these tactical modalities are, ultimately, to serve a very narrow purpose that FICA is intended for. Third, the principles of FICA are neither unique nor novel. In other words, Singapore is neither the only nor the first country moving such laws.

Australia, for example, has the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme (FITS) since 2019. Their definition of activities "on behalf of" a foreign principal is similarly broad. An applicable arrangement with a foreign principal under FITS could be "formal or informal, written or verbal. It could be a contract, understanding or agreement of any kind."

As illustration, if Company A and a foreign government make plans to import Australian food into the foreign country and Company A lobbies the Australian government on export regulations, Company A is deemed to be acting "on behalf of" the foreign government, even if it is also acting for itself. One can also certainly say that Company A in this illustration is working "in collaboration with", in its plain meaning, the foreign government. So, Australia has defined these activities quite broadly and the principles behind FICA are really no different.

I will also note that none of the amendments that the Workers' Party has moved actually touches on clause 5, on what constitutes activities or conduct "on behalf of" a foreign principal. So, I am glad to see that the Workers' Party agreed on the definitions in clause 5 of the Bill.

Having said all these, how can we then assure Singaporeans, nonetheless, and keep their confidence in the Government's judicious administration of FICA?

I have three suggestions. First, and most fundamentally, we should recognise that the ultimate check and balance on governmental powers is not in more and more legislative guard rails, but rather, in the democratic vote in our own hands. We should recognise that any government, today or in future, as Executive of this and other laws of the land, will be held accountable to the people and by the people in Singapore. And, in turn, we, the people, should have a key interest to choose suitable persons who will exercise these powers, any legislative powers, discretionary powers under the law, judiciously and wisely.

Notwithstanding this, secondly, I think transparency and timely disclosure by the Government to the public in its Executive actions under FICA will go a long way towards modulating the Government's administration of the law and keep trust with the public. In this light, I agree with the spirit of the amendments to clauses 78, 79, 81, 84 and 85 moved by Mr Leon Perera. I agree with the spirit of Mr Perera's proposed amendments.

I am heartened to hear the Minister reiterate his Ministry's commitment made to the media last week that any designation of Politically Significant Persons, any stepped-up countermeasures for these Persons, any transparency directive to publish on political matters with foreign links and any Part 3 Direction against harmful foreign online communications except for Technical Assistance Directions will be made public. These commitments generally go further than Mr Perera's proposed amendments which do not cover Part 3 Directions and do not cover some of the stepped-up countermeasures for Politically Significant Persons.

Except for the public disclosure of individuals who are reporting to the Government on their involvement in foreign political organisations and public disclosure of individuals and entities reporting certain arrangements to the Government, these are what Mr Perera has proposed to disclose, but I agree with the Minister that information reported by individuals and entities in general to the Government should not be publicly disclosed if the key intent of transparency is really to hold the Government accountable for its actions.

At it stands now, clause 116 of the Bill already provide that authorities may make public any designation of Politically Significant Persons and and any stepped-up countermeasures for these Persons, and any transparency directive. So, the commitment that the Minister has expressed on transparency goes even further than the clause 116 in the Bill itself. In that number one, the Ministry will make public these actions and two, it will include Part 3 Directions against harmful foreign online communications with one exception.

To this end, I am glad to note that the Minister has also served notice in his speech just now, to move an amendment to clause 116 itself, with the new language reading, "...it must prepare a notice informing about every Part 3 Direction except the Technical Assistance Direction given, every designation made under Part 4 or every directive given under Parts 5 or 6". These proposed amendments will capture the Government's definitive commitment to public disclosure and transparency under FICA and I look forward to the passing of these amendment at the Committee Stage later.

At this point, I would like to seek some clarifications. One, the Ministry has mentioned a Registry of Foreign and Political Disclosures for Parts 4, 5 and 6 in its interview with the media last week. So, my question is, where will Part 3 directions be published? Two, will the reasons for actions taken under Parts 3, 4, 5 or 6 also be published, as much as practicable? Three, will the Registry or Registries be accessible online, free of charge, searchable, sortable and downloadable, so as to maximise its intended potential for public education and awareness? And four, will appeals made and decided under FICA be similarly published?

Sir, my third suggestion to better assure Singaporeans and keep their confidence in FICA is that the Government needs to constantly communicate the law's intended purpose and the Government's commitment to this intent. This is difficult to do, as the concerns that Singaporeans may have towards the Bill can be very visceral, as I noted at the start of my speech.

So, to this end, can the Minister give definitive assurance, in this House, once again, that the youth climate activist working with regional and or international friends to advance their joint vision for climate justice has nothing to worry about as regards FICA and can indeed look forward to continuing and growing his or her work?

Can the Minister assure that the Singaporean youth working overseas and writing, posting from overseas about his or her racialised experience with previous job searches or employers in Singapore will not be deemed a vector of a Hostile Information Campaign and thus, slapped with some Part 3 Direction under FICA?

Can the Minister assure that indeed, students, lecturers, academics in our schools and Institutes of Higher Learning here, interacting with foreign students, discussing, exchanging views on any number of political issues will not find themselves subject to designation as Politically Significant Persons?

Can the Minister assure that patriots, well-meaning Singaporeans who want to lend their own voices to civic discourse here, no matter how critical of the Government and Government Policies, will not be caught by FICA, simply on account of any actual or suspected interaction with a foreigner?

Sir, let me conclude. The Select Committee on Online Falsehoods heard evidence in 2018 on a troll farm cottage industry in Macedonia. Macedonian teenagers worked in these farms and subverted the US presidential elections in 2016.

They might very well have zero actual interest in US politics and it is unclear if they were taking directions from other foreign state players. But it was clear that they did this to earn money through advertisements. One teenager reportedly earned US$16,000 – more than 40 times the average monthly salary in Macedonia.

There were even dedicated classes to train young Macedonians in this trade.

There are two points to note here. One, the content created by this troll farm were not all "fake news" or falsehoods per se. So, not everything can be caught by POFMA. Second point and equally fundamental is that the Select Committee report came out in 2018. We are debating FICA today, three years later. Indeed, it would be fair to ask, what actually took us so long?

Mr Speaker, the threat of foreign interference is real and urgent and the broad powers provided by this Bill are necessary. But Singaporeans, including youths, are concerned and I implore the Government to double down on transparency commitments as well as constantly communicate on the narrow intent of FICA so as to assure Singaporeans while ensuring that the Government has the wherewithal to effectively protect us against a common threat.

Ultimately, each government will be held to account by Singaporeans through the exercise of our individual democratic rights.

To end, I would like to touch on Mr Gerald Giam's proposed amendments to clause 8 on what is defined as being "directed towards a political end in Singapore".

Mr Giam has proposed to remove limbs (f) and (g) of the definition in the Bill, namely, (f) on public opinion about a matter of public controversy in Singapore and (g) on political debate.

Now, I have listened to the Minister explain the philosophy behind clause 8 and Mr Giam's argument for the proposed omissions.

Sir, clause 8 sets out the entire political landscape, the entire surface area that foreign threat vectors can and will operate on to subvert our affairs. I therefore like to ask Mr Giam if he would not agree that the real effect of his proposed omissions will not so much scope the powers of the executive to limit the potential for over-reach and abuse of power but rather the real effect will be to curtail the real powers that the executive needs to counter the real and highly complex threats that FICA is exactly designed to counter?

Would Mr Giam not agree that his proposed omissions defang FICA and strip it of its basic effectiveness to fight foreign interference? It is a bit like saying, let us fight with one arm tied behind our backs, or maybe more, because we are worried about the power of having two arms.

Sir, lastly, I would also point out that the definition of what is "directed towards a political end in Singapore" in clause 8 of FICA is already found in existing laws such as the Public Order Act amended in 2017. In that debate in 2017, the Workers' Party had expressed no concern about the very same definition. So, it is not clear to me why the Workers' Party would have a concern now about the same definition four years on.

Mr Speaker: Mr Gerald Giam.

7.34 pm

Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song: Sir, I thank Mr Xie for his questions on my speech.

I believe I actually explained that quite clearly in my speech as to why I think that even with the removal of clause 8F and G, the Minister will still have all the powers he needs to stem hostile foreign interference.

I mentioned that clause 7, which defines what public interest is, already gives the Minister the power, in the public interest, to take actions if it is necessary to ensure the public health, public finances, public safety, public tranquility, public peace and public order. All those are already in clause 7 and so there is no reason why the Minister cannot use those clauses to invoke directions in the public interest.

I do not believe it is necessary to have such a broad and wide sweeping catch-all clause, which is what we believe parts (f) and (g) are, in order to give the Minister the power that he needs. He has already all the power that he needs.

Mr Speaker: Mr Xie Yao Quan.

Mr Xie Yao Quan: Sir, I thank Mr Gerald Giam for his clarification.

The Public Order Act as amended in 2017 deals with foreign organisation and participation in activities directed towards a political end in physical spaces in Singapore. So, as we debate FICA, I think it is quite clear and we can all agree that the same logic and the same definition should apply to even more nefarious and insidious threats in the online space that can apply to both Singaporeans and foreigners.

Mr Gerald Giam mentioned clause 7 in FICA, specifically, I think, clause D. He cited as an example and I would read out clause D – "to prevent incitement of feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will between different groups of people in Singapore".

I would point out that the Public Order Act has exactly the same clause 7(2)(E). In fact, it has an additional word, "hostility".

I think the construct of the Public Order Act and FICA are essentially the same and I do not see why the Workers' Party, who had no issue four years ago, should have the issue today.

Mr Speaker: Mr Giam. Keep it brief, please.

Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song: Sir, I would like to point out that the Workers' Party opposed the Public Order Act and with respect to Mr Xie's specific points on part E of the Public Order Act, yes, it is. But the Public Order Act does not have clause 7F – to prevent any foreign interference directed towards a political end in Singapore. Clause 7F leads on into clause 8, where it defines the political end in Singapore.

So, I think it is important for us to understand that we want to scope down the Bill to make sure that we focus on the acts that actually cause harm to Singapore, not provide a catch-all phrase inside the Bill for the Minister, if he cannot find anything else to use, to use that as a tool against harm. There are specific qualifications for what qualifies as harm against public interest, against public health and so on.

I have given examples on how, let us say, if there is a threat to public health, the Minister can take action on that. There is nothing preventing him in this Bill from taking action and the Bill has many other strong clauses to give the Minister the power to be able to take action. So, nothing is preventing him from doing that just because (f) and (g) are removed.

Mr Speaker: Mr Murali Pillai.

7.39 pm

Mr Murali Pillai (Bukit Batok): Mr Speaker, Sir, in my first speech in this session of Parliament, I said that I saw building consensus as an important outcome of our work here. The outcome of such a process where areas of agreement are identified would possess the unique legitimacy of all voices in this House.

The hon Leader of the Opposition started his speech by observing that there are quarters outside this House whose views on this Bill are diametrically different from the Government. That may or may not be so. But what is more important is to make it clear, as elected representatives of our people, where we stand, either together or apart on matters under deliberation – not just the broad strokes but the detailed issues as well. That is accountability.

I had carefully reviewed the proposed amendments of the Workers' Party. We only have a few matters upon which we disagree.

Both sides of the House are aligned with the aim of the Bill.

The hon Leader of the Opposition agreed that intrusive powers may have to be vested with the Minister to deal with this scourge of foreign interference, subject, of course, to checks and balances, which I will come to later. I thank the hon Leader of the Opposition for recognising this.

Both also agree on what constitutes public interest under clause 7 of the Bill.

Clause 7 represents the heart of FICA. It enumerates the areas of public interest, including to prevent any foreign interference directed towards a political end in Singapore.

The hon Member Mr Gerald Giam wants to be more specific about what is meant by the meaning of this clause. In my mind, we should equally be mindful of the agreed position of what is not the intention of the clause. It is not to curtail political activity by Singaporean civil society or politicians.

There is also consensus on what constitutes Politically Significant Persons and the responsibilities they should assume. Such persons, because they carry political weight, there is a need to ensure they do not become pawns for foreign influence.

Clause 14 deals with defined PSPs. It is noteworthy that the hon Member Mr Gerald Giam wishes to enlarge this list in the clause further to include more classes of people.

The Bill, as it stands, requires the Government to make a case if there is any other person outside the list it feels should be designated as PSPs. The hon Member Mr Gerald Giam's rendering puts even more people on this list. That is to say, this Bill has a net which the hon Member Gerald Giam wants to make larger.

On the issue of criminalising conduct amounting to foreign interference and influence operations under clauses 17 and 18, there is broad consensus. There should be little controversy over this. We are, after all, talking about actions of spies and saboteurs.

The hon Member Assoc Prof Jamus Lim wishes to limit the ambit of the clauses to only criminal acts that the accused knew would be prejudicial to the security of Singapore as opposed to acts that are likely to be prejudicial to the security of Singapore.

The focus here is on the impact of the accused's action. But before that, he has to be proven to be acting on behalf of a foreign principal. So, that is a narrow issue.

I turn now to the proposed authorisation of the Minister to issue Part 3 directions under clauses 20 and 21.

There is, again, broad consensus to allow the Minister to issue directions, including anticipatory directions where in his opinion there is online communication activity being undertaken by or on behalf of a foreign principal in or accessible in Singapore to protect public interest.

Here, the hon Member wishes to limit the Minister's powers to circumstances where he secures a higher threshold of evidence of foreign interference instead of reasonable belief or suspicion.

Given the protean nature of foreign interference, this has to be resolved on the basis on which wording protects Singapore's interest.

Currently, the Police powers of investigations are triggered as long as there is reasonable suspicion of a commission of a crime. The question arises as to why should there be a higher bar to trigger appropriate action when it comes to foreign interference affecting Singapore's security interests?

This House is unified on the point of vesting in the Minister the power to issue the 14 types of directions to various entities – known as Part 3 directions – in particular, to social media companies described in clause 29 to protect public interest.

I now come to powers of proscription. There is consensus to vest in the Minister the power under clause 24 to Proscribe Online Locations which would be subject to Part 3 directions.

There is agreement to criminalise behaviour that involves the making of money or providing financial support to Proscribed Online Locations.

The only difference here, again, based on the proposed amendment by the same hon Member is on the ambit of evidence required to make out the offence.

Again, this issue is a narrow issue that has been dealt with on the basis of which wording would better protect Singapore's interest.

On the measures of designating an entity or person as a PSP under clauses 80 and 81, there is full agreement on the ability of a competent authority to designate an entity or person as politically significant entities or Politically Significant Persons.

The additional point here, as proposed by the hon Member Mr Leon Perera is that the public list of politically significant entities and persons be maintained unless there is a national security ground, not to name these persons or entities.

I agree with the suggestion. I understand that MHA had earlier indicated that it had intended to do this based on its response dated 25 September 2021 to queries from The Straits Times.

There is consensus in this House on the provisions dealing with political donations. There is full consensus to impose on politically significant persons during election period, a requirement that they declare that they are not subject to foreign influence. There is broad consensus to require these persons to make disclosures of any dealing with/or on behalf of foreign principals or foreign political organisations under clauses 78 and 79, even if the Acts are not directed towards a political end in Singapore, as well as benefits received from these principals.

What is proposed here again by the hon Member Mr Perera is for such disclosures to be made publicly available. From a practical perspective, it seems to me the sting behind this provision will be to deal with the consequence on the part of the PSP for failing to file the report. I say this because if a PSP files a report stating that he has dealings with a foreign principal, directed to a political end in Singapore, it is likely to spell the death knell of his political career. In other words, the publicness of the report maybe neither here nor there.

Turning to the arena of requiring disclosure of foreign involvement in publication of political matters, I know again there is consensus in vesting with the competent authority the power to issue transparency directives to newspapers, broadcasting services and PSPs requiring a disclosure of foreign principals and links. The hon Member, Mr Perera suggested that such directives be made public. I agree but I think the suggestion is already present in the current version of the Bill which specifically provides that the subjects of the directives must make disclosure conspicuously.

There is consensus in the ability on the part of the competent authority to issue directives to PSPs to end their afflictions with foreign principals and foreign volunteers. The additional suggestion made by the hon Member Mr Perera that is being made here is that to have these directives together with any other modification of cancellation made public. In this regard, I understand MHA had issued a statement on making public such countermeasures issued against PSPs.

There is broad agreement on what constitutes exempt activities, that is activities that should not be covered under this Act. The hon Member Assoc Prof Lim proposed adding in this list an exemption on the part of Singaporeans exercising their right to discuss politics and foreign individuals and publications commenting on Singapore politics in an open, transparent and attributable way. I do not disagree that such acts should be outside the jurisdiction of this Bill. The only issue is whether it is necessary, given that the structure of this Bill already makes it clear that it is not intended to stifle such activities.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I accept the hon friends across aisle feels strongly about the differences with the Government which are set out in the Notice of Amendments. My objective here is simply to point out to the fact that there is much more agreement on significant matters than disagreement. This may not be apparent to members of public outside this House.

In my view, the most substantive area of difference lies with the redress mechanism under the Bill which I now turn to.

Under the Bill, it is proposed that appeals made to the Reviewing Tribunal and the Minister with limited judicial review by the Supreme Court. The hon Member Ms He Ting Ru, proposed that appeals be heard hurt by the High Court, with the right of further appeal. I appreciate that her motivation is to provide checks and balances. I would respectfully demur with her suggestion although I must acknowledge there are merits to the broad rationale behind her proposal. As for my reasons for demurring, I need only refer to my Adjournment Motion speech made recently this House when I spoke about judicial review in March 2021.

Both the hon Leader of Opposition and the hon Member Ms He, kindly referred to some parts of my speech today. I said then that each generation of political leaders and people must find their own equilibrium on what is acceptable. They will also recall that in my same speech, I went on to state that, in my view, the status quo should be preserved for the ISA. I recounted the point made in 1991 by Prof S Jayakumar, the former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs in this House that when it comes to issues of national security, putting a Court to scrutinise exercise of powers would be tantamount to giving the Court, an unelected body, the final say on such matters. That, in the scheme of things, was not desirable.

To me, FICA raises the same issues. It is preferable, when it comes to assessment of what action is to be taken, to counter foreign interference affecting public interest, the Minister must be held responsible and accountable through the political process. Also, in my respectful view, since we are dealing with issues of foreign interference affecting public interest, as defined under this Bill, a different form of procedure to ensure the swift and agile handling of cases and judicious safeguarding of sensitive information will be needed.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I seek your permission to make a short speech in the national language.

(In Malay): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Mr Speaker, first I would like to thank the hon Leader of the Opposition, Mr Pritam Singh for commenting on the speech that I delivered in March.

I said that each generation of political leaders should find and achieve their own equilibrium, of what our people would accept.

The Leader of the Opposition would probably remember that I also said, with regard to the ISA, I am of the opinion that there is a reasonable reason to maintain the status quo as it is a bill that is crucial for the security and stability of our country.

FICA is a similar Act like the ISA, because we are discussing about national interests and the country's sovereignty being threatened by foreign interference.

Due to this, I can understand why the Reviewing Tribunal should hear appeals in FICA instead of the courts. This does not mean that there is no protection for an individual. The courts may still hear appeals and the case if there an overreach in power or in certain matters.

Sir, may I resume my speech in English?

(In English): The hon Member Ms He referred to the point I made in my speech in March this year on the need for sunlight of scrutiny of Government action. I thank her for remembering my speech. She may also remember that I stated then in my speech that ISA did not act and does not act in darkness, having regard where checks and balances embedded in the Act and the Constitution.

Similarly, having regard to the subject matter of FICA, establishment of the appellate process in the Bill to set up the Review Tribunal and the preservation of the Supreme Court's powers of judicial review on the issue of procedure as well as when there is an excess of jurisdiction and political accountability of the Minister to our people, I am similarly of the view that there are sufficient checks and balances in place for FICA. The Bill does not confer unlimited power to the Executive, which is a concern of the hon Leader of Opposition.

I think it is worthwhile holding up again this handout, page 36, which the hon Minister Mr Shanmugam showed us earlier. There are already general powers. You can see that in light green. What FICA aims to do is to give targeted powers, and you see that in dark green. I heard the hon Member Mr Perera saying just now a theory about FICA having some latent powers being embedded which can be used later on by a Government which is malevolently intending to use these powers. If that is really the case, it will be better to use the latent powers already embedded in the current Acts. You do not have to pass FICA for that. So, with respect, I have difficulty following his argument.

Notwithstanding what I said, I have a few questions on the redress mechanism concerning the Reviewing Tribunal under clause 92 of the Bill. The Reviewing Tribunal deals with appeals against an authorisation of a Part III direction. I note it is contemplated that the chairperson of the Reviewing Tribunal must be a Supreme Court Judge. I also note that the decision is to be made by the President on the advice of the Cabinet. To me, the President should be consulting the Chief Justice, who heads our Judiciary in deciding who should be the chairman. This is the case under Article 151(2) of the Constitution which provides the chairman and two members of the Advisory Board which deals with preventive detention under the ISA shall be appointed by the President after consulting the Chief Justice. I seek the hon Minister's explanation on this matter.

Next, may I ask if the Reviewing Tribunal will be a standing tribunal that is appointed at the outset for a period of time or will it be an ad hoc tribunal that is created as and when there is an appeal? My preference is that it should be a standing tribunal to ensure transparency.

Moving on to the powers of the Reviewing Tribunal, is it contemplated that the Tribunal will have powers to compel the appearance of witnesses and production of documents? This does not appear to be specifically referred to in the clauses that I have reviewed.

I now turn to appeals to the Minister against decision of competent authority's decision, designating a person as a PSP or given a directive to comply with on that basis. May I please ask what is the rationale of designating the Minister as the primary Appellate body as opposed to designating the Reviewing Tribunal as the Appellate body?

To clause 102, I note that the Minister may appoint an Advisory Committee for consultation purposes but he may not follow the advice. May I ask if the appointments will be gazetted and made public, without going to merits of the case, which is obviously sensitive? How would the public know that the Minister is not following the Advisory Committee's advice in making the determination on an appeal?

Mr Speaker, Sir, in my speech, I have noted that the hon Opposition Members have raised some points of disagreement. I have argued, however, there is a lot more agreement on the main issues. I have seen more that unites than divides us. I acknowledge there is one major sticking point on whether the review should be a political or legal matter. I argued that, like other matters of national security, it ought to be a political matter and hence should rest with the Minister.

An important point of agreement, however, is where and how we disagree in such matters, such as public interest. The PAP and the Workers' Party may disagree on what this interest is, both in substance and form and in the matters, both trivial and significant. But we both agree that such discussions must remain our own. These discussions must enjoy the most important freedom of all, that they be free of interference from foreign principals who ought to have no voice in this House. That is all, Sir. [Applause.]

Mr Speaker: Leader of the Opposition.

7.57 pm

Mr Pritam Singh: Thank you, Mr Speaker. I just have one question for the hon Member Mr Murali Pillai and that pertains to the reference he made in his speech about his earlier Adjournment Motion on the sunlight of scrutiny and I will repeat the quotation where the hon Member says, "It is important for each generation of political leaders and people to find their own equilibrium of what our people would accept without question, under what circumstances and towards what ends."

Would the Member not agree that the Bill in question introduces an ouster clause. It is a new piece of legislation and this is one more piece of legislation for which we have an ouster course. And would the Member also not agree that there has been no equilibrium sought from the people by virtue of an absence of public consultation as to whether this ouster clause has been considered by the public?

Mr Speaker: Mr Pillai.

Mr Murali Pillai: Obliged, Sir. I thank the hon Leader of Opposition for asking the question. And the question, as I understand, posed to me, is whether there has been an equilibrium reached within the present generation of political leaders and the people of Singapore on the matter involving FICA, which contains an ouster clause.

The point I wish to make is this. In my earlier speech in March 2021, I have already stated that when it comes to issues of national security, a different approach should be taken. I found instructive, the speech made by Prof Jayakumar about why the powers dealing with national security should be sited with the political leaders. So, in my personal view, the equilibrium is still the same vis-a-vis FICA because here, we are dealing with issues of national security. Additionally, I would add that FICA does not contemplate detention without trial.

And the powers of FICA is actually quite targeted. What you see here are powers that are already reposed with the Executive. And as I said earlier in my speech, the focus of FICA is to give targeted powers so that you could better deal with national interest. So, in those circumstances, I would say, having regard to the fact that this is an area that has been traversed and the need to provide targeted directives, the equilibrium that we have in ISA would be the equilibrium that I am comfortable with vis-a-vis FICA and there is no contradiction.

Mr Speaker: Dr Shahira Abdullah.

8.00 pm

Dr Shahira Abdullah (Nominated Member): Mr Speaker, Sir, the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act recognises that Singapore remains vulnerable to foreign interference. In cyberspace, the cyberattacks and hostile information campaigns have increased in complexity and have become more illicit, masking themselves in seemingly innocuous ways. Therefore, these risks should be actively pre-empted and addressed for the national security of Singapore.

I believe in the legislative intent of the Bill. However, I have concerns about certain aspects, namely transparency and the need for more checks and balances. Is there a way we can realise and uphold the good intentions of the Bill while at the same time provide some amendments which can address the concerns?

I will speak on three points. First, on the possible avenues of check and balances that can be incorporated into the Bill. Second, on how we can increase the transparency of this Bill. Thirdly, I will speak on how the definition of foreign principal may bring about potential discrimination which may affect Singapore’s reputation as a global hub.

First, the Bill grants considerable powers to the Government. For example, section 21 allows the Minister to give anticipatory directions even when the Minister only suspects or has reason to believe that the person is “preparing for, or planning to undertake, online communications activity by or on behalf of a foreign principal”. The substance of these decisions under the Bill are not subject to judicial review.

I understand that in cases of foreign interference, speed may be of the essence and information received must be acted upon quickly. Moreover, this information may be sensitive and require confidentiality to be preserved. However, provisions can be enacted in the Bill to require that sensitive information be sealed or otherwise not disclosed in the Court hearing such as to allow a judicial review to still be carried out. We have seen some precedent for this in the treatment of whistleblowing information and whistleblowers' identity in court proceedings. If time is of the essence and there is need for judicial reviews under this Bill to be expedited, surely this can also be provided for in the Bill as well. A reviewing Tribunal, even if presided by a High Court judge cannot replace the role of judicial oversight. We must strive to maintain Singapore’s reputation of holding and protecting the rule of law while recognising the ills of foreign interference.

Second, there have also been concerns about the transparency of the Bill. One example is the criteria on who can be designated a Part 4 PSP. In the Bill, a Part 4 PSP is a person or organisation whose activities are directed in part towards a political end in Singapore and the Competent Authority opines that it would be in the public interest to impose countermeasures on the entity. This is further elaborated on in sections 7 and 8 of the Bill. These definitions, though, are still broad and not easily understood by the community.

Section 20 will also grant the Minister for Home Affairs powers to issue directions to various entities such as social media services, relevant electronic services, internet access services, as well as persons who own or run websites, blogs or social media pages, to help the authorities investigate and counter hostile communications activity that is of foreign origin. Although it does not apply to Singaporeans expressing their own views on political matters, unless they are agents of a foreign principal and it may not be the intent of the Bill to stifle political speech, there are some members of the community, for example, members of academia or humanitarian and advocacy groups who have genuine concerns about this. These groups have many foreign connections due to their nature that encourages cross-border collaboration. The fear is that their work, which may touch on complex local political issues, and their ties with foreign entities, foundations and states as well as associated funding, may mean that they are at risk of running afoul of the law.

It may be argued that this does not cross the threshold of “public interest”. However, there is a sense of unease on the ground and reasonable concern that the current non-exhaustive way that “public interest” is defined in section 8 would still mean that their activities fall under it. Could more be done in the wording of the Bill to provide greater certainty to organisations on the types of entities that would be designated a Part 4 PSP and subject to directives, such that it avoids casting a shadow on their activities? After all, unless winter is coming in Singapore, surely it would be in the country's best interest to avoid casting a chilling effect on such complex cross-border research and activities.

I am also concerned about how our youths have received this. Youths include Singaporeans, foreigners and PRs among them, interacting together. And our youths value the ability to talk about potentially politically sensitive and difficult topics and is increasingly comfortable doing so on an online platform. Would these regulations give the impression that the Government is discouraging this? If it does, it will cast a shadow on the trust that the youths have for the Government which is something we should guard against. Youths are our future and trust is essential for governments to effectively lead.

Third, section 4 has defined the meaning of “foreign principal” very broadly to capture any and everything that is remotely foreign in nature, regardless of whether such foreign nature is political or government-related or has a public interest. A foreign principal includes a foreigner even if he or she is a Permanent Resident of this country. This is understandable, as foreign interferences may masquerade as normal foreign entities when in essence they are not.

However, I would like to caution and remind, in the wake of these broad definitions and this House's very recent extensive debates on foreign manpower and CECA, to guard against inadvertently enacting legislation that is potentially discriminatory in nature. This may have unintended effects on Singapore’s reputation as a hub for global trade and investments that upholds its constitutional values of equality and fairness. This is something we should always be vigilant about.

Mr Speaker, Sir, at the end of it all, the fundamental question that needs to be asked is if the needs of national security outweigh the needs of checks and balances and transparency. A balance must be struck and its consequences understood as it also has a bearing on the trust Singaporeans may have in the Government and its systems. I fully agree that Singapore must always be prepared against the threat of foreign interference. This is something I recognise and that no one can deny. However, I do hope that in the implementation of this Act, we do not inadvertently lose public trust, discourage local political discourse or advocacy, or affect Singapore’s reputation as an open trading hub.

Mr Speaker: Mr Sharael Taha.

8.07pm

Mr Sharael Taha (Pasir Ris-Punggol):Thank you, Mr Speaker, Sir. I would like to declare my interest as an employee in a global MNC.

In 2018, the Select Committee of Online Falsehood, which comprises of members from both sides of this House, concluded that “this phenomenon (of foreign interference) is real and a serious problem in Singapore,” and that the “Committee received evidence that state-sponsored information operations have been carried out against Singapore” and the Committee provided 22 recommendations which included implementing specific countermeasures to combat state-sponsored disinformation operations.

Hence, I am glad that three years later, after the recommendations of the Select Committee, discussions in Parliament, conferences, publication and speeches during the Committee of Supply, we are ready to debate this piece of legislation to protect our national interest.

The threat of foreign interference is a global problem and the threat to Singapore is real, is growing and we need to enact strong safeguards to protect our “national sovereignty and security, social cohesion and democratic institutions”.

In protecting ourselves from foreign interference, there are several factors that makes it even more important for this Bill to be enacted.

Firstly, Singapore has a small and digitally connected population with IMDA citing 87% of our four million resident population having access to the internet. Unfortunately, a recent IPS survey also found that our digital literacy rates are worryingly low with 6 in 10 respondents believing false information to be true and found that no one is immune to false information regardless of age, socio-economic status and educational background. The IPS study also found that more than two-thirds of over 2,000 respondents trusted a manipulated "news article" presented to them as part of the study.

Secondly, the existence of fault lines in our society is undeniable. Sensitive issues of race, religion, foreign workforce versus local hires, can be easily manipulated to sow social discord. We cannot allow others the chance to destabilise the delicate balance that we have continuously been working on.

Lastly, our open economy. It keeps us relevant and competitive globally. International investors from various industries are attracted to set up operations in Singapore. Facebook, Google, Twitter, Tencent, Alibaba, Huawei, Wechat. These are all foreign companies that have established substantial operations in Singapore. We value the partnerships we have forged with each one of our trading partners and we seek to continue to be able to balance their needs while propelling our national interest forward.

However, the increased Sino-US tensions will invariably affect Singapore. We will have to be able to assert our neutrality and independence to maintain the balance that we have. We must prevent foreign interference from destabilising what we have. We must keep in mind to pursue what is best for Singapore. As Minister Vivian aptly said in a CNA interview, there is a big difference between “being useful” and “being made use of”.

We are not isolated from the impact of foreign interferences, as Minister Shanmugam had mentioned earlier. With the rise of technology and even more ubiquitous use of social media, these interferences are expected to be more frequent and more sophisticated and they will attempt to sway public opinions and even destabilize the precious balance that we have so carefully cultivated.

I understand that there are some reservations to this Bill. However, let me just point out that such legislation to ensure non-interference by foreign agents are currently already in place in countries such as Australia, EU, US and Canada. They have laws to prevent, detect and disrupt foreign interferences conducted through hostile information campaigns and the use of local proxies in their domestic politics. For example, in June 2018, Australia passed laws targeting foreign interference in politics and other domestic affairs and the European Commission is proposing a new Digital Services Act which will, among other things, regulate online platforms by transposing what is already illegal offline to the online space.

These examples serve to illustrate the fact that it is only expected that states will have to protect their self-interests and prevent foreign intervention especially when its intention is to harvest protest potential.

Notwitstanding the above, I wanted to share a concern which was addressed by the Minister in his speech earlier. One concern was from foreign businesses and Singaporeans working in MNCs on whether discussions between a Singaporean and non-Singaporean individual on policies which may affect their business may be seen as foreign interference and captured within the scope of the Bill especially if it is done on an online platform.

This has been of particular concern, especially in light of the current labour crunch causing delays and pushing up the cost of doing business. This labour crunch is brought about by border restrictions, the lack of access to foreign labour and the perceived increasingly anti-foreigner sentiments exacerbated by the current COVID-19 environment. Rightfully, foreign businesses and MNCs are concerned that such discussions on the impact of our policies on their businesses may run them foul of the law. I am glad to hear that Minister has reiterated that discussions of this nature does not meet the threshold to be foul of the law. Mr Speaker, in Malay, please.

(In Malay): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] The Select Committee on Online Falsehoods was established three years ago and comprises Members of Parliament from both sides of the House. After considering 169 written representations and oral evidence from 65 individuals and organisations, it has concluded that the spread of online falsehoods is a "real and serious problem" in Singapore. The Select Committee was also presented with evidence that information operations sponsored by foreign countries were carried out against Singapore.

Since 2018, the threat of foreign interference has been discussed repeatedly in this Chamber and in online media and publications. It is time that our laws deal with the threat of foreign interference which is increasingly threatening our national security.

There are other factors that make it important for this law to be implemented. A survey by the Institute of Policy Studies, or IPS, found that our digital literacy rate was low, with two-thirds of respondents believing in a manipulated article. Imagine, two-thirds of respondents inadvertently believed an article that was manipulated by the study! And imagine if article is manipulated by those who seek to divide our society. We should and must overcome such online falsehoods, especially when it is done through foreign interference.

The spread of online falsehoods through foreign interference is a real and growing problem around the world. One of the ways it is done is by using fake social media accounts to influence and divide a harmonious society by using sensitive matters such as racial and religious issues. In one case in the United States, an organisation from a foreign state used fake accounts that promote Islamic objectives, as well as fake accounts that spread anti-Islam messages, in order to start a protest against the building of an Islamic library – at the same time and place! This prompted many Americans to attend the protest with one protester reportedly carrying a gun.

In Singapore, we are not immune from the impact of foreign country intervention. For example, in 2018 and 2019, amidst disputes with neighbouring countries over airspace and maritime issues, online comments on social media were found to be made by anonymous accounts aimed at creating fake opposition against Singapore's stance.

As we strive to improve the law to address this problem, we should also realise that we can play a role as Singapore citizens. We must be more careful and sceptical of what we read on social media including the comments and we must not be easily influenced that is not based on truth; especially on sensitive issues which are more easily manipulated to heighten racial discord. We should check the source of information so that we can get the accurate information.

If in doubt, we should not share the messages in case we spread the wrong information. Therefore, this law is an important step that should be taken to protect our national interests and also protect ourselves from being used by those with nefarious intentions.

(In English): In summary, Mr Speaker, Sir, since 2018, the Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehood provided 22 recommendations, which included implementing specific countermeasures to combat state-sponsored disinformation operations.

We have sensitive issues like race and religion which can be easily manipulated by foreign actors to fracture our social cohesion.

Our status as an open economy attracting investments globally implies that we must balance the needs of all stakeholders while putting forward our national interest. We need to enact strong safeguards to protect our national sovereignty and security, protect our social cohesion and protect our democratic institutions.

As we chart the path for Singapore forward, we need to have open conversations, open conversations with all Singaporeans but protected from foreign interferences which may not be in the best interest of Singapore. As such, Mr Speaker, Sir, this is an important step to take. I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Liang Eng Hwa.

8.19 pm

Mr Liang Eng Hwa (Bukit Panjang): Mr Speaker, Sir, I will speak from the businesses' perspective. As a sovereign country, we must always ensure that there is no foreign interference in our politics and in our political process, whatever the intentions. As citizens of this land, we are solely and ultimately responsible for the governance and the future of this country, and we live with whatever the political outcomes and its consequences.

In an increasingly digitised world and given Singapore's global interconnectedness, it is necessary to update our laws from time to time to deal with the new threats that may infiltrate our shores and destabilise or divide us. Many countries like the US, Australia, New Zealand, Germany and India have done so in various forms in recent years and so must we.

Sir, the business community can understand why the Government needs to institute new safeguards against foreign interference and to jealously defend our political sovereignty.

As key stakeholders in the economy and society, it is in the businesses' interest to see political and social stability in the country and that the democratic processes are carry out in an orderly, transparent and legitimate manner.

While the intent and purposes of FICA is clear, there are some who still felt that this Bill could make Singapore seem less welcoming of others.

In a Business Times article on 1 October titled "FICA could affect perceptions of Singapore as global hub", it raised a number of concerns.

Firstly, among others, the article cited a hypothetical example of an international pharmaceutical company funding Singapore-based academic research on a drug that may be caught as "influence(s) or seek(s) to influence Singapore Government's decision" under section 8(c) of FICA.

The article also questioned a situation in which a multinational company's (MNC) employee is vocal about Singapore politics and policy, whether that would be construed as undertaking on behalf of the MNC and hence will come under the ambit of FICA.

Thirdly, the article also mentioned that FICA "is designed such that there will be little opportunity for the Courts to interpret and define the scope of its provisions", unlike the Common Law.

Can I ask the Minister if he could address those issues raised and whether there is a basis to be concerned that FICA could impact our status as a global hub? Sir, in Mandarin.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Mr Speaker, having heard the speeches of several Members of Parliament, my overall feeling is that we have one key consensus on this Bill, and that is: we do not want external forces to interfere with our internal affairs and weaken our sovereignty as an independent country. Our own affairs should be resolved by ourselves and there is no need for foreign political forces to interfere. Some of them may even harbour ill intentions.

Singapore is not the first country to put in place a preventative mechanism to prevent foreign interference. Many countries such as the US, Australia, India and Israel have different types of legal and administrative means to deter foreign interference.

In the recent US elections, we have seen from media reports of alleged foreign interference during the elections. During the 2018 Yellow Vest movement in France, the French government was also aware of the presence of clandestine foreign interference that exploited existing social conflicts to stir up public resentment and incite riots. During the 2019 unrest in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong government repeatedly mentioned that the demonstrators had received funding from foreign organisations.

Mr Speaker, the business community recognises the need for Singapore to introduce FICA and understands that this Bill is not targeted at any country.

Of course, the business community also hopes that Singapore's economy and society, as well as the democratic process can develop steadily, and that our society will operate according to the rule of law and public opinions, and not be influenced by external forces.

However, some business, especially those that often do business overseas, still have concerns about this Bill.

Singapore is a small island state, lacking a large and high growth domestic market. Hence, our economic development strategy must be open and connected to the world. It is only natural for local companies to seek business and growth opportunities through internationalisation and cross-border operations.

Singapore companies that do business overseas will inevitably have dealings with organisations that are connected to the local Government or semi-Government organisations. Sometimes, they may also have exchanges with these local entities in cultural, educational or ancestral matters.

Some of these companies support various exchanges between the two countries in the form of sponsorship, charity or donations. For example, at anniversary celebrations, trade associations or clan associations may receive congratulatory support from foreign organisations or receive goods, sponsorships and donations according to etiquette.

Not all businesses are familiar with the intricacies of FICA. Some are concerned that they may inadvertently be caught under the new law.

We all know that in the eyes of law, ignorance does not mean you are not guilty. Hence, they are worried that their past interactions and future engagement with overseas organisations might cause them or their company to be listed as being politically influenced.

I hope that the Minister can give a more detailed and simpler explanation of the coverage of this Bill, what is allowed and not allowed. It is best to illustrate with situations that we often encounter, for example, how the authority designates individuals or organisations as "politically significant persons/entities". This will require MHA's further clarifications. Given that the conditions in different countries are different, will there be room for flexibility under the Bill?

Will the Government set up a consultative mechanism to allow companies to discuss and communicate with relevant authorities so that the business community can better understand the purpose of the Bill? In this respect, I feel that if trade associations can participate more in the communication, the objective of the Bill can be better achieved.

Lastly, I would like to ask the Minister for his view on the medals, honorary degrees and awards conferred to Singapore businessmen by overseas governments.

Businesses in overseas markets often have to follow local customs and contribute in many ways to the local community and society. These acts of kindness are sometimes recognised by the local government. Some Singaporean businessmen or enterprises will also receive awards or medals from the local government. Here, I would like to seek clarification on these matters too.

(In English): Sir, notwithstanding the points above, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Minister Shanmugam.

8.28 pm

Mr K Shanmugam: Mr Speaker, Sir, I thank Members for their questions.

I will first address some of the points made by Members of the Workers' Party. Mr Pritam Singh spoke about the need for engagement and responding to feedback, but it appears to me that the Workers' Party has really not substantively engaged with anything that I have said.

We studied their proposals. I explained in detail in my opening speech where we agreed and also where we disagreed and why. I replied on many of the points and why some of the proposed amendments will not work.

Mr Pritam Singh cites the jurist Albert Dicey to remind us of the doctrine of separation of powers and that the rule of law requires a system of checks and balances on the exercise of executive power. He also referred to the concepts that were recently affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Nagaenthran a/l Dharmalingam.

Sir, I can tell him, and Members know, these principles are fundamental to us. These are the principles that underpin much of our success. I said in my speech, the starting point is that the rule of law is fundamental to our existence and our well-being as a country.

And that is shown in our consistently high rankings on law and order indices and our good international standing.

It is also fundamental to ensure that we have good investments; low unemployment; healthy economy.

But as I also have explained, we have never taken an absolutist approach. And if you take a dogmatic absolutist approach, it will not work for us and it is not working for many other countries.

Rhetoric alone does not solve problems. You can come to this House and have soaring rhetoric. Rhetoric has not solved the Gitmo problem of the United States. President Obama said, "The choice between liberty and freedom or security. Liberty and security is a false choice". Did he close down Gitmo? Why is it that we continue to be colonised in our minds that there is only one way of doing things properly?

I said what is the answer to the problems we have – practical answers, not just rhetoric. I said we need to see how checks need to be made suitable for the context and the risks we face. I have not heard any answer.

I said how are you going to deal with the risks of leaks in open Court hearings or in-camera? No answer. I would say not a squeak.

What are the objections to the Tribunal chaired by a High Court Judge? No real answer.

So, what we had was not a debate because we are not dealing with these points. Parliament is not just a forum for reading out speeches with an intent of putting it out in social media eventually. We need to engage on the issues.

What are the powers? What are the risks? How are the risks being dealt with in the context of the overall legal landscape?

So, listening to Mr Singh and Ms He, does that mean that they also suggest we do away with the ISA, the CLTPA, the Land Acquisition Act and various other pieces of legislation?

Or do they accept that these are needed? And, if so, why do they say we should not deal with the issues relating or covered by FICA, some part of it, through a Tribunal, given the National Security considerations? The answer may be yes. The answer may be no. But we need to engage. What are the reasons?

Is it the Workers' Party's position that all these tribunals established under all these laws that Parliament has approved should be abolished because it offends the principles of separation of powers and the rule of law?

We accept separation of powers. If we did not and if we did not have the rule of law in Singapore, I would not be here, Mr Singh would not be here, this Chamber would not look this and Singapore would not be like this. In fact, none of you would be here.

The reason we are all here is because this is a country run according to the principles of rule of law. We do not mind listening to lectures on rule of law but we subscribe to them too. But we also deal with real problems.

If the Workers' Party’s position is taken to its extreme, as I have said, we would have to do away with the CLTPA, the ISA, the MRHA and the Land Acquisition Act. All the laws that have worked well for us.

We would have to subject all our laws to judicial review. Will that alone work for us? In matters of national security, immigration, religious harmony? What is the position? So, it is not a reflexive answer each time there is a problem to say that there is only one solution. The point is, as I have said, what is the problem? Identify it. What is the best solution for this particular problem? How do you make sure that the Government is given sufficient powers and how do you make sure that there are checks and balances? So, there are the risks, and the checks and balances. In the end, what is workable?

Why are countries in Western Europe, the United States being opened up by foreign adversaries? All the evidences that we have seen in our list. Why is it that they are so open to foreign attacks? Is it because they do not have the technology?

There is such thing called political will and political courage and there will have to be a recognition that judicial process will not be appropriate.

So, Parliament is not just a place where you come and because you see that there are some people who are saying certain things, you resort to rhetoric without offering real suggestions. It requires some courage to say this is a problem and we will deal with it. This is the way we will deal with it and offer solutions. Alternate solutions.

And in so far as I have seen, the solutions: I have explained why the High Court process, open court process does not work, and I have heard nothing in response.

A judicial process will not be appropriate in matters where we rely heavily on sensitive intelligence and collaboration with foreign counterparts. Many things cannot be publicly disclosed.

The Courts themselves, have recognised their limitations in such matters. In Chng Suan Tze, the Court of Appeal recognised that where a decision – say the ISA detention – was based on national security concerns, judicial review of that decision would be precluded.

The Court acknowledged that what national security requires has to be left to those responsible for national security, that would be the Executive. And in such situations, we have found alternative ways of providing for checks and balances with the view that we must maintain accountability.

Mr Perera asked who checks the checkers? What happens if the Prime Minister or the Minister for Home Affairs are suborned?

Well, what happens in any other country if a prime minister or minister for home affairs or any other minister is suborned? Do the Courts intervene? In the case of the US, have we seen the United States Supreme Court intervene?

The ultimate check are the people. But do you expect the people as a collective body to deal with day-to-day problems of foreign interference? That is why we are elected and we are in Parliament here to debate what is the best way possible for the people.

We talk about consultation. We have had consultations for three years now. Mr Singh read out an answer given by Second Minister Josephine. Yes, she said we will consult. We have to bring people in, and this is what we have been doing from the Select Committee hearing. For three years we have been doing that: conferences, Select Committee hearings for over eight days, if I recall rightly, discussions in Parliament, speeches, extensive discussions.

So, we agree entirely on the principles. In fact, if this Government had not stuck to those principles, fundamentally, and had not recognised that that is the foundation of our existence – rule of law, separation of powers, doing things according to the law – we would not be here. Not just the PAP. PAP would have been long out of power but Singapore would not be here.

So, yes, Executive powers must be subject to checks and balances. The question is in what form and that depends on what is appropriate for the situation. When the Courts are not suitable, we have introduced other types of bodies or tribunals with statutory imposed safeguards. The further safeguards here, like requiring a Supreme Court Judge to consider the matter.

I have taken this House through various pieces of legislation, where we have vested powers in tribunals as an alternate to the Courts as a form of check and balance.

And we also have a series of cases where ouster clauses have been upheld by the Courts. These relate to areas which are traditionally regarded as non-justiciable. National security and foreign relations are classic areas.

Ms He Ting Ru made some points on the Tribunal: the scope of what they can review and their independence.

First, on the scope of its review. She seems to be under the mistaken impression that the Tribunal’s remit is narrow. That is incorrect. The Tribunal can consider any appeal brought against a Part 3 Direction and there can be a review of the merits of the decision. It is not confined to procedural compliance or legality. And the Tribunal, chaired by a Supreme Court Judge, will look at sensitive intelligence and information.

Mr Perera, I think, called it the Government-appointed Committee. I mean, again, rhetoric. Let us please not insult our High Court Judges. Please. And this Tribunal has powers to overrule the Minister’s decision.

The Tribunal has been, as I said, expressly vested with the powers to override the Minister's decision and it is useful to point out clause 95(2) of the Bill insulates the members of the Reviewing Tribunal from pressure and states very clearly that the Minister cannot reduce the salary and terms of office once they are appointed by the President.

Mr Singh pointed out that under clause 99(2)(b), the Tribunal will be able to consider a matter, without the appellant being given full particulars of the conduct which is the subject to the appeal. He talked about natural justice. I accept. But I also explained why sometimes we cannot give the full evidence. I said that in my opening speech which Mr Singh did not refer to at all. There might be times when the evidence would have to be given to the Tribunal for it to look at and decide for itself whether it makes sense to make the orders and it is proportionate to the kind of orders that can be made. We are not talking about the liberty of the individual. Also, clause 99(2)(f) allows the Tribunal to give a summary of any evidence to the appellant.

Mr Singh highlighted the importance of education about foreign interference and its dangers. We agree with that. I have explained that FICA is part of a comprehensive strategy to deal with foreign interference. Powers under FICA are only part of the picture and I have said that it is a calibrated piece of legislation to allow us to act surgically against threats.

Besides legislation, we have been and will continue to strengthen other defences – detection and response capabilities, Singaporeans’ ability to discern legitimate and artificial online discourse, though that is going to be very difficult, to counter the threat of foreign interference.

Our security agencies do their best. On public education, the Government has introduced various programmes.

Let me give some examples. The Digital Media and Information Literacy Framework was launched by MCI in 2019. It educates the public on using information responsibly and the risks and benefits of technology.

The Source, Understand, Research, Evaluate Programme by the NLB educates the public to be responsible producers and consumers of information.

The Media Literacy Council also runs programmes to promote responsible online behaviour.

And we have had extensive communications efforts over the past three years, which I have detailed. We will continue our efforts. But Government cannot do this alone.

Mr Giam is right that a whole-of-society effort is required for public education. So, we will welcome everyone's assistance in helping to engage and educate the population.

But these efforts have to be complemented with laws, which is the focus of FICA.

At the same time, this is something that has been considered at length for at least three years. We have engaged the media to put out examples to increase awareness of the threats happening around us. For example, in CNA and others.

We have also engaged various stakeholders since 2019 and their feedback had been incorporated into conceptualising the Bill: Internet companies – over a period since 2019 and senior lawyers, academics, security experts, students – many of them were closed-door discussions; some were open Panel discussions. So, it has been going on for three years which is what Minister Josephine Teo mentioned.

I think, perhaps, Mr Singh misunderstood that to mean that it will be post whatever she said some months ago. What she meant was during this entire period.

Local academics have also written various commentaries and these were published online. Some of them were mentioned in Annex F which was distributed earlier. Articles have been published, written by security experts from RSIS.

Moving on to foreigners who comment on Singapore politics and whether they are liable. Mr Perera mentioned someone. Again, I think he either missed it or was not listening to my speech, I dealt with it in my opening speech. A foreign commentator putting out his name and commenting is unlikely to be called "covert" per se. Depends on the facts and I said this arose from something that Assoc Prof Jamus Lim had put out in the context of his amendments. So, I addressed it.

If a foreigner puts his name, writes articles, people can assess for themselves what is the weight to be attached. It probably will not come within the proportionality test. But depending on the facts, there is some covert action, some other factors, or the intensity or the nature of the matter, there are a variety of factors to be considered.

For those who have pointed out that the Bill is 249 pages long; in the interest of accuracy, it is 189 pages long. The other 60 pages are the Explanatory Statement which is to help Members and Members will know more than half it, as I said, is based on the Political Donations Act (PDA).

Now, I will go on to the points made by other Members that I have not touched on.

Members brought up questions and suggestions in five main areas. First, the impetus for FICA. Second, the scope of the Bill and its application. Third, on the rules for the Tribunal. Fourth, the implementation of the Bill. Finally, specific clarifications to clauses of the Bill. I will deal with these issues.

Mr Leong Mun Wai asked why is FICA necessary when we already have extensive powers and substantial resources to deal with foreign interference. I have, in my speech, pointed out how the Internet has opened an entirely new front for hostile action. Information forces are seen as a fourth branch of armed service. This Bill is about updating our powers to ensure that they are fit for the Internet age. Given the threats, we think there is a clear and present danger that justifies us acting now.

Assoc Prof Jamus Lim asked how MHA came to the conclusion that Singapore was being attacked in 2018 when Facebook’s assessment was that there had been no cases of foreign influence operations targeting Singapore since 2017. We do not know how Facebook makes its assessment and whether it depends only on Facebook. We look at the wide variety of communication tools. Based on the information we have available to us, we reached a different conclusion. And I would say to Assoc Prof Lim, matters of our national security should not be outsourced to private companies and they should not be made to decide what our fate ought to be.

Dr Tan Yia Swam and Dr Shahirah made the point that there are extensive powers given to the Minister and that provisions are not clearly defined. Mr Xie Yao Quan asked that we explain the targets of the Bill and how the law will be applied, especially with regard to young people. Various Members, several Members have asked if FICA would affect various types of foreign interactions with academics, businesses, NGOs, clan associations, whether there will be a chilling effect on freedom of speech.

The short answer really is no. I mentioned this in my speech earlier; I will just summarise. FICA will not stop individuals, businesses and organisations in Singapore from building overseas partnerships, soliciting overseas business, networking with foreigners, sourcing for donations, discussing government policies or political matters that affect their businesses with foreign colleagues or business partners or supporting charities. As long as these are done in an open and transparent manner and not part of an attempt to manipulate our political discourse or undermine public interest such as security.

It will also not cover Singaporeans expressing their own views. It goes without saying Singaporeans have every right to speak up on our domestic politics. They are also free to engage in advocacy. That is not touched by FICA.

Mr Louis Ng and Mr Zhulkarnain asked how the Government decides what is covert or deceptive. It is an assessment that has to depend on many factors. No different from many of the other things that the Government does.

Primarily, we have to examine the behaviour of the actor involved. Indicators of covert or deceptive behaviour will include attempts to mask their tracks, misrepresent their identity, attempting to launder their narratives by having them amplified by sympathetic or unwitting locals. And these can never be exhaustive. Tactics will continue to evolve and become more sophisticated, and I even attempted to set out the full list of tactics or factors that might be used or need to be considered.

In response to Mr Zhulkarnain and Mr Perera's questions on the use of encrypted messages, VPNs and so on, use of such services is common. The fact that communications is private, on its own, would not make it hidden or covert. The use of such messages or VPN to intentionally avoid detection could be a factor in an assessment but it really must be taken into account with all the other facts and circumstances and the legal requirements set out in the law including proportionality.

Mr Zhulkarnain asked in relation to the offences in clauses 17 and 18, why we should allow an individual to "get away” if there is no covert or deceptive behaviour.

I had previously said that this Bill was calibrated, and this is one example of how. There is a line, a fine one, between a campaign to persuade and a campaign to manipulate. When campaigning is done openly, Singaporeans know who the content is from. They are able to make up their own minds and are free to agree, disagree, depending on whether they are persuaded. So, in our view, that should not be criminalised. But separately, directions can be given against a foreign party, depending on whether the thresholds have been crossed, which I explained earlier.

Mr Leong Mun Wai said someone can be arrested, no reasons given, and if the evidence is offered later, the Government is not entitled, or not obliged to reveal a source. So, you can be detained, trialed in absence, and there is no judicial review for all the actions taken against you

Now, this one, of all the things that have been said today, this one takes the cake. I do not know if he has read the Bill. Or if he has read it, I do not know if he has understood it, because I think we are talking about two different Bills. All of these statements are completely untrue, so I do not know what Mr Leong has read. I will ask him to read the Bill carefully and also ask him to make some preparation before he comes to Parliament and also listen to what is going on in Parliament, including the Minister's speech.

In the Bill, the powers of arrest relate to specific offences which need to be proven in Court like any other offence, and proven beyond reasonable doubt. Those will be prosecuted in open court. I specifically said so in my speech. There is no detention without trial in this Bill. So, to suggest that someone can be detained, trialed in absence, no judicial review? All of that is utter nonsense. I do not know where he got these ideas from. It brings to mind another debate we had a few weeks ago, but this one goes further.

So, we are talking about, I think, completely different things. I can tell Mr Leong, there is no power for detention without trial in this Bill. There is the power to give some directions, so perhaps that might help him change his mind on the Bill now that we know that he has been talking about some other Bill.

These clarifications also address Assoc Prof Jamus Lim’s concerns on whether we will charge those who were duped into committing harmful activities. In such circumstances, the elements of an offence would not be made out. There would be no basis for any criminal action.

Now, we come to the Tribunal. The question really is what kind of powers are needed and how we make the processes work. Mr Murali Pillai and Mr Louis Ng asked how do we select and appoint members of the Tribunal and the rules that will be set out, including whether the Tribunal will provide written reasons for their decisions.

Mr Zhulkarnain asked if there are safeguards to ensure that the Tribunal does not disclose information they have access to during the proceedings. The Reviewing Tribunal will be a standing Tribunal. There will be a few discrete and fixed panels set up, members will be selected for their areas of expertise, they will have to undergo security vetting because they will be receiving highly classified and highly confidential information. They must be people with experience and standing, just like any other tribunals or independent committee, like the ISA Advisory Board. Members will be given the same protection and privileges as a Supreme Court Judge and they must protect secret information, under the Official Secrets Act.

Mr Pillai raised the concern on separation of powers and suggested consulting Chief Justice for the appointment of the Chairperson rather than for the Cabinet to advise the President. While it is not written in law, that is the way Supreme Court Judges are appointed to panels. We consult the Chief Justice and he suggests some names. I have spoken to the Chief Justice to suggest some names.

We will work out the specific rules for the Tribunal in the coming months as subsidiary legislation. These rules will be public. Some broad principles: (a) the Government will have to present the evidence to convince the Tribunal; (b) Tribunal will have powers to call witnesses and compel the production of documents; (c) information will be disclosed to the appellant to the extent that it is not sensitive from a national security perspective; (d) the Tribunal can take an inquisitorial approach when the information cannot be given to the appellant and (e) the Tribunal will decide whether to uphold or overturn directions.

Mr Zhulkarnian asked about the expeditious proceedings of the Tribunal. The Tribunal can consolidate and hear similar appeals as a single case, or they can take one case as a reference point that will apply to other similar cases. They can also dismiss frivolous or vexatious appeals.

Rules of the Tribunal will be set out in subsidiary legislation and the key features drawn from reviewing bodies in other laws.

Mr Pillai asked why is the Minister, and not a reviewing tribunal, the appealing authority for PSP decisions, and why there is no requirement, similar to the Tribunal, for the Minister to review the appeal expeditiously. I think Mr Perera may have raised the same question.

The level of authorisation required for various powers is calibrated based on the impact of the directions and countermeasures. PSP directions are targeted in their applications and scope. They are issued to a specified individual or entity. The impact of the directives are limited to that person or entity and compared with a HIC.

So, the authorisations are accordingly calibrated. HIC directions authorised by the Minister and PSP designations and countermeasures by a civil servant within MHA.

The appropriate appellate authority is therefore framed by reference to the level of authorisation and the respective direction appealable to the next level of authority.

Mr Liang Eng Hwa asked for more details on the process to how a Competent Authority can designate someone as a PSP, and whether businesses can take rectification measures to remove their designation as PSPs.

The processes for designation and appeal are spelt out in clauses 47 to 49 and clauses 100 to 102 of the Bill. Operational details on the designation and appeals process are still being worked out and will be introduced in subsidiary legislation and as Regulations.

Being conferred with an honorary title or degree by a foreign state or University alone is unlikely to be sufficient grounds for designation as a PSP. It is not FICA's intent to stop these types of interactions and activities. But, again, we will look to see whether there is an attempt by a foreign actor to cultivate a Singaporean to undermine our national interest.

Mr Murali Pillai asked if the appointments to the advisory committee to advise the Minister on PSP appeals will be gazetted and make public and how would the public know that the Minister is not following the advisory committee's advice. We have no issues with making the appointments public. The committee will comprise third parties to render advice to the Minister.

In response to Mr Louis Ng's question on whether individuals will receive written responses to explain decisions made by the competent authority on designating PSPs, this would be done as the specific activities that qualified them for designation will have a direct impact on how the controls will apply to them. For instance, a designated NGO that advocates on a variety of issues will have to report donations that it specifically receives for its activities that are directed towards a political end. The explanation will be important in setting out which are its activities of concern and those would be the donations that have to be disclosed.

Mr Louis Ng asked if MHA will release guidelines and illustrations that can facilitate compliance by good-faith actors. Mr Liang Eng Hwa asked if there will be engagement to help businesses navigate how FICA applies to them. Non-compliance is an offence. A recipient of a direction who fails to comply, can be prosecuted. We agree with the intent of Mr Ng's and Mr Liang's questions, there is a need to help good faith actors comply. We will continue to engage stakeholders including tech companies and Internet access service providers to understand their capabilities and constraints, identify suitable modes of compliance and we will continue to work with our stakeholders to operationalise.

The exact mode of compliance with disclosure and declaration obligations and other requirements from counter-measures that they may be subjected to will be articulated in subsidiary legislation. But the vast majority of foreign dealings between Singaporean companies and their business counterparts will continue unchanged.

Mr Xie Yao Quan asked where will Part 3 directions be published and whether the reasons for actions taken under Parts 3, 4, 5 and 6 will be published. Mr Zhulkarnain suggested giving a report on the FICA offences or directions without the need to go into specific details or naming the foreign principals. Mr Darryl David suggested informing the public when there is sufficient evidence that there is foreign interference and said we should make the entity's identity and activities known so that we can take a united position against such a country.

We have taken the approach to not name the foreign state actors whom we suspect to be involved in these foreign attempts. There are wider national and foreign policy considerations in doing so. However, we will alert Singaporeans when such communications activity has been detected and if FICA directions were issued to block and contain such foreign interference. All Part 3 directions, except for the Technical Assistance Direction, will be published on a website accessible to the public.

As Mr Xie has pointed out, national security concerns may make it impracticable to publish the reasons for actions taken. Where possible, we will inform the public on the broad grounds for issuance of directions. In response to Mr Xie's question on whether appeals made and ruled under FICA would be published, we can consider, although it would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. The more sensitive the information used, the less likely we are able to do so.

Mr Xie suggested making the Registry of Foreign and Political Disclosures accessible online, free of charge, in a searchable, sortable and downloadable format, to maximise its potential for public education and awareness. We will consider his suggestions.

Mr Zhulkarnain pointed out that it is easy for a person to deny that he is aware of the purpose of undertaking an activity and asked for the threshold in clause 16 in determining that a person has intention or belief to undertake the activity for a particular purpose. He also asked if a person would be held liable if he was not aware that he is acting on behalf of a foreign principal. The short answer is no. The Member can refer to clause 5(1)(b). The starting point is indeed we want to make it an offence to conduct or abet a HIC. But we cannot remove intentionality from the offence elements, otherwise we will end up making criminals out of Singaporeans who unknowingly aid an HIC by sharing content without knowing better. Given the sophistication of threat actors, this is more than likely.

A deliberate perpetrator may of course deny, which is why we need to set the offence threshold at a reasonable level, "is or is likely to", for example. And making out that case would be the job of our law enforcement agencies.

Referring to clause 49, Mr Louis Ng asked for clarification on what would not be practicable or desirable for individuals to have the opportunity to be heard. If the designated individual is a Singaporean based overseas and not planning on returning to Singapore, it may not be practical to delay his or her designation until he or she is given an opportunity to be heard.

Also, if we have received intelligence that a target for designation may already be compromised and counter measures are required immediately to mitigate the threat, it may not be desirable to wait for the hearing before designation.

Mr Speaker, Sir, this Bill is intended to address a serious threat that concerns Singapore national security and sovereignty. These are important to ensure that Singaporeans continue to make our own choices on how we should govern our country and live our lives.

There is also the question of the Petition as I said in my Second Reading speech. Sir, I will ask that this be treated as being dealt with during this debate, so that we do not have to postpone that to some other time. Sir, with that, I beg to move.

Mr Speaker: Clarifications. Leader of Opposition.

9.07 pm

Mr Pritam Singh: Thank you, Mr Speaker. I thank the Minister for closing speech. I have three clarifications.

I will start with the first which covers the Second Minister for Home Affairs, Minister Josephine Teo's comments at this year's Committee of Supply. Sir, I do not believe I misread that speech. Mr Christopher de Souza filed a cut, asking MHA what it would do to deter foreign interference in our domestic affairs. Minister replies, quite an extensive reply. It goes on for about a page, and right at the end, she says, "Given the experience of other countries, we need to consider further measures". This is post-Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods' findings, post some other seminars that have been referred to. And she says, "We need to consider further measures to guard against foreign subversion, what levels of transparency, support, leadership are appropriate for home and the public has to play a big part in this to shape proposals and to give safeguards the strongest support". It seems to me that it is not a misunderstanding of this but it is probably more accurate to say that, that does not seem to be an answer as to why the Bill could not be put before public consultation, like other Bills are. This is an omission for which I do not think we have heard any responses yet.

The second point pertains to the role of the Courts, which I think is the fundamental disagreement between the Government and the Workers' Party (WP)'s position is the oversight mechanism. I think there is scope to discuss some of the other points and I think Minister has agreed with some of our amendments but Minister referred to the case, the 1988 case of Chng Suan Tze v Minister for Home Affairs. Let me refer to it and try to capture the spirit of the WP's approaches to oversight mechanisms the way we see them vis-à-vis this Bill.

I refer to the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment) Bill. A debate that took place on the 25 of January 1989 and it also dealt with, the main debate also dealt with Internal Security Act (ISA) (Amendment) Bill, which sought to abolish appeal to the Privy Council in case of review of ISA cases.

Then, Minister K Shanmugam, as a backbencher said the following and I would start with the reference to Chng Suan Tze and Minister said, "It will be useful to consider exactly what the Court of Appeal said. It did not say that it can itself decide whether or not the detainee posed a threat. The Court said that it can consider, within broad parameters, whether or not there was any ground at all for the detention. It will set aside the detention only if there were absolutely no grounds for the detention, that is, it takes the view that no one in his right mind could possibly have concluded that the detainee posed any threat to national security. Otherwise, it will not interfere with the Minister's decision.

Sir, the amendments will deny the Courts that power. This Government believes it has never abused the ISA and there is nothing to fear. The Government works on the basis that the persons in Government should be upright, moral and only do what is good for the country. Thus, the people have nothing to fear, despite the powers that the Government has. These powers will never be abused because they are so effective, they help the Government govern effectively for the greater good of all. So, that has worked."

And Minister says this, "But can we be sure that down the road, the situation will be the same? We cannot guarantee that the future government will comprise of honourable men." Minister then goes on, "An argument, therefore, can be made out that there must be checks and balances within the system. The Minister in taking his decision can arguably be made to realise that if his decision is so unreasonable that one look at the facts will show that he could never have considered the detainee a threat, then his decision should be reversed by the Courts."

Insofar as FICA is concerned and as it is drafted with the limited judicial review clause, what we are taking away is precisely what the Minister was warning about in 1989. Illegality, irrationality are not grounds for judicial review consideration in this Bill, only procedural impropriety. And I was listening very carefully to the other People's Action Party (PAP) Members who spoke and I compared the speeches of those Members with the PAP Members who spoke in 1989. The Minister was not the only one who was concerned about an appeals mechanism or other appeals mechanism and that there be appropriate checks and balances. There were a few other PAP Members.

I am not going to go through the entire debate, but I think the point is, the WP does not understand at the very base level, why it has to be limited judicial review in this case. I think Minister gave some reasons and the Minister referred to leaks – that there could be leaks in the system, when you go to Court. Sir, I do not mean to just facetiously give a counter response, but there could be leaks in the reviewing tribunal as well.

So, that question, I think if you ask me on balance, should a Court at least look into and review the decision of the Minister? Should judicial review be allowed to be captured in its entirety by a Court of Law? I think the answer is yes and that is a fundamental difference. Notwithstanding this, Minister makes the point about national security and so forth, which is why the Workers' Party Members have proposed potential in-camera hearings and files can be sealed after that as well.

My third clarification, Sir, is a bit more specific and this pertains to designated PSPs. I am not sure it is appropriate for me to direct this question at Minister because it would probably be more appropriately directed at the other office holders in MHA who spoke on the Bill and this is with regard to designated PSPs. I will give an example, a hypothetical.

Let us assume there is a cause-based, a single cause-based NGO in Singapore. Their cause is, they are very aghast at the idea of foreign workers being transported at the back of hard-top lorries. This is their single cause, they are all Singapore members and they regularly write to their Members of Parliament and encourage their Members of Parliament to bring this issue up in Parliament. Let us assume this NGO receives foreign funding. It receives foreign funding from another International Organisation, whose main object is that they seek to ensure and uphold the human rights of foreign workers all over the world. They are prepared to extend funding to anyone.

Now, one reading of FICA, by virtue of a clause 8(f) and (g) and even (e) perhaps, will suggest that, this Singapore NGO could be classified as a Politically Significant Entity (PSE). My question is, will such a PSE be barred at the first instance, at the baseline, from continuing to accept foreign funding. That means will the Competent Authority say, "No, sorry, you cannot receive this funding." Because, I know under stepped-up countermeasures, you can do that.

At the baseline, I believe it says you cannot accept impermissible donations. I believe the Bill in clause 55 tells you what a permissible donor is. Are we to read that in the opposite, as in everybody who is out of that range is an impermissible donor?

Because this has knock-on implications for other arguments that the Government and other Members of Parliament have made. If you work with climate activists, for example, there is an international solidarity movement on certain issues. How will this be addressed and considered by FICA?

This, I hope explains Mr Gerald Giam's amendments for clause 8(f) and (g), as to how do we balance this exercise. Because if you compare clause 8(a) to (e), there is a very clear target – legislature, presidential counsels, trying to change the laws – but the last two limbs are far more broad and that also explains why the Workers' Party proposed additional oversight arrangements.

Mr K Shanmugam: Mr Speaker, I will deal with the first two points and one of my colleagues will deal with this last point on NGOs and designations.

On what the Second Minister said, I thought I was quite clear. What she was saying and this is an answer I myself looked at, previously. We have seen the experiences of other countries. We have to consider what further measures are necessary. For example, what levels of transparency in funding, support and leadership and for whom? The public has a big part in this to shape the proposals on these further measures to give the eventual safeguards their strongest support.

What does that relate to? What have we been doing with the public for the last three years? We have been engaging in extensive consultations. In fact, we have taken into account the viewpoints that have been given to us by a wide variety of actors.

But if we talk about whole-of-society, this is not the end. It is the beginning. We will face a major attack at some point. We need to bring the entire society together. We need to do a lot more to bring and shape public thinking.

So, there is a long haul ahead of us and the public has to be involved in that. The public has been involved, primarily, experts, in the thinking through of the Bill too.

On the second point. To take that and say – that means for the drafting of the Bill, the public will be involved and how come it was not involved – that is a misreading of that statement.

Let us go to the second question, which I think is the crux of the difference between the Government and Mr Pritam Singh and his party.

He quoted what I said in 1989. I did not only say it in 1989. If you went back and checked, I think I have said it at various points – 1989, 1990. I have said it just for the record since it is all in Hansard anyway. I have said it in respect of the original MRHA. I have said it in respect of the CLTPA and I have said it in respect of the Internal Security Act.

Why? This is fundamental. This is important. I have given this answer to your colleague, Mr Dennis Tan, when he asked me, probably trying to suggest that I am being inconsistent. A person who is prepared to be thinking about issues sometimes has to change his views when he is faced with the real world and experiences.

In 1989, I was a lawyer four years out of law school, four years after being called, and like many other lawyers, my assumption was every problem, the solution is in the Courts. Just like Mr Pritam Singh and others, I also take the separation of powers very seriously. The constitutional principles, the independence of the judiciary, all of these, I take very seriously. We imbibed this in law school.

I believed in it, I believe in it and I believe we try and uphold it. So, any time when there is an approach that seeks to cut back on judicial review or take away the powers of the judiciary, my instinctive reaction is negative. I do not like it, I do not want to do it and I instinctively try and see if there is a different way of doing it.

Which is why when the MRHA was originally brought in, I expressed my discomfort within the bounds of what is possible for the backbench Members of Parliament of the ruling party. Likewise, I expressed my concerns about the CLTPA. Likewise, I expressed my concerns about the Internal Security Act.

Likewise, today, I said, if we can find a better model, I will be the first one to do it. Tell me a better model. Going to the High Court for FICA is not a better model.

I think, Mr Pritam Singh, based on what he says, he obviously does not deny that there will be leaks. Do you want us to take the risks?

Will there be a possibility of a leak with a Tribunal? Much, much, much less. To the point of being close to zero. That is the big difference.

What has made me change my mind? If a man looks at the facts, the real world and refuses to change his mind, he is either stupid or he is ideological. I am neither. I think. Even if I say that of myself.

So, you see 9/11. You look at the way the Americans have dealt with it. You see the issues in Western Europe. You see the issues around the world where lip service is paid to all these grand concepts but the societies live in utter misery, where rule of law is a concept for lawyers but it does not operate in the real world. And you ask yourself.

So, I look at all of this experience practising in the Courts and too many years as a Member of Parliament. Long conversations with the late Mr Lee Kuan Yew, discussing, I would say arguing though it is not easy to argue with him, discussing, tough discussions and then I began to understand the meaning of his original speech to the Law Society when he said, "Law and order, I reverse it. Order first, before law." Because if you do not have order, you cannot have law.

When we all read it, we think we understand it. But I do not think we really do. You need to really imbibe what is the meaning of that. If you cannot have the CLTPA and arrest the gangsters, how are you going to have law? It will be a paper law. But if you can bring order into society, then your law will take full effect.

Look at the state of our society. Look at the number of people under the CL today compared to the number of people under the CL even 10 years ago. It is halved and the reason is as society develops, as society progresses, as there is stability, as there is order, the law takes stronger and stronger roots. If you get that wrong, you will neither have law nor order.

So, I began to understand why we have a strong commitment to the rule of law, a strong commitment to the separation of powers and at the same time, in specific areas, there are some exceptions. For example, I said the Land Acquisition Act. Your property could be worth millions of dollars. The Government could acquire it and you could be asked to leave. It is socialism in action. It is a social policy and there is a need for that. Even today.

Would we in Singapore be where we are if we had taken the Indian approach and every matter goes up to the Supreme Court on land acquisition and it takes years to deal with it?

So, I saw the genius in the adaptations that our system has made or the founding generation has made, being very strict in building up our judiciary.

You look at all the countries in the post-colonial world. They inherited the institutions from the British – a civil service, a judiciary, laws, schools, education. What have they done with it? Most of them have gone down the tube while they have grand rhetoric.

What has Mr Lee and his team done with it? Built up the judiciary. If we do not have a commitment to the rule of law, do you think our judiciary will be ranked as it is today? Internationally?

Built up our civil service so that it is a strong, outstanding, excellent civil service. Built up the other institutions, including SAF, the Police force, our education system, our middle class. All of these were built up with the foundations of bringing order first and making sure that the law and the commitment to the rule of law are there.

But making the exceptions where necessary and I took you through the exceptions.

To me, the best example of how this operated in practice is when I saw how the Americans were struggling with it. They had an ideological commitment to due process. Everyone must be tried. Everyone must have a lawyer. Everyone must be given a full trial.

But then, they have these, I do not know, hundreds or a thousand plus terrorists whom they do not want to give a trial to. America was never under an existential threat as a result of 9/11; never like the threat that we faced. But when they did it, they said Guantanamo Bay is in Cuba, our rules and laws do not apply there, there is no due process, we lock them up and we throw away the keys.

That is why I said, let us get out of this colonisation of our minds. Let us look at what works, what is fundamental. Checks and balances are important. But what is wrong with the checks and balances we have built in here?

So, yes, I am not embarrassed to say that I had certain views, straight out of law school the first four years. The only mistake is I should not have become a Member of Parliament when I was 29 years old. I should have waited a bit longer.

But I am not embarrassed to say those were my views and those views have changed because of the realities of life, not because I became a Minister but because over time, long before I became a Minister, I saw how laws are meant to operate and where the exceptions have to be made.

So, as I sat with my officers and drafted this and with the AGC, yes, there were parts that I wished were different. But that threat we face, as I said, are people armed with bazookas and I described this legislation as a toy gun. Because Singapore believes in the law, so we put forward the law, we give ourselves legal powers, but in reality, the kind of threats we face, the kind of adversaries and the resources they have in terms of manpower are far greater than what we have.

So, that, and our people have not even begun to realise what the problem is and the nature of the problem despite all the speeches and the conferences and the seminars and the Select Committee hearings.

If anybody else from the Workers' Party wishes, I will give you the references to my different speeches where I have expressed my views so that I do not have to keep coming back to the speech once every year or two years. [Applause.]

Mr Speaker: Minister of State Desmond Tan.

Mr Desmond Tan: Thank you, Mr Speaker, I just want to respond to Leader of Opposition's question with regard to a Singapore NGO that is designated as a Politically Significant Entity (PSE). Will it therefore be required to cease the foreign funding at the onset of the designation? So, the short answer to the question is no. At the onset of designation, the PSE will only be required to declare the foreign donors and where the funding is coming from. Only when there are reasons and it meets certain conditions will it be required to step up the countermeasures, the further measures to require the NGOs to then beyond declaring, to have to cease the funding, only when certain conditions are met. I hope that answers the question.

Mr Speaker: Leader of the Opposition.

Mr Pritam Singh: I thank the Minister and Minister of State Desmond Tan.

Minister, I have heard you carefully. On the first point about Second Minister Josephine Teo, I stick to my position that I do not believe it was a misreading. Minister has a different view. I think I can leave that at that.

The point about judicial review, again, that reflection of how one's views changes over time is not something that I take lightly. I think all of us go through such a catharsis in our lives as we build up a crucible of experience.

But I would like to ask whether the Ministry considered judicial review in the usual sense and not limited judicial review. Why was it that illegality and irrationality were deemed, that they ought not to play a part in this Bill. It is not the ISA. We are talking of a different sort of threat. Yes, it could be "ISA-like". I would concede that point. But we are only asking the Court to just look at the lawfulness of a decision. Nobody is asking the Court to substitute the Minister's decision. And this, I believe is an important matter because we cannot use the experience of having legislation with ouster clauses to justify new legislation with ouster clauses. So, I think each legislation must be unpacked to why judicial review has to be limited.

Mr K Shanmugam: I will answer that shortly. The reason is, our assessment was that here, a lot of the evidence we will rely on would probably be based on highly sensitive information that comes from our partners; by definition, partners meaning from outside. They could be from a variety of different intelligence sources. As I said, I am not saying we have the human assets but a variety of different types of assets.

And our view was this. While the actions we take are nowhere near as serious as the Internal Security Act, nevertheless, in some ways, the Internal Security Act is often focused on the people within and we will be able to have our own evidence that would be able to be used. Here, we would have to depend on other types of evidence, other sources, whether our sources or partner sources, and there is a great deal of requirement for secrecy and confidentiality and this should not go to the Court process at all.

But we all agree there needs to be a robust process for making sure that the process we set up can properly look at what the Minister has done. So, the direct answer to the question is we assess that that the kind of information we will be looking at and assessing on deciding would be much, much, much more confidential and secret.

And really, in ordinary circumstances, it would be known to no more than one or two persons. And we have to rely on that kind of information, sometimes for this.

But if there are suggestions on how we can make it more robust, because we want it to be robust. That is why we have a High Court Judge sitting there. As I said, even though it is not in the Bill, I have asked the Chief Justice for names. So, he will give us the names. The President will appoint. And if there are other suggestions to make it robust without affecting the secrecy and confidentiality, we will be very happy to consider.

Mr Speaker: Assoc Prof Jamus.

Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim: Thank you, Speaker. And I thank the Minister for his extensive discussion about our questions. I have three clarification questions for the Minister. The first is to ask if in referring to the events of 2018-2019, whether he continues to believe that there was indeed malign foreign state influence in that case. And if I appreciate the point that he raised, that we should not outsource our national security to a private company. But by the same token, I am sure he will appreciate that the tools available to large and sophisticated Internet companies such as Facebook might indeed throw additional light on an issue.

So, for me, the question is, does this apparent disagreement not already raise caution about how the Competent Authority's suspicions may not always be correct? Or does the Minister believe that MHA will always retain its own Counsel on what he believes to be true.

My second clarification has to do with the standards of suspicion embedded in the Bill. Does this always refer to the term reasonable suspicion, a point that I believe Members of Zhulkarnain and Murali also mentioned.

I ask this because for starters, this was not codified specifically in this form in the Bill. Second, while we do have a long history of, as other Members have said, of using this term in case law, lest we forget the Bill as it stands, does exclude judicial review. So, any such precedent strikes me as a largely advisory and informative rather than binding.

And third, I think it is worth remembering that the types of actions typically afforded by reasonable suspicion tend to be much more limited than those associated with probable cause. And that is part of the reason why, for me at least, this hurdle remains a little too low for establishing offence.

And my last question has to do with whether the Minister continues to believe that there is a misunderstanding of the law by those who have raised reservations. I mention this because the reservations brought by scores of academics, activists, other lawyers who have all scrutinised the Bill and thought that the language was vague. So, for me, it seems like either the language is indeed vague as claimed and hence subject to misunderstanding. Or it is not vague, in which case, then these individuals should not be accused of misunderstanding.

Mr K Shanmugam: Let me try and deal with those points. On the first point, do we believe that there was a foreign state involved response. We believe it to be so. So I think Assoc Prof Lim's real point is, "Facebook says, there is no such thing. You say there is. Doesn't that throw into question your credibility of assessment?"

Let me try and give Mr Lim some examples, or at least one example. At many stages, Facebook has denied something only to come back and reverse itself. I am not saying, therefore, they do not really mean what they say when they have not seen any state attack. I also pointed out that Facebook is not the only medium. There are a variety of other medium, other than Facebook. And I do not know if they have considered a complete survey. We were watching all the different media that was used.

Now, in Sri Lanka, and I think this was 2017 or 2016, on Facebook, Sinhalese were calling to gather together to go and kill Muslims. The Minister for Communications in Sri Lanka called up Facebook to say, can you do something about this? This is a riot being organised on Facebook in order to kill other people. Facebook told him this does not affect our community standards. So, I do not know. Their definition of what is or is not a foreign hostile activity, may well be different from ours. So, if I organise a pogrom to go and kill people, that apparently does not breach Facebook's community standards. And Muslims were killed.

Does Assoc Prof Lim think that a responsible state authority should outsource the way it handles law and order to Facebook, whose primary concern is, how much money it can make with the best thrill in the world?

When someone took Nancy Pelosi's speech and re-did it to make it look as if she was drunk and slurring, Facebook also felt that in the interests of free speech, that does not breach their community standards.

When attacker in the New Zealand mosque was killing people and livestreaming his attack, Facebook said it did not breach its community standards and it felt that attack should continue to be livestreamed, until there was such a furore and uproar that they reversed course. So, I do not know. I do not know what their definitions are. I do not know what are the different types of medium they considered.

So, I cannot comment exhaustively, nor can I take it at face value that if they say, so it must be so. Maybe they do not know what happened. But we noticed activity, we draw certain lines. We have intelligence experts. We have people and they have come to the conclusion that the sudden spike in activity on a variety of platforms, specifically targeted for specific messages to be absorbed by our Mandarin speaking population was a very clear indication. And I am not going to all the details.

As I said, we are a price taker, we do not name countries, we cannot afford to.

Another question by Assoc Prof Jamus Lim is, do I believe there is a misunderstanding by all those who have raised issues? Or is the language indeed vague. There are different points. I think in any debate, again, after long years of experience in Parliament, my view is on any debate, it broadly breaks out into some who are honest and they understand; a large group who do not follow very carefully and may have views which are not accurate.

How many people read very closely? How many people look at Bills? How many people look at even the detailed newspaper reports? And viewpoints tend to be impressionistic; and often impressionistic viewpoints tend to be inaccurate. But for good reasons – people have busy lives and they have a limited bandwidth. They absorb whatever they can absorb.

I do not know about Assoc Prof Lim, but if I was not doing this job and I was a lawyer in private practice, I would also have very limited time to understand what is going on in Parliament, which Bills are coming up. I will probably have, perhaps, a little bit more than the average layperson's understanding. But all our viewpoints tend to be impressionistic on areas that we are not directly dealing with because we all have busy lives.

And then, there will be a small group which will go out to deliberately misinform and confuse the population. There will always be that group and I have indicated that some of that has been happening too.

Quite apart from that, on language, let me try and explain to Assoc Prof Lim one more time. It is going to be 10 o'clock but I will try again. I said in my Opening Speech, I think I said out of 10,000 people, you are trying to catch that one case. Even in that one case, the foreign agency will try and make it look like it is a normal case. So, the facade will be normal, everything will look normal. In fact, if they are worth anything, they will make it look very normal. So, you have to have definitions; just because it looks normal does not mean that you do not have the powers. How do you go behind that, how do you deal with it.

So, that is why you say it is to foreigners' involvement affecting public interest. The way in which it is done, I have explained the framework. If the idea is hostile information campaign, foreign state agency, payments, covert activities, I think it is quite clear. But there are also situations where it is not so clear, and that is where you build in the proportionality test.

And it seems to me quite a few of the commentators do not understand the proportionality test. That is why I made it a point to say AGC advised me; that test is there. When you do not understand the proportionality test, then you say, "Oh dear, it says 'collaboration', so, any collaboration with a foreigner on a matter that is of importance to Singaporeans could potentially run afoul", because you misunderstand the proportionality test.

Beyond that, there is a second vein. Again, there are people who fall into those who deliberately push this line but there are also a large number, genuine people, honest people, who are genuinely concerned.

I would not say a large number of people are concerned with this Bill. In fact, our assessment is that, by and large, a large number of people understand, a vast majority of Singaporeans understand the need for FICA. So, of the very small group who are concerned, a significant number you can put down as honest people who, either for impressionistic reasons or other reasons, may have had some misunderstanding and like the two Nominated Members of Parliament who spoke up, say, is there a possibility of abuse.

And that lies behind some of the points that have been made outside. Yes, if you apply the law as you say it should be, and if you apply the proportionality test correctly, yes, then it will be done properly. But what if you abuse your power? And my answer to that, I gave an extended analysis this morning about how abuse can take place under any legislation. Your question is, do you give the power and what are the checks you put in. So, we have put in, we think, a strong check through the appointment of a High Court Judge with extensive powers. We have drafted this to deal with a very large threat which is clear and present here. It is not in the future. It has happened, it is happening all around us and it will happen to us. It is not for nothing that the French study Singapore and showed it as a test case or one of the case studies.

So, our task is to continue to explain to people how this law works and, over time, just as with the many other pieces of legislation, if the Government operates it properly and honestly, it will be understood. If it operates it wrongly, the people will express their views in a variety of ways.

I think Mr Perera said, "Trust in institutions should be built up". I think listening to Mr Perera over the years, his ideal state, if you take the UK or the US, they have all the things that he says we should have – Freedom of Information Act, they have all these other bodies, many things go to the courts, they do not have an Internal Security Act. Can anyone tell me why the trust in their Congress in the US, I think, is now down to, perhaps, a single digit or maybe low double digits? Why is the trust in the Government in Singapore so much higher?

So, let us, again, get real. Trust depends on how you exercise your power and your track record. Trust depends on whether people's lives have really improved and whether you work to improve people's lives. Trust depends on whether you have the courage of your convictions, in the face of some opposition, to say this is the right way, this is the way I will explain and I will do it for the benefit of people. Trust does not depend on putting in a series of legislation, just copying others whose trust levels are abysmally low.

Assoc Prof Lim asked me about the phraseology "the authorisation by Minister for anticipatory direction". I think the phrase used is "suspects or has reason to believe".

Mr Speaker: Mr Leong Mun Wai.

Mr Leong Mun Wai: Mr Speaker, I would like to ask the Minister three questions. One, basically, the question revolves around what the Leader of Opposition has also been asking. I do not think the Minister has given enough convincing arguments about what is the hurry, why FICA is needed and why the judicial review is not needed.

First of all, my first question, what is the hurry. The Minister has been saying for hours that three years of consultation has been done, they have done a lot of things and all that. But what we have heard here is that those things are about identifying what need to be done and what are the threats, what are the foreign interference threats and all that. But just now he mentioned something that, oh, he also consulted some Singaporeans. But at the end of the day, I think we can all agree that there is little consultation of the general public. And what the Minister was trying to say just now is that it seems to be – I mean that is how I interpret it – let us have the law first and then Singaporeans will understand the law, that the law is good for them and all that. That is not the way the law should be implemented. So, since there is not enough consultation of the general public, should the Minister not consider postponing the passage of the Bill? That is my first question.

The second question, is FICA effective in protecting us much more than all the resources and the laws we have before this? We already have them, they are all there. Can the Minister point out a few examples, do not quote all the foreign countries example, quote Asian countries example, examples of Asian countries that have suffered from foreign interference. Because as an ordinary citizen watching the TV and all that, all the foreign interferences in Taiwan and Australia, for example, seem to be a joke. It was just a theatre of actions and all that but in the end, all the foreign interference seems to be unravelled. So, I ask the Minister to quote us some examples and educate us.

The third question is, we spend a lot of time talking about judicial review. What the Minister seems to be saying is "Trust me, trust me". I ask two questions with regard to that. The Tribunal is appointed by the Minister, right, under this FICA? Two, if judicial review can be done in other country, even with respect to national security issues, why can we not do it?

Mr K Shanmugam: Well, Sir, I will answer to the extent that I understand the questions. On the first point, what is the hurry? I assume now, Mr Leong, we are talking about the same legislation because the legislation you talked about just now seemed to be a very different one. Do you understand that almost everything you said earlier about this Bill is actually untrue and inaccurate?

Mr Leong Mun Wai: Minister, you want me to respond now?

Mr K Shanmugam: Yes, please.

Mr Leong Mun Wai: Okay, what I have said is according to the legal advice that my Party had gotten from senior lawyers. So, you say those are not accurate, they are not right. Then, that is exactly what we have been saying or I have been saying in this Parliament. The discussion and the debate in this Parliament actually should not be conducted in a way that is just interpretation by you. Let us have a Committee, let the experts trash it out and then bring it to this main Chamber. We might as well call this legislative Chamber, legal Chamber. The legal experts who are advising me disagree with you.

Mr Speaker: If I can request both Members to direct your comments through me.

Mr K Shanmugam: Yes, I am sorry, Sir. Sir, can I ask through you for Mr Leong to show me which clause allows for detention without trial in FICA, please, as he suggested? Detention without trial, trial in absence and no judicial review for such detention. Since his senior lawyers have advised it, he should be able to tell me which clause.

Mr Speaker: Mr Leong.

Mr Leong Mun Wai: Mr Speaker, there the Minister goes again. I am not going to go into all these legal interpretation. If we want to argue, we argue out of this. But most of the things that I have said is in section 99, and I did not say detention without trial. I say he can arrest you, of course, through due process, but after he arrests you, you are not bailable and all that, those are provided in section 99. But, anyway, I am not going down that line. Minister, let us go on with the other questions.

Mr Speaker: Minister.

Mr K Shanmugam: Sir, I was listening very carefully when Mr Leong spoke and my blood pressure went up quite significantly when he said detention without trial. That phrase is there, I am sure it is captured in the Hansard. Detention without trial, trial in absentia and no judicial review. So, I just order and the person is arrested and detained, and he has got no rights of review.

And now, Mr Leong says clause 99. He reads English, I read English, I can tell him that neither clause 99 nor any other clause in the Bill has detention without trial. Not just that, he says "There he goes again". When Mr Leong refers to provisions in FICA, I asked him which provisions. When Mr Leong says you can detain without trial, he says it, I asked him which clauses.

So, we will take it that his position is that clause 99 allows the Minister to detain without trial. I can assure the House, he is reading something which I do not know anything about.

Mr Speaker: Mr Leong, would you like to respond to that?

Mr Leong Mun Wai: I have no response.

Mr Speaker: Minister, carry on.

Mr K Shanmugam: Thank you, Sir. Sir, I do not want words put in my mouth. I did not say there was little consultation with Singaporeans nor did I say let us have the law first and then, go and explain to Singaporeans. I think I said a number of things in context and I would ask Mr Leong not to misquote me. I did not say it in those terms nor did I mean it in those terms.

The second the question is, is FICA effective in protecting us, given all the other resources that the Government has at its disposal? And Mr Leong says give us examples of Asian countries which have suffered such an attack. Sir, again, I am not usually at a loss for words. But is the suggestion that somehow because we are Asian, Asian countries will not be affected by foreign interference?

Is that the suggestion? I will suggest Mr Leong reads the French report and that he reads the Select Committee report. And I can tell him in the annexes we gave out this afternoon, while the names are not there, some of those countries are Asian.

It is absolutely shocking to hear that the suggestion of foreign interference in Taiwan and Australia are jokes. I think, in the case of Taiwan, of course, it is a territory, or it is said to be a territory; in the case of Australia, it is a country. Those places will be very surprised that someone in Singapore thinks the attacks on them, for which Australia has passed legislation, very draconian legislation on reporting requirements. I said this afternoon, you are an ex-parliamentarian, your obligations are very onerous.

I think no one who knows the facts will say what Mr Leong has said, that it is a joke that these places have suffered foreign interference.

Whether they have suffered it from the countries they have named, we do not express a view because it is not our business to go and say they were attacked by X or Y or Z. But all the evidence that was laid out this afternoon – I talked about an Australian parliamentarian who was said to have been suborned by foreign money and making a statement on South China Sea that is contrary to his own party's position – what do you call that?

When we say that Singapore itself has been subject to foreign interference recently, are you saying that what we are saying is untrue?

There are reports that the Indian electric infrastructure was brought down as a result of an attack from outside of India. There are reports of foreign inspired attacks in a number of Asian countries, which I think you can see both in the Select Committee report and if you read the newspapers.

The third point he makes is, well, the Judge is appointed by the Minister and basically the approach is, trust me.

No. The Tribunal is appointed by the President, on the advice of the Cabinet. It is headed by a High Court Judge, who has security of tenure, and he is a Judge of the Supreme Court. He does not owe any obligation to the Government.

Mr Leong asks why is it possible that other countries can have judicial review and we cannot. Well, I gave an answer. It is a question of what those countries can do and if you look at New Zealand, they have not had to face very severe threats. For the first time now, they are facing different types of threats. In the absence of an Internal Security Act, they have to allow this man to be free for years outside and one day, he goes into a supermarket and knifes people. Do you want to wait for that?

If you take France, I said 80% of the attackers were known to the security forces. Ninety-seven percent were on their radar. How many people have been killed? I said there were 22 incidents, including the Charlie Hebdo incident. Scores of people have been killed. The entire country brought to a standstill. Paralysed with fear.

These are choices. There are trade-offs. So, I explained the trade-offs we make.

Mr Speaker: Mr Leong Mun Wai.

Mr Leong Mun Wai: Sir, I would like to clarify further with the Minister. One is that the appointment of the tribunal is recommended by the Cabinet, right, to the President? In that case, does the President have the power to reject the appointment? First question.

Second question is, just now I asked for some examples of Asian countries that are affected by foreign interference. I am looking for examples where there are more permanent damage, like really affected a national election and things like that. But what the Minister has pointed is this one senator being found with connections with a country.

Those things in the normal course of our security operation, we can identify already. Do we need an extra law?

Secondly, is that Minister talked about the Indian electric infrastructure and all that? Similarly, our healthcare system data was compromised some years ago. Is FICA needed before we can prevent all these things? Or even with FICA, are we going to be able to prevent these kind of events? Minister, please.

Mr K Shanmugam: Sir, I do not intend to keep repeating my opening speech. I think Mr Leong has got to, I would suggest he goes and listen again or reads and the answers are all there. And it is not just one senator. I suggest he read some material that has been given. Thank you, Sir.

Mr Speaker: Mr Leon Perera.

Mr Leong Mun Wai: Minister, Mr Speaker —

Mr Speaker: Mr Leong, I called Mr Leon Perera.

Mr Leong Mun Wai: Mr Speaker, Sir.

Mr Speaker: You could wait your turn.

Mr Leong Mun Wai: Minister did not answer my question. I asked a question.

Mr Speaker: Mr Leong. I called Mr Leon Perera. Kindly sit down.

Mr Leong Mun Wai: Okay, he did not answer my question.

Mr Speaker: Nor did you answer his questions when he asked you earlier.

Mr Leong Mun Wai: No, but I can ask —

Mr Speaker: You can sit down now, I will call you again later. Thank you.

Mr Leon Perera: Thank you, Mr Speaker, Sir. I know the hour is late, I will try and keep it short.

Mr Speaker: It is late.

Mr Leon Perera: Four supplementary questions. The first two are actually related to my speech and I do not think the Minister answered them, that is, unless I missed them. The first one is the subject of a Part 3 Direction or POL declaration can apply within a 30-day timeframe to the Minister for an appeal for reconsideration. But does the Minister have a timeframe within which he must respond on that; so, would the Minister commit to that?

The second question is relating to clause 93, those who are designated as PSPs or PSEs issued directives on the Parts 5 and 6 may only appeal against that decision to the Minister. They have no right to appeal to the Tribunal, I believe, unlike those who are issued Part 3 Directions. So, what is the basis for that?

The third question is in relation to what the Minister mentioned about my speech and speeches that I have made over the years. He talked about the trust deficit in countries like the UK and the US which have things like ombudsman and Freedom of Information Act, and so on and so forth. I would like to ask the Minister, would he agree that perhaps the trust deficit in the UK, the US and other countries which have those kinds of institutions that he is referring to may not be because of those institutions. It could be for other factors. And would he not agree that maybe if we took some of the kind of laws that we have in Singapore and applied it to those countries, it may not necessarily increase trust in those countries? And would he not agree that perhaps in Singapore, if we put in place laws a little bit more balanced, along the lines that we have argued today in Parliament, that might possibly increase the trust levels that we have here, even though those trust levels, you think are high. So, that is sort of the third question.

The fourth question and the last one, is on the part of my speech where I talked about who checks the checkers. I think it is a big subject. Essentially, I asked what recourse does a concerned citizen have in Singapore if they feel that very senior officials – Prime Minister, Minister of Home Affairs himself – has been suborned by a foreign power? What is their channel to redress that, to have that addressed? As far as I could discern, the Minister responded by saying that the form of redress would be the same as it is in other countries, which is through other people. So, actually, I would like to put this back to the Minister and say that in the spirit of coming to Parliament, not with rhetoric, but with concrete and practical solutions, could you expand on really what is the redress in that kind of scenario, very practically speaking?

Mr K Shanmugam: First, on the first four questions. On the first question, 30 days and whether there will be a time limit. It is difficult to commit to a time limit for the Minister to respond, simply because it depends on the facts and the kind of evidence that needs to be assessed. But what we can commit to is that it will be done as expeditiously as possible. On the stepped-up measures, I explained it in my speech, I responded.

On the trust levels, I think finally we are beginning to get to some sort of narrowing of the gap. So, let us agree, you have all these institutions, Freedom of Information and the kind of media that they have and the ombudsman, does not automatically mean trust levels go up. In fact, trust levels have been declining. It may be because of other problems. And I think there is a kernel of accuracy in what Mr Perera said. And the kernel that I extract is this: each country has got to look at its own situation and decide what works for it.

A country like China with 5,000 years and a single race – different considerations. A country like the US – different considerations. A country like Singapore with 700 square kilometres – different consideration. I think if we can agree on that and that therefore, we need to factor in what works for us, then the next question is, why have trust levels been so high in Singapore? They are very high. Why have they been high? There is a trust based on performance. There is a trust based on probity. There is a trust based on how leaders behave. There is a trust based on how powers are exercised.

So, anytime there is abuse, there is corruption, there is lack of probity, there is a performance deficit, trust will dissipate. I believe in Singapore, it will dissipate very quickly because we are such a small place, everyone understands everything pretty much in broad terms.

Whether bringing in some of these institutions will add to trust is a conversation we can have as long as it is not a priori argument: if you have it, trust will increase. That is just not true. You have to ask, is it really going to? Why? Why do you say that? Or is it actually going to affect the performance of the Government in such a way that actually trust will go down?

Finally, who checks the checkers. I think Mr Perera must be aware the CPIB can investigate anyone including the Prime Minister. When the CPIB wants to investigate the Prime Minister, there is a higher authority they report to, independently. The CPIB can investigate me and any Minister. And the man who was considered – or Mr Lee Kuan Yew had publicly said, "Where will I get another Teh Cheang Wan?" because he solved the housing crisis.

If you were to consider one of the inner core of Ministers, Mr Teh Cheang Wan would have been in the inner core of Ministers. Powerful, heavyweight Minister. What happened when there were allegations? Mr Lee Kuan Yew told him, when Mr Teh wanted to see him, "I am not speaking with you. Let the CPIB investigate." That is Singapore. That is why our trust levels are high. [Applause.]

Mr Speaker: Mr Leong.

Mr Leong Mun Wai: Thank you, Speaker. I want to ask the Minister, is he going to answer my question on the appointment of the Tribunal?

Mr Speaker: Minister.

Mr K Shanmugam: Sir, the position is clear. When the law says "on the recommendation or advice of the Cabinet", then the President acts in accordance with the advice given by Cabinet.

The point I made is that the High Court Judge who will head the tribunal is independent, has security of tenure, is someone whose job is in the Supreme Court. And his primary appointment, the first appointment is approved by the President. So, let us get that clear. Thank you, Sir.

10.17 pm

Mr Speaker: The question is, that the Bill be now read a Second time. As many as are of that opinion, say "Aye".

Hon Members said "Aye".

Mr Speaker: To the contrary say "No".

Some hon Members said "No".

Mr Speaker: Leader of Opposition.

Mr Pritam Singh: Sir, I would like to call for a Division, please.

Mr Speaker: Would you like to record a dissent instead?

Mr Pritam Singh: No, Sir, I would like to call for a Division. Thank you.

Mr Speaker: The "Ayes" have it. Will the hon Members who support the Division please rise in their places?

More than five hon Members rose.

Mr Speaker: Clerk, ring the Division bells.

After two minutes –

Mr Speaker: Serjeant-at-Arms, lock the doors.

Question put, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."

Mr Speaker: Leader of Opposition, you have claimed a Division, would you like to proceed with the Division?

Mr Pritam Singh: Yes, Sir.

Mr Speaker: Take a Division. The Clerk will call the names of Members to indicate their votes in the order based on the current seating arrangement. When called upon, Members are to stand up, raise your vote cards in my direction to indicate their votes. The Clerk will repeat each Member's vote for confirmation. If the vote read is not according to their vote indication, Members should inform me immediately to have the correct vote recorded.

The Clerk will now proceed to record the votes.

Whereupon the vote of each hon Member present was indicated and read aloud for confirmation.

Mr Speaker: There are 75 "Ayes", 11 "Noes" and two "Abstentions". The "Ayes" have it.

Bill accordingly read a Second time.

Mr Speaker: The Bill has now been read a second time. Before I call on the Minister for Home Affairs, there is an issue that I feel compelled to have to clarify – rather reluctant to have to address Parliament at this time of the night.

Mr Leong has asked me to refer the Bill to a Select Committee under Standing Order No 68. Standing Order No 68 requires me to refer a Bill to a Select Committee if I am of the opinion that it is a hybrid Bill. A hybrid Bill is one that prejudicially affects individual rights and interests.

Some of you will recall, as an example, the Kwong-Wai-Shiu Free Hospital (Transfer of Undertaking and Dissolution) Bill in 2016, which specifically affected the Kwong Wai Shiu Hospital. The Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Bill now before the House applies to the public at large and does not specifically apply to an individual. It is therefore, not a hybrid Bill and Standing Order No 68 does not apply. I do not have such power as the Member would like to bestow upon me. Minister for Home Affairs.

The Minister for Home Affairs (Mr K Shanmugam): Mr Speaker, I intend to move amendments* to the Bill in the Committee Stage. The amendments have been distributed to the Members earlier on and as inadequate notice has been given of these amendments, I would like to seek Speaker's consent and the general assent of Members present to take these amendments in the Committee of the whole House.

Mr Speaker: I give my consent. Is it the pleasure of hon Members that the amendments be so taken?

Hon Members indicated assent.

Question put, that Parliament would immediately resolve itself into a Committee on the Bill, and agreed to.

The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill.

Bill considered in Committee.

[Mr Speaker in the Chair]

Clauses 1 to 7 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 8 –

The Chairman: There are two amendments. Mr Gerald Giam, you may wish to take them together.

Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song: Sir, I beg to move the two amendments* to clause 8 standing in my name, as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement. The reasons for the amendments have been explained in my speech earlier.

*The amendments read as follows:

(1) In page 29: to leave out lines 31 to 33.

(2) In page 30: to leave out lines 1 to 4.

Consequential amendment:

In page 29, line 30: to leave out “;” and insert “.”.

Question, put and amendments negatived.

Clause 8 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 9 to 13 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 14 –

The Chairman: There are two amendments to this clause standing in the name of Mr Gerald Giam and the Minister for Home Affairs. It may be convenient that the debate on amendments moved by Mr Gerald Giam and the Minister for Home Affairs be proceeded with simultaneously as though it is a debate on a single question. Do I have hon Members' agreement to this?

Hon Members indicated assent.

The Chairman: Mr Gerald Giam, please move your amendments.

Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song: Sir, I beg to move the two amendments* to clause 14 standing in my name, as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement. The reasons for the amendments have also been explained in my speech earlier.

Question proposed.

The Chairman: Minister for Home Affairs, please move your amendment.

Mr K Shanmugam: Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move, in page 42, after line 19: to insert – "(f) A member of the executive committee or similar governing body and political party, whether or not he or she is also a responsible officer of that political party (called in this Act a senior political party official);".

Sir, I have given my reasons earlier and do not propose to repeat them.

The Chairman: The question is as proposed by Minister for Home Affairs. Members may debate on both amendments simultaneously.

We have now come to the conclusion of debate. I shall put the necessary questions to the House for decision. We will first deal with Mr Gerald Giam's amendments to clause 14. The question is that the amendments as proposed by Mr Gerald Giam be made.

Question put, and amendments negatived.

The Chairman: We will now deal with the Minister's proposed amendment. The question is that the amendment as proposed by the Minister for Home Affairs be made.

Question put, and agreed to.

Clause 14, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 15 and 16 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17 –

The Chairman: There are five amendments. Assoc Prof Jamus Lim, you may wish to take them together.

Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim: Sir, I beg to move the five amendments* to clause 17 standing in my name, as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement. The reasons have been outlined in my speech earlier.

*The amendments read as follows:

(1) In page 44, lines 25, 27 and 29: to leave out “or is likely to be”.

(2) In page 45, line 1: to leave out “or is likely to incite”.

(3) In page 45, line 5: to leave out “or is likely to diminish”.

(4) In page 45, line 10: to leave out “or is likely to be”.

(5) In page 45: to leave out lines 18 and 19.

Consequential amendments:

(1) In page 45, line 17: to leave out “—”.

(2) In page 45, line 20: to leave out “(b)”.

Question put, and amendments negatived.

Clause 17 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 18 –

The Chairman: There are four amendments. Assoc Prof Jamus Lim, you may wish to take them together.

Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim: Sir, I beg to move the six amendments to clause 18 standing in my name, as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement. The reasons have been outlined in my speech earlier.

The Chairman: You have four amendments, rather than six.

Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim: Excuse me, I stand corrected. I beg to move the four amendments* to clause 18 standing in my name, as indicated in the Oder Paper Supplement. The reasons have been outlined in my speech earlier as well.

*The amendments read as follows:

(1) In page 46, line 17, 19, 21 and 32: to leave out “or is likely to be”.

(2) In page 46, line 23: to leave out “or is likely to incite”.

(3) In page 46, line 27: to leave out “or is likely to diminish”.

(4) In page 47: to leave out lines 4 and 5.

Consequential amendments:

(1) In page 47, line 3: to leave out “—”.

(2) In page 47, line 6: to leave out “(b)”.

Question put, and amendments negatived.

Clause 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 19 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 20 –

The Chairman: Assoc Prof Jamus Lim.

Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim: Sir, I beg to move the one amendment* to clause 20 standing in my name, as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement. The reasons have been outlined in my speech earlier.

*The amendment read as follows:

In page 49, lines 3 and 4: to leave out “, or is suspected of being or having been undertaken,”.

Question put, and amendment negatived.

Clause 20 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 21 –

The Chairman: There are three amendments. Assoc Prof Jamus Lim, you may wish to take them together.

Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim: Sir, I beg to move the three amendments* to clause 21 standing in my name, as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement. The reasons have been outlined in my speech earlier.

*The amendments read as follows:

(1) In page 49, line 21: to leave out “suspects or has reason to believe”, and insert “has evidence or actionable intelligence indicating”.

(2) In page 50, line 1: to leave out “reason to believe” and insert “evidence or actionable intelligence indicating”.

(3) In page 50, lines 4 and 5: to leave out “is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to authorise the giving of the anticipatory direction” and insert “has evidence or actionable intelligence indicating that withholding the anticipatory direction presents a real risk to the public interest”.

Question put, and amendments negatived.

Clause 21 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 22 to 39 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 40 –

The Chairman: There are four amendments. Assoc Prof Jamus Lim, you may wish to take them together.

Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim: Sir, I beg to move the four amendments* to clause 40 standing in my name, as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement. As before, the explanations were provided in my speech earlier.

*The amendments read as follows:

(1) In page 69, lines 26, 28 and 30: to leave out “or is likely to be”.

(2) In page 69, line 32: to leave out “or is likely to incite”.

(3) In page 70, line 3: to leave out “or is likely to diminish”.

(4) In page 70, line 8: to leave out “or is likely to be”.

Question put, and amendments negatived.

Clause 40 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 41 to 46 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 47 –

The Chairman: Mr Leon Perera.

Mr Leon Perera: Sir, I beg to move the amendment* to clause 47 standing in my name, in the Order Paper Supplement. The reason for this amendment was given earlier in my speech.

*The amendment read as follows:

In page 80: after line 21, to insert —

“(6) Any entity designated a politically significant entity shall be listed along with reasons for designation on a registry that is provided free-of-charge and easily accessible to the public through electronic means unless the competent authority considers it not practicable or desirable to do so on national security grounds.”.

Question put, and amendment negatived.

Clause 47 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Mr K Shanmugam: A point of order, Sir. On clause 47, we agreed in principle to part of the stepped-up countermeasures on PSPs, the Transparency Directives, all except the TAD. And our position is that the proper place to do this, without affecting the coherence of the Bill, is to amend clause 116. Members would be aware that under clause 116, the Competent Authority is empowered to make transparent his or her decisions regarding designating of PSPs.

So, if any amendment is to be made to require that as a matter of course as opposed to discretion, the amendment to the Bill should be to clause 116.

So, while we agree in principle to part of it, we propose to reject the amendment proposed to clause 47 but we will reflect it later at clause 116. I just wanted to have that recorded.

The Chairman: We will put this on record.

Clause 48 –

The Chairman: There are two amendments. Mr Leon Perera, you may wish to take them together.

Mr Leon Perera: Sir, I beg to move the two amendments* to clause 48 standing in my name, in the Order Paper Supplement. The reasons were given in my speech earlier.

*The amendments read as follows:

(1) In page 81, line 1: after “authority’s”, to insert “reasonable”.

(2) In page 82: after line 12, to insert —

“(6) Any person designated a politically significant person shall be listed along with the reasons for designation on a registry that is provided free-of-charge and easily accessible to the public through electronic means unless —

(a) the person is not a politically significant person under this Act; or

(b) the competent authority considers it not practicable or desirable to do so on national security grounds.”.

Question put, and amendments negatived.

Clause 48 ordered to stand as part of the Bill.

Clauses 49 and 50 inclusive ordered to stand as part of the Bill.

Clause 51 –

The Chairman: Minister, you have four amendments to clause 51, please move your amendments.

Mr K Shanmugam: Sir, thank you. I beg to move, the first amendment, that in page 86, line 19: "after in relation to", to insert "a senior political party official or".

The second amendment, in page 86, line 22: after "lent to", to insert "the senior political party official or".

The third amendment, in page 86, line 27: after "benefit of", to insert "the senior political party official or".

And the fourth amendment, in page 86, line 29: after "used by", to insert "the senior political party official or".

Sir, these amendments are consequential to amendments to clause 14 to include "members of the central executive committee of political parties or equivalent".

Question put, and agreed to."

Clause 51, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 52 to 57 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 58 –

The Chairman: Minister, you have an amendment to clause 58. Please move your amendment.

Mr K Shanmugam: Sir, I beg to move, that in page 96, line 28: after the phrase "political office holder", to insert "a senior political party official". These are consequential to the amendments we have made to clause 14.

Question put, and agreed to.

Clause 58, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 59 to 61 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 62 –

The Chairman: Minister, you have an amendment to clause 62. Please move your amendment.

Mr K Shanmugam: Sir, I beg to move, that in page 105, line 9: after "political office holder", to insert "a senior political party official".

Question put, and agreed to.

Clause 62, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 63 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 64 –

The Chairman: Minister, you have an amendment to clause 64. Please move your amendment.

Mr K Shanmugam: Sir, I beg to move, that in page 108, line 2: after "who is", to insert "a senior political party official or is".

Question put, and agreed to.

Clause 64, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 65 –

The Chairman: Minister, you have an amendment to clause 65. Please move your amendment.

Mr K Shanmugam: Sir, I beg to move, that in page 108, line 14: after "subsection (2)", to insert "or (3)".

Question put, and agreed to.

Clause 65, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 66 –

The Chairman: Minister, you have two amendments to clause 66. Please move your amendments.

Mr K Shanmugam: Sir, I beg to move, that, the first amendment in page 110, line 19: to leave out the word "or".

The second amendment in page 110, after line 19: to insert – "(f) a senior political party official of a political party; or".

Question put, and agreed to.

Clause 66, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 67 to 70 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 71 –

The Chairman: Minister, you have an amendment to clause 71. Please move your amendment.

Mr K Shanmugam: Sir, I beg to move, that in page 115, line 18: to leave out "section 89", and to insert "sections 89 and 116".

Question put, and agreed to.

Clause 71, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 72 to 74 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 75 –

The Chairman: Clause 75. Assoc Prof Jamus Lim.

Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim: Sir, I beg to move the amendment* to clause 75 standing in my name as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement. The reasons have been provided in my speech earlier on.

*The amendment read as follows:

In page 119, lines 25 and 26: to leave out "or is likely to facilitate".

Question put, and amendment negatived.

Clause 75 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 76 and 77 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 78 –

The Chairman: Clause 78. There are two amendments to this clause standing in the names of Mr Gerald Giam and Mr Leon Perera. It may be convenient that the debate on the amendments moved by Mr Gerald Giam and Mr Leon Perera be proceeded with simultaneously as a debate on a single question. Do I have hon Members' agreement to this?

Hon Members indicated assent.

The Chairman: Mr Gerald Giam, please move your amendment.

Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song: Sir, I beg to move that the two amendments* to clause 78 standing in my name as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement. Reasons for the amendments have been explained in my speech earlier.

*The amendments read as follows:

In page 126: after line 9, to insert —

"(f) a member of the central executive council, or its equivalent, of any registered political party in Singapore;

(g) a senior public servant holding the office of deputy secretary or above, or its equivalent;

(h) a board member or chief executive of a key statutory board or government company listed on the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore,".

Consequential amendment:

In page 126, line 9: to leave out "," and insert";".

The Chairman: Mr Leon Perera, please move your amendment.

Mr Leon Perera: Sir, I beg to move that the amendment* to clause 78 standing in my name in the Order Paper Supplement for the reasons provided in my speech earlier.

*The amendment read as follows:

In page 127: after line 26, to insert —

"(7) A list of reportable arrangements under this shall be made publicly available by the competent authority in accordance with section 81 of this Act.".

The Chairman: Members may debate on both amendments simultaneously.

We have now come to the conclusion of the debate. I shall put the necessary questions to the House for a decision. We will first deal with Mr Gerald Giam's amendments to clause 78.

Mr K Shanmugam: Sir, can I put on record?

The Chairman: Yes.

Mr K Shanmugam: Sir, as earlier mentioned, we have no issue with Mr Giam's proposal to include members of the CEC or equivalent of any registered political party. And I have given my views on the other amendments. I have also given my views on Mr Perera's amendments.

The Chairman: Duly noted. Let me repeat this. We have now come to the conclusion of the debate. I shall put the necessary questions to the House for a decision. We will first deal with Mr Gerald's Giam amendments to clause 78.

Question put, and amendments negatived.

The Chairman: We will now deal with Mr Leon Perera's proposed amendment.

Question put, and amendment negatived.

Clause 78 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 79 –

The Chairman: Clause 79. Mr Leon Perera.

Mr Leon Perera: Sir, I beg to move that the amendment* to clause 79 standing in my name in the Order Paper Supplement for the reasons given earlier in my speech.

*The amendment read as follows:

In page 129: after line 2, to insert —

"(5) A registry of the persons with declared involvement in a foreign policy organisation shall be made publicly available by the competent authority, together with the terms of these relationships, in accordance with section 81 of this Act.".

Question put, and amendment negatived.

Clause 79 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 80 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 81 –

The Chairman: Clause 81. Mr Leon Perera.

Mr Leon Perera: Mr Speaker, Sir, with your permission, I would like to withdraw the amendments* standing in my name in the Order Paper Supplement to clauses 81, 84 and 85.

And I also seek your permission to speak very briefly on the reasons for the same.

*The amendments read as follows:

Clause 81:

In page 132: after line 9, to insert —

"(4) All transparency directives, directive modifications, directive cancellations, disclosures, reports and explanations for these decisions shall be made publicly available by the competent authority over the internet in a searchable, sortable and downloadable manner without charge."

Clause 84:

In page 133: after line 29, to insert —

"(3) Any directive to a Part 4 politically significant entity, the suspension, modification or cancellation of the directive, and explanations for these decisions under this section shall be made publicly available in accordance with section 81 of this Act."

Clause 85:

In page 135: after line 30, to insert —

"(7) Any directive to a politically significant person, the suspension, modification or cancellation of the directive and explanations for these decisions under this section shall be made publicly available in accordance with section 81 of this Act."

The Chairman: Mr Leon Perera, you would like to speak on this?

Mr Leon Perera: Yes, briefly.

The Chairman: Yes, please do.

Mr Leon Perera: Mr Speaker, Sir, I would like to withdraw the amendments to clauses 81, 84 and 85, in light of the Minister for Home Affairs' proposed amendments that he had tabled to clause 116.

The Minister earlier on verbally referred to that amendment and in the expectation that the House will pass the amendment to clause 116 that the Minister for Home Affairs has proposed which, in my opinion will substantively cover the same ground as covered by my amendments to clauses 81, 84 and 85, I would like to withdraw those three amendments with the proviso of this comment that in relation to Technical Assistance Directives, the Minister shared that these are difficult to publicise due to the sensitivity of investigations being ongoing.

I would like to ask if the Minister and the Government will give due consideration to this as time goes by to consider perhaps the delayed publication of such actions at the point when it no longer compromises an ongoing investigation.

So, that is just something I would like to express but my intention here today is withdraw my amendments to clauses 81, 84 and 85 in my name in the Order Paper Supplement, for the reasons I have given.

Amendments withdrawn.

Clauses 81 to 91 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 92 to 103 –

The Chairman: Clauses 92 to 103. Ms He Ting Ru.

Ms He Ting Ru: Sir, I beg to move the amendment* to clauses 92 to 103 standing in my name as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement for the reasons explained in my speech earlier.

*The amendment read as follows:

In page 144: to leave out line 19, to the end of line 26 in page 151.

Question put, and amendment negatived.

Clauses 92 to 103 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 104 –

The Chairman: Clause 104. Ms He Ting Ru.

Ms He Ting Ru: Sir, I beg to move the amendment* to clause 104 standing in my name as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement for the reasons explained in my speech earlier.

*The amendment reads as follows:

In page 151: to leave out line 27 to the end of line 13 in page 152, and insert —

"Appeals to High Court

92.— (1) Any person who is subject to a determination, order or any other decision under this Act may appeal to the High Court against such a determination, order or decision.

(2) No appeal may be made to the High Court by any person unless the person has first appealed to, or sought reconsideration from the Minister or the alternate authority mentioned in section 106, made or purportedly made under this Act and the appeal is first refused whether in whole or in part.

(3) An appeal may only be made to the High Court within such a period as may be prescribed by the Rules of Court.

(4) The High Court must hear and determine any such appeal and may either confirm the determination, order or decision or set it aside.

(5) A determination, order or any other decision that is the subject of the appeal in subsection (1) remains in effect despite the appeal, and only ceases to have effect if it is set aside by the High Court, or if it expires or is cancelled under the provisions of this Act.

(6) There is such further right of appeal from a decision of the High Court under this section as exists in the case of a decision made by that Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.

(7) The Rules of Court may provide for the manner in which and the time within which an appeal under subsection (1) may be made and the procedure for an application to stay a determination, an order or any other decision appealed against.

(8) The High Court may order that the whole or any part of any appeal heard under this Act shall be dealt with in camera if it is satisfied that it is expedient in the interests of justice or of public safety or security to do so."

Consequential amendments:

(1) In page 20: to leave out lines 9 and 10.

(2) In page 152, from line 15: to re-number clauses 105 to 127 as clauses 93 to 115, respectively.

(3) In page 167: to leave out lines 25 to 29.

Question put, and amendment negatived.

Clause 104 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 105 to 115 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill.

The Chairman: Minister, you have three amendments to clause 116. Please move your amendments.

Mr K Shanmugam: Sir, I beg to move, that, the first amendment in page 165, line 28: to leave out "section 49", and insert "sections 49 and 71 (2)".

The second amendment in page 165, lines 28, 29 and 30: to leave out "may prepare a notice informing about any designation made under Part 4, or any", and to insert "must prepare a notice informing about every Part 3 direction (except that technical assistance direction) given, every designation made under Part 4, or every".

The third amendment in page 166, line 3: after "fact of", to insert "the giving of Part 3 direction,".

Sir, I have explained it. I have also noted Mr Perera's request for the Government to consider on Technical Assistance Directions. That will be considered carefully.

Question put, and agreed to.

Clause 116, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 117 to 119 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 120 –

The Chairman: Clause 120. Assoc Prof Jamus Lim.

Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim: Sir, I beg to move the amendment* to clause 120 standing in my name, as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement, the reasons for which have been provided earlier in my speech.

*The amendment read as follows:

In page 169: after line 15, to insert —

“(i) an activity undertaken by Singaporeans to exercise their right to discuss politics by expressing their own views on political matters, unless they are agents of a foreign principal;

(j) an activity undertaken by foreign individuals or foreign publications reporting or commenting on Singapore politics, in an open, transparent and attributable way, even if their comments may be critical of Singapore or the Government.”

Consequential amendment:

In page 169, line 15: to leave out “.” and insert “;”

Question put, and amendment negatived.

Clause 120 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 121 to 127 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill.

The Schedule ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Bill considered in Committee, reported with amendments.

Mr Speaker: Minister for Home Affairs.

Mr K Shanmugam: Sir, I beg to report that the Bill has been considered in Committee and agreed to with amendments.

Mr Speaker: Third Reading, what day?

Mr K Shanmugam: Now, Sir. I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a third time.

Mr Speaker: The question is, that the Bill be now read a Third time. As many as are of that opinion, say "Aye".

Hon Members said "Aye".

Mr Speaker: Mr Pritam Singh.

Mr Pritam Singh: Mr Speaker, Sir, I would like to call for a Division.

Mr Speaker: Would you like to record your dissent?

Mr Pritam Singh: Sir, I call for a Division.

Mr Speaker: Will the hon Members in support of the Division, please rise in their places?

More than five hon Members rose.

Mr Speaker: Clerk, ring the Division bells.

After two minutes –

Mr Speaker: Serjeant-at-Arms, lock the doors.

Question put, "That the Bill be now read a Third time."

Mr Speaker: Leader of the Opposition, you have claimed a Division. Would you like to proceed with the Division.

Mr Pritam Singh: Yes, Sir.

Mr Speaker: Take a Division. The Clerk will call the names of Members to indicate their votes in the order based on their current seating arrangement. When called upon, Members are to stand up and raise their vote cards in my direction to indicate their votes. The Clerk will repeat each Member's vote for confirmation. If the vote read is not according to their vote indication, Members should inform me immediately to have their correct vote recorded.

The Clerk will now proceed to record the votes.

Whereupon, the vote of each hon Member present was indicated and read aloud for confirmation.

Mr Speaker: There are 75 "Ayes", 11 "Noes", two "Abstentions". The "Ayes" have it.

Bill accordingly read a Third time and passed.