Registration of Criminals (Amendment) Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

3.45 pm

The Minister of State for Home Affairs (Ms Sun Xueling) (for the Minister for Home Affairs): Mr Speaker, on behalf of the Minister for Home Affairs, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a second time."

Singapore is one of the safest cities in the world. In the 2020 Gallup Global Law and Order Report, 97% of Singapore residents feel safe walking alone on the streets at night. This is significantly higher than the global average of 69%. In 2021, Singapore's overall crime rate was 355 cases per 100,000 population excluding cyber crimes. This is very low compared to other major cities, such as Sydney, London and New York.

To ensure that Singaporeans continue to enjoy high levels of safety and security, we should ensure that our crime fighting capabilities are cutting edge, and that Police have access to useful tools to detect and solve crime. One such tool is DNA profiling.

In 2002, a 12-year-old schoolgirl was raped but the identity of the suspect could not be established at the time. Twelve years later in 2014, a man was arrested for alleged theft and a blood sample was collected from him. Through the DNA profiling of his blood sample, Police discovered that his DNA profile matched the one found at the rape crime scene in 2002. The rapist was charged and sentenced to 16.5 years' imprisonment and 18 strokes of the cane. This is the usefulness of DNA profiling.

This Bill, therefore, seeks to enhance the Police's capabilities to solve crime, using DNA evidence.

In the course of Police investigations, the Police may collect samples at the crime scene. These crime scene samples will be analysed to obtain DNA profiles which will be compared against profiles in the Police's DNA database. In 2021, the number of matches to DNA profiles derived from crime scene samples was about 800. However, a large proportion of Police's crime scene samples, approximately 60% of crime scene samples collected between 2017 and 2021, were unmatched when screened against our DNA database. We should expand the Police's DNA database to bolster their ability to solve crimes.

Fingerprints and DNA are unique to an individual, except for identical twins who share the same DNA. Fingerprint matching and DNA profiling can help the Police identify and place a particular individual at the crime scene or exonerate the individual. Fingerprint matching suffers at times from the inability to lift a complete fingerprint at the crime scene. DNA profiling, on the other hand, is not limited to one source as DNA information may be derived from minute amounts of body samples such as saliva, sweat or blood droplets.

DNA profiling is thus a useful and well-established forensic tool, and is widely used by law enforcement agencies worldwide to solve crimes. According to the INTERPOL Global DNA Profiling Survey, about 70% of the member countries which responded to the survey reported using DNA profiling in police investigations and at least 70 countries have a DNA database. The United Kingdom started to use DNA profiling in criminal investigations in the 1980s and established a national DNA database in 1995.

Apart from the rape case in 2002, several cases, including cold cases, have been solved, both locally and overseas, through DNA profiling. For instance, between 1986 and 1991, 10 women were killed in Hwaseong, Korea. A man was sentenced to life imprisonment. Almost 30 years later in 2019, through DNA analysis of crime scene samples, police eventually identified the real killer and the innocent man was exonerated.

DNA profiling is an effective tool to help the Police solve crimes, by identifying possible suspects accurately and quickly, and exonerating the innocent. But the effectiveness of this forensic tool in criminal investigations depends, in large part, on the size of the Police's DNA database. A larger database means a higher chance of obtaining a match. Conversely, a smaller pool of DNA data would be less effective in helping the Police solve crimes.

If we want our laws to be enforced effectively and to continue to enjoy a high level of safety and security in our daily lives, our law enforcement agencies must be provided with as many forensic tools as reasonably possible. We may have Police cameras in many public places today, but they do not cover the scenes of all crimes, for example, if they take place in homes or other private areas. Similarly, other forensic tools which the Police already have, may be able to help solve some but not all the crimes.

I will now describe the amendments we are looking to make, to enhance the effectiveness of DNA profiling as a tool to help the Police solve crimes. This Bill amends the Registration of Criminals Act 1949 in the following ways: (a) expand the scope for the collection of DNA information and other identifying information; (b) expand the prescribed uses of DNA information; (c) strengthen the protection of DNA information; and (d) introduce procedures to allow the removal of information in the databases.

First, on expanding the scope of collection of DNA information and other identifying information. "DNA information" is defined in the Act to refer to genetic information derived from the forensic DNA analysis of a body sample. "Identifying information" will be defined to refer to other information that can help identify an individual, including fingerprints, photographs and descriptions of the individual such as sex and age.

We will expand the scope of crimes eligible for the collection of DNA information and identifying information. Clause 6 repeals and re-enacts part 3 of the Act to provide for the collection of DNA information and identifying information from individuals involved in two categories of offences: registrable crimes and eligible crimes.

Registrable crimes are crimes that are currently included in the First or Second Schedule to the Registration of Criminals Act. These are usually more serious crimes, such as murder, rape and robbery. An individual who is convicted of a registrable crime will have a criminal record. Today, Police can only take fingerprints and body samples from an individual who is accused of, convicted of, or imprisoned for a registrable crime.

Our statistics show that about one in three individuals convicted of a registrable crime between 2017 and 2021, had been previously convicted of a non-registrable crime. If we had been able to collect DNA and identifying information from these individuals when they were convicted of a non-registrable crime, we might have been able to identify them a lot more swiftly, when they later re-offended and committed the registrable crime.

Other countries collect DNA information for a far broader scope of offences. For example, South Australia collects DNA information for all imprisonable offences. England collects DNA information for imprisonable offences and some non-imprisonable offences.

Therefore, we propose to expand the scope of crimes eligible for the collection of DNA information and identifying information, to include non-registrable crimes which fulfil two criteria.

One, they are punishable with imprisonment; and two, they are not compoundable under any written law, unless the offence is specified in the third column of the Fourth Schedule to the Criminal Procedure Code 2010. This will be defined as an "eligible crime" and will be inserted into the Act by clause 2(d) of the Bill. Eligible crimes are, therefore, the more serious crimes, and will not include minor offences such as littering and illegal parking. Individuals who commit eligible crimes may have their DNA information and fingerprints taken, but will continue to not have any criminal record as such crimes are not registrable. Examples of eligible crimes include voluntarily causing hurt and affray. We will not collect DNA information and fingerprints from individuals involved in minor offences, such as littering and illegal parking.

We will also expand the scope of collection for persons dealt with under the Internal Security Act 1960 (ISA). Currently, we can only collect fingerprints from individuals who are arrested or detained under the ISA. We cannot collect their DNA information. We also cannot collect DNA information and fingerprints of those who are not arrested and are only served with a restriction order. Clause 6 will insert new sections 13 and 22 to allow the collection of DNA information and identifying information from individuals who are arrested, detained or served with a restriction order, under the ISA.

In England, South Australia and the Netherlands, any individual can voluntarily provide his body samples for forensic DNA analysis. Clause 6 will insert new sections 14 and 23 to allow any individual to voluntarily provide his DNA information and identifying information to the Police to assist in investigations. Clause 6 will also insert new sections 37 and 38 to specify that volunteers who have provided their information, may apply to the Police to remove their information from the databases at any time and the Police must do so.

We will also make it clear that it is an offence for an individual who refuses, without reasonable excuse, to provide a body sample and introduce a new offence for a parent or guardian of an individual below 16 years of age to withhold consent, without reasonable excuse, for an invasive sample to be taken from the individual.

To complement these expanded powers for the collection of DNA information, we will make it clear that any person who unreasonably refuses to provide a body sample, including a blood sample, commits an offence. Generally, a person provides his DNA information through providing a body sample, such as buccal sample or hair sample, or a blood sample. Blood samples are generally preferred to other samples, as they are more likely to yield a high quality DNA profile, that can be reliably used to obtain a valid DNA match downstream. More than 99% of the body samples that are taken today are blood samples.

How do we take a blood sample? Before taking a blood sample, a DNA officer must ensure that the taking of the blood sample does not endanger the individual and the DNA officer will obtain the consent of the individual. Thereafter, the officer will prick the individual's fingertip to obtain a small sample of blood. If the individual has a reasonable excuse to refuse the taking of his blood sample, for example, he suffers from a blood disorder such as haemophilia, the Police will not take his blood sample and will take other body samples from him instead.

Currently, if an individual refuses, without reasonable excuse, to allow his fingerprints or a body sample to be taken, he is guilty of an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $1,000, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month, or both. If he refuses to provide a blood sample, he may be taken before a Magistrate, who may order him to provide the sample. A negative inference may also be drawn against him in court, in criminal proceedings.

The amended Bill will no longer require the individual to be brought before a Magistrate before he may be liable for an offence. The new section 27 will make it clear that a person who refuses without reasonable excuse to provide a body sample, including a blood sample, commits an offence. We will also make it an offence for a parent or guardian of an individual under 16 years of age to withhold consent, without reasonable excuse, for an invasive sample to be taken from that individual.

Currently, DNA information stored in the DNA database may be used for a few purposes: (a) forensic comparison with any other DNA information in the course of Police investigations into an offence; (b) comparison with DNA information in the DNA database established under other Acts; (c) proceedings for any offence; and (d) administering the DNA database.

Clause 6 inserts a new section 32 to expand the prescribed uses of DNA information to three new categories that are in the public interest. They are: (a) investigation or inquiry into a death; (b) identifying a dead individual; and (c) identifying an individual in order to provide Police assistance to the individual.

Next, Clause 10 amends section 13I, which will be renumbered to section 47 by clause 9, to give the Police the discretion to share DNA information of an individual convicted of a registrable crime, with foreign law enforcement agencies for investigations and proceedings, where it is appropriate to do so. Before the information is shared, the foreign law enforcement agency will be required to undertake to safekeep the information, limit the use of the information to the specified purpose and comply with other conditions imposed by the Police.

We will legislate safeguards to protect the DNA information and identifying information stored in the databases. Access to the DNA database will be restricted to authorised officers, every access to the database will be recorded and we will provide for an audit trail.

Clause 12 will amend section 14A, which will be renumbered to section 49 by clause 9, to empower the Minister to make rules to introduce safeguards that the Registrar must implement to protect the information recorded in the databases against any loss, modification, or unauthorised access.

Where investigations reveal that a suspect is not involved in the commission of the crime, or where the suspect was arrested and detained under the ISA and investigations subsequently reveal that he had not acted in a manner prejudicial to the security of Singapore, his DNA information and fingerprints will continue to be automatically removed.

Individuals who are acquitted or given a discharge amounting to an acquittal by the Court and individuals who have their offences compounded, can apply to the Registrar for their information to be removed. Upon the individual's application, the Registrar will remove all DNA information and identifying information of the individual from the databases, unless it is relevant for any ongoing prosecution or investigation, or it is in the interests of the security of Singapore to retain the information. Any person who disagrees with the decision of the Registrar may appeal to a Reviewing Tribunal.

The above is provided for in the new Part 6, which introduces procedures to allow individuals to apply to the Registrar to remove their registrable particulars, identifying information and DNA information from the databases. This new Part 7 provides for the establishment of Reviewing Tribunals and for appeals against the Registrar's determination to be made to the Tribunal.

The application and appeal process is straightforward and simple. The individual may apply to the Registrar of Criminals to request for his information to be removed from the databases. Within 30 days of the application, the Registrar determines whether any of the following two grounds exist. One, the applicant's information is relevant to another ongoing prosecution or investigation. Or two, retaining the applicant's information is in the interests of the security of Singapore.

If none of these grounds exist, the Registrar will remove the applicant's information from the databases and notify the applicant that his application is successful, and that the information has been removed.

If any of the grounds exists, the Registrar will notify the applicant that his application is unsuccessful. The Registrar will state the ground for the rejection and the applicant may decide if he wishes to appeal to the Reviewing Tribunal.

If the applicant wishes to appeal to the Tribunal, he must do so within 30 days from the date of the notice of the Registrar's determination. The Reviewing Tribunal comprises a District Judge or Magistrate, who is appointed by the President on the advice of the Cabinet.

The Reviewing Tribunal can either confirm or revoke the decision appealed against. However, the Tribunal must dismiss an appeal if the Registrar presents a certificate issued by the Minister, certifying that the applicant's information was taken in relation to an offence under the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act 2021 or the Internal Security Act, and that it is in the interests of the security of Singapore to retain his information. Mr Speaker, Sir, in Mandarin, please.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] In the course of Police investigations, the Police may collect samples at the crime scene. These crime scene samples will be analysed to obtain DNA profiles which will be compared against profiles in the Police's DNA database. In 2021, the number of matches to DNA profiles derived from crime scene samples was about 800.

However, a large proportion of Police’s crime scene samples, approximately 60% of crime scene samples collected between 2017 and 2021, were unmatched when screened against our DNA database.

DNA profiling is an effective tool to help the Police solve crimes, by identifying possible suspects accurately and quickly, and exonerating the innocent. But the effectiveness of this forensic tool in criminal investigations depends, in large part, on the size of the Police’s DNA database. A larger database means a higher chance of obtaining a match. Conversely, a smaller pool of DNA data would be less effective in helping the Police solve crimes.

This Bill proposes four key amendments: first, expand the scope for the collection of DNA information and other identifying information; second, expand the prescribed uses of DNA information; third, strengthen the protection of DNA information; and fourth, introduce procedures to allow the removal of information in the databases.

The proposed amendments to the Registration of Criminals Act will enable law enforcement agencies to carry out their duties more effectively, to ensure the safety and security of Singapore, while balancing these expanded powers against individuals’ right to privacy.

(In English): In sum, the proposed amendments to the Registration of Criminals Act will enable law enforcement agencies to carry out their duties more effectively, to ensure the safety and security of Singapore, while balancing those expanded powers against individuals' right to privacy. Mr Speaker, I beg to move.

Question proposed.

Mr Speaker: Mr Pritam Singh.

4.07 pm

Mr Pritam Singh (Aljunied): Mr Speaker, this Bill seeks to enlarge the DNA database at the disposal of the Police by including less serious crimes under its ambit. Individuals under investigation for both registrable and less serious eligible crimes are expected to surrender their DNA to the Police. To the extent that this Bill is aimed at cracking cases and bringing criminals to justice, the Workers' Party supports the Bill. Apart from widening the scope of crimes that requires the surrender of one's DNA, the Bill also introduces procedures to allow for the removal of DNA information from the Police's DNA database and strengthens the protection of DNA and non-DNA identifying records. We also support these procedures.

However, I have concerns about the Bill and will seek clarifications later in my speech. In scrutinising the Bill, the Workers' Party reviewed the situation in other jurisdictions to better understand how DNA information is collected and utilised. In South Australia, for example, the offences covered under the Criminal Law Forensics Procedures Act 2007 includes all offences punishable by imprisonment, not dissimilar to our position but technically broader than the position taken in today's Bill, which excludes some offences punishable by imprisonment.

In the United Kingdom, under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, blood and other intimate samples, or what this Bill refers to as invasive samples, can only be taken with written consent without exception. This is a position that is less intrusive upon the rights of the individual than the one proposed by this Bill. However, non-intimate samples, which includes hair and swabs that would allow the collection of DNA, can be taken in the UK without consent if the person is under investigation for what is called a recordable offence. This appears to be a broader position than the one proposed under this Bill, as the meaning of a recordable offence is very wide and it may include offences not punishable by imprisonment.

In Japan, there is no specific statute governing from whom and under what circumstances DNA may be collected. But the Japanese authorities have adopted an approach to DNA collection that is one of the most aggressive in the world. By late 2019, the police in Japan had collected close to 1.3 million DNA samples, which covers about one in 100 of the Japanese population. Data released under Japanese information disclosure laws in late 2019 showed that those alleged to have committed serious crimes, such as murder, burglary and rape, accounted for only 4.8% of the DNA database. By contrast, DNA was collected for 210,000 persons suspected of violating the Road Traffic Law, the Swords and Firearm Law, the Immigration Control Law and the Minor Offence Law. This accounted for about 16% of the entire database. I should add that every DNA sample was collected only after the suspects gave consent to register their DNA information in the national police agency database.

Our review of other jurisdictions shows that there is no consensus as to the boundaries and ambit of DNA collection. But we can certainly pick out some useful points.

For Singapore, we need to ensure that our Bill suits our circumstances and protects our citizens. To that end, Sir, I seek four specific clarifications on the Bill. I will list them and then elaborate on each of them.

First, could the Minister elaborate how the secrecy of the DNA database will be ensured? Second, the proposed section 32(h) allows any information in the DNA database to be used for such purposes as may be prescribed. Could the Minister clarify whether the Government intends or foresees the use of DNA information for purposes other than for Police investigations into specific cases. And if not, will the Government undertake to return to this House to seek Parliamentary approval if the DNA database is to be used for non-investigation related purposes?

Third, could the Minister clarify what factors authorised officers would take into account in deciding whether to take DNA samples from those convicted of eligible crimes? Fourth, could the Minister tell us the cost of taking a DNA sample of an accused person or convicted individual.

Let me elaborate. First, the security of the DNA database. Sir, at its core, the surrender of personal DNA is significant. DNA data is not akin to non-DNA identifying information like fingerprints. For example, it is possible to use DNA information to create a profile of an individual by comparing their DNA data to a larger DNA sample size. This cannot be achieved with an existing register of fingerprints. Our DNA can tell a story or highlight predispositions that most people would not know about themselves.

For example, certain versions of a gene on the X chromosome that codes for monoamine oxidase enzyme (MAO) are associated with sensation-seeking and impulsive tendencies. Another example is the Per2 Gene which has been linked with advanced sleep phase syndrome that informs which individual is more predisposed to going to bed early and rising early, while Per3 is found in night owls.

Both these data points taken to the extreme can indicate the likelihood of possible criminal tendencies. In this era of big data, artificial intelligence and machine learning, the purposes for which the DNA information is collected becomes exceedingly important, something Parliament must scrupulously guard.

Seen in this context, the Bill envisages the surrender of private information for which the highest levels of security and access must be assured by the Government. Just a few years ago, in 2018, the personal information of some 1.5 million Singaporeans was hacked in the SingHealth cybersecurity breach, the worst publicly known cybersecurity incident in Singapore's history.

The Ministry's press release on the First Reading of this Bill dated 1 August states that all persons accessing the DNA database will have to be screened and authorised by the Police with all access logged and recorded, in addition to a tamper proof audit trail to detect data modification. Officers who misuse their powers will be dealt with severely.

With reference to the proposed section 49(1A), can the Minister confirm if the DNA database would be stored in a standalone computer or in systems that are linked to the Internet and therefore susceptible to cyber-attack? How wide is the access to the DNA database?

Finally, have there been any cases within the Police Force where existing DNA data on the database has been wrongfully accessed and misused? What was the range of punishments that have been meted out to such officers? And what recovery procedures and remedies can citizens whose DNA information has been compromised or used in a way not sanctioned by legislation avail themselves to?

My second clarification is on the further uses of the DNA database.

With such depth of personal information extractable from DNA data, Parliament should be apprised of the limits on the use of such data.

Paragraphs (b) to (g) of the proposed section 32 aim to narrow the remit of the use of DNA information solely for criminal analysis and investigations. However, the proposed section 32(h) is a catch-all clause that states that DNA information can be used for any purpose that may be prescribed. This greatly expands the use of DNA information.

Can I invite the Minister to clarify what other uses of DNA information are being contemplated under paragraph 32(h)?

For example, and this is certainly not exhaustive, it is not beyond imagination that this clause could be relied on to use the DNA database for purposes of profiling and to draw inferences about groups of people as being a relatively greater public order threat compared to others, as alluded to earlier.

If there is no such intention, can the Minister clarify the ambit of paragraph (h) for the record? It must be the Government's position that it would return to this House should the DNA database be used for any other purpose other than Police investigation into specific cases. Can the Minister confirm this to be so?

Let me move on to my third clarification.

Sir, under the proposed section 10, an authorised officer "may" take DNA information and therefore may not be required by law to do.

Can the Minister clarify what is the thinking behind not mandating the taking of DNA information but instead giving an option to the authorised officer? This is especially relevant since the public statements of the Ministry in justifying this Bill – I beg your pardon – in tabling this Bill have thus far alluded to expanding the DNA database.

What are the types of cases or scenarios this Bill conceives of where the authorised officer would need to decide for or against the taking of DNA information from an individual and what is the basis of those decisions? What consistency will be applied for the purposes of the proposed section 10 vis-a-vis eligible crimes?

Fourth and finally, Mr Speaker, as is routine in every Bill that comes before this House, the explanatory note contains a section titled "Expenditure of Public Money".

The note states that this Bill will involve the Government in extra financial expenditure, the exact amount of which cannot at present be ascertained. This is understandable because, for example, the exact number of DNA samples to be collected and processed for eligible crimes cannot be known at this time.

However, it should be possible to know the cost of taking individual samples, if not a broad estimate based on crime statistics over the last five to 10 years.

Specifically, I would like to ask how much the taking of each DNA sample from an accused or convicted person costs the taxpayer today.

Ms Sylvia Lim will speak on other matters for the Minister's clarification.

Mr Speaker: Mr Murali Pillai.

4.18 pm

Mr Murali Pillai (Bukit Batok): Mr Speaker, Sir, I support the aims of the amendment Bill for the reasons articulated by the hon Minister of State.

I would add that the hon Member for Holland-Bukit Timah Mr Christopher de Souza, who is away on State duty today and therefore unable to speak on this Bill, has expressed to me his strong support for the Bill too. He is of the view that this Bill enhances the ability of enforcement agencies to act swiftly to identify suspects of a broader array of crime accurately and apprehend them.

I agree with him. Once this Bill is passed, it is my hope that the percentage of unmatched DNA samples from scenes of crime, currently running at 60%, would be reduced.

I seek clarification on three areas from the hon Minister of State.

First, it is proposed that the current section 13G of the Act, which deals with removal of identifying information or DNA information from the register upon acquittal or discharge be repealed and be substituted with the proposed section 37(3) and 37(4) of the Bill.

Currently, the identifying and DNA information of an accused person will automatically be deleted within three months from the accused's acquittal or discharge.

It is proposed that instead of an automatic deletion, the accused has to apply for the removal. Under the proposed section 39(1) in the Bill, the Registrar must remove the same unless he is of the view that the information is relevant to an ongoing prosecution or investigation or it is in the interest of national security.

I note from the Hansard that the hon Minister for Home Affairs then, Mr Wong Kan Seng, in moving the amendment Bill in 2002 to set up the DNA database and elaborating on the kind of information that will be retained, stated as follows, "What happens to body samples of persons acquitted or discharged? Currently, the Act requires the Registrar of Criminals to destroy the photograph and finger impression of a person acquitted or discharged within three months from the date of acquittal or discharge. Similarly, clause 5 requires the Registrar to remove the DNA information of a person from the DNA database within three months of his acquittal or discharge. As the DNA information is stored in electronic form in the DNA database, removal of the information from the database is equivalent to the destruction of a physical record like a photograph."

My question to the hon Minister of State is as follows: the current Bill changes the default from automatic deletion to automatic retention. Why is there a shift in policy? Is it necessitated by a change in the law and order situation?

Why is not preferable for the current mechanism of automatic removal be maintained? The current system is fair to all. The proposed system appears to benefit those with the resources, the time and the know-how to request such a deletion. I would be grateful for the hon Minister of State's clarification.

I now turn to clauses 24 and 28 of the Bill.

These clauses combined provide that where an accused refuses to provide his consent for the taking of a sample to determine whether or not he has committed an eligible or registrable crime, the Court may draw an inference from the refusal that the Court thinks proper. The accused will also be liable for an offence of failing to given a sample without reasonable excuse under clause 27.

The approach taken in this Bill brings to my memory the salutary approach adopted in section 23 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Section 23 deals with the recording of a cautioned statement from a witness. The accused must be served with a written notice that he has to state his defence in his statement, failing which the Court may draw an adverse inference against him for not doing so.

May I ask if it is contemplated that a written notice will also be issued to the accused?

In this regard, I again wish to highlight that in 2002, the hon Minister for Home Affairs then, Mr Wong Kan Seng stated as follows, "But if the suspect refuses to give that consent, he can be brought to Court and the Court may order him to provide the blood sample, and if he still refuses, of course, appropriate warning will be given and inference will be drawn by the Court for his refusal to provide that blood sample."

In this Bill, it is proposed that the referral to the Magistrate is to be taken away. In that sense, warning becomes a lot more important under the current paradigm as opposed to what was proposed in 2002.

Finally, Sir, I note from the Bill that there are additional safeguards being proposed, such as: (a) The introduction of a tribunal to provide independent reassessment of the person's application to expunge his data after the Police has rejected his application; and (b) the safe and secure handling of DNA and fingerprint data. This is welcome.

I also note that the provisions in the Internal Security Act dealing with the taking of body samples is proposed to be ported over to the Registration of Criminals Act. This makes eminent sense too. In this way, the enhanced safeguards will apply to body samples collected from ISA detainees.

May I please ask why it is not proposed that similar provisions dealing with the collection of body samples of detainees under the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act (CLTPA) and drug addicts under the Misuse of Drugs Act (MDA) be also ported over to the Act?

As it stands, the provisions dealing with the collection of samples continue to be dealt with by the same provisions. Under section 27C of the CLTPA, it is provided that the Commissioner of Police shall cause to be maintained both a register and DNA database for persons arrested or detained under CLTPA. Similarly, under section 40D of the MDA, the Commissioner of Police must again maintain both a register and DNA database for drug addicts who are subject to supervision or are in drug rehabilitation centres.

On the face of it, it does not appear that the added safeguards are being proposed to be enacted in the CLTPA and MDA. I am also unclear why there should be separate registers and DNA databases in other pieces of legislation. I would have thought it would be more synergistic to consolidate all the registers and databases under one piece of legislation. I would be grateful for the hon Minister of State's response.

Mr Speaker: Ms Sylvia Lim.

4.25 pm

Ms Sylvia Lim (Aljunied): Mr Speaker, according to the Ministry's media release of 1 August, the rationale for this Bill is to enable law enforcement agencies to more effectively carry out their duties while safeguarding personal data. The Bill enables more DNA to be collected from suspects, offenders, volunteers and others in order to have a larger DNA database for comparison with evidence obtained from crime scenes.

There may be discomfort in some quarters due to the expansion of the net for collection of DNA. From the existing pool of registrable crimes, this Bill widens the net by enabling DNA collection for a new class of eligible crimes, which will include all offences punishable by imprisonment which are not compoundable by a public officer under the law.

It can be argued that actually, the current legislation already enables DNA to be collected for many offences which the average person may not consider serious, such as infringement of copyright and possession of uncustomed cigarettes. Now, the Bill proposes to include less serious offences such as voluntarily causing hurt.

This raises the question of what the appropriate threshold should be to justify the collection of DNA from individuals simply for the database.

In other jurisdictions, this has sparked discussion about the balance between the public interest in securing evidence to prove or disprove guilt versus the public interest in ensuring that private individuals are protected from unwarranted interference. These questions should not be dismissed as unimportant.

At such times, it is appropriate to step back and ask what Singaporeans should expect out of the criminal justice system. While we should always be concerned about treating suspects and offenders fairly, we need also to remember that victims are critical stakeholders who tend to be overlooked.

For instance, while the victim may have suffered harm, criminal justice systems are such that the decision makers in the case will be the prosecuting authorities, with the victims' wishes sometimes being overruled. To that end, the evolution of technology, if correctly applied, can result in bringing to more victims the justice and closure they deserve.

To illustrate my point, I wish to share a vivid personal experience from my days in law enforcement.

It is public information that in the 1990s, the Singapore Police introduced an investigation tool known as AFIS – the Automated Fingerprint Identification System. The system automated the matching of fingerprints lifted from crime scenes with those stored in a database of convicted persons and suspects.

The implementation of AFIS at that time resulted in the resurrection of many old casefiles where fingerprint matches were suddenly found.

I remember being assigned one such case. A fingerprint from a housebreaking scene was found to match the print of a person then in prison for another offence.

My colleague and I then proceeded to visit the prisoner. He initially denied any involvement in the matter. However, when it was pointed out to him that his fingerprint was found at the scene, he immediately recanted and admitted that he had indeed broken into the flat.

As I listened to him narrate what happened, I was struck by how his description of the position of the windows and the furniture and where the elderly female victim lay asleep corresponded exactly with the scene found by Police many years earlier. He was thereafter charged with this old offence and sentenced by the Court accordingly. It was indeed gratifying to know that technology worked correctly in that case to bring justice to the elderly woman, albeit, years later.

If enhancing the DNA database will result in more cases being solved and bring justice and closure to more victims and their families, that is an outcome we should support.

At the same time, there is the important issue of safeguarding personal information.

As mentioned by the Leader of the Opposition earlier, we have looked at how DNA collection is managed in other jurisdictions, including Australia and the UK, two jurisdictions which the Minister of State referred to earlier.

Sir, the Bill before us no doubt widens significantly the State's powers to collect DNA from individuals. However, we see some attempts to limit the scope of the State's powers. I will just cite two examples.

First, as far as what types of DNA samples may be collected, clause 2 makes clear that though the Minister may prescribe additional types of samples that may be collected, he cannot include samples obtained from more private parts of a person's body, such as the genital areas.

A second example of scope limitation is found in the proposed section 25. This section states that while reasonable force may be used to take body samples where the person does not consent, use of such force does not extend to taking an invasive sample, such as a blood sample. I support these and other limitations on the state's powers.

That said, I have concerns about two particular aspects of the Bill which, I believe, need to be clarified.

First, on volunteers giving their DNA samples. Under the current section 13D of the Registration of Criminals Act, a person may volunteer to give a body sample if he was present at the scene of the crime or if he is being questioned in connection with the investigation. In this Bill, the proposed section 23 will expand the potential net of volunteers by enabling any volunteer to provide his sample even if there is no nexus between the volunteer and crime.

Sir, I note that such a provision does exist in other jurisdictions. So, in principle, I do not object to the change. However, the question is: how will this operate in practice and, in particular, whether the vulnerable groups may be pressured to provide blood samples thinking that they have no choice but to "volunteer"? Already, with the current section 13D, I had noted previously in this House the case in 2008 – 14 years ago – of blood samples being taken from 200 foreign workers in the aftermath of an attack on a student at Clementi Woods Park. When I filed the Parliamentary Question on this in 2008, the Ministry replied that the blood samples were drawn after the workers had voluntarily given their consent. I do not know how the consents were obtained from the 200 workers to draw the blood samples. However, one could well ask to what extent the workers were worried that non-cooperation would jeopardise their employment in Singapore.

With the expanded powers to collect body samples from just about anyone who volunteers, what safeguards would be put in place to ensure that vulnerable groups are not picked on and that the consent of volunteers is informed and freely given?

Sir, my second concern is about the proposed section 27. This section makes it an offence to refuse to consent to give a body sample when one is liable to give it. Although refusal to consent is already an offence, the proposed section 27 creates a new offence if a parent or guardian of a child refuses to give consent for a body sample to be drawn from the child. Although it is right to seek the consent of the parent or guardian in the case of a child, is it appropriate to inflict punishment on a parent or guardian who does not give consent to an invasive procedure on his or her child? Are there other jurisdictions where parents are punished in this way?

Sir, finally, I should end on a note of caution. While DNA profiling has certainly been a game changer for law enforcement, there are limitations. From what I understand, DNA profiles lifted from crime scenes are often incomplete and, hence, less helpful in identifying a particular suspect. Such partial profiles will also match with many people. There is also the risk of the DNA being contaminated at the crime scene or being brought there by secondary transfer, that is, a person who was not at the scene may have his DNA inadvertently or even deliberately brought there by someone else. It is a fact that there had been miscarriages of justice in other jurisdictions involving DNA evidence, such as wrongful convictions, due to mix-ups in the laboratories handling the DNA.

Sir, we must be alive to all these risks and demand the highest standards in our investigations, including in the handling, processing and analysis of DNA samples. The relevant agencies, including our Courts, should also be mindful not to regard DNA evidence as infallible, but to assess it in the light of other evidence so as to minimise the risk of wrongful convictions.

Mr Speaker: Ms Denise Phua.

4.34 pm

Ms Denise Phua Lay Peng (Jalan Besar): Sir, I support the key intent behind the Registration of Criminals (Amendment) Bill. No one can quarrel with the Ministry’s aspiration to strengthen the crime investigation capabilities of the Police for the security of our nation. However, in the pursuit of enhancing Police capability in crime solving, there are three key needs that are important to address. These are to protect (a) individual privacy; (b) personal data collected; and (c) the vulnerable.

First, on protecting individual privacy. Sir, the Bill seeks to enlarge the database of criminals for better crime-solving. This is done by granting more power to the Police to collect DNA and non-DNA data of offenders, through a much wider scope of offences; in fact, a list of even less serious offences.

Sir, to have one’s personal data, especially DNA information, collected and uploaded to a Criminal Records Office’s database is a grave matter. Even if giving up one’s personal data is the consequence of committing a crime, the state should not over-infringe the bounds of a citizen’s privacy rights. Hence, I feel the Ministry should explain how this additional list of offences is decided upon.

What were the factors of consideration when the Ministry decides on which offences are included? How would the new offences be administered? For instance, would even a first-time offender of, say, dangerous driving, be compelled to have his DNA collected?

Second, on protecting personal data collected. Advancement in technology means higher risks of hacking and of information being compromised. It is not unimaginable that much more can be done with DNA data, such as creating fake profiles, digital identity stealing, cloning and the like. Personal data, when fallen into wrong hands, can lead to dire consequences. Given that so much more sensitive personal data is collected by the state, what are the additional safeguards to ensure that the database, especially of DNA information, is better protected? What is the accountability of the agency should such personal data be leaked or compromised, whether locally or internationally? How will potential volunteers who might come forward to offer their DNA information to the Police be better briefed so that they can better make informed decisions before volunteering?

Third, on protecting the vulnerable. It is unclear how the vulnerable are protected in this Bill. For the vulnerable, it is not so clear from the Bill that the Police have a positive duty to inform the individuals. How will the Ministry ensure that the vulnerable will not be at a disadvantage, compared to those who are more able and knowledgeable?

I refer especially to individuals who are above 16 years of age and who lack the mental capacity to fully understand the implication of what they say or agree to. Many of those with special needs and disabilities will need a familiar figure to explain and guide them during interrogation, the collection of blood sample and through the rest of the process.

At the early phases of the COVID-19 pandemic, there was an outcry on how the needs of residents with special needs were not accommodated. It took much education and convincing of the authorities to change the Government’s vaccination, quarantine and safe management processes to make the needed accommodations. We should learn from those experiences.

And then there are individuals who may not be lacking in mental capacity but are less educated and less tech-savvy. Take, for instance, the Bill’s introduction of tighter procedures for the removal of personal data collected in the Criminal Records Office’s database. Today, the Police are required to immediately remove both DNA and non-DNA data from the database when an individual is acquitted, discharged or the offence is compounded. But with the amendments, such individuals will now have to apply to the Police to remove their data. If rejected, one will then have to appeal to a Reviewing Tribunal. But unless properly advised and assisted, the less-educated and less tech-savvy individuals may not know how to exercise this right to apply to remove their DNA information nor how to make an application even if they know.

In conclusion, Sir, I support the objective of this Bill. But I seek clarification on what I feel are important needs to protect individual privacy, personal data collected and to protect especially the vulnerable.

Mr Speaker: Order. I propose to take a break now. I suspend the Sitting and will take the Chair at 5.00 pm.

Sitting accordingly suspended

at 4.40 pm until 5.00 pm.

Sitting resumed at 5.00 pm.

[Mdm Deputy Speaker in the Chair]

Registration of Criminals (Amendment) Bill

Debate resumed.

Mdm Deputy Speaker: Ms Ng Ling Ling.

Ms Ng Ling Ling (Ang Mo Kio): Mdm Deputy Speaker, let me start my speech by citing two murder cases that happened about 40 years ago.

The first case happened in 1979 when four children of the Tan family were murdered in their flat in Geylang Bahru. There was no evidence of forced entry nor was their house ransacked. Although bloodstains were found in the kitchen sink, DNA technology was not advanced enough then to identify the culprit and the murders remain unsolved today.

Subsequently, in 1981, a temple medium, Adrian Lim, together with his two partners, murdered two young children, aged nine and 10 then, at their flat in Toa Payoh. The murderers were apprehended only after they had killed the second child. This was when CID inspectors traced the bloodstains at the crime scene to the staircase steps leading to the floor of the same block, near to Adrian Lim’s flat unit. This was the infamous Toa Payoh ritual murders.

What if these cases can be solved by identifying the criminals through the DNA databases owned by our Singapore Police Force? Will the second murder of the 10-year-old child by Adrian Lim and his partners be avoided, or will the perpetrator that killed the four children from the Tan family be apprehended? These questions are pertinent today, as I rise to speak in support of the Registration of Criminals (Amendment) Bill, which expands and enhances the collection of DNA and non-DNA identifying information.

I am heartened to know that the advancement of forensic medicine has greatly improved the possibility of apprehending criminals in recent years. DNA identifying information has become useful tools for crime-solving. Given the high success rate in solving murders through DNA information in recent years, enabling a larger database for our Police Force to compare the samples from crime scenes can help tremendously in our criminal investigations. The amendment Bill is thus a timely response to increase our Police Force’s capabilities to solve crimes.

Nonetheless, like the collection of any other information that is personal, there are ethical and privacy considerations that we need to contend with. Thus, I would like to raise clarifications in two main aspects: one, the collection of DNA identifying information for eligible crimes under the amendments; and, two, the storage of the information collected.

Firstly, clause 2(d) of the amendment Bill states that an eligible crime is “any offence that is, at the time of the commission of the offence, punishable by imprisonment, not a registrable crime and not compoundable under any written law”. As such, under section 9 and 18(1) of the amendment Bill, an authorised officer may collect the DNA and non-DNA information from the individual accused of an eligible crime. MHA has further listed that reckless or dangerous driving causing hurt is one of the eligible crimes under the amendment Bill. Under section 64 of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (RTA), the sentencing of reckless or dangerous driving causing hurt is considered based on the injury caused to the victims, depending on four levels: death, grievous hurt, hurt and minimal or no injury. Under RTA, the sentencing framework of (a) hurt and (b) minimal or no injury, does not carry a mandatory imprisonment sentence and the offence appears to be compoundable under section 135 of RTA . I would like to clarify if the accused or convicted individuals of reckless or dangerous driving causing hurt with injury of (a) hurt and (b) minimal or no injury, will be subject to having their DNA information registered in the Police database?

My concern is for individuals who are accused or convicted of driving without due care or reasonable consideration – which section 65 of RTA states as “any person who drives a motor vehicle on a road (a) without due care and attention; or (b) without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road”. From time to time, I have attended to residents who have been charged in Court under section 65 of RTA during my Meet-the-People Sessions. Most of them committed the offence unintentionally and were remorseful of their actions. Although I stand firm that they should be dealt with fairly under our laws, drivers who unintentionally cause hurt or minimal or no injury, in my view, should not be subject to having their DNA information collected as the degree of blameworthiness of their actions is lower. In other words, it is not a deliberate act of harm. I would like to clarify with MHA if drivers convicted under driving without due care or reasonable consideration will be subject to having their DNA information collected and stored.

Secondly, under section 24 of the amendment Bill, it states that an invasive sample must not be taken from an individual who has not attained 16 years of age unless the appropriate consent – in written forms and by the individual or the parent or guardian depending on the age range – is given. However, in the amendment Bill, it did not explicitly state the requirements for special needs individuals, whom I consider as vulnerable even if they are above 16 years of age. I share the same concerns as hon Member Ms Denise Phua. I would like to thus clarify how would the amendment Bill deal with the collection of DNA samples as well as non-DNA information from special needs individuals who are accused of the eligible crimes.

In addition, section 25 re-enacts with modifications section 13E(5)(b) which empowers a DNA officer to use reasonable force to take a body sample. In relation to my point on special needs individuals, despite being accused individuals, I believe that they are to be considered vulnerable adults and may warrant special attention to their needs and emotions while they undergo the potentially traumatic experience of being an accused person. I would like to clarify how MHA will safeguard the safety of these special needs individuals and ensure that no excessive force would be used on them if body samples are to be collected.

Thirdly, new sections 29 and 32 will be inserted into the amendment Bill to provide for the maintenance of an identifiable database that stores the records of DNA and non-DNA information of individuals accused and convicted of an eligible or registrable crime. It also laid out that the purpose on which the DNA database may be used for investigation into a death, identifying a dead individual or for identifying an individual to provide Police assistance. In November 2021, a laboratory that was processing DNA evidence from rape victims for the Oklahoma City Police Department (OKCPD) in the United States was involved in a data breach due to unauthorised third-party access to their network, resulting in the exposure of personal data of an unknown number of victims of sexual assault. The compromised data included certain personal and medical information. Such news shows the risk of network security breaches and the safeguards that need to be in place.

Although there was an assurance that legislative safeguards will be introduced with several examples cited in MHA’s press release, I did not manage to find them within the amendment Bill. Thus, I would like to ask if MHA can outline some of the legislative safeguards, such as whether the data will be stored in an on-premises secured database at a secured location or a secured cloud database. Also, how will the access of the database be controlled, that is, who are the people that MHA has identified to access the database based on their needs for investigation? Thirdly, will there be a data breach response plan in the unfortunate event that the DNA database experiences a data breach?

Mdm Deputy Speaker, please allow me to say a few words in Mandarin.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] As forensic analysis capabilities and technologies improve, personal information such as DNA, fingerprints and photographs have become the key for solving crimes. Although the Police have a high solving rate for murder cases through DNA information, according to Lianhe Zaobao, between 2017 and 2021, about 60% of the DNA samples collected by the Police at the crime scene did not match the existing database. Hence, I believe that by including those who have committed eligible non-registrable crimes in the scope of data collection through the Registration of Criminals (Amendment) Bill, the database will be expanded to provide a more effective tool for the Police to solve crimes. Therefore, I strongly support the Bill.

However, I hope that MHA will clarify that when collecting invasive samples of juvenile offenders under the age of 16, the written consent of the person, parent or guardian will be sought based on the needs of different age groups. I would like to know if MHA has the same provision to protect persons with special needs or intellectual disabilities who may have committed registrable crimes and eligible non-registrable crimes. I feel that people with special needs and the intellectually disabled, even if they are over the age of 16, are still vulnerable. Hence, there is a need to have provisions to give special attention to them, especially to their mental state, and to protect their rights and interests. Where necessary, provide appropriate assistance when collecting samples from them to help them, their parents, and guardians to understand the procedures and cooperate with the DNA officers.

(In English): Mdm Deputy Speaker, back to English, please. Forensic medicine advancement has contributed to more effective criminal investigations. To our investigators and forensic pathologists, the pieces of evidence that they collect, including DNA data in a secured database, can lend a voice to the victims who suffer the brutality of the crimes committed against them. For the family and friends of the victims in murder cases, it offers the opportunity to bring closure to the death of their loved ones. Being a nine-year-old schoolmate of the first murdered child in the Toa Payoh ritual murders, I can speak personally of the trauma I felt when I heard the tragedy about 40 years ago and the closure I had when the murderers were finally brought to justice.

Mdm Deputy Speaker, notwithstanding the clarifications I have raised, I strongly support the amendment Bill.

Mdm Deputy Speaker: Mr Patrick Tay.

5.12 pm

Mr Patrick Tay Teck Guan (Pioneer): Mdm Deputy Speaker, I rise in support of this Bill. There is no doubt that DNA evidence and identification have helped solve numerous crime cases in and around the world and have been a boon for law enforcement agencies in cracking many major, violent, serious and organised crimes and have led to the successful arrest, prosecution and conviction of highly dangerous and wanted criminals.

Notwithstanding, I wish to submit that there should be adequate safeguards in three important areas: DNA collection, DNA use and DNA disclosure. I have five questions and clarifications for each of these three areas for MHA to respond to and clarify so that we are all properly and unequivocally apprised of the necessary safeguards as we embark on this DNA journey.

First, collection. One, there are numerous ways to collect DNA and I hope MHA can enlighten us on the ways and methods in which the DNA will be collected, or maybe there might only be one method, so that we can better understand how invasive the process may potentially be.

Two, will young, youthful, intellectually-disabled, aged and other vulnerable persons also be subjected to this DNA collection process? And as we know, some young offenders can still be in Primary school and I am concerned that the process may be traumatising to a young offender.

Three, my understanding is that accused persons who receive a judgment of a discharge amounting to an acquittal (DATA) will not have their DNA collected but those who are discharged not amounting to an acquittal (DNAQ) will have their DNA collected. Can MHA explain the rationale for this?

Four, what safeguards will there be in place to prevent contamination of DNA in the entire collection and examination process?

Five, whether this collection and examination will be outsourced to private organisations outside of the Singapore Police Force.

Second, use and storage. One, I note that DNA collection will be for registrable offences. As some registrable offences may be petty in nature and some being more severe, what is MHA's rationale in deciding of this very broad sweeping approach?

Two, can MHA also share how the actual DNA sample as well as the information and data of the DNA sample will be stored?

Three, once stored, how is it protected and safeguarded, so that it shall not be illegally accessed and leaked whether by physical, cyber or virtual means?

Four, for how long will the sample and the data on the sample be stored?

Finally, will the storage be carried out by the SPF or some external or private organisation?

Third, disclosure and disposal. One, can MHA also share how and who this DNA data will be shared with and disclosed to during investigations, prosecution and also in a Court trial as part of the criminal discovery process?

Two, will there be any chance where this DNA information will be shared with law enforcement agencies outside of Singapore as part of worldwide police investigations, for example, as part of INTERPOL or for laws with extraterritorial effects?

Three, will the DNA information collected also be shared with agencies outside of SPF, such as CPIB, CNB, ICA, MOM, MAS, CRA or even other agencies with quasi-enforcement and quasi-investigation powers, including with private organisations, such as insurance companies, when they investigate insurance fraud or corporate fraud and so on?

Four, the other parts of the Act have provisions for offences to be "spent". Will it, therefore, follow that DNA samples will be spent when offences are being "spent"?

Five, how will the DNA sample and data be managed in the eventuality of a disposal of the case? Notwithstanding the above queries and the need for safeguards, I support this Bill.

Mdm Deputy Speaker: Mr Louis Ng.

5.17 pm

Mr Louis Ng Kok Kwang (Nee Soon): This Bill will expand the collection and use of identifying information and DNA information. Such information helps law enforcement agencies to do their work more effectively. Because such information is sensitive, I support provisions in the Bill that protect such information when it is collected. I have four clarifications, all relating to the safeguards for the collection and removal of this information.

My first clarification has to do with the forcible taking of samples. Under the new section 25, if an individual refuses to give a body sample that is not an invasive sample, a DNA officer may use force to take that body sample. I think we can all agree that having a body sample forcibly taken from us can be intrusive, distressing and traumatic. Can the Minister share how will DNA officers be trained to decide whether they should use force to take a body sample? What factors will DNA officers be asked to consider? Will there be checks and penalties to ensure that such acts of force, once done, are warranted and justified?

My second clarification is on the taking of samples from those below 16 years of age. We should exercise extreme caution when taking samples from such young people. It is well-established that children and younger teenagers lack the ability to understand the full implications of their bodily consent. They do not know what they are really saying yes to, and there is good reason that the consent of parents and guardians is routinely required in such decisions.

However, this Bill allows DNA officers to, essentially, ignore the parents and guardians' preferences under certain conditions. Two are noteworthy. The first condition is that the consent of the parent or guardian is refused without good cause or cannot be obtained despite reasonable efforts. Can the Minister of State provide examples of what would constitute good cause and reasonable efforts? The second condition is that the underage person is "willing" to give the sample. Can the Minister of State clarify how DNA officers will ensure this "willingness" is an informed, meaningful one? Will they simply accept a vocal "yes"? The reality is that the child or young teenager in this situation may feel pressured by the Police or other powerful adults bearing down on them. What rules and checks will be in place to ensure DNA officers, Police officers and other officers do not create undue pressure on these young minds to consent?

My third clarification is on the removal of recorded information. With the amendments, the default position is that the data will be retained for individuals who have been acquitted, granted a discharge amounting to an acquittal or had their offence compounded. The onus is on them to apply to remove their data. Otherwise, it will stay in the system. Can the Minister of State share how these individuals will be informed of the option to apply for their data to be removed? What steps will be taken to ensure that the application process is transparent and reasonably easy to access?

Relatedly, it seems that an individual granted a discharge not amounting to an acquittal may not apply for their information to be removed. Can the Minister of State clarify if this is, in fact, the position? Given that a discharge not amounting to an acquittal is significantly different in nature from a conviction, can the Minister of State share if discretion may be exercised to allow the removal of information if there is a discharge not amounting to an acquittal?

Can the Minister of State also clarify whether an individual who has been given a stern warning will have their data information immediately removed after the end of investigations or will be entitled to apply for such removal?

My last clarification has to do with the application process to remove information. Section 39 makes clear that certain individuals will be rejected if they apply to remove their information. This is because their information is considered sensitive, it is relevant to another ongoing prosecution or investigation, or there are other national security concerns. My question is this: will these individuals be told when their information is no longer considered sensitive? If not, how will they know whether they should apply again or not?

Just as important, how will prescribed timelines apply to such individuals? How can they be expected to follow the prescribed timelines for a removal application when their information may be sensitive for a long time and then become non-sensitive without their knowledge?

In my view, the default action should be to remove someone's information without a fresh application if the individual was earlier rejected due to a section 39 reason and the reason no longer holds. After all, the individual had already demonstrated their preference for the removal. We should not require someone to apply again. If these individuals will be required to reapply, will they be informed of the opportunity to make a fresh application? Notwithstanding these clarifications, Madam, I support the Bill.

Mdm Deputy Speaker: Mr Derrick Goh.

5.21 pm

Mr Derrick Goh (Nee Soon): Mdm Deputy Speaker, Singapore is widely regarded as one of the safest cities in the world because of the relentless efforts of our law enforcement agencies (LEAs). Amongst other capabilities, investigation plays a key role in solving crimes and upholding public confidence.

We must continue to support our officers with the right investigation capabilities and legal framework, so that they remain effective in keeping Singapore safe. On this basis, I believe the amendments in this Bill on the collection, use and storage of information from case persons are well-intentioned and sound. Nonetheless, I would like to seek some clarifications.

A key amendment is to allow Police officers to instruct a suspect to provide blood samples to collect DNA, without the need for a Magistrate's order. While this will boost timeliness of collection, as a safeguard, can the Minister of State share if this process will be authorised and supervised by an officer who is appropriately trained and qualified? Greater assurance could, for example, be achieved by requiring officers of a minimum rank, similar to the requirement stated in the Criminal Procedure Code.

Regarding the retention of information, as the intent of this Bill is to collect more data to improve investigations, can the Minister of State clarify the rationale for the default expungement of suspects' information in cases of No Further Action under clause 35(3)? I ask this as the clause appears to be counter-intuitive since volunteers, who have a weaker connection to a case compared to suspects, are required to apply to the Police for removal of their data under clause 37(2). I note that clause 32 sets out the usage of DNA information for limited purposes. Notwithstanding, can the Minister of State explain what are "other purposes" under clause 32(h) that may be prescribed?

The Bill also proposes the sharing of DNA results of convicted criminals with foreign LEAs when assessed necessary. This expands the current regime where registrable information, such as fingerprints, are already shared. As a safeguard, the foreign LEA will need to provide an undertaking to safekeep the data, limit its uses and destroy it upon conclusion. Notwithstanding that these persons have been convicted, given that DNA information is more sensitive compared to fingerprints, can the Minister of State clarify if criteria to assess necessity for sharing will be made more stringent than currently?

Also, considering varying levels of cybersecurity infrastructure across jurisdictions, as well as difficulties of monitoring foreign LEAs, can the Minister of State share how compliance with the undertaking by foreign counterparts will be ensured?

The Bill also introduces a new category of "eligible crimes", expanding the current scope of crimes eligible for information to be collected. Per clause 2(d) of the Bill, these are defined as any offence punishable with imprisonment, except those compoundable. With the foreseeable increase in the size and sensitivity of data collected, retained and used, I am encouraged that the Bill will also legislate safeguards for the handling of information, such as having persons accessing the databases to be screened and authorised by the Police. It follows that with greater powers come greater responsibilities to further strengthen trust in our LEAs.

Some of our agencies have, unfortunately, been impacted by data leakage due to cybersecurity attacks. Going forward, the world is seeing more cybersecurity threats which are also becoming increasingly sophisticated. So, as we continue to build our capabilities, we must be wary that what has happened can occur again.

DNA samples, I understand, are collected on blotter cards, but the data analysed are stored on computer databases, which can be subject to the cybersecurity threats I have mentioned earlier. Given this, can the Minister of State clarify the existing data security safeguards, their effectiveness and proposed enhancements that are implemented and, therefore, to be put in place to provide greater public assurance?

Without being overly technical, will measures recommended by our Public Sector Data Security Review Committee, such as digital watermarking, encryption, tokenisation and multi-party authorisation, be deployed or further enhanced to strengthen cybersecurity?

Mdm Deputy Speaker, in conclusion, data is the new currency in this day and age. Through the use of data, our LEAs must send the message to potential criminals that they will be caught. But it is also critical that we must balance the expanded collection, retention and usage of personal information with safeguards in data privacy and security. In this way, public trust amongst our LEAs can be upheld.

I am confident that this Bill will enable our officers to continue keeping Singapore safe and secure and I stand in support of this Bill.

Mdm Deputy Speaker: Mr Sharael Taha.

5.28 pm

Mr Sharael Taha (Pasir Ris-Punggol): Mdm Deputy Speaker, I seem to have some technical problems. Can I go after this instead? My apologies.

Mdm Deputy Speaker: Mr Wan Rizal.

5.28 pm

Dr Wan Rizal (Jalan Besar): Mdm Deputy Speaker, I rise in support of the Bill.

The Bill, amongst other amendments, aims to enhance the collection of information from suspects which will provide the authorities with a larger database to compare samples from crime scenes. A larger database would simply mean that cases may be solved more effectively and efficiently.

Police have been using DNA to help solve crimes from 1991 and the ability to extract DNA from a crime scene and run it through a database has greatly improved the odds of Police in solving cases. For example, DNA profiling was crucial in solving a case of a serial fatal stabbing in 2010. In that case, the absence of CCTV footage, fingerprints as well as DNA had hindered Police from getting leads.

However, at the fourth occurrence, the blade of a knife had broken off and it was found some metres away from the deceased. Police then found a plastic sheath that was used to cover the knife, where they were able to extract DNA samples, develop a profile and identify the perpetrator.

Mdm Deputy Speaker, although DNA analysis can be used to prove to be conclusive evidence against someone, it can also be used to exonerate someone and prove their innocence. As such, I welcome a key amendment in the Bill which includes allowing individuals to provide his DNA or non-DNA identifying information voluntarily to Police.

Critically, volunteers can request the Police to delete their information at any time and the Police must accede to their request. This will allow volunteers the confidence to step-up and provide them with the opportunity to protect exonerate themselves.

Additionally, due to the high success probability of solving crimes and the possibility to exonerate the innocent, I am in support of the fine and/or jail term that will be introduced for accused individuals who refuse to provide blood samples without a reasonable excuse.

Mdm Deputy Speaker, despite my support for this Bill, there are a few areas of concern.

Firstly, in a situation where the Police searches through the DNA database and comes across a partial match. A relative may come across as a partial match. There are also instances where there are doppelgangers, people who look strikingly similar, but are not related. A recent study published in the journal Cell Reports has shown that their DNA sequence may be similar.

Thus, what are the safeguards for the relatives of people or possible doppelgangers who are on the database?

Secondly, with regards to the DNA sample collection and extraction, how would the Police address issues of sample contamination and what really constitutes a good sample?

Thirdly, with evolving technology, there have been many advancements, amongst them, DNA fabrication. How does the Police safeguards against this and what are the plans by the Police to leverage on advancements in technology in DNA matching?

Finally, with regards to data security. Upon collection of data and data storage, what safeguards are in place to protect the data: prevent the loss, modification and unauthorised access to any information recorded in various databases and also, would there be alternative secure storage locations. And, if so, will it be outsourced to an external agency? Mdm Deputy Speaker, in Malay, please.

(In Malay): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] The Bill aims to enhance the collection of information from crime suspects through the comparison of DNA samples from a crime scene, with a larger database.

The Police have been using DNA to help solve crimes since 1991 and the ability to use DNA analysis has greatly improved the chances of the police to solve cases.

A larger database would mean that cases may be solved more effectively and efficiently.

More importantly, although DNA analysis can be used as evidence against someone, it can also be used to exonerate someone and prove their innocence.

As such, I hope that the Minister can provide clarification about the steps that will be taken to safeguard and protect the DNA data to prevent any modification and misuse.

(In English): Mdm Deputy Speaker, in conclusion, I am convinced that the expansion of the collection and the use of DNA data would enhance the Police's effectiveness and efficiency in solving crimes and exonerate the innocent, and hence make Singapore an even safer and more secure home. I support the Bill.

Mdm Deputy Speaker: Mr Sharael Taha, are you ready now? Okay.

5.33 pm

Mr Sharael Taha: Thank you, Mdm Deputy Speaker, apologies for the technical difficulties faced earlier.

Mdm Deputy Speaker, on 3 August 2022, The Straits Times reported that DNA matching helps Police hit a 100% success rate in cracking murder cases over the past eight to nine years.

The ability to extract DNA from the crime scene and run it through the database has greatly improved the odds of the Police here in apprehending criminals. There is certainly merit in expanding the database to include "eligible" crimes. A larger database would exponentially increase the effectiveness of the Police Force in solving cases, especially when such cases have little leads, such as a lack of CCTV footage or eyewitnesses.

However, with the ability to collect DNA from more suspects and offenders, how do we ensure the privacy of our citizens is adequately protected?

While we acknowledge that an expanded database would prove useful for criminal investigations, we must strike the correct balance between the need to collect and record samples while also protecting the rights and privacy of our citizens. How invasive are we going to be when collecting samples and what are procedures set in place to ensure that the collection and storage of samples does not infringe on the rights of our citizens?

Hence, while I agree with the Bill in-principle as our law enforcement officers should be given every tool possible to help with investigations, I would also like to make certain clarifications.

The first point of clarification is whether this Bill will make the collection of DNA compulsory or admissible. In other words, will the Police take DNA samples in cases like "registrable" and "eligible" offences or the Police can, but need not always take a DNA sample?

In a case of unlawful stalking, for example, which will be an "eligible" crime, where the stalker is already known to the victim, would the stalker's DNA still need to be collected at any point of the investigations? How will the DNA sample be extracted then from such an individual?

In a situation where there are multiple suspects for a single crime, for example, would all the suspects of such "eligible" crime have their DNA sample taken? Does this apply to those currently serving term for "eligible" crimes?

If the intent is to "grow" the database, it is more helpful in this case for the Police to collect as many DNA samples as possible as it is quite plausible that the DNA information would be useful, if not for the immediate case, it could still be useful in future.

However, we also do not want a situation where we indiscriminately collect samples from suspects. There should be proper criteria or procedure to follow to ascertain whether a sample needs to be taken or not. This is to ensure that we can maintain the privacy and dignity of suspects too while investigations are taking place.

Consequently, for suspects acquitted of the crimes, discharged by the Court or found not to be involved in a crime, how long does the individual have to apply for his DNA information to be removed? Does it apply for suspects who are discharged not amounting to acquittal? It has to be reiterated that the collection of samples is to expand the database in order to help with investigations. On what basis do we decide that a person's DNA sample or information would not be stored?

Secondly, with plans to further expand the database with the inclusion of "eligible" offences, will this overwhelm our forensic labs in terms of number of DNA samples? As the list of "eligible offences" is quite extensive, do we have the necessary capacity to handle the expected influx of DNA samples as evidence? Would this inadvertently lead to delays in the administration of justice especially if there is a backlog created due to the inefficient collection and analysis of DNA data?

Perhaps, a breakdown of "registered" and "eligible" crime would be useful to make an informed projection of the number of samples expected. Do we have sufficient professionals and trained personnel in the criminal justice system to ensure the optimal use of DNA as evidence to assist victims and solve crimes? It would be counter-productive if the collection of DNA samples as evidence leads to a delay in investigations.

Lastly, how do we safeguard the data from being abused? How do we ensure that DNA data is safely secured from unauthorised access and protected from being modified or deleted? This should also extend to data that has been shared with foreign law enforcement agencies. Under what contexts would it be necessary for our Police Force to share DNA information with foreign agencies, and how safe would the data be once it has been ported over? Would there be safeguards against future use of this information beyond the original intent of this Bill? Mdm Deputy Speaker, in Malay, please.

(In Malay): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] This Bill intends to expand the DNA database and thus, enable the police to solve cases more effectively. However, I would like to seek the following clarifications. First, how will the DNA sample be extracted? Do those currently serving time need to provide their DNA? Second, for suspects acquitted of their crimes, discharged by the court, or found not to be involved in a crime, how much time is given to them to apply for their DNA information to be removed? Third, do we have the capacity to process this new number of DNA samples arising from this Bill? Lastly, how do we safeguard this DNA data from being abused?

(In English): Mdm Deputy Speaker, notwithstanding the clarifications above, I am in support of the Bill.

Mdm Deputy Speaker: Mr Gan Thiam Poh.

5.39 pm

Mr Gan Thiam Poh (Ang Mo Kio): Mdm Deputy Speaker, in recent years, DNA data has proven to be critical in providing breakthroughs and helping the Police to solve certain crimes or intervene in ongoing cases to save lives, for example, kidnapping. It enables investigators to expedite the identification of victims and suspects. In fact, its use will be efficient in assisting investigations if the data bank has the information of all residents. One would never know how such data may be needed to help solve crimes which could potentially impact anyone of us.

Hence, I support the proposals to expand the powers of the Police to collect DNA and non-DNA identifying information for both registrable crimes and "eligible crimes". The wider scope of eligible crimes will include drink driving, fighting in public and voluntarily causing hurt. With more information and a bigger database, our Police's ability to solve cases and prevent crimes will be greatly enhanced.

On the other hand, it is very important to ensure the data is safely protected against misuse, abuse and theft. As the protection of data is important, MHA should explore various options on how to ensure verification and certification instead of forwarding the data to a third party or foreign counterpart, if it is feasible.

We must have a robust system for the collection of data. It is important to prevent "garbage in, garbage out" and avoiding having the wrong samples collected or stored due to human error. The risk of mismatches needs to be minimised or eliminated.

The Ministry should also address the potential problem where there could be delays in verification due to situations such as power outages.

I also appeal to the Minister to consider permitting civil use by relevant individuals, with the approval of an independent Court. Mdm Deputy Speaker, in Mandarin.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] This Registration of Criminal (Amendment) Bill includes the DNA of persons who have committed eligible non-registrable offences in the scope of data collection. This will expand the database, allow DNA information to play a greater role in helping the Police to solve crimes and to maintain public safety.

DNA can also be used to identify the deceased persons and those who are unable to identify themselves. There are concerns about whether this DNA data can be kept safe from misuse. But we should not give up eating just because of the risk of choking. Imagine someone who almost choked to death wants to forbid eating in the whole world. The analogy is that something which ought to be done is simply not done simply because of little fault or fear of a problem. I am confident that the authorities would do everything in their power to keep the information safe.

The medical book 千金药方 or "the Golden Rules of Prescription", says that the best type of medical treatment is to eradicate the root cause of the disease before it occurs. Second best is treatment applied at the beginning of the disease and when the symptoms are superficial. And third best is to give treatment only when the patient is in a critical condition and in extreme pain, and then help him to recover. I am sure everyone will agree that going to the first type of doctor is the best option.

Therefore, this Bill is to take precautionary measures to prevent minor problems from happening. I therefore support this Bill.

Mdm Deputy Speaker: Mr Melvin Yong Yik Chye.

5.45 pm

Mr Melvin Yong Yik Chye (Radin Mas): Thank you, Mdm Deputy Speaker. I stand in support of the Bill, which seeks to enhance DNA collection by our law enforcement agencies, as this will allow our Police officers to better carry out their duties and ensure the safety and security of Singapore and Singaporeans while also ensuring that sufficient safeguards for personal data are in place. However, I have a few questions and suggestions.

Madam, let me start by stating that we must not underestimate the importance of data collection during the course of Police work. As a former Police officer with 20 years of working closely with frontline policing and investigation officers, I know first-hand how vital the collection of key identifying information, such as DNA and fingerprints, is for the purpose of solving crimes.

In her Second Reading speech, the Minister of State had given us some examples of past cases that had been solved via DNA analysis. DNA analysis is but a single tool in the Police's toolbox of crime-solving methods, which include non-DNA identifying information, CCTV analytics and ground interviews. I, therefore, fully support the proposal to expand the scope of crimes where DNA and other identifying information can be collected so as to help the Police solve crimes more efficiently and more effectively.

Madam, policing work is stressful and our Police officers often have to race against the clock to solve cases. The Bill proposes to expand the prescribed uses of the DNA information collected. I welcome this move as this will help our Police officers solve cases faster. The amendments will not only allow DNA information to be used to identify a deceased person and for any investigations and inquiries into a death but will also allow for the identification of an individual who might be unable to identify himself and allow the Police to assist him.

I would like to ask the Minister of State how the revised DNA collection regime would compare with that of other countries. How do we rank in terms of comprehensiveness of DNA and non-DNA data collection? If there are other countries that allow the collection of DNA for a wider array of crimes, should we not follow suit? I believe the Minister of State mentioned that South Australia collects DNA information for all imprisonable offences while England collects DNA information for imprisonable offences and some non- imprisonable offences. Why are we then limiting the tools that can help our Police officers obtain an investigation breakthrough and potentially solve a difficult crime?

In addition to the Bill's provisions to safeguard the data of DNA and non-DNA identifying information, we also need to ensure that the DNA samples themselves are subject to proper storage and disposal. I would like to ask how do our law enforcement agencies collect DNA samples, how long do they store them for and how are they disposed? In fact, why is there a need to keep the DNA sample once it has been processed, profiled and recorded?

Lastly, Mdm Deputy Speaker, while I note that the intent of today's Bill is to debate the circumstances in which our law enforcement agencies can collect DNA and non-DNA identifying information, I would like to call for a more fundamental review on whether we should do more than just limit DNA collection only to criminals.

We should seriously consider establishing a national DNA registry where every Singaporean and resident would be required to log our DNA sequence.

Beyond identifying criminals, a DNA registry can also be helpful in identifying missing victims or in an event with mass casualties.

From a victim's point-of-view, when he is in grave danger and in need of urgent help, every second counts. To the family of a victim in a homicide case, every possible tool to help bring the assailant to justice counts. To deter a potential criminal, increasing his risk of being caught counts.

Madam, in conclusion, the proposed amendments to the Registration of Criminals Act will allow the Police to enhance the collection and use of DNA and other identifying information. However, I believe there is space for us to do more – to be able to collect DNA from more people and for more uses beyond just identifying criminals. I also hope that, one day, we could have a national DNA registry as an added tool in our Police's crime-solving arsenal. Madam, I support the Bill.

Mdm Deputy Speaker: Minister of State Sun Xueling.

5.51 pm

Ms Sun Xueling: Mdm Deputy Speaker, I thank the Members for their suggestions and questions and their support for the Bill.

There are five key stages in the collection and handling of DNA information. First, a body sample is collected from the individual. Second, DNA information is extracted from the body sample. Third, the DNA information is stored in a secured database. Next, the DNA information may be used for prescribed purposes. Finally, the DNA information will be removed from the database where necessary, in accordance with the requirements under the law.

First, on the collection of body samples. Mr Melvin Yong, Mr Patrick Tay and Mr Sharael Taha asked how body samples are extracted from individuals. Typically, the DNA officer will obtain body samples in the form of blood. I have explained that this is because blood samples are more likely to yield a high-quality DNA profile. The DNA officer will sterilise the individual's fingertip, prick it with a disposable lancet and collect the blood droplets. In situations where it is not feasible to collect a blood sample, the officer will do a buccal swab by using a sterile swab to swab the inside of the individual's cheeks on both sides. However, the chances of obtaining a high-quality DNA profile from buccal swabs are lower.

Mr Derrick Goh asked whether the process of collecting blood samples will be authorised and supervised by officers of a minimum rank. All officers who take body samples will be trained. There are standard protocols on the collection process. Providing for further supervisors will take up additional resources, which we do not have.

Mr Murali Pillai asked whether an accused who refuses to provide his consent for the taking of a sample would be issued a written notice warning him of the consequences of not doing so. As part of the procedure to obtain consent, the accused will be asked to sign a form which will state the consequences of refusing to provide consent. This is no different from the practice today.

Ms Denise Phua and Ms Ng Ling Ling sought clarification on whether certain traffic offences are eligible for DNA collection. To reiterate, DNA and identifying information can be collected for two categories of offences – registrable crimes, which are crimes currently included in the First and Second Schedule of RCA, and eligible crimes, which are non-registrable crimes punishable by imprisonment and not compoundable under any written law unless the offence is specified in the Fourth Schedule to the Criminal Procedure Code 2010. These offences are, generally, more serious. The offence of reckless or dangerous driving under section 64 of the Road Traffic Act 1961 is an eligible crime if no death or grievous hurt is caused.

As for the offence of driving without due care, under section 65 of the same Act, the offence is a registrable crime if death or grievous hurt is caused. This applies for first and repeat offenders. If no death or grievous hurt is caused, the offence of driving without due care is compoundable and, hence, Police will not be able to collect the DNA information of offenders.

Mr Sharael Taha asked whether the DNA collection provisions apply to persons who are currently serving sentences for eligible crimes. The new provisions apply to offences committed after the new law comes into effect.

Mr Sharael Taha asked how officers may decide whether to take DNA samples. Police will assess the nature of the crime, the evidence and whether to collect DNA information.

On Mr Patrick Tay's question about the rationale for the expansion of the scope of collection of DNA information, the intent is to enhance the effectiveness of DNA profiling to help Police solve crimes.

Mr Melvin Yong asked how the revised DNA collection regime would compare with that of other countries. We have surveyed the approach in foreign jurisdictions. We did not just adopt wholesale the practices of other countries but, where appropriate, adapted them to suit our context. For instance, South Australia collects DNA information for all imprisonable offences while England collects DNA information for all imprisonable offences and some non-imprisonable offences. We have chosen to expand our collection only to offences that are punishable by imprisonment and not compoundable under any written law unless the offence is specified in the Fourth Schedule to the Criminal Procedure Code 2010. This strikes the appropriate balance in our local context.

Mr Melvin Yong also suggested establishing a national DNA registry where the DNA sequence of every Singaporean and resident would be recorded. We thank him for his suggestion. His suggestion will be studied.

Mr Sharael Taha raised a concern about whether there are sufficient resources to deal with the increased load in collecting body samples. Resources are an issue. Police will put in place the necessary infrastructure and resources to support the expected increase in load but it will mean that other areas will be even more stretched.

Members also asked about the safeguards for the collection process.

Mr Louis Ng, Ms Ng Ling Ling, Ms Denise Phua and Mr Patrick Tay spoke about young individuals and individuals with special needs. Invasive body samples, such as blood samples, will only be collected based on consent. This applies to all individuals. If the individual is below 16 years old, the written consent of his parent or guardian has to be obtained.

Mr Louis Ng asked how body samples may be taken from young persons and the checks that will be in place to ensure that such consent is given willingly. Please allow me to clarify two points.

First, officers can take any invasive body samples for accused persons below 16 years old with the consent of their parent or guardian. However, non-invasive body samples, such as buccal swabs, can be taken without consent.

Second, where an individual below 16 years of age is a volunteer in the context of the Bill, officers may only take body samples, whether invasive or non-invasive, without his parent or guardian's consent when three requirements are satisfied. First, the parent or guardian's consent is refused without good cause or cannot be obtained despite all reasonable efforts. An example of a good cause can be when the volunteer suffers from blood disorders, such as haemophilia, and the taking of his blood sample may endanger him. Second, the volunteer is willing to give the body sample, and third, a Magistrate's sanction is obtained.

Ms Sylvia Lim asked about the rationale for imposing punishment on the parental guardian who does not give consent for body samples to be taken. Parents and guardians are given the right to decide whether they will give consent on the behalf of their children. If they withhold consent without reasonable excuse, it is their decision. The question then should be why are they refusing if there is no reasonable excuse? There should be an onus to give consent since Police are acting in the public interest.

Ms Sylvia Lim asked how we can protect vulnerable persons from being pressured to volunteer. The law provides for voluntary giving of DNA. When people as adults make up their minds to step forward to volunteer, we should encourage it. I think most people will accept that Singaporeans will make up their own minds.

As for foreign workers, the fact that they may be concerned about their work permits does not negate their consent. They make their assessments and, if they have done nothing wrong, there is nothing to be worried about.

Ms Denise Phua asked how volunteers will be briefed. As part of the procedure to obtain consent, volunteers will be informed that the DNA information provided will be used for purposes under RCA and that they have the option to request for their DNA information to be removed at any point.

Mr Louis Ng asked about the use of force to take a non-invasive body sample. A guilty criminal may not consent to provide data for fear of being incriminated and time is often of the essence when solving a crime. We must thus empower our Police officers to use reasonable force to obtain non-invasive samples, such as buccal swabs, in order to solve crimes. In deciding whether to use reasonable force, Police officers will assess the facts and circumstances of each case, including the urgency of the situation. If individuals feel that the force used was disproportionate, they can provide feedback to MHA or lodge a Police report. The Ministry will investigate the complaint, and take action, where warranted.

After the body samples are obtained, the individual’s DNA information will be extracted from the collected sample, profiled using genetic equipment and software, and the resultant DNA profile stored in the DNA database.

Mr Patrick Tay asked if this process is outsourced to private organisations. MHA engages the Health Sciences Authority (HSA) to administer the DNA Database Laboratory, generate DNA profiles from body samples taken under the RCA and upload them into the DNA database. We do not engage private organisations to undertake this.

Mr Patrick Tay and Dr Wan Rizal asked about the safeguards to prevent the contamination and mixing up of DNA profiles.

First, the DNA sample that is collected is marked with a unique barcode number. After a person has given his body sample, it will be immediately sealed, in his presence. The barcode number will be recorded and the sealed sample is placed into a DNA collection box which will be locked, before being sent to the DNA Database Laboratory for forensic analysis. Thereafter, the sample will be independently processed in duplicate at separate times to ensure the integrity of the DNA profile derived from the sample. The DNA profiles derived from both sets of duplicates are compared for any non-concordance and only the DNA profile of samples which produce identical profiles from the duplicates will be uploaded into the DNA database. This duplication process eliminates potential errors in the uploading process, such as the wrong DNA profile being uploaded into the database.

Next, I will talk about the storage of the extracted DNA information and body samples.

Mr Pritam Singh and Mr Patrick Tay asked how the body samples and DNA information will be stored. The body samples are stored in the DNA Database Laboratory at Police Cantonment Complex and the DNA information is stored in the DNA database which is hosted on a standalone secured network.

As for Mr Melvin Yong’s question on why we keep DNA samples after it has been profiled, Police keep the samples for two main reasons. First, to keep pace with technological developments – allowing us to re-profile the samples as technology advances to upkeep the quality of our records. And second, for quality assurance – so that if the information is challenged, it can be re-profiled from the sample.

Members have asked questions about the data security measures and given suggestions to protect the sensitive information. Mr Pritam Singh, Mr Derrick Goh, Ms Ng Ling Ling, Mr Sharael Taha, Ms Denise Phua, Mr Patrick Tay and Dr Wan Rizal spoke about this.

There are practices in place to protect the DNA information and identifying information stored in the database. Only authorised individuals are allowed to access the DNA database. All access is logged and recorded, through an audit trail, to detect any data modification. The data is stored on a secured network to prevent unauthorised access.

There is also a framework in place to manage any Government data incidents. In the event of a data breach, appropriate remedial actions will be taken in accordance with standard operating procedures and workflows. We thank Mr Derrick Goh for his suggestion to strengthen cybersecurity measures. We will continue to review and enhance the security of our systems.

Mr Murali Pillai asked why the provisions dealing with the collection of body samples under other Acts were not consolidated under the RCA and about the safeguards for the databases maintained under the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act 1955 (CLTPA) and the Misuse of Drugs Act 1973 (MDA). There is no need to consolidate the provisions dealing with the collection of body samples under those other Acts in the RCA, as those Acts already have provisions dealing with the collection of body samples.

Next, I will talk about how the DNA information will be used. Mr Patrick Tay asked how the DNA information will be disclosed during prosecution. One example is where the DNA profile extracted from a crime scene sample is matched to DNA information in the database, leading to the identification of a possible suspect. This can be tendered as evidence in Court.

Ms Sylvia Lim and Dr Wan Rizal asked about the treatment of partial matches. Generally, a partial match will unlikely be the sole piece of evidence that Police rely upon to identify the perpetrator. Police use a range of investigative tools and leads to solve crime.

Mr Patrick Tay asked if the DNA information collected can be shared with other agencies, private organisations or used for civil proceedings. DNA information collected under the RCA can only be used for the purposes specified under the RCA. DNA information collected under the RCA may not be disclosed to private organisations or used in civil proceedings.

As for sharing with foreign law enforcement agencies, which Mr Derrick Goh, Mr Sharael Taha, Mr Patrick Tay spoke about, we will share particulars or DNA information of persons who have been convicted of a registrable crime for the purposes of foreign investigations or proceedings. Further, the foreign law enforcement agency must comply with the conditions prescribed for the transmission of such information and any other conditions that the Singapore authority may impose.

Mr Pritam Singh, Mr Derrick Goh and Mr Sharael Taha asked about future uses of the information that may be prescribed. This relates to clause 13F(2)(d) of the current RCA. The clause, for such other purposes as may be prescribed is not new. It is an existing provision under the current RCA. This provision allows the Ministry to prescribe additional uses for DNA information via subsidiary legislation and such subsidiary legislation has to be published in the Gazette and presented to Parliament.

Next, I will talk about the removal of information. Mr Murali Pillai, Mr Louis Ng, Ms Denise Phua and Mr Sharael Taha asked about the process to apply for the removal of information. One only has to apply to the Registrar online, with his particulars and case details. The Registrar will review the application and provide an official reply within 30 days. The details of the application process will be made available on SPF’s website in due course.

Mr Louis Ng also asked whether individuals would be told that their information is no longer sensitive so that they may re-apply to the Registrar to remove their information from the databases and how the prescribed timelines apply to these individuals. When the Registrar rejects an individual’s application to remove his information from the database, the Registrar will notify the applicant and state the reasons for the rejection. If his data has been retained because there is an ongoing prosecution or investigation, the individual should be aware when these are concluded, such that he may re-apply for expungement. Where his data is retained due to national security concerns, we will not be able to inform him when these concerns no longer exist. If he disagrees with the decision of the Registrar, he can appeal to the Reviewing Tribunal. Even if the Reviewing Tribunal dismisses the appeal, the individual may re-apply for removal at any time.

Moving on to the removal of information from the database. Mr Murali Pillai asked why we require acquitted accused to apply for their information to be removed. The purpose of the database is to assist in crime-solving.

When the acquitted accused applies to have his information removed, we will remove it except under two circumstances. First, where the information is relevant for another ongoing investigation or prosecution; and second, where it is in the interests of the security of Singapore to retain the individual’s data. Subject to that, it is in society’s interests that there is a larger database of DNA – the DNA has to be collected and retained in acceptable ways. That was our rationale. If acquitted persons want their DNA to be removed, they can apply to do so.

Mr Derrick Goh asked about the rationale for the default removal of the information of suspects who are found not to be involved in the commission of the crime, while volunteers need to apply for the removal of their information. Upon arrest, suspects would have been compelled to provide their DNA information, and failure to do so without reasonable excuse is an offence. So, when we find out later that he is not involved in the crime, it would only be right that we remove his DNA information which we had acquired coercively. On the other hand, volunteers provide their information on a voluntary basis, and hence it is reasonable for their data to remain in the database until they apply to remove it.

Mr Louis Ng, Mr Sharael Taha and Mr Patrick Tay asked whether individuals who are granted a discharge not amounting to an acquittal or given a stern warning can apply for their information to be removed. These individuals will not be allowed to apply for their information to be removed. An individual granted a discharge not amounting to an acquittal has not been granted a full acquittal on the charge and the Public Prosecutor may still institute proceedings against the accused on the charge. This may occur, for example, where an accused has absconded. Thus, his information should not be removed from the database as it is still required for investigations or prosecution. Persons who are warned are also not equivalent to persons who have been acquitted. They were warned because investigations revealed that they were involved in the commission of the offence, but the Public Prosecutor has decided not to prosecute them in court.

Mr Patrick Tay also asked about the retention of information for individuals whose offences have been rendered spent. Individuals who have their offences rendered spent are not equivalent to individuals who are acquitted or discharged. The significance of a spent conviction is that the individual will no longer have a criminal record for the spent offence. This facilitates his rehabilitation and re-integration, by removing stigma associated with a criminal record. On the other hand, his identifying information and DNA information will continue to be retained by the Police, as this information may be vital for solving future crimes.

Mr Pritam Singh had asked four questions. His first question was on safeguarding the DNA database and access to it. I had set out, in my Second Reading speech, what the safeguards are. Only authorised individuals are allowed to access the DNA database. All access is logged and recorded and there will be an audit trail to detect any data access. The DNA information is stored on a standalone, secured network to prevent unauthorised access.

Mr Singh wanted to know what will happen if an officer accesses information without authorisation under this Bill. When there is unauthorised access, action will be taken. This could include criminal charges being brought. Members will be aware that in the past, officers have been charged in Court for unauthorised access or use of information. Most recently, Members may have seen media reports of two former prison officers who had been charged for unauthorised use of inmate information. Both were imprisoned. One of the cases was in the news two days ago. If any person feels that his information has been misused, he can lodge a complaint and the complaint will be investigated. Action will be taken if the complaint is found to be substantiated.

Mr Singh's second question relates to section 13F(2)(d) of the current RCA. The provision for such other purposes as may be prescribed is not new. It is an existing provision under the current RCA. This provision allows the Ministry to prescribe additional uses of DNA information via subsidiary legislation. Such subsidiary legislation has to be published in the Gazette and presented to Parliament.

Mr Singh's third question is on how officers may decide whether to take DNA. Officers on the ground will have to be given the discretion, exercise their judgement whether to take the DNA for the investigations. It is not possible to prescribe precisely when they should and should not take DNA in future, because there are thousands of different situations. What the law can do is to set out the parameters, the framework for the exercise of the powers and that is what we are doing. Police will assess the nature of the crime, the evidence and whether to collect DNA information even if the offence is registrable or eligible.

Mr Pritam Singh's fourth question was to ask for the cost of taking a DNA sample.

Police officers perform a variety of duties. It is not possible to ascertain the cost of every individual isolated act. If we wanted to identify the cost, technically, one will have to assess the number of officers involved, the time cost based on their salaries and so on and many other factors to do this exercise.

In conclusion, Mdm Deputy Speaker, I hope I have addressed Members' concerns. This Bill will enable our law enforcement agencies to carry out their duties more effectively and to continue to keep Singapore safe and secure.

I thank Members for their valuable suggestions and support for this Bill. With that, Mdm Deputy Speaker, I beg to move.

Mdm Deputy Speaker: Mr Murali Pillai.

6.16 pm

Mr Murali Pillai: Mdm Deputy Speaker, I seek clarification from the hon Minister of State on two areas.

The first area is in respect of her reply to my query in my speech about whether or not a person would be warned of the consequences of not giving a blood sample to extract DNA information. The hon Minister of State mentioned that the current practice would be followed.

May I just point out to her that this Bill actually creates a new offence, the new offence being the offence of failing to give a blood specimen to extract DNA information. So, my question to her is whether the current practice is be updated to specifically mention about this new offence.

Secondly, in relation to my question as to why the databases for DNA information extracted under the Misuse of Drugs Act and the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act are not merged or consolidated with the database under the Registration of Criminals Act. The hon Minister of State mentioned that there are already provisions in these acts, meaning the MDA and the CLTPA, and therefore there is no need for consolidation.

My question is a different one. My question is – what are the legislative safeguards for collection under the MDA and the CLTPA? In principle, I do not see a difference between a convicted criminal and a ISA detainee, which is covered by the current Bill, and a drug addict of a Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act detainee. For all of them, their DNA information should be safeguards. I seek the clarification from the learned Minister of State. At the very least, can she perhaps assure the House that this will be looked at at some point in the future.

Ms Sun Xueling: I thank the Member for his clarifications. I would like to reiterate that what I meant about the procedure to obtain consent is that the accused will be asked to sign a form, which will state the consequences of refusing to provide consent. I hope that answers his question.

Mdm Deputy Speaker: Ms Denise Phua.

Ms Sun Xueling: Sorry, he had a second question.

On Member's second question, I would like to share that under CLTPA as well as the Misuse of Drugs Act, there are clauses that specify with regards to the taking of photographs, finger impressions, body samples, so on and so forth as well as with regards to the retention of these photographs, finger impressions as well as body samples. As such, because they are already explicitly stated in the CLTPA as well as the MDA, we do not see a need for us to consolidate them under the RCA.

Mdm Deputy Speaker: Ms Denise Phua.

Ms Denise Phua Lay Peng: Thank you. Just two questions on the vulnerable. I was not sure if I caught it. How will the Police actually help those who are above 16 years old with disabilities, special needs or who do not have full mental capacity in, for example, the process of collecting blood samples and so forth.

Secondly, on those who are less educated and less tech-savvy, I heard the response that they will be informed to go online but that is exactly how many of them would not be able to do so. So, I just wanted to have some clarification on that. If you are not ready, it is okay, but please look into it and please just look into these two groups, especially.

Ms Sun Xueling: I thank the Member for her questions.

On the first part, with regard to individuals who are above 16 years old, where the Police assessed that the individual may not have the mental capacity to give consent, the Police will err on the side of caution and not take an invasive blood sample.

On the second question, I understand where the Member is coming from. We have tried to make the process as straightforward and as simple as possible. They only need to fill up an online form, fill in the case number and as such. That is as simplified as we can make. But I understand where the Member is coming from, that anything that is online may make it difficult for certain groups of individuals.

I would like to share that the Police will be able to explain this process to the vulnerable person to enable them to get onto this process. But if there is difficulty that they face, they can raise it with us and we will see how to help them apply for their information to be removed.

Mdm Deputy Speaker: Ms Sylvia Lim.

Ms Sylvia Lim: Thank you, Mdm Deputy Speaker. One question for the Minister of State. When the law enforcement agency is getting consent from the person they are drawing the DNA sample from – it could be a suspect, it could be a volunteer – and that person is not comfortable in English, are there steps to make an interpreter present?

Ms Sun Xueling: I thank the Member for her question. In most situations, our Police officers are able to speak in the vernacular. So, I think for the situation that she shared, I believe the Police will be able to explain the process in the vernacular language that the accused person is comfortable with so that the suspect is able to comprehend and understand what is necessary from him or her.

Question put, and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House.

The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. – [Ms Sun Xueling].

Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed.