Protection from Scams Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

12.33 pm

The Minister of State for Home Affairs (Ms Sun Xueling) (for the Minister for Home Affairs): Mr Speaker, on behalf of the Minister for Home Affairs, I move that, "The Bill be now read a Second time."

Sir, the scams situation continues to be of grave concern in Singapore. Preliminary indicators show that the number of scam cases and losses would have increased by about 10% and 40% respectively, in 2024, compared to 2023. Over the past few years, Government agencies have worked closely with banks to put in place measures to safeguard the public from scams. For example, we have the Money Lock, which allows bank customers to set aside a portion of their funds in their bank accounts that cannot be transferred digitally; and we also have the Kill Switch, which allows bank customers to suspend their accounts quickly if they suspect that their bank accounts have been compromised.

Despite the safeguards and extensive public education efforts, we still see a high number of scams involving self-effected transfers, where individuals willingly transfer monies to scammers. From January to September 2024, self-effected transfers accounted for 86% of all scams reports and 94% of losses. These include government official impersonation scams, investment scams and Internet love scams. Such scams rely on social engineering and prey on respect for authority, greed and the human desire for companionship and love.

In some cases, the Police have observed that the victims were so taken in by the scammers' deceit, that they refused to believe that they were being scammed, despite being repeatedly advised by family, friends, their bank and even the Police. By the time these victims realised the truth, the scammers had siphoned their monies out of Singapore. Let me give you a few examples.

In a love scam case, a 64-year-old female victim befriended the scammer on a social media platform and entered into an online relationship with him. The scammer claimed to be working on an offshore oil rig project outside Singapore and told the victim that once his project was completed, he could come to Singapore to marry her. Over the course of about two years, the scammer repeatedly asked for money from the victim, claiming it was to buy equipment for the project or to pay his workers' salaries. Each time, the victim transferred the money to various bank accounts designated by the scammer. Despite attempts by the Police and her family to convince her that she was being scammed, she continued to make money transfers to the scammer. It was only after multiple engagements by the Police that the victim was finally convinced that she was being scammed. And by that time, unfortunately, the victim had already lost about $400,000 to the scammer.

In another case and this is an example of a love and investment scam, a 33-year-old male victim met the scammer on an online dating platform. The scammer slowly gained the victim's trust, eventually deceiving the victim into believing that they were in a relationship. The scammer then introduced the victim to a fake investment opportunity promising substantial profits. Believing that the investment opportunity was legitimate, the victim made several transactions to multiple bank accounts on the scammer's instructions. The transactions amounted to a total of $200,000. Despite being engaged by both banks and the Police, the victim remained unconvinced that the person was a scammer. He subsequently even attempted to borrow money from his parents to fund the "investment". It took multiple attempts by the Police before he was convinced.

These are but two examples of the cases of victims that the Police have encountered. In these cases, the Police and the banks have no legal powers to stop the victim from making further transactions. The victim would continue to lose more money to the scammers until he or she is eventually convinced that he or she is being scammed. In some of these cases, the victims have appealed to the Government for financial assistance.

Mr Speaker, Sir, it is not just the victim who suffers. Their loved ones – spouses, children, parents – suffer too. They often have to support the victim emotionally and financially as he deals with the loss, sometimes amounting to a lifetime of savings. These family and friends, they feel frustrated and helpless. They wish that more could have been done to protect their loved ones.

In such situations, the authorities should have powers to intervene decisively. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has, therefore, tabled this Bill to introduce new powers for the authorities to step in and stem further scam losses.

This Bill empowers Specified Officers, including Police Officers and Commercial Affairs Officers, to issue a Restriction Order (RO) to banks to restrict the banking transactions of an individual, if there is reason to believe that he will make money transfers to a scammer, withdraw any money and give it to a scammer or apply for a drawdown from any credit facility with the intention of benefiting a scammer. The intent is to buy the Police more time to engage and convince the individual that he is being scammed, including through enlisting the help of his family members. ROs will only be issued as a last resort, if all other efforts to convince the individual has failed.

Clause 2 of the Bill defines a scammer as a person who has interacted with the scam victim substantially via remote communication, for the purposes of committing or facilitating the commission of a scam offence. MHA has filed a Notice of Amendment, to remove the word "substantially" from the definition of a scammer in clause 2, as well as to remove the words of "conducted remotely" from the long title.

The MHA's policy intent in introducing the power to issue ROs is primarily to protect victims from remote scams. However, the Police have observed some cases where scammers introduce elements of physical interaction to strengthen the deception. These amendments will remove ambiguity over whether ROs can be issued in such cases.

Clause 3 empowers a Specified Officer to issue an RO to a bank. The RO will direct the bank not to execute any banking transaction from an individual's bank account and not to allow any drawdown of credit facilities. In other words, an individual who is subjected to an RO will have his bank accounts, automated teller machine (ATM) facilities and credit facilities suspended. Nevertheless, the individual will be provided access to his monies for daily living expenses. This will be covered in clause 5 of the Bill, which I will elaborate on later.

Operationally, the RO will be issued to the seven Domestic Systemically Important Banks, or DSIBs in short, which account for the vast majority of consumer bank accounts in Singapore. The RO will also be issued to a non-DSIB, if there is reasonable suspicion that the victim will effect transfers to a scammer from a non-DSIB account or withdraw money from it to give it to a scammer.

Clause 4 specifies the threshold that must be crossed before an RO can be issued. First, the Specified Officer must have reason to believe that the individual will transfer money to a scammer, withdraw money and give it to a scammer or apply for drawdown from a credit facility with the intention of benefiting a scammer. Second, the Specified Officer must determine that the RO is necessary for the protection of the individual.

With the amendment to remove the word "substantially" from the definition of a scammer in clause 2, the legal power to issue ROs would, technically, extend beyond remote scams to more traditional cheating cases, which involve mostly physical interactions and where the other party is known to the individual in real life. Traditional cheating cases are more complex. They require deeper investigation to establish if there is, indeed, an offence.

For example, in a case of cheating alleged to be committed by a real friend or real lover, it is not always clear at the outset whether a criminal offence is disclosed, unlike in remote scams. Hence, the threshold to issue ROs in such cases will be higher. A Specified Officer will only issue an RO in an exceptional case when there is clear and incontrovertible evidence that a relevant offence is disclosed. Similarly, the Specified Officer must determine that the RO is necessary for the protection of an individual.

The decision to issue an RO will be made solely by the Police, based on a holistic assessment of the facts and circumstances of each case. While the wishes of the individual and his family members may be taken into consideration, the Police will make the final decision.

MHA is mindful of the need to strike a balance between protecting an individual from further harm and not unduly inconveniencing him. The Bill takes this into consideration and has put in place four sets of safeguards.

First, clause 4 of the Bill requires that an RO be issued only if necessary for the protection of the victim. An RO is, thus, issued as a last resort. Where there are still other options available for protecting the victim, the Police will first explore these options. Let me give you an example.

The Police are notified by the bank that a person is making large transactions to an account linked to a love scammer. Despite multiple engagements by the Police, the victim refuses to believe the Police and continues to make transfers to the scammer. As part of their engagements with the victim, the Police find out that the victim has a sibling whom he is close to and he trusts. A Specified Officer may not issue an RO to restrict the victim's banking transactions or use of credit facilities, if the victim and the sibling agree to an arrangement where the sibling will monitor the victim's transactions via a joint account and can advise the victim against making further transfers to the scammer.

Second, clause 5 of the Bill limits the duration of an RO to a maximum of thirty days at the outset. This provides assurance that the restrictions will not be imposed for longer than is necessary to protect the individual, while ensuring that the Police have sufficient time to further engage and convince the individual.

During this period, the Police may work with the individual's friends or family members and gather further evidence. The individual may also be referred to a counsellor or a social service agency for support. A Specified Officer may cancel the RO ahead of the 30-day limit if the officer assesses that the individual is no longer at risk of making money transfers to the scammer.

Clause 5 also empowers a Specified Officer to extend the RO for up to 30 days at a time, up to a maximum of five extensions, if the officer assesses that more time is required to persuade the individual. The initial RO and five potential extensions will last up to a maximum of 180 days. After this, the RO must lapse.

The RO will not be extended further, even if the victim is still at risk of transferring more money to the scammer and may well do so after the restriction order lapses. MHA takes a practical approach to this. We cannot handhold the victim indefinitely, nor do we have the resources to do so, but we will do all that we can, while the RO is enforced, to bring the individual to his senses.

Third, clause 5 empowers a Specified Officer to vary the RO temporarily to allow the individual to have access to the money in his bank accounts. For example, upon application by the individual, a Specified Officer will allow him to withdraw a fixed amount of money for the purposes of daily living or to pay medical bills or insurance premiums.

Fourth, clause 7 provides for an appeal process so that an individual can appeal against the issuance of an RO to the Commissioner of Police, whose decision is final. Given that the RO will remain active pending the assessment of the appeal, MHA will ensure that the appeal process is expeditious.

MHA has conducted public consultations on the Bill. Around 90% of the respondents expressed support for the proposals. Some recounted past experiences, where their family members or friends were scammed and commented that the RO would have been useful in those situations. A minority of the respondents, however, highlighted the need to respect individual autonomy and were concerned that such powers would be intrusive.

MHA acknowledges these concerns. As I explained earlier, the RO will only be issued temporarily and only as a last resort. Specified officers would have conducted investigations to satisfy themselves that the individual is indeed being targeted by a scammer and would have futilely engaged the individual before issuing the RO. We will also put in place safeguards to ensure that the powers are used judiciously.

Mr Speaker, the Police have a duty to protect the public from harm and to prevent crime. The cost of falling prey to scams does not only affect the scam victim. Often times, their family members and even Government finances are needed to support scam victims in the aftermath. We thus have a collective responsibility to protect potential scam victims. This Bill allows the Police to act decisively and close a gap in our arsenal against scammers. While this Bill alone may not significantly dent the total number of scams, it will save some individuals and their loved ones much agony and pain. I hope the Members of this House will support the Bill.

But even as we continue to work on providing protection to scam victims, we must remember that scam prevention and mitigation is not the responsibility of the Government alone, nor can we succeed alone. Combating scams requires the whole-of-society, and we must all continue to work together to protect ourselves and our loved ones from scams. Mr Speaker, Sir, with your permission, I would now like to speak in Mandarin.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] From January to September 2024, cases where victims willingly transferred monies to scammers accounted for 86 percent of all scam reports and 94 percent of losses. Such scams exploit an individual’s respect for authority, human desires and longing for companionship and love. In some cases, the victims were so taken in by the scammers’ deceit that they refused to believe that they were being scammed, despite being repeatedly advised by their family, the banks or the Police.

The Police and the banks have no legal powers to stop victims from making further transfers, so victims may continue to transfer money to scammers until they finally realise that they have been scammed, or until they have lost their life savings. Not only are the victims affected, their families, spouses, children and parents may also need to support the victims financially and emotionally. In some of these cases, families have to appeal to the Government for financial assistance.

The authorities need the powers to intervene decisively, which is why the introduction of the Protection from Scam Bill is necessary. This Bill allows the Police to step in and stem further scam losses. Through ROs, if there is reason to believe that an individual will transfer money to a scammer, the Police can work with the banks to restrict the individual's banking transactions and use of credit facilities.

The RO will only be issued as a last resort, after all other efforts to convince the individual have failed. According to the Bill, the RO is valid up to 30 days at the outset and can be extended up to five times. The total duration will not exceed 180 days. During this period, the Police will work with the individual’s friends or family to gather more evidence. The individual may also be referred to a counsellor or social service agency for support. The individual can also apply to withdraw a fixed amount of money for the purposes of daily living, or to pay medical bills and insurance premiums.

We believe that this Bill is necessary as it enables us to stem scam losses and prevent scam victims from losing their life savings due to a moment of impulse or fear.

Question proposed.

Mr Speaker: Mr Yip Hon Weng.

12.53 pm

Mr Yip Hon Weng (Yio Chu Kang): Mr Speaker, Sir, I believe this Bill is a necessary step forward. But I have some clarifications to ensure it works as intended.

First, Mr Speaker, Sir, when it comes to scams, speed is everything. Every minute counts. This Bill lets officers issue ROs to block suspicious transactions. But how fast can this happen?

Imagine if someone's life savings were on the line. Minutes, even seconds, could make the difference. Can we move fast enough?

Then, there is the question of scale. Scams today do not target one person – they hit hundreds, sometimes thousands, at once. Can our systems handle such a surge? Or will delays cost victims dearly?

In Yio Chu Kang, I have had residents come to me, frustrated that their cases have not been followed up for weeks, even after the Police assured them that they would. Perhaps this is a symptom of the system being overwhelmed. If so, how do we address it? Delays like these can erode trust in our ability to protect victims.

And what if the wrong account gets blocked? Mistakes can happen. How quickly can we fix them, so that innocent people are not left stranded?

Prevention is just as important. Can we do more to educate the public? Let us make every Singaporean scam-wise. Let us turn them into scam-fighters who can protect themselves and their loved ones.

Next, Mr Speaker, Sir, the appeals process in clause 7 is critical. But it needs to work for everyone. What about seniors who are not tech-savvy? Many seniors in Yio Chu Kang do not even use smartphones. If their account gets blocked, how can they appeal? Community networks, like grassroots organisations, must step up to help them.

Then, there is fairness. Clause 7(5)(b) allows appeals to be decided based on documents alone – no hearings. While that saves time, what about those who struggle to explain their case in writing? Should they not get a chance to speak, especially for complex cases? And under clause 7(6), the Commissioner's decision is final. To build trust, could we introduce regular reviews? Or publish anonymised outcomes to show that the system is working fairly? Transparency matters.

Third, Mr Speaker, Sir, this Bill places heavy responsibilities on banks, and rightly so. But we must be careful not to overwhelm them.

Clause 6 imposes a $3,000 fine for non-compliance. Is that enough to deter negligence? Or do we need stricter penalties? More importantly, banks need resources. It is not always easy to distinguish a scam from a legitimate transaction. Can we provide clear guidelines, training or support, especially for smaller banks?

Penalties alone would not recover lost savings. Prevention is the real solution. Let us work closely with banks to stop scams before they happen.

Finally, Mr Speaker, Sir, scams do not stop at our borders. Many originate overseas, where our laws have no jurisdiction. What can we do about that? Could Singapore lead efforts to create a regional task force? A shared intelligence system could make it harder for these syndicates to operate. What if we built a global registry of known scam accounts? This could help authorities and financial institutions block scammers faster.

And while clause 9 protects banks acting in good faith, we must ensure this does not lead to complacency. Especially for overseas transactions, we cannot leave any gaps.

In conclusion, Mr Speaker, Sir, this Bill is a necessary and timely step in addressing the scam crisis. However, it is also highly intrusive, as it temporarily removes personal agency by restricting access to accounts.

We must therefore act with care. Temporarily freezing someone's account is a serious measure. It should only be justified by the need to protect vulnerable individuals. To mitigate this, we must prioritise robust training and resources for bank employees and artificial intelligence (AI) systems to minimise errors in account restrictions. A streamlined, human-centered appeals process is also vital to address disputes swiftly and fairly.

We must also be mindful of unintended consequences. Victims who feel unsupported might turn to unsafe alternatives, like loan sharks, out of desperation. Furthermore, disputes involving family members over money can escalate and create long-lasting tensions. This is why safeguards are essential. Neutral support systems, such as community networks and counsellors, must be in place to guide victims and help them recover from such experiences.

For many seniors, the impact of scams goes beyond financial loss. They often suffer a loss of dignity and confidence, leaving them too ashamed to seek help. Young people, too, have not been spared. In some tragic cases, falling prey to scams has led to severe mental health issues and even suicide.

To truly protect Singaporeans, we must act fast, be fair and address the root causes of scams. Loneliness, financial insecurity and lack of support create vulnerabilities that scammers exploit. These underlying issues must also be tackled to build resilience in our society.

Mr Speaker, Sir, this Bill must be supported by a strong commitment to act swiftly, fairly and wisely. It must protect the most vulnerable segments of our society, while ensuring interventions are timely, precise and carefully managed. Together, we can create a society where scams find no foothold and every resident feels safe, supported and empowered to protect themselves and their loved ones. Sir, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Gerald Giam.

12.59 pm

Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song (Aljunied): Mr Speaker, scams are wreaking havoc on lives and the life savings of many Singaporeans. In just the first half of 2024, 26,587 scam cases were reported, with losses exceeding $385.6 million.

Behind some of these numbers are residents of Aljunied Group Representation Constituency, a number of whom have sought my help to recover their hard-earned money. Sadly, in most cases I have seen, recovery has been minimal as the funds have been transferred out of Singapore and the burden of preventing scams still rests heavily on the shoulders of the end-users.

The Protection from Scams Bill is an important step forward towards combating this scourge. However, it introduces a significant change to the legal relationship between banks and their customers. Traditionally, banks have acted as fiduciaries with a singular duty of loyalty to their customers, including following specific instructions for financial transactions. This Bill, however, empowers the Police to issue Restriction Orders to banks, enabling them to temporarily restrict an individual's banking transactions if there is a reasonable belief that the customer is about to transfer money to a scammer. I believe that this is a justifiable shift, given the grave risks posed by scams, including the potential for victims to lose their life savings.

However, its effectiveness is contingent upon timely identification and intervention by the authorities, which may not be feasible in all cases. Many scams are executed within minutes, even seconds, leaving no time for third parties to intervene. This makes the Bill less effective in these increasingly common high-speed scenarios.

May I ask the Minister of State, based on the scam cases that came to the attention of the Police over the past year, has the Ministry modelled how many ROs would have been issued if this Bill had already been in effect?

To better combat scams, we need more systemic safeguards that stop scams before they start, hold financial institutions, telecommunications companies, social media companies and messaging providers more accountable in preventing scams from taking place on their platforms and compensate victims if they fail to put in place adequate measures.

Some safeguards are captured in the Shared Responsibility Framework (SRF), which took effect on 16 December 2024. However, SRF focuses solely on phishing scams that lead to unauthorised transactions. It assigns a few specific duties to banks and telecommunications companies to mitigate such scams and requires compensation for victims when these duties are not fulfilled.

While SRF improves protections against phishing-related threats, it does not cover the full range of scams affecting consumers today. Many scams, such as investment scams or romance scams, rely on social engineering to deceive victims into authorising payments under false pretences. Unlike phishing scams, these involve victims being misled about the purpose of the transaction, rather than unauthorised access. Addressing such scams requires tailored strategies and frameworks, which I will come back to later.

I am concerned about the SRF's reliance on banks to conduct the initial investigation into scams, including assessing whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities. This presents an inherent conflict of interest, as banks are both the investigator and an interested party with a financial incentive to conclude that they met their obligations. This also creates a significant disadvantage for scam victims who lack access to key evidence, such as system logs or fraud detection records and often do not have the expertise to effectively challenge the bank's findings.

Consider this scenario: a bank customer falls victim to a phishing scam, where their funds are fraudulently transferred out of their account. The customer raises a claim under SRF, asserting that the bank failed to meet its obligations, such as sending real-time notifications or flagging a suspicious transaction through its fraud detection systems. The bank conducts the initial investigation and concludes that it fulfilled all its duties under SRF, including providing the required alerts and adhering to the cooling-off period. It informs the customer of its findings and denies reliability for the losses. The customer, lacking access to system logs or detailed evidence of the bank's actions, is unable to independently verify whether these obligations were indeed fulfilled.

Although the customer has the option to escalate the matter to the Financial Industry Disputes Resolution Centre (FIDReC) or the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), these bodies may also face limitations in their ability to access critical evidence. If these bodies are called upon to adjudicate disputes or review banks' investigations under SRF, do they have direct access to the necessary evidence, such as system logs, fraud detection records and notification timestamps? If these bodies rely solely on banks to supply this evidence, there is a risk that the information provided may be selective or incomplete, especially when the findings could impact the bank's liability. For oversight to be truly effective, these adjudicating bodies must have the authority and technical capability to directly access and verify evidence rather than depend on the banks' representations alone. Without this, the impartiality and robustness of the review process may be compromised.

To address these shortcomings, an independent investigative body should be established to handle scam-related cases pertaining to banks' fulfilment of their SRF obligations. This body would examine evidence provided by the bank, the customer and any relevant third-parties to ensure impartiality and transparency. Such a body would act as a neutral arbiter, removing the inherent conflict of interest in having banks investigate cases where they are the interested party.

Additionally, victims should be informed of their rights and available recourse options as part of the investigation outcome report. This includes clear guidance on how to escalate disputes to independent bodies, such as FIDReC. Providing this information upfront will ensure victims are aware of their options and are not left without avenues for redress if they disagree with the findings of the investigation.

I would like to make several more proposals for regulators to require platforms to put in place enhanced protections against a wider range of scams. These complement the proposals I put forward in my speech during the Second Reading debate on the Online Criminal Harms Bill on 5 July 2023.

A recurring scam that my residents have brought to my attention involves the misuse of digital wallets, like Apple Pay and Google Pay. Scammers set up a digital wallet linked to the victim's bank account. While multi-factor authentication is typically required during set-up, scammers exploit social engineering techniques to manipulate victims into unknowingly approving the setup. Once the wallet is linked, subsequent payments often bypass additional authentication, allowing scammers to rapidly deplete funds without further victim involvement.

This highlights several possible vulnerabilities in the current system. First, the reliance on multi-factor authentication alone is insufficient when victims are tricked into authorising fraudulent setups. Second, once the digital wallet is authorised, there is a lack of effective monitoring to detect and flag suspicious transactions. Third, the absence of clear accountability between banks and digital wallet providers exacerbates the issue, leaving victims with little recourse.

To address this gap, banks must be required to work with digital wallet providers to deploy real-time fraud detection algorithms that monitor all digital wallet transactions for anomalies, including transactions that occur after the initial digital wallet set-up. These algorithms should integrate behavioural analysis, such as device changes, unusual transaction patterns or foreign Internal Protocol (IP) addresses, to flag high-risk activities. This will enable proactive intervention to block unauthorised activities before the funds are lost.

Bank should be held liable for losses if they fail to meet these duties. Financial institutions should be required by the regulator to enhance back-end fraud detection by integrating account data, behavioural analysis and anomaly detection to identify high-risk payees. These are the possible scammers or their agents. This approach minimises reliance on customers' judgement alone and strengthens fraud detection.

Many platforms, including social media, email and messaging services, as well as telecommunications companies and mobile handsets already offer mechanisms to block and report suspected scams. However, these reports are often siloed, remaining on the user's device or with the platform concerned. There is no centralised scam database to consolidate and share this information.

Currently, many scam reports only enter the scam database managed by the Singapore Police Force (SPF) if the user installs the ScamShield app and submits a scam through it. This approach is insufficient to crowdsource the collective knowledge of a broader pool of users to identify and report scams as they emerge.

To address this, the scam database currently managed by the Police, should be allowed to receive real-time updates from the banks, telecommunications companies, social media platforms and messaging providers based on user reports, while incorporating robust safeguards to protect privacy. These platforms should then use this shared data for monitoring and proactively blocking scams on their own platforms.

MAS and the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) should assess and rate financial institutions, telecommunications companies, social media companies and messaging platforms on the robustness of their anti-scam measures and their implementation of the systemic safeguards mentioned earlier. To promote accountability and incentivise improvements, these ratings should be clear, fair and standardised, with transparency to consumers. However, vulnerabilities identified during the assessment should not be publicly disclosed until the entities have had a reasonable opportunity to address them to ensure security is not compromised.

Mr Speaker, scams are an evolving threat. This Bill takes an important step forward with its focus on "emergency brakes" to mitigate harm in individual cases.

However, its scope remains narrow. To effectively combat scams, we need more systemic safeguards that address root causes and build resilience across platforms. These systemic safeguards include, deploying real-time fraud detection for digital wallet transactions, enhancing Know Your Payee mechanisms to flag suspicious payees and creating a centralised scam database accessible to banks, telecommunications companies and social media companies for real-time monitoring and blocking. Together, these measures will ensure more robust prevention, swift enforcement and shared responsibility in protecting Singaporeans from scams.

Sir, I support this Bill but urge the Government to consider these proposals and look forward to the Minister of State's responses to them.

Mr Speaker: Ms Hazel Poa? Not here. Mr Gan Thiam Poh.

1.11 pm

Mr Gan Thiam Poh (Ang Mo Kio): Speaker, Sir, in Mandarin.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Scam cases have become more rampant in recent years. From 2019 to 2023, the number of scam cases increased almost five times, with losses reaching $650 million in 2023 alone. Despite the government and banks' continuous public education activities and measures to protect bank accounts, the number of victims voluntarily transferring money to scammers remains high. What is worrying is that some victims still insist on transferring money to scammers despite the scams being exposed by relatives, friends, bank employees, or even the police on the spot.

In this case, I support the Protection from Scams Bill by the Ministry of Home Affairs. It offers certain protection and restricts victims of online and telecommunications fraud cases from conducting bank transactions to better protect them.

Those who receive a restriction order will not be able to transfer money from their accounts, take out loans, and use ATMs or credit cards. I would like to ask the Minister, if it is found during the police investigation that a third party assisted the party in transferring money to overseas scammers, will the authorities also issue a restriction order to him?

The effectiveness of the bill depends on the police's quick response and investigative capabilities. Can the government consider giving the police stronger powers to reduce losses?

Finally, it takes a while to wait before remittance. Can the minister ask the bank to add a checking procedure to give the police and the bank more time to try to contact the person involved and make the necessary confirmation and explanations.

Mr Speaker: Assoc Prof Jamus Lim.

1.14 pm

Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim (Sengkang): Mr Speaker, the Protection from Scams Bill is the Government's latest legislative efforts to tackle the scourge of scams which, as we all know, almost doubled between 2022 and 2023, and amounted to more than $650 million in losses. The key idea embedded in the Bill is the granting of powers to issue ROs to banks to stop transactions as a last-ditch effort by the Police to prevent what has clearly adjudged to be a scam.

I will make two main points. First, given the eroding distinction between fraud and scams, I wonder whether the definition of scams covered by the Bill alone is sufficient. Second, in light of how the Bill represents a significant intrusion into private transactions, I wonder if there is room to further constrain the specific application of ROs.

Let me start by explaining how many observers perceive a difference between frauds and scams. Fraud, for them, is a result of deception. A malicious actor obtains personal information without the victim's knowledge or consent and proceeds to use said information for financial gain. Scams, in contrast, occur when an unwitting victim is manipulated to either release such information voluntarily or, in the most egregious cases, abet the process altogether with active cash transfers or withdrawals.

As observers, we are often inclined to place the blame for fraud on the provider and scams on the consumer. Hence, we think of how financial institutions or telecommunications companies (telcos) can step up their surveillance of fraudulent schemes or ads, or to plug security holes in their back-end systems, or to contain fraudulent activity.

This has, indeed, been the focus of the SRF, where guidelines underscore how the duties and responsibilities of the bank or telco tend to be limited to actions taken when fraudulent activity is detected and ascertained. If the consumer subsequently authorises the transaction, however, then these institutions tend to be absolved of their share of any losses since they would have already taken reasonable steps to stop said transaction.

There is often less sympathy for those who fall victim to scams. Many claim that victims are either too naive, or too greedy, or too careless. Surely, if they had simply stepped back and thought through the moment more carefully, they would not fall prey to wily scammers. Or worse, they are frequently viewed as willing, if unwitting, participants who should be punished to learn their lesson. They need to recognise that 20-year-olds who connect with 80-year-olds, if they truly are even 20-year-olds, are not really there because of true love, or that it is not possible to double your money in the span of a few months by lending it to a cash-strapped entrepreneur, returns guaranteed.

The problem, however, is that this distinction, while appealing in theory, is both artificial and misleading in practice. Let me offer a few real-life examples to illustrate my point.

Those holding credit or debit cards may have inadvertently used them at a terminal with a skimmer installed or exposed their card to radio frequency identification (RFID) devices. The card then gets cloned and the clone is either used directly to make purchases or the relevant information is sold on the dark web.

Syndicates have also become sophisticated in testing the waters, effecting one or two small transactions that could easily have been missed in a sea of transactions or by sending packages to the actual address. Verified "live" cards are then used for large purchases, usually in foreign jurisdictions with weak scammer laws.

Has the consumer truly been defrauded here, as one could argue, since they never approved these purchases? Or is it more akin to a scam since it could be argued that their indifference in response to the testing of transactions implies their acquiescence to the larger scheme?

As another example, consider an investment scam disseminated as an ad through a social media platform. The scammer would have paid for the ad – and in many cases, an ad that is targeted at a potentially vulnerable demographic – and the text of the ad may well include disclaimer language about the "opportunity".

So, it seems straightforward. Surely someone who "invests" in, say, a villa in Cambodia or a business in Thailand understands the associated risks. But these scammers do not always propose overt gambles of this nature. In our Meet-the-People Sessions, we have encountered residents who were duped by offers of, say, a tour in Malaysia, offered at a discount, or the promise of a job, which involves specialised pre-training for a fee.

From the vantage of the social media platform, these may well seem legitimate and, unsurprisingly, the social media company would have a financial interest to classify them as such. Yet, when revealed to be a scam, the provider is often reluctant or outright refuses to take down the ad.

Is this a scam or a fraud? It exploits the victim's desire to secure a good deal or a job, which makes it closer to a scam. Yet, it embeds elements of deception, such as hidden fine print or bait-and-switch tactics, which makes them more akin to fraud.

Of course, there is yet another third possibility often cited by defenders of the status quo – that scammers may pose as victims to try to defraud financial institutions. Such conspiracies are, of course, criminal. But what if the line between collaborating to deceive and a plea for assistance is far less clear? We are certainly acquainted with cases where in the name of love or compassion, someone is asked to help with hospital expenses for a friend or their child. Is this a scam, or a cry for help, or something in between?

While it is an empirical question whether such activities are actually as widespread as feared, or would become so if a more robust consumer protection framework were put in place, it is nevertheless true that practices of this nature tend to blur the line between scams and fraud and the sort of give-and-take that is common to human relationships.

The artificial line between frauds and scams therefore places an even more pressing onus on the formulation of laws that adequately protect Singaporeans from the scourge of both. We should not simply default to the necessary – but absolutely insufficient – calls for consumers to simply exercise more cyber hygiene while standing pat with more robust legislation.

Sir, relatedly, the current treatment of scams in the ambit of the law appears imperfect. Scams are defined in the Schedule as offences falling under sections 416A, 417, 418, 419, 420, 420A and 420B of the Penal Code 1871. We can cross-reference this against the guidelines issued by the Sentencing Advisory Panel for scam-related offences, which touch on sections 51 and 55A of the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes Act, sections 8A and 8B of the Computer Misuse Act, and section 420 of the Penal Code. The overlap is section 420 of the Penal Code.

If we treat this as encompassing the full scope of how scams will be addressed by this proposed law, then the sort of scams that would trigger the issuance of restriction orders are those associated specifically with cheating behaviour.

The key question, then, is whether this definition is sufficient for prosecuting the sort of scams experienced in the real world, given the examples I have cited above. After all, as already mentioned, scams could be designed such that the fraud intent is either not immediately evident or is somehow justifiable. Love, job and investment scams could be framed as genuine pursuits, with the perpetrator even undertaking actions, such as disclaimers to risky investments, or a nominal amount of useless training, or providing a genuine medical bill, that would justify the request for money and its subsequent transfer.

Furthermore, the most successful scams often involve confidence-building measures that exploit known weaknesses in human psychology or emotion to an extent that the scam victims may even refuse to acknowledge or believe that they are being duped even when the scam may appear evident to external parties. Undoubtedly, this is one of the focuses of the present Bill, yet many remain well in denial after the fact or refuse to face losses head-on. Is this cheating any more? If an individual truly wishes to proceed with an action even when confronted with evidence to the contrary, is this indeed something that constitutes cheating?

When even experts and professionals that do this for a living may be duped, how can we be assured that the Police will have special insight or clarity, in advance, into what does or does not constitute a scam? Will the RO only be activated when the Police is able to successfully peg the case to a known scammer or organisation?

If we accept this inherent uncertainty, how will we be certain that ROs will also be effective in circumstances where scammers are not immediately recognised, especially in an age of AI, where the online signature of a potential scammer may easily be masked by extreme personalisation and customisation, otherwise known as "deep phishing"?

What if the 30-day freeze period activated by clause 5 of the Bill simply postpones the inevitable? Would the knowledge that a scammed victim plans to remain resolute in their insistence on a monetary transfer ultimately undermine the good-natured intent of the law?

To be clear, existing laws and regulations are always going to be somewhat incomplete, which is precisely why efforts like the current Bill are necessary. Even if we focus more narrowly on the notion of fraud, the existing framework offers scant protection for the consumer.

This is a matter that the Workers' Party has previously spoken up about. In particular, we believe that the way the SRF doles out the burden for dealing with fraud and scams remains incomplete at best, and ineffectual, at worst.

For instance, the responsibilities of telcos in the SRF are currently only limited to texts via SMSes, perhaps due to known vulnerabilities in that system. But can telcos do more? After all, I am sure that many of us have received calls from what appears to be local numbers, phishing for details in a foreign accent. If indeed these are locally registered numbers rather than spoofed ones and these numbers have previously been reported to ScamShield, could the Police use registration documentation to preemptively pursue these scammers?

Moreover, scams are often disseminated via alternative communications channels, such as WhatsApp messages, social media post or ads, as mentioned previously, and direct messages on social media platforms. So, while phishing texts that seek to prod potential victims into clicking malicious links or fake websites do indeed exist, the more nefarious scamming attempts of late are reliant on social engineering and establishing relationships – much more scam than fraud.

Perhaps more concerning is how the SRF relieves financial institutions from solely bearing the burden of fraud so long as they fulfil a checklist of seemingly reasonable actions. These include instituting cooling-off periods, real-time notifications of risky transactions, a self-reporting tool for freezing accounts and a fraud detection system.

These are, surely, valuable measures, but they cannot cover reasonable eventualities where the customer does not appear to be very much at fault at all. One example, based on an experience that I believe many in this House would share, is when a resident encounters an unrecognised transaction in their account. Typically, when they discover such charges on their credit card or debit card, they would simply call the bank. The institution would typically freeze the card, issue a new one and perform an investigation into the matter, after which, in most instances, the errant transaction would be struck off.

Unfortunately, when the charge is on a debit card, things get far more complicated. In principle, such transactions would have required some sort of additional personal identification number (PIN) verification, which would make fraud far more unlikely. But the rise of contactless payments, as mentioned by my friend Mr Gerald Giam, means that the embedded RFID chip in the card performs the same security function, which negates the need for any additional PIN. This has permitted fraud of this nature to emerge via RFID skimming. While the cardholder could certainly take additional steps to protect their phone or cards from such skimming attempts, to me, it is a stretch to claim that the fault solely lies with the customer and that they should bear the full burden of such unauthorised transactions.

As another example, consider how many banks deal with unrecognised transactions that are reported. The process will usually entail a freeze and an investigation, as I explained earlier. But the investigation itself is opaque. I am sure Members will also have residents who have reported erroneous transactions expeditiously – only to be subsequently told that the appeal was unsuccessful and that they would need to carry the cost of these charges even if they had no clue as to how they incurred them.

As a final example, think about how often we receive calls from individuals claiming to be officers from a legitimate financial institution. These days, many such calls are fraudulent and seek to illegitimately obtain the accountholder's personal information. But when customers do not have telephone banking set up, they are often asked a series of security questions, in lieu of the passcode or PIN. Even if these questions do not rely on the NRIC, which, as the recent Bizfile fiasco has demonstrated, is clearly insecure, the answers to these questions may potentially be obtained by any sufficiently motivated investigator. And on the flip side, it is far from clear how, as customers, we can verify that the caller is indeed from a financial institution. I have, on more than one occasion, challenged an actual call from an officer from my bank and the absence of equivalent mechanisms to verify the legitimacy of the caller was made amply clear.

All this to say that SRF, as currently conceived, has offered accountholders scant protection from even instances of fraud, even when customers make good-faith efforts to protect themselves. What more scams, which are much more sophisticated in design and target the most vulnerable among us.

Hence, there is clearly much more work to be done to protect consumers and, hence, the driving motivation for this Bill. Even so, there are reasons to have reservations about the manner by which the proposed Bill goes about the task. One may be uncomfortable, specifically, with how the Bill grants law enforcement an enormous amount of latitude to intervene and restrict what is, ultimately, a private transaction.

While there is no perfect solution and, to be clear, I recognise the well-meaning nature of what is embedded in the Bill, I wonder if the law could also exercise flexibility in its application. In particular, is it possible for banks to offer individuals the right to designate a trusted administrator, perhaps, a close friend or relative, the full authority to freeze transactions for up to 30 days, in lieu of the Police? This would be similar in spirit to a grant of a letter of administration, albeit in a more limited sense. It would also essentially be an extension of the existing Money Lock feature, which already covers 61,000 accounts and $5.4 billion in savings, to designate a third-party as an authorised person with the ability to corroborate a genuine withdrawal intent.

Sir, the blurring lines between scams and fraud means that efforts to tackle the scourge of online and offline thievery requires more innovative mechanisms that account for human psychology and behaviour. The ROs put forward by this Bill are one way forward. I have expressed some reservations over their intrusiveness and hope that there will be some exit option for those who, ex ante, insist on opting out. I also urge this Government to not be content with the measures in this Bill alone, but to continue refining the SRF to build an ecosystem that is more resilient to scams and fraud. That said, on balance, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Ms Hazel Poa.

1.34 pm

Ms Hazel Poa (Non-Constituency Member): Mr Speaker, Sir, scams have proliferated in recent years and appear to be increasing in number. In the first six months of 2024, scam victims in Singapore lost a record high of over $385.6 million.

The Bill we are debating today is a groundbreaking one. If passed, we could be the first country in the world to allow the Police to restrict bank accounts and an individual's banking transactions, if there is reasonable belief that the individual will make money transfers to a scammer.

The Bill is well-intentioned. Eighty-six percent of scams in the first half of 2024 involved the voluntary transfer of monies by the victim to the scammer. By allowing the Police to restrict a potential victim's bank account for 30 days in the first instance and up to 180 days in total, we will provide the Police, banks or family members with more time to convince potential scam victims that they may be at risk of being manipulated into sending money to scammers.

That being said, the money in the bank accounts belong to the account holders and to uphold the principle that they have the right to determine its use. We suggest introducing a provision for individuals to opt out, subject to some safeguards. These safeguards can include a 30-day period before the opting out takes effect, the opting out must be done in person and after a compulsory counselling session.

Additionally, an RO may run the risk of pushing emotionally-vested victims into desperation. For example, a victim of a romance scam may be emotionally devastated if they are prevented from sending money to the scammer, who has also become their lover. Such victims may need emotional support. How does the Police intend to support such victims?

The Progress Singapore Party's (PSP) suggestion is for an explicit provision to be added to clause 4(b) that the Police must take into account the views of a social worker before issuing the RO. Scam victims should be counselled by a social worker and be provided mental health support. With the assistance of family members, the social worker can determine whether an RO would be to the victim's benefit or might instead cause harm. This would better help the Police decide whether an RO would benefit the victim.

PSP would like to raise several further clarifications about the Bill.

The Government has said that it will put in place a mechanism for an individual who is the subject of an RO to have access to his monies for legitimate reasons, such as sustaining daily living and paying bills. Will this mechanism be extended to all RO subjects automatically, or will they have to submit appeals to withdraw monies for legitimate reasons? If it is the latter, can the Police consider streamlining the mechanism, because it is likely that almost all RO subjects will submit such an appeal? RO subjects may face significant hardship if they are unable to access their money for legitimate reasons for an extended period.

Additionally, how will the Police determine the quantum of these withdrawals? How much proof will the Police require the individual to show? Will the Police also subject these monies to restrictions or monitor whether individuals are also sending these withdrawals to scammers?

Next, will the RO extend to joint accounts owned by the individual? If so, while this may protect the other joint account holder from financial losses caused by another joint account holder who is being scammed, we must also ensure that there are mechanisms to avoid unduly inconveniencing joint account holders.

During the public consultation by Reaching Everyone for Active Citizenry @ Home (REACH), members of the public suggested that individuals should be allowed to continue with General Interbank Recurring Order (GIRO) payments, including bill payments to legitimate organisations, while an RO is in force. PSP supports such a suggestion.

The Government has said that the banks are unable to exempt selected transactions, such as GIRO payments and bill payments, from the RO, without significant system changes. However, a freeze on such legitimate payments may add to the inconvenience and confusion faced by scam victims during an already difficult time. In addition, they may face financial penalties for any late or unsuccessful payment. We urge the Government to work with the banks to set up the system changes and enact this suggestion as soon as possible. Mr Speaker, in Mandarin, please.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Mr Speaker, Sir, the Protection from Scams Bill being read the second time today is an unprecedented piece of legislation. Once passed, we may become the first country in the world to allow the Police, under reasonable circumstances, to restrict bank transactions to prevent fraud.

PSP believes that the intention behind this Bill is good. In recent years, scam cases have been on the rise and it is necessary for us to take to strong measures to protect our citizens from the threats posed by scams.

However, PSP also believes that the money in the bank accounts belongs to the users as their assets. An important principle of private property rights is that users have the right to decide how to dispose of their assets.

To uphold this important principle, PSP proposes that we should establish an opt- out clause, allowing bank users to opt out of this restriction. To ensure that users are not invoking this opt-out clause under the influence of scammers, we propose setting a 30-day cooling off period. The opt-out clause would only take effect 30 days after the user invokes it, during which time the Police can restrict bank accounts to prevent fraud.

Furthermore, Restriction Orders (Ros) may drive some emotionally vested victims to desperation, for example, victims of romance scams who are forcibly prevented from remitting money to their lovers may make impulsive or foolish choices. These victims need emotional support. How does the Police plan to provide such support?

PSP proposes that the Bill should stipulate that the Police must consider the opinions of social workers before issuing ROs. Scam victim should receive counselling from social workers who can, with the assistance of the victim's family members, determine whether the RO would cause harm to the victim. This will better help the Police decide whether the RO is beneficial for the victim. Guarding against scams is everyone's responsibility. We hope that after the implementation of this Bill, we can prevent more people from voluntarily transferring money to scammers, thereby reducing Singapore’s attractiveness to scammers.

(In English): Sir, a whole-of-society effort is required to prevent the scourge of scams from spreading. The Government can only do so much to protect Singaporeans from scams. The onus is also on Singaporeans to remain vigilant and take steps to protect themselves from potential scams. We hope that after this Bill is enacted, we will be able to prevent more victims from voluntarily transferring funds to scammers, which will hopefully reduce the attractiveness of Singapore as a target for scammers. Sir, notwithstanding my clarifications, PSP supports the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Ms Usha Chandradas.

1.42 pm

Ms Usha Chandradas (Nominated Member): Mr Speaker, Sir, I rise in support of this Bill but I have some clarifications that I wish to seek from the Minister of State.

The proposed Bill seeks to protect targets of ongoing scams by empowering the Police to issue ROs to banks. These ROs have the effect of restricting the banking transactions of scam victims and they will be issued if there is a reasonable belief that the victims concerned will make money transfers to scammers or utilise credit facilities to benefit them. Joint account holders of scam victims are also affected by these measures. While the intent of the proposed law is to protect individuals from losing their money, the law also grants very wide-ranging powers to the Specified Officers as they are defined at clause 2 of the Bill.

My first question for the Minister of State is, on the experience of these Specified Officers as defined at clause 2, they presently include any Police Officer or Commercial Affairs Officer as defined under the Police Force Act 2004. Since the Bill grants these Specified Officers very wide-ranging and serious powers, and these are powers that impinge greatly on the personal autonomy of scam victims, can the Minister of State elaborate on the expected qualifications of these Specified Officers? For example, will there be a minimum work experience requirement for these officers? Will they be required to undergo specialised training before assuming their roles?

In her speech earlier, the Minister of State referred to certain safeguards being put in place. Could the Minister of State explain how the public can be reassured that ROs will only be issued by experienced and qualified officers?

The definition of a scam victim as provided in clause 2 of the Bill includes an individual against whom a scam offence is intended to be committed. Read together with clause 4, this, theoretically, has the effect of enabling the issuance of an RO, even before the intended victim has suffered any actual financial loss.

So, my second question to the Minister of State is this: can the Ministry provide some examples of what would make a Specified Officer think that a scam victim will act in the manner as described in clause 4(1)(a)? While the Minister of State referred to incontrovertible evidence that the scam has taken place but, if for example, no actual financial loss has taken place, how will the Specified Officer be satisfied or have reason to believe that the acts in clause 4(1)(a) of the Bill will actually take place?

Clause 4(1)(b) states that ROs may be issued when necessary to protect scam victims. This provision takes into account the time that is required by Specified Officers, relatives, or other persons to implement preventative measures. Accordingly, it is hoped that these measures will mitigate the risks of victims continuing to fall prey to scam-related offenses. Clause 4 (1)(b)(ii) also refers to "all other relevant circumstances" being taken into consideration. However, there is no indication in the Bill as to what these circumstances might be.

As the Bill already gives very wide powers to Specified Officers, could the Minister provide some more examples of the kinds circumstances that are envisaged here? The criteria for issuing ROs seems to rely heavily on the judgment of Specified Officers. The exercise of this discretion really does need to be guided by very clear regulations to ensure that we do not see errors in judgement being committed or even worse, an abuse of power.

My fourth question has to do with the definition of a relative in relation to a scam victim. I note that parents are left out of the definition and could I ask the Minister why this is the case? What would the recourse be if the parent of a scam victim wishes to be involved in the risk mitigation measures outlined in clause 4(1)(b) of the Bill? Can they or can they not be involved in these processes?

My fifth question has to do with the amount of time that will be taken for the consideration of an appeal against an RO. The explanatory statement to the Bill acknowledges that there is a need to ensure that appeals are made and determined expeditiously, but is the Minister able to provide an indication on the length of time that the Commissioner will take to review an appeal?

My sixth question is on the appeals process laid out in this Bill. At clause 7(4)(b) we see that appeals against decisions related to ROs can be decided without a hearing and in the absence of the scam victims themselves. The absence of a formal hearing denies individuals the opportunity to present their case or to challenge evidence. Victims or affected individuals might also feel disenfranchised by an appeals process that does not allow them to participate actively. In light of these concerns, could the Minister clarify why clause 4(b) is required? Could the Minister also explain or provide examples of the kinds of circumstances that will result in an appeal being decided without a hearing?

My final question has to do with what the Government is doing to address the underlying causes of the perpetuation of scams. While the Protection from Scams Bill is a blunt tool that curtails the freedoms of scam victims, ROs may also not be extended indefinitely. The very fact that this law is required is testament to the core problem at hand and, that is, why are we in Singapore so susceptible to scams in the first place? It has been reported quite widely that scammers manipulate victims into making poor decisions by using deep-seated psychological tactics. They often use strategies that exploit fundamental human emotions, such as the desire for love and friendship or the instinct to make quick and guaranteed financial gains, whether through jobs or investments. These are all very powerful motivators that can override rational thinking.

Many Members in the House had spoken about these factors but I would like to approach the matter from a slightly different perspective and, here, I would like to take the opportunity to remind the House that art can really be a very powerful tool In addressing the root causes behind the perpetuation of scams. First, it can be used to raise better awareness about scams; and secondly, it can help people to form communities of trust and care that they can lean on, instead of becoming easy prey for scammers looking to exploit their emotional vulnerabilities.

In last year's Motion on Building an Inclusive and Safe Digital Society, I mentioned the example of HSBC in Hong Kong, which organised an art exhibition aimed at promoting public awareness on fraud prevention and online scams. In December last year, Singapore art, animation and design educational platform Eyeyah partnered Meta, SPF, the National Crime Prevention Council and the Cyber Security Agency of Singapore to come up with a 44-page, a very artistically designed magazine for students which was focused on scam prevention. Eyeyah's resources are completely free for Singapore educators and it uses creative approaches to demystify up to 13 different scam types. The publication includes interactive activities, such as word searches and mazes, and encourages readers to slow down and make observations. These are critical skills in identifying potential scams. I understand that 40,000 hard copies of the magazine will be distributed for free to students through primary and secondary school art clubs. In addition, educators from any institution may request an e-book version to distribute schoolwide. I am so incredibly heartened to see this successful collaboration and the important recognition given by the Government to the power of the arts. I hope that the Ministry can continue to engage more with the arts community in its educational outreach on scam prevention.

Mr Speaker, there is also plenty of evidence to show that engagement with the arts, whether as an observer or a creator, helps to mitigate feelings of isolation. They help us to forge new social connections as well as recapture ones that may have been lost. There are plenty of reports and statistics on this and I will highlight just one for today. According to a 2012 report by the Baring Foundation in the UK, entitled "Tackling Loneliness in Older Age – The Role of the Arts", older participants frequently noted that their first significant benefit from arts projects was meeting new people, forming friendships and feeling less isolated. This is just one example of how social engagement through the arts can be particularly effective in countering loneliness that scammers often seek to exploit when they are targeting their victims.

I have another example I would like to talk about from this past weekend. This past weekend, terminally ill artist Jun Yang Pow held an exhibition entitled "Canvas of Memories" at Suntec City celebrating his artistic and personal journey. Crowds gathered to view the show, share their support and engage with the works on display. The event organised by Art Outreach and Ambulance Wish, who worked very hard over Christmas and New Year breaks, brought together practising artists and various members of the public. It really showcased how art can create a strong sense of community and shared purpose. The atmosphere of solidarity and connection at the show was really just as moving as the art itself.

Events like this highlight how the arts can do more than just combat isolation. They build networks of care, trust and empathy. By fostering meaningful relationships and creating environments where people look out for one another, art strengthens social bonds. This makes individuals more resilient to scams and manipulation, which often prey on those who are isolated and who lack a supportive community. When people feel connected and cared for, they are less likely to fall victim to exploitation. To put it another way, a community which is rooted in care and connection is one that is so much harder to exploit.

I hope that the Government will consider my suggestions for a deeper and more meaningful involvement of the arts community in our broader collective fight against scams. Notwithstanding my suggestions and clarifications, Sir, I support this Bill.

Mr Speaker: Ms Ng Ling Ling.

1.53 pm

Ms Ng Ling Ling (Ang Mo Kio): Mr Speaker, the scam and cybercrime situation in Singapore has become a cause of concern, with an increase of 18% to 28,751 cases from January to June 2024, compared to 24,367 cases in the same period in 2023. Over the first half of last year, victims lost more than $385.6 million, which is a substantive sum of losses that impact victims very significantly, some of whom are my residents in Jalan Kayu.

Given the extensive impact and losses of scam cases in Singapore, I am supportive of the introduction of the Protection from Scams Bill, which will enable the Police to better protect targets from ongoing scams who refuse to believe that they are being scammed. Nevertheless, I believe that the protection of individuals from scam should not solely rest on the Government, but there is a shared effort by the financial institutions, telecommunication companies and the public at large, in minimising the likelihood for people to fall prey to scam tactics.

I will raise considerations on three key aspects of the Bill. First, on the scope of the ROs to support effective implementation; secondly, on how the Government needs to balance between safeguarding individuals' assets with fostering shared responsibility; and finally, on strategies to minimise unintended consequences, such as efforts in reducing inconvenience, maintaining public trust and enhancing public awareness.

Firstly, I am seeking to understand the effectiveness and the scope of RO in addressing evolving scams. The Bill currently only allows for the issuance of ROs for scam cases conducted substantially via digital or telecommunication channels. Under clause 3 of the Bill, RO is limited to the extent of directing banks in: one, to prohibit a transfer or withdrawal of money from any bank account of a scam victim maintained with that bank; or two, to prohibit the granting or allowing a drawdown of any credit facility to the scam victim.

Nonetheless, scammers today have become innovative in exploiting newer platforms, such as cryptocurrency exchanges, remittance companies or e-commerce and e-wallet providers. Scams involving crypto assets are also not easily recovered as the asset can be quickly transferred overseas, with limited jurisdiction oversight, from Singapore. This makes it easy for scammers to use such for anonymous transactions to untraceable accounts in their scam exploits. Similarly, remittance services also play a role in cross-border scams, such as the recent investigations into the suspected fraudulent transactions by a remittance company operating in Chinatown. Without restricting potential victims access to these platforms might result in scammers shifting their operations from traditional banking transfers to the use of crypto-assets or remittance services, for example.

As such, I would like to ask if MHA will consider expanding the scope of ROs to include platforms, such as cryptocurrency exchanges, remittance companies or e-commerce and e-wallet providers? Also, what mechanism could be in place to ensure the adaptability of the Bill in protecting victims when scammers shift to less-regulated financial platforms to conduct their scams?

The key aspect of this Bill is to protect the victims through empowering Police Officers to issue ROs to banks in Singapore to prohibit certain bank transactions and the use of credit facilities temporarily. I support the issuance of ROs to protect individuals from losing their money to scammers. As scam victims are often manipulated or pressured into acting against their own interests, such intervention can help prevent further harm.

While the Bill seeks to safeguard individuals from scams, there are practical concerns about the balance between protecting victims and respecting their autonomy. For instance, making decisions for victims, especially before a thorough investigation can be initiated, could lead to the possibility of misjudgement for ROs to be applied. I understand that an RO can be issued if there is a reasonable belief that the individual will make money transfers to the scammer. I would like to ask MHA, how "reasonable belief" will be determined when assessing the risk of transfer to scammers? Will there be thresholds for evidence or is the judgement based on an Officer's discretion?

Furthermore, if the Police are unable to convince a potential victim to halt a particular transaction, should the responsibility, ultimately, rest with the individual if they fall victim to a scam? How would MHA ensure that the issuance of an RO balance between protecting scam victims while respecting their autonomy and personal responsibility?

I also hope that the Government can consider expanding the current SRF for phishing scams to include a broader range of stakeholders and measures. Aside from financial institutions and telecos, to include e-commerce and e-payment platforms, remittance companies and social media companies. These entities can contribute to scam prevention by enhancing account verification process, monitoring suspicious activities and implementing robust measures to safeguard users from fraudulent schemes.

Additional scam types, such as malware-enabled fraud and cryptocurrency scams, should also be included in a broader framework to address evolving tactics of scammers. This will allow stakeholders to robustly implement targeted measures to reduce the vulnerabilities in digital ecosystem and allow for collaborative efforts between law enforcers and technology platforms to disrupt fraudulent activities at source.

Lastly, I understand that clause 5 of the Bill allows for ROs to be in force for up to 30 days; and clause 7 provides for appeals against the decision to issue a RO. On this aspect, I am keen to understand the unintended consequences that may be caused by the issuing of RO, on how we can mitigate the potential risks of the ROs while minimising inconvenience. I hope to clarify if there would be mechanisms to allow individuals issued with ROs to access limited funds for daily expenses, for example, up to a reasonable cap while investigation is underway.

Currently, the Government has worked with banks to provide mechanisms, such as the Kill Switch and Money Lock, as safeguards to protect the public. These measures provide banks' customers with proactive options to secure accounts through either freezing their bank accounts if they suspect their accounts are compromised or set aside a sum of monies that cannot be transferred out of their bank account via online means. It is a positive sign when more than 181,000 customers have used the Money Lock to protect their money to set aside close to $15.8 billion in savings, out of reach of potential scammers.

If greater public awareness and education on Money Lock and Kill Switch can help to support the effectiveness of these safeguards, we should do more to help our Singaporeans to safeguard their assets. I hope the Government can further encourage adoption across different demographics, especially among the elderly. These mechanisms can complement the issuance of ROs to address cases where scams progress despite these safeguards. Greater collaboration between financial institutions and law enforcement agencies, through public education campaigns, will be essential to maximise the impact of these tools in protecting individuals from financial harm.

Mr Speaker, to conclude, this Bill represents a proactive step in protecting Singaporeans from the undue impact of scams, which could result in irreversible losses for individuals. I believe that its success depends on our ability to ensure ROs are implemented effectively, strike a delicate balance in protecting individuals without overstepping into personal autonomy and responsibility and minimise unintended consequences that may burden victims while enhancing public awareness and education.

Moving forward, we must adopt a collective approach, involving financial institutions, telecommunications companies, technology platforms and individuals themselves to combat scams comprehensively. This Bill must, thus, serve not only as a legal safeguard, but also inspire a broader culture of vigilance and resilience against scams. Together, we can protect the vulnerable from the risk of scams and strengthen our society against such evolving threats.

Sir, notwithstanding my considerations raised, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Neil Parekh.

2.02 pm

Mr Neil Parekh Nimil Rajnikant (Nominated Member): Mr Speaker, Sir, for the past decade, scams have escalated into a pressing issue, significantly impacting families and businesses in Singapore. The urgency of this problem is underscored by the fact that just in the first six months of 2024, a staggering $385 million was lost to scams, which is a 25% increase from the previous year.

Disturbingly, 86% of these scams involved victims willingly transferring money despite repeated warnings from banks, law enforcement and loved ones. These figures are not just numbers, they represent real people and their heartbreaking stories of retirees losing their life savings, individuals manipulated by false promises of love and people driven to financial and emotional despair.

One recent case involved a man on the brink of losing all his $600,000 in savings, but was saved by the quick intervention by a diligent bank officer. Unfortunately, not every story has a happy ending. Even when faced with undeniable evidence, many victims remain steadfast in their trust in scammers, sometimes to their ruin.

The escalating scam landscape also poses a multifaceted threat to Singapore's business ecosystem, with small and medium enterprises particularly vulnerable to sophisticated cyber threats that can inflict severe financial, operational and reputational damage.

Beyond direct monetary losses, businesses face increased cybersecurity investment costs, potential operational disruptions and erosion of customer trust, whilst employees handling financial transactions become prime targets for scammers seeking to compromise both personal and corporate assets. These challenges not only jeopardise individual companies' sustainability but also undermine the broader confidence in Singapore's digital economic infrastructure, necessitating comprehensive protective strategies that extend beyond individual victim protection.

The Protection from Scams Bill addresses this urgent and escalating challenge by empowering the Police to issue temporary ROs as a last resort to protect potential victims. This Bill represents a pivotal step forward, balancing the need to respect individual freedom with the collective responsibility to shield our citizens from irreparable harm.

Today, as we discuss this Bill, let us remember that this is not just legislation. It is a lifeline for those caught in the psychological grip of scammers. It reflects a commitment to safeguarding the vulnerable in our community and a testament to our determination to combat this escalating issue.

The Bill aims to empower law enforcement, specifically, the Police, to intervene more effectively by enabling them to issue temporary ROs to prevent further victimisation of individuals at risk of falling prey to scammers. Sir, these temporary ROs are a central feature of the Bill. They will allow the Police to intervene before financial damage occurs, providing a crucial window of protection for potential victims who may be transferring money to scammers.

These Orders can be issued to freeze or restrict certain activities that may lead to further victimisation, such as freezing bank accounts or restricting certain financial transactions. While we recognise that implementing these measures may pose operational challenges for our financial institutions, requiring system adaptations and staff training, this investment in infrastructure will, for sure, strengthen our financial ecosystem against fraud.

Moreover, this legislation presents significant opportunities for innovation. We anticipate increased demand for advanced fraud detection and prevention technologies. This opens new avenues for Singapore-based companies to develop cutting-edge solutions, potentially creating a new export market for our cybersecurity expertise. Our fintech sector stands to benefit greatly, too, from these developments.

Though we need to strike a balance between regulatory effectiveness and technological innovations, I do believe stronger protections will increase public confidence in the banking and financial systems.

We must also consider the cross-border implications of this Bill. As we implement these measures, we need to ensure that they do not unduly hinder legitimate international financial relationships and cross-border transactions, which are vital to our economy. The enhanced trust in a system, our well-oiled cross-border processes, coupled with a proactive stance against scams, will reinforce Singapore's reputation as a secure financial hub, potentially attracting more international investment.

Sir, at this point, I have six clarifications for the Minister of State. One, at this juncture, what would be the minimum threshold for issuing these Orders? Two, could the Ministry spell out clear timelines and documentation requirements for scam victims or joint account holders appealing against the ROs? Three, could additional details be outlined on the limits of immunity granted to banks and their staff, particularly in cases of unintentional errors? Four, what will be the criteria and processes for including new offences to ensure transparency and consistency? Five, could I request the Minister of State to outline the process for scam victims to apply to lift or modify restrictions, ensuring timely resolution of legitimate concerns? Lastly, would it be useful at this time to establish a single regulatory body to coordinate the mechanisms between banks, regulatory authorities and officers to streamline the implementation of the Bill's provisions?

In conclusion, public education is a key element in ensuring that the importance of this Bill is communicated to the common man and the business community. The importance of the Protection from Scams Bill cannot be overstated. It is a crucial step towards protecting our citizens and businesses and ensuring a safer, more secure society. Mr Speaker, Sir, notwithstanding my clarifications, this Bill has my full support.

Mr Speaker: Assoc Prof Razwana Begum.

2.09 pm

Assoc Prof Razwana Begum Abdul Rahim (Nominated Member): Mr Speaker, I stand in support of the Protection from Scams Bill. This Bill empowers the Police to issue ROs to banks to restrict an individual's banking transaction if there is reasonable belief that the individual will make money transfers to scammers. The aim of this authority is to enable the Police to better protect targets of ongoing scams, who refuse to believe that they are being scammed.

Mr Speaker, the Bill is an important addition to Singapore's existing suite of initiatives designed to identify, prevent and prosecute financial scams. However, I have four issues of concern that I would like to clarify. Before I do, I would like to make some introductory comments to reinforce the need for these changes. I would also like to note that I am currently the head of the Public Safety and Security programme at the Singapore University of Social Sciences and cybercrime is an issue of primary concern.

Mr Speaker, in the first six months of 2024, scam losses in Singapore amounted to over $385.6 million, an increase of 24.6% from the previous year. These figures are concerning, as they reflect not just credit and debit balances on a bank statement, but the life savings and associated financial, social and emotional health and well-being of thousands of fellow Singaporeans.

Mr Speaker, there is a common misconception that only the elderly are susceptible to scams. However, data shows that 72% of the scam claimants are between 31 and 60 years of age. Scamming is a crime that can and does impact people of all ages and genders and all social, cultural and economic backgrounds.

Mr Speaker, the concept of digital trust underpins our modern economy. According to the World Economic Forum, digital trust is an expectation that digital technologies and services will protect the interest of their stakeholders. Scammers are aware of this trust and use increasingly sophisticated and believable psychological and emotional techniques to manipulate it in their favour.

In the first six months of 2024, 86% of scams involved victims voluntarily transferring funds based on false but sincere trust, including love scams, investment fraud and impersonation schemes. Mr Speaker, despite what we may think of ourselves, we are all susceptible to such deceits. Scamming is not something that only impacts others. It impacts all of us.

Mr Speaker, I will now return to my four issues of concern. First, on autonomy of individuals. Overriding the decision-making authority of a competent adult is a significant step and one that should not be taken lightly. In Singapore, we already have guardianship and financial management legislation to protect adults who are legally considered incompetent to make decisions in their own best interest. These provisions do not, however, apply in the context of this Bill, as the adults in question are still legally competent.

We are, in fact, saying that we know better than them and that despite their legal competency, we are going to stop them doing what they want to do with their own money. Mr Speaker, I understand and support the rationale for these provisions, yet, suggest that in those circumstances where an involuntary RO is issued, that the affected adult be automatically referred for independent legal advice and that there be provisions for that adult to appeal the RO if they so choose.

Mr Speaker, my second issue is related to the first, and concerns the provision in the Bill that note that ROs will be issued only as a last resort and after other options to convince the individual have been exhausted. I support this approach, yet, seek clarification about who is responsible for attempting to convince the individual and what is meant by those attempts being exhausted. Perhaps guidelines need to be developed to ensure transparency and consistency in forming a view that what all reasonable attempts have been exhausted?

My third issue relates to the training and support to be provided to bank officers to enable them to comfortably and competently recognise issues that may require intervention, determining if and when a customer is seeking to make a transaction that may be scam-related or not, in the customer's best interest, is not as straightforward as it sounds. We do not want to inadvertently create a situation where banks either over-refer or under-refer customers and, again, perhaps, guidelines need to be developed to ensure consistency in referral process.

Mr Speaker, perhaps, it may also be helpful for banks to develop formal relationships with a selected group or community organisations, specifically trained to provide age, gender, religious and culturally appropriate support to customers at risk. That is, instead of banks contacting the Police, they contact a nominated community organisation, who can work with the customer to determine if an RO is actually needed.

Mr Speaker, my fourth and final issue relates to victim support. Many victims of scams experience significant and ongoing issues after being or almost being scammed, including financial loss, emotional distress or trauma, relationship difficulties and housing or employment issues. Perhaps the Ministry could establish dedicated support services to provide free and confidential support to victims or near-victims of scams, including those subjected to ROs.

Mr Speaker, Singapore's digital future is bright but there are also risks. This Bill addresses one of those risks and, in doing so, aims to protect the financial, social and emotional health and well-being of thousands of fellow Singaporeans.

Mr Speaker: Mr Sharael Taha.

2.16 pm

Mr Sharael Taha (Pasir Ris-Punggol): Mr Speaker, the alarming rise in the number of scams is deeply concerning. Even more shocking, is the staggering amount of money lost to such scams. In 2023 alone, in Singapore, an astonishing $650 million is lost to scams. Alarmingly, in just the first half of 2024, 86% of reported scams were the result of self-effected transfers.

What is particularly troubling is the significant amounts lost in individual cases. During the same period, government officer impersonation scams (GOIS) and investment scams stood out as the most financially devastating. On average, victims of GOIS lost more than $100,000 per case while investment scams saw average losses of over $40,000 per case.

This issue is not confined to any one demographic. In my conversations with residents of Pasir Ris-Punggol, I have met scam victims of GOIS, love scams and investment scams. Contrary to popular belief, the victims are no longer just the elderly or the digitally inexperienced. Increasingly, they include younger professionals – educated and digitally literate individuals – something which was mentioned by Assoc Prof Razwana earlier.

While the statistic that 86% of scams involved self-effected transfers may suggest a level of voluntary action, the reality, Mr Speaker, is far more insidious. A common modus operandi involves seemingly innocuous messages, such as a notice from the Land Transport Authority claiming an underpayment of 10 cents for parking or a fine. The message contains a link to settle the fine and while the initial transfer appears minor, it serves as a gateway for scammers to drain much larger sums from victims' accounts.

Let me illustrate this with a specific case shared by a resident. She received such a message, prompting her to make a small initial payment. Shortly after, she received an alert from her bank about several overseas transactions. She immediately informed the bank that she had not authorised these transactions and was a victim of a scam. Yet, to her dismay, the bank allowed the transactions to proceed, citing the fact that she had already initiated the first transfer as part of an e-wallet. As a result, she lost close to $3,000.

Allow me to share another distressing case involving a Pasir Ris-Punggol resident who fell victim to a love scam. This case came to my attention when her family, in sheer desperation, sought my assistance. The victim, a 60-year-old woman, had already transferred more than $50,000 to an overseas acquaintance. Shockingly, this sum included loans that she had taken from her own family members. Despite her family's repeated efforts to intervene and persuade her to stop, she remained resolute in her actions, believing in the legitimacy of her relationship. Her family approached me to talk to her, hoping I could help her see the gravity of the situation.

This case underscores the deeply manipulative nature of scams, which prey not only on victims' financial resources, but also on their emotions and trust.

Hence, Mr Speaker, I stand in support of this Bill, which seeks to empower the Police to issue ROs to banks, enabling them to limit banking transactions for individuals when there is reasonable belief that these funds may be transferred to scammers.

This is undeniably a significant step, granting the Police substantial authority over an individual's access to their own financial resources. Such powers are, by nature, intrusive and it is imperative that we approach this matter with utmost caution. We must strike a delicate balance between holding individuals accountable for their financial actions and ensuring that authorities do not overreach in matters of personal autonomy.

While I support the intent and direction of the Bill, I have several clarifications and concerns that I hope the Minister of State will address: firstly, on the issuance of the Restriction Order; secondly, on the scope of the RO; and thirdly, on minimising the inconvenience to individuals affected.

Mr Speaker, in Part 2, clause 3 of the Bill specifies that an RO is an order issued by a Specified Officer to one or more banks in relation to a scam victim. I seek clarification from the Minister regarding the definition of this Specified Officer. Will this Officer be the one reporting the case, the investigating officer or someone from a specialised branch of the Police Force focused on scams?

This provision grants significant authority to the Police over an individual's financial assets. How do we ensure that such powers are not subject to abuse and that there is accountability in their exercise of power?

At the same time, to make this measure truly effective, how do we ensure an efficient process that prevents victims from transferring further funds to scammers? In the love scam case I cited earlier, the victim was rushing to transfer money and without immediate intervention, the transfer would have already been completed.

As an additional safeguard, since such cases often involve family members who act as the primary complainants to the Police in their efforts to stop further transfers, should the issuance of an RO be contingent on a valid complaint lodged by a credible party, such as a family member?

Furthermore, clause 6 of the Bill stipulates that banks which contravene an RO shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $3,000. Just $3,000. However, considering the significant sums often lost in scams, a penalty of $3,000 appears disproportionately small when weighted against the devastating financial impact on the victims.

In addition to imposing a heftier fine, I urge that banks be held liable to the victims for any losses incurred as a direct result of their failure to comply with the RO. Such accountability would ensure that banks take their obligations under this Bill seriously and act decisively to protect victims from further harm.

In addition, there is also something that we need to address on how scam cases are investigated by the banks. Scam investigations by banks require closer scrutiny. Currently, when a victim reports a fraudulent transaction, the bank handles the investigation internally and issues their findings, leaving victims with limited recourse. To better protect victims, we should consider appointing an independent arbitrator to review such cases, ensuring a fair and transparent process for redress.

Moving to my second point regarding the scope of the RO, I seek clarification on whether banks can also be mandated to halt transactions if victims explicitly acknowledge that the transactions are fraudulent. In such cases, should banks not also bear the responsibility to recover the lost funds if they proceed with the transfer despite the victim's warning?

In the first case I highlighted earlier, the victim had shared that, apparently, they had already informed the bank that the transactions were fraudulent. Yet, the bank allowed the transfer to proceed, citing that it was self-effected as she had already set up the e-wallet with the scammer's bank details. This raises serious concerns about the level of accountability expected from financial institutions in safeguarding their customers, particularly in situations where fraud had already been flagged.

Moving to my third point, individuals subjected to an RO may face limitations on their ability to transfer or withdraw money as well as restrictions on their credit facilities. While it is mentioned that mechanisms will be in place to allow access to funds for legitimate purposes, such as daily living expenses and bill payments, this access will be determined on a case-by-case basis upon application to the Police.

Given that applications can take time and investigations into scam cases may span several months, I propose that the default position should be to ensure individuals affected by an RO have immediate access to sufficient funds to sustain their daily living. This would provide a safety net while investigations are ongoing. It would be deeply unfair and disproportionate to cut off an individual from their own financial resources without prior notice or a mechanism for immediate relief. Mr Speaker, in Malay, please.

(In Malay): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Mr Speaker, the alarming increase in scam cases and staggering financial losses are worrying. In 2023, Singapore lost $650 million to scams, and in the first half of 2024, 86% of cases involved transfers made by the victims themselves. Such scams are not confined to specific groups but are increasingly targeting individuals who are educated and digitally literate. The modus operandi in scam cases is becoming more sophisticated. Sometimes, they impersonate government officials, starting with fake messages, such as fines or overdue payments, which ultimately lead to much greater losses.

For example, a Pasir Ris-Punggol resident lost $3,000 despite reporting the fraudulent transaction to the bank, which still allowed the transfer to be made. Another fell victim to a love scam, losing over $50,000 despite her family's attempts to stop her. These cases demonstrate the manipulative nature of scams that exploits victims' emotions and trust.

I support the Bill that empowers the Police to issue Restriction Orders (ROs) to stop such transactions. However, safeguards are needed to prevent misuse and ensure accountability. Banks must act swiftly when notified of scams and be held responsible if they fail to comply with the order. Additionally, independent arbitrators should oversee banks' investigations into scams cases to ensure justice for victims. Finally, victims under an RO should be given access to daily funds while investigations are ongoing.

This balance is important to effectively combat scams and deliver justice for scam victims.

(In English): Mr Speaker, scams not only rob individuals of their hard-earned money but also erode trust and confidence in our financial institutions. This Bill is a crucial step in addressing these challenges, but it must be implemented with precision, transparency and fairness. Safeguarding victims while balancing the powers of authority and personal autonomy is no easy task. However, by refining processes, ensuring accountability and minimising undue inconvenience to individuals, we can make meaningful strides in combating this growing threat.

Notwithstanding the clarifications above, I stand firmly in support of this Bill.

Mr Speaker: Minister of State Sun Xueling.

2.28 pm

Ms Sun Xueling: Mr Speaker, I thank Members for their support of the Bill and their suggestions. They have raised important questions, which I will now address. First, on the scope of the Bill.

Ms Ng Ling Ling asked if the RO could be expanded to include other entities, such as cryptocurrency exchanges, remittance companies and e-wallet providers, should scammers shift their tactics to exploit these platforms.

MHA recognises that there is a risk that such entities can also serve as intermediaries in the scam chain. However, as a start, we will impose restrictions only on bank accounts and credit facilities, which would address a significant number of scam cases and reduce the risk of fund flows to scammers. We will continue to work with MAS to monitor the scam situation and consider expanding the scope of the Restriction Order in future, if necessary.

Mr Neil Parekh asked about the criteria and process for including new scam offences into the Schedule to the Bill. We will consider including a new offence into the Schedule if it has nexus to scams, such as offences related to cheating or fraud. The Minister for Home Affairs can amend the Schedule to include the new offences.

Mr Neil Parekh also asked what the minimum threshold for issuing an RO would be. Ms Ng Ling Ling and Ms Usha Chandradas asked how the threshold of "reasonable belief" would be established, when assessing whether an RO should be issued, renewed or cancelled.

An RO can be issued once two conditions are satisfied. First, there is reason to believe that the victim is likely to make a monetary transfer to a scammer, withdraw money and give it to a scammer, or apply for a draw down from a credit facility with the intention of benefiting a scammer. Second, an RO is necessary to protect a scam victim, having regard to the time required to engage the victim and implement risk mitigation measures. Officers will assess every case based on the specific facts and circumstances. This is what the Police are trained to do in the course of any investigation. As an example, in their assessment, the Police will consider factors such as: one, whether the victim is still in communication with a scammer; two, whether the victim has transferred monies to the scammer; three, whether the victim continues to believe the scammer; and four, whether the victim is likely to transfer money to a scammer.

Assoc Prof Razwana asked about what it means for the attempts by the Police to convince the individual having been "exhausted". Ms Usha Chandradas asked whether parents can be involved in the risk mitigation measures and what "other circumstances" we have in mind when determining whether an RO is required to protect the victim. Our policy intent is for the RO to be issued as a last resort. By extension, this means that wherever feasible, we intend to explore other interventions first, and to only issue an RO if these other interventions fail. These interventions could include engaging the relatives of the victim or other persons, which could include the victim's parents where appropriate. We have drafted the legal provision broadly to empower the Police to take into account the specific circumstances of the case, which can vary significantly, when making their assessments.

Ms Ng Ling Ling asked whether the responsibility should ultimately rest with the victim, if the Police are unable to convince the victim of the scam. Ms Hazel Poa suggested to allow individuals to opt out of the RO regime, given that they have the right to determine the use of their monies. As pointed out by Ms Ng and Ms Poa, it is indeed our policy intent to balance between protecting an individual from harm and respecting the individual's autonomy and personal responsibility. And this is why the RO is meant to be a measure of last resort and is only issued temporarily – for a maximum of 30 days at the outset and extended up to five times if necessary. The RO will lapse after the maximum number of renewals, even if the individual remains set on transferring monies to the scammer.

As I had mentioned in my opening speech, we cannot handhold the victim indefinitely. But we will do all that we can while the RO is in force to bring the individual to his senses. If the individual persists in making transfers to scammers after the maximum RO period, the responsibility must lie with the individual.

Mr Gan Thiam Poh asked if the Government would consider lowering the threshold to issue an RO, in order to minimise scam losses. He also asked if a third party would be subject to an RO, if the third party assists an individual who is subjected to an RO to transfer monies to the scammers.

Indeed, the authorities have to intervene decisively in scam cases, in order to protect the individual and minimise losses. However, imposing an RO entails causing significant inconvenience to the individual subjected to the RO. It is therefore important for officers to carry out due diligence so that they can assess whether an RO is warranted and avoid, or at least minimise, the mistakes in blocking an account that Mr Yip cautioned against. Our view is that the current threshold stipulated in the Bill is appropriate. Officers will issue an RO if they have reason to believe that the individual will make monetary transfers to a scammer, withdraw any money and give it to a scammer, or apply for or draw down from any credit facility with the intention of benefiting a scammer.

The RO will only restrict banking transactions and credit facilities of the individual, but not that of a third party assisting an individual to make monetary transfers. However, if the third party is also an unwitting victim of the scammer and similarly, at risk of making monetary transfers of his or her own to the scammer, then the officers may similarly consider whether that individual should be the subject of a separate RO.

Mr Sharael Taha asked how ROs can be issued in an efficient manner, such that it is effective in preventing victims from transferring further funds to scammers. We recognise that speed is of essence in preventing losses, but the Police must also conduct the necessary investigations to determine if a case has met the threshold for issuance of an RO. The Police will also work closely with the banks, which are co-located at the Anti-Scam Command (ASCom), in their investigations and in effecting the restrictions on the victim’s bank account.

Ms Hazel Poa asked if ROs would be applicable to joint accounts and noted that doing so would inconvenience the joint account holders who are not subject to an RO. There are two types of joint accounts: Joint-Alternate accounts where each account holder can perform banking transactions without the consent of the other account holders and Joint-All accounts where all account holders must give their instruction for any bank transaction.

MHA would prefer to take a risk-calibrated approach by imposing the ROs on Joint-Alternate accounts and exempting Joint-All accounts given their lower risk of being depleted through scams. However, the banks have informed us that it would be operationally challenging for them to implement such a proposal. Hence, we have decided to impose the ROs on both types of joint accounts for a start. This is not ideal, but we have decided to go ahead with the Bill at this juncture to provide victims with the necessary protection at the soonest. We will continue to work with the banks to explore the possibility of putting in place technical solutions to facilitate such exemptions in the future. We will notify all joint account holders should an RO be imposed. We will also facilitate their access of monies in the joint accounts.

Members have asked how family members of individuals would be involved and consulted when an RO is being issued, cancelled or renewed, and whether family members or banks can initiate for Police to consider issuing an RO. Mr Sharael Taha asked if the issuance of an RO should be contingent on a valid complaint lodged by a credible party, such as a family member.

Members of the public, including a victim’s family members, can make a Police report, when they suspect that an individual or their family member has encountered a scam. The Police will conduct investigations and assess if an RO should be issued. In determining whether an RO should be issued, the Police may engage the victim’s family members, to assess if there is reason to believe that the victim is being scammed, and to explore whether it would suffice for the family to intervene and convince the individual that he or she is the victim of a scam without the need for an RO. Family members may also bring in social workers and counsellors to help convince the victim.

That said, the issuance of an RO is not contingent on a police report by a family member or other third parties, as this may not be necessary and may even delay our efforts to protect our victim. For example, the Police may uncover potential scam victims in the course of investigating mule accounts, or the Police may be alerted by bank staff of an individual who is suspected to be a scam victim. For such cases, it is not necessary and may be less efficient to require a family member or other third party to file a police report. The Police are required to perform due diligence checks and will issue an RO if the threshold for issuance is met.

Assoc Prof Jamus Lim asked if a trusted friend or relative could be empowered to freeze transactions, in lieu of the Police. Earlier in my opening speech, I had provided an example where if the victim and the sibling agree on an arrangement where the sibling will monitor the victim's transactions via a joint account and can advise the victim against making further transfers to the scammer, the Specified Officer may not issue an RO.

That said, I would like to reiterate that the decision to issue an RO will be made by the Police. The Police would have been engaging with the individual and his family members for some time, and the Police will be in the best position to make an objective and informed decision.

Mr Gerald Giam asked about the estimated number of ROs that would be issued in a year and the potential losses that could have been avoided if we had implemented this earlier. The Police do not currently track the number of cases where Police officers have been activated to engage potential victims, as well as the number of successful and unsuccessful interventions. Notwithstanding, based on the Police’s experience, we expect to issue five to 10 ROs per month, mainly for scam victims. The actual number will depend on the cases that are brought to the Police’s attention and their assessment of each case.

Ms Hazel Poa and Assoc Prof Razwana noted that some victims may be emotionally affected when being prevented from sending money to the scammer and asked how the Police intend to support such individuals in course of them being subject to an RO. She also suggested for MHA to require the Police to take into account the views of a social worker before issuing an RO.

As I have mentioned, speed is of the essence in order to protect these individuals and minimise losses, which in some cases might involve all of the victim's life savings. Hence, an RO will be issued once the Police have assessed that the conditions for an issuance is satisfied. Notwithstanding, victims who require emotional support during the process may inform the investigation officer, who will arrange for them to speak to a victim care officer. MHA will work with the Police on the operational details to ensure that victims are adequately supported.

I have made available copies of a pamphlet with frequently asked questions for victims of scams and avenues for them to consult mental well-being counselling and other financial assistance channels. This copy, a resource guide, is available for Members at the entrance and exit for the Parliamentary Chamber. Members can see that there is a section called "Where can I seek support?" that directs victims to support from victim care officers and to community support in the form of mental well-being and counselling support.

Mr Neil Parekh asked about the process for individuals to apply to lift or modify an RO. Mr Yip Hon Weng asked how quickly a restriction on an account can be lifted, especially if a wrong account gets blocked. Ms Ng Ling Ling asked if there would be mechanisms to allow an individual who is subjected to an RO to access limited funds for his daily expenses while investigations are underway. Mr Sharael Taha and Ms Hazel Poa suggested for an individual subjected to an RO to have immediate access to sufficient funds, instead of having to apply for it.

We understand the need to minimise inconvenience to the affected individual. However, we are also mindful that the scammer may exploit any channel through which the individual can gain access to money. We will therefore take a risk-calibrated approach, by allowing an individual who is the subject of an RO to apply to the Police for access to a fixed amount of monies for living expenses. MHA and MAS are working with the banks on the operational details, including the amount of time required to impose or lift an RO. Our intent is to ensure that this is done as quickly as possible – we are talking about hours, not days. Notwithstanding, if the bank makes a mistake in complying with the RO and blocks a wrong account, the bank should rectify the mistake immediately.

Ms Hazel Poa asked if an individual can be exempted from certain legitimate facilities, such as GIRO bill payments, or have any financial penalties arising from late bill payments waived, during the period where the RO is in effect. Ms Poa also asked what proof an individual would need to show for withdrawals, how will the Police determine the quantum of the withdrawals and whether the amount withdrawn would be subjected to further restrictions or monitoring.

If the individual requires additional amounts of money, the individual can apply to the Police to vary the RO to allow a specific transfer or withdrawal by showing proof of the need to access these amounts. This could include, for example, bill statements, such as for medical expenses, utility and rental payments, or any documentation as requested by the Police. Every request will be assessed on a case-by-case basis, based on the needs of each individual. This amount will not be subjected to further restriction or monitoring, since it has been assessed to be necessary for the individual.

MHA agrees with Ms Poa's suggestion and has, in fact, considered exempting individuals from certain legitimate facilities, such as GIRO bill payments. However, the banks have informed us that it is not feasible to exempt selected transactions from the RO without significant system changes. Again, this is not ideal but we have decided to go ahead with the Bill at this juncture, given the importance of providing victims with the necessary protection at the soonest. But we hear your feedback and we will continue to work with banks towards allowing for these exemptions.

On the question of lead time required before an individual can access his funds, once the Police have assessed if the individual should be allowed access to funds, the Police will work with the banks to arrange for the individual to make the withdrawal at a bank branch. We are working with the banks on the operational details and our intent is to ensure that this is done as quickly as possible.

Ms Usha Chandradas and Mr Sharael Taha as well as Assoc Prof Razwana Begum had asked who the Specified Officers engaging the individuals would be, including their seniority and qualification, and how MHA would ensure that these powers are not subject to abuse. Mr Neil Parekh, Mr Yip Hon Weng and Ms Usha Chandradas asked about the documentation requirements for an appeal, how long it would take for the Commissioner of Police to review an appeal and whether hearings should be allowed for appeals. Mr Yip also asked if the Government would conduct regular reviews on the decisions regarding appeals or publish anonymised outcomes of such appeals.

I trust that Members will agree with me that our officers can be expected to perform their duties professionally and impartially. The Police will institute internal controls such that the initial approving authority for ROs will reside with the Director of the Commercial Affairs Department or, in his absence, a Deputy Director of the Commercial Affairs Department.

To ensure no conflict of interest in the appeals process, appeals will be decided by the Commissioner of Police, whose decision is final. The appeal process has been designed with speed in mind to ensure that an appeal can be decided expeditiously, issued judiciously and officers are held accountable for the exercise of this power.

MHA will prescribe in subsidiary legislation, the documents and information an individual will need to provide when submitting an appeal. These would include, but are not limited to: one, any evidence that the individual has taken up additional safeguards willingly and, therefore, the Restriction Order is no longer required for his protection; and two, any evidence that the individual is not a target of scams, such as proof that the other party is legitimate.

On Assoc Prof Razwana's suggestion for individuals subject to an RO to be automatically referred for independent legal advice, individuals are free to seek their own legal advice and avail themselves of the appeal mechanism.

In operationalising the Bill, we will ensure that victims are adequately supported and appeals are fairly assessed. I would also like to remind Members that the Police will always try to engage the victim before deciding whether to proceed with an RO, since the RO is intended to be a lever of last resort. So, we will not have a situation where the Police decides to proceed with the RO without trying to find out the perspective of the victim first.

Mr Neil Parekh asked about the limits of immunity granted to banks and their staff, particularly, in cases of unintentional errors. A bank and its officer, employee or agent will be protected from criminal and civil liability for any act or omission in complying with an RO. The immunity applies only if the act was done or the omission was made with reasonable care and in good faith.

Mr Yip Hon Weng asked if imposing a fine of up to $3,000 on banks for contravening an RO without reasonable excuse is sufficient. This is in line with section 35(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code, which is in relation to banks being ordered by the Police to seize property held in their account or safe deposit box. Thus, it is a close approximate to the current order to freeze the bank account of the suspected scam victim. Mr Sharael Taha suggested for banks to be held liable for losses incurred resulting from their failure to comply with an RO, in addition to a heftier maximum fine quantum. He also asked if banks could, additionally, be mandated to stop transactions, if informed by a victim that the transactions were fraudulent.

I would like to say that there is a strong level of cooperation between the Police and the banks at the ASCom and this partnership has helped to stop many scams, even without the RO regime. As I have mentioned, MHA shares the desire to minimise inconveniences for the affected individual. However, to guard against the risk of abuse, any request for funds will have to be assessed based on facts and circumstances of each case. Upon application by an individual to the Police, he will be allowed to withdraw a fixed sum of money, which will be reasonable and sufficient for basic sustenance, including their bill payments, which I had mentioned earlier. Should the individual request for more money, thereafter, the Police will require him to show proof of the need to access the money. This is to avoid the risk of scammers exploiting this mechanism to obtain monies from the individual.

Assoc Prof Jamus Lim asked if the definition of scams covered by the Bill is sufficient, given that it may be difficult to distinguish between scams and traditional cheating cases. The Police regard scams as cheating offences that are conducted remotely, online or over telecommunications. Traditional cheating, on the other hand, involves mostly physical interactions, where the other party is known to the individual in real time. That said, however, as pointed out by Assoc Prof Jamus Lim, the Police have, indeed, observed cases where scammers introduced elements of physical interaction to strengthen the deception and, hence, we have amended the Bill to ensure that the ROs can be applied in such cases.

The offences in the law include, cheating and offences under the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act 1992 and the Computer Misuse Act 1993. These offences cover the full range of acts that constitute or facilitate scams. And to send a stronger deterrent signal, guidelines issued by the Sentencing Advisory Panel have recommended higher sentences for acts that facilitate scams.

I will now cover other issues and suggestions from Members and as these matters fall outside the scope of this Bill, I will address them very briefly.

Mr Gan Thiam Poh asked if MHA would consider getting the banks to increase the number of checks required before a fund transfer can be allowed, to buy the authorities more time to engage and convince the individual. Banks have improved their real-time fraud surveillance in detecting possible fraudulent transactions. Today, bank staff may call up their customers to verify their transactions, if suspicious activity is detected. Cooling periods, such as those for the activation of digital tokens and other high-risk activities, will help to slow down selected transactions and give individuals more time to think about the transfers. Ultimately, banks will have to balance between fraud prevention and customer experience, as they consider ways to enhance their anti-scam measures.

Mr Yip Hon Weng and Assoc Prof Razwana Begum asked if the Government could provide banks with the necessary guidelines, training or support to ensure that banks are able to distinguish a scam from a legitimate transaction. Members had also asked if MHA would consider having periodic reviews of bank processes or to facilitate sharing of best practices among banks, to ensure implementation effectiveness across the board. Mr Neil Parekh also asked if it would be useful to establish a single regulatory body to coordinate the processes among the banks, the regulatory authorities and the officers. Mr Gerald Giam also suggested for real-time coordination between the Police, MAS, the banks and other platforms to enhance enforcement against scams.

There are ongoing efforts to do so. Since 2022, the ASCom and MAS have worked with the major retail banks in Singapore to co-locate the banks' staff with ASCom. This has greatly enhanced the banks' real-time coordination with the Police to distinguish a scam from a legitimate transaction, trace fund flows and freeze bank accounts suspected to be involved in scammers' operations. We welcome other stakeholders, including social media platforms, to co-locate within ASCom, to improve real-time coordination. The Police also regularly share observations with banks to improve their fraud detection capabilities. This model has worked well and we will continue to build upon it to strengthen enforcement against scammers and recovery of scam proceeds. We agree with the suggestion to facilitate the sharing of best practices amongst banks and we are considering how to do so efficiently and effectively.

Ms Ng Ling Ling and Mr Gerald Giam raised a number of suggestions to tackle scams, including on SRF, Money Lock and Kill Switch. These are outside the scope of the Bill and Members may wish to file Parliamentary Questions on these. Ms Usha Chandradas also suggested for MHA to consider including art as a tool to address the root causes behind the perpetration of scams by victims. We note Ms Ng's and Ms Chandradas' suggestions and will take them into account, as we review our overall approach to tackle scams.

Mr Yip Hon Weng suggested for the Government to strengthen cross-border enforcement against scams and do more to educate the public on scams. Cross-border enforcement is indeed a priority, given the transnational nature of scams. The Police have strong operational ties with their counterparts in key jurisdictions and work with international organisations, such as the INTERPOL, to exchange information and conduct joint investigations.

But, importantly, it would be even better to prevent such scams from materialising in the first place and this is why we fully agree with Mr Yip Hon Weng that public education is a critical area of work. We recently launched the ScamShield Suite to make scam resources easily accessible to the public. The new 1799 helpline, which operates 24/7, offers the public an easy option to check with whenever they are unsure if a situation they are facing is a scam. MHA will share more on our public education initiatives at the upcoming Committee of Supply debate.

Mr Speaker, Sir, fighting scams is a whole-of-society effort. The threat will keep evolving and we must ensure that we have the appropriate tools to deal with this threat, as this Bill aims to do. We will continue to evolve our methods, evolve our laws, to continue our fight against scams. I thank the Members for their support for the Bill. I seek to move.

Mr Speaker: Any Members have clarifications for the Minister of State? Mr Gerald Giam.

2.59 pm

Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song: Sir, can I seek some clarifications from the Minister of State? I thank her for responding to some of my proposals just now. The Minister of State mentioned that the Police expect to issue five to 10 ROs a month. So, that is about 60 to 120 a year, but this is negligible compared to the approximately 50,000 scam cases reported annually. Does the Minister of State agree that this Bill will have limited impact on combating scams overall and that more systemic safeguards are needed?

Secondly, I thank the Minister of State for responding to my proposals on sharing between the Police and the banks and social media platforms. However, I was not proposing just the sharing of best practices but sharing and collecting data from these social media platforms and requiring them to use that data to prevent scams from taking place in the first place. So, is that something that the Police are prepared to do?

Ms Sun Xueling: I thank the Member for his two points. Firstly, in my opening speech, I had shared that the Bill alone will not significantly dent the total number of scams. I also mentioned that we require a whole-of-society effort and we will have to work with stakeholders collectively to fight the scourge of scams.

That said, when we look at the cases we have encountered, because the cases we are targeting right now are those that involve social engineering. And the cases I had cited – government official impersonation scams, love scams, investment scams – we have observed that the losses from these categories of scams, especially if they are over a long period of time, can lead to quite large amount of losses. So, while in terms of the number of scams that could be deterred through this Bill which we approximate to be between five and 10 cases a month, I think we should not neglect the fact that actually, the absolute amounts arising from these losses could be substantial. And definitely, when we look at it on an individual basis, we could be talking about the loss of lifetime savings.

But that said, this is but one of many other methods and many other initiatives we are undertaking to fight the scourge of scams. We should not downplay the importance of public education because at the end of the day, when it comes to socially-engineered scams, the best defence really is a discerning public.

Sorry, could I ask the Member to repeat the second question?

Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song: It was to seek a response to the proposal about sharing data between the banks, social media companies and the Police – so, consolidating all that crowd-sourced data to be able to prevent scams from taking place in real-time.

Ms Sun Xueling: Thank you. There is a mechanism whereby different stakeholders share trends that they observe. The only thing I would say is that for some of the social media companies, they have certain data protection laws. So, while they have not disagreed with the sharing of information and data that they see and observe, sometimes, there is a certain lag time, because they need to process the information on their end, make sure that the information is in the form that can be shared with external parties. Therefore, we see that there could be a lapse in terms of timing when it comes to the sharing of information.

But definitely, the key principle of sharing information and data between platforms, between stakeholders to tackle the scourge of scams, that principle is something that we all collectively agree with.

Mr Speaker: Mr Derrick Goh.

Mr Derrick Goh (Nee Soon): Mr Speaker, the question to the Minister to State would be in two parts. The first question is, although the numbers may not be significant, would the Minister of State clarify if, in dollar terms, the Bill would have a significant impact and therefore, reduction to the current scams amount that happens every year?

The second question would be, if this takes place, in terms of this policy and if it is effective, would the Minister of State be thinking that this may be extended to other platforms, such as crypto companies and institutions of that sort, beyond banks?

Ms Sun Xueling: I thank the Member for the two points that he raised. When we looked at the cases, in particular, when we looked at government official impersonation scams, we looked at investment scams, we looked at love scams, we are looking at losses per case of between, on average, $150,000 and $1 million. We have also had a couple of outliers when we are talking about a couple of million dollars. So, it is very hard for me to be able to pinpoint a number to say that because we now have this RO regime in place that "X" amount of scam losses will be prevented every month. All I can say is that when we looked at the cases that the Police have encountered, when we looked at the cases that the Police have to be activated, where they have gone down, to their best efforts, together with family members and friends and try and convince scam victims that they are scam victims and still, unfortunately, the victims continued to believe that they are not scam victims – when we look at those cases, in particular, because it happens over a period of time, the losses are pretty substantial.

On the second point that the Member raised, I mentioned in my speech that the RO could be expanded to include other entities, such as cryptocurrency exchanges, remittance companies and e-wallet providers, should scammers shift their tactics to exploit these platforms. So, we recognise that there is a risk that such entities can also serve as intermediaries in a scam chain, but for a start, we are imposing restrictions only on bank accounts and credit facilities. But we will continue to work with MAS to monitor the scam situations and we will consider expanding the scope of the RO in future if necessary.

3.06 pm

Mr Speaker: Any other clarifications? No.

Question put, and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House.

The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. – [Ms Sun Xueling].

Bill considered in Committee.

[Mr Speaker in the Chair]

The Chairman: The citation year "2024" will be changed to "2025" as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement.

Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2 –

The Chairman: Clause 2. Minister for Home Affairs.

Ms Sun Xueling: Mr Speaker, I move the amendment* to clause 2 as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement.

*The amendment read as follows:

In page 4, line 5: to leave out "substantially".

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 2, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 3 to 11 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill.

The Schedule ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Long Title –

The Chairman: The Long Title. Minister for Home Affairs.

Ms Sun Xueling: Mr Speaker, I move the amendment* to the Long Title as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement.

*The amendment read as follows:

In page 3: to leave out "conducted remotely".

Amendment agreed to.

Bill reported with amendments; read a Third time and passed.