Transport Safety Investigations Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

5.36 pm

The Senior Minister of State for Transport (Dr Janil Puthucheary) (for the Minister for Transport): Mr Speaker, Sir, on behalf of the Minister for Transport, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."

Singapore is a vibrant transport hub. We have world-class air and sea ports that connect us to the rest of the world and an extensive public transport system that enables our people to move around efficiently for work and leisure.

Ensuring safety is a key focus of our transport system. We set high safety standards through legislation and regulations and close oversight of our transport operators. Our transport operators also employ technology, train their personnel and run safety campaigns.

Despite these measures, incidents happen. When they do occur, it is important that we learn from them, identify the causes and take measures to prevent a recurrence. We do this by conducting safety investigations. As these investigations aim to identify lessons and not to ascribe blame, they enable those involved in an incident to freely share information in a truthful manner without any fear of being penalised.

The Transport Safety Investigation Bureau (TSIB), a department of the Ministry of Transport, will be the authority responsible for conducting safety investigations into air, sea and certain land transport incidents.

The Transport Safety Investigations (TSI) Bill will be the single legislation that governs the conduct of safety investigations. It will facilitate the TSIB's work and enable TSIB investigators to effectively perform their safety functions.

Currently, TSIB conducts safety investigations into air and marine incidents. The TSIB Bill will extend the no-blame safety investigation principles, processes and best practices from the air and marine sectors to the rail sector. It will standardise the procedures for the conduct of investigations and apply the same set of safeguards on the treatment of information obtained during an investigation.

Mr Speaker, Sir, let me highlight the key provisions of the Bill.

Clause 3 of the Bill states the purposes of the Bill, one of which is for the prevention of future transport occurrences and not for ascribing blame to any person or organisation.

Clause 15 makes clear that TSIB may investigate incidents involving any combination of modes of transport vehicles, and between civilian and military transport vehicles.

[Deputy Speaker (Mr Lim Biow Chuan) in the Chair]

Clause 16 of the Bill sets out the scope of TSIB's investigations, which include incidents involving civilian aircraft and vessels. When TSIB has built up its rail accident investigation capabilities, they will also conduct safety investigations into domestic and international railway incidents which happen on or after a date set by the Minister under clause 5. When directed by the Minster for Transport, TSIB may also investigate incidents involving certain land transport incidents involving buses, such as those operating under the Land Transport Authority's (LTA's) public bus services contract.

As is the case under the existing legislation in the Air Navigation Act, clause 16 of the Bill will continue to allow TSIB to investigate an incident involving only military aircraft engaged in a flying display in Singapore organised by civilians.

To ensure that investigators are able to effectively perform their roles, clauses 26 to 31 of the Bill confer on TSIB investigators the necessary powers, including powers to access occurrence sites, gather information and records, take possession of evidence, and require medical examinations of persons involved.

Clause 23(5) specifies that these powers are exercisable by TSIB investigators only when and to the extent authorised by the Director of TSIB.

Clause 43 of the Bill prescribes limits on the disclosure of restricted information collected during an investigation. This limit on disclosure is important in order to encourage the free flow of safety information in transport safety investigations and is also necessary in order to meet international requirements. Examples of restricted information include witnesses' statements, medical or private information, voice and image recordings and their transcripts, analysis of information and draft final reports. This clause, however, does not prevent transport regulators and other agencies from conducting their own investigations to obtain similar information directly from the source.

Subsection 4 of clause 43, however, allows the High Court to order the disclosure of any restricted information, if the High Court is satisfied that any adverse domestic or international impact that the disclosure might have on any current or future investigation is outweighed by the public interest in the administration of justice.

Clause 44 provides that TSIB investigators are not compellable to give any evidence or provide any expert opinion in any proceedings except to a Coroner's inquiry. This reinforces the purpose of the Bill, which is not to ascribe blame to any person or organisation. Information obtained by TSIB in the course of their investigation is to be used solely for the purpose of improving safety and not by the judicial system whose purpose is for blame or liability.

Clause 18 of the Bill specifies that the expenses incurred by TSIB during an investigation is recoverable from the owner or operator, or both, of the transport vehicles involved in the incident.

To enable the findings and lessons learnt from TSIB's safety investigations to be shared with as many people as possible, clause 20 of the Bill requires TSIB to make their investigation reports publicly available.

Clause 21 of the Bill prevents the TSIB's reports from being used for disciplinary or criminal purposes. Accordingly, the TSIB's draft reports are inadmissible in all Courts and proceedings. Reports of completed investigations are also inadmissible in all Courts and proceedings except a Coroner's inquiry. Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, I beg to move.

Question proposed.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Louis Ng.

5.43 pm

Mr Louis Ng Kok Kwang (Nee Soon): Sir, I stand in support of the Bill.

The work of TSIB is notable for its independence and objectivity, and its focus on preventing future accidents and incidents rather than apportioning blame. These characteristics allow it to carry out its existing functions effectively through the Air Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) and the Marine Safety Investigation Branch (MSIB). As such, it would be beneficial for the TSIB's investigative powers to be extended to two other modes of transport, rail and LTA-contracted buses, as proposed in this Bill. This will allow a greater proportion of transport users to benefit from the robust work of TSIB.

I would like to raise a few short clarifications with regard to the Bill.

First, I would like to clarify a point with regard to the recovery of costs and expenses of the investigation, under clause 18 of the Bill. The clause states, "the Director of the Transport Safety Investigation Bureau may recover from the owner or operator of a transport vehicle or both, a reasonable part of the remuneration of an investigator; and all expenses reasonably incurred by an investigator in the exercise of any powers." Can I clarify with the Minister under what circumstances would these costs be borne by TSIB, and under what circumstances would it be borne by transport owners or operators?

Second, I would like to clarify a point with regard to the powers to detain vehicles under clause 30 of the Bill. The clause states that the director of TSIB has the power to detain a transport vehicle on reasonable grounds, which includes the powers to stop, move and take control of the vehicle.

The clause also states that the Director must not detain a transport vehicle under this section for longer than is necessary and reasonable to exercise any other powers under this Bill. Can I clarify if there is a maximum duration for such detainment?

Lastly, I would like to clarify a point with regard to the general exemptions of the Bill, under clause 47. The clause states that the Minister may, by order in the Gazette, exempt any person or class of persons or any transport vehicle or class of transport vehicles from all or any provisions of this Bill.

Can the Minister clarify if there are certain classes of transport vehicles that are currently in contemplation for exemption? Are there specific circumstances which would govern an exemption that can be made known in this Bill? Sir, notwithstanding the above clarifications, I stand in support of this Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Ms Sylvia Lim.

5.45 pm

Ms Sylvia Lim (Aljunied): This Bill tasks TSIB with the mission of investigating incidents relating to aviation, marine, rail and public transport with a view to enhancing transport safety and preventing accidents or the recurrence of accidents. This mission will improve public safety and should be supported. Nevertheless, I have two queries on the enhanced TSIB and how it will operate.

First, TSIB investigations and other investigations or proceedings. My first query relates to how TSIB investigations will proceed if there are other agencies or bodies investigating the same incident.

According to clause 9 of the Bill, TSIB's role is to independently investigate occurrences, identify factors that have contributed to the occurrence and report publicly on those investigations. As I understand it, TSIB's primary concern is safety and recommendations to improve safety. To this end, clause 9(3) makes it clear that assigning blame and liability is not the function of TSIB. However, the same clause rightly recognises that blame or liability may be inferred from its report.

How will TSIB's work relate to the work of other investigative agencies? Let us take a scenario of two marine vessels colliding within Singapore port limits, resulting in deaths. A Coroner's inquiry or other Inquiry will usually be conducted, which means the Police will likely commence investigations. Under this Bill, TSIB will also be activated to conduct its own investigations into what caused the accident. Will TSIB and the Police share their findings with each other, or will they work independently? Is there a possibility of conflicting findings being reached by TSIB and other agencies, for example, TSIB may find that there was a mechanical problem in one of the vessels, while the Police may find that the crew was reckless? Further, according to clause 21 of the Bill, the TSIB report will be admissible before a Coroner's Inquiry. Does this mean that the Coroner will wait for TSIB to finalise its report before the Coroner reaches his verdict on the likely cause of death?

My second point concerns how TSIB will preserve its independence.

According to clauses 8 and 11 of the Bill, TSIB is to be headed by a Director who will be a public officer. As for the investigators, clause 23 provides that where an investigation is needed, the Director will appoint either TSIB staff members or consultants as investigators.

Sir, investigating transport occurrences are major investigations with grave implications. For instance, a finding of the factors that contributed to deaths or injuries may encourage lawsuits from victims and lead to reputational and economic damage to big players in the transport industry. Such findings thus carry high stakes.

To illustrate, we can recall the tragic crash 20 years ago of Silkair flight MI 185 over Palembang. In that incident, there was controversy around whether the crash had been caused by deliberate pilot action, or by mechanical or other causes. A lawsuit was brought in Singapore by the families of six victims who refused to reach settlements with Silkair. The Court had to consider two conflicting findings from transportation investigation agencies – the Indonesian National Safety Transportation Committee and the United States (US) National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The Indonesian agency concluded that the cause of death was unascertainable while the US NTSB found that the crash was likely caused by intentional pilot action. Eventually, the Court found that the cause was unascertainable and the families lost their cases. However, if the US NTSB finding had been accepted, Silkair would not have been covered by the applicable Warsaw Conventions to limit payout to each victim to US$75,000 each.

Sir, I understand that under this Bill, a TSIB report would be inadmissible in such a Court proceeding. However, the Silkair incident illustrates that the enormous pressure that may confront the TSIB Director and investigation team when probing such high-stakes incidents. It seems to me that if we want TSIB to succeed as a credible agency, TSIB must be absolutely fearless in its investigations and not be seen to cower to transport regulators or big business. To this end, I have two concerns.

First, how senior in the Public Service will the Director of TSIB be to have the independence and clout needed?

Secondly, clause 19 provides that the Director may provide a draft report to any person he considers appropriate, to allow the person to make submissions to the Director about the draft report before it is finalised. This is potentially worrying. In the normal course of events, TSIB would have interviewed the relevant parties in the incident before coming to conclusions in any draft report. By allowing parties to make representations about the draft report, could this be a window for parties to lobby TSIB to change its findings? I would ask the Minister to clarify the purpose of allowing a person to make representations at this late stage.

Sir, in conclusion, I have stated my general support for the TSIB's proposed expanded role and work. However, I have raised several queries and concerns for the Ministry's response.

I certainly hope that the enhanced TSIB will grow into an agency with a solid reputation for independent investigations that will enhance transport safety.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Ms Joan Pereira.

5.51 pm

Ms Joan Pereira (Tanjong Pagar): Deputy Speaker, Sir, we pride ourselves as a busy regional and international aviation and maritime hub. On top of that, our railways see a huge volume of traffic on a daily basis. While fortunately, accidents involving aircraft, marine craft and railway are not a frequent occurrence in Singapore, the probability of incidences is certainly on the higher side, given the volume of traffic we handle.

To keep this probability low, besides having in place adequate safety measures, it is crucial to ensure all incidences are duly reported. In doing so, the key is not to lay blame on anyone, but to empower the relevant authorities and personnel to learn from shortcomings and resolve them, so we may prevent them in future. Thus, I am pleased to note the significance on incident management and reporting in the Bill.

When it comes to transport, there is plenty at stake. In less severe cases, there is some damage and/or loss of property. In serious accidents, human lives are at stake. So, TSIB certainly has heavy responsibilities.

Prevention should remain the focus when it comes to dealing with accidents. It is not just about looking into how an accident had happened and what could have been done to prevent it. Rather, the prevention work that is in place to lower the probability of an accident happening at all is imperative. Can the Minister explain how will TSIB be staffed with sufficient professionals with the necessary skills to collate information, analyse and study the patterns of near-misses and anticipate weak links so that preventative measures can be drawn up and implemented? Will the initial staff strength be drawn by transferring some manpower from the Civil Aviation Authority, Maritime and Port Authority, Public Utilities Board and so on? If so, how many people will be affected by this transfer?

Next, with a new set up and a new grouping of people in place, how long will it take before TSIB becomes effectively operational?

Are we seeking any ad hoc appointments of experts from overseas to help put us on a strong foundation? Will staff who are earmarked for jobs in the Statutory Board be sent abroad for training? Also, how many investigations are currently ongoing, being conducted by other Government agencies, which will be transferred to the TSIB umbrella? There would even be opportunities for TSIB to collaborate with our Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF) to work on fire safety matters, as I see it.

I note in the Bill, it is stated that TSIB may be called upon to render assistance to foreign countries. I would like to ask how the Ministry intends to grow the expertise and services of the Board and how much resources would go into foreign assistance? I note that "consultants" are referred to in the Bill. I believe this means TSIB recognises that it would have to draw on external expertise to augment its investigation teams. And on the subject of expertise, it would be ideal if, further down the road, TSIB could set up its own training centre to develop local talents who would be well-versed in dealing with local and even transport occurrences in foreign context.

Accidents involving drones are a growing concern. In recent years, international media has captured a number of high-profile drone accidents. Amongst them, one of the most serious accidents involved a drone operator who crashed a quadcopter into the grounds of the White House, triggering a security lockdown. Eventually, the US attorney did not pursue criminal charges against the operator as the incident was determined to be not deliberate as the operator had simply “lost control” of the device. This brings to mind some grave concerns. Indeed, most accidents are not deliberate, so who will be held responsible if damages, casualties, or even fatalities stem from a drone accident?

In July 2014, a drone had narrowly missed colliding with an Airbus A320 as it was taking off from London's Heathrow airport. In Singapore, we have been fortunate to have had no serious accidents involving drones. With technology enthusiasts touting the potential of the use of drones in all sorts of important situations, from delivering parcels to security patrols, it is high time we also looked into safety and incident management for drones.

Are there plans for more incorporation of artificial intelligence (AI), particularly in the area of data science? I would foresee TSIB working closely with our Defence Science Technology Agency (DSTA), using technology to develop accident prevention devices that can be used by our transport operators. Sir, in Mandarin.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] On the other hand, in light of the sophistication and frequency of cyberattacks on databases of the Government and public services, we must ensure that security of our data systems is in top form and frequently reviewed. Errors in or deliberate tampering of data can lead to inaccurate information, causing disruption and inconveniences to transport commuters. In the worst scenario, fatal accidents may occur. I would foresee that terrorists could hire hackers to tamper with public transport systems to cause mass accidents. I urge the Bureau to prioritise cybersecurity management and cyberhygiene as part of safety management efforts.

(In English): I now refer to section 22, Responses to reports of, or containing, safety recommendations. After TSIB has made a recommendation, the party to whom a recommendation is made must give a written response to the Director within a prescribed time after the report was published. The penalty for failure to comply without a reasonable excuse is a fine not exceeding $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or both. Sir, I feel the $10,000 fine should be reviewed because safety involves lives. The penalty should be more punitive and set at a minimum of $50,000.

This Bill is a representation of the Government’s determination to shore up safety lapses and provide a safer transport system worthy of a regional and international transport hub. It also brings with it potential for greater interest and development in safety and risk management, which could lead to more careers in a meaningful industry that saves lives. Sir, I support the Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Melvin Yong.

5.59 pm

Mr Melvin Yong Yik Chye (Tanjong Pagar): Mr Deputy Speaker, I would like to declare my interest as the Executive Secretary of the National Transport Workers' Union. My members include public rail workers and public bus workers. I stand in support of the Bill which seeks to enable TSIB to conduct independent safety investigations into transport incidents, across the air, land and sea domains. However, I do have some questions for the Minister.

The TSI Bill is a new omnibus Bill that will centralise the conduct of transport safety investigations by TSIB. I would like to ask what the rationale was when deciding to centralise the safety investigations of all air, land and sea transport modes into one investigation body. What key advantages would such centralisation provide, and has the Ministry studied examples of what have been done overseas?

Australia, for example, has a similar transport safety bureau that only covers the aviation, marine and rail sectors. As they do not cover bus accidents, I am curious as to why the TSI Bill has catered specific provisions for investigations into public bus accidents. Is there certain specialist knowledge required to investigate public bus accidents, as compared to a normal vehicular accident on our roads?

Mr Deputy Speaker, as the new TSIB would have enhanced powers to investigate rail and bus accidents, it comes across as odd that certain segments of the land transport sector are not covered under its ambit. For example, the Bill limits the TSIB’s role to investigating only incidents involving buses that are operating under the LTA’s public bus service contracts. Why not extend the powers to cover all types of bus incidents? With so much innovation disrupting the land transport sector currently, should not TSIB have the powers to step in and investigate major incidents on our public roads that are beyond the public bus contracts?

On that note, new and emerging forms of land transport also do not seem to have been covered under the Bill. Autonomous buses and shuttles are soon to be deployed in Punggol, Tengah and the Jurong Innovation District in 2022, and TSIB should also be empowered to investigate any incidents involving such autonomous public transport, should an unfortunate accident happen in Singapore.

Mr Deputy Speaker, the Bill also covers investigation into incidents involving military and Police vehicles. Clause 16(3) states that subsection (2) – which covers exempt vehicles – does not prevent an investigation of a transport occurrence that involves a Singapore military ship or Singapore military aircraft, if an appropriate authority in the Singapore Armed Forces requests the Director or TSIB to conduct an investigation into the matter. It is my understanding that military and Police vehicles are exempt because otherwise the personnel involved would have to give testimony that may cover national security matters. Hence, I would like to ask the Minister under what circumstances would the Air Force or Navy request TSIB to investigate an incident involving a military aircraft or a military vessel. If a request is, indeed, made for TSIB to investigate, some protocol should be put in place to address and safeguard security information relating to the incident or the assets.

What about incidents involving Police vehicles or those used by our border control or Civil Defence departments? The Bill clearly exempts such vessels from investigation by TSIB. Would a similar provision, therefore, be made for these agencies to request TSIB to investigate?

Mr Deputy Speaker, an investigator’s skills are like a muscle that needs to be constantly exercised in order to remain at its peak. With the move to expand the TSIB’s scope into the rail and bus sectors, how does TSIB intend to build its capabilities in investigating such areas? In addition, how does the Ministry plan to keep the skills of their investigators sharp? Perhaps the Ministry could also shed light into how many investigations TSIB typically conducts in a year, and the estimated number of incidents TSIB would be expected to investigate annually in the future.

Mr Deputy Speaker, the first 24 hours of any major incident is crucial for an investigator to gather and preserve important pieces of evidence. It is, therefore, necessary that our transport investigators are well-trained and have the mandate to be flexible enough to investigate all possible modes of transport across the air, land and sea sectors. My concern is with the deep specialisation of these specialist investigators and how to upkeep the currency of their knowledge and skillsets.

Like Ms Sylvia Lim who spoke earlier, I hope that TSIB will one day be a highly regarded transport safety investigation agency that we can all be proud of. With that, Mr Deputy Speaker, I support the Bill.

6.05 pm

Mr Deputy Speaker: Senior Minister of State Janil Puthucheary.

Dr Janil Puthucheary: Mr Deputy Speaker, I thank the Members, Ms Joan Pereira, Ms Sylvia Lim, Mr Melvin Yong and Mr Louis Ng for their support for the Transport Safety Investigations Bill.

This arena of transport safety investigations is very specialised. It is a fairly unique process; it has been tested in practice; it has an international application. It arose really from our obligations under some international treaties, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO).

This Bill brings together the work that has been already ongoing. TSIB was administratively created in August 2016, coming out of the Air Accident Investigation Bureau. They have been doing the work already but this Bill will facilitate that work. It brings it together under one legislative framework, and it enables the investigators to effectively perform their safety functions, improve transport safety, and be in accord with international practices as well as our international agreements under one legislative framework.

Many countries have a similar multi-modal transport investigation agency – Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, the US. Having a multi-modal transport safety investigation agency allows the cross-sharing of best practices and resources. While there is a need for domain-specific industry experience, engineering experience, safety operation experience, there is a significant amount of cross-sharing in terms of legal practices, cross-border issues, and how one interfaces with other Government agencies, among other things.

So, there is a need for deep specialisation – aviation experts, maritime experts, subsequently rail experts. But there is also a need to bring them together administratively, and the experience from overseas shows that this works. It also allows the deepening of the investigation expertise, for example, in the human and system factors.

TSIB is staffed with very experienced and competent investigators, currently with aviation and maritime industry experience. So, this industry experience is something very significant. While they have been in industry, they have had the experience of operating some of these safety issues, of designing safety policies within their agency, within their commercial organisation. So, they bring to bear, when they come and work under TSIB, all of those years of experience. The director has 20 years of experience and is a fairly senior person, and it is that level of expertise that we will need to have.

Some of the Members asked about training and capability development. The investigators attend both local as well as foreign training courses to update their knowledge of transport systems, to sharpen their investigation capabilities. And the training is ongoing; it is not just merely at the point of entry at TSIB. They go on attachments with TSIB’s counterparts. Indeed, we are able to and have brought in both volunteer investigators as well as appointed overseas experts, depending on the nature of the incident and the case that is being investigated. A whole series of resources will be brought together, depending on what is needed.

The number of people, however, that we need here in Singapore in order to do this, while they are very talented and have deep expertise, is probably not a number that will justify a single training centre. So, that is not something that we are currently planning on.

We are planning to build up our rail safety investigation capabilities over the next two years through the recruitment and training of rail safety investigators. But we are not looking to do this by transferring people across different parts of the Government because these types of capabilities will be needed in other agencies and in other entities, because there is an ongoing need for investigations, for disciplinary processes, enforcement and regulations, and so forth. So, we want to build up a separate arm of capability.

The objective of TSIB is really just to focus on the safety standards, looking at the causes, drawing safety lessons, preventing recurrence.

As has been noted, we have included the provision for TSIB to be activated to investigate incidents involving LTA-contracted bus services. The question was raised about why not all buses, why not all major incidents? So, again, I would reiterate, there are plenty of other organisations and agencies that can investigate – the Police; LTA itself can conduct an investigation; the Minister for Transport can also convene committees and Commissions of Inquiry, for instance.

So, by constituting TSIB, it is not that all investigations will only happen under the remit of TSIB. It is a very specific and particular type of investigation that will happen under TSIB, and all the other agencies that can continue to investigate incidents and systems will continue to have that opportunity to do so.

The reason why we have looked at the provisions specifically for LTA-contracted bus services, firstly, it is about the systems associated with it. You need something which is a fairly complex system to begin with organisationally to justify this type of investigation.

Secondly, ordinary road accidents usually are about human error and the opportunity is there for the Traffic Police as well as LTA to investigate. But in this case, we wanted something, apart from LTA, to investigate LTA-contracted services. I hope that answers the Member's questions. This independent assessment of safety issues and recommendations would run in parallel to any potential Traffic Police investigation.

The TSI Bill does provide for the investigation of incidents involving unmanned aircraft, unmanned vessels, unmanned rail vehicles, and, at the Minister's direction, unmanned buses which operate on services contracted by LTA.

There were a number of questions about military vehicles and exemptions. This is a requirement under international agreements that transport safety investigations are not conducted into occurrences involving only military and state transport vehicles. So, as part of that international agreement, we have had to then put in that exemption clause. But we do have jurisdiction to investigate the occurrences between one of these exempted vehicles and one which is not, that is, one which is a civilian vehicle.

One of the Members asked about what are the circumstances in which the SAF would request TSIB to conduct an investigation into a transport occurrence that involves a Singapore military ship or Singapore military aircraft. I think that is an issue for them to answer. TSIB is available as a pool of resources and expertise that are there, so, if there is a need for this particular type of safety investigation and we are resourced to be called upon by the SAF. If the investigation involves information that is relevant for national security, there are already protocols in place, and that came out of the experience that the Air Accident Investigation Bureau had, working together with the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF). So, protocols have been developed and they will extend across all these different interagency boundaries to deal with issues around sensitive information, to allow these investigations to proceed.

Members brought up the issue of the exemption that the Minister for Transport can order through the Gazette. This will only be exercised in highly exceptional cases and it will not be taken lightly. This exemption arises from the fact that there is an international requirement for the provisions of the Bill, which provide TSIB with a significant amount of powers and require the reports to be made public, and we do want to make sure that when it is necessary from a national interest, that certain vehicles can be exempted from those provisions. It will be done through an order in the Gazette and will not be taken lightly.

In the past two years, TSIB has initiated an average of 17 investigations into aviation and marine incidents per year. Each investigation takes approximately one year to complete. TSIB institutes its own investigations. There is no transfer of investigations from other agencies, and there will not be as these new domains are investigated. These will be independent and separate investigations.

Mr Louis Ng asked about the detention of vehicles under clause 30, which empowers the Director to detain a transport vehicle for the reasons given. There is no expressed cap on the duration of detention. Clause 30, paragraph 5, explicitly says "The Director must not detain a transport vehicle under this section for longer than is necessary and reasonable to exercise any other powers under this Act." The transport vehicle can only be detained for both what is necessary and reasonable to facilitate the investigations. So, TSIB will be mindful not to detain these vehicles for longer than necessary.

With respect to the issue of costs, today already, air incident investigation costs and expenses are recovered from owners and operators whose aircraft are the subject of investigations. So, clause 18 is really looking for parity across a number of domains just to make sure that the same approach and same treatment are applied.

The examples of the types of costs were asked, for example, the cost of conducting specialised tests, recovering and storing the wreckage as well as administrative and operational overheads of conducting the investigation.

Ms Sylvia Lim, in particular, asked about the information that will be obtained by TSIB in the course of investigation. So, the requirement is that the information is used solely for the purpose of improving transport safety. That is why the Bill is crafted in the way it is, in order to maintain that opportunity to have a free flow of information without the fear that the persons giving that information will be penalised. So, in order to do so, the TSIB staff, as well as former staff who are involved need to be distanced from judicial proceedings. They cannot be compelled to give evidence in civil or criminal proceedings related to the incident. Further to that, some information, such as onboard recording information, cannot be disclosed. This is the international practice.

The final part of this component is that the investigation report is inadmissible as evidence in Courts and proceedings, with the exception of the coroner's inquiry, and that is to stay consistent with the fundamental purpose of these transport safety investigations. The reason why the coroner's inquiry has an exception made for it is because the purpose of the coroner's inquiry is to determine the cause and circumstances connected with the death without necessarily framing a finding as to determining a question of criminal, civil or disciplinary liability.

However, this barrier against disclosure is not absolute. Under clause 43, paragraph 4, the High Court may order the disclosure of the restricted information if it is satisfied that this is necessary. But ultimately, it is the coroner's prerogative to decide whether it is necessary to wait for the conclusion of the TSIB investigation before making a decision about the cause of death, the verdict on the cause of death. This is not under TSIB's remit, it will be up to the coroner to decide, and the coroner will be aware that this investigation is happening and the coroner will have to make that decision.

There are issues with respect to the coordination of multiple investigations from multiple agencies. So, the agencies involved have developed a standard operating procedure to make sure that they adhere to their own regulatory framework as well as to allow the investigation to proceed. If there is sharing of information, it is done within the regulatory and legal frameworks for each investigation and for each agency.

Indeed, during the course of the investigation, TSIB will engage with the parties concerned to deliberate the information collected to analyse the contributing factors and to try to make some preliminary recommendations. But ultimately, the drafting of the report is by TSIB. TSIB has to take full responsibility for those recommendations and stand by them. So, where there is, for example, conflicting information that is coming in, TSIB has to make the decision about what would be their recommendations and justify these in their report.

Ms Sylvia Lim asked particularly about the issue of making the draft report available. This is a practice that has been happening in the aviation industry, particularly, internationally, and the commercial players see value in this because it increases public confidence in the safety of the processes – their processes as well as the international agreements. It should be seen not as a vetting of the final report but as a completion of the fact-finding and analysis of the information that is there and how experts interpret what has happened.

But ultimately, the positioning of where TSIB sits within the Ministry, its protections under the law, and the structure of their operations as regulated by this Bill give it that independence from commercial interests. I am sure there will be an attempt to put across vested interests and lobbying and so on and so forth. But it is precisely because of that, that we need to ensure that there are protections for the Director of TSIB and the officers of TSIB to have that independence when they issue their recommendations in their final report.

Ms Joan Pereira asked about the penalty for failing to respond to safety recommendations. This is not the penalty for a safety lapse. This is a penalty for failing to administratively cooperate with TSIB and respond to safety recommendations. It is not as a punitive penalty for a safety lapse for an incident, which is a matter not for TSIB to determine, but for the Police or for the agencies or the regulators to investigate and determine as needed.

Mr Deputy Speaker, once again I thank the Members for supporting this Bill and the good work that our TSIB officers do, and for bringing up these key and important issues in the operations of the maritime, air and, in the future, rail sectors. I beg to move, Mr Deputy Speaker.

Question put, and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House.

The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. – [Dr Janil Puthucheary.]

Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed.