Infrastructure Protection Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

2.28 pm

The Second Minister for Home Affairs (Mrs Josephine Teo): Mr Speaker, I beg to move, “That the Bill be now read a Second time.”

Members of the House will be aware, as it appears on the Order Paper, that the hon member Mr Christopher de Souza has filed a Motion on fortifying Singapore’s resolve against the rising threat of terrorism. This Bill is also about fortifying Singapore, specifically to protect our critical infrastructures and certain buildings.

Today’s terrorists typically target crowded places or iconic buildings, so that they can take out as many lives as possible and make a huge statement with their acts. Their aim is to create fear and upend our way of life in the ideological battle between their and our values. There are already many horrifying attacks.

In August this year, vehicle-ramming attacks in Catalonia, Spain, killed 16 people. The terrorists behind the attacks had also planned to bomb iconic buildings in Barcelona.

In 2011, a car bomb exploded in front of government buildings in Oslo, which included the Prime Minister’s office. It killed eight people and significantly damaged several buildings.

In 2008, the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad was targeted by a massive truck bomb. It was stopped by the hotel’s vehicle security barrier 40 metres from the front of the hotel, which blunted the attack. But it was not enough; the blast left a huge crater outside the hotel and 54 people dead.

These incidents testify to the importance of adequately protecting our infrastructure. Despite heightened alert and best efforts by the security agencies, the attacks had still succeeded to varying degrees.

Singapore is not immune to such threats. We have been cited as a target in jihadist publications and videos. Attacks have been plotted against us, such as the one involving Marina Bay Sands last year. There has been a significant rise in the number of radicalised individuals detained. Terrorist attention on this region is also growing, fuelled by conflict in areas like Marawi.

Realistically, we cannot expect to uncover and foil every terrorist plot. That is why our response has to be comprehensive, covering not just pre-emptive action by the security agencies, but infrastructure protection as well, to mitigate the consequences of a successful attack.

Over the past two years, the Government has expanded closed-circuit television (CCTV) coverage, enhanced border protection, upgraded the response capabilities of our security forces and mobilised the community, among other measures. The Public Order Act was amended in April to require organisers of large-scale events to take necessary security measures to protect the public.

This Bill is a continuation of our counterterrorism efforts. It has to be seen against the backdrop of the evolving and worsening threat, and the cognisance that no single approach can effectively deal with it. The Bill aims to protect key infrastructure against attacks. Indeed, measures like vehicle barriers and hardening of structures and of glazing, are a key line of defence. They can both deter attacks and blunt the force of an attack. They can save lives.

Building security is the responsibility of building owners, and it will remain so. They know their needs and operations best and are responsible for the safety of their tenants and the public who visit their buildings.

But for certain buildings, the risk and impact of an attack are much more significant, for example, those with high public footfall, or are iconic of our society and way of life. In these cases, it is in the public interest for the Government to be proactive in ensuring that appropriate security measures are put in place to safeguard lives and property.

Today, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) already works with owners of critical infrastructure and selected commercial buildings, to take security into account upfront in the development process, by integrating into the building design. This is called security-by-design.

Current laws, however, do not provide us with the authority to mandate such infrastructure protection; we have relied on engagement and persuasion.

While such an approach has worked reasonably well so far, given the worsening threat environment, the Government has assessed that we should establish a clear regulatory framework to more systematically protect Singapore’s infrastructure. This will also provide more transparency and clarity about the requirements and processes for building owners and developers.

The Infrastructure Protection Bill sets out such a legal framework. It aims to achieve three things.

First, the Bill will ensure that critical infrastructure, as well as buildings with high public footfall and iconic buildings, are designed with security in mind. It is impractical to turn the whole of Singapore into a fortress. In deciding which buildings to regulate, we have to consider the risk to the public, the national interest and the cost to businesses.

A successful strike on critical infrastructure will disrupt essential services, such as power, water or transport. An attack on large buildings with high public footfall could result in mass casualties. Iconic buildings are also attractive targets for terrorists because of their international reputation or significance to Singapore. The Bill will require such infrastructure to undergo a security-by-design process before they are built or renovated.

Second, the Bill will allow the authorities to issue directives and orders to protect other buildings in Singapore against terrorist attacks. While any building could be a target, it is clearly not practical to require every building in Singapore to undergo security-by-design.

For buildings that need not undergo security-by-design, the Bill enables MHA to introduce or to issue directives for owners to put in place appropriate security measures against the risk of a terrorist attack. If an attack is imminent, emergency orders may also be issued to protect these buildings.

Third, the Bill will enhance powers to protect sensitive locations. These locations are currently declared under the Protected Areas and Protected Places Act (PAPPA). Most of them are critical infrastructure or military areas. The Bill will address gaps in the PAPPA. It will give the owners of these locations enhanced powers to address threats and implement heightened surveillance in the area surrounding the facility.

I will go through each of these three aspects covered by the Bill in some detail.

First, on security-by-design. Security-by-design is a process to ensure that security is designed into the building design. It attempts to mitigate security risks through good building design and incorporates security measures upfront into the building features. Examples of such security measures include: (a) hardening of structural elements, such as walls and columns, to resist bomb blast effects; (b) providing for a stand-off distance using security barriers to prevent unauthorised vehicles from coming close to the building; and (c) combining security technology with operational processes, such as monitoring CCTVs, operating access control systems, or implementing security procedures.

A key benefit of security-by-design is that security is effectively incorporated into the building without overly compromising other factors, such as the form and function of the building. It is generally more cost-effective because good design can reduce or even eliminate the need for some security measures. It also avoids costly retrofitting later on.

Security-by-design will be made a legal requirement under the Bill.

Clause 5 will empower the Minister for Home Affairs to appoint a Commissioner of Infrastructure Protection. The Commissioner will be responsible for the administration of the Bill, including security-by-design requirements.

Part 4 of the Bill, or clauses 32 to 48, details the security-by-design requirements.

In Part 5, clauses 51 to 53 allow the Commissioner to issue directives to address non-compliance with security-by-design requirements.

The Minister will designate the buildings that need to undergo security-by-design in the interests of public safety and public security, or national interests. Under clause 34, such new buildings that have not yet been built will be designated as Special Developments. They will need to undergo security-by-design before construction starts. Under clause 41, existing buildings will be designated as Special Infrastructures. They will need to undergo security-by-design when they undertake major renovations.

The Minister will designate two groups of buildings as Special Developments or Special Infrastructures: first, critical infrastructures, which are vital to the delivery of essential services, such as water, power and transport; and second, large or iconic buildings, which face a higher level of threat either due to high public footfall, or because of their prominence or symbolic significance.

All critical infrastructures, whether existing or new, will be designated under the Bill. Owners of such infrastructures would already be familiar with security-by-design. In the past decade, MHA has worked closely with Government agencies to identify critical infrastructures and incorporate security into their design. This will continue under the Bill.

As for the second group of buildings, new developments that have potential of high public footfall will be designated as "Special Developments". They will be identified based on objective criteria, such as gross floor area, whether they are zoned for commercial, community or mixed use, and whether they are in certain planning areas. In clause 34, the Bill makes clear that we will publish the criteria which will be used to designate a class of Special Developments under a gazette order. The order will require any new developments that meet the criteria to undergo security-by-design.

We may also designate new developments that do not meet the high public footfall criteria but are iconic as Special Developments.

For existing buildings that meet the high public footfall criteria, they will generally be designated as Special Infrastructure. MHA will engage each owner and assess the need for security measures, taking into consideration the building’s actual land use and profile. Any further requirements to be imposed will be reasonable and practical, taking into account the fact that these are existing and not new buildings.

We will be as transparent as possible about the buildings that we will designate as Special Developments or Special Infrastructures and inform the building owners as early as we can.

Clause 32 describes who will be the responsible person of a Special Development or Special Infrastructure.

After a new development or existing building is designated, clauses 35 and 42 require responsible persons to submit a security plan to the Commissioner for approval, before specified works can be carried out.

The term “specified works” is defined in clause 2. For Special Developments, specified works refer to key construction works, such as those affecting the foundation, retaining structure, substructure or super structure. For Special Infrastructures, specified works refer to an extension of the premises, or major renovation works.

Clause 33 explains what the security plan should cover. It should include the risk assessment and necessary security measures for the designated premises and must be prepared by a competent person approved by MHA.

For Special Infrastructures, a security plan to be approved by the Commissioner is required for major renovation works. The term “major renovation” is defined in clause 2 and broadly refers to works that may introduce new security risks, for example, works at publicly accessible areas, the perimeter, or involving critical assets. A security plan to assess the risks, adjust existing security measures or add new measures will be required.

The security plan may be required to cover areas outside of the specified works, so that security risks to the designated premises may be addressed adequately. The scope of such security measures will be reasonable, for example, to install or upgrade access control or video surveillance systems.

It will be an offence to commence specified works without an approved security plan. The penalty is a fine of up to $200,000 or two years’ jail, or both.

Under clause 51, the Commissioner may direct the responsible person to stop any specified works and take actions to comply with the requirement to submit a security plan for approval. This requirement will also be incorporated in the Urban Redevelopment Authority's (URA’s) conditions when granting provisional permission to developers to carry out works.

After the Commissioner approves the security plan, works can commence and the security measures in the approved security plan must be implemented. Clauses 38 and 45 describe this.

Clauses 39 and 46 require the responsible person to submit a Certificate of Works Completion (CWC) and obtain the Commissioner’s approval. The CWC certifies that required security measures have been implemented by the time specified works are completed. The CWC must be prepared by an approved competent person. Clause 40 explains that Special Developments become Special Infrastructures once the CWC is approved.

If the specified works require a Temporary Occupation Permit or Certificate of Statutory Completion from the Building and Construction Authority (BCA), these cannot be obtained without an approved CWC.

After the CWC is approved, clauses 40 and 47 require the responsible person to implement the rest of the security measures and maintain every security measure in accordance with the approved security plan. Failure to do so will be an offence punishable with a fine of up to $20,000 or two years’ jail or both.

Clauses 38 and 45 allow flexibility through regulations for security measures in the security plan to be modified after the CWC is approved, for example, due to changes in the owner’s operational needs, or if existing measures need to be adjusted because of new specified works.

Under clauses 52 and 53, the Commissioner may direct the responsible person to take actions to rectify non-compliance with the approved security plan.

The second key aspect of the Bill is the introduction of directives and orders to protect buildings against terrorist attacks.

The Commissioner may issue security directives to Special Developments and Special Infrastructures. Under clause 54, the Commissioner may direct the responsible person of a Special Infrastructure to implement and maintain specific security measures, if it is necessary to address any security risk. This could be because the Special Infrastructure does not have any approved security plan, meaning that it did not previously undergo security-by-design, or because the approved security plan does not address emerging or new security risks.

Under clause 55, the Commissioner may issue security directives to publicly accessible premises which have not been designated as Special Infrastructures. The purpose is to be able to direct persons to implement specific security measures to address the risk of a terrorist attack. Such measures could include installing vehicle security barriers, or improving CCTV coverage and allowing the Police to view the feeds in order to protect the building against a terrorist attack. These measures will also not include the strengthening of structural elements against blast effects, which typically involve major structural modifications.

Clause 56 makes non-compliance with security directives an offence. For directives under clauses 49 to 54, which is applicable to Special Infrastructures, this is punishable by a fine of up to $100,000 or imprisonment of up to two years or both. For directives under clause 55, which is applicable to buildings not designated as Special Infrastructure, this is punishable by a fine of up to $50,000 or imprisonment of up to two years or both. It is also an offence if the person continues not to comply with the security directive even after he is convicted.

Security directives are intended as a last resort. Where a building is assessed to be at risk, MHA and the Police will first engage building owners to develop practical security measures and encourage them to undertake those measures voluntarily. But if the building owner is resistant and there is a potential risk to public safety and security, directives will be used.

To address any imminent risk of a terrorist attack, clause 58 empowers the Minister to issue an order to any premises to take immediate actions against that risk. The order can require security measures, such as preparing and implementing contingency plans, installing temporary security measures, and deploying security guards to restrict access of people and vehicles.

The order can also require the temporary closure of a part or the whole of the premises, allowing state forces to access the premises, or for the owner to provide any information relevant to protecting the premises, for example, their building plans, visitor and car park records, or CCTV feeds.

Clause 60 makes non-compliance with the Minister’s orders an offence, punishable by a fine of up to $100,000 or five years’ jail or both. Under clause 65, if the Minister’s order is not complied with, the Commissioner may enter the premises to carry out the directions in the order and recover the costs from the owners.

Part 7 provides for appeals to the Minister against certain decisions of the Commissioner. During security-by-design, if the Commissioner rejects the security plan of a Special Development or Special Infrastructure, the responsible person may appeal to the Minister. Persons issued with security directives under Part 5 may also appeal to the Minister. In cases where independent technical advice is needed, the Minister may refer the appeal to an Appeal Advisory Board, comprising relevant experts, and appointed under clause 63.

The third and final key aspect of the Bill is to enhance powers to protect sensitive locations. These are locations currently declared under PAPPA. Most Singaporeans would be familiar with the red warning signs. These are sensitive facilities where the movement and conduct of persons need to be controlled for security reasons, for example, border checkpoints, military training camps, and critical infrastructure delivering essential services.

The difference between a Protected Area and a Protected Place is that a Protected Place is not accessible to the public without approval from the owner of the place. Let me use the airport as an illustration. The transit facilities are Protected Places. So, only persons with a valid boarding pass or other authorisation may enter those places. On the other hand, the departure halls are Protected Areas and are accessible to the general public. But in both locations, the movement and conduct of people are controlled for security reasons.

The purpose of PAPPA is to provide powers to authorities in charge of sensitive locations and their guards to protect their premises. The key provisions of PAPPA remain relevant today. The Bill will repeal PAPPA, enhance the provisions, and port them over to Part 3, or clauses 8 to 31 of this Bill.

Most provisions remain unchanged. Protected Areas and Protected Places declared under the current PAPPA will remain under the new Act. So will existing powers for guards to control movement in the Protected Area or Place, conduct searches of persons and property, remove persons and property, and arrest persons by force, if necessary.

Clauses 12 and 18 make explicit the responsibilities for authorities in charge of Protected Areas and Places. Where guards are deployed, they must be authorised officers to ensure that they have the proper training and authorisation to exercise the powers. The boundaries of Protected Areas and Places must be clearly marked. For Protected Places, measures must be put in place to prevent unauthorised access.

To address today’s threat environment, the Bill will make two enhancements to the powers for Protected Areas and Protected Places.

The first enhancement is to prevent terrorists from carrying out pre-attack surveillance of their targets. Images of Protected Areas and Places can threaten public safety, if used for unlawful purposes. They can reveal details of security measures, the flow of people and the movement of the guards.

To address this, clause 29 will make unauthorised photography of the whole or any part of a Protected Area or Protected Place an offence. This means that photos can only be taken if the authority in charge of the Protected Area or Protected Place gives its permission. This will apply to land-based, as well as to aerial photography. Clause 29 also empowers authorised officers to direct persons to stop taking photos and delete any photos taken. Signs will be displayed at the perimeter of the Protected Area or Place to indicate that unauthorised photography is prohibited.

Clause 30 deals specifically with photography by unmanned aerial vehicles. Similar provisions exist in the Air Navigation Act and the Public Order Act. Unauthorised photography of Protected Areas and Places by unmanned aerial vehicles is an offence. Authorised officers designated by the Police under clause 30 will have powers to address such instances of unauthorised photography, such as assuming control of the unmanned aerial vehicle to land it safely and quickly.

The second enhancement is to deter and detect persons in the surrounding area who pose a security threat to the Protected Area or Protected Place. This could be a person who carries a suspicious bag or parks a truck near the perimeter or loiters near the Protected Area or Place without good reason. Such persons could be carrying dangerous items. They could also distract the attention of authorised officers.

Potential attacks overseas have been stopped by vigilant guards in the surrounding area of a sensitive facility. In April this year, police in the United Kingdom (UK) arrested a man near the Prime Minister’s Office on suspicion of preparing to commit an act of terrorism. It turned out that he was carrying three knives in a rucksack.

Clauses 27 and 28 provide authorised officers with powers to identify and deal with potential security threats in the surrounding area. When engaging a person in the surrounding area, authorised officers may request for his personal identification and reason for being there. If the person fails to comply, or does not give a good and lawful reason to be there, the authorised officer may direct him to move on. The authorised officer may also inspect belongings and vehicles, if he reasonably suspects that the person is carrying dangerous items.

Clause 26 makes clear that the powers in clauses 27 and 28 apply only if the surrounding area is specified in the order of the Protected Area or Place. Signs will be displayed at the perimeter of the Protected Area or Place to indicate that the powers apply.

MHA has consulted stakeholders in developing the Bill, including from the built environment sector, such as real estate developers, architects and engineers, as well as owners and operators of critical infrastructure. Security industry professionals were also consulted. We recognise that the new infrastructure protection framework would require more expertise and resources in the area of building security.

MHA and the Professional Engineers Board will establish a new category of specialist Professional Engineers in Protective Security [PE (PS)] scheme to recognise and develop local expertise. It will be launched in 2018. In the longer term, we will consider making the involvement of PE (PS) in the security-by-design process as a legal requirement.

MHA will also publish updated Guidelines for Enhancing Building Security in Singapore. This will guide building owners on conducting security risk assessments, designing secure buildings and selecting appropriate security measures. The Centre for Protective Security Studies will conduct training and outreach on the guidelines. Mr Speaker, please allow me to conclude my speech in Mandarin.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Today, MHA works with selected buildings to integrate security into their design. We have thus far relied on engagement and persuasion rather than the law. But given the heightened threat environment, the Government is of the view that there is a need to establish a regulatory framework to more systematically protect Singapore’s infrastructure.

With the Infrastructure Protection Bill, key buildings will be required to incorporate security into their design. These include critical infrastructure delivering essential services, as well as large or iconic buildings that face a higher threat due to high public footfall, or their prominence or symbolic significance.

Other buildings which we deem to be at some risk of terrorist attacks, but which we have not designated as Special Infrastructures, may also be required to put in place security measures, if directed to do so.

But while infrastructure protection measures can mitigate the terrorist threat, they cannot eliminate it. We need to step up efforts on all fronts. The Bill must thus be seen as part of a comprehensive national counterterrorism framework. This includes CCTV coverage, border protection, response capabilities of the security forces, as well as the role of the community.

Indeed, no single initiative or legislation alone can tackle the multifaceted threat of terrorism. Every Singaporean must stand up to be counted and play our part to safeguard Singapore’s safety and security.

Question proposed.

Mr Speaker: Ms Joan Pereira.

3.01 pm

Ms Joan Pereira (Tanjong Pagar): Mr Speaker, Sir, the Infrastructure Protection Bill is necessary in view of the rising terrorism threat to Singapore. According to the Singapore Terrorism Threat Assessment Report, we are facing the highest level of threat in recent years.

Under this Bill, the Government will be able to require selected new and existing buildings to put in place features to strengthen their security. Naturally, owners and occupiers designated as the responsible authorities of protected places are concerned with higher costs associated with such designs, installations and measures. These may include special materials for protection against blast effects, vehicle barriers, CCTV and security guards.

MHA has given the assurance that it will continue to rely on engagement with such facilities' owners or occupiers before turning to legislation for enforcement. However, while the penalties for non-compliance have been listed clearly in the Bill, information about Government funding and resource support for identified facilities is lacking. The owners and occupiers of protected places will want more clarity about the burden and apportionment of costs for enhanced security. I would like to ask if the Ministry will be issuing guidelines on how it will work with businesses to manage such costs.

Next, another equally important component for infrastructure protection is the personnel involved. Besides the security staff, non-security personnel at these facilities should also be trained in how to act to reduce risks and respond in the event of emergencies. All staff should be trained with regular drills, and processes must be in place to ensure that the necessary steps and compliance measures are adhered to.

Last, I would like to request that hospitals be considered for the list of selected protected areas. Hospitals are a very important part of our infrastructure, along with other more obvious facilities, such as our airports, ports, checkpoints and military installations. They provide an essential service and experience high human traffic daily, which make them potential targets for terrorists. In the event of a terror attack, the provision of medical care could be severely disrupted. Furthermore, medical personnel and equipment are very difficult to replace. Therefore, I hope that our hospitals will be accorded greater protection. I would like to conclude with my support for the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Ms Sylvia Lim.

3.04 pm

Ms Sylvia Lim (Aljunied): Mr Speaker, Sir, this Bill seeks to protect selected areas and buildings against security risks. These threats are not merely terrorism-related but include threats from crime and accidents. It goes without saying that appropriate security measures can safeguard lives and property and minimise disruptions to essential services. Thus, this Bill should be supported.

Having said that, it should also be borne in mind that we should also not go overboard and have the country in perpetual lock-down mode. We must be able to go about our daily activities efficiently. If we cannot live normal lives, the terrorists have already won.

This Bill has several Parts. While I am in general support of the Bill, I have some queries and concerns to raise.

First, on Part 3: protected areas and protected places. The Bill repeals the current Protected Areas and Protected Places Act and re-enacts the same provisions but includes some new provisions as well. At the same time, the maximum fines for offences have been drastically increased, from $1,000 to $20,000. I assume that this is due to the heightened security environment and inflation over the years, but I appreciate the Minister's clarification on this.

Next, clause 29 introduces a new provision to make it an offence to take photographs or videos of protected areas and protected places. While it is perfectly reasonable to prohibit such actions inside or above the protected area or protected place, the section makes it an offence to take a photograph or make a recording from outside the protected area and protected place. Is it reasonable to punish someone taking a picture from outside, when he is standing in a public area, and the photograph is simply capturing what is already visible publicly? Maps available on the Internet, such as Google Earth, already show such information publicly anyway.

Next, I move on to Part 4: special developments and special infrastructures. This Bill introduces new provisions that certain developments and buildings will be required to have security plans approved by the new Commissioner for Infrastructure Protection.

What constitutes a "special development" or "special infrastructure"? According to the Ministry's press release on 11 September and also the Minister’s Second Reading speech, these buildings would be those which "house essential services, are iconic, or with high human traffic". Clause 34 states that the Minister will be the one designating "special developments" and "special infrastructures" that need to comply with the Act. Could there be further elaboration on the types and extent of buildings that would need to be designated? For instance, will all shopping malls be designated? What about hospitals? As for Housing and Development Board (HDB) estates, clause 2 of the Bill states that Town Councils would be considered owners of common property for the purpose of the Bill. Which part of HDB estates would be deemed "special infrastructures"?

Next, as far as developments are concerned, the intention is to have security embedded into the facility at the design stage. Clause 35 makes it clear that key structural works cannot commence until the security plan is approved. From a security management perspective, such early emplacement of security concerns is recommended and likely to achieve better outcomes. At the design stage, security professionals can work with architects, engineers and facility owners to ensure that security features do not disrupt the overall building aesthetics or the facility's operational needs.

Clauses 33 provides that the security plans must be prepared by a person approved by the Commissioner for Infrastructure Protection in connection with those works. I would like to know whether it is intended that the Commissioner pre-approves a list of security practitioners who would be acceptable, or would the Commissioner be open to case-by-case approvals of security consultants, depending on the project or the building at hand? Will the Commissioner accept a security professional who is an employee of the owner or occupier?

Lastly, Sir, clauses 37 and 44 talk about amendments to approved security plans. The amendments can be initiated by either the building owner or the Commissioner for Infrastructure Protection. In other words, after the Commissioner has approved the security plan, he can change his mind sometime later and require additional measures to be included. What if the new measures result in wasted costs, for example, if they require undoing of systems or structures already put in? It seems that, according to clause 80, the owner has to bear such wasted costs. Whether clause 80 is fair will depend on why the amendment to the plan at a later stage was needed. If the amendment was due to the negligence of the authorities in the first approval, should the owner be forced to bear the additional cost?

Mr Speaker: Mr Darryl David.

3.10 pm

Mr Darryl David (Ang Mo Kio): Mr Speaker, Singapore has so far managed to prevent a terrorist attack on our soil, but given the extreme ease with which acts of terror can now be committed using a runaway truck or with a knife easily bought from a supermarket, we cannot afford to be complacent. On 1 June 2017, MHA released the Terrorism Threat Assessment Report that highlighted the persistent risk of attack that Singapore faces, and the recent video released by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) media centre featuring a Singapore-born terrorist further brings home the point that security is our collective responsibility.

With the launch of SGSecure to sensitise, train and mobilise the community in the event of an attack, it is highly relevant that we now take a hard review at the adequacy of our safety protocols and put in place networks, structures, systems and processes to support our nation's effort in the constant battle against terrorism. While I am most supportive of this Bill, I would like to raise some points for the Minister's consideration. Perhaps, some of these points have already been covered to some extent by the Second Minister in her very thorough opening speech, but I hope that she will be open also to considering the points raised over the next few minutes or so.

I would like to start off with talking about clause 5 which talks about the Commissioner of Infrastructure Protection. The Bill, when passed, will vest the Minister with the authority to appoint, among public officers, a Commissioner of Infrastructure Protection, and a team of Deputy Commissioners and Assistant Commissioners that administer the Act. This reinforces the importance given to securing our key installations and properties against possible incursions.

While the appointment of a coordinating Commissioner and his/her team is a step in the right direction, the question of how coordination can be done across multiple agencies needs to be addressed. For example, what are the criteria for the Commissioner's appointment and what will be the extent of his/her power? Would he or she be vested with authority to coordinate the activities of different agencies that are now responsible for infrastructure protection? And is the Ministry considering setting up a dedicated Agency for Infrastructure Protection to execute the duties of the role?

I would like now to move on to clause 8 which states that the Minister will be vested with wide-ranging power to declare any premises in Singapore as a protected area if it is deemed necessary to control the movement and conduct of persons on the premises. While I appreciate that exigencies might require swift responses from the Government, would the Government consider building in safeguards to protect against potential compromise of stakeholders' interests?

In its current form, the Bill clarifies only the purpose and intent of the protected area but does not specify the criteria that would be used to determine if a premises should come under protection. As opposed to the current broad interpretation that an area can come under protection upon application of its owner and by volition of the Minister, would the Ministry consider publishing guidelines that lay out the framework to determine whether an area will be put under protection, and also, how would the scope of protection relate to the strategic importance of the asset and level of threat?

On a related note, if a designated protected area incorporates a mix of residential and commercial interests, such as, say, the Marina Bay Financial Centre, how would the designation of the protected area impact the interest of residents and businesses in that area?

Clause 18 of the Bill highlights that only "authorised officers" are to be deployed to guard protected places. A closer reading of the Bill reveals that "authorised officers" are interpreted broadly to encompass personnel from various divisions of the Home Team and the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), as well as Auxiliary Police Officers and security guards.

I believe, Mr Speaker, that we need to ensure that "authorised officers" who are protecting the installations are adequately and adeptly trained to spot, manage and neutralise potential terrorists. While the Singapore Police Force (SPF) and SAF have specialised personnel who are trained to protect key installations, it would be hard to reconcile that an Immigration and Checkpoints Authority (ICA) officer, though with due respect, or security guard deployed by a commercial security firm would possess that same level of training to be a deterrent for would-be terrorists.

Would the Ministry consider implementing a training curriculum and a certification process to ensure that all personnel deployed to guard key installations have the right level of competence and skill to discharge their duties? This would differentiate a casual security guard from a specialised officer that has been trained and prepared for guarding protected places.

Finally, I support the Bill’s provision that new developments can be designated as special developments where developers are legally obliged to construct and build the relevant safety structures to ensure the safety of the building’s occupants. Some of these devices, as mentioned by the Second Minister herself earlier, would include video or surveillance devices in the vicinity of the building, barriers to prevent vehicular threats to crowds or building structures, specially-reinforced concrete walls that do not collapse easily, and fireproof claddings. While these features can be incorporated with relative ease into new developments, they are much more difficult to be implemented in existing buildings.

It was reported in April 2016 that an interagency working team has been put together to study security guidelines for existing buildings and the results of the study will be made available. Can the Ministry shed some light on the outcome of this study? Does the Ministry intend to conduct a safety audit, as it were, on existing buildings to ensure that building owners are compelled to rectify security shortcomings to mitigate collateral damage from terrorist attacks? Also, would there be guidelines for public agencies, such as Town Councils and HDB, on enhancing public safety in HDB estates, as well as guidelines for owners of commercial properties on what they could and, perhaps, should do to deter would-be attacks? The Second Minister talked earlier about "security-by-design". I was wondering if this concept could be expanded to include perhaps the notion of "security-by-redesign" for existing buildings and properties.

The threat of terrorism is real and persistent, Mr Speaker. Recent sectarian violence in Southeast Asia is not only the result of violent extremism and fundamentalism originating from the Middle East, it also provides the recruitment platform for the extremism and fundamentalism to be fuelled further. This is a vicious cycle that will have potentially grave consequences as returning fighters from the conflict in that part of the world come back to this part of the world in Southeast Asia.

The reading of this Bill is thus timely and we certainly need to strengthen our resolve to combat extremism and terrorism, not only in terms of being more vigilant, reinforcing our social ties, boosting our paramilitary competencies, but also in protecting our buildings and infrastructure as well. Mr Speaker, Sir, I conclude my speech in firm support of the Bill.

3.17 pm

Mr Desmond Choo (Tampines): Mr Speaker, the 9/11 attacks ushered in an era whereby terrorist attacks are an unfortunate norm. While we have avoided terrorist attacks on Singapore soil thus far, we must not stop enhancing our defence against terrorism.

Terrorists evolve their tactics quickly to stay one step ahead of security and law enforcement agencies. Cars and lorries are now used just as effectively as explosives to cause carnage, fear and deadly divisions in many countries. We saw these in Finland, the UK and Spain. The broad-ranging terrorist arsenal meant that our security agencies cannot be the only active agents in preventing terrorism.

This Bill seeks to ensure that our key infrastructures are well guarded against threats. Infrastructure owners will be required to adopt measures against security threats. These will involve additional costs and resources for businesses and may result in some inconvenience as well. The concern about cost is understandable. Yet, a successful attack involves a far graver cost, and not just for businesses, but for everyone. This Bill is not alone in its bid to strengthen Singapore’s line against terrorism. The Counter-Terrorism Committee under the United Nations has similarly called for greater partnership between the public and private sectors to secure critical infrastructure.

We can understand the concerns on costs because there can be a long tail of them. The costs involved will include consultancy, implementation and long-term maintenance and replacement. How would the Ministry better help our businesses to manage these costs effectively so that it will not be passed down to tenants and customers? In fact, the Ministry’s regulatory costs could also increase to ensure that the security measures are in working condition. How can the Ministry itself better manage such longer-term costs?

Because the measures that might be needed can be extensive, there is value for a prescribed code, much like a building code. This allows companies to know what is expected of them as part of forward business planning. Yet, this might then become an ironically useful guide for terrorists. We need to strike a balance. Could the Minister share more on how the selection of infrastructure is made, and how many buildings will be affected? What is the timeline given for affected buildings to comply with all the requirements set out in the Bill?

Mr Speaker, skilled manpower along the value chain is needed for these measures to work. For example, there must be sufficient consultants and capacity in the Ministry to ensure that building owners are not unduly delayed in seeking approvals. We need to ensure that security officers are kept updated on these new measures. Would new forms of training be required and refresher training be introduced to help existing security officers? There is also a consequential need for a pool of capable and well-trained staff in facilities management who can ensure that the new security measures implemented are in good working order. We will also need the security agencies to have sufficient resources to audit the buildings, the list of which perhaps will only grow with time.

The powers to stop unauthorised photography are needed to stem terrorist surveillance and reconnaissance. This is an important first counterterrorism measure. Do the powers also extend to publishing of such photos? What measures or education efforts will be taken to increase awareness?

Mr Speaker, this Bill improves the security in Singapore. However, laws alone will not solve all our security issues. There will still be many buildings holding thousands of people and of iconic and important value but not included within the guidelines. Yet, we know it is unwise to barricade every building and line every street with bollards. We must secure whatever we can, prudently and effectively. This is another ring of defence to complement our SGSecure work. The best defence is still an engaged and resilient citizenry. With this, Sir, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Louis Ng.

3.22 pm

Mr Louis Ng Kok Kwang (Nee Soon): Sir, I stand in support of the Bill. Enhancement of security measures to buildings and provision of powers to security personnel to better protect Singapore’s infrastructure against security risks is timely, in light of the prevalence of indiscriminate terror attacks carried out globally.

Further, I applaud the initiative to rope in the business community as part of the shared effort to keep Singapore safe. There are two clarifications I seek.

Firstly, clause 22 describes the circumstances which allow the authorised officers of protected areas or places to use such force as is reasonably necessary to remove any person or, without warrant, arrest a person who enters or is about to enter such protected areas or places.

These circumstances include a catch-all provision prescribing if that person, in the opinion of the authorised officer, does not have a good and lawful reason to enter or to be in that protected area or place, or is acting in a suspicious manner.

The presence of the global threat of terror is very real, and the need to empower our officers is much needed. However, can the Minister clarify if these powers given to the authorised officer in clause 22 are subject to guidelines?

I believe there are less concerns when these powers are given to Police Officers, but there is concern that this Bill indicates that such powers can be given to security officers. The training a Police Officer receives is very different from the training a security officer receives. Can the Minister provide further clarifications on the need to provide security officers with such powers? In addition, there is now a stronger focus on the role of security officers in our fight against terrorism. Will MHA be devoting resources into developing this industry and reviewing and improving the training provided to these officers?

Secondly, I appreciate that ensuring the security of Singapore’s infrastructure should be a joint responsibility. This duty ought to be shared by all, including businesses, premises owners and developers. However, as shared by Members who have spoken before me, there have been concerns by building owners on rising operational costs when additional security measures have to be put in place.

There is less concern for new buildings or those undergoing major renovations since they can factor in such costs during the initial stages, but more so when we issue directives or orders for existing buildings. I do appreciate that this is necessary. But perhaps the cost of not implementing such measures against terrorist attacks would be greater than the cost of installing CCTVs, deploying security officers and barriers.

But I hope the Minister can address some of the public concerns with regard to the availability of grants in exceptional cases where the building owner is unable to afford the costs of implementing the directives or orders.

Sir, I applaud the efforts of the Ministry thus far with the SGSecure movement. I also applaud their focus on the “Security-by-Design” process, and I understand we are one of the first few countries in the world to legislate the need for such a process.

I believe it is important and necessary to include the entire community in efforts to keep Singapore safe. By working together, we can keep Singapore secure. Sir, notwithstanding the above clarifications, I stand in support of this Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Zainal Sapari.

3.25 pm

Mr Zainal Sapari (Pasir Ris-Punggol): Mr Speaker, I rise to support the Infrastructure Protection Bill. However, to ensure that the desired outcomes of the Bill be achieved, it is important that other aspects related to the implementation of the Bill be looked into as well.

Firstly, I think we need to look at the quality of our security officers, especially those engaged by the private security agencies. The effectiveness of the Bill will depend on the capabilities and competency of the security officers which, currently, vary widely. Our ICA and SPF officers are well-trained and equipped with relevant training, such as the Threat-Oriented Person Screening Integrated System (TOPSIS) profiling and Red-Team simulations, to ensure that they always maintain their edge in executing their duties.

For private security officers today, the 42,000 of them on the ground are treated as a common group. I seek MHA to review this approach. The 42,000 officers diverge on demographics, education and capabilities. At the risk of over generalising things, may I propose that we categorise them into three separate groups?

On the one hand, we have officers who are fit and highly competent. Bouncers, event security officers fit into this category, which is not unlike the APO (E) scheme currently available for APOs who do not need to carry a weapon. For this group, we should treat them as APOs and they should command a premium salary. They would have to undergo annual refresher courses and physical fitness tests.

On the other hand, based on our ground engagement, about one-third of the 42,000 officers today are near retirement or post-retirement. For these officers, taking every extra module subjects them to undue stress because of language difficulties. These officers should be allowed to serve as security officers at sites deemed low risk, and we thank MHA and the Police Licensing and Regulatory Department (PLRD) for taking the first step towards this consideration, as reflected in the proposed Bill. It is important to note that my recommendation does not discriminate this group of workers. Should any of these officers like to upgrade themselves, by all means they can do so.

In the middle, we have a group of officers who, though not as fit, may be able to take on other duties, like first aid, lift rescue and firefighting. Buyers today already expect them to do so, without properly prescribing them in the contracts, nor paying for it. I would like to propose that for every skillset they are expected to have, these officers must be given an extra pay equivalent to the value of that skillset. This should sit on top of their basic pay.

I firmly believe that if we variegate the jobs in the security industry in this manner, we will create a proper career path for our security officers with meaningful pay. After all, none of us would like to work in an industry where everyone has the same job scope. Afterall, we are talking about 42,000 officers.

Related to this is the need to have better working conditions and employment terms and benefits for our private security officers which can lead to better work performance. Currently, the security industry is plagued by issues, such as long working hours, lack of proper rest areas, and officers are given only basic employment statutory benefits.

Unless a decisive effort is made to improve the working conditions and mandating better employment benefits, it will be difficult to attract younger workers into the industry. Hence, I would like to ask MHA what are the plans to improve working conditions of the security officers and to consider my proposals above to attract younger people to be security officers.

Second, I would like MHA to consider having basic security requirements in residential areas, such as condominiums, that will require the use of technology to improve security with less reliance on headcount. Even though a set of guidelines on enhancing building security by MHA and BCA is available, the take-up rate can be further improved if some of these requirements are made mandatory in these residential developments.

Some of these mandated security requirements should involve the use of technology, such as next-generation visitor management systems, using more smart cameras with surveillance software and smart analytics, perimeter detection that would reduce the need for patrolling, cloud-based reporting for incident reports to be sent to key decision-makers at short notice and having a remote command centre that could optimise manpower deployment on the ground. All these could reduce the overall demand for private security officers to allow for shorter working hours which are currently at 12 hours a day for six days a week.

As a start, by properly assessing the security needs of a site, suitably hardening first before prescribing security manpower will definitely go a long way in enhancing security outcomes for any site and also increase productivity almost instantly. In short, I would like to propose MHA mandating some of these security risk assessments for residential areas as well. Alternatively, MHA could also allow building owners not under the select building scheme to opt-in to meet the requirement or standard of the security measures under the category of Selected Buildings. Would MHA be able to provide the support they require to conform to the prescribed security standards?

In conclusion, security is everyone’s responsibility. I have made some suggestions that would complement the efforts undertaken by the Infrastructure Protection Bill as these areas would have a direct impact in achieving the desired outcome under this Bill. I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Melvin Yong.

3.31 pm

Mr Melvin Yong Yik Chye (Tanjong Pagar): Mr Speaker, I stand in support of the Infrastructure Protection Bill. It is timely that we are stepping up security for key buildings and places with high human traffic to counter threats and keep Singapore and Singaporeans safe and secure. However, I would like to seek some clarifications on the Bill.

Under the new law, does the Ministry foresee a sizeable increase in demand for security officers? If so, how is the Ministry planning to address the supply shortage whilst ensuring the quality of new APOs? Like my fellow Labour Member of Parliament (MP), Mr Zainal Sapari, I am concerned with the manpower shortage, which does have a negative impact on our security officers, including fatigue. I would, therefore, like to ask how the Ministry plans to attract more Singaporeans into the sector.

The manpower crunch, coupled with the projected increase in demand for security officers, makes it clear that we must turn to technology to fill the gap. For example, the use of smart video technology and motion sensors can help reduce labour-intensive patrol work. Smart video technology and motion sensors can pick up movements at the perimeter and analyse if they present a threat to the building. In my constituency, the Orchard Road Business Association has been encouraging hotels, retail buildings and offices to harness technology, such as AI-enabled facial recognition, when upgrading their security systems. However, the cost of implementing such advanced security technologies may be prohibitive for some building owners.

Mr Speaker, as highlighted by Members who have spoken before me, the cost of implementing additional security measures under the proposed Bill, be it traditional or advanced measures, will not come cheap. While new developments can incorporate the new security requirements into their design, older buildings may face a far heftier price tag if retrofitting works are extensive. These costs will be passed down to the tenants, many of whom are small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and eventually trickle down to consumers. Hence, I would like the Ministry to consider extending co-funding support to older buildings seeking to comply with the Bill and incentivise building owners to adopt more advanced technologies by providing higher funding support.

The introduction of advanced technologies will also mean that existing security officers must upgrade and upskill themselves to remain relevant. I understand that such concerns have already been raised to the Security Industry Transformation Committee, and an Industry Transformation Map (ITM) for the Private Security Industry is due by the end of this year. I would like to propose a review of the mandatory training modules under the Progressive Wage Model (PWM) so that security officers are better equipped to handle the new technologies and the new responsibilities accorded by the new provisions.

Mr Speaker, a crucial component of any security plan is the evacuation route once a building is targeted or compromised. I am sure that Members of this House have all taken part in a fire drill before and, indeed, it is essential for all buildings to have their own evacuation plans. However, such evacuations are often planned in insolation by the building’s management. When I was a Police commander and asked to see the fire evacuation plans of buildings in the city centre, I was surprised to find that every building had designated the same small grass patch in the vicinity as its assembly area. Surely, the space would not be enough if everyone from every building gathers there at the same time. That is why coordination, sharing of information and joint exercises are important.

I would like to suggest that the Ministry consider having sector-wide, integrated evacuation plans for buildings around key installations or have high human traffic, such as the Central Business District.

In closing, Mr Speaker, I am strongly in favour of the Bill’s intent to safeguard our nation’s key areas and buildings from terrorist threats. However, we cannot think of infrastructure protection in isolation. We must consider the cost of complying to the new laws and whether our security officers are well-equipped to protect our infrastructures. With that, Sir, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Gan Thiam Poh.

3.37 pm

Mr Gan Thiam Poh (Ang Mo Kio): Mr Speaker, it has often been said that prevention is better than cure. The Infrastructure Protection Bill is, indeed, all about pre-emptive measures to protect critical infrastructural facilities against the increasing threats of terrorism.

However, I am concerned about how we are going to achieve the balance between our security needs and public convenience. If we overdo it, we may end up with protected areas which are operated like a prison. On the other hand, if our protection measures are insufficient, such lapses could invite exploitations by terrorists.

I would like to suggest that we invest more in and leverage on technology to boost security. This could be a better solution than relying heavily on hardware, such as physical protective installations, which are also necessary. The use of big data analytical digital techniques, for example, would be useful.

The recent attempt by terrorists to fire a rocket from Batam is a clear example of terrorists exploring all means to cause casualties and instill fear. We have been fortunate in that our neighbouring countries have been working closely with us to cripple such attempts. In such cases, the scope for infrastructure defence will be limited due to the destructive powers of such weapons. Mr Speaker, in Mandarin.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] It is said that “As virtue rises one foot, vice rises 10”. The enemies are in the dark but we are in the open. Hence, we must take pre-emptive measures to protect our infrastructural facilities. It is always wise to play safe. Only by doing this can we effectively prevent and fight against terror.

(In English): Hence, early detection of self-radicalised individuals, their education and rehabilitation are important countermeasures as well. We must stay united and harmonious as a community in order to deter extremism, intolerance and terrorism. All races must keep constantly reminding one another that our religions and ideologies promote peace and love for our fellow men. Our fight is against terrorism, not against any religion nor any race.

We should leverage upon our well-trained, multiracial, multi-religious National Service (NS)men, active and reservists, and update them regularly with counterterrorism skills to expand on security measures on the ground.

Finally, I would like to voice my support for making it an offence the unauthorised photography and videography, including with the use of drones, of protected places listed under the existing PAPPA under this Bill. I would like to conclude with my support for the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Second Minister Josephine Teo.

3.40 pm

Mrs Josephine Teo: Mr Speaker, let me thank all the Members who have spoken up in support of the Bill. They raised many useful points which I shall address.

Let me start by talking about the cost of the security measures, which Ms Joan Pereira, Mr Desmond Choo, Mr Louis Ng and Mr Melvin Yong highlighted concerns about.

Terrorists have imposed many costs on society. I think Members agree that all of us bear a share of that burden.

Much of the cost of strengthening protection and enhancing security response is borne directly by the Government. Members will agree that safety and security are not only in our collective interest, they also impact the bottom line interests of businesses. Therefore, businesses must also contribute.

In this high threat environment, building owners and developers recognise that ensuring the security of their buildings is part and parcel of carrying out business. A recent survey by the World Economic Forum found that business leaders in Singapore see terrorist attacks as their top global risk. Their concerns are not misplaced.

They know that if the security of the building is breached, the damage to property could be much more costly. This is why even without the Bill, many buildings today already put in place security measures, like CCTVs and vehicle barriers. Most of these security measures do not involve complex systems and are maintained as part of the buildings’ other facilities.

In fact, security-by-design can offer cost savings to businesses in the longer term. When security measures are properly planned and seamlessly integrated into the design of the building, the use of technology, such as CCTV and access control systems, coupled with the appropriate processes, can help save on manpower cost. The flow of vehicles can be designed to reduce the risk of an attack to crowded areas and minimise or even eliminate the need for bollards.

The security requirements under the Bill also apply only to designated buildings, and not all buildings. Based on the proposed criteria, we expect a handful of new developments each year to be affected.

In past projects where security-by-design was implemented, the cost of security measures was between 0.2% and 3% of the total construction cost. But I should add that not all of this cost is attributable to the design process per se, since all buildings have to be fitted with some security measures in any case. Also, given that MHA will try to make known as early as possible which buildings need to undergo security-by-design, developers will likely factor in the cost of security measures in their bid price for the land.

Mr Darryl David is right to point out the need to ensure that buildings which are not designated as Special Developments and Special Infrastructures are also protected. Directives and orders offer a calibrated way to safeguard these buildings when a specific security risk has been identified, without having to impose security-by-design on all buildings. They can be used to require security measures, such as those mentioned by Mr Darryl David, including security checks and bollards.

To help manage the costs, MHA will engage building owners on what security measures would be effective and practical. Directives will be issued only as a last resort where owners refuse to take action and there is a risk to the public.

Let me now provide some clarifications on Special Developments and Special Infrastructures. Ms Sylvia Lim and Mr Desmond Choo asked about the kinds of buildings that would be designated Special Developments and Special Infrastructures.

It is fair that building owners and developers know, as early as possible, whether security-by-design requirements will apply in their own cases. This is why we intend to publish the criteria in the Gazette on the types of new developments that will be designated as Special Developments.

What are these criteria based on? Essentially, we look at indicators that signal the high likelihood of public footfall being very large. So, that will naturally include the size, location and the type of the developments. For a start, we will include developments with a gross floor area of over 100,000 square metres, are located in specific planning areas, and there is a list which will be identified in the Gazette. And apart from the gross floor area of 100,000 square metres, and also the location being in specific planning areas, these buildings ought to be designated by URA for commercial, community and mixed use. So, it will be quite clear through the Gazette which buildings are going to be designated Special Developments. Existing buildings that meet the criteria will generally also be designated as Special Infrastructures so that security can be incorporated in their design during renovation.

By publishing the criteria in the Gazette, developers and building owners will, therefore, have a good sense if they are affected and those who are unsure can approach MHA for clarification.

As for the timeline, we will inform the building owners as early as we can. Along with the high public footfall criteria, the details of the security-by-design review process will also be provided to the industry. We will also be reasonable in the amount of time given to developers and consultants to comply with the requirements under directives and orders.

Mr Darryl David asked about the Commissioner of Infrastructure Protection. This person would be a senior public servant in the Ministry of Home Affairs who has the necessary professional expertise to make assessments and to coordinate with relevant Home Team agencies. MHA has been working with selected building owners over the past decade on security-by-design. So, there is already a team in place and we will make sure the team is adequately resourced to implement the new requirements. But no new agency needs to be set up for now.

Ms Sylvia Lim also asked about competent persons who need to be approved by the Commissioner to prepare security plans. The Commissioner will make an assessment for each project, after assessing the person’s relevant qualifications, past experience with security-by-design projects, and the nature of the project. There is no pre-approved list, and we will provide broad guidelines on the requirements that competent persons should meet. Inhouse experts may also be included. But all will need to be approved for each project because some projects may require special expertise or may be of a sensitive nature.

Developing industry capabilities in security consulting and infrastructure protection is also one of our key priorities. There are security and blast consultants, as well as other built environment professionals like architects, who are well-versed with security-by-design. In other words, it is not an idea that is completely new in Singapore. Over the last decade, a number of projects have already gone through this process. As the Bill extends security-by-design to more new developments, we will build up the pool of competent persons with the new scheme for PE (PS). We will also work with the security industry to develop security consulting capabilities as part of the Security Industry Transformation Map.

Ms Sylvia Lim also asked about the Commissioner requiring amendments to the security plan after it has been approved and complied with. This will only be done if warranted by a security risk. Given the evolving nature of security threats, the Commissioner must be in a position to order a review of the security plan so that new risks assessed to warrant attention can be mitigated. I think Mr Darryl David referred to this as security-by-redesign. He is very right. Will there be abortive costs as a result? We will try to avoid this as much as possible, but it may not always be possible. We have to weigh it against the value of the enhanced security protection.

It is important for us to talk about Developing Industry Capabilities and, in this section, I shall do so. Mr Melvin Yong asked whether the demand for security manpower will increase as a result of the Bill. As I mentioned earlier, the key benefit of security-by-design is that it can mitigate security risks upfront in the design of the building and offer cost savings in the longer term. A building that is well-designed for security, with the use of technology, such as CCTV and video analytics integrated upfront, will actually require less manpower to guard.

Not only do we get to save on manpower, this is an opportunity to create new, higher skilled jobs and thereby attract new entrants to the sector. For example, guards with an integrated command centre can focus on analysing and responding to incidents over a much larger area, as compared to if they just patrolled on foot.

Mr Zainal Sapari, Mr Louis Ng, Mr Desmond Choo and Mr Melvin Yong spoke about the need to train security officers and uplift the industry. Indeed, the security industry is a key partner. MHA is working closely with industry stakeholders and tripartite partners to develop an Industry Transformation Map. This process has been ongoing for some time.

Among other initiatives, the Industry Transformation Map will identify ways to enhance the skills of security officers. Currently, security officers guarding Protected Areas and Protected Places must go through a counterterrorism course. The course was updated earlier this year to be more relevant. MHA and SPF are working with stakeholders in the Security Tripartite Cluster to make this counterterrorism course a licensing requirement for more security officers and incorporate this in the Progressive Wage Model.

Mr Zainal Sapari and Mr Melvin Yong also pointed out rightly that technology is a key enabler to improve productivity and alleviate manpower challenges in the security industry. The Member spoke passionately and also suggested enhancing training and job roles and recognising security officers with additional skills. The ITM will look into this, together with other important related issues they raised, such as attracting more Singaporeans into the industry.

Mr Zainal Sapari suggested mandating that all residential buildings carry out security risk assessments. There are thousands of such buildings and the general threat assessment does not yet warrant a blanket requirement on all of them. Nonetheless, the residential building owners can take reference from the criteria used to designate special developments or infrastructures and implement the appropriate security measures themselves. They can also refer to MHA’s Guidelines on Enhancing Building Security in Singapore (GEBSS). In addition, if they join the Safety and Security Watch Group, a Police Liaison Officer can help their premises undergo a security assessment. Mr Darryl David asked for an update on the interagency review of the guidelines. This is ongoing and we hope to publish the revised guidelines by early 2018.

Let us now turn to safeguards for the enhanced powers at Protected Areas and Places. Mr Darryl David asked about the criteria used to declare Protected Areas and Places. The PAPPA has been in place since 1948. Typically, the declaration is made at the application of the owner in charge of the sensitive location. Examples of such locations are military areas and critical infrastructures. They would generally not involve residential or commercial areas.

Mr Louis Ng asked whether powers given to the authorised officers are subject to guidelines, and the need to provide security officers with such powers. Mr Darryl David also mentioned the need to ensure authorised officers are properly trained.

The private security industry supports the Home Team in ensuring the safety and security of Singapore. Under the current PAPPA, security officers and APOs can already be deployed to guard Protected Areas and Places and exercise appropriate powers. They must, however, first undergo compulsory training, which is mandated by the Police. This already includes the counterterrorism course which I mentioned earlier.

Under the Bill, security officers and APOs will have to undergo additional training on how to exercise their proposed new powers. They need to become clearer about that. The Police will also develop rules of engagement on how these new powers are to be exercised so that the security officers and the APOs know the boundaries within which they operate.

There are other safeguards. For example, authorised officers will have to carry a map showing the specified surrounding area where they can exercise the proposed powers. And because they carry a map, there can be no dispute. Another safeguard: clause 26 provides that if the specified surrounding areas include private property, powers may only be exercised with the consent of the owner or occupier of that private property. Clause 31 further provides that when exercising such powers, authorised officers must identify themselves and state their authority to do so, if asked.

Unauthorised photography, some clarifications there. Mr Gan Thiam Poh supported making unauthorised photography of Protected Areas and Places an offence. Ms Sylvia Lim asked whether such a prohibition was reasonable.

The purpose of this prohibition is to deter would-be attackers from carrying out pre-attack surveys of their targets. Today, while many Protected Areas or Places have "No Photography" signs outside, authorised officers are not able to stop persons from taking photos.

On the ground, the authorised officers will have to exercise some judgement. If photos were taken inadvertently, they would typically warn and ask the person to delete the photos. Further action would be taken if the person does not comply, or if there are security reasons to do so. The Bill will limit the availability of more recent and detailed photographs of Protected Areas and Places. Such photos can threaten public safety and security by facilitating the planning of attacks. Making it clear that unauthorised photography is prohibited will also have a deterrent effect, allowing security resources to focus on areas that are more likely to be a real threat.

Mr Desmond Choo asked how many people have been charged or warned against taking photographs or videos of Protected Areas and Places, and how awareness will be increased.

Currently, because this is not an offence – though some of our Protected Areas and Places like our checkpoints have rules to disallow it – no one has committed an offence since it is not an offence. The Bill will make unauthorised photography an offence punishable with a fine of up to $20,000 or imprisonment of up to two years or both, and signs will be displayed at the perimeter of the Protected Area or Place.

Ms Sylvia Lim had asked what were the reasons for the increase in fines under Part 3. Our consideration is as follows. The PAPPA has not been amended since 1959. The existing offence provisioned under section (7) of the Act is a fine of $1,000 and two years' imprisonment or both. That is clearly relevant in 1959. It serves as a sufficient deterrent. But we are now in 2017. So, under the Bill, the fine for offences relating to Protected Areas and Places is increased to $20,000. How is this benchmarked? Well, it is benchmarked to similar and more recent offences, such as those in the Public Order Act. For example, remaining in the special event area without authorisation and contravention of move-on orders. Those are the benchmarks that have been looked at.

Turning now to other counterterrorism efforts. Mr Gan Thiam Poh spoke about the need for other counterterrorism efforts to complement infrastructure protection. I share his views that we need to step up on all fronts, including regional cooperation and strengthening religious harmony which we will debate in Mr Christopher de Souza's Motion. Ms Joan Pereira, Mr Desmond Choo and Mr Melvin Yong mentioned the importance of preparing members of the staff and public so that they know how to respond in the event of emergencies.

Just last week, Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean spoke about the important role of the corporate sector. Businesses can help raise the preparedness of their workers, for example, by briefing employees on emergency escape routes and places to hide, and equipping them with firefighting, cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR)/automated external defibrillator (AED) as well as first-aid skills. The SGSecure Guide for Workplaces was also launched recently and will be made available to all companies. We urge all companies to study the guide and take steps to raise preparedness.

As for Mr Melvin Yong's suggestion on coordinated evacuation plans, I think he talked about sector level plans. The Police and the Singapore Civil Defence Force conduct annual exercises with the Watch group members to enhance joint responses to crises and incidents. Some of these exercises are conducted with a cluster of buildings located in the same area. So, that is, indeed, what has happened.

Ms Joan Pereira, and I believe Ms Sylvia Lim, spoke about protecting hospitals since they provide essential services. Let me assure Members that MHA works very closely with the Ministry of Health on this. The efforts include building security measures, patrols by the Police, and also engagement through the Safety and Security Watch Group scheme. Each hospital has put in place preventive security measures, physical security operations and contingency plans to deal with different scenarios, including terrorist incidents.

Mr Speaker, I hope I have addressed Members' concerns. The Infrastructure Protection Bill is an important step forward as we fortify Singapore's resolve against the threat of terrorist attacks. With the support of the House, I beg to move.

Question put, and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House.

The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. – [Mrs Josephine Teo.]

Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed.

Mr Speaker : Order. I propose to take a break now. You will be glad to know that we will have 20 minutes this time. I suspend the Sitting and will take the Chair at 4.30 pm.

Sitting accordingly suspended

at 4.10 pm until 4.30 pm.

Sitting resumed at 4.30 pm

[Mr Speaker in the Chair]