Immigration (Amendment) Bill

1.19 pm

The Second Minister for Home Affairs (Mrs Josephine Teo): Mr Speaker, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time".

The Immigration Act 1959 is the main legislation that regulates the movement of persons into and out of Singapore. It was last reviewed in 2018. Since then, the landscape has evolved and there are trends that challenge our ability to exercise effective border control.

First, traveller volume has continued to rise across all our checkpoints. It is expected to return to pre-pandemic levels by 2024 and continue to increase thereafter.

Changi Airport Terminal 5 is being built and the Johor-Singapore Rapid Transit System Link will be ready in a few years. Our immigration systems must be able to manage this high and growing volume of travellers efficiently and provide a positive clearance experience while ensuring our security.

The added challenge is our ageing population and shrinking workforce. The Immigration and Checkpoints Authority (ICA) will have to cope without a significant increase in manpower.

Second, the unabated security threats, including terrorism and pandemics like COVID-19, call for us to go upstream in our immigration measures, such as the collection of advance passenger and crew information and entry restrictions to be imposed on undesirable foreigners even before they arrive at our shores.

To this end, ICA has reviewed its systems and concept of operations.

One key initiative is the New Clearance Concept (NCC), where ICA will make good use of data analytics and automation for more secure yet efficient immigration clearance of passengers and cargo. For travellers and businesses, there will be time and cost savings from smoother and faster clearance, and for our land checkpoints, reduced traffic congestion as well.

Mr Speaker, the Immigration (Amendment) Bill does not introduce major changes to our immigration policies. It is about putting in place provisions to better support and facilitate these new initiatives.

The proposals in this Bill are categorised along four broad objectives: first, to digitalise and automate immigration clearance; second, to future-proof our immigration systems and processes against new and evolving challenges; third, to strengthen our border controls; and fourth, to enhance the administration of immigration passes and permits.

Let me start with the first objective: to digitalise and automate immigration clearance.

With automated clearance and the use of biometrics as the new norm, clause 3 of the Bill will amend section 5A of the Act to specify that a person may undergo immigration clearance using an automated clearance system, if available, but that he may also be required to appear before an immigration officer for immigration clearance after using the automated clearance system, if so directed.

Next, to enhance the traveller experience at Changi Airport, the departure journey will be biometric-enabled, end-to-end, from the first half of 2024.

Biometrics will be used to create a single token of authentication that will be employed at various automated touchpoints, from bag-drop to immigration and boarding. This will reduce the need for passengers to repeatedly present their travel documents at these touchpoints, allowing for more seamless and convenient processing.

To facilitate this initiative, it is proposed that the Minister be empowered to authorise the disclosure of passenger and crew information to the airport operator for specific use cases, namely: (a) bag drop, access control and gate boarding; (b) passenger tracing within the airport for security purposes; (c) offloading of baggage for passengers who did not board the flight; and (d) verification of travellers' identity and tax liability for duty free purchases and Goods and Services Tax (GST) refunds.

To this end, clause 41 expands the definition of "passenger information" and inserts a new definition of "crew information", while clause 42 expands the list of purposes in section 36B for which the Minister may authorise access to or disclosure of identifying information, passenger information and crew information.

ICA will ensure that the data shared under this initiative will only be used for authorised purposes and that there are sufficient data privacy and security safeguards. The airport operator is also subject to the Personal Data Protection Act 2012 governing the collection, use and disclosure of personal data.

The second objective is to future-proof our systems and processes against new and evolving public health and security challenges.

Advance passenger and crew information enables ICA to conduct more timely risk assessments and flag out undesirable travellers such as those who pose a public health or security threat before they reach our checkpoints.

Currently, a transport operator of a vessel, aircraft or a train that arrives, leaves or is due to leave Singapore must furnish a list of passengers and a list of crew, including their particulars, to an immigration officer.

Clauses 21 to 27 amend sections 22 to 23B and introduce new sections 23C, 23D, 23E and 23F to, among other things, impose requirements on the accuracy of the lists of passengers and crew furnished by transport operators, in addition to completeness and timeliness.

These amendments will enable ICA to also collect passenger and crew information from bus operators as well as the particulars of persons travelling through our land checkpoints via other modes of land transport such as cars, trucks or motorcycles or on foot. Non-compliance will be a strict liability offence.

ICA is engaging relevant cross-border transport operators on the approach for the collection and submission of advance passenger and crew information. We will take their views into consideration before any new requirements are implemented.

Separate from advance information, clauses 28 to 31 amend sections 24 to 26 to allow immigration officers to require all persons to furnish particulars about themselves upon arrival. This allows ICA to require travellers to furnish particulars such as their travel history or health status when the need arises.

Clause 9 introduces the new section 9AA to empower the Controller of Immigration – henceforth, "the Controller" – to issue to one or more persons for an in-bound conveyance, which I will refer to as the transport operator for brevity, No-Boarding Directives (NBDs) against undesirable persons, whether they wish to enter or transit through Singapore, to prevent them from boarding the in-bound conveyance at the point of departure.

This will remove the need for ICA to manage and remove or repatriate such individuals when they arrive in Singapore.

The clause also introduces offences if a person arrives in Singapore in an in-bound conveyance despite an NBD being issued. NBD regimes have been implemented in jurisdictions such as Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US).

The COVID-19 experience has also demonstrated the need for powers to prohibit the arrival or entry of foreigners during a pandemic. Clause 8 amends section 9 to clarify that the Minister is empowered to make such an order where the Minister thinks it is expedient to do so in the interests of public health.

Clause 8 also amends section 9(1A) to provide that an order made on the grounds of public security or public health can apply to persons with valid immigration permits or passes, such as Permanent Residents (PRs) or long-term pass holders. Such strict measures may be necessary in a severe pandemic situation where lives are at stake. They will be invoked sparingly.

Currently, a person subject to an order made under section 9 is a "prohibited immigrant" under section 8(3)(o) of the Act. Any immigration pass or permit he holds is therefore liable to be invalidated on this ground.

Clause 7 amends section 8(3)(o) to expressly provide that the Minister may exempt an individual from this provision so that he is not a "prohibited immigrant". His permit or pass will not be invalidated by the operation of section 8(3)(o), and he may return to Singapore once the order prohibiting his entry is lifted, for example, when the public health emergency has abated.

Currently, it is an offence under section 57(1)(k) of the Act for a person to make a false statement to obtain or attempt to obtain an immigration facility such as a permit or a pass. Clause 57 amends section 57 to:

(a) replace the section 57(1)(k) offence with a new offence of knowingly giving information that is false or misleading, or omitting any thing, without which the information is misleading. This offence will be punishable with a fine of up to $8,000 or imprisonment of up to 12 months or both;

(b) introduce a new strict liability offence under Section 57(1)(ka) for obtaining or attempting to obtain an immigration facility by giving such false or misleading information, which will be punishable with a fine of up to $4,000;

(c) provide that these offences apply even if the applicants had provided the false or misleading information while outside of Singapore.

The amendments make clear that the applicants ultimately bear the onus of providing true and accurate information in their applications for immigration facilities.

I will now speak on the third objective of strengthening border controls. The first group of amendments are on detention, custodial management, and repatriation.

Today, immigration officers are empowered to examine persons arriving in Singapore. These persons may be denied entry for reasons such as invalid visas or expiring documents, and will be instructed to leave Singapore. However, it may take time for the necessary arrangements to be made for their departure, for example, the next available flight may be days away. Clauses 28 to 31 will amend sections 24 to 26 to empower immigration officers to direct such persons to remain at an immigration depot or at a place designated by the Controller, until arrangements are made for them to leave Singapore.

Next, to enhance legislative oversight over custodial management measures implemented at immigration depots, including the ICA lock-up, clause 56(c) will introduce a new section 55(1)(kb) to allow the Minister to make regulations for custodial management measures, such as medical triage and the control of unruly persons through the use of restraints.

Next, "prohibited immigrants" are currently liable to be removed to their country of birth or citizenship, their place of embarkation, or any other port or place designated by the Controller. Clauses 36, 37, 40 and 57(i) will introduce amendments to similarly empower the Controller to repatriate other categories of persons who have been ordered to be removed from Singapore, including "illegal immigrants" and “persons who remained unlawfully in Singapore”.

Mr Speaker, ICA is currently empowered under section 47A of the Act to recover funds from “prohibited immigrants”, to cover expenses incurred by the Government in connection with their repatriation. But it has to rely on moral suasion to do the same for the other categories of persons ordered to be removed from Singapore. Clause 51 will amend section 47A to rectify this anomaly. Nevertheless, ICA will assess all cases carefully, and government-aided funds may be made available to help persons who are genuinely unable to afford their own repatriation expenses.

The second group of border control amendments seeks to facilitate ICA’s taking over of protective security functions from the Singapore Police Force at authorised areas such as the land checkpoints.

Today, the Act only empowers immigration officers to stop and search persons or vehicles for immigration-related offences, or if an offence is committed within or in the vicinity of a checkpoint. For all other cases, police officers are needed to intervene, to stop such persons or vehicles of interest, and arrest them.

Clause 55 therefore introduces new sections 51AB to 51AE to allow immigration officers to arrest persons involved in such non-immigration cases and detain any vehicle driven by them or which is under their control, pending the handover of custody to the relevant law enforcement agency.

Next, clause 34 will amend section 30 of the Act to allow ICA to give instructions to all travellers arriving in or leaving Singapore, to prevent evasion of examination. This includes asking travellers to queue at certain lines, or to proceed to a waiting area. Currently, under the Act, ICA can only give instructions to arriving passengers and crew members carried in any vessel, aircraft or train.

The third group of amendments pertains to immigration offenders who are either exempted from caning or found medically unfit for caning. The Criminal Procedure Code 2010 provides that all females, as well as males above the age of 50 shall not be punished with caning. In addition, caning cannot be carried out if the offender is medically unfit to undergo that punishment. Such individuals can be liable for an additional imprisonment term of up to 12 months, in lieu of caning.

Some immigration offences attract caning. For foreigners who commit such offences but cannot be caned, such as if they are female, keeping them in our prisons for a longer term is not in the public interest. Our aim is instead to repatriate them as soon as possible.

Incarceration is also not an appropriate deterrent against an immigration offender whose goal is to stay in Singapore and even more so if the offender requires state-sponsored medical treatment. For such an offender, a fine, in lieu of caning, may be a more appropriate deterrent than additional jail time.

This is already the case for some offences in the Act. For example, for the offence of illegal entry without a valid immigration pass or permit, for which caning is mandatory, the Act requires the courts to impose fines in lieu of caning, for all females as well as males above the age of 50 who cannot be caned. However, for males who were sentenced to caning, but are subsequently found medically unfit for caning, the current law does not allow the imposition of fines in lieu of caning. To address this, clause 58 of the Bill introduces a new section 58A to allow the courts to impose a fine in lieu of caning on such an offender.

Clause 8(i) of the Bill will introduce a new section 9(7), to allow the courts to also impose fines, in lieu of caning, for the section 9(6) offence of arriving, entering or remaining in Singapore in contravention of a prohibition order by using a false travel document or a travel document belonging to someone else. This applies to all females and males above the age of 50.

The fourth type of amendment will allow ICA to better ensure a child’s safety and well-being when acting on a Restraining Order issued by a court that prevents the child from being taken out of Singapore. ICA already enforces such a Restraining Order when notified of it.

Clause 4 will introduce a new section 5AA that allows ICA to temporarily keep a child within the immigration checkpoint, after having prevented the child from being taken out of Singapore, until the child’s parent or guardian, or a police officer, is able to take the child into his care. The new section 5AA protects immigration officers from personal liability as long as they have acted in good faith and with reasonable care in complying with the court order or exercising this power.

Sir, I will now explain how the Bill enhances the administration of immigration passes and permits.

Foreigners should neither be entitled nor expect to be given the right to enter or remain in Singapore. This must be the absolute prerogative of the Government acting in the public interest.

To this end, clauses 7, 12, 13, 16, 33 and 37 remove the right of a foreigner to make statutory appeals to the Minister for decisions made by the Controller affecting his stay in Singapore. Most of these decisions are related to permanent residency. This aligns the treatment of such PR-related decisions with the treatment for application of immigration passes and Singapore Citizenship, for which there is no avenue of statutory appeal.

Although statutory appeal will no longer be available, individuals can continue to seek the Controller’s reconsideration of such decisions when there are relevant new facts or circumstances.

The Bill also seeks to clarify at law when a PR is deemed to have lost PR status. The proposal before Parliament is specific to the scenario when the person is outside of Singapore without a valid Re-entry Permit. Let me explain.

ICA issues a PR with two permits. The Entry Permit is issued when PR status is first granted and allows the person to enter and remain in Singapore. The Re-entry Permit or “REP” is issued to a PR upon application and allows him to re-enter Singapore after having left Singapore temporarily; it has a fixed validity period.

ICA deems a PR who is overseas without a valid REP to have lost his PR status. In the current Act, the PR has a grace period of one month after the REP has expired to apply for an REP to reinstate his PR status.

Notwithstanding this, ICA has been exercising flexibility in allowing some PRs who miss this deadline to have their PR status reinstated if they have legitimate reasons, for example, if they were hospitalised overseas. However, this means that the PR had effectively lost his PR status during the period between the REP expiry and PR reinstatement.

This Bill will introduce amendments to the Act to clarify at law when the PR status is lost, by introducing a definition of “permanent resident of Singapore” and setting out the circumstances that will lead to the loss of PR status.

(a) Clause 2 will define a “permanent resident of Singapore” as the holder of a valid Entry Permit.

(b) Clause 12 amends section 10 to provide that a non-citizen who wishes to be a PR must apply for an Entry Permit, and sets out what the Entry Permit authorises its holder to do.

(c) Clause 13 amends section 11 to require a PR who is outside Singapore without a valid REP to apply for an REP within a period to be prescribed in regulations. The Ministry for Home Affairs (MHA) intends to set this period at six months. This will give PRs sufficient time to remedy the situation, compared to the one-month grace period today.

(d) If the said PR applies for an REP before the end of the prescribed period, and is successful, he remains a PR.

(e) If the PR fails to apply for an REP before the end of the prescribed period, the new section 14A introduced under clause 17 provides for the automatic cancellation of his Entry Permit. His PR status will then be lost. This will take effect on the date immediately after the last day of the prescribed period.

(f) If the PR applies for an REP before the prescribed period ends and his application is unsuccessful, this new section 14A also provides that his Entry Permit will be automatically cancelled, and this will take effect on the date immediately after ICA has rejected the REP application.

(g) Clause 13 introduces section 11(2A) to clarify that the Controller may refuse the grant of REP to a PR. Each REP application is subject to a polycentric evaluation of factors relating to our policies and security, the PR’s period of residence in Singapore, his contributions to Singapore, family ties and conduct.

Given that six months is more than enough time for PRs to regularise their status, there will be no avenue for reinstatement once a PR loses his PR status in accordance with the revised framework. If a person who has lost PR status wants to be a PR again, he will need to make a fresh application for PR.

We encourage all PRs to obtain an REP or to renew their expiring REP in a timely manner, before travelling out of Singapore.

The vast majority of REP applications are approved as long as the PR continues to be committed and contribute to Singapore. This includes retired PRs because we recognise that while they may no longer be earning an income, they had contributed to Singapore during their working years. Most of those who are unsuccessful in applying for an REP to reinstate their PR have far exceeded the existing grace period for reinstatement despite the flexibility exercised by ICA. The rest do not live in Singapore anymore, no longer have family ties to locals here, are no longer contributing economically or have adverse records.

Sir, the Bill will simplify the process for imposing new conditions for immigration permits after they have been issued, or varying the existing conditions of such permits.

Currently, ICA must first notify permit holders of any such changes in conditions and invite them to make representations in this regard before such changes take effect. Clauses 12 and 13 amend sections 10 and 11 to allow such changes in conditions to be effected simply through the giving of notice to the affected permit holders.

Clause 56 updates the Minister’s regulation-making powers, such that similar provisions may be introduced to provide the Controller with similar powers in respect of immigration passes and certificates. These provisions will allow ICA to impose new conditions on permit, pass and certificate holders especially during a contingency such as a pandemic, as well as to regulate the conduct of the holders more efficaciously through the variation of existing conditions.

Last, the Bill also makes other technical, related and consequential amendments.

In particular, clause 61 repeals the Banishment Act 1959. MHA has been relying solely on the Immigration Act since the 1980s to remove undesirable foreigners. The Banishment Act, which also allows the Minister to remove a foreigner from Singapore, is no longer relevant today, and hence we propose to repeal it. There is no operational impact, and the provisions under the Banishment Act can be found in other legislation.

Mr Speaker, this Bill will facilitate the implementation of more digitalised and automated services for the benefit of all travellers, as well as enhance our immigration processes so that they are more robust, effective and efficient. This is imperative for Singapore’s safety and security, and to maintain our status as a world-class transport hub and destination. Mr Speaker, I beg to move.

Question proposed.

Mr Speaker : Mr Murali Pillai.

1.48 pm

Mr Murali Pillai (Bukit Batok): Mr Speaker, Sir, I support the primary aims behind this Bill, as enunciated by the hon Second Minister for Home Affairs in her speech, especially the proposal to digitalise and automate the immigration clearance.

It is well known that our ICA officers, staff and auxiliary police officers deployed at our immigration checkpoints have heavy workloads. The Woodlands Checkpoint ranks amongst the world’s busiest border crossing with more than 350,000 passing through every day. Just over the long weekend of the Presidential Election from 31 August 2023 to 4 September 2023, more than 1.7 million people crossed Woodlands and Tuas checkpoints.

These officers often make personal sacrifices to discharge their duties. Owing to the lean manpower situation, they frequently forgo going on leave during school holidays which coincides with the peak travel periods. This is so that fellow Singaporeans are not inconvenienced when they travel on holidays. They deserve our salute for steadfastly securing Singapore’s borders and keeping us safe despite the significant challenges, some of which were enunciated by the hon Second Minister.

With the manpower crunch that all sectors across Singapore face, it makes eminent sense to leverage on technology to ease the clearance process.

The plans to implement automated and contactless clearance and the checkpoints without passport presentation are particularly welcome. Not only will these measures result in faster clearance, but they also improve the experience of travellers too.

For these reasons, I fully support the provisions in the Bill to implement the automated and contactless clearance process at checkpoints.

Turning to the other objectives of the Bill, I seek clarification on three broad areas.

First, the revised approached to sentencing when dealing with immigration offenders, I note that it is proposed that fines be introduced in lieu of an extended prison term for immigration offenders convicted of immigration offences and who are exempted from or found to be medically unfit for caning.

On the face of it, the replacement of a prison term imposed in lieu of caning with fines instead of imprisonment alone may dilute the overall deterrent effect of the sentence. I understand that the policy reason for this is to reduce the state resources that would otherwise be committed when foreigners who cannot be caned have to serve longer imprisonment terms.

In principle, I do not have an issue with the policy so long as the execution of this policy is carefully calibrated with other sentencing aims. My query is two-fold.

One, why is this policy applicable to an offender convicted of the offence of employing five or more illegal immigrants under the proposed section 57(1B) of the Act? Usually, such offenders, being employers, are likely to be Singapore residents. Hence, the policy precipitating this change should not be applicable to this class of offenders.

Two, why is there no provision in the Bill to deal with the probability that immigration offenders do not pay the fine? I would imagine that most foreign immigration offenders would lack the means to pay fines. This is why they left their home to come to Singapore – to make money.

If fine sentences are imposed in lieu of imprisonment over the inability to carry out a caning sentence, we would have to deal with the high probability that these offenders would not be able to pay the fine.

In such a situation, since nothing is specifically proposed in the Bill, section 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code, or CPC, would apply. This provision gives the Court the power to impose an additional imprisonment term in default of payment of fine.

There is a scale under section 319 of the CPC that determines the limit of the imprisonment terms. For offences punishable with a term of 24 months or more, the maximum imprisonment term cannot exceed half of the maximum term of imprisonment fixed for the offence. This is the upper limit of the scale. For offences punishable with imprisonment for a term less than 24 months, the maximum imprisonment term cannot exceed one-third of the maximum term of imprisonment fixed for the offence. This is the lower limit of the scale.

There are several offences provided in the Immigration Act that are subject to caning, for which the upper limit under section 319 of the CPC applies. And to illustrate that, if you were to look at section 9 of the Act as it currently stands, which deals with an immigration offender who has already been issued with a Prohibition Order. If he were to come into Singapore again, then, he may face an imprisonment term of not less then two years or not more than five years, and shall also be liable to be fined and caned.

As was mentioned by the hon Minister, if he is not medically fit to take caning, then the Court can replace the caning sentence with an imprisonment term of not more than 12 months. But with the replacement of the caning with a fine sentence, by applying section 319, because the punishment is more than two years, the upper limit of the scale would apply; in which case the default imprisonment term can go up to two and a half years – which is more than the 12-month period for not receiving a caning sentence.

In my respectful view, a simple provision in the amendment Bill would have taken care of this – spelling out that a shorter imprisonment period, or the lower limit under section 319 of the CPC may be imposed in situations where fines, imposed in lieu of caning, are not paid.

May I ask the hon Minister why is it not felt necessary to make this explicit in this amendment Bill?

I now turn to the next area. I would term this as an issue of fairness in dealing with foreigners.

In explaining this provision, I note the hon Minister's point: entry into Singapore is really the prerogative of the government. I have no quarrel with that proposition.

In addition, it is proposed that current section 8(4A), which requires the Controller to inform a person the class of prohibited immigrants of which, in the opinion of the Controller, the person is a member of, be also repealed too.

For the benefit of hon Members, there are 15 classes in the Immigration Act, ranging from a person who is believed to have no means of supporting himself or herself, or believed to be a prostitute or believed to be a person who advocates the overthrow of the government by violence.

Also, under the proposed section 39B of the Act, it is provided that the Controller is not required to give any person, who may be affected by his decision, an opportunity to be heard. Respectfully, I am concerned about these proposals for the following reasons.

First, from a values perspective, I disagree with the view that just because we are dealing with foreigners who should not expect the right of entry or stay in Singapore, we should deal with them summarily.

In my respectful view, our immigration system should reflect the values we stand for as a nation. Granted, we do not owe non-Singaporeans the same duties and obligations we owe to ourselves. But foreigners should have the same recourse to justice, as a matter of principle, and in this case, we owe them two specific duties as members of a common humanity.

First, a duty to treat them fairly. To mandate that they need not be told why they are labelled as prohibited immigrants, nor offer them an avenue to provide explanation does not, in my respectful view, fulfil this duty.

Also, we must be mindful that a good number of foreigners who may be subject of action by the Controller have spousal or familial relations with Singaporeans. Such affected Singaporeans would certainly expect that the system operates fairly for their spouses or relatives in dealing with immigration matters.

As I said on point of fairness, sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. I would imagine if the roles were reversed, Singaporeans who are immigrants in other countries would expect to be dealt with fairly by foreign immigration authorities too.

Second, a duty of due process. The current appeal process to the Minister ensures that there will be no single point of failure; from a system perspective.

We should be mindful it is proposed in this Bill that the Controller be vested with even more powers. As was explained by the hon Minister, one example is the No Boarding Directive to deny foreigners from boarding from places of embarkation, even as transit travellers.

Just by having an appeal process alone, we will ensure, system-wise, that the Controller will use his powers carefully and with circumspection. By having an appeal process, the Minister would be able to have access to all relevant facts of the case to make his own decision on the merits of the case. This is as opposed to a mere administrative review by the Minister on the basis that ICA comes under his charge. He is well capable of handling sensitive factors and information too.

In fact, this is the rationale for providing the statutory appeal to the Minister instead of to the Court which is ordinarily be accessible by members of public and the press.

Finally, I am not privy to any information that suggests that the current system is broken. I do appreciate that the Government must be pragmatic in dealing with immigration matters. However, unlike some countries which deal with immigration matters through the judicial system and have a backlog of cases to handle, I do not think a similar situation exists in Singapore. Hence, the question arises, if it ain’t broken, why fix it?

I would also like to point out that, as a matter of comparative law, countries such as Malaysia and Brunei which have similar history and similar pieces of legislation as our Immigration Act, still retain the statutory appeal to the equivalent of our Minister. I would be grateful for the hon Minister’s explanation to my concerns.

Finally, I turn to my last area – operational matters. For this area, I wish to raise two points.

First, on the proposal to allow immigration officers to collect Advance Passenger Information (API), I would like to enquire if it is proposed that public transport operators such as the operator of the Rapid Transit System (RTS) Link that is due to be commissioned in about three years’ time or SBS Transit that operates service no 170 will have the obligation to collect API or would they be exempt?

The provisions in the Bill, as they stand, are to be wide enough to include public transport operators. Should they apply, however, this may create practical problems and bottlenecks having regard to the huge number of train and bus commuters that the operators will have to handle on a daily basis.

Second and finally, I note that it is proposed that the Controller be vested with the power to temporarily restrain a child from leaving Singapore in compliance with the court order until the child’s parent or legal guardian collects him or her.

I support the proposal. I would like to make a suggestion in this regard.

I understand from my professional colleagues who practise family law that, in the usual case, the Family Court would order that a child be allowed to leave Singapore where the other parent provides his or her written consent. Such orders would then be served on ICA. ICA will then have to take on the obligation to operationalise the order by checking to see if the "suitable person" wanting to bring the child out of Singapore has the requisite written consent. I wonder if there is scope to digitalise the entire process. They should cover both the notification of Court orders as well as the lodgement of written consent with ICA. In this way, I believe we will gain more efficiency and reduce the risk of making mistakes, too.

Sir, in conclusion, let me iterate my support once again for the provisions in this Bill aimed at equipping our men and women of the ICA with the necessary legal tools and teeth to effectively deal with the growing challenges that they face in carrying out their important task of securing our country's borders.

I have carefully reviewed the proposed amendments in the Bill dealing with sentencing policy in the Immigration Act. I do not believe they represent a derogation from our uncompromising stance against immigration offenders as well as traffickers and harbourers of illegal and prohibited immigrants, that the law will deal with them firmly by imprisonment, caning or fine.

It is important to maintain this tough stance so that we do not backslide to the situation several decades ago when we had a serious illegal immigrant problem that affected Singaporeans' safety and security. Mr Speaker, Sir, notwithstanding my concerns that I expressed in my speech, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Gerald Giam.

2.02 pm

Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song (Aljunied): Mr Speaker, Sir, I would be addressing two areas of amendments in the Immigration (Amendment) Bill, namely, digitalising and automating immigration processes and the administration of immigration passes and permits.

The Bill will introduce provisions to support ICA's new clearance concept to further automate immigration clearance. I appreciate that ICA is in the forefront of immigration technology. But I have three concerns to highlight regarding the rollout of the NCC.

First, Minister of State Faishal told the House on 21 April that under the NCC, all manual counters and automated lanes will be replaced in phases with the next generation automated border clearance system gates. Does this mean that once the NCC is fully rolled out, the use of manual counters will no longer be an option for Singaporean travellers?

Some categories of travellers frequently face difficulties in the process of clearing immigration. For example, some elderly citizens are unable to provide usable fingerprints due to their dry skin. Wheelchair users may have difficulty getting their irises scanned due to the height and angle of the scanners. Iris recognition systems could become prone to error as people's irises change with age or after cataract surgery and the biometrics of young children are still developing and may change over time.

Will the NCC include reasonable accommodations, like wider gates for wheelchair users and adjustable scanners that can capture biometrics from travellers who cannot hold their head up for long?

Most importantly, will special assistance lanes which are manned by ICA officers continue to be provided at the passenger halls of Changi Airport and all land and sea checkpoints and will they be easily accessible by all travellers with special needs?

Second, I note that the Bill empowers the Minister to authorise the disclosure of passenger information to the airport operator for specific uses. Does this airport operator refer to only the Changi Airport operator or also operators of foreign airports? Do the specific uses include sharing of Singaporeans' biometric data? What enhanced safeguards are in place to ensure data security, particularly if Singaporeans' data will be shared with third-party vendors or foreign governments over which we have little control?

And third, I note that Singapore is one of the first countries in the world to implement NCC-type capabilities. As shared by Minister of State Faishal in April, some of these capabilities will be implemented in a form and manner not used or tested elsewhere. I also recall that the four-and-a-half-hour disruption to immigration systems on 31 March was caused by a failed upgrade to the multimodal biometric system (MMBS). May I ask the MMBS has since been fully upgraded? What additional contingency plans will ICA put in place to ensure that the upgrade to the NCC will not cause immigration disruptions of that scale or worse?

Another key area of amendments in the Bill is to enable ICA to more efficiently administer immigration passes and permits issued to foreigners and PRs. Cross-national marriages between a Singaporean and a foreigner make up about a quarter of all marriages in Singapore. Foreign spouses face many challenges settling down in Singapore, the chief of which is obtaining permission from the Government to remain in Singapore for a long term. This can be achieved first through securing a Long-Term Visit Pass or LTVP and, subsequently, a PR.

For foreign spouses who hold university degrees and draw high salaries, obtaining a LTVP, PR and even citizenship is usually not difficult since their income and skills add great weight to their applications. But those with low educational qualifications and incomes face far greater challenges in obtaining long-term residency.

At my Meet-the-People Sessions, which are attended mainly by residents in the lower-income groups, about a fifth of cases involve immigration matters. The Singaporean residents who approached me are usually disappointed that their foreign spouses' LTVP or PR applications were unsuccessful and want me to make appeals for them. Some shared with me their deep longing to start a family but their hesitation due to their spouses' uncertain immigration status. Most do not understand why the applications were rejected because no reasons are provided by ICA.

During a 2012 parliamentary exchange between Ms Indranee Rajah and the then-Minister of State Mr Masago Zulkifli, Ms Rajah highlighted three cases of Singaporeans with prior convictions who are facing difficulties getting their foreign spouses' LTVP approved.

Mr Masagos agreed with Ms Rajah that families are the pillar of support for ex-offenders but clarified that family, in this case, referred to an existing family unit, not a new family unit formed when an ex-offender got married soon after his release. He added that an offender just out of prison has many issues to deal with and an environment he is not familiar with anymore. He further stated that should a marriage not work out or the husband re-offend, the spouse, who is a foreigner, will not have relatives in Singapore to turn to nor jobs to sustain herself or her children as many are, generally, low-skilled.

Sir, parents and siblings are not the only pillar of support for ex-offenders. Many may be estranged from their existing families or may have suffered divorce while incarcerated and are starting anew. In fact, having a spouse provides stability and an added incentive for them to remain crime-free. We should not deny ex-offenders who have served out their prison sentence the right to get married to anyone they choose to.

Similarly, once they are married, it would be most unfair for the state to deny or delay a foreign spouse's long-term residency on account of the ex-offender's past conviction. This could put a strain on their marriage and finances and keep the ex-offender "locked" in a second prison.

The Government should not make it difficult for a married couple to stay together by denying an LTVP to a foreign spouse or child of a Singaporean. Family formation is one of the core social values in Singapore and our immigration policy must support it.

In 2015, ICA introduced the Pre-Marriage Long-Term Visit Pass Assessment or PMLA to give prospective cross-national couples an indication that the foreign spouse is likely to qualify for an LTVP after the marriage. However, since the PMLA was introduced, out of an annual average of 7,200 LTVP applications, only 3,000 applicants or less than half had completed the PMLA prior to applying for the LTVP, according to a reply by the Minister to my question last month.

In my conversations with residents who face difficulty getting an LTVP for their foreign spouses, most were unaware of the PMLA before they tied the knot. Does the Registry of Marriages (ROM) and the Registry of Muslim Marriages advise cross-national couples to complete the PMLA before getting married? I am aware that the ROM website advises them to undergo a PMLA. However, is this highlighted to the couple in person before the marriage registration process, keeping in mind that many of these couples may not be proficient in reading English? Furthermore, even passing the PMLA is not a guarantee of obtaining an LTVP after marriage.

In another reply to me last month, the Minister revealed that only 1,900, out of the 3,000 foreigners issued with letters of LTVP eligibility, were eventually granted LTVP or LTVP-Plus status, which means 37% were not. The Minister explained that not every person who has obtained a letter of LTVP eligibility goes on to apply for an LTVP. But it is unclear if this fully accounts for the 37% gap.

The Minister has stated in this House that ICA generally does not disclose the reasons for unsuccessful applications for immigration facilities. This lack of transparency is out of step with the practices in some other developed countries. In Canada, for spouse sponsorship applications that are refused, their government provides reasons for refusal in writing. Similarly, Australia's Department of Home Affairs explicitly states that if a partner's visa application is refused, the department will provide information on why the visa was refused.

I wish to propose four approaches that could improve ICA's immigration process for the immediate family members of Singaporeans.

First, there should be disclosure of the broad reasons for rejection of LTVP, PR and citizenship applications by foreign spouses, children and parents of Singaporeans.

Singapore does not permit dual citizenship. So, this is our citizens' only homeland. They do not have an easy option to settle in another country if their spouse is not given permission to live with them in Singapore for the long term, especially if they are from a lower-income group. When rejections happen without a reason, the Singaporean spouse can feel disconnected from their own nation. I have seen this in the eyes of my constituents who sought appeals for immigration applications for their spouses.

Second, where mitigation paths for future applications can be furnished, ICA should do so. For example, if an applicant was rejected because their economic contributions were not deemed sufficient, they should be informed of this so that they can take steps to enter the workforce, upskill themselves and strive to perform better at work so as to earn promotions and salary increments. This is preferable over an opaque dead end.

Third, ICA should provide more criteria transparency in the immigration framework similar to the Complementarity Assessment (COMPASS) framework for employment passes. Previous answers by Ministers in this House have revealed the range of factors that are considered for LTVP, PR and citizenship applications. Why not list all these criteria clearly on the ICA website and on application forms instead of expecting applicants to comb through the Parliament Hansard? Applicants meeting these criteria should get fast-track approval with discretionary rejections allowed on a case-by-case basis.

The Minister told this House in 2018 that ICA does not share the specific criteria or grounds for rejecting applications due to concerns that information about detailed assessment criteria can be abused to inflate an undeserving applicant's chances of success and that some people could then try to game the system.

However, in presenting the COMPASS framework, which is used to evaluate foreigners' employment passes and went live this month, the Government emphasised that it brings benefits like transparency, clarity and predictability for businesses.

COMPASS provides a points system, specific benchmarks for salaries and diversity and employs objective data so that firms can actually assess where they stand. Indeed, the COMPASS criteria spell out in no uncertain terms how many points are awarded for various factors, like salary, qualifications and improving diversity.

If the Ministry of Manpower (MOM) is comfortable with the disclosure and transparency in the COMPASS framework in order to provide businesses with clarity and predictability for manpower planning, then surely, ICA can also extend these same principles to Singaporeans and their foreign spouses, children or parents who need the same clarity and predictability for their family planning.

The Minister also said that the reasons for rejection may be used to arouse negative sentiments in other countries and that this may create bilateral sensitivities and is not in Singapore's interest. Sir, it is a universally accepted principle that countries have the right to make their own decisions on immigration. In any case, ICA does not need to tell the applicant that they were rejected because they were from a particular country or a particular race. If there are reasons for rejection that may conceivably cause diplomatic friction, those need not be shared with the applicant. However, the vast majority of reasons for immigration rejections are not going to sour relations with other country. Let us not throw out the baby with the bath water.

Lastly, ICA should provide clearer channels for immigration appeals. The Bill removes the statutory right of appeal to the Minister on the decisions made by ICA on granting, revoking and varying conditions attached to PRs' permits. I have no objection to the removal of this right. I agree that foreigners have no right to demand to enter or stay in Singapore. And I note from MHA's statement that PR applicants and PRs may seek ICA's reconsideration of its decisions, particularly if there are new facts that were not previously submitted to ICA.

However, when searching the ICA website, I could not find much information on submitting appeals for failed LTVP or PR applications. The website only states that failed PR applicants may submit a fresh application if there are changes to their circumstances. Anecdotally, residents often tell me that they were advised by ICA officers to make an appeal through their Member of Parliament. While I am grateful for the chance to engage more of my residents at my Meet-the-People Sessions, submitting appeals through one's Member of Parliament should not be the default means of communication between citizens and the Government. An accessible, self-service channel should be made available, particularly for appeals with a substantial volume. A secure online form should be made available on the ICA website for all immigration appeals, with clear instructions guiding appellants to submit new facts that were not previously submitted or provided in their earlier application.

Mr Speaker, I believe these proposals will provide a balance between the Government's prerogatives and the needs of Singaporean families while upholding our national interests. They could lessen the anxiety and frustration that Singaporeans with foreign spouses, children and parents experience with the immigration process. Sir, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Yip Hon Weng.

2.17 pm

Mr Yip Hon Weng (Yio Chu Kang): Mr Speaker, Sir, Singapore is an open economy that relies on the free movement of people and goods. Following the challenges posed by the global pandemic, it is heartening to note that all our checkpoints are once again bustling with activity. The numbers crossing our checkpoints speak volumes about our nation's economic resilience and quick recovery.

The proposed legislation demonstrates our commitment to utilising technology and digitalisation to enhance ICA’s operations. The amendments seek to improve efficiency and productivity within our immigration processes, whilst upholding stringent controls to ensure that the right individuals enter Singapore. I would like to seek clarifications in two broad areas. First, on digitalisation and, next, on the self-declarations by passengers.

First, Mr Speaker, Sir, I have clarifications on data security and operational issues. The adoption of the NCC, prompts us to consider its impact on the future of passports and its associated data security measures. Can the Ministry share how many countries have also employed such technologies regularly to allow for seamless travel? Could the implementation of such technologies eventually render physical passports irrelevant? It would be insightful to understand if the ICA envisions a time when passports might be phased out in favour of e-passports.

How does the ICA plan to collaborate with other Government agencies like GovTech, Cyber Security Agency and Smart Nation Digital Government Group (SNDGG) to raise the resilience of our digital solutions against potential scammers and frauds? As Singapore’s passport is highly sought after, any vulnerabilities and breaches in the system can result in the theft of critical passenger data.

How does ICA intend to address the needs of individuals who might not be digitally adept and ensure that no one is left behind in this transformative journey when residents use the NCC?

Second, the retention period of passenger data and the mechanisms to safeguard it are of paramount importance. Could ICA shed light on how long personal data will be stored? Also, will there be a designated timeframe for the destruction of this information? What rigorous measures are in place to prevent hacking or misuse? Could we receive assurance on how personal data, particularly biometrics, will be fortified against potential breaches?

Third, the introduction of NBDs for transport operators of land-based conveyances, has raised some operational questions. There have been concerns about the practical feasibility of implementing NBDs for buses, especially considering the dynamic nature of bus schedules and connectivity with different bus services and transport modes. Could the Minister clarify the exemption status of operators like SBS? Could the Minister also provide insights into the rationale behind this exemption? What about taxis and coaches which operate across our borders?

Furthermore, understanding the potential challenges faced by transport operators in complying with this new clause is critical. Are there plans for a transition period to facilitate a smooth implementation? When can we expect the composition framework to be introduced to support transport operators? Moreover, how can we address the concerns of passengers who are worried that some of these bus companies lack the necessary infrastructure to secure their personal data?

Fourth, the shift towards accepting digital versions of permits and passes to verify immigration status and declaration of goods raises a question about initial potential congestion, particularly at our land checkpoints. What are the projected short- and long-term impacts of allowing digital permits and passes on the flow of travellers at these checkpoints? How will ICA address situations where individuals may not possess a functional electronic device to present e-permits? Will physical permits still be issued or remain valid as an alternative option?

Next, Mr Speaker, Sir, let us proceed to issues concerning self-declaration. With regard to the offence of making false statements, how does ICA plan to effectively monitor and validate the accuracy of these declarations? Could ICA provide insights into the frequency of validation or fact-checking procedures? Are there plans to implement audit checks to ensure the compliance and accuracy of these self-declarations? As we all know, strong enforcement serves as one of the most effective deterrents against such transgressions. How does ICA plan to strengthen enforcement measures to discourage false statements and uphold the sanctity of self-declarations?

There is a concern that new diseases are not accurately declared. As we consider the potential health risks posed by contagious diseases, a pertinent scenario arises: if a passenger fails to declare symptoms of a new disease, or is ignorant of the symptoms, how would ICA issue a no-boarding directive or prevent such a passenger from disembarking in Singapore? How does ICA intend to collaborate with MOH to address this concern?

In conclusion, Mr Speaker, Sir, this Bill serves as a vital tool in our efforts to strike a delicate balance between welcoming deserving visitors and safeguarding our national interests. With limited resources and space, we must be vigilant in managing the entry of individuals into our country. Singapore's allure as a destination for visitors and foreigners is well-recognised. However, our attractiveness also renders us susceptible to criminal elements, due to the significant influx of people.

While preventing acts of terrorism is a primary concern, there is an additional facet to consider. The recent high-profile $1.8 billion money laundering investigation underscores this point. Some individuals may exploit the guise of business and investments to engage in unlawful activities once they enter and reside in Singapore. We need to do our best to deny entry to individuals who have malicious intentions to commit crimes within our borders. To achieve this, the implementation of a more rigorous system is essential, safeguarding the safety and security of our nation and residents.

Mr Speaker, Sir, allow me to conclude in Mandarin.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] I suggest that we use technology to further differentiate different categories of control measures. This represents an important step forward to optimise productivity, especially in a tight labour market.

In addition, our manpower is precious and limited. We must be able to assess what we want to achieve. Can the authorities explain in detail what improvement measures we will implement to reduce the queueing time at Woodland and Tuas checkpoints? Can we calculate whether efficiency will increase or decrease in percentage terms?

Mr Speaker, the amendments reiterate our commitment to progress, security and efficiency. They pave the way for Singapore to remain open and innovative. We are fully prepared to meet the challenges and opportunities ahead.

I support this Bill.

2.26 pm

Mr Desmond Choo (Tampines): Mr Speaker, Sir, we need to harness technological advancements to enhance our immigration procedures and bolster border security. The integration of cutting-edge methods, such as biometrics and data analysis, into our immigration processes improves security and overall travellers' experience. We can be secure without being burdensome.

The proposed amendments enable the ICA to achieve greater operational efficiencies from future-proofing against new and evolving challenges, digitalise and automate immigration processes, strengthening border controls and efficient administration of immigration passes and permits. I will address them in turn.

First, on future-proofing against new and evolving challenges. Mr Speaker, currently, airline, ship and train operators must submit advance passenger and crew information. Under the proposed sections 23C and 23D, the ICA will be empowered to collect advance passenger and crew information for entry into Singapore’s checkpoints via buses. This would unify the ICA’s powers to do so across all modes of entry, as entry into Singapore via buses is not covered under the Immigration Act. There is no reason why entry by bus should be considered less of a security threat compared to entry by air or sea. This unification of security measures gets us closer to completing our nation’s security infrastructure to collecting information.

In addition, the introduction of NBDs to direct transport operators to deny boarding to undesirable individuals, particularly those who pose a threat to our safety and security, is a crucial enhancement. It prevents such individuals from travelling to Singapore in the first place, instead of only being turned back at our checkpoints on arrival. There are four points that I would like to highlight for the Ministry’s consideration.

Firstly, it is worthwhile reviewing whether failure to comply with NBDs should be considered a strict liability offence. Human errors or technological glitches are realities in any operational system. Strict liability offences do not account for genuine mistakes or errors made in judgement made by transport operators. I would like to ask the Minister how can the Ministry balance between being thorough while yet being compassionate or flexible in cases where the breach of an NBD was not deliberate.

Furthermore, Singapore's reputation as an international transportation hub depends not only on security measures but also on its ability to facilitate smooth travel for passengers. Overly harsh penalties for transport operators could deter them from serving Singapore, potentially reducing our attractiveness as a transit point for travellers and cargo. I call on the Ministry to consider to strike a balance between our objective of making Singapore an international transport hub and safeguarding our security.

Second, it is currently proposed for NBDs to cover individuals who are both entering and transiting in Singapore. I believe that there is, indeed, value for NBDs to apply to transit passengers. Singapore cannot become an easy transit point for undesirable characters. Could the Ministry share how many instances of undesirable characters that have transited through our checkpoints in recent years and how these could have been avoided if we had NBDs?

Next, on the electronic service of giving notices of NBDs. Could the Ministry clarify how long in advance does the controller need to inform operators that an NBD is issued in relation to a passenger or crew they are ferrying? Furthermore, I would like to call on the Ministry to provide operators with a suitable transition timeframe to ensure compliance with NBDs. We must ensure that operators have sufficient time to adjust their operational design and workflow to comply with NBDs without unduly impacting their other business objectives.

Lastly, on the proposed amendments which grants ICA officers the authority to require travellers to furnish particulars about themselves upon arrival. As currently proposed, this power may be exercised by ICA officers to furnish particulars about themselves “as that officer may require”. I would like to ask the Minister on what grounds and circumstances can such powers be exercised? This will guide officers in their duties and also passengers in their adherence to the requests.

Next, on digitalising and automating processes. ICA's NCC is an excellent initiative. Given the current security environment, increased travellers’ demands, and the nation’s ageing workforce, there is a pressing need for secure and streamlined immigration clearance procedures. The NCC aims to automate routine tasks and allocate human resources to more critical functions. Could the Ministry share if manpower and operational workstreams are ready for the NCC?

Furthermore, what is the net impact on the ICA officers? How can they be trained and upskilled for a smooth transition? Perhaps we can redeploy affected ICA officers to other roles with higher human touch, or even providing courses for upskilling to help ICA officers transition into working alongside the NCC effectively.

Under the amendments, it is now proposed that digital versions of permits and passes can be used to verify immigration status. Under this initiative, the passenger's digital identity and flight information undergo backend processing to generate a unique token, which is then used along with their biometric data to confirm their identity and travel details at different automated touchpoints.

While the Ministry has stated that this data will be retained for a “short time” with adequate “safeguards”, there may still be concerns about the necessity and potential risks associated with holding such sensitive information. We are also constantly at risk of cyber-attacks. What are the cyber-security provisions to ensure the integrity of the NCC? What are the contingency plans during data breaches?

In recent months, there has also been significant delays at our immigration checkpoints due to technological glitches. How is the Ministry and the ICA stepping up to prevent such incidents? Perhaps the Ministry could share the measures we are taking to prevent a system-level breakdown like the one we suffered as recent as March 2023.

Next, the NCC will put Singapore as trendsetter in the global security landscape. However, additional value will be created for Singapore and our visitors if other jurisdictions come on board and integrate the NCC in their security administration. Could the Ministry share whether there are plans for us to work with regional partners to integrate the NCC as a cross-border initiative?

Lastly, on strengthening border controls. ICA personnel currently possess the ability to make arrests for non-immigration violations occurring within or near authorised zones and detain vehicles for immigration-related infractions. When non-immigration violations beyond authorised areas are identified at checkpoints, ICA relies on police officers to effect arrests or detentions. Could the Minister share more on under what circumstances would the proposed changes improve Home Team’s operational effectiveness?

Mr Speaker, the proposed amendments to the Immigration Act mark a significant stride towards modernising our immigration processes and bolstering our nation's security. These changes are essential to adapt to the evolving challenges posed by technological advancements, increasing traveller demands, and emerging threats. By updating the Act, Singapore demonstrates its commitment to effective border management while embracing technology in line with our digital nation blueprint and greater operational efficiencies at our borders. Mr Speaker, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Ms Poh Li San.

2.34 pm

Ms Poh Li San (Sembawang): Mr Speaker, Sir. Singapore is a thriving international hub. We expect 12 to 14 million visitors this year. Last year, passenger movement at Changi Airport totalled 32.2 million and is expected to return to pre-COVID-19 traffic of 68.3 million by 2024. Over the same period, we had close to 1.2 million cruise passengers. At Tuas and Woodlands land checkpoints, daily crossings are around 300,000 to 400,000 people.

In 2022, 104.8 million travellers were cleared. An efficient, effective and resilient border control is critical to smoothen the movement of people and restrict criminals and blacklisted travellers from coming into Singapore. With the increasing number of visitors, juxtaposed against a shrinking workforce, the use of technology to automate immigration clearance is a critical enabler.

I support the introduction of the NCC. Advance technology will improve the speed of immigration clearance and enhance security. Digitalisation and automation will enable ICA to make efficient use of limited manpower resources.

ICA is one of the early adopters of facial recognition technology. When Changi Airport Terminal 4 opened in October 2017, the Automated Immigration Gates allowed Singaporean passengers to sail through immigration clearance without the need to interact with an ICA officer. The shift to the automated clearance by using facial recognition and fingerprint for identity validation was a major milestone then. ICA has extended the automated clearance to foreigners as well. Since May 2022, more than four million foreign visitors from 51 jurisdictions have enrolled in the automated clearance initiative and cleared immigration with their biometric details.

The next NCC will allow residents and visitors leaving Singapore to clear immigration without having to use their passports from 2024. Instead, they can use the Automated Border Control System with their biometrics for clearance. With the NCC, immigration clearance will become even faster and smoother for all travellers.

In addition, the amendments to the Bill will enhance ICA's powers to obtain information on travellers upstream. The introduction of NBDs will require transport operators to deny the boarding of undesirable individuals that are a threat to our security. Screening them prior to arrival and prohibiting them from arriving or transiting is a necessary step towards the protection for Singapore.

The benefits of faster and easier immigration clearance and manpower savings are evident. However, the typical pitfalls associated with digitalised and automated systems must also be highlighted and the mitigation measures carefully considered. I shall highlight three key concerns.

The first relates to system reliability and their massive knock-on effects. The system must be made extremely robust to prevent system breakdowns, long down time and false negatives, which will all result in delays in clearance, resulting in build-up of long queues and passengers missing their flights, and other knock-on effects.

Sometime in March this year, there were delays and long queues at Changi Airport and land checkpoints. This disruption to the immigration clearance system lasted more than five hours. All automated departure lanes in all four airport terminals as well as at Woodlands and Tuas Checkpoints were affected by this system disruption and some passengers missed their flights.

Will the NCC be more resilient to such breakdowns? Here are some questions.

One, how can ICA prevent or minimise the occurrences of such failures? What measures does ICA have in place to protect and reinforce the systems?

Two, will the Ministry have regular independent audits to check on the failure rates?

Three, what are the contingency plans since manning levels will be minimal with the implementation of NCC?

Four, how quickly can the back-up response kick in?

I do hope that there are sturdy solutions to address these technical weaknesses and operational impacts.

The second concern relates to cybersecurity and biometric vulnerabilities. Despite cybersecurity protection, hacking incidents and data breaches continue to affect both private companies and public organisations more often than expected.

In 2021, there was a data leak affecting 580,000 Singapore Airlines' customers, arising from an external air transport information technology company. Last year, personal information of 4,749 KrisShop customers were exposed to a phishing attack.

For the departure process, the NCC entails an end-to-end biometric system to be used to verify identities and travel details at various automated touchpoints, from bag-drop, to immigration and to boarding. This would mean that the travellers’ biometric information will be stored and linked to even more points than we have today. Though this process will provide more convenience, will the trade-off result in an increase in a higher risk exposure to data breaches?

Internationally, the number of public and private organisations collecting and keeping biometric information has been increasing. Correspondingly, the number of hacking incidents involving biometric data is also on the rise. Given this trend, how will the Ministry ensure the strictest protection for biometric data?

Unlike passwords, we must be mindful that in the event of data breaches, biometric data such as fingerprints and iris scans cannot be reset. How can we assure Singaporeans, residents, and travellers of their concerns over the collection of their biometric information is a safer option compared to traditional identification methods?

I am also concerned about the credentials and quality of IT contractors’ systems and staff when it comes to outsourced technology work. How robust are the checks on theses contractors and the background clearance of their staff? What are the potential vulnerabilities from the involvement of foreign partners, firms and governments? Lastly, are these IT systems contracted out to firms with foreign associations?

My third concern is about small private bus operators. Bus operators had expressed that they are facing difficulties in submitting passenger information before their vehicles arrive at the Woodlands and Tuas checkpoints. They are also worried that some passengers might use fraudulent identities. Understandably, these bus operators will not have the means to validate such information.

We should not burden the bus operators on immigration matters. To get around this problem, I would like to suggest that foreigners entering Singapore via the land checkpoints, submit SG Arrival Cards online three days before their arrival. This way, ICA can inform any affected passengers directly on any entry concerns. I hope ICA will assist these rather senior small operators who are not tech-savvy with their operating costs. Mr Speaker, Sir, notwithstanding my three concerns raised, I will conclude with my support for the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Vikram Nair.

2.43 pm

Mr Vikram Nair (Sembawang): Mr Speaker, I support this Bill. Singapore's immigration has been one of the most user-friendly anywhere in the world. This latest Bill will make it even easier. The amendments allow further automated clearance for passengers, vehicles and cargo. Two of these changes, namely the advanced clearance for conveyances and for cargo, are likely to make a big difference in our land borders with Malaysia.

I would like to ask the Minister whether the intention is to have automated clearance for most of the vehicles passing through the Causeway and the Tuas link. Related to this, is it envisioned that foreign nationals coming through these land borders will also be able to take advantage of these automated clearance measures? I definitely think these measures will increase the speed of clearance at customs.

One concern that arises from this though is whether these changes will make checks become less stringent. In particular, does it mean that customs officials may not check people, vehicles and cargo for most vehicles passing through these checkpoints, or are there alternative automated methods for checking vehicles, cargo and passengers?

I am also interested to know whether ICA intends to share data and information with other governments which may make automated clearance possible for foreigners in Singapore, and for Singaporeans abroad? The sharing of data may also be made consensual, meaning that frequent travellers who prefer to clear customs more quickly may consent to their data being shared with governments of countries they regularly visit. This may be especially useful once the RTS Link between Singapore and Johor starts operating.

Currently, around half a million people cross the Causeway every day. If a good part of this traffic switches to the RTS, that may have the benefit of reducing vehicles and road congestion in Singapore. However, this option will become especially attractive if customs' clearance is automated for regular daily travellers. This may mean that travel from Singapore to Johor may one day be only a little bit more difficult than taking an MRT.

Many of the other changes in this Bill include giving ICA officers the powers they need to prevent undesirable people from entering Singapore, including provisions giving them the power to detain, if necessary.

The requirement for pre-clearance of passengers on board aircrafts and vessels also allow ICA to prevent undesirable people from boarding these vessels if they wish to come to Singapore.

These are sensible measures and I think better for everyone involved.

Currently, the only way to prevent these people entering Singapore is after they have already arrived but before they have cleared Customs. This means that individual concerns may have to be detained and repatriated. This step will be avoided if pre-clearance can be done.

One area of concern for me is how permanent residents (PRs) are being dealt with. This Bill sets out a legal basis for people who may lose the PR status and also it removes the avenue of appeal to the Minister. To better understand the people being affected, I would be interested to know and I have a few clarifications here.

The first is, how many PRs lose their status each year? The second – how many of these would appeal against such loss? Third, of those that appealed and failed, how many would take up the avenue to appeal to the Minister? And fourth, I know this last one may be a bit sensitive, how many such appeals have succeeded?

I think these questions will give us a sense of how many people will be affected by the changes and the extent of that effect. I understand the rationale for these changes is to make clear the basis for losing PR and the removal of the avenue for appeal to Minister is to harmonise the avenues for appeal for other foreigners such as employment pass and long-term visit pass holders.

However, I think people have generally regarded the PR status as being much more important. For many, it is part of a journey to citizenship, while for others, they could be husbands, wives or parents of Singaporeans. I think it would be helpful if PRs can be given assurance that their status is likely to be permanent as the name suggests as long as they reside in Singapore and are law-abidding.

Generally, though, I think this Bill makes important exciting changes to our immigration process. Most Singaporeans can expect even more seamless and convenient travel. I, therefore, support this Bill.

Mr Seah Kian Peng: Mr Louis Ng.

2.48 pm

Mr Louis Ng Kok Kwang (Nee Soon): Sir, this Bill will strengthen border security by digitalising immigration processes, allowing faster responses to pandemics and other challenges, strengthening controls against undesirable persons and allowing efficient administration of passes and permits to foreigners and PRs.

I have three points of clarification.

My first point is on the right of appeal. The Bill removes the statutory right of appeal against certain decisions. The Bill will remove the right of appeal on the grant and revocation of PR status. MHA has clarified that PR applicants and PRs can still seek ICA’s reconsideration. ICA’s website appears to provide no information on how to request for such reconsideration. Can Minister clarify by what channels should PR applicants and PRs request ICA’s reconsideration of its decisions? What should such requesters provide and how long should they expect to wait for a response?

Will ICA consider providing a standard form for filing such requests? It would centralise ICA’s intake of requests and reduce administrative complexity. This form could also provide information about factors relevant to ICA’s reconsideration and warn against the inclusion of irrelevant documents and submission of frivolous requests. This would likely cut the time taken to review requests and reduce the volume of requests, saving Government resources.

Additionally, the Bill removes rights of appeal against other decisions such as the removal of persons unlawfully remaining in Singapore and entry and re-entry permits.

For this category of decisions, MHA has not stated that these individuals can seek ICA’s reconsideration of its decisions. Can Minister clarify whether individuals who are subject to decisions on removal from Singapore, and entry and re-entry permits can seek ICA’s reconsideration? If yes, what is the process for seeking ICA’s reconsideration?

My second point is on the variation of conditions of entry permits. The new subsection 4A of section 10 states that the Controller may publish any changes to conditions on a prescribed website or in the Gazette instead of giving notice to individuals if the Controller assesses that it is not practicable to give notice to every individual.

Given that entry conditions are important for the legality of stay in Singapore, can Minister share when it would not be practicable to give notice to every individual? How will individuals with no knowledge of prescribed websites and no habit of reading the Gazette learn about the variation of conditions of their entry permits?

My third and final point is about how children will be prevented from being taken out of Singapore. A new section 5AA states that an immigration officer may prevent a child from leaving Singapore or being taken out of Singapore. In doing so, the immigration officer may keep the child in an authorised area. This can be a traumatising situation for a child. We must ensure that there are robust standards for ensuring the well-being of the child.

Can Minister share what requirements it will set to ensure that facilities in the authorised area are appropriate for keeping a child? By what standards will immigration officers be held to ensure that they handle a child appropriately? Can Minister also share whether there is any limit to how long a child may be kept in the authorised area? Sir, notwithstanding these clarifications, I stand in support of the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Gan Thiam Poh.

2.51 pm

Mr Gan Thiam Poh (Ang Mo Kio): Mr Speaker, Sir, I rise in support of the amendments to the Immigration Act that will strengthen our border security and ensure that our immigration system will be more efficient and responsive to the evolving challenges of our time.

Digitalisation and automation will help fortify our border security even as we speed up and simplify the immigration clearance process. We can substantially cut processing time, eliminate mistakes, improve the entire experience for passengers and reduce some of the tedious work for our immigration officers by utilising technology. This move will place us at the forefront of international practices for immigration processes, in addition to strengthening the security of our borders.

On the other hand, with increasing reliance on digitalisation and biometrics, there will be higher risks from system vulnerabilities and failures. How will the Ministry ensure the reliability and security of our IT systems at border controls?

Every day we receive reports about hacking and data breaches, affecting organisations across sectors and at all levels. Digital connectivity means that now we need to defend our systems from attackers from around the world, not just at our borders.

Physical copies of permits and passes still have their place as they are immune to hacking attacks, power failures and equipment malfunction. Even as the Ministry seeks to up our cybersecurity, let us continue to have backup plans and modes of operation as part of our resilient ecosystem.

I would also like to ask how the Ministry will protect the data privacy of individuals since biometrics are not replaceable. If biometric data breaches occur, personal identities can be stolen and the hackers can gain access to all aspects of the targets’ lives.

Another concern I have is regarding the inability to use biometric data, especially due to ageing. Singapore is a fast-ageing society, but so are many other countries. For some seniors, fingerprints can no longer be read well by scanners due to dry and worn-out skin. Eyes affected by cataracts or post-cataract surgeries may affect the effectiveness of iris scans. Even face recognition scans face challenges. What are the Ministry’s plans to deal with this problem as more of our people will be senior or elderly?

Next, our immigration system has been under a great deal of stress due to the world witnessing unprecedented challenges, such as pandemics. In such situations, we must quickly adjust. I support measures to enable ICA to establish processes to control the entry or transit of persons for reasons of public health.

Finally, I want to voice my support for the proposed measures to keep out persona non grata from our doorstep. We need to tighten border security measures to keep these unwelcomed persons as far from our border as possible. Doing so will reduce the time and manpower demands to process and subsequently send away these foreigners.

However, due to the high number of passengers travelling between Malaysia and Singapore every day, there is a possibility that persons impersonating others will try to slip through. Will the Ministry share with House the measures to counter these criminals? In the last three years, how many persons had been caught using falsified identification documents? With that, I conclude with my support for the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Derrick Goh.

2.56 pm

Mr Derrick Goh (Nee Soon): Sir, a defining characteristic of Singapore’s success has been its progressive attitude towards leveraging new ideas. I note this Bill introduces new provisions to support the use of new technologies and innovation to tackle an evolving security landscape. It takes into account learnings from the recent pandemic, factored use of digital technologies to improve both effectiveness and efficiency of border operations.

Singapore was early in reopening our boarders in 2022. Given the rebound of travel, it is timely for this Bill to be put before this House. These amendments will not only enable ICA to strengthen immigration controls but also help in its delivery of a more seamless checkpoint experience for residents and tourists. These steps will also help upkeep Singapore as a globally reputed transport and tourism hub.

As such, I support this Bill but would like to seek some clarifications.

The Bill introduces provisions to support ICA’s new procedures. This includes streamlining the clearance experience at Changi Airport, where a person’s biometric and flight information will be processed backend using a unique digital token at the various automated touchpoints.

With technology being at the core of this new operating model, any disruption to this critical system, will have considerable risk and costs that include security, reputational and financial. Given the technology risk around resiliency, can the Minister elaborate on the measures and safeguards to ensure service availability and the expected system uptime?

As system outages can be expected, can Minister also clarify the plans for redundancy and recoverability? For example, will sufficient ICA officers and related resources be available on standby to support an activation of manual clearance processes where required and what kind of tolerable service levels is being planned so that travellers can expect that the system should it not be available?

Regarding the access by the airport operator to biometric and flight information, can Minister elaborate on the measures and the safeguards against misuse, unlawful retention and cybersecurity risks? What are the level of governance standards around data usage applicable to ensure robust requirements across different organisations like Changi Airport and airline operators who may have differing data infrastructure and, therefore, security policies as well compared to, say, ICA? And will there be independent checks or audits by qualified authorities to ensure compliance?

I now turn to future-proofing against evolving challenges. I note that clause 27 of the Bill expands ICA’s powers to collect advance passenger information from currently, vessels, airlines and train operators, to across all modes of entry including from bus operators. ICA will also be able to issue NBDs to direct transport operators to deny the boarding of undesirable individuals, particularly those who pose a threat to our safety and security.

While I support the expanded collection of these data to strengthen our border controls, I note that there have been operational difficulties in this regard, where a number of airlines have failed to comply with the requirements to submit advance information to ICA since the inception of advance passenger screening in October 2019.

Can Minister clarify if ICA had sought to understand the root cause of these non-compliances and whether there are plans to improve or smoothen this reporting regime, other than by introducing a composition framework?

Also, considering that the bus operator sector is more fragmented than the airline industry, they also have customer management systems that are less sophisticated and there are ground concerns that such operators may face difficulties with compliance.

With this ground challenge known, how can ICA ensure the accuracy, completeness and timeliness of information submitted as well as compliance with any issued NBD by bus operators? Are there plans for ICA to create a generic portal to help such operators to comply with the new regulations?

Clause 8 also expands the powers of the Minister to prohibit the entry or transit by foreigners on public security or public health grounds. This includes Singapore PRs and pass-holders.

In this regard, especially in considering PRs who are more likely to have families in Singapore, of which some of whom may even be our citizens, can the Minister clarify the factors of assessment before the exercise of such powers and if there is a lead time for notification so that such affected persons and their families can make adequate preparations?

I next move on to the enhancing of border controls and the administration of passes and permits, and on this point, with respect to the recovery of funds from offenders for their repatriation.

I welcome clause 51 of the Bill, which empowers ICA to recover funds from all categories of persons to be removed from Singapore and not just prohibited immigrants.

In recognising the closure of this gap, may I also seek the Minister's clarification on the number of cases and the total amount of repatriation costs unrecovered over the past five years?

Lastly, the Bill seeks to streamline processes regarding the loss and renewal of a PR status as well as the imposing and varying of PR conditions.

I agree with the underlying principle that the right to enter or stay in Singapore must be the prerogative of the Government. On this note, will ICA consider publishing high level guidelines on its assessment criteria to provide some clarity and, more importantly, to guide expected behaviour?

Sir, notwithstanding the clarifications, I am confident that this Bill will enable ICA to keep Singapore's borders safe and secure in a dynamic operating landscape.

Mr Speaker: Mr Shawn Huang.

3.04 pm

Mr Shawn Huang Wei Zhong (Jurong): Mr Speaker, there is an urgent need to address the pressing global immigration challenges posed by false and stolen identities, exacerbated by the increased use of technology to evade immigration and customs control. It is paramount that Singapore recognises these challenges, acknowledges the evolution of technology used for such activities and emphasises the urgency of staying ahead of emerging threats.

As such, we must harness innovation and technology to enhance our immigration and border management systems.

In a world marked by unprecedented mobility, criminals and those with malicious intent are using technology to exploit gaps in our immigration and customs control systems. The ease with which digital documents can be forged and manipulated poses a grave risk to national security.

We must remain vigilant and proactive in our efforts to combat these threats. Criminals are increasingly adept at circumventing traditional controls and our response must be swift, sophisticated and technologically advanced. Over the years, our immigration technology has evolved, adapting to the changing landscape of threats.

Introducing biometric data such as fingerprints and facial recognition has strengthened our ability to verify identities accurately. These technologies are robust deterrents against false identities and those attempting to slip through the cracks. Furthermore, the advent of electronic passports and identity cards embedded with chips has become a standard practice, ensuring the integrity of our identity documents.

However, as technology continues to advance, so do the methods employed by criminals. Therefore, we must progress in tandem.

We have been using technology integration such as Automated Passport Systems, which expedite entry for legitimate travellers while maintaining a high level of security. Additionally, advanced data analytics has enabled us to detect patterns and anomalies, enabling us to thwart potential threats in realtime.

INTERPOL's Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD) database contains information on travel and identity documents that have been reported as stolen, lost, revoked or invalid. Today, it currently holds around 99 million records, all of which are potential threats. Two key issues why this is important.

First, it is fundamental proof that the existing physical travel document is vulnerable. The physical document holds critical information that is too slow to adapt and use new data points for verification and validation.

Second, the sheer existence of 99 million potential travel identity documents that nefarious and dangerous individuals can use. We must better safeguard ourselves and our loved ones.

The pre-journey bulk submission will reduce the risk for all travellers. It would have prevented those potentially dangerous from embarking at the start of the journey.

Embracing technology, digitalisation and innovation is our best defense against false and stolen identities. By staying at the forefront of technological advancements, we can ensure our immigration and border systems remain robust and capable of detecting these threats faster and more effectively.

In Singapore, the number of travellers attempting to enter Singapore using a false identity or one different from their past trips jumped from 28 in 2021 to 441 in 2022. This is a 15-fold spike in multiple identity cases and a rise in immigration offences in 2022.

In the UK, more than 20,000 fake documents have been identified over a decade. We must do more to keep pace.

At the same time, it is paramount that we prioritise privacy and personal rights as we employ technology to bolster security. Robust data protection measures and transparent practices will ensure that our citizens' rights are safeguarded.

Singapore continues to be at the front edge of technology to ensure that the best possible set of technologies is used to digitalise and automate our processes. This is an essential part of the system. As such, this amendment, comprising of these initiatives and the enhancement of the powers of immigration officers will further safeguard our security and keep our borders safe.

Here, I would like to thank our frontline immigration officers who have served us well all year around 24/7 and have kept Singapore safe.

I have two questions for clarification. First, given the increased data collection and usage, what are the cybersecurity measures taken to enhance the integrity and security of the data? Second, how do we detect system malfunctions where border entry approvals were wrongly granted? Mr Speaker, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Second Minister for Home Affairs Mrs Josephine Teo.

3.09 pm

Mrs Josephine Teo: Mr Speaker, I thank the Members for their thoughtful comments and strong support of the Bill. Please allow me to address their questions in turn.

Where digitalisation and automated immigration clearance is concerned, there are three broad buckets of concerns. The first has to do with cyber readiness and resilience; the second on data security; and the third, how we deal with impersonations.

Mr Derrick Goh, Mr Desmond Choo, Mr Gan Thiam Poh, Mr Gerald Giam, Mr Shawn Huang, Mr Vikram Nair and Mr Yip Hon Weng asked many good questions. Ms Poh Li San knows the issues particularly well, being deeply involved in airport management.

Sir, Singapore will be one of the first few countries in the world to introduce automated, passport-free immigration clearance. Besides Dubai, which already offers passport-free clearance for certain enrolled travellers, we do not know exactly which other countries have similar plans. MHA and ICA will certainly seek to enable more convenient travel for our people but it is likely that physical passports will still be required for many countries outside of Singapore.

To prepare for this NCC, ICA has been training its officers since 2020. Mr Choo will be glad to know that as a result, around 4,000 ICA officers are able to take on higher-value jobs in assessment and investigation, using newly acquired skills such as investigative interviewing and profiling.

Besides levelling up staff capabilities, the key to a successful implementation of the NCC is universal coverage of all travellers. This requires a willingness to phase out traditional methods of identifying and authenticating travellers. The alternative of running two systems in parallel is not only costly but also cumbersome.

To assist seniors who may not be able to provide certain biometrics or who may not be digitally savvy, I assure Mr Gan, Mr Giam and Mr Yip that immigration officers will be on hand to help. The officers can also conduct manual clearance by exception.

As immigration clearance becomes more digitalised, ICA is fully aware of its responsibility in ensuring the availability and resilience of its systems. It therefore works closely with the Home Team Science and Technology Agency (HTX) and GovTech to meet reliability and security requirements in upstream design.

For example, the next generation Automated Border Clearance System (ABCS) will allow travellers to continue using automated clearance gates if there are any outages. This is possible because they will be equipped with failover capabilities such as UPS or uninterruptible power supply and can still function if the supporting systems such as the online biometrics database is down.

Nonetheless, some of the NCC capabilities are novel and highly customised to Singapore's context. Despite our best efforts, disruptions may still happen. Our business continuity plans will then be promptly activated through a combination of measures such as recalling off-duty officers and prioritising traveller clearance according to departure times. This should help minimise service degradation. This is also the careful approach as we undertake the ongoing upgrade of the Multi-Modal Biometrics System (MMBS), which Mr Giam asked about.

In addition, ICA monitors systems performance to ensure benchmarks are met. With large systems, external vendors may be involved. ICA and HTX can and will pursue liquidated damages from a vendor if the systems fail to meet the required standards.

To Ms Poh's query, only Singapore-registered companies can undertake IT projects related to ICA. All employees of vendors undergo a compulsory security screening exercise and must be cleared before they are allowed to work on the project. They are bound by a non-disclosure agreement and may be held criminally liable for any wrongful or unauthorised communication, possession or use of information under the relevant laws such as the Public Sector (Governance) Act.

To uphold high standards of cybersecurity, HTX also carries out independent Vulnerability Assessment and Penetration Testing exercises prior to commissioning and annually thereafter. This complements the regular audits by ICA to identify and address vulnerabilities.

I hope Mr Vikram Nair will be reassured to know that ICA will also deploy more advanced scanning technologies and sensors to automate security checks for vehicles. Additionally, AI will also be used to strengthen detection capabilities for cargo.

These assurances are relevant for both cyber and data security. The Minister’s approval is required for access to and disclosure of data, and must satisfy the purposes specified in the Act, such as for the enforcement of criminal law, failing which an offence can be made out. In addition, the data will be encrypted and go through secured data exchange gateways.

Specific to the biometric-enabled departure journey at Changi Airport that Mr Derrick Goh asked about, the Changi Airport Group (CAG) will be bound by the terms of a data sharing agreement with ICA. It puts the onus on CAG to take all reasonable measures to ensure the data is protected against unauthorised access, use, disclosure, modification or misuse. This includes setting up relevant access controls such as Two-Factor Authentication. ICA will audit CAG’s compliance and conduct regular checks on CAG’s systems.

As for the questions Mr Gerald Giam and Mr Vikram Nair raised, whether such data will be shared with other governments or foreign airport operators so as to facilitate immigration clearance for Singaporeans abroad, for security reasons this is not yet on the cards.

Members will be reassured to know that ICA itself must also comply with data protection provisions set out in the Public Sector (Governance) Act and the Instruction Manual 8. It will retain traveller data only for the period necessary for immigration processing, analytics or investigation. Once these tasks are completed and ICA no longer needs the data, they will be de-personalised and properly deleted.

In the unlikely event of a data breach, ICA and HTX will immediately conduct investigations to stop the breach, trace the extent of the breach, and prevent further breaches through remediation measures. On top of that, system vendors are obliged to adhere to data protection, cybersecurity and breach procedures as part of their contractual obligations to ICA, and must extend full cooperation and assistance to ICA at no additional cost.

Whether with analogue or digital systems, a determined criminal may still try to breach immigration controls. ICA will deploy monitoring tools to constantly check on its systems. They are equipped with the capability to detect impersonation and forged or tampered passports presented for clearance. Mr Gan Thiam Poh will be glad to know that the more recent use of multi-modal biometric clearance systems has in fact resulted in better detection of individuals seeking to impersonate others.

For manual clearance, immigration officers are trained to conduct facial checks to ensure that the person is the rightful holder of the passport. For those undeterred and caught, we will deal with them firmly. Between 2020 and 2022, there were 38 cases prosecuted in court involving the use of false passports or travel documents.

The risk of entry approvals being wrongly granted, which Mr Shawn Huang asked about, is no higher with the NCC than with the current system. Moreover, ICA and HTX will conduct thorough end-to-end testing for any system changes before deployment.

Sir, Mr Yip Hon Weng asked about the impact of ICA’s shift to the use of digital permits and passes to verify immigration status. Since February 2023, ICA only issues digital Long-Term Passes. Individuals no longer need to visit ICA to collect the physical card, nor run the risk of losing or damaging it. ICA will not issue new physical cards for Long-Term Pass Holders but previously issued cards will remain valid until they expire or are cancelled. ICA will digitalise other pass types in due course.

If an individual does not have a smart electronic device to display his digital permit or pass, he can enlist the help of family members to access the digital documents from ICA’s e-Services and print a copy to be used at our checkpoints. As such, we do not expect the digitalisation of passes to cause congestion.

Next, I will go on to ICA’s future-proofing initiatives. Mr Derrick Goh asked about the root cause of non-compliance by airlines in submitting advance passenger information. From ICA’s experience, it usually boils down to tardiness. Without being able to screen incoming travellers before their arrival, immigration clearance will be slower. A composition framework is therefore necessary, and is already practised in established jurisdictions like the US, the UK and New Zealand.

On the provisions for buses to also collect advance passenger information, let me assure Mr Desmond Choo, Mr Derrick Goh, Ms Poh Li San and Mr Yip Hon Weng that no timeline has been fixed. ICA has been engaging bus operators since July 2022, and will continue to do so before firming up any plans to collect such information.

Similarly for the NBDs, raised by Mr Desmond Choo and Mr Yip Hon Weng, we will continue discussions with the operators to find a practicable way forward before proceeding.

It is premature to go into details but in the event of non-compliance, ICA intends to make a holistic assessment of the facts of the case before deciding whether to prosecute. The offence of failing to comply with NBDs will likely be compoundable; and this can be provided for in subsidiary legislation.

Mr Murali Pillai and Mr Yip Hon Weng asked about public transport operators such as SBS Transit. The Bill specifically excludes public bus operators from the submission of advance passenger information or to comply with the NBDs. This is because tickets are not being sold in advance and advance passenger information thus cannot be collected for ICA’s screening.

Mr Desmond Choo also asked for data on undesirable travellers transiting through our checkpoints. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, there was a monthly average of 110 undesirable travellers denied entry into Singapore. With an NBD regime, we could keep such undesirable travelers from even coming to Singapore, especially those who pose a high security risk. Transport operators such as the airlines could also save resources from having to repatriate these travellers.

As a final point on NBDs, let me assure Mr Desmond Choo and Mr Yip Hon Weng that ICA will provide adequate transition periods for the respective domains and will do so in close consultation with the industry. For example, with the airlines, ICA intends to run trials from end-2024.

Let me now deal with the issue of false statements. Mr Yip Hon Weng asked how ICA plans to monitor and validate the accuracy of such statements. ICA will review the historical records of a person’s self-declarations and conduct further checks when there are inconsistencies across records. ICA will also cross-check with other available sources. For persons who are suspected to have made false statements or provided false information, ICA will commence investigations.

In the event passengers fail to declare symptoms of a contagious disease, whether deliberately or otherwise, ICA will work with relevant stakeholders to ensure there are other means to identify them. This includes engaging the transport operators’ help to flag them prior to boarding.

During a pandemic situation, travellers may also be required to conduct pre-arrival health checks or tests. If, unfortunately, such passengers still manage to arrive at our checkpoints, ICA will work with the Ministry of Health (MOH) to implement necessary measures to identify them promptly, such as through temperature screening or visual checks.

In terms of enforcement measures, ICA will maintain a firm and strict posture. Travellers deemed to have made false statements will have their entry into Singapore denied. With the proposed amendment at clause 57, it will be a strict liability offence for anyone who gives false or misleading information, or omits anything so as to mislead.

Mr Derrick Goh asked for factors of assessment before the exercise of powers to prohibit the entry or transit of foreigners. As I have mentioned earlier, we will only use such powers when the situation warrants it. The key consideration is whether such a restriction is proportionate to the severity of the situation. We have seen how in times of a pandemic, travel restrictions may have to be put in place at very short notice.

I shall move on to the proposals to strengthen our border controls.

Mr Derrick Goh asked for the number of cases and the costs unrecovered from repatriated persons over the past five years. From 2018 to 2022, there were 74 cases and more than $53,000 of Government-aided funds used for repatriation expenses. Most of the involved offenders genuinely could not pay their way; the rest were able to.

Mr Murali Pillai asked two questions on the proposed amendments to introduce fines in lieu of caning, for offenders exempted from or found medically unfit for caning. First, he asked why our amendment applies to offenders convicted of employing five or more immigration offenders, since they are likely to be Singaporeans.

To clarify, the law today requires offenders convicted of this offence to be caned. But for offenders who cannot be caned because of their age or sex, the current law also requires the Court to impose fines in lieu of caning. This is under section 57(1B), which we are not changing.

Our amendment does nothing more than extend this provision to males who are sentenced to caning for this offence but are subsequently found medically unfit for caning. This allows for the deterrent effect of the penalty to still be met without unduly expending our prison resources while the penalty is held in a suspended state. Such a move also ensures consistent treatment in offences where fines are imposed in lieu of caning.

Second, Mr Murali Pillai asked why there is no provision in the Bill to limit the length of the imprisonment term that the Court can impose on an offender who cannot be caned but defaults on the fine imposed in lieu. We agree with him, that in such cases, it would be ironic if the imprisonment for defaulting on a fine is longer than the prison term that could have been imposed in lieu of caning. Nevertheless, we have decided that this should be left to the Court’s discretion, looking at all the factors in each case. If the Court considers that an in-default imprisonment term is appropriate, it can also calibrate the length of the imprisonment. Section 319 only sets out the upper limit of the imprisonment terms that can be imposed and do not prevent the Court from imposing a shorter term.

I thank Mr Murali Pillai for the suggestion to digitalise the process of notification of Court orders and lodgement of written consent from the parent for a child to leave Singapore.

Currently, parties who wish to inform ICA of any Restraining Orders or provide their written consent can do so by simply emailing ICA at a stipulated email address. This is the process we have agreed with the Family Justice Courts and it is set out in the Family Justice Practice Directions. We will continuously explore new ways to make the process more efficient.

Mr Louis Ng asked if the facilities in ICA’s authorised area are appropriate for keeping a child. The new section 5AA seeks to give ICA ancillary powers to keep the child temporarily, while preventing the child from being brought out of Singapore by any person without the consent of the parent or guardian. While ICA facilities are not specially designed for a child, it will make all reasonable efforts to ensure the child’s safety and well-being. Whenever possible, immigration officers will ask that the travelling companion stays with the child until the child’s parent or guardian arrives. If a child is abandoned at the checkpoints, and the parent or guardian is uncontactable, ICA will hand over the child to the Police. Child Protection Services will also be involved if necessary.

Mr Murali Pillai spoke about the issue of fairness in dealing with foreigners and asked why there is a need to remove statutory appeals. Let me explain in greater detail.

As is the case in most countries, foreigners do not have the right to enter or remain in Singapore. That follows then that they should not be entitled to challenge the terms of their entry or stay under the law.

This position is reflected in our legal provisions regarding the issuance and cancellation of long-term passes and application for citizenship. There has never been a right of statutory appeal for such immigration facilities and this has also not prevented us from according the affected foreigners fair and reasonable treatment and protection from harm under prevailing laws.

The provision of statutory appeals for entry permit holders who are PRs is found in the Immigration Act 1959, an old piece of legislation dating back to the start of self-government. We are now simply updating and rationalising our laws so that the position for entry permit holders who are PRs is aligned with that of applicants for long-term passes and citizenship.

Let me also assure Mr Murali Pillai that we do not make immigration decisions in a cavalier manner. Like him, we are particularly sympathetic to foreigners with close family ties to Singaporeans.

Immigration decisions take into consideration a wide range of factors. In some cases, this includes sensitive intelligence information. As I mentioned earlier, each decision is also based on a polycentric evaluation of factors relating to our policies and security needs. While we understand the desire for explicit reasons to be provided, a blanket provision will be too blunt.

Instead, we will continue to allow foreigners affected by an immigration decision to make representations and to provide explanations to the authorities. As Mr Gerald Giam suggested, for certain decisions, ICA does advise affected persons in broad terms why a decision was made, for example, that his PR status was revoked because of his criminal offences.

Foreigners can continue to seek ICA's reconsideration of the matter and ICA will escalate the matter for the Minister's determination if appropriate. This approach strikes a better balance between the need to safeguard the public interest and our national security on the one hand and fairness to foreigners affected by immigration decisions on the other.

Mr Louis Ng and Mr Gerald Giam asked how affected persons can submit appeals. They can do so via a general feedback form on ICA's website and it will be directed to the relevant immigration officers. In any case, I can assure them that even without a Member of Parliament's representation, these appeals are attended to.

Mr Giam asked about the administration of the Pre-Marriage LTVP Assessment (PMLA). This is outside the scope of this Bill but we would like to assure the Member that the Registry of Marriages and the Registry of Muslim Marriages do provide to couples in person advice to complete the PMLA before marriage.

Mr Derrick Goh and Mr Gerald Giam asked immigration criteria can be made more transparent, including the assessment criteria for the renewal of the Re-Entry Permit. Mr Vikram Nair asked if we can give assurance to law-abiding PRs of their stay in Singapore.

As Members know, we do not disclose our detailed immigration criteria. The reasons are well-known and not new. They are also not the focus of today's Bill.

Nonetheless, I should point out that the comparison with COMPASS neglects important differences. I was the Manpower Minister when COMPASS was conceived. Its considerations are that employment pass holders mainly impact the workplace and they are also mostly transient. But for PRs and Singapore Citizens, the applicants must be considered differently because they are not transient and they impact the wider fabric of society. Therefore, the considerations must be more holistic and sensitive to long-term impact. We must also recognise the stronger incentives to game the system if the criteria were fully disclosed.

Be that as it may, we have shared the broad criteria that ICA considers, such as whether an applicant is gainfully employed, contributing to Singapore or has family roots here. PRs who have conducted themselves well and continue to be a resident in Singapore should not have much difficulty with the renewal of their Re-Entry Permit. I can assure the Members that the vast majority of applications for Re-Entry Permit renewal are approved.

To Mr Vikram Nair's question, on average, 7,900 or less than 2% of the total PR population each year lose their PR status by being outside of Singapore without a valid Re-Entry Permit. Of those who appealed, the majority were successful as they had valid reasons for not renewing their Re-Entry Permit in time.

On the powers of the Controller to publish changes to permit and pass conditions on a prescribed website or by Gazette, Mr Louis Ng asked when such situations would arise.

There are many instances where ICA may impose conditions on permit and pass holders. For example, if an individual committed a minor offence or displayed adverse behaviour, ICA would notify the person individually that it will impose a condition that he shall not engage in such activities further or risk having his permit or pass cancelled.

However, there may also be situations where ICA is required to impose conditions en masse, for instance, during a pandemic. Given the large number of PRs and pass holders, it would not be practicable to contact each and every one to notify them individually. The Controller will then publish the changes on a prescribed website or by Gazette.

Mr Louis Ng rightly pointed out that many individuals may not know how to access a prescribed website or the Gazette. Hence, ICA will explore suitable avenues to reach out to as many affected persons as possible, for example, through media platforms.

Finally, in his concluding remarks, Mr Yip Hon Weng asked how congestion at the Woodlands and Tuas checkpoints can be improved. This is not the focus of the Bill today and I would draw the Member's attention to ICA's various announcements over the past months on its efforts. Nevertheless, I shall share broadly four key initiatives.

One, since January 2023, ICA has implemented the Automated Clearance Initiative to allow eligible foreign visitors to use the automated lanes for immigration clearance, without prior enrolment of their biometrics.

Two, ICA will progressively implement automated clearance for cars at the two checkpoints in addition to motorcycles, thereby reducing overall time taken to clear immigration.

Three, progressively from 2024, Singaporeans and departing visitors will no longer need to present their passports for immigration clearance and will instead verify their identity through biometrics, reducing clearance time in bus halls by up to 40%.

Four, over the longer term, ICA will redevelop Woodlands Checkpoint to enhance clearance for all types of vehicular traffic and reduce travel times, especially during peak periods.

Mr Speaker, to conclude, the Immigration (Amendment) Bill will facilitate the implementation of more digitalised and automated services for the benefit of all travellers, as well as enhance our immigration processes so that they are more robust, effective and efficient.

Once again, I thank Members for their support of the Bill. Mr Speaker, I beg to move.

Mr Speaker: Any clarifications for Minister? Mr Gerald Giam.

3.39 pm

Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song: I thank the Minister for her detailed replies to my questions. I have just two clarifications to seek.

I think I heard the Minister say that for security reasons, the sharing of Singaporean passengers' biometric data with foreign governments is not on the cards yet. This suggests that it may be on the cards in future. Can I ask if the Government will seek Parliament's approval before the sharing of such personal data with foreign governments in the future?

And secondly, regarding providing the reasons for rejections of immigration passes, can ICA minimally share the broad criteria that is already been shared in Parliament in their standard rejection letters to applicants so that applicants can figure out on their own where they fell short? Without this, the applicants will tend to just keep trying to apply with the same information and not really realising why is it they cannot make the cut.

Mrs Josephine Teo: I thank Mr Gerald Giam for both his questions. It is really premature for us to consider what steps might make it possible for us to proceed with sharing of biometric data with other governments or foreign airport operator. The technology must be secure enough and there must be also mutual acceptance of the additional safeguards that must be put in place. Without knowing exactly what those conditions need to be, I do not want to speculate on what approvals may be needed. It is really just too early for us to even contemplate such a step.

To his second question, I am very sympathetic to the situations when the applicants are told that what they would like to see by way of a grant of permanent residency or other passes has not been approved. In my own experience dealing with these applicants, even when the reasons are articulated to them, whether broadly or with a fair amount of detail, the disappointment does not go away. So, I will be quite realistic as to what these steps can achieve.

I think it is more important to look at it in broader context. The broad context is that we have been facilitative, particularly for families who have children, for applicants whose family ties are long-established and we will continue to support them in this process.

Mr Speaker: Any other clarifications? No.

Question put, and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House.

The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. – [Mrs Josephine Teo].

Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed.

Mr Speaker: Order. I propose to take a break now. I will suspend the Sitting and will take the Chair at 4.10 pm.

Sitting accordingly suspended

at 3.46 pm until 4.10 pm.

Sitting resumed at 4.10 pm.

[Mr Speaker in the Chair]