Clarification by Minister for Foreign Affairs

Mr Speaker: Clarification by Minister Vivian Balakrishnan.

3.15 pm

The Minister for Foreign Affairs (Dr Vivian Balakrishnan): Thank you, Mr Speaker. I wanted to make some clarifications with respect to TraceTogether.

You will recall that the hon Member Mr Christopher de Souza had raised the question yesterday. I want to make three points.

First, on the purpose of the programme. Second, the built-in protection for privacy. And third, the legal provisions governing the use of TraceTogether data.

First point: contact tracing is absolutely essential for the control of COVID-19. We need to quickly identify everyone who has been exposed or potentially exposed to a patient who is infected in order to provide the necessary care to this close contact and to reduce the probability of them passing on the virus. In other words, to be able to truncate chains of transmission quickly, effectively and early.

We have today in Singapore perhaps the most successful contact tracing programme in the world, with a TraceTogether participation rate of around 78%. This is one of the key reasons for our current good control of the COVID-19 situation in Singapore today.

Second point: we have always been conscious of the need to protect personal privacy. To this end, we took great effort in the design of the system, the coding of the application. We even open-sourced the code for public scrutiny and to share with overseas jurisdictions.

TraceTogether only collects Bluetooth proximity data on a temporary basis. It does not collect – and I want to emphasise – it does not collect GPS location data nor movement data.

Let me reiterate this. The TraceTogether app and token were not designed to allow any Government agency to track the user. The app or token only keeps a temporary record of who you have come into close contact with for a prolonged basis. Neither the app nor the token tracks a user's location. The data is then stored in encrypted form locally on your device – either your phone or your token. And that encrypted data is automatically purged after 25 days.

So, you can see that we have taken maximum efforts to protect privacy while enabling contact tracing to be facilitated through digital means.

Third point: on legal provisions. Under section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC), the Police have the power to order anyone to produce data for the purposes of a criminal investigation. And the key word here is criminal investigation.

We have gone to great lengths to protect the privacy of all TraceTogether users in all normal use cases, but TraceTogether data is not exempt from section 22 of the CPC. [Please refer to "Clarification by Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister-in-charge of the Smart Nation Initiative", Official Report, 5 January 2021, Vol 95, Issue No 15, Correction by Written Statement section.]

The Police can only do so – meaning can only ask for access – by requiring a person involved in or assisting a criminal investigation to produce either his smartphone or his token. Frankly, and I think Members know me well and I am always very frank. Frankly, I had not thought of the CPC when I spoke earlier.

This application of the CPC is not unique to TraceTogether data. Other forms of sensitive data, for example, phone or banking records, which may be protected by specific privacy laws are also, nevertheless, subject to the provision of the CPC. And from time to time, the Police have done so, with proper safeguards and with the good outcomes that Singaporeans have come to expect from our Police investigations.

I think Singaporeans can understand why section 20 of the CPC confers such broad powers. There may be serious crimes, like murders or terrorist incidents where the use of TraceTogether data in Police investigations may be necessary in the public interest. The Police must be given the tools to bring criminals to justice and protect the safety and security of all Singaporeans. And especially in very serious cases and where lives are at stake, it is not reasonable for us to say that certain classes of data should be out of reach of the Police. But this power – on the part of the Police to access data – must be exercised judiciously and with utmost restraint.

Mr Speaker, we do not take the trust of Singaporeans lightly. We cannot prevail in the battle against COVID-19 if Singaporeans did not trust the public health authorities and the Government of Singapore.

We are grateful that more than three-quarters of our residents have chosen to participate in the TraceTogether programme. It reflects not only their willingness to play a part in our collective fight against COVID-19, but also their confidence in the Government's commitment to protect the data so collected.

I want to again assure Singaporeans that your confidence is not misplaced. We will protect your privacy. I would add that, once the COVID-19 pandemic is over and there is no longer a need for contact tracing, we will most happily and cheerfully stand the TraceTogether programme down.

Mr Speaker, Members of this House, every society has to find the right balance, the right balance between protecting public health on one hand and personal privacy on the other hand. I believe it is possible to find that optimal point by being transparent, by being open, by being diligent, disciplined and doing our best all the time collectively.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I will be happy to take questions with your permission.

Mr Speaker: Mr Pritam Singh.

3.23 pm

Mr Pritam Singh (Aljunied): Thank you, Mr Speaker. I did not expect Minister to issue this statement at this current point in time, but I think it behoves me to ask some questions.

I thank Minister for acknowledging that the CPC was not really in his contemplation when that statement was made. I think Minister has made that remark in good faith and we will take it as it is.

But Minister made another comment about the Police judiciously using the information that is collected by TraceTogether. Can the Minister further explain under what circumstances the Police would be calling on that information because Police investigations would, by nature of our legislation, comprise of a wide spectrum of offences. So, the expectation cannot be that this information could be used at first instance whenever a Police investigation commences.

I am also mindful as to whether this question should be put to the Minister for Home Affairs or the Minister-in-charge of Smart Nation. So, I think some clarification of this would be quite important for members of the public because everybody wants TraceTogether to succeed, in view of the public health considerations. But this particular point has done has caused consternation and that also probably explains why the Minister has decided to make this clarification.

The Minister for Home Affairs (Mr K Shanmugam): I thank the Member. I think Mr Singh will know under section 20 of the CPC, the Police are authorised to seek any information within the possession of a person. There are various provisions. As long as the seeking of such information is not excluded by some other written law. There are some provisions and some written laws which circumscribe the exercise of Police powers. Subject to that, the CPC gives the power to the Police and when such a power is given, the Police are obviously under a duty as well.

To give you an example. Let us say there is a murder and the victim, the victim's family and information is available on the TraceTogether token. If Police chose not to seek that information, you can imagine how the victim's family and indeed the rest of Singapore might react to that situation. You could even argue that there can be a judicial review application in such a situation.

However, given that this TraceTogether token is necessary for dealing with the pandemic and it is of national importance and its purposes are to help us deal with the pandemic, the Police approach has been and will be that it is pretty much restricted to very serious offences. And while that requirement is not in the legislation, it will be carefully considered within the Police and discretion will be exercised in seeking this information.

Mr Speaker: Mr Christopher de Souza.

Mr Christopher de Souza (Holland-Bukit Timah): I had wanted to ask if there was a protocol for officers to use the data reasonably. I think that has been answered by Minister, and whether the data can be collected for all crimes or just serious crimes and that is already been answered.

My remaining clarification is, will the data be deleted at the end of the investigations, if it does not yield anything or at the end of the case?

Mr K Shanmugam: Can you come again with your question?

Mr Christopher de Souza: The third clarification is, will the data be deleted at the end of the investigations?

Mr K Shanmugam: If the data is of no particular use, yes, it will be deleted. Otherwise, it will have to be produced in Court.

Mr Christopher de Souza: And in trial.

Mr K Shanmugam: And in trial or use for trial purposes, even if not produced in Court.

Mr Speaker: Mr Gerald Giam.

Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song (Aljunied): Thank you, Sir. Two clarifications.

Minister Balakrishnan just now said that once the pandemic is passed, the TraceTogether programme will be stood down. My question is, will the data that collected by TraceTogether including data that is beyond 21 days, will that be stored on a server and will that still be accessible by the Police if they invoke the CPC?

And secondly, has the Government considered the impact that yesterday's clarification would have on the adoption and the usage of the TraceTogether app as well as the token? Because as I mentioned yesterday, although we might have 78% adoption, there is no real way of finding out whether people actually using the system because you may have it downloaded on your phone, but you can switch off your Bluetooth when you enter the building or you could use what is called a Faraday bag to keep the token. So, there are many different ways which people can prevent themselves from being tracked if they could well be criminals or engaging criminal activities.

Which is more important then? Is it the fight against this pandemic or the exceptional circumstances where the Police, with all their other powers on hand, are not able to trace where the person is and track the person down?

Dr Vivian Balakrishnan: I thank Mr Giam for that very useful set of supplementary questions. His first point was – what happens post-pandemic? We all look forward to that day.

First, let me deal with the data in your phones and in your tokens. As I said, all that data, first of all, is encrypted and is auto-purged after 25 days. You do not need to wait for the end of the pandemic before your longer term historical data beyond 25 days is auto-deleted.

I will volunteer an extra supplementary question for you – what about the data on patients and close contacts?

Which with the patient's consent or with the close contact's consent and, in fact, active participation – you will know if you look at the app, you actually have to receive a PIN from MOH and you will have to authorise that upload – that data would reside, when you upload it, in a database that MOH's contact tracers have.

I would imagine that so long as the pandemic is alive and posing a clear and present threat, MOH will want to have that data available because it may be the start of a larger transmission chain.

But I believe that once the pandemic has passed, that data – certainly, the specific, personalised data – those fields should be eliminated. For research purposes, I believe MOH may want to still have epidemiologic data but it should be anonymised. It should not be personalised, it should not be individualised.

This is a very important point that you have raised and I think you should continue to ask this point as the pandemic and our response to it evolves.

Your second question is a very important point as well, which is what impact does all this open discussion have on participation and on the way we handle the pandemic itself?

The Member will recall – in fact, I know he had paid attention to this issue even before coming into Parliament this time. There were people who said, "Well, you have got a tool. Make it compulsory. Just enforce it. This is a clear and present emergency."

Members will recall that on numerous occasions in this House and outside this House, I have asked that to the maximum extent, I am going to try to make this voluntary. A much harder target, an approach which requires constant explanation – sometimes, I will get it wrong and when I get it wrong, I will just come clean and say so – and persuasion.

You should be asking me, "Why do you take such a 'ley chey', labourious approach?"

That is because I believe that our victory over this pandemic is not by us sitting up here and issuing rules and edicts, but that our people must understand not only the measures that we are implementing but why we are implementing it, the spirit behind it, so that with their understanding and voluntary and full cooperation, we can achieve success.

The reason we are now in this happy situation – and I tell you, in stark contrast to virtually anywhere else in the world – is not just because we have two wonderful co-chairmen, Minister Gan and Minister Lawrence Wong. It is not because we have such technological wizardry. It is trust, it is understanding, it is cooperation and it is collective responsibility.

The answer to the question yesterday – when Minister of State Desmond Tan answered it – is that we want to be completely above board and transparent. The reason I asked the Speaker's permission to make this clarification is precisely because of this.

If there is disquiet, if there is uncertainty, we must answer it. I must answer it openly, transparently.

Mr Giam, I might be right, I might be wrong. You might agree with me, you might disagree with me. But regardless, at all times, in this House and outside, we must be forthright, honest, open, transparent and do the best that we can.

It is in that spirit, therefore, that we have these open discussions and why I remain confident that the participation rate in contact tracing, using the latest tools that we have available, will remain high and why I hope we will continue to one of the bright spots in the world.

This is a new year but I can tell you at a worldwide level, this is not going to be the year that COVID-19 lifts its impact on the world.

Let us wait and see, but I appeal to you – by all means, continue to push us, ask us, question us, disagree with us. This is the attitude by which we will make progress and overcome.

Your final point was on the pandemic. You tried to juxtapose between what we need to do in the immediate short term as an emergency response to the pandemic and the longer term interest of how the Police needs to be able to safeguard public security and safety.

I am not the Minister for Home Affairs but let me give you some insight from looking at the situation across the world.

In different jurisdictions, the thermostat for how much investigative power you give the Police versus the individual's right to privacy is different. If you go to the United States, for instance, you will recall the case where there was a terrorist – I think it was at San Bernardino – and his phone was locked. The terrorist was obviously dead but the FBI needed access to that data and could not legally get access to the data.

This is their system and they are entitled to make their own regime and their own thermostat. But what happened at the end of that? We know now that in fact, they paid millions of dollars to get a hacking firm to hack that phone in order to gain access to the contents.

Now, I am not making this as a criticism or offering it as a model for us. I am just making the point that every society has to get that balance right.

In Singapore, I submit to you that we have a Police force that is not only excellent in its investigative methods but a Police force that enjoys the trust and the cooperation of all of us. It is this relationship, this trust, that enables us at any point in time, regardless of the crisis confronting us, to set the balance right and to be effective.

I will tell you very frankly. After I realised that the CPC applied to this, I did think, I did have sleepless nights wondering, "Should I try to persuade my colleagues to change the law?"

But, having thought about it, discussed, consulted people both within and outside this House, I have come to the conclusion that right now we are doing well. We are able to keep Singapore safe, we are able to keep and deal with the current crisis. And so long as this Government is able to maintain our reputation for openness, transparency, reliability, I think we are still on the right track.

But if you have specific suggestions on legislative or policy changes, we would be happy to hear from you and from the Leader of the Opposition. Thank you again, Mr Giam.

Mr Speaker: Ms Tin Pei Ling

Ms Tin Pei Ling (MacPherson): Thank you, Minister, for the clarification. I have a couple of questions to ask.

First of all, I understand that the TT token itself does not have the GPS function and that the data will be deleted after 25 days. For the handphone app, I would just like to clarify because the handphone itself has GPS function. Would this also apply to the TT application on the phone? I understand that the data will be deleted or purged after 25 days. I just want to seek clarification and confirmation on this.

The next question that I have is that prior to COVID-19, the Police has a range of ways of collecting data or information that they need for criminal investigation. Therefore, in this case, given it is only exchanges of Bluetooth information, how is the data from this TT useful to Police investigation into crimes? I hope to get a better understanding on this.

Lastly, I really appreciate the effort to make such a statement in Parliament, in this Chamber, because this is a matter of public access. Everything will be on public record. Therefore, I would like to ask the Minister for his reaffirmation that the vast majority of the ordinary Singaporeans out there will not be affected by this question that we are now exploring. That the data that is being taken and collected by TT is really only for a very selected purpose and that is only for serious criminal investigation.

Dr Vivian Balakrishnan: I thank Ms Tin for those three questions, some technical, some operational.

First, on the technical point. The token has no GPS chip and we have opened it up, we have allowed external parties to dissemble it. I can guarantee you there is no GPS chip. There is no way that the token can keep track of your location.

Ms Tin makes the point that most smartphones nowadays do have a GPS chip. But we have been very careful in our coding for the TraceTogether app – that it does not keep a record of GPS locations. The only thing that the TraceTogether app keeps track of is proximity on the basis of Bluetooth data.

On your second question – whether this is useful? I mean that is an operational question, which I will leave to the Police – whether proximity data is useful or not and how they would use it. But, again, I will stand by what the Minister for Home Affairs has said – that this is not something to be accessed lightly or trivially, only for serious crimes and to be used very judiciously, and with utmost discretion applied.

The final question was to give an assurance that the majority will not be affected. Ms Tin, I will put it to you this way. The vast majority of Singaporeans are not involved in or assisting in criminal investigations. In that sense, they are not affected. But TraceTogether and its success affect the welfare and the public health of all of us. In that sense, confidence in this programme makes a difference to all of us.

Mr Speaker: Mr Leong Mun Wai.

Mr Leong Mun Wai (Non-Constituency Member): Thank you, Speaker. I have two questions for Minister Vivian Balakrishnan. Firstly, how many instances are there where the Police has tapped the data from the TraceTogether app? Secondly, I would like to thank the Minister for making his statement, because since yesterday, there has been a lot of responses from the public. However, I would also like the Minister to clarify further. One, when did he discover that his statement that he made before, is going to be affected by the CPC? Two, his message today, is it that he wants to apologise that the Government or the Minister had made an oversight? Or is his message telling us that in Singapore, we should just take it that the CPC will be able to access all the information that they have on us in Singapore?

Dr Vivian Balakrishnan: I thank Mr Leong. How many instances? That is an operational question. As far as I am aware, so far, I think there has been only one in which involved a murder case. But I am not privy to operational details and I should not be and, therefore, I am not in a position to comment further on the investigations.

I told you just now that I made the comments and statements earlier. The CPC was not in my mind. Subsequently, we have been having discussions, especially over the last few weeks as to whether, and I alluded to it earlier, we should in fact change the law or whether we continue as we are now. In any case, we decided it is better to be upfront and that is why we were very glad that Mr de Souza asked the question and Minister of State Mr Desmond Tan answered it yesterday.

I have been in the House now for almost 20 years. All the staff who have worked with me over the years will know that I am obsessively concerned with accuracy, needless to say, absolute adherence to honesty. And that means over the years, from time to time, when I have misspoken, I have said so. I have never shied away from saying so because, as I said, it is far more important to maintain trust. And that I might be right or I might be wrong or I might have mistaken some thing or overlook something but, rest assured, when I discover it, I will say so. And to the best extent possible we will find a solution together. That is my approach and I do not see any need to change from that. And I hope you understand.

Mr Speaker: Mr Murali Pillai.

Mr Murali Pillai (Bukit Batok): With your indulgence, Sir, I would like to raise a point of information. I recall the hon Member Mr Giam in a debate on the Personal Data Protection (Amendment) Bill raised the possibility of linking the standards under the Personal Data Protection Act and the Government's standards in relation to data protection, with the General Data Protection Regulations of the EU.

As far as the General Data Protection Regulations of the EU is concerned, there is a carve-out in relation to police investigation. In fact, police may access personal data in relation to detection, prevention, investigation as well as prosecution of criminal offences. So, in a sense, there is parity in relation to the Singapore situation with that of the situation in the EU. That is all, Sir.

Mr Speaker: Mr Gerald Giam.

Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song: Yes, Mr Speaker. I want to thank Minister Vivian for his candour and explaining the circumstances and the thought that went behind the considerations whether or not to have a carve-out for the CPC for the TraceTogether data.

I just wanted to clarify that my purpose for raising that intervention yesterday was mainly in the interest of maximising the adoption of TraceTogether. It was not exactly from a civil liberty perspective although there is a time for discussion about that in the future. But my intervention was mainly for the purpose of ensuring that there is a maximum adoption of the TraceTogether system because I have been a strong advocate of it on the ground with my residents in the face of quite a bit of scepticism actually, about the system. I have exactly tried to convince people to not only use the token but also use the app and use the app instead of using the token if they have a mobile phone.

So, I think I just want to put on record that I do support the TraceTogether system and I do encourage Singaporeans to use the token or the app as much as they can.

In response to Member Mr Murali's point about the GDPA and the PDPA, I do not intend to open up a whole debate about this. But just to clarify that, if I recall right, what I said during the debate was that the GDPA does have carve-outs for security purposes. So, it is possible to have a PDPA that has carve-outs that allow the Police do certain things and access certain data. It is not incongruous to what I said earlier on.

Mr Speaker: Mr Vikram Nair.

Mr Vikram Nair (Sembawang): Thank you. I have listened to the discussion and explanation. One point that I would like to make is that I would actually support the use of TraceTogether for Police investigations. Because not only is it necessarily helpful in finding out who may have been in the vicinity of a crime, for example, but it can also help exonerate people who are wrongly accused.

So, for example, if you accused and TraceTogether will tell you who was around you, it may help you establish an alibi. So, I would suggest that people who are accused or assisting in investigations, should be able to request that the Police do check their TraceTogether to see if they may have alibis at the time of the offence.

Mr Speaker: Okay, let us move on. Minister for Transport. We will move on to the Multimodel Transport Bill.