Statutes (Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

4.04 pm

The Senior Minister of State for Law (Ms Indranee Rajah) (for the Minister for Law): Madam, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time".

Madam, this Bill contains various amendments to several Acts. The amendments are mainly technical in nature. I will highlight the key amendments.

Presently, the Evidence Act requires the Courts to presume the genuineness of laws and reports of judicial decisions contained in books, where such evidence is tendered in Court. However, as the presumption only applies to those contained in books, it does not apply to laws or reports published online, even if they are published on official websites authorised by the government of a country.

Clause 6 of the Bill extends this presumption by requiring the Court to presume the genuineness of (a) any legislation that is published on an official legislation website; and (b) any law report published on a website that publishes official or authoritative reports of decisions of the courts of a country.

The amendment will also make clear that the presumption is applicable only to official or authoritative reports of decisions of the courts of a country.

Clauses 7 and 43 of the Bill contain three main sets of amendments to the Family Justice Act and the Supreme Court of Judicature Act respectively. These amendments seek to: (a) align the right of appeal between family cases and non-family cases; (b) clarify that all family proceedings must be commenced at the Family Court; and (c) introduce immunity provisions for certain groups of individuals.

Let me first touch on aligning the right of appeal. Presently, under the Family Justice Act, family proceedings can be heard, at first instance, by: (a) the Family Division of the High Court, in which case, appeals are heard by the Court of Appeal; or (b) the Family Courts, in which case, appeals are heard by the High Court.

The Bill amends the Family Justice Act to restrict the right of appeal from the Family Court to the High Court, where any order specified in the new Second Schedule is made by the Family Court. This ensures that the right of appeal is consistent across the lower Courts, namely, the Family Court, District Court and Magistrate's Court.

The Bill also amends the Supreme Court of Judicature Act to restrict the right of appeal from the Family Division of the High Court to the Court of Appeal, such that certain interlocutory orders made by the Family Division of the High Court are either not appealable, or appealable only with leave of that Court or the Court of Appeal. This aligns the appeal regime in the Family Division of the High Court, with that applicable to non-family proceedings in the High Court.

I will now touch on the amendments requiring family proceedings to be commenced in the Family Courts. Currently, the practice is for applications for all family proceedings to be filed in the Family Court, except those proceedings which the Chief Justice has directed to be heard and determined by the Family Division of the High Court.

The Bill makes this current practice law by providing that all family proceedings must be commenced in the Family Court at first instance, except those classes of family proceedings which the Chief Justice has directed to be heard and determined by the Family Division of the High Court. Presently, this exception applies to probate cases involving estates which exceed $5 million in value.

For family proceedings commenced in the Family Court, the current practice has been to transfer contested matters where the assets are above $5 million or, where the case is complex, to the Family Division of the High Court. This practice will continue, subject to any adjustments that may be made by the Chief Justice from time to time.

Lastly, the Bill amends the Family Justice Act and the Supreme Court of Judicature Act to confer certain individuals with protection from personal liability where the acts are done in good faith and do not involve any fraud or wilful misconduct.

Child representatives, appointed to represent the interests of a child, will be protected from personal liability under the Family Justice Act. Registered medical practitioners, psychologists, counsellors, social workers or mental health professionals appointed by a Family Court or the High Court to examine or assess a child or person will be protected from personal liability under the Family Justice Act and Supreme Court of Judicature Act.

The immunity provisions ensure that these professionals, who do not represent any of the parties before the Court and lend their expertise to assist the Court in arriving at a fair and just decision, will be able to perform their duties without fear of legal liability, so long as they act in good faith and without fraud or wilful misconduct.

The Bill also introduces amendments to the Maintenance Orders (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, Reciprocal Enforcement of Commonwealth Judgments Act and Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. As the Family Justice Courts hear proceedings under these three Acts, these Acts will be amended to allow the Family Justice Rules Committee to make Family Justice Rules to prescribe the relevant procedure for proceedings under these Acts.

I will now turn to the amendments arising from the Mental Capacity Act. The Mental Capacity Act was passed in 2008, and it introduced two frameworks to deal with the issues arising from the lack of mental capacity. First, it conferred powers for the Court to appoint deputies to make decisions on behalf of persons who lacked mental capacity. Second, it introduced the Lasting Power of Attorney, a legal instrument which allows individuals to appoint a "donee" to make decisions on their behalf should they lose mental capacity.

The Bill amends nine Acts to include the reference to a donee of a Lasting Power of Attorney under the Mental Capacity Act, where there is already a reference to a deputy. This ensures that donees will have the same standing as deputies under those Acts, when the donor loses mental capacity.

I will next turn to the amendments which allow the designation of other political office holders to hear appeals. Clauses 10, 19, 25, 30 and 32 amend the Immigration Act, Massage Establishments Act, Passports Act, Private Security Industry Act and Public Entertainments and Meetings Act respectively, to empower the Minister for Home Affairs to designate other political officeholders of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) to hear appeals under these Acts in his place. This is consistent with other newly introduced and recently amended laws and facilitates administration by allowing political officeholders to focus on various responsibilities and portfolios within the Ministry.

Let me touch on the amendments to the International Organisations (Immunities and Privileges) Act. In 2015, Singapore signed a Joint Declaration with the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) to allow ITLOS proceedings to be hosted in Singapore in future. ITLOS is an independent judicial body established by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to hear disputes concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS.

Clause 12 of the Bill amends the International Organisations (Immunity and Privileges) Act to empower the Government to apply the Act to relevant international organisations and bring ITLOS within the scope of the Act. This ensures that the Government has the power to grant the legal capacities and to confer the privileges and immunities necessary for ITLOS to carry out its functions in Singapore.

Turning now to the amendments to the Legal Profession Act and the Singapore Academy of Law Act, clauses 16 and 38 of the Bill contain three main sets of amendments to both Acts, namely: (a) to allow the Singapore Institute of Legal Education (SILE) to enact rules for the administration of the Part A course and examinations; (b) to deal with the establishment of the new Law School of SIM University (UniSIM Law School); and (c) to allow the Presiding Judge of the Family Courts and the Presiding Judge of the State Courts to refer matters to the Law Society or the Disciplinary Tribunal.

Clause 16 of the Bill also contains a number of amendments which were proposed by the Law Society of Singapore. Let me explain these amendments in turn.

First is allowing SILE to enact rules for the administration of the Part A Course and Examinations. Since 2015, SILE has taken over the administration of Part A of the Bar Examinations, which is one of the requirements for overseas trained law graduates from overseas scheduled universities to become a qualified person. The amendments to the Legal Profession Act will enable SILE to enact rules to administer and provide for the conditions for entry to the courses, tests and examinations for Part A.

Second, the UniSIM Law School was recently established, and its law degrees will be recognised for the purposes of admission to the Singapore Bar, similar to those from the National University of Singapore (NUS) and the Singapore Management University (SMU). The Legal Profession Act and the Singapore Academy of Law Act will be amended to ensure that UniSIM Law School and the members of its faculty will have the same standing or restrictions as those which are correspondingly applicable to NUS, SMU or their faculty members.

Third, allowing the Presiding Judge of the Family Justice Courts and the Presiding Judge of the State Courts to refer matters to the Law Society or the Disciplinary Tribunal. Presently, any Judge, Judicial Commissioner, Senior Judge or International Judge of the Supreme Court may refer matters touching on the conduct of any regulated legal practitioner to the Law Society or the Disciplinary Tribunal. The Bill amends the Legal Profession Act to confer the same powers on the Presiding Judge of the Family Justice Courts and the Presiding Judge of the State Courts.

Lastly, there are a number of amendments arising from requests made by the Law Society, which I will summarise.

First, the composition of the Council of the Law Society will be amended in order to better reflect the composition of the members of the Law Society who are entitled to vote for the election of the members of the Council.

Second, it will no longer be compulsory for the voting of Council members to be conducted in a physical space via ballot.

Third, the Council will also be allowed to transfer certain amounts from the Compensation Fund to a fund established by the Law Society to purchase or maintain a library, where no grant is made from the Compensation Fund in any year and there is no application for a grant from the Compensation Fund that is pending at the end of that year.

Clause 15 amends the Legal Aid and Advice Act to enable the Legal Aid Bureau not to charge any registration fees for an application for legal aid or advice. This takes out one step in the registration process and makes it administratively more convenient for applicants when they apply for legal aid.

Clause 35 amends the Remote Gambling Act 2014 to enlarge the jurisdiction of the District Court or a Magistrate's Court to try cases and sentence offenders under that Act. This allows the District Court or a Magistrate's Court to hear cases and impose the maximum fine or imprisonment term set out in the Remote Gambling Act 2014, notwithstanding the limits prescribed under the Criminal Procedure Code.

Currently, in contentious proceedings before the Registrar of Trade Marks, there is no avenue for appealing against interlocutory decisions. There can be potentially severe consequences where interlocutory decisions have the effect of bringing proceedings to an end. An example would be when an interlocutory decision leads to a trademark application being treated as withdrawn. Clause 45 amends section 75 of the Trade Marks Act to allow for appeals in such situations.

Clause 50 of the Bill amends the Wills Act to expressly confer our Courts with the power to order rectification of a will upon application of any interested person. The Court may exercise this power where it is satisfied that the will fails to carry out the testator's intentions due to a clerical error or a failure to understand the testator's instructions.

This amendment will allow the Courts to better give effect to the testator's testamentary intention. It arises from a recent decision of the Court of Appeal, which strongly suggested that the power to rectify wills is not available to our Courts.

In conclusion, Mdm Speaker, I beg to move.

Question proposed.

Mdm Speaker: Ms Sylvia Lim.

4.18 pm

Ms Sylvia Lim (Aljunied): Mdm Speaker, I would like to seek some clarifications on the amendments being made to the Wills Act, the Government Proceedings Act and the Legal Profession Act. I declare that I am a lawyer with a Practising Certificate in force.

First, the Wills Act. Clause 50 of the Bill will introduce a new provision to the Wills Act. The new section 28 will allow a Court to order that a will be rectified if the Court is satisfied that the will is expressed in such a way that it fails to carry out the testator's intention due to a clerical error or a failure to understand the testator's instructions, or both. This provision seems to be influenced by legislation in other countries, such as the United Kingdom (UK) Administration of Justice Act 1982, which contains a section 20 similar in wording to the Bill. I have noted that an NUS law academic, Assoc Prof Barry Crown, had recommended that our Wills Act be amended to include such a statutory right to rectify a will to bring more certainty to this area of the law. This is because a 2014 case decided by the UK Supreme Court had suggested that the courts had a common law right to rectify wills even if there is no statutory right, and it is probably more prudent to legislate the right to make clear what powers the court should have.

Nevertheless, the UK case in question, Marley vs Rawlings, also raises questions about how wide the power under the new provision should be. In that case, a husband and wife made mirror wills to leave their entire estate to a non-family member. But each spouse signed the other spouse's will by mistake. Clearly, the lawyer's office was at fault in not checking that the wills were executed by the proper party. What the court did in that case was to exercise the statutory power under the Administration of Justice Act to rectify the wills by replacing wholesale the words of each will with the text of the other spouse's will. This is way beyond the usual understanding of rectification being the adding or omitting of certain words only. Is the Ministry intending the Court to have such a wide rectification power?

I would also like a confirmation about the implication of such a provision on lawyers who have been negligent in drafting wills or in will execution. How will this provision save them from being liable for negligence? Will clients be expected to go to Court first to try to rectify the will before suing lawyers for negligence? This would put a heavy burden on clients.

Next, the Government Proceedings Act. The Government Proceedings Act enables the Government to sue and to be sued. Clause 9 of the Bill amends section 29 of the Act to provide that, in such lawsuits, it is possible that the Court can certify that legal costs for more than two Government lawyers may be payable. This is a change from the current position where the maximum number of Government lawyers a litigant may have to pay for is two. According to the explanatory note, the change is to bring the position in line with that in other civil suits and family matters. The current position in other civil suits and family matters is that the Court may order a litigant who loses to pay legal costs for more than two solicitors on the winning side. In order for such a Court order to be obtained, the Court must find that more than two lawyers were reasonably required to handle the case due to factors, such as the complexity of the case or novel points of law being raised.

Madam, I have concerns about the Government taking such a position as the prospect of a very heavy legal burden in legal costs could have a dampening or even crushing effect on persons involved in suits against the Government. As it currently stands, anyone who is thinking of suing the Government or defending a legal action by the Government is aware that if the action is lost, he would likely have to pay legal costs to the Government. This is on top of funding his own lawyers to meet the fierce challenges thrown by the Government's legal team, whose limitless resources include having the entire Legal Service and Civil Service at its disposal. Not many individuals or entities have the financial resources needed to take the Government to Court or to defend a suit by the Government.

I believe the Government should consider taking a broader view on this matter and keep the current provision of capping its claim for legal costs to no more than two legal officers. After all, the purpose of the Government Proceedings Act is to enable the Government to sue and to be sued. If the costs of suing or being sued by the Government are too high, people will surrender. There must not be a signal sent that the Government is trying to use the prospect of crushing legal costs to deter or wear down those who may wish to sue the Government or to defend Government lawsuits vigorously.

Lastly, Madam, the Legal Profession Act. Clause 16 of the Bill makes various amendments to the Legal Profession Act. My query relates to clauses 16(t) and (u) which deal with the disciplinary proceedings against lawyers who have misconducted themselves. Under clauses 16(t) and (u), the Minister may make rules to exempt lawyers from disciplinary action if they had given gratifications or remuneration to those who procure business for themselves or other lawyers under circumstances to be prescribed in the rules. The act of giving gratifications for procuring legal services is generally abhorrent to the profession. What sorts of exemptions are being contemplated and under what circumstances?

Mdm Speaker: Mr Louis Ng.

4.24 pm

Mr Louis Ng Kok Kwang (Nee Soon): Madam, I stand in support of this Bill. However, I have two brief clarifications to be made.

Firstly, the proposed amendment to the Community Mediation Centres Act removes the requirement for the Director of a Community Mediation Centre (CMC) to prepare and submit to the Minister an annual report on the activities, operations and use of the CMC. Consequently, this removes the requirement for the Minister to lay that report before Parliament.

Based on my house visits and Meet-the-People Sessions, I sense an increasing number of neighbourly disputes. As such, I value the work of the CMC, which provides a neutral platform for residents to resolve relational, social and community disputes amicably without resorting to litigation. Through community mediation, the CMC aims to cultivate a more harmonious, civil and gracious society.

I also expect that the CMC will be facing an increasing amount of work. As such, I believe the report we are proposing to do away with, would be useful and crucial in allowing us to further detect issues in our community, detect trends, see what has worked and what has not and chart the way forward.

Can the Senior Minister of State clarify why we are proposing this amendment and, if amended, will there be other forms of reports from the CMC and will these be made available to the public?

Secondly, there are proposed amendments to the Legal Profession Act, which involves the recategorisation of junior, middle and senior categories of lawyers based on their number of years in practice. Currently, junior lawyers are practitioners with less than seven years of practice, middle category lawyers are those with between seven and 12 years of practice, and lawyers with more than 12 years of practice are senior lawyers.

Based on statistics obtained from the Law Society of Singapore, as at 31 August 2015, there are only 423 middle category lawyers, as compared to 1,909 junior lawyers and 2,502 senior lawyers.

It would appear that the proposed changes to the middle category of lawyers from five to 15 years, instead of the current seven to 12 years, will go some way towards evening out the numbers of lawyers within the various categories.

Can the Senior Minister of State share the possible underlying causes which have resulted in the legal profession seeing a shrinking middle category of lawyers and whether sufficient steps are being taken to address this concern within the legal profession?

Mdm Speaker, my request for the Government to clarify the above notwithstanding, I support the Bill.

Mdm Speaker: Mr Lim Biow Chuan.

4.26 pm

Mr Lim Biow Chuan (Mountbatten): Mdm Speaker, I rise in support of the Bill. This Bill seeks to make several amendments to about 51 Acts, most of which are mainly technical in nature. Several amendments to the Act involve dealings by Government authorities with a person without mental capacity either through his Deputy or through his donee appointed under a Lasting Power of Attorney. Some of the amendments also allow the Minister to designate either the Second Minister, the Minister of State or Parliamentary Secretary to hear appeals.

I wish to raise two queries for the Senior Minister of State. Like my hon colleague Mr Louis Ng, I have a query about clause 3 of the Bill where section 21 of the Community Mediation Centres Act is repealed.

From an accountability point of view, when a Community Mediation Centre is established by the Government and funded by the Government, and the Director and staff are deemed public servants, surely the Director should continue to provide a report to the Minister. This is to allow proper accountability of civil servants to the Executive arm of the Government. I am also of the view that the Minister ought to continue to lay the report before Parliament and account for the activities and efficacy of the Community Mediation Centres. So, could I ask the Senior Minister of State to clarify the rationale for repealing section 21 of the Community Mediation Centres Act?

The next clarification required is on the amendment to the Work Injury Compensation Act. Mdm Speaker, there was a recent case involving an engineer who had lost mental capacity following an accident. His next-of-kin had purportedly accepted compensation under the Work Injury Compensation Act but, subsequently, his brother, who was appointed as a deputy under the Mental Capacity Act, then proceeded to sue the employer for damages under common law instead of claiming for compensation under the Work Injury Compensation Act.

I note that the amendment to this Act states that section 22(2) of the Act has been deleted and the following has been substituted. Let me cite the section 22(2) which has been substituted. It says: "Where it appears to the Commissioner that compensation or interest is payable to an employee under this Act and the employee lacks capacity within the meaning of the Mental Capacity Act, before such payment is made, it is lawful for the Commissioner to receive and pay the compensation or interest to any one or more of the dependants of the employee for the benefit of the employee, even if there is no donee of a Lasting Power of Attorney which is granted by the employee under the Mental Capacity Act and under which the employee confers on the donee authority to receive the compensation or interest, and even if there is no deputy who is appointed or deemed to be appointed for the employee by the Court under the Mental Capacity Act and who is conferred power to receive compensation or interest".

This section seems to suggest that the Commissioner of Labour continues to have the power to receive and pay compensation to any one or more of dependants even if there was no donee, even if there is no deputy appointed.

A dependant under this Act is quite rightly crafted and it means the wife, husband, parent, grandparents, stepfather, stepmother, child, grandchild, stepchild, brother, sister, half-brother, half-sister, stepbrother, or stepsister, irrespective of whether that person is actually dependent on the employee's earnings or not.

If I may ask the Senior Minister of State, in light of the recent case in the High Court in April 2015, Justice Quentin Loh had made a decision and, in that decision, he had said that "In my judgement, the next-of-kin of a mentally incapacitated employee do not have, without more, the requisite capacity to make a claim under the Act on behalf of the employee. Only a person duly appointed by the Court under the Mental Capacity Act will have the legal capacity to do so".

I am sorry if this House is struggling to understand what I am saying because this is quite legalistic. That was a High Court case made in April 2015 and, in March this year, the Court of Appeal had affirmed that particular decision. In light of what the Courts are saying, which is that only someone who is either a donee appointed under a Lasting Power of Attorney or someone who is appointed by the Court under the Mental Capacity Act as a deputy would have the power to make such a claim.

Could the Senior Minister of State clarify who would be the rightful person to make a claim to the Commissioner of Labour and whether that decision made by the next-of-kin or dependant is final and binding on the employee's dependant because the law and the case law seem to say something differently? I think it would be useful for the Senior Minister of State to clarify that. With that, Mdm Speaker, I support the Bill.

Mdm Speaker: Senior Minister of State Indranee Rajah.

4.32 pm

Ms Indranee Rajah: Mdm Speaker, I thank the Members for their comments and for their support of the Bill.

Mr Lim Biow Chuan and Mr Louis Ng asked about the amendment to the Community Mediation Act and the removal of the need for the CMC to submit an Annual Report.

Mdm Speaker, we continually review our laws to see if our processes are still relevant or if the objectives of those processes can be achieved by other means. In this case, the CMC is a department of the Ministry of Law (MinLaw), which is held accountable through its accounts and budget estimates which are available in the annual Budget Book which is presented to Parliament. However, we do agree that information on the activities and the operations of the CMC should be available to the public. Insofar, as information and statistics relating to the CMC are concerned, they will continue to be available on the CMC website, and this includes statistics on the number of mediations conducted, CMC's success rate and the types of disputes handled by CMC.

Mr Lim Biow Chuan raised two queries on the amendments to the Work Injury Compensation Act (WICA): first, whether next-of-kin who are not donees or deputies may submit claims to the Commissioner of Labour; and second, what happens if the Commissioner of Labour errs in his assessment as to whether there is a donee or deputy.

I should clarify at the outset that the purpose of this particular amendment to WICA in this Bill is simply to ensure that donees have the same standing as deputies under the Act. So, in other words, wherever you see deputy, the donee will have the same standing. This particular amendment is not intended to address the larger question, which is whether other third parties are entitled to file claims or receive compensation under WICA. There has been a recent decision by the Court of Appeal, as Mr Lim Biow Chuan has alluded to, on this wider issue, and the Ministry of Manpower (MOM) is studying the implications of this decision. So, it would be premature for me to make any remarks on that at this moment. MOM would see what implication the Court of Appeal's decision has.

With regard to the amendments to the Legal Profession Act, Mr Louis Ng queried the possible underlying causes leading to the shrinking middle category of lawyers and what steps were being taken to address this concern. In May 2013, the report of the 4th Committee on the Supply of Lawyers identified three main factors as causing or contributing to attrition among legal professionals. They were unsustainable work practices, unsuitability of the individual legal professional for legal work and structural problems within law firms.

To address this issue of attrition, the 4th Committee recommended that the two existing local law schools should consider a more targeted selection of law school applicants and help prepare young graduates early for the realities of practice, for example, by expanding clinical legal programmes currently offered. And to address the work-life balance concerns by providing flexibility in legal practice, for example, allowing flexible schedules or different career tracks for lawyers and by providing greater support and welfare, for example, by providing lawyers with tools to create a better working environment.

Tackling these issues will take time and require a concerted effort on the part of the law schools and the legal profession as a whole. Steps are being taken to look into this. The Law Society is presently conducting a study to look into how junior lawyers can be encouraged to stay in practice which, in turn, will help the number of lawyers in this middle category. The findings of their study should be available later in the year.

There are also longer-term initiatives which have taken these concerns into account. For example, the third law school at UniSIM will select its students based not just on academic ability but also aptitude, attitude and interest in the practice of family and criminal law. Their curriculum will be practice-oriented, culminating in a six-month practicum training, so that students will be better prepared and equipped for the realities of practice. So, this will deal, to some extent, with the second problem identified by the 4th Committee, in relation to the unsuitability of individuals for legal work.

I should also highlight that the lawyers represented by the original middle category are more limited, compared to the junior and senior categories. It represents five cohorts of lawyers: those between seven and 12 years of standing. In comparison, the junior and senior categories represent lawyers under seven years' standing and not less than 12 years' standing respectively, which is a larger number of cohorts. In addition, the statistics relate to the number of lawyers who remain in private practice in law firms. Some of those who leave private practice remain in the legal profession as in-house counsel in the private sector, or by joining the public sector or academia. Others move into other industries, such as investment banking, fund management, private equity, where their legal skills come in useful, and they continue to make a meaningful contribution to the wider economy.

I believe Ms Sylvia Lim has asked a number of questions, the first relating to the Wills Act and the scope of the power to be given to the Courts. What is driving this amendment was the Singapore Court of Appeal's decision in Cheo Yeo and Associates and another where the Court of Appeal held obiter that the remedy of rectification of wills is not available in Singapore. The Court of Appeal's decision strongly suggested that where a will fails to embody the intentions of the testator due to a clerical error or a failure to understand the testator's intention, the Singapore Courts do not have the power to correct the error in the will.

This particular amendment was intended to address that and to give the Court the power to correct a clerical error or to give effect to the testator's intention where there was a failure to understand that intention.

With respect to costs, that is really just intended to bring the position with respect to the Government in alignment with that for other parties in normal civil proceedings, and the costs remains at the discretion of the Courts. It is not intended to give the Government any additional power but just to bring it in line with other normal civil proceedings.

Mdm Speaker: Ms Sylvia Lim.

4.40 pm

Ms Sylvia Lim: Madam, I have three clarifications for the Senior Minister of State. First, she did not touch on my query on the Legal Profession Act amendments, clause 16(t) and (u). What are the circumstances contemplated under which the Minister would prescribe rules to exempt lawyers who had, on the face of it, committed some misconduct, according to what is raised in the Bill?

The second clarification concerns the Wills Act. The Senior Minister of State mentioned that it was spurred on by the recent Court of Appeal's case. But I would like her to confirm whether the inspiration for the wording came from the UK and whether she is aware of the case which I cited, Marley vs Rawlings, which interpreted that provision very widely and whether it is the intention of the Government to give the Court this kind of width of rectification power.

My third clarification concerns the cost of Government proceedings. The Senior Minister of State mentioned that this does not give the Government additional powers, but the fact is that under the existing section 29 of the Government Proceedings Act (GPA), the cost claimable is limited to two. So, this amendment would actually give an allowance for the Court to certify more than two lawyers' costs being payable. It is a change to the legal position, as far as GPA is concerned. I have my grave reservations about this clause for the reasons I stated earlier.

Mdm Speaker: Senior Minster of State.

Ms Indranee Rajah: Madam, with respect to the costs, as I had indicated, the idea was to just bring it in line with what is available to other civil parties, that means, even where the Government is not involved. So, it is not intended to be used in an oppressive manner but really where if costs are incurred, it gives the Court the discretion to allow costs for more than two counsel, if the Court really thinks that this is an appropriate case to do so. So, the safeguard there is that it lies in the hands of the Courts.

With respect to the question on the Wills Act, I am not able to comment if there was a specific reference to the UK case. What I can say is that we had specific regard to our Court of Appeal's case and, the intention, as I had indicated, was to make sure that our Courts have the power to rectify a clerical error or our Courts have the power to give effect to the testator's intention. That, really, is, as I have stated, the intent behind this.

With respect to the third question, I think that the Minister would have to look at it on a case-by-case basis. I am not setting out any specific guidelines in this instance. But basically, when the Minister looks at it, he would have due regard as to what cases should be exempted.

Mdm Speaker: Ms Sylvia Lim.

Ms Sylvia Lim: Madam, I need to clarify further with the Senior Minister of State on the issue of cost. The point here, of course, is that when you have the Government on one side of a legal proceeding and perhaps a private individual or private entity on the other side, you are dealing with an inequality of resources in most cases. The Government, with its Legal Officers, having the whole Civil Service there, the prospect of a litigant going into litigation with the Government and sustaining that litigation, I think it is already prohibitive to most people.

So, my question is, why is the Government not able to take a broader view, you may want to say, even a magnanimous view or perhaps a view from the accountability standpoint that, look, we are not going to allow cost to be an inhibition or prohibitive factor when the litigant decides whether to continue with litigation or to commence litigation with the Government or not.

I am sure the Government does not need the money. So, the question is, why do you need to change that position to allow for more than two lawyers' costs to be claimed? Why can the Government not limit its position to two?

Mdm Speaker: Senior Minister of State.

Ms Indranee Rajah: Madam, it is not always the case that somebody who brings the proceedings against the Government is impecunious. I just want to flag that as a first point. So, there are any number of parties with different situations and they may have different financial means.

The second point as to why it is necessary or why should the Government not limit itself, the answer is that there is no one size fits all when it comes to the issue of costs. There will be some instances where a lot of work is required and where it is very complex, and where there will be others where it is much more straightforward and simpler.

At the end of the day, it is really for the Court to decide. And our Courts, in this matter, I believe, are objective and fair. The idea is that if it is a case that really a lot of work was incurred, and it appears to the Court that it is fair and just to award costs for more than two counsel in such a situation, the Court can do so; but if the Court, having taken into account the circumstances of the case, feels that it is not equitable to do so, then it will be up to the Court. So, at the end of the day, I think it rests with the Court to do the right thing, with respect to costs.

Mdm Speaker: Mr Dennis Tan.

Mr Dennis Tan Lip Fong (Non-Constituency Member): Madam, just a point of clarification for the Senior Minister of State. Regarding the case law of the UK case that is cited by Ms Sylvia Lim, I just want to ask for the Senior Minister of State's clarification. I am not sure I understand the Senior Minister of State's answer, but I think for judicial guidance, if it is not the intention of the Government that the UK Supreme Court decision is intended to be applied, then perhaps the Government can state its position now so that the Courts will be able to follow accordingly when the Bill is passed.

Mdm Speaker: Senior Minister of State.

Ms Indranee Rajah: Madam, I thank Mr Dennis Tan for his clarification. I am sorry if I was not sufficiently clear just now. First, it was prompted by our Court of Appeal's decision, but when the Government drafted these provisions, the Government did look at the UK case and some of the wordings were based on that. That is as far as I can go. Obviously, when our Courts apply it, and when they look at other precedents, our Courts will have to give effect to the law as our Courts see correct. What I do not want to do, is to suggest in any way that our Courts are bound by another court's decision.

So, the short answer to the Member's question of whether we looked at the UK case in question, the answer is yes. But as to what was it that prompted this particular amendment, it was our Court of Appeal's decision.

Mdm Speaker: Ms Sylvia Lim.

Ms Sylvia Lim: Madam, I do not want to belabour the point, but I would just like to record my reservation about clause 9. Notwithstanding what the Senior Minister of State has said about the Courts being a safeguard, I do feel that the Government could have taken a different view to make it clear that it would not want to be seen to be, in a sense, using legal cost as a deterrent or prohibitive factor when it comes to litigation with the Government. So, I want to record my reservation about that clause. I note that the Bill is very broad-ranging, and I will not oppose the Bill, but I have grave reservations about that clause.

Mdm Speaker: Senior Minister of State.

Ms Indranee Rajah: Madam, I think what I can say is this: when this Government is engaged in litigation, whether it is brought by somebody else or whether the Government has reasons to initiate it, the Government does its best to be fair, objective and rational about it. So, it would not be our approach to use costs to be oppressive, but to seek costs where we think that it is fairly and justly incurred and to leave it to the Court to make the appropriate decision on the quantum of costs to be awarded and the number of counsels to be taken into account.

Mdm Speaker: Mr Low Thia Khiang.

Mr Low Thia Khiang (Aljunied): Mdm Speaker, on the same point made by Ms Sylvia Lim on clause 9, I am wondering whether this will raise the perception of Singaporeans that the Government is using the cost to intimidate Singaporeans in bringing any legal case against the Government. So, you have no choice whether you think you are being wrongly or rightly prosecuted, but because you look at the cost, you say, "Oh let's forget about it, let's pay."

So, is that a good thing for Singapore as a society? That the people who feel somehow victimised by the Government are intimidated by the cost; you do not know how much the Court is going to decide. In the past, you said, "Okay, it is limited to two lawyers", but now, there will be more. So, the sense of intimidation of Singaporeans, I think, does not spell well for the future of Singapore.

Mdm Speaker: Senior Minister of State.

Ms Indranee Rajah: Mdm Speaker, I said it before, once; I said it before, twice; and I will now say it again a third time. It is not the intention of the Government to be using costs to intimidate anyone. As I have indicated, when the Government has to defend a matter or pursue a matter, it will do so after having taken advice, doing so rationally and doing so if it thinks that it is the right course of action. That is the first thing when it comes to taking proceedings.

With respect to the amount of costs that a person may face, when a person brings proceedings against the Government, that person would, no doubt, be legally advised, and also have an indication of the amount of costs that would be incurred. And it should not be forgotten that if costs ought to be awarded against that party, it does mean that that party, at the end of the day, ultimately failed against the Government. Meaning that, that case should not have been brought in the first place.

And the final safeguard is really the Court. It is in the hands of the Court to ensure that the amounts of costs that are awarded are fair and just. And as I have said, this Government will pursue a course that is reasonable and rational and that the costs sought are commensurate with the claim. So, it is not the intention of the Government to intimidate anyone.

Mdm Speaker: Mr Low, I must stop this clarification, because you have made your point, Ms Sylvia Lim has made the same point, Mr Dennis Tan has made the same point, clarification sought. Senior Minister of State Indranee Rajah has already made her replies. I do not think there is going to be any further development by continuing with the clarification.

Question put, and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House.

The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. – [Ms Indranee Rajah].

Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed.