Criminal Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

1.23 pm

The Senior Minister of State for Home Affairs (Ms Sim Ann) (for the Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs): Mr Speaker, on behalf of the Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs, I move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time".

Sir, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has been reviewing and amending the Penal Code over the years to ensure that the law remains fit for purpose. We made major amendments in 2019 and 2021. We have since completed another round of review, which has culminated in this Bill. The amendments in the Bill cover six themes.

First, increase deterrence against scams by introducing caning as a punishment, while re-calibrating its use in other offences.

Second, enhance measures to address the increasing misuse of technology to produce and circulate abusive materials.

Third, enhance protection for minors and vulnerable victims.

Fourth, better protect public servants and public service workers.

Fifth, ensure adequate penalties for older youth offenders.

Sixth, recalibrate the requirements on workers and dealers of precious metals.

The first category of amendments will enhance deterrence against scams by introducing caning for scammers and scam mules, while re-calibrating its use in other offences. With your permission, Mr Speaker, may I ask the Clerks to distribute an Annex?

Mr Speaker: Go ahead. [A handout was distributed to hon Members. Please refer to Annex 1.]

Ms Sim Ann: Members may also access these materials through the MP@SGPARL app.

Sir, scams are by far the most prevalent crime type in Singapore today. Between 2020 and the first half of 2025, there were about 190,000 cases reported, with losses amounting to about $3.7 billion. These are staggering numbers. They constitute 60% of all reported crimes, and the losses are more than three and a half times the cost of building Woodlands Health Campus.

MHA has been working with other agencies and the private sector on measures to counter the scourge of scams. Earlier this year, Dr Tan Wu Meng suggested in this House that MHA also consider introducing caning for scams, to better deter and punish those who commit scams or facilitate the commission of scams.

We have reviewed the suggestion and agree with it. Members may refer to Part A of the Annex for the proposed amendments.

We will introduce mandatory caning for scammers. Clause 64 of the Bill amends section 420 of the Penal Code so that offenders who commit scams, defined as cheating mainly by means of remote communication, will be punished with at least six strokes of the cane. We will also introduce discretionary caning in section 420 of the Penal Code for serious cases of cheating.

We will take an equally firm stance against scam syndicates. These syndicates mobilise significant resources to conduct and profit from scams and have the highest level of culpability. Clauses 37 and 38 of the Bill introduce new offences in the Organised Crime Act so that members of and recruiters for scam syndicates will be subject to mandatory caning of at least six strokes, if they knew that the organised criminal group was a scam syndicate.

Beyond dealing with scammers and scam syndicates, another key strategy is to deny them the tools that enable them to conduct scams. These scam enablers include SIM cards, Singpass credentials and payment accounts. Crippling the supply of scam enablers would significantly increase the difficulty for scammers to successfully conduct or profit from scams in Singapore.

We will therefore introduce discretionary caning for those who facilitate scams. These are offenders who either knew or had reasonable grounds to believe that the scam enabler they provide, would be used in the commission of, or would be used in the facilitation of, a crime. Clauses 10, 11, 19, 20 and 30 to 34 of the Bill introduce discretionary caning for certain offences under the Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act, the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act, and the Computer Misuse Act, in this regard.

For upstream enablers such as Singpass credentials and SIM cards, discretionary caning will broadly apply to two categories of cases.

The first category is where the offender intended or knew, depending on the offence, that the enabler would be used to commit or facilitate the commission of a scam.

The second category covers cases where the enabler is actually used to commit or facilitate the commission of a scam, even if the offender did not intend or know this. For the second category of offenders, discretionary caning will apply if the offender fails to prove that he or she had taken reasonable steps to ensure that the enabler would not be used to commit or to facilitate the commission of a scam.

For downstream enablers such as payment accounts, discretionary caning will apply if the criminal proceeds laundered involve benefits from a scam and the offender had failed to take reasonable steps to ensure that the account is not used to launder scam proceeds.

Let me assure Members that genuine victims who are found to have been deceived into providing a scam enabler would not be affected by the introduction of caning as a punishment. The existing offences do not penalise genuine victims in the first place. The Ministry will continue monitoring the scams situation closely and will further increase our penalties if needed. Mr Speaker, in Mandarin.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] The Government continues to place strong emphasis on combating scams. In the first half of 2025, there were almost 20,000 cases and almost half a billion dollars lost. While these numbers have decreased compared with the first half of 2024, they are still significant.

In this Bill, we are proposing to introduce mandatory caning for scammers, as well as members and recruiters of scam syndicates. We will also introduce discretionary caning for those who facilitate scams through providing enablers, such as their Singpass credentials, SIM cards or bank accounts. If we can deny scammers access to such enablers, it will be much more difficult for them to carry out successful scams and we can better protect Singaporeans.

(In English): Sir, even as we introduce caning for scams, we also intend to recalibrate the use of caning in other offences.

Today, there are 96 offences that attract discretionary caning and 65 which attract mandatory caning. My Ministry has conducted a review, to ensure that caning is only applied where there is a need. As Members can see from Part B of the Annex, we are proposing to amend eight provisions to remove caning entirely and in the case of vandalism, to remove caning for a subset of the offence.

As our societal context and crime situation have evolved, caning may no longer be necessary in some offences. These are generally offences that do not involve intentional harm to a person nor cause significant harm to the public and for which we assess that the other penalties are adequate. Clauses 41, 61, 67 and 69 to 76 of the Bill make the necessary amendments.

For 15 provisions reflected in Part C of the Annex, we propose to give the Courts the discretion to decide whether to impose caning, rather than to require caning in all cases. These are given effect by clauses 15 to 17, 40, 54 to 60, 62, 65, 66 and 72 to 74 of the Bill.

For avoidance of doubt, more serious cases should still result in caning, even as we make these amendments to change mandatory caning to discretionary caning.

Let me illustrate with vandalism. Clauses 72 to 74 of the Bill amend the Vandalism Act so that mandatory caning is replaced with discretionary caning for vandalism of public property and designated private property. The latter category includes private property that is of national, cultural or religious significance and any other private property that the Minister may prescribe – in short, primarily property that has public significance or serves a public function. For these vandalism offences, we will leave it to the Court to decide whether caning should be imposed on a case-by-case basis.

This approach maintains a firm stance against vandalism generally, while allowing the punishment to be calibrated based on the facts of each case. The Court may consider factors like the extent of property damage, the vandal's motivations, the degree of premeditation, and the impact on public services and functions.

Similarly, in other offences which only involve preparatory acts or do not require an element of harm to be present before the offence is made out, we have assessed that discretionary caning is adequate. The Courts can still impose caning in serious cases where real harm results or there are other aggravating factors. This includes certain offences under the Corrosive, Explosive Substances and Offensive Weapons Act, as well as attempted robbery and making preparation for gang-robbery under sections 393 and 399 of the Penal Code.

Let me be clear. The amendments do not signal any softening in our stance against crime. The large majority of offences which attract caning today, including serious sexual and violence offences, will continue to attract caning as a punishment.

Sir, the second category of amendments ensures that our criminal laws keep pace with technology.

First, we are introducing amendments to deal with large-scale circulation of obscene objects, which include sexual images or videos. Members will recall the case of the chat group SG Nasi Lemak, in which over 44,000 members circulated and shared obscene materials involving women and girls.

The Government's view is that the current penalties are not adequate. Technology allows obscene materials to be shared with tens of thousands of recipients, through a single key stroke. The harm is amplified, many times over. We cannot begin to imagine the distress suffered by a young girl whose images are sent to thousands of prying eyes. And because these materials can be sent to so many people, it is impossible to take them out of circulation entirely. They will always be lurking somewhere, threatening to resurface. These victims may never have peace of mind again.

Clause 42 of the Bill therefore introduces enhanced penalties for offences under section 292(1) of the Penal Code where obscene materials are circulated by electronic means to 10 or more persons. This threshold takes reference from other provisions where the involvement of 10 or more persons introduces a public dimension. For example, under the Societies Act, the threshold size of a group that must be registered as a society is 10 persons. The maximum imprisonment term for such offences will be increased from three months to two years. If the obscene material depicts a minor below the age of 18, the penalty will be mandatory imprisonment of up to four years, a doubling of the current maximum of two years' imprisonment. These enhanced penalties will also apply to cumulative transmissions to 10 or more persons in total, to close the potential loophole of accused persons sending separate messages to single individuals, but to a large number of individuals.

In addition, clause 43 of the Bill introduces a new offence to target those who set up or manage online locations where obscene materials are circulated, including administrators of chat groups or channels, blogs, or accounts on video-sharing platforms. The offence is scoped to offenders who intend that the online location be used to circulate obscene materials. It will not cover, for example, platforms whose online locations are used in this way contrary to their original intent or administrators whose chat groups are spammed by bad actors.

Given the seriousness of such conduct, the offence is punishable with a fine and mandatory imprisonment of up to five years, or seven years if the obscene material circulated depicts a minor below the age of 18.

Second, we also intend to deal with the problem of images and videos generated by the use of artificial intelligence (AI).

Let me begin with intimate images or recordings. By virtue of section 377BE(5) of the Penal Code, our criminal laws already cover sexually explicit deepfakes, where an image or recording is altered to depict the victim. It is already an offence to possess or gain access to, or to distribute or threaten to distribute such sexual deepfakes without consent.

However, generative AI now makes it possible to generate entirely synthetic images or videos of a person, without making use of a pre-existing image or recording. Clauses 50(a) and (b) of the Bill update the relevant provision to get ahead of this development.

Clause 49(d) makes clear that it is an offence to produce any intimate image without consent. Today, such offenders would already be liable for the offence of possessing or gaining access to an intimate image, but we want to make criminal liability clearer as far as production of the intimate image is concerned.

Clause 50(c) makes explicit what has always been our intent that for the offence of threatening to distribute an intimate image, it is not necessary to prove that the intimate image exists. Such threats can cause serious harm even if the intimate image does not exist, especially now that it is easier to generate such images using AI.

Sir, let me turn to child abuse materials. When the relevant offences were introduced in 2019, it was always the Government's intention to criminalise realistic computer-generated child abuse material, even if the material depicts a fictional child. The offences should not require proof that an actual child was involved, for example, that an image of an actual child was used as part of the training data for the AI used to generate the material. This is both to reduce the roadblocks to enforcement and to reduce the supply of such materials, which contributes to a vicious cycle of abuse. Clause 53 of the Bill amends the relevant definitions to put these points beyond doubt.

Mr Speaker, the third category of amendments builds on past efforts to protect minors and vulnerable victims.

First, clause 42 of the Bill extends enhanced penalties for offences relating to obscene materials under section 292 of the Penal Code to obscene materials depicting minors below the age of 18, up from the current threshold of 16. This will also bring us in line with the United Nations' Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography.

Second, we propose to strengthen the sexual grooming offences under sections 376E and 376EA of the Penal Code. Today, the offences generally only apply if the groomer and victim meet or intend to meet in Singapore for the sexual acts. There have, however, been cases where sexual grooming charges could not be preferred because the sexual acts were done or intended to be done overseas.

Clauses 47 and 48 of the Bill will amend the sexual grooming offences so that they will also apply to sexual acts intended to be done overseas, as long as the acts would constitute an offence if done in Singapore. To prevent overreach, this will only apply where either the groomer or victim travels from a location in Singapore to meet overseas. The amendments also increase the penalties for sexual grooming offences.

Third, clauses 45 and 46 of the Bill will increase the penalties for fatal abuse of vulnerable persons under sections 304B and 304C of the Penal Code to life imprisonment, or up to 30 years' imprisonment if life imprisonment is not imposed.

We are introducing life imprisonment because there is strong public interest to deter abuse of vulnerable persons. Often, they are voiceless, they cannot protect themselves, and they depend on others for even their basic needs. And so, when they are abused to the point of death, it is especially heinous and must be met with the full force of the law.

Take the tragic case of the young boy who was scalded to death by his parents a few years ago. In 2022, his mother was convicted of murder while his father was convicted of voluntarily causing grievous hurt by means of a heated substance. Both were sentenced to life imprisonment. Although the father's charge was not for causing death but only endangering life, the Court of Appeal found that life imprisonment was justified given the cruelty and severity of the abuse. The Government agrees with the Court's decision. Moving forward, similar cases may be prosecuted under sections 304B and 304C of the Penal Code instead as these provisions were specifically introduced to overcome certain hurdles in prosecuting cases of fatal abuse. The amendments will ensure that life imprisonment will be available as a sentencing option in such cases.

The fourth category of amendments addresses protections for public servants and public service workers.

Many public servants and public service workers are at risk of being doxed in the course of performing their duties, that is, having their identity information published with the intent to cause harassment, alarm or distress. Doxxing can impede or deter them from discharging their duties objectively and impartially, and when accompanied by falsehoods, can also undermine public confidence in our institutions.

First, we will strengthen the protections for public servants and public service workers under section 6 of the Protection from Harassment Act (POHA). Today, this offence requires proof that the victim actually suffered harm, alarm or distress. Clause 68 of the Bill removes this requirement. All harassment of public servants or public service workers in the line of duty is unacceptable. For the purposes of securing a conviction, it should not matter whether or to what degree the victim experienced harassment, alarm or distress.

The extent of harm experienced by the victim should, of course, still be a factor for sentencing.

Second, clause 25 of the Bill introduces a new offence in the Miscellaneous Offences Act to criminalise the doxxing of a public servant, when accompanied by a falsehood about the public servant that the offender knows or has reason to believe is false. Such conduct is especially harmful because not only are the individual public servants adversely affected, but trust in our public institutions is undermined. Section 7 of the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) today already criminalises the publishing of a falsehood if that specific falsehood diminishes public confidence, but this new offence will not have that requirement of needing to show diminution of public confidence.

To be clear, neither of these amendments prevents members of the public from expressing legitimate feedback or criticism, including publicly. Such feedback, expressed constructively and through the appropriate channels, can help us improve our service delivery and staff training. There will also not be any offence disclosed if the feedback is based on genuinely mistaken facts, since the offence requires that the person know or have reason to believe that a statement of fact is false.

Mr Speaker, the next category of amendments in this Bill ensures that adequate penalties, including reformative training, imprisonment and caning, can continue to be imposed on older youth offenders who are repeat offenders or who commit serious crimes, and whose cases are heard outside the Youth Court.

In 2019, the Government moved the amendments to the Children and Young Persons Act (CYPA) to expand the jurisdiction of the Youth Court to all offenders below the age of 18, up from the previous age of 16. The policy intent, however, was to ensure that if youth offenders between the ages of 16 and 18 commit serious offences or repeat offences, their cases could be transferred out of the Youth Court to the High Court and State Courts. In those cases, it was always intended that the High Court and State Courts will continue to have the full suite of powers to deal with the offenders. However, when preparing to operationalise the CYPA amendments, we identified certain provisions in the earlier round of amendments which are not fully aligned with the policy intent.

Clauses 3 to 7, and 23 of the Bill straighten out these provisions and ensure that the policy intent is given its full effect. In particular, it ensures that reformative training, imprisonment and caning are available in such cases. To be clear, the amendments will not require the Court to impose these penalties, nor otherwise limit the Court's discretion in sentencing. The Court can still, upon a close examination of the facts, impose a rehabilitative sentence.

The final set of amendments, Sir, in clauses 26 to 28 of the Bill pertains to workers and dealers of precious metals. The amendments to the Miscellaneous Offences Act will increase the waiting period before such workers or dealers can work on or deal with goods sold to them, from three days to five. This will give the Police more time to trace and recover stolen goods.

At the same time, we are reducing the scope of the requirement. This waiting period will only apply to the worker or dealer who first receives goods from a customer; and not the worker or dealer who receives the goods from another dealer. Stolen goods usually come from a customer, rather than from another dealer.

The overall intent of the amendments is to improve law enforcement's ability to trace stolen goods and the criminals, while minimising the burden on businesses in a risk-calibrated manner.

Sir, the amendments in the Bill are part of MHA's regular efforts to make our criminal laws clearer, fairer and more responsive to the prevailing operating environment. They will help MHA carry out our mission of keeping Singapore safe and secure more effectively. We seek the support of Members for the amendments. Mr Speaker, I seek to move.

Question proposed.

Mr Speaker: Mr Xie Yao Quan.

1.48 pm

Mr Xie Yao Quan (Jurong Central): Mr Speaker, Sir, I would like to weigh in on two categories of amendments. First, the amendments regarding the large-scale electronic circulation of obscene objects; and second, the amendments regarding scams and scam-related offences.

First, on the large-scale electronic circulation of obscene objects. I fully agree with and applaud the Government for creating a new offence to target administrators who set up or manage online locations to facilitate the large-scale circulation of obscene material. I believe this will allow the Government to better go after the source of the problem and deal with the problem at its source and hopefully, deter the problem at its source as well.

I also agree with the Government that such administrators who set up or manage online locations to facilitate the large-scale circulation of obscene material have a higher level of culpability compared to members of the online location who share obscene content.

But I wish to suggest even stiffer penalties for such administrators. The current amendments introduce mandatory imprisonment of up to five years, with a higher maximum if the obscene materials circulated depict minors. We can and should go further, to introduce discretionary caning for administrators of online locations circulating obscene material, to bring the penalties for such offences in line with those for assault or use of criminal force to a person with the intent to outrage modesty, under section 354 of the Penal Code.

Because the criminal force inflicted through electronic means by administrators of online locations on their victims is certainly no less severe than the criminal force inflicted in person by a physical perpetrator. And many a times, the criminal force inflicted is probably even more severe, due to the multiplicity and simultaneity of the outrage on modesty made possible by electronic means to assault a victim at scale and at speed.

Discretionary caning for administrators of online locations circulating obscene material is, therefore, proportionate and fits the crime. Given the prevalence and extreme ease to become an administrator of such online locations, discretionary caning is also needed as a deterrent. Therefore, the nature of the offence of administering online locations to circulate obscene materials fits both the functions of proportionality and deterrence that judicial caning today serves.

Sir, I move on to my second point, on scams and scam-related offences, and I start with the following premise – that scams are a national law-and-order priority, like drugs. Scams are operated in a way, basically, like drugs are. Scams are perpetrated by organised crime syndicates, like drugs. And scams are masterminded and commandeered remotely, from overseas, with the most downstream part of the production chain of criminal activities sited onshore, in Singapore – just like drugs are.

Scams cause immense harm to society, just like drugs. If drugs destroy lives, scams destroy life savings. Scams harm both the young and old. And because scammers often impersonate Government agencies, scams can also erode the trust of our society at-large, in our key institutions, like the Police, the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority, and so on. In other words, scams do not just affect victims, they impact the whole of society.

Our key institutions have to react, put up defences and these defences come at a cost. So, scams extract a cost on the whole of our society, every day. Scams cause immense harm to society, just like drugs. And so, our criminal laws should deal with scams just like they deal with drugs.

I suggest that penalties for scams and scam-related offences should be brought more in line with those for drug-related offences, at three levels.

At the first level, the scammers. In other words, the masterminds, the key operators, the most culpable, those at the highest level in the chain. Scammers manufacture schemes on an industrial level to cheat victims of their life savings. In my mind, scammers are, therefore, no less harmful to our society than manufacturers of controlled Class A drugs.

The amendments before us today introduce mandatory caning for scammers, minimum six strokes, which I fully support. But the law also provides for maximum imprisonment of only 10 years for scammers. I would like to suggest much stiffer penalties: a minimum of six strokes and 10 years; and a maximum of 15 strokes and 30 years or life imprisonment for scammers, to bring these penalties in line with those for illegal manufacturers of controlled Class A drugs, including New Psychoactive Substances.

I will stop short of calling for capital punishment for the most egregious scammers, which should be in line with the penalty for manufacturers of specific Class A drugs, like morphine, cocaine and methamphetamine.

We know the scammers, masterminds and key operators, are mostly based overseas; just like the masterminds and key manufacturers of illicit drugs. But having very stiff penalties for scammers is an important and necessary marker, in my view.

Sir, the second level, members and recruiters of scam syndicates. Many of these members and recruiters of scam syndicates are based in, or come through, Singapore, unlike the scammers. If scammers are as harmful to our society as manufacturers of Class A drugs, in my mind, scam syndicate members and recruiters are as harmful as traffickers of Class A drugs.

The amendments before us today introduce, again, mandatory caning for such scam syndicate members and recruiters, minimum six strokes. But the law also provides for maximum imprisonment of only five years. So, for scam syndicate members and recruiters, I would like to suggest much stiffer penalties, again: a minimum of six strokes and five years; and the maximum of 15 strokes and 20 years, to bring these penalties in line with those for traffickers of Class A drugs in most instances.

Sir, the third level, scam mules who enable scammers by laundering scam proceeds, providing SIM cards and/or providing Singpass credentials. To my mind, these are the lowest levels of the scam crime production chain. Yes, they do harm, they have culpability, but they are the lowest levels. I will peg them closer to traffickers of Class C drugs.

And therefore, in my view, the penalties introduced by the amendments before us today for scam mules appear somewhat disproportionately harsh, compared to the penalties being introduced for scammers and scam syndicate members and recruiters higher up the scam crime chain.

For example, if the Bill today is passed, a mule who provides accounts or arrangements to launder scam proceeds, in particular, will face discretionary caning of up to 12 strokes and also maximum imprisonment of 10 years, compared to, as I said before, maximum imprisonment of five years for being a scam syndicate member or recruiter.

So, I suggest more proportionate penalties for all types of scam mules: discretionary caning with a maximum of six strokes instead of 12 and maximum imprisonment of five years but, also, I would like to suggest a minimum of two years, to bring these penalties more in line with those for trafficking Class C drugs. I believe these suggested penalties, especially the minimum imprisonment of two years, will sufficiently deter specific offenders and would-be offenders from offending in future.

Sir, notwithstanding the above suggestions, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Ms Sylvia Lim.

1.58 pm

Ms Sylvia Lim (Aljunied): Mr Speaker, this Bill makes significant changes to 17 of our criminal statutes. Overall, I am supportive of the Bill.

I wish to speak today on two matters that I find most significant: first, on tackling scams; second, on the reduction in the use of caning for other offences. I also have some queries on the new offence of doxxing of public servants. My party colleague, Member Fadli Fawzi, will speak later on related issues and other aspects of the Bill.

First, on tackling scams. It is clear that despite significant efforts poured into anti-scam measures, Singaporeans are still falling prey to scams and losing significant sums. Banks have made efforts to strengthen digital banking to detect and delay unusual transactions. Public education has intensified: there is now even an anti-scam warning on the Parliament website. But scammers, too, have raised their game.

Scam organisations are brilliant at social engineering and tailoring their ruses to suit the intended victim. Scammers are going further. In one case I came across, the scammers even coached the victim as to what to tell Police if she was questioned, which she dutifully complied with, as if under some sort of spell. Clearly, we are dealing with highly sophisticated operators.

Sir, the Bill has 19 provisions that are targeted at scam offences. Although there are existing laws to cover these situations, the new provisions create new specific offences or enhance the punishment if they are committed through scams.

For instance, the Organised Crime Act is being amended to create two new offences; of being a member of a locally linked organised scam group and being a recruiter for organised scam groups, whether locally linked or not. Besides setting high fines and jail time of up to five years, mandatory caning of at least six strokes is to be imposed.

How effective the provisions will be will depend on how tightly they can be enforced – no point having strict laws if offenders are not pursued. It is also likely that even if persons are caught, offender displacement will occur – meaning that there will be no shortage of persons willing to replace them, if the rewards are lucrative enough.

For organised scams, effective enforcement will require agencies across borders to share information and conduct joint operations as well.

At this point, it is not clear to me how committed every government in Southeast Asia is towards combatting scams. In the past week, there was extensive media coverage on a scam ring in Cambodia, apparently led by a Singaporean and staffed by scores of compatriots. It was reported that the Cambodian police conducted a joint operation with Singapore Police on 9 September, after which 15 suspects, including 12 Singaporeans, were arrested and charged here. It was further reported that Cambodian police found evidence of the involvement of other suspects and this evidence formed the basis for the Singapore Police Force (SPF) to issue INTERPOL Red Notices against them. While the handling of this case so far shows strong cross-border cooperation, I wonder if such extensive cooperation happens on a regular basis. Further, does the Ministry expect in future to utilise the expanded powers under the Extradition Act to request the Association for Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) neighbours to hand over such suspects to Singapore through extradition?

Sir, it is public knowledge that Southeast Asia is a hotbed for organised scam groups and some ASEAN countries are reported to be where the main operations are located. To respond to this, some governments are using other tools besides the criminal law. Two months ago, the American Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, issued a statement highlighting that "criminal actors across Southeast Asia" had, and I quote, "increasingly exploited the vulnerabilities of Americans online", resulting in an estimated loss of US$10 billion last year. He announced that the American government would impose sanctions on various persons and entities involved in running a scam centre in Myanmar and forced labour compounds in Cambodia. He opined that the sanctions would have the effect of disrupting the ability of the criminal networks to perpetuate their fraudulent and abusive activities.

To that end, it would be useful to know to what extent the Singapore Government will also consider other tools outside the criminal law to disrupt such organised scam groups.

The Bill also introduces caning as an additional option in scam cases involving the misuse of Singpass credentials under the Computer Misuse Act. The same is being done under the Miscellaneous Offences Act for scams involving the misuse of SIM cards. As for cheating under the Penal Code, there will be mandatory caning if done through remote communications, such as the Internet, telephone or electronic or other technology.

Sir, the most significant aspect of all the scam-related amendments is the introduction of caning as a punishment. Given the tremendous material loss and psychological harm caused to scam victims, I have little sympathy for those who perpetrate these cruel acts.

That said, the sentence of caning is a harsh punishment. While it is a legacy of our colonial past, it is a punishment where the state inflicts violence and physical pain on a prisoner. From reported accounts of some who underwent the punishment, caning led them to bleed and by some accounts, to suffer such pain that it led them to go into a state of shock.

Sir, I accept that there is a strong imperative to curb scams and it could well be at the stage now when we have to pull out all the stops. In that light, could the Ministry elaborate on why it has assessed that caning will be effective to reduce scam activity? Did the Ministry consider alternatives, such as providing for longer jail terms and heavier fines?

This brings me to my second point which is related. I strongly welcome the reduction in the use of caning for other offences.

The Bill proposes the total removal of caning as a punishment for certain offences and for others, making caning optional instead of mandatory. In its press release on 14 October, the Ministry stated that it made these moves considering factors such as whether the offences were still of significant public concern and whether other punishments sufficed. This review – to remove unnecessary punishments – brings important balance to this Bill.

The amendments proposed to the Vandalism Act are particularly significant and welcome. The Bill removes the rigidity of the current Act, where mandatory caning of between three to eight strokes must be imposed on vandalism of both public and private property, except in limited circumstances. The Bill instead proposes that mandatory caning be removed for all vandalism offences. Instead, caning will exist as an option for the Court, in cases where the vandalism is deemed more serious.

Sir, even after the Bill is passed, I hope the Government will, from time to time, review offences which currently attract caning to see if caning is still warranted. Social conditions change over time, and our laws should be fit for purpose. Singapore is currently on a short list of about 30 countries that still have corporal punishment on its criminal statutes. Of course, we must decide for ourselves what is appropriate for our criminal justice system. That said, I believe Singaporeans will support a criminal justice system that is effective and at the same time, humane.

Finally, doxxing of public servants. Clause 25 creates a new offence in the Miscellaneous Offences Act of doxxing of public servants. Under the proposed section 14E, it will be an offence for anyone to publish identity information and false statements about public servants, if connected to the discharge of their duties. I have three questions related to this.

First, the section will apply to protect public servants. As to who would be considered a public servant, the proposed definition refers to the definition of public servant in the Penal Code, as well as any person who, under other written laws, is deemed a public servant for the purposes of the Penal Code. If so, would someone holding a political position, such as a Minister or Member of Parliament (MP), be covered under the section?

Second, the section prohibits the publication of identity information, not just about the public servant but also a "related person". The definition of "related person" is stated as "another person about whose safety or well-being the (public servant) would reasonably be expected to be seriously concerned". This definition is inexact and potentially includes almost everyone, including family members, colleagues and acquaintances. What is the intended ambit of the definition of "related person"?

Sir, the third query relates to the use of illustrations to clarify the law. There is an illustration clarifying that the doxxing offence would be made out where the false statement and the identity information were carried in two separate online posts. However, this illustration is found in the Explanatory Statement to the Bill and is not part of the text of the law. I would like to know why the illustration is not legislated together with section 14E but instead is relegated to the Explanatory Statement. It would seem to me to be more appropriate to carry the illustration upfront in the law itself, to make it clearly visible to anyone looking up the law in the future. Instead, having it in the Explanatory Statement makes it harder to locate and may lead to unnecessary arguments down the road.

Sir, let me conclude. The Bill confronts us with decisions about the use of caning as a judicial punishment. In view of the devastating harms scammers have caused and continue to cause to Singaporean families, I believe the public supports the amendments regarding scam offences. At the same time, there is a concerted effort in the Bill to remove or reduce the use of caning for various other offences. This is a move I fully endorse, as we work to scope our criminal laws more tightly and appropriately. Finally, I look forward to the answers to the questions I have posed regarding regional cooperation and other approaches to disrupt scam organisations and on the offence of doxxing of public servants.

Mr Speaker: Ms Joan Pereira.

2.09 pm

Ms Joan Pereira (Tanjong Pagar): Mr Speaker, Sir, I rise in support of the Bill which seeks to future-proof and strengthen our criminal justice framework, particularly in response to emerging threats involving technology, public safety and organised crime. I would like to speak on three areas today: sexual offences, protection of public servants and the revision of caning penalties, including for scams.

First, I applaud the Ministry's move to update sexual offences to protect our people, especially the young and the vulnerable, in an ever-evolving digital landscape. The amendments proposed have been designed to be able to factor in future developments and trends in technology and social media.

The Bill proposes enhanced penalties for the sale, distribution or large-scale electronic circulation of obscene objects, particularly those depicting minors, with the age threshold also being raised from 16 to 18. These amendments bring us in line with international standards and are crucial to allow us to respond to cases like the SG Nasi Lemak Telegram group, which saw thousands exposed to such harmful material. Importantly, the amendments make it clear that consensual and private sharing of intimate images between adults will not be criminalised, reaffirming the law's focus on protecting, but not policing citizens' private lives. While this is the case, I hope that people continue to be careful about who they share their intimate content with, especially in the face of potential love scams or even blackmail, amongst other possibilities for abuse or misuse. I would also like to suggest that such potential harms are addressed in sex education classes in schools.

The amendments also seek to deal with the risks of synthetic, AI-generated intimate images, including "deepfakes" and computer-generated child abuse materials under our criminal laws. These images, though not constructed from real photographs, are equally harmful and can devastate reputations and cause emotional damage. The law must remain ahead of technology and this amendment sends a strong deterrent message to would-be offenders that "virtual" crimes are, in fact, very real, with equally real and painful penalties. It would also reinforce what our society considers to be obscene.

While these are laudable steps, I would urge the Government to pay closer attention to bullying cases, in situations where it could entail the distribution of intimate images of minors, which can be weaponised as a form of sexualised bullying. While legal deterrence is very important, the penalties imposed on the perpetrators are by themselves not able to help support the recovery of the victims or to cope with the aftermath of the bullying attacks. Therefore, I hope that there will be clear guidelines and robust victim support systems to protect the vulnerable young victims.

The Bill introduces stronger measures to deter harassment, doxxing and the making of false allegations against public servants, recognising the negative impact these acts have on public officers and, by extension, public confidence in our institutions.

No longer must the victim prove harassment, alarm or distress. Intent to harass is enough and this is a much needed strengthening of deterrence without placing undue burden on the doxxing victim to prove that they had suffered. A new offence targets the disclosure of a public servant's identity accompanied by a falsehood, when intended to prevent or deter the discharge of their duties. This recognises that false narratives can rapidly undermine confidence in public institutions and make it difficult for public servants to perform their jobs.

Finally, I support the revision of caning penalties, especially the landmark move to introduce caning for scams and scam-related offences. In the past five years, scams have shattered lives and torn families apart, with Singaporeans losing billions of dollars. This pain extends far beyond financial loss. Some victims feel so desperate that they resort to tragic ends. Families are broken by trust betrayed, and savings painstakingly built over lifetimes are wiped out in a moment.

Mandatory caning for scammers and syndicate members, and discretionary caning for so-called "mules" will send an unequivocal signal: Singapore will not tolerate those who prey on our people, be it from behind a keyboard or through sophisticated networks. Deterrence must be robust and, as past experience with loan shark harassment shows, caning is effective in reducing recalcitrant crime. While the punishment is severe, the harm caused to victims, whose lives are often ruined, justifies the tough response.

However, cross-border cooperation is still very important in the enforcement of these laws, in order to bring the criminals to justice. Sir, in Mandarin.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Mandatory caning for scammers and syndicate members, and discretionary caning for so-called "mules" will send an unequivocal signal: Singapore will not tolerate those who prey on our people, be it from behind a keyboard or through sophisticated networks. Deterrence must be robust and past experience with loan shark harassment shows – caning is effective in reducing recalcitrant crime. While the punishment is severe, the harm caused to victims – whose lives are often ruined – justifies the tough response. However, cross-border cooperation is still very important in the enforcement of these laws, in order to bring the criminals to justice.

(In English): Mr Speaker, the amendments before us today make our laws more relevant, responsive and robust in the face of new threats. I support the Bill, even as I urge for continued vigilance, including in victim support, clarity for bullying cases and stronger protection for public servants, in the age of ease of doxxing.

Mr Speaker: Mr Fadli Fawzi.

2.17 pm

Mr Fadli Fawzi (Aljunied): Mr Speaker, I am declaring my interest as a lawyer in private practice and I have been a defence counsel in criminal cases. Sir, the Bill advances some timely updates to our criminal laws. I am supportive of the Bill's intentions, especially the changes which allow us to keep pace with the ever-evolving nature of crimes.

The Bill addresses important lacunae in the law that have emerged as a result of technological advances, some of which may have extra territorial implications. For instance, I support the provisions to explicitly penalise the production of computer-generated obscene images to strengthen penalties for obscene objects involving minors below the age of 18 and to expand the scope of sexual grooming offences to cover meetings outside of Singapore.

The Bill also affords public servants better protections from harassment. As an MP overseeing the running of a Town Council, I fully understand the need for these amendments. I have seen how our hardworking Town Council staff have been unfairly targeted with their names and identities spread around by some unhappy residents. The Bill provides our public servants with the necessary assurance that they can safely and securely discharge their duties without the threat of public harassment.

I support how the Bill increases prison terms for causing or allowing the fatal abuse of vulnerable victims. This includes children and domestic workers who are often defenceless and cannot fight back. We are sending the right message by increasing the sentences, which can go up to 30 years or life imprisonment to ensure that the vulnerable are protected.

Mr Speaker, the Bill also revises our penal policy with respect to caning. On one hand, caning has been introduced for certain categories of scam- and fraud-related offences. On the other hand, caning has been removed or made discretionary for other offences, such as specific vandalism offences. I mentioned the Vandalism Act, in particular, because there were some disquiet, both in public and in Parliament, when caning was first mooted as a penalty.

For instance, the Vandalism Act has been described by legal academic Jothie Rajah as a significant departure from penal practises in prescribing a violent punishment for a property offence when it was introduced in 1966. It is worth noting that the then-Law Minister EW Barker recognised the unique nature of Singapore's caning policy on vandalism. He said, "At the outset, it must be considered that the present day penological trends are against the infliction of caning as punishment, and that legal opinion is, in general, against the imposition of corporal punishment in cases not involving violence or brutality."

In the same debate, then-People's Action Party (PAP) backbencher, Mr Tang See Chim, also warned, and here I am quoting him, "That the severity of the punishment may not, in fact, necessarily be a deterrent. The way to deter any crime, I submit, is to impress on the wrongdoer the certainty of his being found out if he commits one."

Sir, we seem to have come full circle from 1966. Now, we are about to cease mandatory caning as punishment for vandalism. At the same time, however, we are introducing corporal punishment for a new class of offences related to frauds and scams. It goes without saying that we need to protect Singaporeans from scammers. Their modus operandi grows ever more sophisticated and multifarious, and it can seem as though we are trying to fight a hydra. Of course, we would want to use all the weapons we have at our disposal to confront this hydra-headed challenge.

As we consider caning as punishment against scammers, I do believe the points raised in the debate on the Vandalism Act in 1966 can still be relevant. In particular, they were concerned about whether caning is an appropriate deterrence against crime. I do not wish to understate the severity of the monetary losses as a result of scams: it can run up to life-changing amounts or even the entirety of an elderly person's retirement funds.

Many of us in the House, myself included, will have encountered scam victims seeking assistance at our meet-the-people sessions. The scale of their losses can be heartbreaking.

The question still remains. How should we fight the hydra of these scam networks? Would caning be effective and is it appropriate?

As many of us are aware, scams are now increasingly being perpetrated by organised crime networks. These groups often operate transnationally. It is quite likely that the ringleaders would be cocooned safely somewhere, far from Singapore, in countries that may not have extradition treaties with us. Meanwhile, the lower-level operatives are the ones on the frontlines and liable to be caught. Would caning the latter group of individuals cause a dent on their criminal operations? Furthermore, would introducing the prospect of being caned substantially change the calculus for the ringleaders?

From the perspective of disrupting these scam operations, it may actually make more of a difference if we strengthen cross-border law enforcement cooperation and extradition arrangements. I acknowledge that this is being done by the Government. My point, however, is that we can better deter the ringleaders by increasing the likelihood of them being caught, rather than the prospect of more severe punishment.

Another possibility is to offer leniency to lower-level operatives who assist the authorities in dismantling these crime networks. Many of these lower-level operatives, including the mules, may be unwilling participants who have been, themselves, tricked into working for these criminal networks.

On another note, I want to ask whether there is the possibility of the Government imposing sanctions against criminal organisations involved in scamming Singaporeans, similar to what has been done in other jurisdictions, like the United States (US). Can financial sanctions or asset confiscation be viable options to pursue with a view of, perhaps, using the recovered funds to finance a scam victim restitution fund of sorts? I am aware of the operational details of something like a victim restitution fund, would have to be worked out carefully. However, unlike caning, this offers a more tangible benefit to the victims.

Mr Speaker, I wish to emphasise again that I am not speaking out of some misplaced sympathy for the potential scammers who might be caned. I fervently believe that scam victims deserve justice for the psychological and material losses they have to endure. I can also understand the appeal of bringing the full force of the law onto these scammers who have left so much misery and pain in their wake. But, Sir, the law is not a blunt instrument, but something to be used with precision.

It is worth reiterating that this is not a question of whether scammers should be harshly punished; of course, they should be. However, the pertinent question is whether the marginal deterrent value of a longer prison sentence matches or even exceeds the marginal deterrent value of imposing caning as a penalty.

Mr Speaker, I do not doubt that the Government sincerely wants to do the right thing for Singaporeans. I hope my reservations about caning for scam-related offences are also seen in the right way – that is, as a constructive intervention to ask whether caning is truly the most effective means of protecting Singaporeans from the scourge of scams.

Mr Speaker: Dr Wan Rizal.

2.25 pm

Dr Wan Rizal (Jalan Besar): Mr Speaker, I rise in support of the Bill. Our laws must keep pace with the way harm is spread today through closed chats, fast moving platforms and AI tools that can humiliate in seconds. This Bill makes targeted amendments across several key acts, including the Penal Code, Criminal Procedure Code, Computer Misuse Act, Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes Act, and the Miscellaneous Offences Act.

This Bill makes updates in six key areas. It strengthens deterrence against scams and tech-enabled crimes, increasing penalties for abuse of vulnerable victims and update laws on sexual offences, including AI-generated intimate images. It introduces a new offence for spreading false statements or doxxing public officers, align scanning and sentencing provisions for greater consistency and refines procedures for youth offenders to balance rehabilitation and accountability.

Together, these changes modernise our criminal laws, ensuring firm deterrence, comprehensive protection and a justice system that remains fair and trusted. Given the breadth of this Bill, I will focus my remarks on two key areas.

First, the measures to deter scams and technology-enabled crimes, particularly, how they protect vulnerable residents, including seniors in older estates, such as mine in Kolam Ayer, and across the Jalan Besar group representation constituency (GRC). Second, the protection of our frontline public service officers, our teachers, our healthcare workers, our Home Team officers, among others who serve with dedication, but are increasingly vulnerable to online harassments and false allegations.

As a labour MP, I will also touch on how these changes strengthen workplace protection and mental well-being for those who serve the public every day.

Mr Speaker, scams continue to be a scourge in our society. They prey on trust, create financial pain and leave victims, especially seniors, feeling ashamed or helpless. In Kolam Ayer and across Jalan Besar, I have met elderly residents who have fallen prey to scams. Some were tricked into disclosing their bank details, others believed they were helping a family member in distress. For many, it was their life's saving, painstakingly build over decades, that vanish in mere minutes. The emotional trauma often outlasts the financial loss.

This Bill introduces caning as an additional penalty for scam syndicates and their enablers: those who knowingly Singpass credentials provide SIM cards or launder criminal proceeds. These acts are not trivial. They enable syndicates to prey on the unsuspecting and amplify harm across the community. This is appropriate because behind every scammer or mule stands a victim who loses not just money, but confidence and dignity. However, deterrence must be matched with precision and prevention.

To that end, I seek two clarifications from the Ministry.

Firstly, on role indicators, will sentencing guidance clearly define the markers of key roles, such as recruiters and organisers. For example, when they procure SIMs, multi-wallet control, profit shares and script coaching, so that the Courts can distinguish mastermind from the low-level participants. I ask this because clearer distinctions help to ensure that penalties fall proportionately on those who profit most, while preventing unfair outcomes for those who have limited involvement.

Second is on reasonable steps. Will there be positive checklists defining what counts as reasonable steps for first-time offenders or mules? This will prevent sham compliance and give fair notice to those tempted by easy money. I ask this because clear guidance can deter borderline cases before they can actually occur, especially among the young or financially desperate individuals who may not grasp the full consequence of aiding a scam.

Sir, beyond punishment, I do believe prevention remains critical. Our laws are strongest when our people are informed. Many seniors and low-income residents remain vulnerable to scams because of their limited digital literacy. So, I hope with this enforcement, we continue to be complemented by sustained public education through our digital ambassadors, our community volunteers, so that every resident can navigate the digital world with confidence. Strong deterrent must be matched by proactive education so that no Singaporean feels unprotected in this increasingly digital landscape.

My second point, Sir, is on protecting frontline public service officers. Sir, the Bill also strengthens protection for those who serve the public – our officers, our educators, healthcare workers and enforcement personnel – by criminalising doxxing and false allegations against them. This is a timely and necessary step.

In recent years, we have seen public officers unfairly targeted online, their names and photos circulated with false claims. At Tan Tock Seng Hospital, a patient uploaded a police report online and falsely named a doctor as being involved in an alleged mistreatment. The hospital later clarified that the named doctor was not involved, but by then, the harm to his reputation and peace of mind was already done.

The Ministry of Education has also acknowledged that educators and even students, had been doxed and attacked online, following the Sengkang Green Primary School incident. Teachers, who dedicate their life nurturing our children, should never have to fear harassment simply for doing their jobs.

Our Home Team officers, who enforce laws and respond to emergencies, have at times, been filmed, misrepresented and vilified online, such as the 2021 Yishun case, where a video falsely accused Police Officers of bullying an elderly woman. Investigations later showed that the Police were actually helping the woman, not harassing her, and a POFMA correction was issued.

These incidents illustrate how misinformation can quickly erode trust and endanger the morale of those who serve the public. This Bill rightly introduces a new offence under the Miscellaneous Offences, Public Order and Nuisance Act for publishing an officer's identity, together with a falsehood, when done to deter or punish them for carrying out their duties.

It also amends POHA to remove the need to prove that the officer suffered harassment or distress. This shifts the focus where it belongs on the offenders' intent, not the victim's reaction. However, three clarifications may help strengthen this protection further.

Firstly, on falsehood threshold, will the Government confirm that material falsehoods suffice and that offenders cannot escape liability by claiming the lie was minor or disguised in humour, sarcasm or emojis? I ask this because such tongue-in-cheek posts can still mislead the public and incite, ridicule or harass our officers who are carrying out their duties.

Second is on policy distinction. When will agencies invoke POFMA to correct misinformation and when will they use the new doxxing with falsehood offence to protect individual officers? A short policy note would be helpful to agencies, employers and even unions, who can help to apply the law consistently. I ask this because operational clarity prevents hesitation. Agencies and unions must know which legal route to take swiftly to safeguard their officers and restore public confidence.

My third point is on coverage clarity. Will protection also extend to outsourced essential workers, such as cleaners, healthcare assistants, or transport enforcement officers, who perform public duties, but are not statutory officers. I ask this because similarly, these workers will face some public exposure – same risk as civil servants – yet they lack the institutional protection or recourse channels available to them.

As a labour MP, I am heartened that this Bill recognises both public servants and public service workers. The latter includes nurses, our Town Council staff and contract personnel who keep Singapore running every day. Their service deserves the same protection and respect.

Unions, such as the Healthcare Services Employees Union and the Singapore Teachers' Union, have long advocated these protections, standing beside our workers who face harassment or stigma during the course of duty.

We must ensure that every person who serves the public, regardless of employer, can do so safely and with dignity. Mr Speaker, in Malay, please.

(In Malay): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Sir, this Bill strengthens justice and safety in our society. It does not merely punish the perpetrators; it also protects those who are vulnerable and safeguards the dignity of public officers who have shown total dedication in performing their duty. Through these amendments, we enhance penalties for cyber scams, extend protection to public officers and frontline workers, and ensure that our laws remain relevant in this digital era. In short, justice is not just about meting out punishment – it is about preserving trust, safety and humanity.

(In English): Mr Speaker, this Bill represents an important step in strengthening both justice and trust. By deterring scams, we protect our seniors, our workers and our families. By protecting our officers and public service workers, we safeguard those who uphold the values of duty, care and compassion.

Good law leaves no easy exits for bad actors and gives confidence to those who protect us. With this Bill, we will send a clear signal that Singapore stands firm against harm and stands with those who protect and serve our people. Notwithstanding the clarifications I sought, I support this Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Henry Kwek.

2.35 pm

Mr Kwek Hian Chuan Henry (Kebun Baru): Mr Speaker, I support this Bill and the suite of changes it makes. Given its breadth, I will focus my remarks on three areas: one, tackling global scams and online crimes while protecting innovation; two, a calibrated approach to accountability for 14-to-17-year-olds; and three, improving proportionality by resolving the inflexibility of mandatory caning.

Let me first talk about our efforts to target operators of crime. I support forward-looking legislation that go after the operators – scam networks, credential abuse, deepfakes, child sexual abuse material (CSAM) creators – without impeding technological progress.

Indeed, the impact of such crimes is immense. Just take scams. Since 2019, Singaporeans have lost over S$3 billion to scams. In 2024 alone, losses were over S$1.1 billion. In the first half of this year, government-official impersonation scams almost reach 1,800, nearly triple year-on-year. Victims, like many of my fellow Members have mentioned, are disproportionately elderly, vulnerable or desperate. Many lose their life savings and suffer deep hardship.

Mr Speaker, technology is like the wind: swift, powerful and unstoppable. But when a forest fire breaks out, we do not try to stop the wind; we go after the arsonists of that forest fire.

This Bill does just that. It focuses on those who exploit technology for harm – organised crime networks, scam operators and credential traffickers.

Criminalising the misuse of another's identity or SIM registration cuts off the pathways in which scams spread. Each stolen credential is a spark, each mule account, a dry branch. Therefore, this Bill builds the firebreaks we need while keeping the wind free so that legitimate innovation can grow.

Let me next turn to calibrated charging for 14- to 17-year-olds. This Bill implements and clarifies the 2019 Children and Young Persons Act (CYPA) changes to treat ages 14 to below 18 as young persons and expands Youth Court coverage while preserving the ability to transmit serious or repeat cases to the State Courts or the High Court, so that adequate penalties can be imposed where warranted.

Many teenagers today are better informed and more mature, compared to youths decades ago. For very serious crimes, we should hold them responsible. But maturity is a continuum; one does not gain wisdom and fortitude at a precise birthday.

To avoid the cliff effect, where the full weight of adult liability falls on, say, a 14-year-old, I urge the Government, led by the Ministry of Law, to adopt a graduated, age-sensitive charging approach for those from 14 to18, which means calibrating charging positions and legal submissions based on age, maturity and context, and reserving adult-style positions for truly serious crimes.

Lastly, I welcome the calibrated caning penalties for 22 offences while introducing caning as a penalty for scamming. Today, multiple statutes impose minimum strokes and leave the Court with no room to calibrate punishment. It is a one-size-fits-all penalties for those laws.

But justice can be tempered with mercy. The new flexibility from this Bill for 22 offences provides judicial discretion to weigh mitigation factors on a case-by-case basis, for example, first-offender status, coercion or duress, genuine remorse, or early plea.

Proportionality is not leniency. It is the law taking full account of both harm and human circumstances. At the same time, given the severe impact of scamming, I fully support the inclusion of caning penalties for scamming crimes.

Let me conclude, this Bill goes after the operators of technology scams and online scams – the arsonists – without stifling the impact of technology. It also aligns accountability with maturity, and it restores judicial discretion when it is due. It protects our people and our progress while keeping justice fair and firm. With that, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr David Hoe.

2.40 pm

Mr David Hoe (Jurong East-Bukit Batok): Mr Speaker, Sir, I rise in support of this Bill. This Bill does a few important things. It strengthens our laws against scams, amends sexual offences, raises penalties for causing or allowing fatal abuse to vulnerable victims, revises sentencing for young offenders and updates older provisions to fit today's realities.

At its core, it defines new offences, allowing caning for some scam-related crimes, removes caning from others, and refines how we deal with youths and vulnerable persons.

In this response, I will focus on deterring scams through tougher and more targeted measures. This is close to my heart. In Clementi, I have walked the ground and sought help for my residents who fell into victims of scams. Their stories are heartbreaking and even more painful when I learnt how their families are affected.

Let me place on record by saying that I agree with the direction to introduce caning for scam-related offences. However, I would like to highlight four clarifications and considerations.

The first is on discretionary caning and proportionality. For scam-related offences such as offenders who facilitate scams such as the misuse of SIM cards, disclosing access credentials such as Singpass account, this Bill allows for up to 12 strokes of the cane under discretionary caning. I support this direction.

You see, scams can wipe out the life savings of many and shatter families. A strong deterrence is justified. However, I would like to better understand how the upper limit of 12 strokes was set. For instance, was the upper limit of 12 strokes benchmarked against other offences with similar harm and culpability? Were the existing caning-eligible offences considered and used as comparisons when setting this upper limit and if so, what was the principle for alignment?

I am glad to hear earlier that the upper limit has room for review. On this note, we should be clear what caning is not. It is not a silver bullet.

This brings me to my second point on the economics of deterrence. As someone who had spent years teaching economics, I tend to think of deterrence as a simple equation. Does the expected cost outweigh the expected benefit?

In my view, the expected cost of committing a crime depends on three things. One, severity – how harsh that punishment is. Two, certainty – how likely you are to be caught and punished. And three, speed – how fast the punishment happens.

In short, deterrence, in my view, mentions three things: severity, certainty and speed. Because if scammers believe they never will, or are unlikely to be caught, perhaps because they are hiding behind a fake or an anonymous account, or operate outside of Singapore, then harsher penalties might not make much of a difference. So, beyond raising penalties, we should raise the certainty, visibility and speed of enforcement and punishment.

At the end of the day, we measure what is important to us. In this regard, the Government should consider publishing regular updates on scam activities – how many were reported, caught, and continue amplifying public communications. Why? Because this sends a clear signal that Singapore does not just punish harshly, but we also catch swiftly, in this context of scam activities.

My third point is cross-border scams. Many scams that hit Singapore are not run from here. They are operated overseas, layered through syndicates. In late October, Police named 27 Singaporeans and seven Malaysians suspected of running a Cambodian-based syndicate scam ring targeting Singapore believed to be behind at least 438 cases and $41 million in losses. Police said that they are working with Interpol to issue red notices because these suspects are out of Singapore.

This fact underlines a simple point. The threat of caning here may not deter someone who sits overseas or never plans to set foot in Singapore. The answer then, in my view, has to be stronger and faster cross-border cooperation, coordination and enforcement. Singapore already works with partners within ASEAN, INTERPOL and other countries. My point is, there needs to be a continued deepening of mutual legal assistance channel bilaterally and multilaterally. This may involve a memorandum of understanding between authorities and their counterparts abroad on things like digital evidence requests, standard operating timelines, as well as having dedicated offices to oversee and expedite such cross-border coordination and collaboration.

My last point, beyond strengthening our laws against scammers, we must continue to build a scam-resilient society. This is because the law cannot carry full load. We have to build habits, skills, systems that help Singaporeans to determine scams early and act fast. We want a vigilant public not a fearful one. Singapore must never become a place that we suspect every single message and live in constant anxiety. We can teach this balance from young. Pause, check, then decide when encountering something suspicious. In this regard, we should consider incorporating more practical scam education within our schools and community to enable our ability to detect scam activities.

Today, our Character and Citizenship Education classes teach students to evaluate and verify credibility of online information sources to recognise and report different types of online scams, including phishing, online purchase scams and Internet love scams. However, as scams continue to evolve, we must continue to do more to educate or being able to identify deepfakes. We have made progress through Police Anti-Scam Command ScamShield, but I think we can go further. Just as from time to time at work, we have to take cybersecurity quizzes, I wonder if we can have scam quizzes built into ScamShield. And perhaps users who complete the quizzes could also earn some reward or incentive. For example, if you can get 20 or 30 questions right, a pretty high bar, it could entail you to have additional Community Development Council vouchers. The goal, it is really just to be more scam resilient.

On another note, I also just want to mention that part of scam resilience is also fighting the stigma associated with the person falling prey to scams. Speak to scam victims, you know that often times they feel shame and fear, viewed as silly or naive by their loved ones or others or even being blamed for their own troubles. Therefore, many may choose to stay silent and not even report being scammed; and scammers will rejoice in their silence. So, we must, hence, fight this stigma, make early help the norm.

Our public message must be simple: report quickly, you are not alone, every minute counts. Also, a "report once" pathway would give each victim a single case reference, would spare them from repeating the painful details from agencies to agencies or bank to bank. Just one reference number, find the details all there. Giving scam victims discretion and privacy is equally important as well, including ensuring private spaces for conversations and the option to bring someone else along.

We should also consider inviting those who wish to step forward to tell their stories in a safe and respectful setting. Because I have learned that sharing stories is powerful, because then survivors choose to share, even anonymously, they show others it is okay to seek help. It reduces the shame that keeps many silent and turn painful experiences into lessons that protect and empower others.

In my view, if we pair strong laws and with early help, empathy at the front line and survival voices that breaks the stigma, we reduce shame, shorten response time and improve recovery. This is how we stay vigilant without becoming fearful, keep trust alive while protecting one another.

I would like to close by noting that the Bill strengthens our hand against scammers and I welcome it. But deterrence or true deterrence does not just come from harsher punishment alone. It comes from a system that is swift, certain and smart. Swift in catching offenders, certain in delivering justice and smart in building public awareness. Because at the end of day, the best deterrence is not fear of punishment. It is a society that is alert, resilient and one step ahead of scammers.

Mr Speaker: Mr Melvin Yong.

2.51 pm

Mr Melvin Yong Yik Chye (Radin Mas): Sir, I stand in support of the Bill which seeks to amend the Penal Code and other related legislation to update our criminal laws. Sir, the scope of this Bill is vast, I will focus my speech today on scam-related crimes and the proposal to revise caning penalties for certain offences, including introducing caning for scams and scams-related offences.

I read with great concern about the recent media coverage of Singaporeans being involved in scam syndicate operations in Cambodia. In one of the reported cases, a Singaporean was alleged to be the leader of the crime ring, targeting Singaporeans in government impersonation scams. Their use of the Singaporean accent was meant to reassure the victims that the calls were genuine.

Scams are a major source of crime in Singapore. Today, we are far more likely to get scammed online than to be robbed in the streets. In the first half of 2025, victims lost $456 million, with almost 20,000 cases reported. These figures are a representation that scam cases continue to plague our country. According to statistics by the Police, scam victims lost $1.1 billion in 2024 and more than $651 million in 2023.

When I first joined the Police in 1995, cheating cases were common but limited largely to face-to-face interactions. Over time, as Singapore's digital penetration grew, scam archetypes evolved to love scams on WeChat to the current situation, where so many variants of scams affect different segments of our population. The Bill's proposal to introduce mandatory caning for offenders of scams is, therefore, highly welcomed and timely, as we need to send a clear signal that our legal system has no tolerance for those who scam and prey on others. However, when it comes to enforcement, it is often the most vulnerable who are recruited as mules, who are caught. Syndicate bosses are often based offshore and it can be tough for our local law enforcement to take them to task. I would, therefore, like to ask how the SPF are working with the foreign enforcement agencies, including with Interpol and member agencies of the Anti-Money Laundering Case Coordination and Collaboration Network (AC3N) to take these criminal masterminds to task.

For offences with proposed discretionary caning, such as those involving individuals who launder scam proceeds, supply SIM cards or provide Singpass credentials, I would like to ask whether sentencing guidelines will be made available to the Courts and, if so, what would these sentencing guidelines be? Would vulnerable offenders, such as youths and those with mild intellectual disabilities, be given greater leniency if they are preyed upon and roped into scam operations? How can we do more to protect these vulnerable individuals from being taken advantage of by the scam syndicates?

Sir, let me next talk about a small but growing variant of scams that threaten Singapore's ambition to become a live entertainment hub. Between 2023 and 2024, 1,500 people lost about $1.1 million in scams due to the sale of concert tickets by online third-party resellers. Ticket scams pertaining to live entertainment events have been a growing concern for the Consumers Association of Singapore (CASE). Consumers tell us that ticket scams are a particular area of concern as many event goers try to get tickets to A-list events at all costs. Many of them simply cannot buy tickets on the primary market due to the presence of bots. They try all means possible to attend the events by their favourite artiste, even at the risk of purchasing fake tickets.

Members would recall reading news articles about ticket scams whenever an A-list event takes place in Singapore, from Taylor Swift to Coldplay to Andy Lau. The Taylor Swift Eras Tour concert that was held in Singapore in March 2024, became an unfortunate incident where many locals and international consumers became scam victims. The Consumer Protection Review Panel, which I co-chair, is looking into this issue deeply.

For example, the Panel is actively engaging ticket service platforms to explore establishing authorised ticket sales platforms to provide consumers with greater certainty that tickets resold on proper platforms are legitimate. Other suggestions, include phasing out paper tickets and to only have digital tickets with dynamic QR codes. But while the industry players and CASE do our best to tackle the issue, we cannot succeed in eradicating the problem of ticket scams without support from the Government. Some overseas jurisdictions with thriving entertainment industries, such as in Japan and in Taiwan, have already rolled out anti-ticketing scam laws to tackle this issue, something which I hope the Government would also consider adopting.

Sir, we must address the variant of ticketing scams more seriously, despite its relatively smaller losses when compared to the other scams. Because if left unaddressed, these scams could threaten to derail Singapore's efforts to anchor ourselves as the region's entertainment hub.

In closing, the amendments proposed under the Bill are timely, as it will send a strong signal that tackling scams continue to be a national priority. We must continue to act firmly against scam syndicates, while having a care on how we treat vulnerable citizens who are roped into scam operations. I also urge the Ministry to also look into how we can deal with ticketing scams more decisively, as it affects a large number of consumers. Mr Speaker, with that, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Foo Cexiang.

2.58 pm

Mr Foo Cexiang (Tanjong Pagar): Mr Speaker, my speech will focus on the introduction of caning for scams-related offences. It is an understatement today that scams are the scourge of societies. According to the SPF's Mid-Year Scam and Cybercrime Brief 2025, there were 22,476 scam and cybercrime cases from January to June this year and the amount lost to scams was about $456 million. So, to put this into perspective, this averages out to be about more than 120 of such cases each day, more than five cases an hour. In terms of losses, an average of $2.5 million lost each day to scams.

These figures are astonishing to say the least. In fact, the monies lost to scams are not representative of the entire cost of such criminal enterprises for society because if we tabulate the man-hours and other valuable resources deployed to combat scams, then the total amount would be many times that, just the loss quantum.

The motivation of scammers is clear, their ill-gotten rewards are enormous, vis-à-vis the risks. All these, at the expense of their victims. I believe all of us have met scam victims at our meet-the-people sessions and have heard their pleas for help, as many Members have pointed out. It is heartbreaking to hear of Singaporeans having their honest and hard-earned monies despicably stolen from them.

In fact, just two weeks ago, a family member of mine almost fell victim to one such scam. I do not know whether the scammer knew that I was going to make a speech in Parliament so soon. So, she received a call from someone claiming to be a Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) officer, who told her that her bank account had been compromised for illegal transactions and then, assured her that he would help her to resolve the issue. He then told her to lock herself in the room as he guided her through the process via video call and he told her many times not to let anyone know in the family. So, flustered and helpless, my family member ended up spending several hours on the call with this scammer. And in this time, she set up a crypto-currency account, she has never learned about crypto before. She terminated an investment savings account and transferred the funds from the investment savings account to her savings account. But fortunately for her, she informed my wife after the call, who then informed me and we were able to stop any losses in time.

But this is a very common modus operandi of scammers now. They get into the minds of their victims by first sending them into a panic mode and then, assure them that they can help by impersonating themselves as public officials. Very sinister. And I told my family member: I said when they told you to lock yourself in a room and not tell anyone, alarm bells should have started ringing in your head! But she told me that during the entire process she was almost in a trance-like state. I think similar to what some of the other Members have shared. So, my family member was fortunate to have family members around. But I worry very much for my residents who are seniors, who stay alone and I have also met residents who are even younger than me all preyed to the similar tactics that I have just shared.

So, no condemnation leveled against scams and scammers to me would be considered unjust. And clearly, the existing sanctions are not adequate and do not effectively deter scammers and potential scammers.

So, it is, therefore, timely that this Bill seeks to enhance the penalties for scams offences. With this as context, I would like to raise several points and clarifications for the Senior Minister of State's response.

First, clause 63 of the Bill inserts a new section 416B in the Penal Code. In this new section, with respect to the element of deceit by way of remote communications, the operative threshold is "mainly", mainly via digital or remote means. But in this current day and age, almost all our daily communications are arguably "mainly" done through digital and remote means, whether it is emails, social media, text messaging. So, I want to find out what is the rationale for this statutory requirement and how should the word "mainly" be legally interpreted?

Second, the Bill introduces "mandatory" and "discretionary" caning. Scammers, members and recruiters of scam syndicates will face mandatory caning of at least six strokes, while scam mules who enable scammers in certain ways will face discretionary caning of up to 12 strokes.

Recently, in The Straits Times, 17 July 2025, 15 people were reportedly being investigated for sharing their Singpass credentials, some used to open bank accounts and register for mobile phone lines for scam purposes. Over the weekend, CNA also reported that the Police had arrested 38 people acting as money mules for scammers, having sold or rented their YouTrip accounts for monetary gains. The same article also reports a "surge in such scam cases" in the months of September and October.

So, in light of what I have shared, my question is: why is caning not made mandatory for scam mules as well, in particular, the mules who know that they are enabling or likely to enable scrams? Because Mr Speaker, scammers, members and recruiters of scam syndicates and the scam mules, all these participants are essential to the operations of the scam enterprise. So, what is the rationale for such a distinction between caning to be meted out to these various players in the ecosystem?

Third, impersonation of public officials. SPF's Mid-Year Scam and Cybercrime Brief 2025 also reported that "Government officials impersonation scams have almost tripled" in the first six months of 2025. And recently, on 26 October 2025, the Police shared that they had arrested 24 persons, investigating another nine for their suspected involvement in a case of government officials' impersonation scam. The impersonation of government officials is probably the most deplorable of the various types of scams we have discussed today because it carries the very real danger of also undermining the public's confidence in the Government and the integrity and security of our services.

We have all heard feedback that in a bid to avoid scammers, many Singaporeans have chosen either not to answer any calls from unknown or private numbers. When they receive SMS-es that are sent by official sources, they read it with apprehension and suspicion. So, the fear of being scammed has affected us all. In this vein, would the Ministry consider imposing even more severe penalties for scam-related offences, when there is an element of Government impersonation, such as by doubling the mandatory number of strokes, for example?

Mr Speaker, I heard Mr Fadli Fawzi's concern earlier with the use of caning as a punishment and he raised how we are moving away from mandatory caning for vandalism offences in this same Bill. Instead, he suggested that we strengthen enforcement bite to be more effective.

I would argue that we need both effective enforcement and deterrent in the form of caning to deal with the scourge of scams. I will go further to say that we are able to remove mandatory caning for vandalism today and discussing it in this Bill because we have successfully deterred the act of vandalism from taking root in society in Singapore where there was a very threat several decades ago. So, we should do the same now for scams and if we are similarly successful as we were or we are with vandalism, we can review this in the future as well.

Mr Speaker, the amendments in this Bill demonstrate the Government's practical and hard-nosed approach to be more effective in protecting our people while also reviewing policies in keeping with the times. We enact harsh laws but not after deep and careful consideration to protect the everyday Singaporean – honest, hardworking, resilient and really just doing his or her best for their families.

So, Mr Speaker, notwithstanding my clarifications, I support of the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Cai Yinzhou.

3.08 pm

Mr Cai Yinzhou (Bishan-Toa Payoh): Mr Speaker, the Bill updates the Penal Code and other legislations, strengthening the legal framework for urgent issues, like scams, and serious crimes, like abuse. This aligns with Singapore's history of strengthening laws against trends in crime.

I support the Bill but seek clarification firstly on complementary social and support measures to tackle the scourge of scams between deterrence and dialogue. The Bill distinguishes money mules from scam syndicate leaders, introducing mandatory caning for scammers and discretionary caning for money mules. This toughens measures against scams, addressing a national issue. The message is clear, "If you dare to scam Singaporeans, this is the price you pay."

This move is crucial due to devastating losses: over $3.4 billion since 2019, with a record $1.1 billion in 2024. But beyond financial figures, victims have experienced ruined family relationships, depression and some even turned to suicide.

Caning is, therefore, an effective deterrent in reducing loan shark harassment, but I have two clarifications on this.

First is for those above 50 years old where caning is unsuitable, how will alternative penalties be applied? And whether these enhanced penalties will immediately apply to the 27 Singaporeans allegedly found to be part of the Cambodian scam syndicate, if found guilty?

While the Bill assigns lower culpability to money mules, their punishment is still significant. I support the new offences but suggest new ways to augment the effectiveness. As criminal lawyers note, deterrence is not the only crime control method; focusing solely on increased penalties might ignore root issues.

Mules might be financially disadvantaged, incentivised by financial hardship to sell Singpass details or personal access. A worrying trend involves youths becoming scam mules; and a misconception that only elderly are victims when those in the 21 to 59 age group, who might be digitally native and overconfident, thereby constituting most victims. Greater deterrence therefore may not address economic hardship or coercion, but our approach needs to be balanced, focusing on financial literacy and legitimate employment.

Given the heavy penalties for potential money mules, public education on offence severity is needed, especially demographics of those less aware. We must also incorporate these messaging, using technology, like the ScamShield app, a powerful intelligence network against scam trends. Another suggestion includes encouraging money mules to become informants, aligning with Government efforts against local scam enablers, where those actively cooperating with authorities by providing information on scam operations could receive reduced sentencing.

But often the investigation of potential money mules might be complex and lengthy. It is hard to distinguish those who participate as a mule versus those whose personal information might have been misused and compromised.

During investigation, these individuals might face strict restrictions, including frozen bank accounts, affected credit ratings, making it hard to receive salaries, to pay bills or to receive Government benefits. This significantly impacts those already struggling financially. Can the Minister, therefore, clarify interim measures and collaborations with banks to support the increasing number of Singaporeans implicated in scam-related investigations but might not be convicted?

Next, I will speak about strengthening protections for vulnerable victims against abuse.

The Bill proposes increasing maximum jail term for fatal abuse of vulnerable victims from 20 years to life imprisonment of up to 30 years. This tool ensures penalties for the "worst of the worst" egregious cases. Despite serious penalties for abuse, advocates for vulnerable groups, like domestic helpers, highlight root causes lie in power disparity and victims' fear-driven difficulty in seeking help, sometimes due to social isolation.

Increased abuse penalties also need to come with complementary protection and empowerment for potential victims, especially for early intervention. For example, migrant domestic worker abuse averaged 320 reports annually from 2020 to 2024. Existing support measures can be expanded through awareness of help avenues and increased checks on these foreign domestic workers.

Enhanced penalties also apply to abuse of children under 14 and vulnerable persons. Beyond age, if I may suggest stipulating definitions of vulnerable persons for seniors or even those with disabilities using metrics, like the Activities of Daily Living score, which is an established tool for measuring functional ability.

In conclusion, I strongly support this Bill's decisive move to address crime threats and introduce tougher penalties. Notwithstanding these clarifications, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Ms Lee Hui Ying.

3.14 pm

Ms Lee Hui Ying (Nee Soon): Mr Speaker, I stand in support of the Criminal Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill. The nature of crime is rapidly changing and I am glad the Government is taking steps to update our laws to keep pace. The legislative amendments protect our people both by enhancing deterrence and ensuring that, where deterrence is met with recalcitrance, the offenders receive rehabilitation and a chance to mend their ways.

In supporting this Bill, I would like to expand upon two areas for the Government's consideration. First, the reach of penalties for scam-related offences. Second, the revision of caning penalties. In chess, the king is the most important piece, it can determine victory or defeat and is the most strategic centre of the game. Like the chess king, the kingpin is crucial to the overall strategy. The kingpin is the one that defines the game.

First, can I ask the Minister, what steps are we taking to target the leaders of scam syndicates, in other words, the kingpin? The new penalties currently apply to three categories of offenders. First, those who perpetrate scams or other forms of cheating; those who are members of or recruit members for scam syndicates; and those who facilitate the scams, such as through mule activities, by supplying the scammers with bank accounts, Singpass accounts and SIM cards.

These persons who should be charged with these penalties are likely to be low-level operatives. While this would improve deterrence and disrupt scam networks, we would not be rid of scams until we apprehend the principals and the financiers, and demolish scam networks entirely. Scams today, are intricate supply chains, which include clearly defined functions of data acquisition, scripting, operations and even technology. The key to sustaining such operations are the key decision makers, in other words, the kingpin, to put the supply chain together. May I ask if the new penalties are intended to also target the kingpins for a more comprehensive approach or if the Organised Crime Act may be invoked here for investigative powers?

For a solution to be sustainable, it must lower the incentive for scammers by cancelling out the profitability. Scams have grown increasingly sophisticated and transnational, exploiting digital platforms and encrypted communication channels that make enforcement challenging. May I ask what plans does the Government have in terms of implementing more robust industry safeguards, disrupting communication channels for syndicates, especially intractable ones, like Telegram and the Dark Web, and strengthening cross-border collaborations to tackle the globalisation of scams?

How are we handling the transnational nature of scam offences? While local laws have their place, many cyber-enabled scams cross international boundaries such that the lines in jurisdictions are blurred. Scam centres are based in other countries, such as Cambodia and Myanmar, but their victims are our Singaporeans. Does the Criminal Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill apply or are we using our diplomatic channels to motivate enforcement? Are we able to send the SPF to those countries to provide support or technical assistance?

While we fight to support Singaporeans from scams, it is worrying to hear that there are Singaporeans being involved in leading scam networks. For example, three Singaporeans and 17 Singapore-registered entities were recently sanctioned by the US for alleged involvement in transnational crypto scam activities linked to a Cambodian conglomerate. Why were these links not discovered by us earlier? What action is our Government taking and are there checks being done to ensure no other Singaporeans are implicated? There may also be a need to implement sufficient safeguards for persons based in Singapore vis-à-vis foreign law risks.

Beyond the legal aspect, the importance of public education cannot be understated as each individual is his/her own first line of defence against scams. How can we detect and respond more quickly to new modalities of scams? How do we then shorten the time and respond quicker between detection and public education efforts? What plans are in place to monitor the impact of current outreach and education efforts and to increase their effectiveness amid the evolving nature of scams?

On the flipside, it is critical that these measures avoid a chilling effect, whereby people cross the threshold from reasonable caution to pervasive distrust of all online activity, even the legitimate ones. In this ever-evolving digital world, we must empower our people to be prudent without pulling back unnecessarily. Similarly, security measures should be carefully assessed before implementation to ensure that they do not make legitimate online processes unjustifiably onerous for users.

Second, our approach to exclude caning penalties based on age. Currently, Singapore's maximum age for caning is 50 years old. If age was intended to be a proxy of physical suitability, we should review if it is appropriate to increase the maximum age to 60, in view of our lengthening health-spans. Our average health-span, defined as years of good health, is now at 75, as shared by the Prime Minister, at the National Day Rally. Revising the caning age limit upwards would align with the trend towards an ageing society whereby, assuming status quo in crime rates, the average age of offenders is expected to increase year on year. This ensures that deterrence stays relevant and effective even as the age profile of our population changes. This also avoids situations that may seem unjust where offenders may be spared simply because they are caught and sentenced after they pass the age of 50. Mr Speaker, in Mandarin, please.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Mr Speaker, I support this Bill. It strengthens the deterrent effect of penalties whilst simultaneously ensuring that offenders have opportunities for rehabilitation, achieving both objectives.

Scam cases are emerging constantly. The new penalties target scam perpetrators, gang members and recruiters, as well as those who provide SIM cards or Singpass credentials to criminals. These individuals may not hold high positions within scam syndicates.

As the saying goes, "to catch bandits, first catch their leader." I hope the Minister can clarify whether, from a more comprehensive perspective, the new penalties are also targeting the masterminds behind criminal syndicates.

The Bill also covers caning. Currently, the age limit for caning is at 50 years old. However, with longer healthy lifespan and society ageing, should we consider reviewing and raising this limit to 60 years old? I believe this would better reflect the current situation in our society and would be more effective as a deterrent.

(In English): Mr Speaker, notwithstanding these points for clarification and consideration, I express my full support for this Bill. These amendments are timely, not just in offering tangible protection to Singaporeans, but also in inspiring public confidence that our criminal justice system is sensitive to emerging needs, especially in the realm of scams, it sends a clear signal that new ways to commit old crimes will be met with new penalties.

Mr Speaker: Senior Minister of State Sim Ann.

3.23 pm

Ms Sim Ann: Mr Speaker, let me thank Members for their questions and their strong support for the amendments.

Let me first touch on the amendments to sexual offences. Ms Joan Pereira highlighted bullying cases which involve the distribution of intimate images of minors. We agree that a firm stance should be taken against such acts. Let me assure Ms Pereira that this is already an offence under the Penal Code which attracts severe punishment. I also thank Ms Pereira for her suggestions regarding upstream preventive measures and downstream victim support and agree that these are important to complement the proposals in the Bill. Measures have, indeed, been put in place to help victims of sexual offences, including minors, through the criminal justice process.

Mr Xie Yao Quan suggested introducing discretionary caning for administrators of online locations circulating obscene material. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) will continue to monitor the situation and assess if there is a need to review the penalties further.

Next, on the enhanced penalties for fatal abuse of vulnerable victims. Mr Cai Yinzhou highlighted that beyond increasing the penalties for abuse of vulnerable victims, it is also important to have upstream preventive measures. We agree. Such measures have been put in place by the Ministry of Social and Family Development and Ministry of Manpower.

Mr Cai also suggested including seniors and persons with disabilities within the definition of vulnerable persons. Under our current laws, a "vulnerable person" refers to those who, due to mental or physical infirmity, disability or incapacity, are substantially unable to protect themselves from abuse, neglect or self-neglect. Seniors and persons with disabilities who meet this definition will be protected by the enhanced penalties we propose to impose on their abusers.

On the new offence to criminalise the doxxing of a public servant, Dr Wan Rizal asked if offenders could escape liability by claiming that the falsehood was minor or was disguised in humour or sarcasm. The Courts apply an objective standard in determining what constitutes a false statement of fact and will not take such claims at face value.

Dr Wan Rizal sought to clarify when agencies would use levers under POFMA versus the new offence of doxxing accompanied by a falsehood. The POFMA levers focus on the likely impact of the false statement of fact on key public interests, such as Singapore's security, public health, safety, tranquillity or finances, or public confidence in our institutions. On the other hand, the new offence is targeted at protecting public servants and thus, requires that the false statement of fact relate to the public servant. Different cases may require one lever or the other, or even a combination of the two. Such a determination would have to be made on a case-by-case basis.

Dr Wan Rizal and Ms Sylvia Lim had questions regarding the scope of the new offence. Dr Wan Rizal asked if the new offence would extend to public service workers who perform public duties, but are not public servants. The new offence will only cover public servants. False statements against public servants can directly undermine confidence in our public institutions and so, warrant a higher penalty.

That said, doxxing of a public service worker is already an offence under POHA that carries enhanced penalties. Ms Lim asked if the new offence would extend to politicians, such as Ministers and MPs. Political officeholders are covered as they are part of the executive. MPs are currently not covered but MHA is separately reviewing this. To be clear, persons who harass MPs are nonetheless still liable for an offence under POHA, or other offences, like criminal intimidation and criminal defamation, depending on the facts of the case.

Ms Lim asked if the definition of a "related person" of a public servant could be made more precise. A "related person" of a public servant is defined as a person whose safety or well-being the public servant would reasonably be expected to be seriously concerned about. The rationale for extending the offence to cover doxxing of "related persons" of a public servant is because offenders may target persons close to a public servant to get to the public servant. The question of whether a person falls within the definition of a "related person" is an objective one that the Courts will determine based on the facts of the case. The concept of a "related person" is not new and already exists within POHA.

Ms Sylvia Lim asked about the placement of the illustration in the Explanatory Note instead of within the provision. We assess that the provision is clear enough. Not all offence provisions need to have illustrations. In any case, the Explanatory Note is available in the public domain and can be referred to by all stakeholders, including Counsel and the Courts, if necessary.

Let me now move on to comments on the scam caning proposals. Comments from Members are largely divided into three categories: the Government's general anti-scam measures, adequacy of the proposed penalties and clarifications on the proposals.

First, on the Government's general anti-scam measures. Ms Lee Hui Ying asked about the Government's plans to implement more robust industry safeguards to disrupt the communication channels used by scam syndicates to approach victims. In the first half of 2025, scammers used online platforms to approach victims in about 82% of all scam cases. To address this, the Government has worked with online platforms to implement anti-scam safeguards and remove scam-tainted content and accounts. For example, in September 2025, the Online Criminal Harms Act Competent Authority issued an implementation directive to Meta to put in place measures to target scam advertisements, accounts, profiles and/or business pages impersonating Government Office Holders on Facebook. The Government will consider further legislative levers as necessary.

Given the transnational nature of scams, Mr David Hoe asked if Singapore can establish a permanent joint disruption cell bringing together both governments and private entities in different jurisdictions. Mr Melvin Yong and Ms Lee Hui Ying asked if Singapore takes action against overseas scam syndicates. I agree with Mr Hoe, Mr Yong and Ms Lee that it is critical for governments to work together to disrupt scams and recover assets. To cite one example, in October 2024, the Police formalised FRONTIER+, an initiative to strengthen real-time intelligence sharing, improve asset recovery and coordinate joint operations among the anti-scam units of several jurisdictions. FRONTIER+ now covers 13 jurisdictions, including Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. We are actively encouraging other jurisdictions to join FRONTIER+. Between May and June this year, SPF conducted one of the biggest anti-scam operations with six other jurisdictions under FRONTIER+, which led to the arrest of 1,800 persons and the recovery of more than $26 million.

Mr Hoe also asked if the Ministry publishes regular updates on the number of scammers caught and their penalties, for deterrence. SPF regularly publishes its enforcement efforts through press releases following key operations, and via the biannual Scams and Cybercrime Briefs. For example, in the Scams and Cybercrime Brief for the first half of 2025, the Police reported that more than 3,500 suspected money mules and scammers were investigated, of whom more than 500 were charged. The Police also arrested 93 persons and investigated another 119 persons for their suspected involvement in providing fraudulently registered SIM cards for monetary gain. The message is clear – if you enable scams, even indirectly, you will face the full force of the law.

Mr Yong asked if we could do more to prevent vulnerable individuals, such as youths, from becoming scam mules. The Government has been running many public education initiatives to educate youths about the consequences of facilitating scams. For example, MHA has worked with MOE to conduct school talks and insert anti-scam messaging into advisories, which are disseminated to students in primary and secondary schools, as well as Institutes of Higher Learning.

Mr Hoe asked if more could be done to support scam victims and encourage them to come forward and make reports. The Police have developed a resource guide on what victims should do and the community support that they can seek. The guide is available in all four official languages and has been delivered to all households, with online copies available on the SPF and ScamShield websites. Where necessary, the Police may also refer victims to a Victim Care Officer for psychological first aid and crisis intervention.

Mr Hoe also highlighted the need to build a resilient public, and suggested gamification and making scam quizzes more accessible. I thank Mr Hoe for raising these ideas, which my colleagues will look into. I agree with him that we should consider new and creative ways to get the message across. I hope businesses too will consider these ideas and proactively help shore up their employees' digital defence against online threats including scams.

Ms Lee also asked about the Government's efforts to monitor the effectiveness of anti-scam public education tools. SPF periodically commissions surveys on the outreach and engagement performance of the Government's scam education initiatives. A recent survey to measure the effectiveness of Singapore's "I can ACT against scams" campaign found that 89% of the respondents felt that the campaign messages were easy to understand, while 84% said that the campaign motivated them to adopt anti-scam protective measures.

Mr Yong also asked if the Government would consider introducing anti-ticketing scam laws to tackle concert ticket scams. I thank the Member for his concerns and passionate advocacy on this issue. Over the past year, MHA and the Police have worked with secondary resale platforms, like Carousell and Facebook Marketplace, to disallow listings of resale tickets for high-demand concerts. MHA is also working with the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth, and Singapore Tourism Board (STB) to explore other measures to address concert ticket scams, including the establishment of authorised ticket resale platforms and consumer education campaigns. More details will be announced when ready.

Mr Cai Yinzhou highlighted that stiffer penalties alone will not be effective in dealing with the scams problem. Ms Sylvia Lim asked if the Government had considered other measures outside the criminal law to disrupt scam syndicates. I would like to assure the Members that introducing stiff penalties is not the only anti-scam measure that the Government employs. The Government adopts a whole-of-society approach to deal with scams, ranging from upstream measures to prevent scammers from approaching victims to the usage of technology to scale up disruption efforts. The Members may wish to refer to the Mid-Year Scams and Cybercrime brief published by the SPF for an overview of these measures.

Second, on the adequacy of the proposed penalties.

Mr Hoe asked if we relied on any benchmark in deciding the maximum number of strokes for scam-related offenders and if a ceiling of 12 strokes provides sufficient deterrence. In deciding the maximum number of strokes, the Ministry considered factors including the existing penalty regime for offences of a similar nature, such as unlicensed moneylending. We assess that 12 strokes is sufficient for now but will monitor the situation closely. The Courts will have discretion to decide the actual number of strokes, and will take into account the principle of proportionality that Mr Hoe talked about.

Mr Foo Cexiang asked if caning should be made mandatory for scam mules as well given that mules are essential to the scam enterprise. Mr Foo also asked if caning should be mandatory for scam-related offenders with a nexus to government official impersonation scams. Mr Xie Yao Quan suggested for the penalties for scams and scam-related offences to be increased and aligned with drug offences. I thank the Members for their suggestions and for their recognition of the severity of the problem. Scammers indeed rely heavily on the enablers provided by scam mules to deceive victims and profit from their scams. Dismantling this local ecosystem of enablers is essential to addressing the scams situation. Notwithstanding the need to deter scam mules, MHA recognises the need to be calibrated in our approach. In reality, scam mules have a range of culpability. Therefore, we have proposed for caning to be discretionary to allow the Courts to decide if the facts of the case warrant the application of caning. MHA will monitor the situation and adjust the penalties further if necessary.

Mr Fadli Fawzi and Mr Cai asked if leniency could be shown for mules who step forward as informants. An offender's degree of cooperation with the authorities and degree of remorse are already mitigating factors that the Courts may consider.

Mr Cai made the point that scam mules are often from vulnerable backgrounds and are incentivised to facilitate scams because of financial hardships. Perhaps, he has seen a recent The Straits Times article on crime gangs quoting an expert drawing connections between economic inequality and family-linked crime. The Government has many measures in place to uplift and support families and individuals in financial need. MHA's view on this matter, therefore, is that financial hardship cannot be used as a justification to facilitate or commit scams, or any crime for that matter. And as many Members have pointed out, scams are not victimless crimes. The victims can suffer permanent, irreparable harm, not just financial harm, but also severe psychological and in some cases, physical harm. To reduce such harm, we must be prepared to deter potential scam mules with sufficiently stiff penalties.

Third, Sir, on clarifications on the proposals.

Dr Wan Rizal asked if there would be sentencing guidance to clearly define the key roles in a scam to aid the Courts in distinguishing between the masterminds and low-level participants. Mr Yong asked if the sentencing guidelines would accord leniency for youths and those with intellectual disabilities. Today, the various scam-related offences already differentiate penalties based on the fault element. In general, the higher the level of culpability, the higher the maximum penalty for that offence. Where an offender has been charged for a particular offence, the legal burden will be on the Public Prosecutor to prove that all the elements of the offence, including the fault element, have been met. In sentencing, the Courts will consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, including mitigating factors, such as the offender's young age or intellectual capabilities. In August 2024, the inter-agency Sentencing Advisory Panel, chaired by Justice Tay Yong Kwang, issued sentencing guidelines for scams-related offences.

Dr Wan Rizal also asked if there was a checklist defining what counts as reasonable steps that an individual can take to ensure that an enabler would not be used to commit or to facilitate the commission of a scam. It would not be practical to provide an exhaustive checklist. It will be for the Courts to decide whether the steps taken, if any, meet the legal threshold, based on the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case. That said, all individuals should protect their Singpass credentials, payment accounts and SIM cards, and should not provide them to unknown individuals no matter what the unknown individuals claim they would be used for.

Mr Cai asked if the enhanced penalties can apply retrospectively to the 27 Singaporeans who are alleged to be part of the scam syndicate in Cambodia, if found guilty. The proposed penalties will apply prospectively. In other words, only those who commit offences after the enhanced criminal penalties come into force can be liable for them. This is provided for under the Constitution.

Mr Foo asked about the need to scope scam offences to deceit mainly by way of remote communication. A defining characteristic of scams is the substantial use of remote communications to reach and engage victims. Using remote communication allows scammers to significantly scale up their operations and frustrate law enforcement efforts by allowing them to reach victims without entering Singapore. They can, therefore, be far more insidious than traditional cheating cases and warrant the application of the enhanced penalties. We have been careful in the choice of words; in particular, we have chosen not to scope scam offences to deceit only by way of remote communication, as we cannot rule out the possibility of scammers making some form of physical outreach to victims as part of their modus operandi. Such scammers should not escape liability for caning because of this technicality. It will be for the Courts to decide whether each case meets the definition of scams as set out in law.

Ms Lim asked what led MHA to decide on tightening the penalties for scam and scam-related offences. MHA periodically reviews the adequacy of our criminal penalties. Specific to scams, MHA needed time to examine the deterrence effect of the new money laundering and Singpass offences that were operationalised in February 2024 and the new SIM card offences that were operationalised in January this year. We think there is strong public interest to tighten the penalties further now, and caning would be commensurate with the severity of the scam problem.

Mr Fadli suggested using recovered funds to finance scam victim restitution fund. As we stated in Parliament on 28 February 2025, we are studying various proposals, including the return of seized scam assets. However, there are significant difficulties with returning recovered assets through a restitution fund, and any such approach has to be carefully considered, as Mr Fadli himself has also pointed out.

Lastly, there were also some comments from Members that go beyond the scope of this Bill. Let me touch on these briefly.

Ms Lee raised the ongoing case involving Prince Holding Group. As this is beyond the scope of the Bill, I invite Ms Lee to file a separate Parliamentary Question with her detailed questions. But I will say that this case demonstrates the Police's ability to advance investigations against highly complex, large-scale transnational criminal networks. We will continue to work with our foreign law enforcement counterparts and financial intelligence units, as well as leverage domestic coordination platforms like the AC3N, which Mr Yong had earlier highlighted, to act against such organised crime groups and money laundering networks.

Ms Lim asked if the Extradition Act can be used in future to transfer suspects from foreign jurisdictions to Singapore and whether joint operations with foreign jurisdictions would occur more frequently. I invite Ms Sylvia Lim to file a separate Parliamentary Question on the usage of the Extradition Act as it goes beyond the scope of this Bill. But I would like to highlight that SPF regularly collaborates with their foreign counterparts to enforce against transnational criminal syndicates and in the first half of 2025, eight scam syndicates were dismantled through such joint collaboration. The syndicates must know that they cannot take refuge anywhere. The law will eventually catch up with them.

Mr Cai asked about the application of caning to offenders who are above 50 years old. And Ms Lee also suggested reviewing the maximum age limit for caning. The Government has previously explained that we do not intend to do so. First, the number of men above the age of 50 at the point of arrest for serious offences that attract the punishment of caning is significantly lower than that for men aged 50 years and younger. Second, an additional imprisonment term of up to 12 months can be imposed in lieu of caning.

Finally, on the amendments regarding young offenders. Mr Henry Kwek suggested the adoption of an age-sensitive charging approach for younger offenders. This is already the case today. Cases involving offenders below the age of 16 will generally continue to be heard in the Youth Court. The amended Children and Young Persons Act only provides that cases involving offenders aged 16 to below 18 may be transmitted to the State Court or High Court if they have committed serious or repeat offences. Even for such offenders, I would highlight that the prosecution retains discretion in deciding on the appropriate charge and whether to apply for these cases to be transmitted out of the Youth Court. In exercising this discretion, the Public Prosecutor will consider the full facts and circumstances of the case including the age of the offender.

Sir, the Government regularly reviews our criminal laws to ensure that they remain effective, fair and responsive to the changing environment. The proposed amendments enhance our efforts to maintain a safe and secure Singapore and I thank Members for their support. Mr Speaker, I beg to move.

Mr Speaker: Are there clarifications for the Senior Minister of State Ms Sylvia Lim?

3.48 pm

Ms Sylvia Lim: Thank you, Sir. I have one clarification for the Senior Minister of State. Earlier she mentioned Operation FRONTIER+, which is supposed to be a cross-border collaboration across jurisdictions for joint intel sharing as well as joint ops. My question is that she mentioned there are 13 jurisdictions under the platform. For the recent joint operation with Cambodia in September which I mentioned in my speech, it was not mentioned that it is under FRONTIER+. So, does this mean that Cambodia has actually not signed on to FRONTIER+?

Ms Sim Ann: At the moment, Cambodia is not part of FRONTIER+. However, we have both plurilateral as well as bilateral means of engaging our counterparts. So, even as we expand networks with different jurisdictions, it also does not prevent us from working bilaterally with them.

Mr Speaker: Any other clarifications for the Senior Minister of State? None.

Question put, and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House.

The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. – [Ms Sim Ann].

Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed.

Mr Speaker: Order. I propose to take a break now. I suspend the Sitting and will take the Chair at 4.10 pm. Order. Order.

Sitting accordingly suspended

at 3.52 pm until 4.10 pm.

Sitting resumed at 4.10 pm.

[Deputy Speaker (Mr Christopher de Souza) in the Chair]