Steps to Ensure Thales Signalling System is Safe for Use on MRT System
Ministry of TransportSpeakers
Summary
This question concerns the safety of the Thales signalling system on Singapore's MRT following train collisions at Joo Koon and in Hong Kong. MP Sitoh Yih Pin inquired about LTA’s safety measures, to which Minister for Transport Khaw Boon Wan responded that Singapore does not use the unique dual backup system involved in the Hong Kong incident. He explained that the Joo Koon collision was caused by concurrent system operations, a situation resolved by the full transition to the new signalling system. To further ensure safety, LTA and Thales established a local CBTC simulation laboratory for rigorous testing and software fine-tuning before implementation. This facility enables robust system design and has contributed to the significant improvement in rail reliability for the North-South and East-West Lines.
Transcript
2 Mr Sitoh Yih Pin asked the Minister for Transport what are the steps that LTA has taken to ensure that the Thales signalling system used on Singapore's MRT system is safe for operation in light of the train collisions at Joo Koon station in 2017 and on the Tseun Wan line in Hong Kong recently.
Mr Khaw Boon Wan: Ensuring the safety of rail operations is our top priority. The recent train collision on the Tsuen Wan line in Hong Kong is a reminder that we must always be vigilant every step of the way, from robust system design, to rigorous testing and commissioning, and responsible operations and maintenance.
The Thales SelTrac Communications-Based Train Control (CBTC) signalling system is an established product and has been adapted for use on 86 metros across 40 different countries. Hong Kong's Tsuen Wan line and Singapore's North-South and East-West Lines (NSEWL) also use the system. Each system is however custom-built to the metro's unique architecture and specifications, with software logic tailored for the local needs and conditions.
The Hong Kong authorities are investigating the 18 March 2019 train collision. This may take a few months. We will study the investigation report when it is available. There were media articles linking the incident to a dual backup system which was uniquely designed for the Tsuen Wan line's signalling system. None of our MRT or LRT lines use such a system. Regardless, we should avoid unnecessary speculation into the root causes of the incident until the formal investigation report is available.
The Joo Koon incident in late 2017 was due to complications from concurrently operating the NSEWL's legacy and new CBTC signalling systems on the same line. We understand that this was not the case for the collision on the Tsuen Wan line in Hong Kong. The NSEWL now operates entirely on the CBTC signalling system, so a similar incident to Joo Koon will not recur.
Arising from the Joo Koon incident, LTA invited Thales to set up a CBTC simulation laboratory in Singapore – the first of its kind in Asia, and the largest by Thales in the world. This has allowed LTA and SMRT to perform additional tests to fine-tune the CBTC signalling system's software and hardware before it is implemented on our rail lines. It has also contributed to the NSEWL's vast improvement in rail reliability.