Motion

Committee of Supply – Head J (Ministry of Defence)

Speakers

Summary

This motion concerns the budget allocation for the Ministry of Defence, with Members of Parliament highlighting the sobering lessons from the Russia-Ukraine conflict regarding small-state sovereignty and the intensification of US-China tensions. Members raised concerns about the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the Singapore Armed Forces' (SAF) training regimes, overseas exercises, and medium-to-long-term capability development plans. Inquiries were made to Minister for Defence Ng Eng Hen regarding the SAF’s operational readiness, the safety of servicemen, and the resumption of large-scale military activities as Singapore transits to living with the virus. The discussion emphasized the necessity of transforming into the Next-Generation SAF by leveraging unmanned technologies and artificial intelligence to address declining birth rates and emerging grey zone threats. Finally, Members sought updates on how the Ministry of Defence is strengthening its digital defences through the Cybersecurity Task Force to protect critical infrastructure from evolving cyberattacks and disinformation.

Transcript

The Chairman: Head J, Ministry of Defence. Mr Vikram Nair.

Security Trends and SAF's Priorities

Mr Vikram Nair (Sembawang): Chairman, I beg to move "That the total sum to be allocated for Head J of the Estimates be reduced by $100".

We live in a dangerous world. In the past week, we have witnessed Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the largest war on the European continent since World War II. The signs of this conflict had been brewing for a long time. The Russian troop build-up along the Ukrainian border had taken place over many months and various NATO countries, including the US, had anticipated conflict would break out.

Yet, when the time for fighting came, despite wide-spread condemnation from the international community, Ukraine had to fight alone against a much more heavily armed neighbour. This is an important reminder to all countries, particularly small ones like us, that we cannot assume other countries will come to our assistance when we are at war and we have to do all we can to defend ourselves.

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has brought to light some concerning methods of coercion, including "false flag" operations – essentially, disinformation campaigns – to create a pretext for war.

This is not the only hotspot. In the past year, we have witnessed other significant developments in the international security environment. The US-China rivalry has continued to intensify and we see that this is increasingly playing out in both countries' regulations in the trade and technology domains. We have also seen stronger rhetoric and action over Taiwan and this seems to be an increasingly likely catalyst if a conflict, intended or otherwise, were to break out between the two powers.

In recent years, commentators have also suggested that the trajectory of the international order will be determined by developments in the Asia Pacific. As a result, there is a discernible shift in the global centre of gravity and extra-regional countries are increasingly turning their attention here. This includes the European Union countries like the UK, France and Germany. In one view, this is a good thing as the more invested countries are in this region, the more likely they will play a role in balancing the powers in this region.

However, with this growing attention focused on the Asia Pacific, we have also witnessed the emergence of new security arrangements, such as the trilateral security pact between Australia, the UK and the US. The flip side of this is that there are concerns that such developments may have a divisive effect in the region or could, potentially, trigger an arms race.

Another trend that has emerged is the growing intersection between geostrategic issues and technology.

Technology is a major area of contestation in the strategic rivalry between the US and China. Technology is also being used by both state and non-state actors that seek non-conventional ways to coerce their adversaries, including through cyber attacks and information warfare.

Although Singapore is far away from the Russia-Ukraine conflict, I have seen messages being circulated in chat groups that seemed to be targeted at swaying public opinion in Singapore and I have my suspicions that such messages may be part of an info-operations exercise by foreign actors.

While the pandemic has pushed us in the positive direction in terms of leveraging and maximising the use of digital platforms, this has, arguably, left our societies more susceptible to digital threats.

Could the Minister for Defence comment on some of the trends in our security environment that MINDEF is watching? Could the Minister for Defence also provide an update on how these and other geopolitical security developments are shaping MINDEF's and the SAF's plans and priorities? How will MINDEF and the SAF respond to the challenges in our external environment and how will MINDEF and the SAF work with like-minded partners to address these threats?

Question proposed.

The Chairman: Mr Alex Yam is not here. Mr Vikram Nair, your next cut, please.

6.45 pm
Global Fight against COVID-19

Mr Vikram Nair: Chairman, as a small nation, Singapore's security is contingent on the stability of the wider region. Because of the open and interconnected nature of Singapore's economy, major destabilising developments elsewhere can have a very tangible impact on our lives here.

The ongoing battle against COVID-19 is a clear example of this. Even at times when Singapore has appeared to be managing relatively well with the virus, we have seen other countries struggling. Our dependence on trade and travel has also meant this virus would, eventually, find its way back to Singapore.

The SAF has played an important role in assisting our neighbours during times of crisis, including assisting with relief efforts, when neighbours faced natural disasters.

Over the years, the Minister for Defence has updated the House on MINDEF's and the SAF's efforts to cooperate with international partners to safeguard the peace and security in the region.

So, I have a question for MINDEF and the SAF and, that is, whether it is taking any steps to assist our neighbours in its battle against COVID-19. And, if so, how has it done?

COVID-19 and Capability Development Plan

Mr Shawn Huang Wei Zhong (Jurong): Despite facing the pandemic of a century, the SAF responded admirably. Essential operations were not suspended even during the height of the circuit breaker. The SAF has now vaccinated almost 100% of its soldiers, sailors and airmen.

However, last year, Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen spoke about delays to major SAF programmes and initiatives due to the pandemic. This would, undoubtedly, have led to an impact on SAF's medium- to long-term capability development plans.

COVID-19 has disrupted supply chains around the world. Would it also disrupt the supply chains for building the next generation platforms and technologies that the SAF is seeking to acquire?

In the same vein, I would also like to better understand how the pandemic has affected the SAF's ability to develop and test new training doctrines in overseas settings. I am well aware that there are some military manoeuvres that we simply cannot practise in land-scarce Singapore. And I am concerned that the COVID-19 travel restrictions over the past few years may have made it difficult for the SAF to pursue valuable training opportunities overseas.

Could the Minister explain how the COVID-19 pandemic has impacted the SAF's medium- to long-term capability development plans?

Training amidst COVID-19

Mr Don Wee (Chua Chu Kang): Chairman, the COVID-19 pandemic has caused huge disruptions. Our SAF training has probably been one of the more heavily impacted since limited aspects of Army training can be done remotely or online. In the early phase of the pandemic, Basic Military Training and National Service (NS) call-ups had to be suspended for a while. Some overseas training and exercises were affected due to travel restrictions as well.

Last year, MINDEF spoke about the resumption of some overseas training and large-scale exercises, after implementing stringent testing and safe management measures. I am glad that despite some disruptions, the SAF's training did not grind to a halt and that all parties managed to find ways to proceed with some exercises. The external threats to our nation do not diminish during pandemics. Hence, neither should our defence preparations and training. What is happening in Europe now is a stark reminder that security threats are not pandemic-proof.

As Singapore is moving forward with our calibrated approach towards resumption of most activities, I feel that we are in a better position now than we were earlier in the pandemic, as a significant proportion of our population now is vaccinated. In addition, our people are much more familiar with how to interact with one another safely, despite the sustained presence of the virus in our community.

Hence, would MINDEF share an update on SAF's training at home and abroad? Which parts of our training have returned to pre-COVID-19 levels?

NS Training amidst COVID-19

Mr Desmond Choo (Tampines): Chairman, as Singapore transits to living with COVID-19, the SAF has also, gradually, resumed training for NSmen. I note that this is not without the implementation of safe management measures, testing and cohorting arrangements, to ensure the safety of our NSmen. What are MINDEF's plans to recall NSmen in the coming year?

Many of our NSmen have not had the opportunity to participate in large-scale overseas exercises. Even while SAF successfully concluded Exercise Wallaby in 2021, the scale of the exercise was limited, due to concerns relating to the transmission of the virus.

Nations are now transiting to living with COVID-19. With global borders now gradually reopening, overseas exercises must continue to be scaled up to pre-pandemic levels. Can MINDEF share its plans to resume larger-scale overseas exercises in 2022?

The Chairman: Mr Vikram Nair. Mr Nair, if you would like to take your two cuts together, please do.

SAF's Operational Readiness

Mr Vikram Nair: Chairman, thank you. Even as we battle COVID-19, external threats persist. As we grapple with the pandemic and its effects, there have been new vulnerabilities for potential adversaries to exploit in order to target Singapore.

At the COS debate last year, Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen talked about disruptions to SAF's training activities as a result of the pandemic. He highlighted that there had been steady progress on resuming In-Camp Training and exercises, enabled by strict safe management measures and robust testing. The developments in the world that I have highlighted earlier make it imperative that SAF remains operationally ready and able to function at all times, even in this pandemic environment.

So, now that we are one year on, I would be grateful if the Minister can provide an update on how the pandemic has affected SAF's operational readiness and whether it is still able to move into operation if necessary.

SAF's COVID-19 Safety Measures

Training in the SAF is an important and necessary part of our nation's defence. And as I have mentioned in my earlier cut, it is important for such training to continue even during this difficult period. So, this is, in fact, the flipside of my earlier cut.

Now that SAF's training activities and operations are likely to require people to continue to work in close proximity – and these can be in camps, on ships, in military vehicles or even on exercises – there is clearly a risk of COVID-19 transmission. I also expect that SAF will need to work on scenarios on what will happen if parts of operational units come down with COVID-19.

So, I would be grateful if I can get an update, first of all, on what are the safety measures that are being taken to protect Servicemen in relation to COVID-19 and reduce the risk of transmission of serious illness arising from COVID-19. Secondly, what are the measures that MINDEF has taken to manage the risk of COVID-19 and to continue operating?

The Chairman: Mr Dennis Tan.

SAF Training and Combat Readiness

Mr Dennis Tan Lip Fong (Hougang): Thank you, Mr Chairman. In the last two years, COVID-19 has affected virtually all aspects of our lives. It has affected our workplaces, businesses, public offices, schools, events and many other areas. SAF and military training have not been spared, too. SAF had to overcome the challenges which COVID-19 might have imposed on its training programmes, training methodology, restriction of travel for overseas exercise and, possibly, our morale, due to restriction of activities, including cohesion activities, and so on and so forth. And all these without compromising SAF's combat readiness and maintaining the quality of its training regimes and programmes and the morale of our Servicemen.

The recent Russian invasion of Ukraine is a reminder to us of the importance of Singapore having a strong defence force as an effective deterrent against foreign aggression and ambitions. Both the quality and credibility of our defence force must be maintained at all times, regardless of the challenges, such as COVID-19.

At last year's COS, Minister Ng Eng Hen shared with the House that despite the challenges of COVID-19, protection of key installations, maritime security, air defence and counter-terrorism efforts continue around the clock. The Minister also shared that COVID-19 affected some training programmes, exercises and deployments. And while certain major exercises resumed with the help of safe management measures, it might require more time to restart other exercises or for training to reach pre-COVID-19 levels.

I hope the Minister can brief the House again on what was SAF's experience in maintaining its training regime and high-level of combat readiness last year, our second year of fighting COVID-19, and share with us the challenges which SAF had overcomed.

At last year's COS, Minister Ng Eng Hen also updated the House on the involvement of many SAF personnel to assist in COVID-19-related operations for the community, such as packing masks, stabilising the outbreak in dormitories, helping to set up the community care and recovery facilities, supporting contact tracing and medical logistics operations.

While I understand and agree with the support given by our SAF personnel in these areas, it also meant time-out from their training and their usual deployment or roles. As we head towards a post-pandemic world – and this includes more countries opening up their borders – I would like to ask the Minister what are SAF's plans to work towards the resumption of training and exercises back to a pre-COVID-19 level. Will SAF be enhancing training for all our forces and Servicemen and, in a sense, making up for their time spent away from our training or operational role as a result of COVID-19?

The Chairman: Ms He Ting Ru is not here. Mr Henry Kwek.

Next Generation SAF Transformation

Mr Kwek Hian Chuan Henry (Kebun Baru): Mr Chairman, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and, with it, a new world order, is unfolding before our very eyes. There are many lessons that we can draw from the new reality.

A strong SAF is vital in deterring potential aggressors and in protecting Singapore's peace and stability.

We cannot expect others to shed blood for us.

Therefore, we must work hard to build the Next-Generation SAF and stay ahead of rapidly changing defence and warfare. For example, with the rapid evolution of technology, interstate conflict may no longer manifest in conventional physical or kinetic modes. Conflict could instead be conducted through grey zone tactics below the threshold of war, or through attacks in the cyber and digital domains, where most of us now live and work following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. And even as the domains and modalities for conflict continue to expand and grow, existing threats to our peace and security, such as terrorism, remain salient.

I also recognise the importance of SAF ensuring that its platforms and capabilities serve as a credible deterrent to conventional military threats.

Indeed, any perceived weak point in our military capabilities is a vulnerability that could be exploited and the SAF must remain ready and prepared to respond to the ever-growing range of challenges to defend Singapore.

As a small country with a shrinking total fertility rate, we can expect subsequent National Service cohorts to similarly decrease in size in future. At the very same time, new technologies arising from the fourth Industrial Revolution, such as artificial intelligence (AI), digital analytics and the Internet of Things, offer new opportunities for SAF to leverage as a force multiplier to overcome manpower limitations.

I welcome the efforts to build the Next-Generation SAF, as MINDEF and SAF first announced in 2019. It is timely and necessary that SAF harnesses technology to respond better to security threats.

Could the Minister for Defence update the House on the progress of the transformation efforts towards the Next-Generation SAF?

Unmanned Technology

Mr Desmond Choo: Mr Chairman, our low birth rate is a significant challenge to Singapore's defence strategy. The number of full-time National Servicemen is projected to decrease. MINDEF and SAF will need to do more with less.

At the same time, new technologies have allowed us to better optimise manpower resources and complete tasks better, more efficiently and with less manpower. I believe that MINDEF and SAF have already made strides in this area. For example, at last year's COS, the Minister for Defence spoke about the inauguration of the Singapore Army's Headquarters Sense & Strike (HQ SS), which integrated various technology-enabled capabilities, to allow the Army to "see better and shoot faster" with less manpower.

The Minister also spoke about how new technology had enabled SAF to redesign more jobs. SAF can then tap on a larger pool of Servicemen to serve in roles that they would have previously been ineligible for under SAF's old medical classification system. This included being deployed to protect key installations, now augmented by unmanned watch towers.

SAF has been working closely with the defence technology community to leverage advances in technology to better support the needs of our defence strategies. The use of technology, such as drones, can significantly make up for a shortfall in personnel. Can MINDEF update on its plans to develop and intensify the use of unmanned technologies to ensure our defence strategies remain robust despite our declining population? How has MINDEF developed its concepts of operations to incorporate such unmanned technologies? How has MINDEF incorporated AI also into its defence plans?

The Chairman: Mr Gan Thiam Poh is not here. Mr Shawn Hwang.

7.00 pm
Emerging Threats

Mr Shawn Huang Wei Zhong: The ongoing hostility in Ukraine is difficult to ignore. The onslaught of cyber attacks that the Ukrainian government is facing shines a light on the nature of warfare in the 21st century. Battles are fought not just in the sea, air and on land, but also in cyberspace. Ukraine is not alone when facing such threats. Recent events have underscored that these attacks can be initiated by non-state actors. Major ransomware attacks have targeted critical infrastructure in different parts of the world, causing serious, real-world disruptions.

In fact, Singapore has experienced such cyber attacks as well. In the years ahead, it seems likely that potential cyber attacks will continue to increase in frequency, scale and complexity. If these attacks were to successfully target our military infrastructure and systems, there would be dire consequences. In the light of this, could the Minister for Defence provide views on how threats in the digital domain are evolving and what MINDEF and SAF are doing to better address these evolving threats?

Cyber Threats

Mr Patrick Tay Teck Guan (Pioneer): The cybersecurity threat landscape is constantly evolving in the current digital age. These threats, which include ransomware, denial-of-service attacks and advanced persistent threats, are originating further up the value chain by impacting operational technology and threatening critical infrastructure.

As a result, the effects of cybersecurity threats have left no stone unturned, as it has the potential to adversely impact governmental operations, global supply chains, healthcare systems and our military systems, among others.

On the defence and national security front, we have seen the increased prevalence of grey zone operations involving malicious cyber campaigns. At last year’s Committee of Supply, the Minister for Defence said that the Cybersecurity Task Force had been stood up, as part of SAF’s plans to monitor and actively seek out potential threats and aggressors in the cyber domain. I think this is a step in the right direction to shore up Singapore’s defences in the digital domain.

In view of this, I would like to ask the Minister for Defence for an update on the SAF’s ongoing efforts to enhance our military’s cybersecurity to address these emerging cyber threats.

Defence Relations with US and China

Mr Ang Wei Neng (West Coast): Chairman, the rise of China and the evolving geopolitical situation between China and the US had a global impact, especially on Singapore. When US President Richard Nixon visited China 50 years ago in 1972, the US was a superpower while China was seen as the sick man of Asia. In terms of nominal GDP, the size of China's economy in 1972 was just 8.9% of the US economy. But in 2020, China's economy became 70.3% of the US economy. It is projected that China's economy will overtake the US economy by 2030. The rivalry between the two countries has given rise to stiff competition in technology, innovation and defence build-up. As a result, Quad and AUKUS were formed to counter the influence of China. Many ASEAN countries, including Singapore, have been asked to take sides. We are being swept up in this current of geopolitical change.

I would like to ask the Minister for Defence what is the impact of the Quad and AUKUS on our relationship with the US and China and how does it impact the current Five-Power Defence Arrangement, or FPDA, which was started in 1971 as a third security arrangement involving Australia, New Zealand, Britain, Malaysia and Singapore? Will Singapore continue to welcome US nuclear submarines at our naval base and, eventually, host Australia's nuclear submarine when New Zealand had categorically said no?

In view of the COVID-19 pandemic, especially the latest Omicron wave, how does it affect MINDEF's engagement with its US and Chinese counterparts, including the joint exercises with these two countries respectively? Has the ongoing Ukraine war affected our defence relations with the US and China?

Defence Diplomacy

Mr Saktiandi Supaat (Bishan-Toa Payoh): Mr Chairman, as a small state, Singapore’s defence depends not only on our will and ability to defend ourselves, but also the strategic friendships that we maintain with other nations. Singapore is particularly vulnerable to shocks that take place in our external environment, often due to developments outside of our control. Hence, our cooperation with like-minded partners in areas of common interest is important.

As the world looks to step out of the COVID-19 shadow, I am glad to see that diplomatic meetings and engagements are starting to return. I imagine that virtual formats may not be the most conducive means to build mutual trust. The recent agreement signed at the Singapore-Indonesia Leaders’ Retreat is a good case in point. Notwithstanding that, I am sure that MINDEF and SAF have innovated new ways to keep up international engagements and advance partnerships in extraordinary times.

How are MINDEF and SAF cooperating with their foreign counterparts to address common security challenges?

It is also important to note that national security threats have evolved today and may now take less conventional forms. Instead of hot war or armed conflict, different threats, such as cyber attacks, hostile information campaigns and even future pandemics, might endanger our lives and livelihoods, equally or even to a greater extent.

In view of that, what are the principles guiding our defence diplomacy efforts? Will we see more agreements to conduct joint military exercises and our SAF training abroad, or for other types of cooperation like the cybersecurity MOU we signed with the US Department of Defence when US Vice President Kamala Harris visited Singapore last year?

Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with Indonesia

Mr Kwek Hian Chuan Henry: Mr Chairman, I would like to ask MINDEF about the implications of the Defence Cooperation Agreement with Indonesia for Singapore and for SAF.

The Prime Minister recently visited Indonesia for the Singapore-Indonesia Leaders’ Retreat hosted by Indonesian President Jokowi. Not only was the Retreat significant because it was the first Retreat since the COVID-19 pandemic, it was also successful in that it saw the signing of three sets of agreements that addressed longstanding bilateral issues under the ambit of the Expanded Framework.

I am heartened by the good progress that we have made in advancing our bilateral interests in issues, such as the Flight Information Region, extradition and military training, especially following the long-drawn discussions and negotiations on these issues, which started back in 1995.

One of the three agreements signed was a Joint Statement on the 2007 Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and its Implementation Arrangement between SAF and the Indonesian National Defence Forces for the Military Training Area in Indonesia. What does the DCA with Indonesia mean for Singapore, MINDEF and SAF?

Regional Security Cooperation

Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim (Chua Chu Kang): The recent crisis in Ukraine has thrown up stark reminders to all nation-states, big or small, that cooperation in times of need is critical. Globally, US-China tensions have polarised countries, both in our region and further afield. These have manifested in various geopolitical theatres, including the South China Sea.

Internally, many ASEAN countries are facing challenges domestically, economically and with the current pandemic. A region that is divided and distracted is not in our interest. Singapore should seek to facilitate stronger cooperation among ASEAN countries, given the increasingly complex regional landscape. The ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) is the region's security platform to engage in open dialogue and practical cooperation to foster regional stability. ADMM prides itself as being open and inclusive in this regard.

Can the Minister for Defence provide an update on MINDEF's efforts to foster greater cooperation through ADMM? Further, ADMM-Plus consists of eight other countries, including China, Russia and the US. ADMM and ADMM-Plus are the region's security architecture and are meant to contribute to regional peace and stability among all 18 countries. Given the developments in Ukraine, what is the impact on the work and security cooperation of both ADMM and ADMM-Plus?

Environmental Sustainability

Mr Don Wee: Chairman, climate change poses an existential threat to all humanity. The related crises arising from climate change have deep implications for international peace and stability. Singapore is one of the more vulnerable nations due to the rising sea level. We are already experiencing erratic weather patterns which wreak havoc with sudden downpours causing flooding. Changes in weather patterns are also affecting food supplies – a frightening prospect, as we rely heavily on imported food; exporting nations will prioritise their own nations’ needs first.

While Singapore may be limited in how we can contribute to global climate action, we should spare no effort as we have a strong moral obligation and duty.

Would the Ministry share an update on its measures to improve environmental sustainability and reduce carbon emissions within SAF and MINDEF? I urge the Ministry to continue with its systematic and comprehensive approach to sustainability, from reducing food waste to trying out green aviation fuel for RSAF’s fighter jets. I look forward to hearing more about its green initiatives, improved processes and enhanced inspections to prevent wastage, particularly for food and electricity.

The Chairman: Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen.

The Minister for Defence (Dr Ng Eng Hen): Mr Chairman, thank you for allowing me to reply to the Members' cuts. I will try to answer as many of the questions that they have asked. The others will be replied to by the Senior Ministers of State.

Mr Chairman, I state the obvious when I say that battling COVID-19 has been the central preoccupation of governments and their citizens all over the world in the last two years, including Singapore. If we think about it, very few events have that power and reach. In recent history, I think World War II did, and that shared experience had defined that affected generation. If you compare, COVID-19 is not as devastating as World War II, but many years on, I suspect that it will likely linger in the memories of all those who have lived through it.

But despite the singular challenge of this century, COVID-19, there is no respite, no temporary cessation of other challenges that pose security threats to Singapore, as some Members have observed. My Ministry and SAF have remained very focused on the security environment even as we went into the trenches to join the whole-of-Government in our fight against COVID-19.

The SAF’s core purpose, first and foremost, must remain to protect Singapore from all potential external aggressors. Mr Vikram Nair alluded to this, Mr Dennis Tan, too. And because we are a small country, with less space figuratively and literally to react, we need to recognise these threats early. For Singapore’s survival and well-being, the SAF not only needs to be always prepared, to plan long term and be well-organised, but also nimble to change, if we are to prevent or ward off imminent danger.

Therefore, despite our efforts to fight COVID-19, MINDEF and SAF have continued to plan in earnest so that we build the next generation SAF that is not only capable of meeting today’s security threats, but anticipating tomorrow’s, too. And I think that must be our approach. There will always be the unexpected threats, just like COVID-19. But the better the SAF is structured to deal with the known threats, the more bandwidth it has to deal with the unknown unknowns. I will deal with some of these initiatives later on, which Members have asked for.

But, first, let me put MINDEF’s budget this year in context.

This year, my Ministry will increase our spending relative to the past two years. Mr Shawn Huang asked about this. That increase is due to the resumption of projects, training and exercises which were disrupted by COVID-19 over the past two years. I should underscore that we continued to purchase and acquire new platforms despite COVID-19. But suppliers were also affected, causing delays. For example, deliveries of RSAF’s H225M Medium Lift and CH-47F Heavy Lift helicopters were delayed from end-2020 to March and May 2021, respectively. The delivery of our Invincible-class submarines, initially planned for last year, has also been delayed. For this year and beyond, projects deferred or delayed will resume, as will the acquisition of new platforms.

7.15 pm

Members have asked about training – Mr Don Wee, Mr Desmond Choo, Mr Dennis Tan and Mr Shawn Huang. SAF expects to increase numbers of training, both locally and overseas, to reach pre-COVID-19 levels later this year. Last year, we, indeed, had fewer overseas exercises and with fewer troops. For example, Exercise Forging Sabre in the US, with 800 personnel, Exercise Wallaby in Australia with around 580 personnel, much fewer than pre-COVID-19 levels. At home, NS training has progressively returned to normalcy and in-camp training call-up rates are on track to reach pre-COVID-19 levels this year.

With the planned resumption of both projects and training to pre-COVID-19 levels in the coming financial year, we are projecting an expenditure of $16.3 billion. This translates to an increase of 6.5%, which is expected to be one-off and a catch-up for the reduced spending for FYs 2020 and 2021. COVID-19 resulted in sharp dips and spikes but, over the next five years, MINDEF's budget is expected to keep pace with inflation, or 3% to 4% nominal growth each year, which I have assured this House previously.

The reduction in spending over the last two years did not occur at the expense of readiness. Members have asked about this – Mr Vikram Nair and Mr Dennis Tan. Indeed, SAF was able to operate at a high level of readiness and conduct critical operations amidst the pandemic. Soldiers within units were disciplined and kept to strict health and safety protocols, such as health screening for all recruits and instructors, training in smaller groups where possible, temperature taking, testing, and testing returning NSmen from their In-Camp Trainings (ICTs) every seven days.

Of our MINDEF/SAF personnel, 99.7% are vaccinated and 91% have received their booster shot. And that has helped us keep our infections at bay. I said that we were determined to keep building up the next-generation SAF – Mr Henry Kwek and Mr Desmond Choo asked for updates. Let me provide some details.

The Formidable-class frigates, first commissioned in 2007, are now 15 years old and due for their midlife upgrade. They are our key fighting platforms for maritime strike, anti-air and anti-submarine warfare, but the midlife upgrade, as we do for all platforms, will be more than just addition and alterations, if I can use the construction term. Because each time we do a midlife upgrade, we look at the technology that has evolved, our manpower, the design and, including artificial intelligence, if we can.

So, after the upgrade, the frigates' combat capabilities will increase and be equipped with better combat management and communication systems, weapons systems, along with improved maintenance processes – basically, to use less to achieve more. The next-generation SAF, which Mr Desmond Choo asked about, too, will have more unmanned systems across the three services. The RSAF has acquired the Orbiter 4 Close-Range Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (CR-UAV). And with their smaller size, capable sensors and increased portability, these can be used for a wide range of operations, in peace and combat.

This year, our Navy will deploy the first tranche of Maritime Security Unmanned Surface Vessels (USVs) to patrol local waters. The Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) will also replace its Mine Countermeasure Vessels with a fully unmanned system from 2027 onwards.

We are among the first few navies in the world to operate unmanned maritime systems. These systems were designed and integrated locally by DSO National Laboratories and Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) and RSN. DSO and DSTA are critical enablers.

DSO celebrates its 50th anniversary this year. We are immensely proud of and grateful for the men and women of DSO, who, for the past five decades, have worked hard behind-the-scenes to provide game-changing defence technologies and solutions. They have transformed the SAF into today's modern fighting machine.

Some Members would remember that at last year's Committee of Supply (COS), I spoke about the inauguration of the Headquarters Sense and Strike (HQ SS) and the HQ SS was able to participate for the first time in exercise Forging Sabre late last year. The Army will also operationalise the first Hunter Armoured Battle Group later this month.

With your permission, Mr Chairman, I would like to display an image on the screens.

The Chairman: Please do. [A slide was shown to hon Members.]

Dr Ng Eng Hen: The next-generation SAF is taking shape. You can already see its new form now, inchoate, but with greater definition as each year passes. By 2040, the Army, equipped in the next-generation infantry battalions and new armoured tracked carriers and howitzers, will be more manoeuvrable, able to track and strike faster and harder. The Navy, with Multi-Role Combat Vessels, Invincible-class submarines and USVs will be able to see and strike further at sea and in the depths, to better protect our waters and our sea lines of communication.

The next-generation air force, with F-15s, F-35s and the next generation Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, will be more lethal, versatile and effective to better protect our skies. This next-generation SAF will provide for this and the next generation, our children and theirs, greater confidence in dealing with potential aggressors to fulfil the SAF's core mission.

Many Members have asked how we navigate the increasingly complex geopolitical situation and rivalries. I am afraid no country has a magic formula, no Aladdin's lamp that you can make wishes from. Our philosophy is a simple one. We make friends with all countries and seek no enemies. But we are realists, too, and keen observers of history and events around us, and, especially what happens to small, vulnerable states.

We saw how Kuwait, an oil-rich state, was invaded by Iraq in 1990. We observed how Qatar suffered an air, land and sea blockade imposed by its neighbours in 2017, not so long ago. And at this very moment, we witness Ukrainians deeply troubled as they ponder over their future, balanced on a knife's edge. The unthinkable and unimaginable have occurred. Their cities are under bombardment and with foreign troops; their way of life, their dreams are shattered; their independence and freedom are under peril. Ukraine, with a population of over 40 million, is not a small country. But size and might are relative. For them, Kuwaitis and Qataris, these moments are about life and death, freedom or subjugation.

Indeed, we live by the dictum that the stronger the SAF, the easier it is to make friends and have fewer enemies. No one will defend Singapore as robustly if Singaporeans do not or cannot. But if we are able to build up the kind of SAF by 2040, can we be satisfied collectively, as leaders in the Government and Members of this House, that we have discharged our duties honourably and with satisfaction to our children's generation?

Some here might say, yes, because that kind of SAF is impressive. I think our founding fathers could not have envisaged that we could have come quite this far. It will, certainly, be among the most modern and better-equipped militaries in the region. But my honest answer is "almost there, but not quite", because, as good and as ambitious as the next-generation SAF is, there are some gaps in capabilities, which recent events and developments have warned us against.

And I am glad that Members of this House have warned us, too – Mr Vikram Nair, Mr Shawn Huang and Mr Patrick Tay. And I am talking primarily about threats in the digital domain. To complete that SAF 2040, we will need a fourth service to complement the existing three services. I will spend some time elaborating on this significant move as the reasons are important.

Let us characterise the digital threat, first, in broad general terms, to know what countries, including Singapore, are up against. The digital terrain has become as real as the land, air and sea domains for which we have raised the Army, Air Force and Navy. I think no one here doubts that. In fact, some would argue that, for the next generations, the digital domain is the dominant domain. So much so that a new word "metaverse" has been coined for that virtual universe.

Threats that emanate in the digital domain can readily impact events in a real physical world. That divide between virtual and physical, in security terms, is a false one as the two are, in fact, intricately interwoven. Again, I do not think anyone here would gainsay this. We already have real-life examples that exemplify this truth and Members have quoted it: fuel shortages across the US East Coast last May due to ransomware attacks on the Colonial Pipeline; Iranians could not top up their gas and petrol stations last October because the payment systems were hacked. There have also been clear examples of countries or non-state entities, like terrorist groups, that use a combination of attacks through both the digital and physical domains.

I first spoke about this type of hybrid warfare seven years ago in my 2015 COS speech, but, over the past few years, there have been many more examples of this type of campaigns. Even now, we are witnessing with our own eyes that kind of campaign in Ukraine. The Financial Times reported it, with the headline: "Ukraine shores up cyber defences" and this was on 14 February, so quite recent. Let me give Members some relevant quotes which provide vividly what to expect in this kind of attack: "The country has been under constant attack since 2014, cyber-espionage damage to databases and servers, disruption to powers and communications, and disinformation are all part of the playbook. The Ukraine government and independent experts expect hostile cyber activity to increase, in an effort to destabilise the country before or during any physical attack".

Another quote: "There are bound to have been many, many more attacks over the years that we do not know about and that have left malware embedded in systems ready to be activated" – this was a quote from Prof VS Subrahmaniam, who is a professor of Computer Science at Northwestern University in the US. He adds: "It is a bit like a bomb being planted in your house, is benign until someone sets it off". Another quote: "Ukraine meanwhile suffers from a deficit of public sector cyber security expertise, weak regulation, limited response capabilities and a lack of coordination between various agencies".

I think all of the Members would agree with me here that we can learn from this unfortunate situation. And far better to learn and adjust now, because if we wait and change only after an attack on ourselves, the cost is going to be very high. When we look at all these incidents in the digital domain, what then should our response be? Fortunately, our intelligence sources have not identified such orchestrated attempts to subvert or subjugate Singapore using hybrid means.

But, of course, that does not mean that the threat will never come. So, I think, we best prepare now with a longer runway. And for SAF, a clear-cut response is a fourth service. Internally, over the past decade, MINDEF/SAF have progressively built up what we call the C4I – Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence.

We built up that community to enhance the resilience of our networks and systems. We set up the Defence Cyber Organisation (DCO) in 2017, to coordinate cyber security across the defence sector, and Members of Parliament have filed questions and I have given updates. And some of you have asked for updates, even at this COS.

The C4I community and its predecessors, the Military Intelligence Organisation and Joint C4, have been supporting elements to the three other services for over 20 years. However, the demands and direct responsibilities on the intelligence community for both threats in the digital and physical world have risen sharply. If we take terrorism, for example, the role of the C4I community is not only supportive but a direct responsibility.

Members would remember that when 9/11 occurred, it was characterised as a failure in intelligence. Shortly thereafter, Members might recall that decisive actions by ISD, based on good intelligence, foiled a Jemaah Islamiyah plot to launch terrorist attacks in Singapore.

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The formation of a new service for the C4I community will greatly facilitate their mission focus, sharpen direct responsibility and accountability, and capability development. The human resource is particularly important for the intelligence services and having a Service status, just like Army, Navy and Air Force, will enhance recruitment and career prospects considerably.

The evolution of the C4I community into a new fourth service will integrate and expand our capabilities in the digital domain. But we will need more than that to deal effectively with digital threats from external aggressors that we expect will grow in number, sophistication and organisation. To achieve this, we will need not only an intelligence force but a dedicated digital force. The current DCO is building up such a force but it is insufficient for the SAF’s expanding needs and mandate. Figuratively, if the digital force is now a battalion force, we actually need a few brigades, perhaps even a Division-size force.

MINDEF and SAF have been considering these changes for some time now, exploring various options to better prepare for threats in the digital domain. Our conclusion is that a new fourth service – the Digital and Intelligence Service, or DIS – best encapsulates this fourth arm of the SAF.

DIS should not and cannot be just like the Army, Air Force and Navy, with similar troops operating in the digital domain instead of the physical domain. The nature of the digital domain and the threats therein require different skillsets, mindsets – what we call Tactics, Techniques and Procedures. I think that is intuitive to most.

SAF envisages that the type of soldiers you recruit for DIS, their training, force structure will be different. But some traits must be maintained for soldiers across the four services – the adherence to SAF core values, operational mindset, resilience that lead to mission success and, above all, a commitment to the shared mission to enhance Singapore’s security and peace.

Technology, especially related to IT and communications, will play a big role for DIS. But it will also require a force with specialisations not only in core IT areas and communications, but in diverse areas, including data science, psychology, linguistics, anthropology and geography, that will help them understand the motivation and means by which orchestrated state and non-state groups aim to harm Singapore.

The addition of this fourth service, the DIS, will allow SAF to better train and fight as a networked, integrated and expanded force to deal with the spectrum of threats that we know exist today, but also the digital domain that we know will increase in the future. Other countries have also come to the same conclusion and added a digital force to their tri-services. Germany, for example, has established the Cyber and Information Domain Service, consolidating its Communication and Information Systems Command and Geo-information Centre.

There are many procedures and processes to undertake to set up this fourth service, DIS. Notwithstanding this, we expect to set it up by the last quarter of this year.

NSmen form the backbone of the SAF, on land, air and sea and, in the future, also our digital domain. Whatever our plans, ultimately, it is the quality and commitment of our NSmen that will determine whether SAF can succeed.

This year marks the 55th anniversary of NS and, as we have previously done, we will have a number of events to recognise their contributions. We will put out more details in the coming months.

But we also want to make improvements to our NS system. These new initiatives are from the NS Review Committee, which some Members have asked about, which is chaired by the Deputy Secretary (Administration) of MINDEF and the Chief of Army. Three key changes are proposed.

First, to optimise our precious manpower resource, we will now use functional assessments as part of the pre-enlistment medical screening. I think Mr Lim Biow Chuan and Mr Mohd Fahmi Aliman asked about this. What are functional assessments? Compared to general physical assessments, functional assessments are a more precise gauge of whether the Servicemen can perform specific vocations. At the same time, we have redesigned 1,000 jobs so that more Servicemen can contribute in areas they were not previously eligible for.

Second, Make-Up Pay. And this has been a longstanding issue. I am happy to announce that better data management across Government services, agencies will now allow claims of Make-Up Pay to be streamlined and, yes, the magic word, automated. Streamlined and automated. There will be a default base NS pay which NSmen can claim for In-Camp Training. This will be especially useful for those in informal employment and training. The base NS pay is set at $1,600 per month and prorated for the duration of NS call-ups. Over 100,000 NSmen and 25,000 employers will benefit from the automated Make-Up Pay claims and base NS Pay.

Third, we will increase the NS HOME awards, with higher cash components – an extra $2,000 in cash to each National Serviceman.

Senior Minister of State Heng Chee How will provide more details on these changes, as well as several others.

This four-service Next Gen SAF, with committed and capable NSmen, will better position Singapore to deal with both conventional and emerging threats. Our deterrence depends on a strong Next Gen SAF. That is the main prong. But another prong is good relations, which many Members have talked about, particularly defence relations, with like-minded partners.

Mr Ang Wei Neng and Mr Saktiandi Supaat asked about our approach. As a small country, Singapore needs as many friends as we can have. Having a strong network of defence partners has allowed us to build up our defence capabilities, train overseas and cooperate on strategic issues critical to our security.

In the past year, we maintained high-level defence engagements. For example, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin made his introductory visit to Singapore in July and we concluded a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Concerning Cooperation in Cyberspace with the US Department of Defense in August. With China, I met Minister for National Defense General Wei Fenghe virtually in June. The RSN held joint naval exercises with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army via a “contactless” modality twice last year.

With India, we signed an MOU in January for the SAF to conduct weapon firings in India’s Chandipur Integrated Test Range. We renewed the Singapore-Vietnam Defence Cooperation Agreement in February. We have also concluded new defence cooperation agreements with a few Baltic States, to institutionalise our professional exchanges. This is interesting. We decided that the Baltic States were of interest and this happened before Ukraine. Now, we are even more interested. So, I think that cooperation will bear more fruit.

Closer to home, we conducted Exercise Safkar Indopura with the Indonesian Army in November, the first physical exercise between our Army and a foreign counterpart. In January, Indonesian Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto and I signed a Joint Statement on our agreement to bring into force the 2007 Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and its Implementing Arrangement between SAF and the Indonesian Armed Forces for the Military Training Area in Indonesia.

Mr Henry Kwek asked what the implication of this is. The DCA will strengthen the strategic relationship between our defence establishments and promote closer interaction and cooperation between our armed forces.

Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim asked about our approach to ADMM-Plus and ADMM. It is, indeed, the de facto multilateral defence grouping in Asia, and we have taken the lead on tackling threats in the cyber and information domains by establishing the ADMM Cybersecurity and Information Centre of Excellence, which now provides monthly reports for all ASEAN Member States. Similarly, SAF’s Counter Terrorism Information Facility (CTIF) has been in operation since 2020 and 11 foreign liaison officers are stationed there. The CTIF produces timely and actionable counter-terrorism intelligence.

I am also pleased that, this year, the Shangri-La Dialogue will resume in June physically, after a two-year hiatus.

Mr Chairman, let me also update Members on MINDEF/SAF’s major green initiatives, which Mr Don Wee has asked about, which I announced at the last COS, to reduce the growth of overall emissions by two-thirds by 2030.

The SAF Sustainability Office, led by SAF’s Chief of Staff-Joint Staff, has convened an external panel comprising experts to provide insights on implementation plans to meet our sustainability targets.

Members have asked for updates, let me give some. By the end of this year, about a quarter of SAF camps will have solar panels installed to deliver 20 megawatt peak of electricity. This is equivalent to the consumption of around 5,000 4-room households. By 2025, it will jump from a quarter to two-thirds of our camps generating 50 megawatt peak of electricity. Smart Metering Systems will also be installed to track electricity and water consumption automatically, starting with Jurong Camp, Paya Lebar Airbase and Changi Naval Base.

RSAF has commenced trials for the use of green fuel for its F-16 Fighting Falcons. These efforts and others will help us meet our emission targets by 2030.

I am thankful that Members of this House have supported our budget each year. On MINDEF and SAF’s part, our responsibility is to spend prudently and effectively to build a strong national defence, as I have detailed.

But it is gratifying to me, and to Members here, too, that SAF is a national asset to deploy in situations like the current COVID-19 pandemic. When Singapore experienced a resurgence of cases due to the Delta and Omicron variants, MINDEF and SAF personnel were called upon to assist MOH to provide operations planning capabilities, staff contact tracing, call centres or to man emergency departments. SAF also stood up the Home Recovery Task Group to better manage the home recovery programme for patients, and NSmen also helped as Home Vaccination Teams and Mobile Vaccination Teams. Our defence scientists and engineers contributed a variety of support systems.

Members have asked how we helped overseas. And, indeed, we did, beyond Singapore’s shores. Last year, SAF’s Changi Regional Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Coordination Centre coordinated the transfer of medical equipment and supplies to regional countries worst hit by COVID-19, including the shipment of over 500 tonnes of oxygen at Indonesia’s request as part of the "Oxygen Shuttle" programme.

Mr Chairman, let me thank Members of this House for their steadfast commitment and support for a robust national defence through a strong SAF. This year, particularly because of the events in Ukraine, I think Singaporeans need less convincing that it is our collective responsibility to keep Singapore safe and secure for ourselves and successive generations. So, we were pleasantly pleased that others were saying the right things on behalf of MINDEF and SAF, and of their own convictions, of course.

But I think salutary lessons have sunk in and, indeed, some Singaporeans have sent me emails. Let me just quote from two of them.

One is from Mr Tee KH: “I used to take my in-camp training as a ‘holiday’ camp till I realised how important it is to defend Singapore when Iraq invaded tiny Kuwait. Now a retiree and from the Merdeka Generation, I reminded my son who is serving NS to take his training seriously. The greater the force of dutiful citizens who are actively serving their country, defending the weak, fighting for freedom and doing what is right, the better chance that wars will end quickly and the less chance wars will even begin.”

The second is from Mr Cheng CF: “If Singaporeans don’t defend our country, nobody will help us. I am 67, a retired NSman. But as long as I am fit, I will not hesitate to don my uniform again to help my fellow Singaporeans to defend our country. This is my country, my home and soil.”

As long as we have Singaporeans who share the deep resolve and conviction that Mr Tee and Mr Cheng shared, then, I say, our future remains secure. [Applause.]