Protection from Harassment (Amendment) Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

The Senior Minister of State for Law (Mr Edwin Tong Chun Fai) (for the Minister for Law): Mr Speaker, on behalf of the Minister for Law, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."

Sir, Tim Berners-Lee introduced us to the World Wide Web in 1989. Thirty years later, more than half of global population – 4.4 billion – are active Internet users, 3.5 billion of which are on social media. The ubiquity of technology, the way it is embedded in every aspect of our everyday lives, is a given. It has gone beyond just being a useful tool to help us perform tasks to becoming the primary means by which we search for information, we communicate, and we socialise. It is commonplace to see families, groups of friends, all sitting around a table, all looking down at their phones. Some figures to demonstrate the widespread use of the Internet and social media are as follows: Google handles more than 5.5 billion searches each day; there are 2.27 billion monthly active users of Facebook; there are 500 million tweets which are sent each day on Twitter; and almost five billion videos are watched on YouTube every day.

Singaporeans are at the vanguard of growth in internet use. In 2017, Singapore, alongside Sweden, topped the Global Inclusive Internet Index. This index measures the adoption and ease of access to the

Internet. There is no question about the benefits of the Internet and social media, and the convenience that they bring to our lives. But these benefits also come at a price.

In exchange for this convenience, we have in turn bestowed significant power on the social media companies. We voluntarily surrender personal data to them, exposing the most intimate details of our lives on social media websites. We are often unaware that websites and companies are collecting and amassing our data, without our knowledge, until perhaps a scandal breaks.

Last December, Facebook admitted that it had struck deals with companies like Netflix, Spotify, that allowed them to read, write and delete private messages of users. Google Plus, for instance, on two separate occasions last year, admitted that it had exposed personal data of over 50 million users in total to third party developers. After the first discovery, that mistake was hidden from the public for over half a year. Amazon’s Alexa, as another example, an "always on" device in our homes – Bloomberg recently revealed that the team charged with auditing commands given to Alexa had access to customers’ home addresses and other personal information. Alexa also recorded private conversation and sent it to a user’s acquaintance.

In short, there is no adequate way to moderate and control how this information is used, or shared by others. And it is not a simple matter of a leak of data, or loss of privacy. Many of us think that we still have some measure of control over our privacy. Some brush off loss of privacy, saying it is a worthwhile exchange for the convenience and benefits that technology brings to us. But we fail to recognise that the digital traces that we leave online can be connected and thereafter shared with others. There are wide-reaching, and sometimes devastating repercussions that could occur.

There are some key areas of concern for us and I will enumerate them.

First, on cyberbullying. Cyberbullying is, really, traditional playground bullying transmuted into an online new digital form. In many ways, it is more insidious than traditional bullying. There is anonymity, and there is a lack of a physical confrontation and it allows people to engage in conduct that they may not ordinarily engage in, in normal daily life. The effects are more wide-ranging, more long-lasting. The abusive comments that are put up can be permanently displayed on the Internet. They are broadcast to a large online community. And in truth, the victim has nowhere to hide.

In our 2014 Second Reading speech on this Bill – POHA – the Government highlighted alarming trends about cyberbullying. Since then, matters have grown worse and I will cite a few numbers to this House. In 2017, a survey commissioned by Talking Point found that three out of four children and teenagers had reported being victims of cyberbullying. In a 2019 Google survey, teachers in Singapore view the need to prevent cyberbullying as the most pressing concern when it comes to teaching children about online safety.

The consequences of cyberbullying can be dire. The Journal of Medical Internet Research published a study last year and showed that cyberbullying raised the risk of self-harm or suicidal behaviour amongst young persons by 2.3 times. The latest research suggests that bullying may cause physical changes in the brain, increasing the risk of mental illness. Studies have also shown that bullying in childhood has effects that last into adulthood as well. Mental problems including anxiety, depression, suicidal tendencies, poor general health, lower educational, financial and social functioning. Many suffer in silence and we may not know until it is too late.

In Singapore, for instance, it was reported a few years ago, that a 13-year-old girl was bullied by her friends on Facebook and in a WhatsApp group. She started cutting herself with metal rulers and razor blades as a result, causing injury to herself. In the US, a 12-year-old girl in Florida hung herself after being subjected to cyberbullying by two 12-year-olds: rumours about having sexually transmitted diseases, vulgar name-calling and the like. In the UK, a 17-year-old boy in Manchester stepped in front of a train after he was called a "black rat" and "ugly" online, both by people he knew and also by people who were complete strangers to him.

The second area of concern is in doxxing. Doxxing is the disclosure of personal information to cause violence or harassment to others. The term was originally used in 1990s to describe a tactic used by hackers. They would release dossiers of personal information about other hackers, to breach their anonymity and expose them to harassment. We are familiar with some local examples: the Caltex incident, Members would know; about the couple who pushed the old man at Toa Payoh hawker centre; and of course, the Anton Casey case, where he had to leave Singapore as a result.

Some may say, these people get what they deserve. But doxxing has a darker side. It has been used as a political tool by extremists. In the US, an ISIS-linked group published names, addresses and phone numbers of 1,400 mostly US military and government personnel, urging supporters to attack them. Can you imagine if you were one of these 1,400? In New Zealand, in the wake of the Christchurch terror attacks, an anti-gun control Facebook group posted contact details of the Queenstown detective online. One post featured an image of a rifle and words, "Come and take it". You can imagine how dangerous this information is, and can be, in the hands of wrong people.

Some other examples. In New York, an 18-year-old boy, a gifted violinist, killed himself after his roommate live-streamed him behaving intimately with another man, to 150 people. Also in New York, a journalist, Asher Wolf made anti-war posts online. Her address was shared on the dark web, and people posted dog faeces through to her, in her mailbox. In South Africa, a journalist, Karima Brown. Her contact details were published on Twitter by the leader of the Economic Freedom Fighters. She received an onslaught of graphic messages threatening rape and murder. Some threatened to expose her flesh by peeling her skin off. Finally, in Boston, there was a mis-identification of the Boston bomber. After the Boston Marathon bombings, online citizens on Reddit wrongly identified Sunil Tripathi as the Boston bomber. The family received hundreds of threatening and anti-Islamic messages, even though they are not Muslim.

Third, the area of falsehoods. Falsehoods are disseminated even more easily today for a number of reasons. First, the psychology of Internet users. Internet users are prone to confirmation bias. They have shorter attention spans, people skim, rather than critically evaluate content. They tend to share information because it triggers an emotional response more so than because of its credibility. Users generally share links without even having read them. When content gets shared enough times, it seems and appears more credible.

There is also a market for online disinformation tools and services. Fake social media accounts commonly used to spread falsehoods. "Click farms" consisting of large number of low-paid workers can be used to sell video views, "likes" and even votes. For instance, Members will probably know, that one million Instagram "likes" can be bought for US$18 and 500 re-tweets for US$2. Bots can sometimes take the place of these low-cost workers as well enhancing the spread of this online disinformation. Other online influencers can also be paid to spread false content, and clickbaits can be used to profit from Internet traffic.

Falsehoods affect people, real people in real life, as well as entities. Some examples. It affects those close to home. One of our local actresses: messages were circulated suggesting that she had an STD. She started receiving messages such as: "Are you a prostitute?" and "Heard you have STD. Get well soon." Lewd comments continued to surface even after the facts were put out and it affected her reputation even when she tried to venture overseas.

Recently, the Select Committee on Online Falsehoods heard from a new citizen, Mr Hetamsaria, falsely identified in an article as a new citizen who was disappointed with Singapore and considering giving up his citizenship. The article was shared over 44,000 times on Facebook. The family was deeply affected by numerous xenophobic comments made about them.

Just last week, there was fake news on Facebook that a veteran of our local acting scene, Lim Kay Tong, received a 16-year sentence. In truth, this was a clickbait. When users clicked on the link, it led to a recipe for tikka. Another linked to a recipe for pumpkin spice cheesecake. But the impact of the clickbait was self-evident. There was also fake news circulating on WhatsApp claiming that Fandi Ahmad was taken into custody for hurting someone. Again, a clickbait.

Falsehoods about companies can cause them irreversible damage, set off a public relations nightmare and cause economic damage. Even giants like Coca-Cola are not immune. There have been stories claiming that clear, parasite worms were found in bottles of Dasani across the country. Several hundred people had been sent to hospital as a result. That FDA had shut down a manufacturing plant. Coca-Cola, of course, denied this, as did the FDA.

NTUC FairPrice, closer to home, was affected by multiple rumours. In 2007, a photo suggesting NTUC sold halal pork circulated on the Internet. Similar rumours later affected Ya Kun Kaya Toast and a Yong Tau Foo business at Westgate shopping mall. In 2017, Members would recall that there was a post going round social media suggesting that FairPrice’s house brand rice was made of plastic. All untrue.

Studies paint a bleak picture of a world where the spread of falsehoods over social media is quick, wide and pervasive, whilst truth, even if it corrects the original falsehood, lags far behind. An MIT study analysed 126,000 rumours that spread on Twitter over 12 years. The study showed that rumours travelled farther, faster, deeper and more broadly than truth in all categories of information. The study showed that tweets which perpetrated a falsehood about the Ebola virus being transmitted by air, outnumbered tweeted corrections by 2.7 to one.

Another study by the Journal of Experimental Psychology indicated that repeated exposure to a false statement on social media made it more believable.

And, finally, in a University of Buffalo study, 20,000 tweets during Hurricane Sandy and the Boston Marathon bombing showed that 86% to 91% of active twitter users spread falsehoods. Nearly as many did nothing to correct that.

It is self-evident, partly from what I have seen and partly I am sure from Members' own experience, that the Internet is almost impossible to control, akin to a lawless jungle. As in any jungle, the weakest and most vulnerable are disproportionately affected. Recent surveys showed multi-racial females have the highest risk of being harassed online. Adolescent girls are more likely to experience cyberbullying than boys. Seventy-five percent of children with autism are bullied online. Seventy percent of children with physical defects are bullied online. LGBT teens are at five times more at risk of being abused on Facebook than non-LGBT teens.

This online harassment translates into real world violence. One in three women in the US experiences domestic violence. Nearly 90% of domestic abuse shelters and programmes report that abusers have intimidated and made threats against them using electronic means. An Australian survey found that 98% of domestic violence practitioners reported clients who experienced technology-facilitated abuse.

We cannot trust the Internet companies to regulate this jungle. Why? Because their primary motivation is the pursuit of profit. In an internal company memo, Facebook Vice President Andrew Bosworth in June 2016 claimed that any growth, any growth on Facebook was good. Let me quote the memo, he said, "Maybe it costs a life by exposing someone to bullies. Maybe someone dies in a terrorist attack coordinated on our tools. And still, we connect people. The ugly truth is that we believe in connecting people so deeply that anything that allows us to connect more people more often is de facto good." This memo leaked two weeks after the Cambridge Analytica scandal broke.

There is not enough transparency in how administrative standards are derived and enforced. There is no democratic process and no court process. Facebook only made public its community standards in 2018 after the Cambridge Analytica scandal erupted – 14 years after Facebook was first founded. People have no faith in social media giants to contain harassment. Users have complained that social media companies have taken days to address their complaints about harassment, if at all.

A poll in the UK this year showed that more than half the reports that women lodge about harassment on Facebook are met with either no response or response that the behaviour did not breach their own community guidelines. A Singaporean girl saw a Minister to complain that she had her picture put up on Facebook by a male acquaintance, along with derogatory remarks containing sexual innuendo. She wrote to Facebook, whose response was, that it did not violate their community standards.

Last year, a US Democratic strategist received threatening tweets. He complained to Twitter, which said it did not violate rules against abusive behaviour. The man later sent pipe bombs to politicians, and then, at that stage, Twitter said its earlier assessment was wrong. The actress who accused James Franco of sexual misconduct was also repeatedly harassed on Instagram. She made a report to FBI and said that Instagram ignored almost all her complaints.

Tech companies have admitted that they are unable to deal with some of these problems. So, we need a solution.

The amendments to POHA today, give power to the people so that the man on the street can take back the truth and find a way to reclaim his dignity. We seek to simplify the process to make it easier for the man on the street to get recourse, to get redress; make clear what remedies he can get; enable him to tackle falsehoods and harassment once they are published; enable him to put the truth out there, to counter falsehoods that may affect his livelihood, or in the case of a company, its business.

So, first, let me take Members back to our first attempt in 2014 to deal with online harassment holistically, when this piece of legislation was first enacted. This, as Members will recall, was the first piece of legislation dedicated to protecting victims of harassment, both offline and online. It laid down clear norms as to what constitutes unacceptable social behaviour. The presence of this framework encouraged victims to come forward to seek help, to seek redress. To date, more than 3,000 Magistrate’s Complaints have been filed under the Act. Over 1,700 prosecutions have been brought. About 900 convictions have been obtained. There were 500 applications for protection orders under this Act of which over 200 such orders were granted. These numbers demonstrate how important POHA has been as an avenue of relief to victims of harassment.

In introducing the revisions today, we have taken keen interest in feedback on POHA from at least three groups. First, the Courts. Second, the civil society groups. And finally, from the victims of harassment themselves. Let me sketch out the feedback that we have obtained, given to us by these three groups, which have been instrumental in shaping the amendments behind this Bill.

First, the process of obtaining relief under this Act. It is clear to us that processes under POHA can be simplified further, made cheaper and also faster. The current process of applying for an expedited protection order (EPO) and protection order (PO) can be streamlined. The forms can be made simpler. Some victims have said, they feel that they need the assistance of a lawyer to navigate the current process. Currently, applying for a PO costs about $300 to $500. In contrast, there is a simpler and more inexpensive method to apply for a personal protection order (PPO) under the Women’s Charter.

Those victims who choose instead to file a Magistrate’s Complaint face some difficulties. First, the outcome of the complaint often turns on the conclusion of police investigations. Victims do not know when these investigations might conclude. A victim who has filed a complaint with the Magistrate, does not have the benefit of the protections afforded by a PO. If a PO is necessary, the victim has to separately apply for one in the civil courts. We can simplify the procedure, so that a victim does not have to provide evidence of his or her harassment more than once. We can also ensure that we prevent the duplication because reliving the experience only causes further mental anguish for the victim.

Second, feedback received is that the courts should also be given more powers when making orders. In particular, the scope of the POs should be widened. It should cover related persons of the victim, as harassers often target persons close to the victim in order to get to the victim. The courts should be able to order offenders to be sent for psychiatric assessment and treatments where appropriate as there are cases where mental illnesses may well be the root of the offender’s behaviour.

Third, it was suggested that POs should also be given more bite. At present, a breach of a PO is not arrestable. This perceived lack of severity might be another factor which deters victims from coming forward and applying for POs.

Further, our attention was also drawn to a specific group of victims – victims of intimate partner violence. These are often victims in a romantic relationship. They may be dating or married. If unmarried, they do not qualify for protection under the Women’s Charter, which only protects victims of family violence. Some might assume that it might be easier for an unmarried victim to break off the abusive relationship. However, the psyche of an abused partner is sometimes the same, whether married or unmarried. The intimacy of the relationship allows the abuser to create a psychological hold over the victim and makes it difficult for the victim to break free. Research shows that romantic love can sometimes be like an addiction.

A PAVE study in 2012 in Singapore, showed one in three unmarried persons between the ages of 15 and 34 were found to be in an abusive relationship. Of these, two-thirds had their first abusive relationship in their teens. On average, for 20% of those who were abused by their spouses or were themselves abusers, the abuse started when they were first dating.

Let me highlight the case of Mdm A. She dated a man for five years, they had five children. Dating violence started in the first year of their relationship. The man began by shouting vulgarities at her. It escalated to physical violence – he hit, kicked, slammed her face on the floor, threatened her with a knife. And all of this, in front of the children. He threatened to kill himself or the children and abused the children. He would follow Mdm A everywhere and track her whereabouts via calls, texts, GPS. When Mdm A decided to seek help, she could not apply for a PPO under the Women’s Charter as she was unmarried. Her first child who did not carry the man’s name on her birth certificate was in same position. She could only apply for PPOs for the other four children. Mdm A and her children had to go to a crisis shelter, where they are living now. The man is in a new relationship.

There are other such cases and I am sure Members themselves will be familiar with their own experiences. We need to find a way for people in intimate relationships, who are the subject of serious abuse, to get POs more easily. PAVE, in particular, highlighted this strongly to us and has advised the Government on how best to deal with the situation. As a result, we amended the Penal Code yesterday and are proposing amendments to POHA today to further strengthen the recourse.

We have carefully considered the feedback, some of which I have sketched out, from stakeholders alongside the need for greater regulation. We will improve the process of obtaining relief from the Courts. Let me start with that in the Bill. The Bill has a new part 3A, which will establish the Protection from Harassment Court (PHC). The PHC will be dedicated to dealing with harassment matters, whether online or offline, and will have oversight of all criminal and civil cases under the Act. It will be sited in the State Courts and will have the jurisdiction of a District Court. The judges will be specially trained to deal with harassment matters. Volunteers will be on hand to help victims navigate the court process.

In egregious cases, it may not suffice to grant the victim a civil remedy in the form of a PO. The law may need to deal with the offender even if the victim has not already gone to the police. In the Bill, there is a clause 18 which imposes a duty on a judge granting the EPO to consider whether a criminal investigation is warranted. So, the Court has a proactive duty to look at facts, circumstances in the course of granting the EPO. If it is, the judge must refer the matter to the police. The intention is for serious cases of hurt or harassment which come to the court to be referred to the police. This will ensure that the State can intervene, and intervene at an early stage to reduce the risk of further or greater hurt to the victim.

In addition, we are taking measures to help victims to meet the burden of proof. Clauses 16(1) and 17(1) provide that if the respondent has been convicted of a hurt offence under the Penal Code, or a POHA offence, the requirement to show that the respondent has contravened POHA will be deemed satisfied. In other words, the victim will not have to prove his or her case more than once.

In terms of streamlining procedures and expediting timelines, we have worked with the State Courts to do so, so that the process for applying for a PO under POHA will, as far as possible, be aligned to that under the Women’s Charter. The victim will be able to file an application for a PO using a simplified form, at the PHC or online. Relief will also be quicker and more permanent. Clause 17 will ensure that EPOs will be in place until conclusion of proceedings unless they are successfully challenged. The victim will no longer have to renew the EPOs every 28 days. The hearings will also be conducted more quickly. The PHC will aim to conduct hearings for EPOs within 48 to 72 hours of application. Where there is an element of violence involved, the PHC will try to conduct hearings for EPOs within 24 hours of the application.

The PHC will aim to conduct hearings for final POs within four weeks of the application. The timelines, of course, will be subject to practical constraints. For example, if an application is filed over the weekend, the Courts may only be able to hear it on the next working day. Applicants should of course, always seek police intervention if they are in immediate physical danger. Finally, should the Court decide to stay proceedings for a PO under the new section 13A pending a criminal investigation, it may take longer for a PO to be granted. However, in that situation, an EPO will be in place until the PO is granted. We hope that these measures will relieve some of the anxieties that an applicant faces when invoking the court process and encourage those in need to come forward.

Next, in terms of enhancing the protection for harassment victims and related persons. We will enhance the protection for these categories of person, expand the scope of POs and the powers available to the Court when granting a PO. Let me explain. First, clause 16(1) widens the ambit of POs to deal specifically with the situation where an offender may publish a harassing communication which is then shared by others. A PO can now be made to prevent the publication of communications which are, not just identical, but also substantially similar to the offending communication. In addition, clause 16(2) clarifies that Internet intermediaries can be ordered to disable access to an offending communication published on their platforms. This is to try to clamp down on harassing communications going viral, or spreading even further.

Second, clause 16(2) extends the scope of POs to protect related persons of the victim. This will ensure that individuals such as Mdm A, in my example, will be able to obtain POs for herself and her children, rather than have to live with the abuse and to worry about potential harassment or abuse to her children.

Third, we have acted on feedback that the Courts should be empowered to proactively intervene in cases where the harasser’s conduct may not cross the threshold of criminal or dangerous conduct, but where the facts demonstrate that the harasser is mentally ill.

Clause 19 empowers the court to order the respondent to undergo a psychiatric assessment after it grants a PO and undergo psychiatric treatment if certain criteria are fulfilled. And the criteria are: that the respondent must have a psychiatric conditions susceptible to treatment, capable of being treated. The respondent must be suitable for treatment. The psychiatric condition must have contributed to the contravention that formed the basis for making PO, having a nexus with the conduct complained of.

The criteria and nature of the treatment will largely mirror the treatment regime under the Criminal Procedure Code, with appropriate safeguards. Failure to comply with the orders will be punishable as contempt of Court.

Two further amendments in clause 16(1)(a) clarify the law. POs can be obtained against entities who commit contraventions under the Act. The common law principles of attribution will apply. This will address cases that have already been brought before our courts, for example, where wayward companies might have crossed the threshold of lawful debt collection into criminal behavior such as intentional harassment or violence in the context of conducting their lawful activity. So, harassing, intentional harassing sometimes violence in the context of carrying out their debt collection.

Companies may have sent different runners to harass a victim. Victims can now obtain a single PO against the company and they do not have to bring each runner who conducts each of these harassing acts to Court each time.

Domestic exclusion orders are available under the Act. These orders, which are also available under the Women’s Charter, will allow victims to exclude a harasser from their shared residence. This is so even if the harasser has a proprietary interest in the residence.

We are also taking measures to strengthen the recourse available to victims and increase the deterrence factor of the remedies available under the Act. First, clauses 4 to 10 and 13 clarify that entities can be liable for contraventions under the Act. They can be prosecuted or sued for damages and the common law principles of attribution will apply. This will discourage entities from allowing their employees to harass customers.

Second, this House heard yesterday about amendments to the Penal Code to double penalties for offences committed against vulnerable persons. Under the proposed POHA amendments, clause 10 provides that penalties for POHA offences against vulnerable persons, be they adults or children, will likewise be doubled.

Third, we spoke earlier about the pressing need to protect victims of intimate partner violence. The Government has amended the Penal Code to provide for enhanced penalties for specific offences committed against intimate partners. In a similar vein, clause 11 of the Bill doubles the penalty if a POHA offence is committed against an intimate partner.

We are also taking steps to ensure that a harasser who reoffends is also dealt with severely. At present, as I mentioned earlier, breach of a PO under POHA is not an arrestable offence. This is in contrast with the position under the Women’s Charter. In response to concerns that POs issued under the Act are perceived as ineffective, we propose to amend the law. Clause 22 provides that if a harasser breaches a PO, this will be arrestable in prescribed circumstances, such as where hurt is caused or where the harassing conduct persists despite the issuance of a PO. In addition, clause 9(b) provides that if a harasser breaches a PO more than once, he will be liable on subsequent conviction to twice the maximum punishment prescribed. This also brings the Act in line with the Women’s Charter.

I turn now to online harassment. I spoke earlier about the scourge of technology when not handled properly. I would like to turn to amendments that have been targeted towards online behaviour and harassment.

First, on doxxing. To understand the basis of the doxxing amendments, let me first highlight a case that might fall through the cracks today. A Singaporean girl, whom I shall not name, was in the middle of her "O" levels. She discovered edited photographs of herself on a Tumblr blog with pornographic content. She started receiving unsolicited messages on her social media platforms. One day, she noticed a man following her home. Her former best friend, it turned out, had emailed her full name, photos, address and names of the school and tuition centres that she attended to over 60 porn blogs. With this knowledge, she retreated from her social interactions, afraid to even leave her home. This young girl was a victim of harassment. However, the email sent by her friend to the porn blogs, despite its malicious intent, may not have been caught by existing POHA provisions which require communications to be "threatening, abusive or insulting" in themselves.

The doxxing amendments are an extension of the existing provisions on harassment and seek to deal with this lacuna in the law today. Clauses 4(a) and 6(d) introduce the offence of doxxing. For this offence, the intention or knowledge of the publisher is key. Doxxing will be made out if the person published identity information of another person: intending to cause harassment, alarm or distress; intending to cause the victim to fear that unlawful violence will be used against him or another person, or to facilitate unlawful violence against the victim; or knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the publication is likely to cause the victim to fear that unlawful violence will be used against him or another person, or to facilitate unlawful violence against the victim.

Identity information is defined as information that on its own or with other information identifies, or purports to identify, the victim. This includes photographs, contact details, address and place of employment.

The new offence will not affect most people, who continue to engage constructively on the Internet. It does not stop them from: identifying the perpetrators of crimes, including traffic offences or POHA offences or, indeed from posting videos of public disputes to give a factual account of an incident. On the other hand, publishing someone’s contact details to netizens intending to harass or alarm that person, or intending that other netizens use the information to harass or hurt the person, is unacceptable. Publishing photographs and contact details of a girl, intending that others use those details to harass her, is likewise unacceptable.

There have been concerns raised that the new doxxing provisions could be too broad. These similar concerns were raised about the existing harassment provisions back in 2014. Harassment is heavily fact specific and doxxing is a subset of that. It is no different. The law today in fact, with these amendments, adds clarity. Doxxing is currently prosecuted through a mix of provisions arising in different pieces of legislation. Courts will now be able to develop a body of jurisprudence on when the offence made out and, furthermore, existing case law on when intent is made out in the circumstances can be relied upon.

Other concerns have also been raised about whether the new provisions can deal with anonymous posters. Let me deal with that. Anonymity not a new issue under the Act. Minister Shanmugam, when he spoke on this Bill in 2014, addressed this. Even if the respondent or publisher is anonymous, he may be identified by an Internet location address, website, or other unique identifier as the court may order. In addition, POs are binding, even if the person behind the account may not be identified. The POs can be served on multiple accounts as well.

As with the other victims of harassment such as cyberbullying and intimate partner violence, a victim of doxxing will be able to avail himself of the streamlined processes and expedited timelines as well. The court may order that the offending communication be taken down by the offender and persons who have shared the original post or substantially similar posts. Where appropriate, the court may also order that an Internet intermediary disable access to the offending post. And finally, where an EPO involving online doxxing is involved, the Court will aim to hear the application within 24 hours.

Let me now turn to online falsehoods. First, in terms of setting the context. Aside from doxxing, the Bill also enhances existing measures available to address the spread of falsehoods by repealing and re-enacting the falsehoods regime. The falsehoods regime under POHA aims to help individuals to give recourse and redress against the effects of falsehoods whilst, at the same time, striking the balance with the right of people to hold their own opinions and debate matters of interest.

Broadly, POHA categorises the remedies available by types of orders which are available, split into five categories. Section 15 deals with the final orders which can be given in cases of falsehoods and section 16 deals, amongst others, with interim orders for the same. This is similar to the approach taken in section 12, which makes a PO available against both persons, entities and Internet intermediaries. In contrast, the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Bill has distinct parts dealing with individuals versus corporate entities – and these are found in Part III and Part IV of that Bill.

For the avoidance of doubt, the falsehoods regime under sections 15 and 16 POHA, and clause 20 of the Bill, deals with false statements of fact. This includes misleading statements but does not cover criticisms, opinions, satire or parody.

Let me make this clear. First, a statement that omits material facts is misleading if the statement would have been considered by a reasonable person to be misleading by reason of such omission. If for example, A says that B is dishonest, that is a statement of opinion and not a false statement of fact. However, if A goes on to say that B was convicted by a court of cheating, then this is a false statement of fact if B was never convicted of such an offence. This is also false if B was subsequently acquitted on appeal.

Debate resumed

Mr Edwin Tong Chun Fai: Thank you, Mr Speaker. Going back to my example. The statement is also false if B was subsequently acquitted on appeal, because the statement conveys a false meaning by reason of its omission of B’s subsequent acquittal. Once a false statement about a subject is established, clause 20 sets out five orders that may be available to address it. Interim relief will be available for all orders save the General Correction Order. This was necessary given the speed at which online falsehoods can now spread. Interim relief can be obtained ex parte in the case of interim stop publication and interim notification orders, both of which are targeted at individuals or entities which publish falsehoods. In the case of interim disabling orders and targeted interim notification orders, which are directed at Internet intermediaries, notice of the application first has to be served on the Internet intermediary. This is because the Internet intermediary is not directly responsible for the falsehood, and should be given a chance to explain its position in court, should it wish to contest the application.

Let me explain each order in turn and start by saying that all of the orders, save the General Correction Order, are already available under the Act today. As is the case under the current Act, the Court will not make any of these orders unless satisfied, amongst other things, that one, the statement being complained of is false; and two, it is just and equitable in the circumstances to make the order being sought. The test of when it is just and equitable to grant a section 15 order has been set out by our courts in case law. It is a flexible one, taking into account various factors including but not limited to the nature of the false statement; the seriousness of the allegation made; the degree to which the statement has been publicised; whether the subject of the false statement has the means to publicise his or her own version of the truth.

A stop publication order requires a person or entity not to publish a false statement or any substantially similar statement. It is already available today as I have mentioned. The orders have been amended to include substantially similar statements. This ensures that publishers cannot game the system by simply amending the statement slightly, but such that it is still false.

As with the present regime, stop publication orders can be taken out against multiple individuals or entities and the applicant need not take out separate applications against multiple persons. Anyone who publishes the false statement or a substantially similar statement is bound upon service unless the court has dispensed with service. This deals with the situation where an anonymous user may use different online accounts to publish the same false statement. This will be covered by the order, regardless of which account is used.

Next, on correction orders. These are available today, but fleshed out in the amendment Bill. I spoke earlier about how falsehoods travel faster, deeper and more broadly than truth; and that repeated exposure to false statements on social media make them more believable.

Correction orders seek to address this problem. There may be cases where it is not enough to order a respondent to stop publishing a falsehood, and it may be necessary to go beyond that to require the respondent person or entity to put the truth out there.

The respondent in such a case will be required to publish a notice online or in a printed publication, stating that the statement in question has been found to be false, and correcting the false statement. The respondent will also be required to make the notice available to persons, or specified description of persons, as determined by the Court.

Next, on disabling orders which are available today. They can be made to require an Internet intermediary to disable access to a material containing a false statement on the Internet intermediary’s platform, so that it is no longer available to viewers.

Next, targeted correction orders which are also available today. They are in like vein to correction orders but can be made against an Internet intermediary. It requires an Internet intermediary to distribute a correction of the false statement to viewers of a false statement on the Internet intermediary’s platform. So, it carries the corrections on the platforms.

Again, the purpose of this is to ensure that where the false statement has been published by way of the Internet intermediary service, the truth is made accessible to viewers of the false statement.

Finally, the general correction orders which are new. Let me describe them.

They can be made where the Court is satisfied that serious harm to the reputation of the subject, whether professional or otherwise, has been caused or is likely to be caused. Unlike the other orders, they operate against a prescribed third party who has not been responsible for the publication of the false statement. This third party, as an example, could be a news outlet, broadcaster, or Internet intermediary.

The prescribed third party can be required to publish a notice stating that the statement in question has been found to be false, as well as a correction of that false statement.

The rationale of this? Well, the ubiquity of technology nowadays means that falsehoods may spread across several different platforms. It may start on one; it may carry through to one or several others. It might be difficult to identify who has been exposed to a falsehood.

As mainstream purveyors of information, prescribed third parties have a sufficiently wide reach to help to correct viral falsehoods which are particularly serious or persistent.

What are some of the safeguards? As this order imposes obligations on third parties, interim relief will not be available. The third party should be allowed to fully contest the claim if it wishes to, before an order is granted. However, a victim can still rely on other forms of interim relief to stop or stem the spread of the falsehoods, such as the disabling order or interim stop publication order.

In terms of the relevant procedure for these orders, the same streamlined process I mentioned and also, expedited timelines will apply.

The PHC will aim to conduct hearings for the interim orders within 48 to 72 hours of application, and given the speed at which online publications can go viral, the PHC will aim to hear the application for an interim order within 24 hours of application if the false statement has been published online, subject to any requirements to give notice.

The interim order will remain in place until it expires or has been cancelled.

As with POs, the PHC will aim to hear applications for final section 15 orders within four weeks of application.

Finally, non-compliance with orders will be punishable with contempt, which is similar to the current regime, and contempt only if non-compliance is intentional.

For those who want to appeal against an order under section 15, they will still need to seek leave under section 21 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act.

In light of the decision by the Court of Appeal in AG v Ting Choon Meng, which ruled that only individual persons have recourse under section 15, clause 20 of the Bill states that both individuals and entities can apply for remedies under section 15.

As with the other remedies under POHA, the Government will not have recourse under section 15 – Government will have to rely on the Protection From Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act which is currently, still a Bill.

Likewise, section 15 orders can be made against both individual persons and corporate entities, but not the Government.

Allowing entities to seek relief will ensure that the companies and their staff do not suffer, lose their livelihoods, as a result of falsehoods.

Mr Speaker, Sir, after five years, we have introduced a significant number of amendments to keep pace with changes in technology, and to be responsive to feedback as to the ease with which applications can be brought, and relief granted.

The Bill builds upon an existing eco-system to deal with harassment, and to offer victims recourse and redress.

It is equally integral to this eco-system that there are the many volunteers, psychiatric institutions, the police, the news agencies, schools and many others. They are all part of the eco-system and we are grateful for their efforts in highlighting harassment issues and broadcasting the remedies available, and also assisting with the victims.

Finally, I must underline the fact that the levers that we have devised under the Act are designed to be responsive in nature. They offer protection, recourse and redress.

At the end of the day, harassment is a social problem which requires a concerted social response. We all bear a responsibility for ensuring that harassment is not perpetrated, or escalated. This is the surest way to provide victims with protection. We should not tolerate any harassment or violence, least of all those which occur in an intimate partner or family setting. Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move.

Question proposed.

12.51 pm

Mr Christopher de Souza (Holland-Bukit Timah): Sir, this Bill makes our regime against harassment and spreading falsehoods more effective. The legal protection from harassment is as relevant today as when the Protection from Harassment Act was first enacted in 2014.

Cyberbullying is one of the social ills that the Protection from Harassment Act has sought to address. In 2014, a survey by Singapore Children’s Society and the Institute of Mental Health of more than 3,000 students aged 12 to 17 found that one in nine had been victims of cyberbullying. In 2018, Channel News Asia’s Talking Point surveyed 353 youths aged 13 to 19, finding that three in four had been cyberbullied and almost all had not informed their parents.

Besides amendments to the criminal law addressing voyeurism, revenge porn and cyber flashing, a protection order under the Protection from Harassment Act is capable of ordering published images that cause harassment, alarm or distress to be taken down.

There are several commendable features of this Bill.

First, clause 22 makes contravening a protection order an arrestable offence in certain circumstances. This should be welcomed as it would allow for a prompter response especially when someone is at risk of getting hurt.

Second, this Bill criminalises doxxing. Social media can proliferate information that can be used to harass. Whether it be through pictures in school uniform, consistent patterns of posts, family pictures, pictures taken near a person’s home, the point is there is a lot of information online that can be pieced together at strategic times to harass a person, and his or her family. Furthermore, online words can spark offline consequences and things can spiral out of control. Therefore, the amendments we are debating today in POHA are crucial and timely. For example, in China, because a person’s ca-plate number was a partial match to a car belonging to a driver who had spat on a homeless elderly, the "human flesh search engine" caused a person who had consistently protested his innocence to receive blackmail calls, threatening to burn his house down.

People who speak up about something controversial also get doxxed. Threats to safety, threats to family members, harassment at work – these are all possible consequences of doxxing.

Third, the other ways the provisions have been strengthened include extending the protection under protection orders to the person’s related to the victim, making it clear that entities can avail themselves of the protection under the Protection from Harassment Act, enhancing the penalties if a contravention of a protection order was between a person and his or her intimate partner or if it was towards a vulnerable person. This is to be welcomed.

Fourth, the Bill broadens the kinds of orders that can be made, particularly with respect to false information. For instance, instead of requiring a person to stop publishing it unless he or she also publishes a notification drawing attention to the falsehood and what is true, a correction order, stop publication order, disabling order, targeted correction order, and general correction order may be ordered under clause 20. What would be especially useful are interim orders as the falsehoods may be spreading quickly. In some of these orders, there are additional criteria which need to be fulfilled beyond the just and equitable basis. For instance, in the new section 15E, a general correction order requires that the publication of the false statement of fact must have caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of the subject. For an interim disabling order in the new section 16AA, the additional requirement is that it has caused or is likely to cause the subject harm.

Here, I seek a clarification of the Senior Minister of State: Is the harm in this section limited to physical harm, or would it extend to other forms of harm? Here, I would point out that there is a specialised definition of harm only for the new section 8A in clause 10(e) which is "any physical harm; harassment, alarm or distress; or being caused to believe that unlawful violence will be used against the victim."

On the topic of general correction orders which I have raised above, the Bill will allow general correction orders to be made against third parties, such as internet intermediaries. Therefore, it could be envisioned that expenses can be incurred by such third parties in complying with and adhering to such orders.

Thus, my question is: does the Bill ensure that such third parties are not put out of the pocket for trying to comply with these orders.

The fifth point, Sir, is more of a clarification than a position. It is to be noted that the current section 15 already has the phrase statement of fact. This section will be repealed in clause 20. Is the meaning of "statement of fact" in clause 3 meant to be different from how statement of fact is to be understood in the current section 15?

Sixthly, this Bill makes the overall process quicker and more accessible, primarily by setting up the Protection from Harassment Court, governed by its own rules of procedure and evidence per clause 24(h). There are several features of the Bill which make it easier for litigants in person. For example, the proposed section 13B mandates that the court explain to the respondent in ordinary language the purpose and effect of a mandatory treatment order, consequences if the respondent fails to comply. Beyond these useful initiatives, are there any other measures in place to ensure that victims of harassment and abuse are given sufficient assistance when they approach the courts for help?

Seventh, the press release says that the Protection from Harassment Court (PHC) aims to hear applications for expedited protection orders within 48 to 72 hours of application, with applications involving risk of violence or actual violence within 24 hours. How long does the process currently take and would the Minister share what resources will be deployed to the PHC so that the suggested tight deadlines are met?

In conclusion, Sir, the Protection from Harassment (Amendment) Bill is to be welcomed as it strengthens the anti-harassment regime in Singapore. As a result, Singaporeans stand to benefit. Therefore, I support the Bill.

1.00 pm

Mr Pritam Singh (Aljunied): Mr Speaker, the changes proposed to the Protection from Harassment Act or POHA by this amendment Bill are very significant, in my view, falling into three broad categories – outlawing doxxing, establishing the Protection from Harassment Courts with faster processes, and enhancing judicial powers to deal with false statements of fact made against individuals and companies. The Workers’ Party supports the Bill.

I will speak on five general matters where I seek clarifications about the application of certain clauses in practice. I will also highlight one important area where I feel the Bill falls short in my view.

First, the problem of doxxing. Sir, victims in cases of doxxing normally start as perpetrators – they behave in an outlandish, loutish or uncivilised manner. They are shamed, often through social media with videos of their actions shared and distributed widely. This in and of itself is not the issue and the public must be clear that posting and sharing such of examples of behaviour is not circumscribed by the Bill, even if other company specific regulations or codes of conduct apply.

So, for example, if an individual says that he had to wash the stench of SMRT or SBS commuters off his body because he had to take public transport for two weeks that his Mercedes Benz or Bentley was in the workshop – and he is then pilloried online for such crass remarks – that in itself would not be caught by the Bill. What happens however in such cases is that the public approbation that ensues has the potential of inviting vigilante justice against the perpetrator and a real risk of personal harm when the private information of the perpetrator is revealed.

This has become a growing problem. In some cases, netizens would release identity information such as the perpetrator's place of work and contact numbers and other personal information, ostensibly in the pursuit of a sense of justice. Others, however, may release the information with malicious intent.

To this end, clause 6 of the Bill is helpful because it illustrates and clarifies what particular factual circumstances can operate to give rise to the offence of doxxing.

Nonetheless, there may be a challenge in other cases, particularly borderline cases where the intent of the individual releasing identity information does not neatly cohere with the offence and illustrations in the Bill. For example, there may be a case where an individual's identity information is already online and another online commentator posts a hyperlink to it with an innocuous comment like, "This person is a lawyer and yet he behaves in such a way" – the actively revealed information being uncontroversial – in this case, the occupation of the individual. However, the hyperlink reveals other personal information like place of work and contact numbers, for example. In such a case, it would be arguable whether the comment and hyperlink together meet the threshold of intent as required under clause 4 of the Bill. What would be Minister's view on such a scenario? Would the individual who made the comment, and including the hyperlink, be guilty of an offence in such a case?

A second issue could be doxxing carried out by anonymous users on popular third party Facebook pages, something which requires active moderation to combat, a resource most social media sites and Facebook page moderators may not have any real bandwidth to undertake. Would such sites be found liable for the offence of doxxing where there is no intent on the part of the moderators of the page to harass, but because of the ecology and anonymity provided by the Internet, doxxing ensues nonetheless?

Secondly, enhancing protection for victims of intimate partner violence (IPV).

My second clarification involves enhancing the penalties for offences against a victim in an intimate relationship with the offender under clause 11 of the Bill. A corollary purpose of the amendments under the Bill are to bring the Protection Orders and Expedited Protection Orders regime in line with the Personal Protection Order regime under the Women's Charter. I believe these are important amendments, providing better protection for individuals, particularly women, who may not be married but are in an intimate partner relationship and suffer from intimate partner violence or IPV at the hands of their spouses.

I read Minister of Law's speech at PAVE's Dating Violence Awareness Week Event at *SCAPE in February and the stories shared on intimate partner violence (IPV) and separately, how PAVE's activism and engagement directly resulted in the amendments in this Bill to address current gaps in the law. Indeed, according to the World Health Organization (WHO), the overwhelming global burden of global IPV is borne by women. However, according to the WHO, IPVs also occur in same-sex marriages as well. Can I clarify if the remedies proposed under this Bill can be sought by individuals who are not married but are in same-sex relationships?

Thirdly, the boundaries of the definition of misleading under the Bill.

Sir, clause 3 of the Bill explains that "a statement is false if it is false or misleading whether wholly or in part, and whether on its own or in the context in which it appears". The Bill targets both a false statement and a misleading one. While there exists an objective legal test for determining whether a statement of fact is false, can the Minister confirm how the Government expects the Courts to interpret the boundaries of a statement that is misleading in the context of the new remedies provided for under the Bill. I understand from the Minister's Second Reading speech that a reference to the omission of material facts would make out what misleading is. But this may not be without controversy and I will try and use a hypothetical example to explain this point.

An individual has made a statement against a black metal band two weeks before it is due to perform, encouraging others not to attend the performance, leading to a loss of revenue and poor ticket sales that can be attributed to the onset of a viral online campaign by an individual. The statement released by the individual that is headlined in bold goes like this: "People who listen to black metal music may commit violence in the real world", alongside pictures of individuals with heavily tattooed faces. From the standpoint of the black metal band, whose music may undoubtedly not be everyone's cup of tea, the statement is misleading because all sorts of people may commit violence in the real world.

Therefore, a statement can potentially be misleading if it does not cover all the relevant facts or represent the matter fairly, and the choice of which facts are chosen usually turns on where you stand on any given matter, philosophically, politically or morally, for example. In this scenario, what remedies will be available to the band under the new clause 20(1) of the Bill? I understand there is a corpus of literature on misleading statements when it comes to Securities law. It would be helpful if Minister could share with the House and lay members of the public what the appropriate test would be in the case above, where real damage, for example, is done to the band.

Fourthly, the Protection from Harassment Courts and the speed at which they are expected to deal with falsehoods.

Sir, clause 20(8) of the Bill creates a specialist court, the Protection from Harassment Courts, that have oversight over all criminal and civil matters under the Bill. A key feature of the Bill is the adoption of simplified procedures involving a straightforward claims form for victims of harassment and the doing away with having to initiate an application through an originating summons, something which more often than not, requires the hiring of a lawyer. This is to be welcomed, especially for those who seek urgent relief.

A second important feature of the Bill is the speed at which the Harassment Courts will hear applications. For example, in the case of Expedited Protection Orders, where there is a risk of violence or actual violence, MinLaw has indicated the Courts will aim to hear the application within 24 hours. I have one clarification in this regard, and this not is with respect to EPOs, but to victims of falsehoods online where virality is a real concern and applicants can rely on a variety of remedies under the Bill.

MinLaw has stated and I quote, "Courts will be empowered to make relevant interim orders to provide victims with urgent relief". This was in the statement released on 1 April after the First Reading of the Bill. It was not made clear how long that timeline would be. But I understand Minister has now clarified that it would follow the regime under the Expedited Protection Orders (EPOs). Even so, let me use an example to suggest why in certain cases, this may not be satisfactory.

In Minister Shanmugam's comments on the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Bill, a Bill which I will refer to as POFMA, Minister made comments to Channel News Asia on 13 April, and he used an actual example of the financial markets, where, I quote, "the founder of a bitcoin company had died; the news was put out deliberately by somebody, I think, seeking profit. Within a period of four or five hours, billions of dollars were wiped out from the value. Lots of innocent investors lost money." Clause 3 of the Bill clarifies that an entity can seek relief under the Bill and an entity is defined to mean any company or association or body of persons whether corporate or incorporate.

It follows therefore, that a company in Minister's example, the bitcoin company, provided that it was domiciled in Singapore, could apply urgently to the Harassment Courts for perhaps a general correction order to arrest further damage which gives the Court powers to make the appropriate order or the applicant could rely on the other remedies available. The term here is the expedited relief that is sought. In such a scenario, how quickly will the Courts hear such an application given that significant damage, using the Minister's example, can occur within four to five hours? Or does the Bill envisage a faster hearing for the applicant, given that the death of a founder who has actually not died would easily meet the prima facie threshold of an interim order?

To that end, it would appear that in some cases, the Courts may have to move faster on online falsehoods affecting individuals and companies, and hear applications perhaps in even less than 24 hours. Is such a shorter application hearing timeline within the contemplation of the Bill for individuals or entities who seek very urgent relief, failing which significant damage or losses would inevitably increase with every passing hour? If so, how quickly can the public expect the Harassment Courts to hear an interim application in the case of an online falsehood against an individual or entity? And more generally and equally important, would the remedies provided for false statements in such a scenario necessitate filing a summons and affidavit as is currently the case, or does the Ministry seek to introduce a quicker and simpler filing procedure akin to a simple form as envisaged for expedited protection orders (EPOs)?

Finally, orders relating to false statements of fact.

Sir, clause 20 repeals the existing sections 15 and 16 and broadly replaces them with a stop publication order, a correction order, a disabling order, a targeted correction order, a general correction order and various other orders in cases where a prima facie case is made out. These are far reaching remedies, largely identical to those the Government has sought under POFMA and they can be imposed upon any individual or entity and applied for by the same. While much of the attention of the public has been focused on POFMA since the first readings of both Bills, but for the man on the street, POHA will be the law they can avail themselves to, with a view to take action against other individuals or entities who peddle falsehoods against them, in addition to applications against Internet intermediaries like technology companies. I have two clarifications here.

First, in view of the costs incurred by the applicant and claimable under the new section 16CA, I note these apply specifically to general correction orders. However, the explanatory statement to the Bill at page 71 appears to suggest that costs can be ordered regardless what type of remedy is ordered by the Courts. Is there any particular reason why the clause as drafted does not order costs against authors or publishers of false statements of fact in cases where the Courts issue orders other than correction orders, such as stop publication orders? In addition, can Minister share in what circumstances and scenarios would the Court mandate costs against the subject who applied for the order as provided in clause 16CA(c)?

Secondly, under clause 3, the Bill has defined the word "entity" to exclude any public agency and public agency is in turn defined in the Bill by section 128A(6) of the Evidence Act. What this effectively means is that an individual or company cannot apply to the Harassment Courts in case the Government makes misleading or false statements against them. As a matter of principle why ought this to be the case?

The Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods noted the observations of some representors that Governments can also communicate falsehoods or misleading information. There are enough examples of governments around the world through the course of history that have done so. Why should the public not receive protection provided by this Bill, against a prospective Government or Minister that uses his or her powers not just unwisely but maliciously, with a view to seek a remedy from a neutral body like the courts, the same remedies which the Government can direct against individuals and companies under POFMA?

On this point, Mr Speaker, the decision to create an exemption for the Government such that it cannot be sued for perpetuating a falsehood is, in my view, a glaring omission and a lost opportunity at winning the trust of the public. More fundamentally, it does not conform to the principle that the rule of law applies equally to all.

To illustrate the point, in late 2014 and 2015, the New Mandala, a publication of the Australian National University ran a series of exchanges between the former Singapore Ambassador to Australia Mr Burhan Gafoor and former ISA detainee Dr Poh Soo Kai. One aspect of the exchange involved the alleged assistance given by Dr Poh to an injured Communist Party of Malaysia (CPM) bomber who escaped the premature detonation of an explosive device in a car along Still Road in 1974. Last week, Function 8, a local civil society organisation put up a video titled "Fake News: Who is the culprit?" on its Facebook page. In it, Dr Poh accused the Government of wrongfully alleging that he rendered assistance to the injured bomber in Masai, Malaysia.

Dr Poh's position was that he never went across to Malaysia to render assistance to the injured party, something the Government has accused him of doing. Dr Poh further asserts that this can be proven in his favour through immigration records. By alleging that he did go to Malaysia, Dr Poh then goes on to accuse the Government of peddling a false statement of fact as defined by the Bill.

The limitation period of this example notwithstanding, under the Bill, such an individual would have no remedy against a false statement made by the Government, or an allegedly false statement by the Government, I should add.

Would the public interest not be better served in allowing a person to apply for the appropriate order from the Harassment Courts and in doing so, make their case? I would argue that the prospects of such recourse and the availability of a neutral forum like the Courts, combined with a simple process, would in itself act as a deterrent against individuals who seek to retrospectively burnish their reputations or embarrass the Government. To this end, in the event an individual can apply for a stop publication or correction order under the new section 15 but he or she does not, and instead continues to accuse the Government, then an obvious adverse inference can be drawn about what the truth really is.

In conclusion, Mr Speaker, in highlighting this example, I am not taking a view about the veracity of facts as presented by Dr Poh or the Government. Because all the relevant information is not publicly accessible, there is no way members of the public can objectively take a view on either side of the story.

The Workers' Party has made its position known on matters involving the opening of the archives and a Freedom of Information regime in Parliament before. But these are not matters within the boundaries of this Bill. However, it goes without saying that there exists an asymmetry in information and power between the Government and its citizens.

It is my view that allowing the Government to open itself up to scrutiny on matters where it is accused of peddling falsehoods can paradoxically operate to strengthen trust in the Government, particularly in these times where political leaders all around the world find their mandate to rule increasingly questioned by a skeptical public and where political polarisation increasingly appears to be the order of the day. I look forward to having my clarifications addressed.

1.17 pm

Assoc Prof Walter Theseira (Nominated Member): Thank you, Mr Speaker. I had the best education one could receive on harassment on 9 May last year, when I inadvertently became the most hated man in Singapore for a day or two. I made a comment about CPF policy that was taken out of context. People thought I wanted the Government to stop them from using their existing CPF money for housing. A Facebook post to that effect went viral. I am sure Members can now infer why people hated me.

I am aware that many Members have had similar experiences receiving abuse online, as have others in the public eye. I hope Members were prepared for the immense stream of criticism – some reasonable, some not; some gentle, some violent – that flows your way online. I was not prepared. It was an unpleasant experience that I do not wish to recall.

But I share it today because I think it illustrates an important principle. While the law exists to provide justice, justice also requires that we play our part in understanding the limits of the law. The Protection from Harassment Act, with these amendments in place, will enhance the rights of private individuals to seek redress for online communication that harasses them. But individuals must also ask themselves if reference to the law is the most appropriate and effective means of solving the dispute at hand.

I am not discouraging individuals or victims who receive credible threats of physical harm, or who are exposed to sustained campaigns of abuse, from using the full measure of the law against the perpetrators. A victim is the only one who can decide whether the law is the best recourse. But there are many reasons why people feel the need to spew invective online. The law is not always necessary to effect a good outcome for all.

Let me now explain my side of the story. Last year, a reporter from the Straits Times contacted me to ask for my views on the President’s Address to Parliament which was delivered on 7 May 2018. That address called for bold changes and strong steps to address the challenges facing Singapore. As I have some expertise on social security, I spoke on the role that CPF plays in providing both retirement and housing security. I was concerned that some Singaporeans might be over-investing in housing. Housing asset values are highly dependent on demographic conditions decades down the road, as well as on the remaining lease length. Hence, I suggested to the reporter that a bold reform might be to end the use of CPF for housing by focusing CPF purely on retirement and medical security, which also means cutting CPF contribution rates significantly. I never said that CPF funds should be locked up immediately, so as to prevent the use of existing CPF money for housing.

In the event, what made it through to The Straits Times was my comment on ending the use of CPF for housing, and not the full reasoning behind it. I do not blame the reporter in the least because article space is scarce and many other experts were interviewed for a short article. If my comment had remained in the pages of The Straits Times, that would have been the end of it. However, someone from a website called Sure Boh Singapore found my CPF policy suggestion interesting. Mr Speaker, may I have your permission to display a slide on the screen?

Mr Speaker: Yes, please. [A slide was shown to hon Members.]

Assoc Prof Walter Theseira: Thank you. Mr Speaker, Sure Boh Singapore created a post that caricatured what I said, based on the Straits Times report. The post went viral. The post asks if Singaporeans who are made homeless by my CPF policy suggestion should sleep in my house. The posting shows 3,800 shares. I am sure there were more shares of different versions. At some point, people even got confused and thought that the President or the Government were responsible for these suggestions on ending the use of CPF for housing.

Of course, CPF is an emotive issue. I understand why people were so affronted. I provided some examples of the comments people left on the Sure Boh Singapore post. You will notice people do not think much of my haircut. Plenty of insults on my appearance, on my qualifications, a few outright threats of violence. Of course, there were also more considered arguments, which I did not show here, and some who tried to appreciate the broader context of my views on CPF and housing.

Were there any real risks to my personal safety? I do not know. As a University academic, where I work is public knowledge, and we have a fairly open campus. A gentleman actually turned up at the front desk of my University looking for me. The staff could not find me so they sent him away. But he left his phone number. I called him. It turned out he had come to complain about my dangerous views on CPF, to me in person, or perhaps to the University management. So, I explained the context to him. It turned out he was not unreasonable, just misinformed. But it did cross my mind that perhaps not all unexpected visitors might be reasonable people.

So, why am I recounting this? I realised that resorting to the law would not have helped anybody, least of all myself. There was a basic misconception about what I had said on CPF that I had to set straight. But more importantly, there was an opportunity to engage people in a discussion on what CPF policy should be and what are the trade-offs involved in the home financing decision.

So, I contacted the various parties to set the story straight. The Straits Times stood by their reporting but they accepted that what was originally printed could be taken out of context. They adjusted the story. Sure Boh Singapore likewise proved amenable to reason and corrected their story and publicised the correction. I want to put on record my thanks to all parties for helping me. I was not a Nominated Member of Parliament back then, so it is not a question of influence, it is just people doing the right thing. All of this was achieved without using any rights I might have under the law.

I then posted a public statement on Facebook, on 10 May, setting out the reasons for my thinking on CPF and housing, and I invited a dialogue. Yes, I received some unreasonable insults and jokes. But I also had a large number of people willing to engage with me. I will not say I convinced all of them. What is more important is that we had an honest dialogue.

If there had been specific threats against my family or friends, I think it would have been quite right to refer the matter to the Police. Fortunately, I do not think anybody made such threats. And the random threats of simple assault, frankly, I did not take too seriously and they were really not as hurtful as the ones who took the time and creativity to insult me further.

Nothing but my ego was bruised. I could live with that. It was an important lesson in not taking myself too seriously. We must treat each other with dignity online and offline, no matter our political disagreements. And if we fall short, I hope that we will be treated with grace by the parties that we are offending. The law gives us rights, but justice is not always served by insisting on those rights. Mr Speaker, I support the Bill.

1.25 pm

Ms Rahayu Mahzam (Jurong): Mr Speaker, when the Protection from Harassment Act (POHA) was first introduced, it was welcomed as there was a need to provide a range of remedies against harassment, including sexual harassment, cyber bullying and even online stalking. I note that since POHA came into force in November 2014, there have been more than 1,700 prosecutions and over 3,000 Magistrate’s Complaints. These numbers reflect that the Act had been well utilised over the few years. I am therefore happy to hear that there will be enhancements to the Act.

In particular, I am happy to hear that there will be an establishment of a specialist court, the Protection from Harassment Courts (PHC), to oversee matters under POHA. Going through the Court process can be very daunting for lay persons. It is therefore imperative that processes are kept simple and timelines are expedited. It would help if the PHC becomes a one-stop "shop" where victims of harassment can get support with the Court proceedings and even help with counselling or enforcement procedures, to ensure a meaningful remedy under POHA. I hope this is what is envisioned under this Bill.

The harsh reality is that any order made under POHA will be a paper order. Whether it truly affords protection will depend on whether there is support by the whole ecosystem, the Police, the Court staff and social workers. It is therefore important to provide holistic support to the victims. In this regard, I would like to ask if are there any measures in place to ensure that victims of harassment and abuse are given sufficient assistance when they approach the courts.

I would also like to make reference to the judge-led approach at the Family Justice Courts. Basically, one judge oversees all matters relating to the same parties and it allows for the judge to have a holistic understanding of the parties’ case. The judge-led approach also allows the courts greater control over proceedings. I would therefore like to know if there are plans for the PHC to employ the judge-led approach.

At this juncture, Mr Speaker, I would like to continue my speech in Malay.

(In Malay): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] The advent of technology has transformed the way we live. Social media has become an important channel for us to communicate and interact with one another. So much interaction take place in social media to the point that it has led to the creation of an ecosystem and a different world online, which has become the place where we study, chat, trade, find love and to do many other things, and now, certain norms have also come into existence in the cyber world. It is important for us to ensure that we continue to uphold societal values by having certain rules online. Any negative actions that are unacceptable to us in the real world should similarly be unacceptable in the internet. In my view, certain rules and ethics can exist by educating all online users. However, we know that sometimes legislation and monitoring are required to ensure that everyone display positive behaviour on the internet.

One issue being raised in today's Bill is doxxing. This term refers to the action of searching and publishing someone's personal information, usually with malicious intent. This is a growing trend on the internet. This usually happens when an individual did something that the general public finds unacceptable and the person's actions become viral online, usually in the form of a video. Some people who receive such information may feel triggered by what happened and begin to look for information on the supposedly errant individual. Information about the person's name, home address, place of study or work is then displayed to the public on the internet with the intent to shame the person and invite others to collectively condemn that individual’s actions and take revenge. With the amendment to the law, this will be an offence and those found guilty can be fined or imprisoned.

There may be those who ask, what is wrong with doxxing? Perhaps they feel that there’s nothing wrong with upholding the truth and getting back at the person who did something wrong. I think we need to be clear about the negative impact of doxxing. What is our intention if we make someone's personal information public? What do we hope will happen and what is the impact on the individual and his or her family? Is this the kind of healthy behaviour we want to see on the Internet and in real life? Just imagine, if we use a real world example, the act of doxxing is akin to printing the individual's photos and personal information, and then placing it all in everyone's mail box. It is the same as using paint to display information about an individual on the walls of public areas and telling everyone about what he or she did. I believe that doxxing is not a good thing and goes against the norms of living as a society. Therefore, I fully support the recommendations in this Bill with respect to doxxing.

(In English): For the reasons set out in my Malay speech, I am supportive of the proposed amendments in relation to making doxxing an offence. I feel that if a certain conduct is unacceptable offline, it should not be permissible online.

I would, however, like to seek clarification on the application of the new laws. I believe many Internet users especially, may want to know if they are committing an offence, given the prevalence of such acts online now. To be made an offence, there must be intention to cause harassment, alarm or distress to the target person. Would an individual who has published the details about the target person, but without making any further statement urging action to be taken against him or her, be able to argue in defence that there was no intention to cause harm, but just to share information? What if the individual was not the one who created the publication in the first place and was just forwarding the information? I am also curious as to how enforcement will take place. What if numerous people have shared and forwarded the information with malicious intent? Will the police and prosecutor be pursuing every individual involved? Further, could there be possible challenges of preservation of evidence, for example, if comments or information were shared on Instagram through Insta-stories? I would be grateful for the clarification on the matters above.

Mr Speaker, new norms have developed with the pervasive use of the Internet and interactions in the online space. There is, therefore, a need to regulate behaviour online. Harassment, online or offline, is not acceptable behaviour. It impinges on the personal rights of an individual and can have severe repercussions to the victims’ physical as well as mental well-being. I appreciate that this needs to be balanced with the need to ensure that the process is not abused and no unduly harsh penalties are imposed. I believe that enactment of laws needs to be coupled with public education and I hope we will continue with this effort to build a better community online and offline. Mr Speaker, notwithstanding my comments above, I support this Bill.

1.32 pm

Prof Lim Sun Sun (Nominated Member): Mr Speaker, whereas your job is as old as the institution of Parliament itself, there are today many new jobs that 20 years ago were unheard of. Online reputation management, online reputation repair, online image rehabilitation – these are jobs that indicate the importance that companies and individuals attach to their online reputations today. The restoration of damaged online reputations has become a growing industry.

In a digitalised world where a vast proportion of our daily interactions and transactions are undertaken online, in both professional and social realms, our online reputations are crucial to getting employed, making new friends and even finding a life partner.

I, therefore, rise in support of the proposed amendments to the Protection from Harassment Act, particularly the introduction of doxxing as a crime. To date, doxxing has adversely affected many individuals worldwide and in Singapore. Individuals who have been seen behaving in socially unacceptable or unlawful ways have been taken to task by online vigilantes. These vigilantes mount campaigns to uncover personal information of individuals, such as phone numbers, addresses, workplaces and publish them online, thereby inviting possible harassment by the online masses. Victims of doxxing have been known to receive verbal abuse and even death threats to themselves and their families.

Under the amendments, doxxing will attract stiff penalties, including fines of up to $5,000 and jail terms of up to 12 months that I believe will have a significant deterrent effect. Indeed, there are many reasons why the criminalisation of doxxing is both crucial and timely.

In the first instance, doxxing, even when undertaken by seemingly well-intentioned online vigilantes, is often fraught with error. Online vigilantes have been praised for their heroism and for helping to bring criminals to justice. But their actions can also lead to the misidentification of individuals with harmful consequences, especially when these vigilantes rush to "mete out justice". Using only partial information shared via social media, including grainy videos and blurry photographs, the chances of erroneous identification are high. In April 2017, when a video of a couple being rude to an elderly man in a Toa Payoh hawker centre went viral, netizens were quick to act but first identified the wrong man and woman. The wrongly identified woman recounted her ordeal in her Facebook post, calling it "an emotional period and scary moment". Such mistaken identification can lead to incalculable emotional and financial costs for the unfortunate victims.

Even when the right individuals are correctly identified, it is unfair to have them harassed in this manner when they have yet to offer their side of the story. But they are sentenced prematurely by the court of public opinion in a manner that can be disproportionately harsh. Indeed, the equivalent Chinese term for doxxing is "renrou sousuo" 人肉搜索 or "human flesh search engine". This term graphically captures the rabid zeal with which online vigilantes hunt down and tear apart their targets.

Mobile phone shop owner Jover Chew may have been despicable in making his customer kneel and plead for a refund. However, when netizens published all the personal details of him and his wife, forcing them to go into hiding, their boorish behaviour was just as questionable.

In a society that is so connected, we cannot create a climate where online vigilantism is allowed to run riot and let the ferocity of the online mob inflict damage on individuals. We should not permit mob mentality to take root and be the first recourse for justice. Instead, we must allow for due process. Members of the public must also be educated that if they have evidence on any crimes or misdeeds, that they should turn it over to the police rather than take matters into their own hands through doxxing.

Second, we are transitioning towards a world which is increasingly powered by algorithms. Processes, such as college admissions, job applications and even insurance premium pricing, will progressively include more aspects of automated decision making. Automated searches of individuals’ online profiles will play a bigger role in helping companies and organisations assess people. Research has found that many existing algorithmically-driven decision making systems offer little room for recourse in situations of error. Individuals seeking redress must invest considerable resources, with little guarantee of success. Given such emerging circumstances, if someone’s online reputation is irretrievably damaged by doxxing, it will significantly hamper his or her existence in far-reaching ways and with life-long consequences.

In as much as I support the inclusion of doxxing as a crime in the amendment to POHA, I would also like to raise my concerns about the new remedies for victims of falsehoods. Obviously, in light of the earlier points I made about the importance of our online reputations, I welcome the introduction of new remedies for victims of falsehoods. However, I would like to seek clarifications from the Minister about targeted and general correction orders. From the past records of MINLAW, what is the estimated volume of online falsehood cases that could be brought before the Courts by individuals and entities under POHA? How significant an administrative cost might this impose on Internet intermediaries? And what impact will this new regulation have on Singapore’s pro-innovation image? I look forward to hearing the Minister’s clarifications.

1.38 pm

Mr Yee Chia Hsing (Chua Chu Kang): Thank you, Speaker. I rise in support of the Bill. This Bill, if passed, would strengthen and streamline the protection from harassment as well as fake news.

I would like to thank Senior Minister of State Mr Edwin Tong for clarifying that not only does the Bill make it clear that both individuals and entities may be liable for offences under the Act; where the Act refers to victims of harassment, the term "victim" also includes business entities.

Fake news is not only a political problem; it can also hurt businesses in Singapore, especially smaller ones which have no resources to take swift remedial action to stop the damage. Whether these are attacks from their competitors, angry customers or pranksters, fake news can cause adverse impact on businesses. Small businesses are more affected as they do not have to resources to react to fake news about their businesses.

For instance, two years ago, a man made a claim online that a grass-jelly or chin chow product manufactured locally by Tan Soon Mui Food Industries is made of plastic. That video was widely shared on social media but proven false two weeks later by AVA after it conducted laboratory tests.

Also in 2017, shoe company Bata in Malaysia lost more than half a million ringgit within a month after fake news about it selling shoes with the Arabic word "Allah" forming on the soles went viral. In that episode, Bata was forced to withdraw 70,000 pairs of its B-First school shoes from its stores in Malaysia. Not only was money lost, the image of the company suffered as well. As Senior Minister of State Mr Edwin Tong mentioned, even local supermarket chain NTUC Fairprice became a victim of fake news about its house brand Jasmine fragrant rice being made of plastic.

So, Mr Speaker, Sir, I would glad that businesses can now rely on the Act to protect themselves from fake news.

Another point, regarding the establishment of the Protection from Harassment Court which has the powers to hear both criminal and civil matters, I would like to ask: in practice, does it mean that a victim of fake news would only need to make a Police report and the victim would be then able to "piggy-back" on the criminal investigations? Or is it a case where the victim would still have to hire his own lawyer to apply for a stop publication order or correction order? In terms of damages suffered by the victim, would the Protection from Harassment Court be able to award damages to the victim without the victim bringing a civil suit if it has already been established by the Court that the perpetrator has, indeed, committed an offence and caused damage to the victim?

Mr Speaker, Sir, many SMEs do not have the resources to hire a lawyer for the issue of the stop publication order or correction order; or to seek damages from the perpetrator. I hope the Minister can clarify how having the Protection from Harassment Court to hear both criminal and civil matters can make it easier and less costly for the victim of fake news to control the damage caused as well as seek damages and redress. Mr Speaker, Sir, notwithstanding my comments above, I support the Bill.

1.43 pm

Ms Anthea Ong (Nominated Member): Mr Speaker, I would like to express my support for this amendment Bill. It reflects a deeper commitment to the protection and support for the vulnerable amongst us. We are also debating this Bill at a time when a case of sexual voyeurism on University grounds has raised important and pressing questions about legal protection and institutional support for survivors.

We must use the current focus on harassment to have a meaningful national conversation on how we can create a society that does not tolerate any form of harassment – one where bystanders feel equipped to intervene and survivors feel empowered to seek justice. Otherwise, these amendments will not fulfil their mission.

One major change introduced is streamlining the process for applying and obtaining POHA orders in section 17 of the Bill. Currently, applicants need a lawyer to assist in the preparation and submission of documents and subsequent proceedings and this can be financially prohibitive. It typically costs between $5,000 and $8,000 leading up to mediation and significantly higher if mediation fails and the matter goes to Court.

I commend this amendment to make the process expeditious as well as more economical and accessible which help to make the ordeal less alienating and intimidating for the applicant. Lina is a survivor who did not submit her case to Court because the process is currently complicated and costly. In her words, I quote, "I’m still struggling to rebuild my life…. [there was] so much paperwork, and I [would] need to take leave to go down to the Court so many times… It was too much for me." These changes will help individuals like Lina seek justice against their perpetrators.

Though not provided for in the primary legislation, the Minister has assured us in his statements to the media that the subsidiary legislation will stipulate that an Expedited Protection Order application under POHA could be granted within 48 to 72 hours. If there is actual violence or risk of violence, an Expedited Protection Order could be granted within 24 hours. I think a $200 fee has also been cited. I seek the Minister’s clarification on this.

Mr Speaker, at this juncture, I would like to highlight another obstacle that remains which may impede a survivor's access to help: young adults under the age of 21 cannot seek protection orders under POHA unless a guardian makes applications on their behalf. This can be a deterrent from seeking legal redress for intimate partner violence and sexual harassment, even if social service agencies or law firms are involved.

Tina, not her real name, was 20 when she approached AWARE about a blackmail case. The perpetrator was threatening to leak explicit photos and videos of her if she did not continue to send him more. Despite the mental and emotional distress she was going through, she insisted on not involving her parents because she believed they would react "badly". In fact, she preferred waiting a whole year to turn 21 so that she could go to the Court alone. Tina’s concerns are echoed by many, and they reflect a gap in the current system. Tina’s story is not the only one I know.

The 18-year-old student I was mentoring a few years back was sexually harassed by her best friend’s brother and did not seek protection either because she did not want to let her parents know, they still do not till today. I hope that barriers for 16-21-year-olds can be removed. If need be, we could appoint social workers or court counsellors to support applications in the place of the survivor’s parents or guardian. We need to be cognisant of the social pressures that survivors might face, and understand that some may not be ready to involve their family.

The other significant change introduced in section 8 of the Bill is close to my heart – namely enhanced penalties for perpetrators for crimes against vulnerable persons. The Bill defines these vulnerable persons as those with mental, physical disabilities and victims in an intimate relationship with the perpetrator. These changes recognise that these persons are especially vulnerable to being targeted for harassment, potentially face greater psychological and physical damage from such harassment, and are less able to defend themselves or prevent such harassment. I have heard many bullying and harassment stories from just amongst my deaf friends and persons with mental health conditions whom I work with.

This extra consideration and attention is definitely a progressive yet necessary step forward. But I cannot emphasise enough that the protection of the differently-abled must not only come from the law. The continued harassment of these individuals originates from a deeper prejudice within our society. We must continue our whole-of-society efforts to tackle the root of this stigma and establish a widespread agreement to care and support the differently-abled.

Mr Speaker, I must at the same time urge caution when pursuing the strategy of enhanced punishments. There are valid concerns to be raised on the effectiveness of enhanced punishments in administering two key areas of justice, namely deterrence and retribution.

Extensive studies reflect that enhanced punishments do not necessarily create a greater deterrent effect, and may in fact be counter-productive. Research done by Centre for Criminal Justice Studies in Canada has shown that longer sentences and harsher punishments do not reduce the rates of sexual crimes. Instead, the reverse may be observed, where longer sentences increased recidivism due to a lack of repentance for the initial crime, as reported by the National Research Council in the United States.

Moreover, enhanced punishments may even counter-productively discourage the victim from reporting instances of harassment. In eight out of 10 cases that AWARE’s Sexual Assault Care Centre sees, survivors know or are close to their perpetrators. In some cases, especially when the perpetrator is a family member, enhanced punishments may heighten the fears of destroying the perpetrator’s life, deterring survivors from reporting. Jenny, for example, shared that even if the perpetrator, her father, was jailed for the maximum period of time, he would never feel the fear, shame, terror and disgust that she has had to deal with throughout her childhood and into adulthood. She also shared that her mother would not be able bear the guilt and it would devastate her, I quote, "so punishing him even for the longest time would only bring more pain", unquote.

Harsh punishments are not necessarily an effective deterrent nor do they serve survivors better. Instead, increasing victim support and making reporting and prosecution processes trauma-informed and more victim-friendly would go a long way in ensuring that survivors will come forward and sustain their involvement all the way to conviction. Improving the chances of securing convictions will do more to promote deterrence than imposing harsh penalties.

In 2017, the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women Committee or CEDAW made a similar recommendation. CEDAW suggested that Singapore prioritises gender sensitisation training in the criminal justice system, not increasing punishments, as a way to strengthen protection for women against gender-based violence. I also urge the Government to consider and look into the deterrent effects of other measures like community service and restorative justice measures as restitutionary agreements.

Mr Speaker, I applaud the Government for extending the recourse available under POHA to entities that are victims of harassment in section 11. However, I would like to clarify if the protection that is now available to entities also creates an equal responsibility for them to exercise reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any harassing behaviour, failing which they would be held liable for their employees’ actions.

The sexual voyeurism case I mentioned at the start of my speech raises questions about organisational investigation processes, support offered to complainants, and helpful prevention programmes. Although not legally enforceable, the Tripartite Advisory on Managing Workplace Harassment provides important guidelines on these issues but it is unclear if the Advisory covers institutes of higher learning. If they are not covered, I strongly urge the Government to consider establishing a mandatory code on sexual and other forms of harassment that can hold Institutes of Higher Learning accountable when they do not handle student complaints promptly and fairly.

The changes made in this Bill are driven by key principles that should be celebrated, especially in the clear commitment towards protecting and supporting the most vulnerable amongst us.

Yet, Mr Speaker, we must remember that legislative changes cannot be the end of the process of change. I hope that the Ministry spares no effort in education and awareness efforts with schools, Institutes of Higher Learning, workplaces and communities so that every member of our society knows not just what their rights are but also how to activate these rights in the face of bullying and harassment. Social support must be enhanced to ensure victims have an accessible and holistic process of recovery from these traumas. And more importantly, we must continue to spare no effort at every level to build a society with values of respect and inclusivity that will discourage these crimes against the vulnerable in the first place.

Because a society that has more justice and compassion needs less charity. And our great hope in such a society is in individual character. Notwithstanding the above clarifications, Mr Speaker, I support this Bill.

1.54 pm

Er Dr Lee Bee Wah (Nee Soon): Mr Speaker, Sir, Chinese please.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Every now and then, there will be online news about people who have done something seemingly wrong, followed by doxxing on these people. Their personal information will be put online, including their home address, work address or their telephone numbers. Then the harassment starts.

Quite often, the one being searched out turns out to be the wrong person. Even if it is indeed that person, we should not harass him. If we can hurt someone just because we do not like his behaviour, then we are no different from a primitive society. What is more, the people living with them including the elderly and their children are equally harassed. Is this fair?

Singapore is one of the first countries in the world to illegalise doxxing and I am very proud of this. I also want to remind everyone not to go online and publicise your personal information.

(In English): This Bill criminalises publishing online identifying information of others, such as full name, address, phone number and so on. This is also known as doxxing, and often leads to harassment and harm of individuals in real life. Doxxing is certainly not a foreign concept to Singapore’s cybersphere. There are communities and forums dedicated to "CSI", a term they use which refers to investigating the victim and publishing his or her personal information online. I am proud that Singapore is the first country to make the act of doxxing a criminal offence.

We have had our own social vigilantism gone wrong incidents. When netizens tried to identify the perpetrators in a viral video of a young couple bullying an elderly man at Toa Payoh Hawker Centre, they wrongly identified them to be employees of a local bank. This information, along with the couple’s pictures, were circulated, and people even threatened to boycott the bank. Eventually, it was found to be a mistake.

Even if the people are correctly identified, harassing and harming them is never justified. If someone has done something objectionable, we can deal with it through our laws. But we cannot allow people to harass them in real life. That is like taking justice in our own hands, no different from secret societies or pre-historic villagers.

Regardless whether the target of doxxing was innocent or guilty of the allegation against him, the consequences of doxxing can be disproportionate, and may plague the victims for life. There is the saying, "The Internet never forgets."

When information goes viral on the Internet, even if you remove the source material, the other people who have seen it would have remembered it and even made copies to share it around. Even when clarifications are made, these may never reach the people who have seen the original mistaken source.

Jon Ronson’s book "So You’ve Been Publicly Shamed" documents the stories of doxxing victims who continue to live in fear of harassment and prejudice even years after the doxxing happened. Some of them had their employment prospects hurt. Others continue to face harassment. Most of them had not actually hurt anyone or committed crimes to deserve all these. And those innocent people who live with them, including elderly and children, are put through hell too.

Not everyone who gets doxxed is even suspected of doing something wrong. There are whole accounts dedicated to taking pictures of women without consent and talking about them in a sexual way. For some women, people have found their social media accounts and from there their personal information, and harassed them in real life. So, I hope more can be done to educate individuals to be careful with their personal information and photos.

This includes having the correct privacy settings for information like home addresses and phone numbers on social media accounts, erasing location information on photos when sharing them on social media, and not sharing compromising photographs and information publicly or with people they do not know well.

Social vigilantism has been referred to as a perilous form of justice. In fact, I wonder if it can even be considered a form of justice when it simply creates chaos and fear in many cases. I urge all those who truly value justice to consider joining the Police force, where you can put your "CSI" skills to good use. There is no need to take matters into your own hands and risk causing irreversible damage to innocent lives in the process.

What I had spoken is online harassment. Now, I would like to highlight another type of harassment, that is, harassment by ex-employer using WhatsApp and emails. I would like to share with you a real case that my resident is going through. I received an email from my resident asking for help. Subsequently, I met up with her in MPS. She looked like in her late 20s and she told me that she get her new job through her friend and this company is dealing with block chain technology and cryptocurrency. So, her job is to sell cryptocurrency to as many customers as possible. She has to do a lot of networking, has to see many customers. On the first day of her work, her boss added her into many WhatsApp groups. She felt rather uncomfortable, she wanted to quit but she was persuaded to stay on. Then, two weeks into the job, she decided to quit because she found out that her boss "hire and fire", and there is a lot of people being fired before she was hired. So, she sent an email to her boss to inform her boss that she wanted to quit with immediate effect. Her boss replied, "Okay". So, she stopped working the following day.

Soon after that she started receiving WhatsApp messages and emails from her ex-boss. Her ex-boss said, "I agree to your resignation but I disagree to you resigning without giving notice. So, you have to pay the company 1 month salary." She has been working there for two weeks and she was not paid. According to her, in her employment contract, during probation period she need to give only one week's notice. So, she has been bombarded with WhatsApp, email messages and even her personal details, her employment contract was circulated to her ex-colleagues. Just a few days ago, on 2 May, she received one more email. Her boss told her that he is taking legal action on her and in order to do that, he had to deliver a notice to her personally and kept asking her when he could visit her at home. Mind you, she has left the company for six months.

So, I would like to ask the Senior Minister of State is this harassment. Can this Bill help a victim like my resident? It is very painful to see young ladies being harassed, being tortured like this; and she is not the only one. I have seen several similar cases. It so happens that they are young, beautiful ladies. Sir, I support the Bill and I hope it will put a stop to all this harassment.

2.04 pm

Mr Gan Thiam Poh (Ang Mo Kio): Mr Speaker, Sir, I support the introduction of the new offence of "doxxing" as the number of such incidents is getting out of hand. Publicly sharing personally identifiable information, such as photographs, videos, addresses, phone and contact details, while inciting people to "punish" or humiliate targeted parties have become increasingly common. Some of these cases are just plain bullying, others involve manipulation with criminal intent, and yet others are carried out in the name of justice or "vigilantism".

While we understand that people generally want justice to be done, they must understand that it would be best to leave it to the relevant authorities to perform thorough investigations and follow-ups. After all, many internet users may be too quick to present information without having the full facts. The Government should educate members of the public about appropriate actions they can take and how to share information with the relevant agencies. In order to build trust and increase the public’s confidence, the informed agencies should also share investigation results and outcomes where circumstances allow, with concerned members of the public, so that they would not feel that all their cooperative efforts have gone down a deep black hole. As time goes on, the public will trust in the Government to take the right and calibrated actions, and be less inclined to administer their own brands of justice.

We should not encourage violence in our society; and one taking law into one's own hands, especially doxxing, can cause unnecessary harm to the parties concerned, including their families, which are innocent parties. Such acts are amounting to the "warrant to kill" order practised by the triads and secret society in the old days, which should not be allowed to have a place in our society.

In addition, we should consider the harm caused to innocent parties, especially those who have been framed and set up. This reminds me of a friend who was humiliated and threatened with breaches of privacy by her ex-husband after their marriage turned sour. The damage and harm is far reaching and hurt the children who are the innocent parties.

Therefore, anyone who advocates and resorts to all means to hunt down another party with threats of violence should not be dealt with lightly as such threats are provocations to violent behavior, which are against the efforts to make Singapore a gracious society.

We should also educate the public and raise awareness that they could be used for mass manipulation by persons with their own agendas. There are already cases of companies and individuals misleading the public online with information discrediting their business rivals in order to gain a competitive advantage in their businesses and improve their own profits. In Mandarin, please.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Mr Speaker, this Bill is very timely. I am sure that many of our Members here have similar experiences where residents come to them for help about cyber bullying. We cannot allow cyber bulling to threaten public and individual safety. Although they claim that they do this for justice, they must respect our law and to pass the matter over to the authorities. There is no need to get the innocent involved.

(In English): With that, I would like to conclude with my support for the Bill.

2.09 pm

Mr Patrick Tay Teck Guan (West Coast): Mr Speaker, I rise in support of this Bill. The establishment of the Protection from Harassment Court (PHC) which adopts simplified procedures and expedited timelines coupled with the strengthening of protection for victims of harassment sends a strong signal that victims of harassment must be taken seriously, and harassment cases must be dealt with effectively.

It is critical that the avenues to seek relief and redress are not fraught with complexity or lead to a sense of futility or worse, where the victim of harassment perceives himself or herself to be further victimised.

I will be addressing these points in relation to: one, anonymous harassers; two, intimate harassers; three, workplace harassers; and four, the management of harassment cases.

First, anonymous harassers. One of the challenges to the ability of the victim to take any action against a perpetrator is the lack of knowledge of the perpetrator’s identity. Take for example, a female victim who was harassed online by persons unknown to her. These persons had posted hateful messages directed at her, revealed her contact number online while threatening that they were closing in on her residence and posted her contact details on online sex forums offering sexual services. Worried for her safety and her family’s safety, the victim reported the matter to the Police but was told that there was nothing further that the police could do as they needed real names and contact numbers before they could proceed.

This same example may happen to a male victim as well.

While the Bill now provides for the application of stop publication orders to prohibit the publication of false statement of facts, these unknown perpetrators can easily put up other false information of the victim on other platforms to continue harassing the victim. Some of these persons also deliberately mask their identities and IP addresses to avoid detection. The anonymity of the harassers adds to the sense of loss of control and fear already experienced by victims. The anonymous harassers may pose threats of violence or incite violence by others on the victims and their loved ones. The victims have no means of assessing if the harasser or persons will carry out the threats of violence, or who they should be guarding against. This creates a significant amount of stress on the victims, which can be debilitating. In this regard, the law enforcement agencies must strengthen their capabilities in identifying these unknown perpetrators to send a strong message to these harassers that they cannot get away with such behaviour.

Second, intimate harassers. Intimate harassers can inflict even more pain and anguish on their victims and even persons related to the victims, due to the increased vulnerability and proximity of the victim in the intimate relationship. The intimate harasser has access to private and intimate information of the victim which can enable the intimate harasser to hold the victim ransom and force the victim to acquiesce to the harasser’s demands.

The Bill rightly provides for strengthened protection for victims of intimate harassers who require greater protection and means to extricate themselves from the reach of the intimate harasser. However, the Bill also provides that the enhanced penalties do not apply to the intimate harasser, referred to as "A", if "A" can prove that despite "A" having been or being in an intimate relationship with the victim, referred to as "B", the relationship between "A" and "B" did not adversely affect "B's" ability to protect "B" from "A" in respect of the harm caused by the offence. Could the Minister share examples of what these possible exceptions might be?

Third, workplace harassers. Workplace harassment involving cases of rage and aggression by members of the public against persons in public-facing frontline jobs is on the rise. Last month, a man was caught on camera punching a 60-year-old private security supervisor at Roxy Square allegedly over seeking of directions out of the building. The security supervisor fell and suffered a swollen eye and a sprained neck. Following this incident, I reiterate my call once again for MinLaw and MHA to review the scope of "public service" workers under the Act.

While these private security officers work in private spaces, their work, in effect, straddles the line delineating private and public spaces as provided in the Act. Given the recent introduction of criminal penalties regulating the conduct of private security officers to boost the industry’s professionalism and bolster Singapore’s defences, it is timely to review the according of special protection to this group of workers under POHA beyond what is currently provided for under the Act.

I raised this on several occasions in this House on behalf of these workers who undertake public-facing jobs and who may be exposed to harassment. They include private security officers, cleaners, transport workers as well as healthcare workers. Harassment cannot be condoned nor accepted as part and parcel of these public-facing jobs.

Through the Legal Clinics and Legal Primers organised by the National Trades Union Congress (NTUC), union members are provided with access to support, resources and the expertise of legal professionals, social workers and counsellors to prevent and manage workplace harassment. At these sessions, workers have shared personal encounters of harassment at the workplace, ranging from physical to verbal harassment, some of a sexual nature. A dipstick poll at one such Legal Primer indicated that 20% of respondents had encountered workplace harassment of a sexual nature before. Name calling and hurling vulgarities were also commonplace. In some cases, harassers used physical force to intimidate victims by blocking their way or even by pushing and shoving. Instances of workplace bullying were also shared. A member shared that her colleague who bore a grudge against her took photographs of her without her consent and spread malicious untruths about her, suggesting that she was in an intimate relationship with another colleague. She was advised to seek recourse under POHA.

Victims of workplace harassment often find it difficult to speak up because they may be fearful of losing their jobs, receiving a bad appraisal, perceived as not going along with the office culture or blaming themselves. One member shared that after she had made a Police report against her superior for sexual harassment at the workplace, her superior subsequently made false allegations against her, took away her work duties and dismissed her.

Workplace harassment can impact the victim psychologically and physically and his or her ability to work. I am glad that the Ministry of Law has, at the Committee of Supply Debate 2019, taken note of my suggestion to track the types of POHA cases filed and that the Ministry will be working with the State Courts to explore this further. Information gleaned from workplace harassment POHA cases can help in the refinement of the Tripartite Advisory on Managing Workplace Harassment to better prevent and manage harassment at the workplace.

On a related note, the Bill allows business entities to seek relief against falsehoods through the application of stop publication and correction orders. Falsehoods can damage the business reputation and have knock-on effects on the workers' livelihoods. Last year, videos were circulated alleging that fake chilli was sold in the vicinity of Tekka Market and fake keropok was sold at the Hari Raya Bazaar. The relevant authorities had investigated the claims and found the allegations to be untrue. Not only do these falsehoods cause unnecessary alarm and confusion among the public, the reputation of the business and their workers' livelihoods would also be impacted, in the event where the public chooses to boycott the business due to the falsehoods.

Fourth, management of harassment cases. In cases of prolonged and sustained harassment, victims can feel compelled to make drastic changes to their way of life, including moving houses, changing jobs and cutting themselves off from social media and social engagements. Victims undergo significant stress, experience a sense of loss and powerlessness and a pervasive sense of insecurity, even in their own homes.

It takes courage for victims to take action against their harassers. This is at the risk of further incurring the wrath of the harasser and being subject to even greater harassment. Care must be taken to minimise inadvertent victim-blaming in the course of investigative and legal inquiry. The victim should also be kept informed of developments in investigations at appropriate junctures.

To help victims to get back on their feet and prepare for any backlash from harassers, the Police and the newly set-up of the Protection from Harassment Court should direct victims to specialised counsellors or social workers to assist victims in drawing up safety plans.

In putting together a personalised safety plan, victims can identify concrete steps they can take to better protect themselves along with resources they can tap on to seek help. These safety plans can help victims to gain a sense of control over the situation and better cope with the investigative and legal processes to follow. With these submissions and suggestions, I support the Bill.

2.19 pm

Mr Murali Pillai (Bukit Batok): Mr Speaker, Sir, I first would like to declare my interest as a practising lawyer. I support the aims of the amendment Bill which was carefully outlined by the hon Senior Minister of State, Mr Edwin Tong in his speech. I commend MinLaw for taking active steps to protect victims of harassment. I believe, once passed, this Bill will have the effect of considerably strengthening the protection regime for victims.

I have four comments to make on Bill. First is on the issue of doxxing. Many hon Members spoke about this before me. I think there is clearly support for the criminalisation of such behaviour. The query, though, is on the ambit of the proposed crime, and in that, I join the observations made by the hon Member Pritam Singh. He mentioned an example where an author posts information online to highlight a person's offending conduct. The author's focus is not necessarily to harass the person but to highlight the person's bad conduct. It, however, may be foreseeable that the person may still be harassed.

Alternatively, there could be situations where a victim of an offence shares his or her experience online and names the perpetrator at the same time. In such situations, would the offence of doxxing be committed? I think it is important to understand what kind of behaviour would be caught under this new provision so that people will know how they should regulate their conduct online.

I now turn to the proposed section 11 which is being broadened to allow for a victim of harassment to bring civil action against any individual or entity; and this entity may include corporate bodies or unincorporated bodies. I would like to seek clarification as to whether the provision is broad enough for corporate entities or other third parties who may not be directly victims of the harassment but nonetheless are affected by the acts of the harasser so as to be able to bring civil actions against the harasser.

Let me provide an example by reference to the 2013 High Court decision of AXA vs Chandran Natesan, where I acted as the lawyer. This case pre-dates the enactment of POHA. In that case, the defendant was a psychotic. He targeted the plaintiff company's employees, particularly the women, and repeatedly sent emails and made calls to them using vulgar and threatening language. The company obtained an interim injunction preventing the defendant from harassing its employees. However, it failed to get a permanent injunction as the High Court doubted the existence of the common law tort of harassment. The common law tort of harassment has since been abrogated by POHA.

Under section 11 of POHA, clearly, the harassed employees will have a remedy in commencing civil action against the harasser. However, it is not clear to me whether the company, the employer of the employees would be able to commence an action to protect its employees. It would be good for employers to be provided with such remedies for two main reasons. First, as an employer, the company has a duty to its employees to provide a safe working environment. The hon Member, Mr Patrick Tay, was talking about Workplace Harassment just a few minutes ago. Hence, it has a direct interest in ensuring that its employees are not harassed at work. Second, when we are dealing with a company with many employees, the harasser can escape the effect of an injunction by shifting target to employees whom he has not harassed before. If the provision is widened to allow the company to commence civil action against the harasser and obtain an injunction to prevent harassment, it can protect all its employees in one go.

In UK, there is precedent that allows an employer to sue a harasser on behalf of all its employees. In the 2005 English High Court decision of First Global Locums, the High Court granted an injunction under the UK Protection from Harassment Act in favour of a recruitment company against a disgruntled ex-employee. In deciding to issue an injunction protecting the company, the Court held that if it only covered the employees who had been harassed without including the company, there is a likelihood for the ex-employee to harass other employees of the company who, at that point in time, have not been harassed yet and thereby retaliate against the company. I would welcome the hon Senior Minister of State's clarification on this matter.

My next point deals with the ambit of the protection order under the proposed section 12 of the Act. As currently worded, the scope of protection under the order would involve prohibiting the harasser from doing anything in relation to the victim and this right may extend to directing that the harasser be excluded from occupying the shared residence with the victim. It also may include requiring the harasser to stop publishing an offending communication, or referring the harasser to attend counselling and mediation.

The hon Senior Minister of State also mentioned some other aspects of broadening the Protection Order.

I would like to seek clarification that the wording does not prohibit the Court to make whatever ancillary orders that it deems fit, for example, "delivery up" orders, to ensure that the victim is sufficiently protected depending on the circumstances of the case.

Let me provide an example to explain the point. From time to time, we read of cases of female victims being harassed by ex-boyfriends who possess videos of them being intimate. On such occasions, victims may, and indeed have, taken action under POHA to obtain a protection order against the respondents. What is not clear, though, is whether under the proposed provision, the victims are able to demand that the respondents give back the videos featuring them. This is important because so long as the videos are in the hands of the harasser, there is every chance that offending behaviour may re-occur. I would have imagined that the Court should have such powers to ensure that the objective of the protection order is met. I would welcome the hon Senior Minister of State's clarification on this point.

Finally, I have a query on the jurisdiction and application of POHA over persons outside Singapore, or persons whose actions covered by POHA were committed when they were outside Singapore. From my reading of the proposed section 17 of the POHA, it seems that there may not be jurisdiction to deal with a situation where the victim of harassment is outside Singapore at the material time and the act of harassment by the harasser is committed outside Singapore too.

I do appreciate why there should not be criminal jurisdiction over such acts. However, when it comes to civil jurisdiction, I would respectfully suggest different considerations should apply. Under common law, there is a "double actionability" rule which Senior Minister of State would know. It would ordinarily applied to torts. For example, a person who has been defamed overseas, he may, in certain circumstances commence an action in Singapore if he can show that the offending act that occurred overseas would constitute a civil wrong both at the location where it had occurred as well as Singapore. In an interconnected world, these kind of expanded bases of jurisdictions would be welcome. Otherwise, the victims would be left with no remedy and has to wait until he'she is harassed in Singapore before commencing action. Notwithstanding my comments, I wholeheartedly support the amendment Bill.

2.27 pm

Dr Chia Shi-Lu (Tanjong Pagar): Mr Speaker, Sir, I rise in support of this Bill which will further strengthen the current legislation to provide protection against harassment.

One of the key amendments of this Bill is the establishment of the specialist court – the Protection from Harassment Courts (PHC), which will provide a one-stop centre for all matters relating to protection from harassment. This arrangement will certainly facilitate the provision of holistic and effective interventions for victims.

Two of the main concerns of harassment victims are the time required and also difficulties faced in getting Protection Orders (PO). I am heartened to note that the PHC will adopt simplified procedures and expedite the hearings for certain applications, for example, within 48 to 72 hours for Expedited Protection Orders (EPOs), and where there is risk of violence or violence had already occurred, within 24 hours.

The decision to permit the PHC not to be bounded by the rules of evidence in the conduct of civil proceedings will also be very helpful for victims. I would like, however, to seek some clarifications on the enforcement of Protection Orders once issued. The Bill indicates that remedies and recourse for breaches of POs and EPOs will be strengthened. The measures include the issuance of community orders and in the cases of causing hurt or continued harassment, making such breaches arrestable offences.

My concern is that these are implemented after the breaches, by which time the victims would have suffered another round of psychological or physical trauma. In cases where the accused may be unable to think rationally nor behave with restraint, there seems little to prevent them from causing more trouble. I have encountered some of these cases in my dealings as a Member of Parliament, for example, we had a daughter and her mother who felt they were threatened by one of their sons. Although I do not have the full information about the case, it was clear that they felt that this son was not behaving rationally and they were in constant fear of being attacked or harassed by this son, despite the existence of Protection Orders. And there was very little in terms of immediate recourse that they could turn to.

So, is it possible to introduce stronger deterrent measures to enforce the POs and can more be done to prevent subsequent harassments or attacks? Would the Ministry also share recent data on the effectiveness of POs, including the number of cases of repeated breaches or subsequent injuries or perhaps even deaths?

Next, like many Members before me, I do welcome the amendments to counter the unfortunate new social trend of doxxing, where people’s personal information, such as names, photographs, contact details, home and work addresses, are shared online in order to facilitate harassment, issue threats or cause physical harm. I think many examples have been shared in this House over the past hour. I myself have also encountered such examples, maybe not of such degree or this nature.

For example, several months ago, I came across a cleaner in one of the hawker centres who had a little bit of disagreement with one of his customers. It so transpired that the details about the cleaner were then posted on social media which led to a lot of consternation to this cleaner. And, of course, notwithstanding the merits or the lack thereof of the case, I think these are very unfortunate developments in the social media arena.

Some of these acts of online "vigilantism", such as to expose the couple who harassed an old man at a hawker centre, inconsiderate and dangerous drivers, voyeurs and Peeping Toms, may seem warranted but in fact, undermines the very foundation of our justice system. Administering justice is not an activity which can be done part-time, remotely nor casually. Thorough investigations of the facts of the events are necessary, in fairness to all parties involved. In fact, there have been many cases where false or misleading information had been shared, causing hurt and damage to innocent parties.

I urge the Ministry to step up awareness of what constitutes the illegal act of doxxing through public education programmes as well as the appropriate measures the man in the street can take to address bad social behaviours.

A number of netizens resort to doxxing because they lack confidence in Government institutions to rectify certain situations and social behaviours, leading them to take matters into their own hands. It is important that public institutions concerned show their awareness of these incidents, and prove that the Government takes a serious view of their feedback through comprehensive measures and consistent enforcement.

Public education to increase their awareness of the appropriate forums to share such information is essential. For example, they should be encouraged to post and share videos of, for example, dangerous driving with the Traffic Police, forward information on disputes to the relevant authorities and share information with emergency services. In order to reduce the incidents of doxxing, public institutions must be prepared to step up to address public concerns expeditiously and provide updates on actions taken. As it has often been said, not only should justice be done, it must be seen to be done. I support the Bill.

2.33 pm

Mr Louis Ng Kok Kwang (Nee Soon): Sir, the Protection from Harassment Act (POHA) has protected and provided redress for harassment victims. This Bill will amplify these positive effects by making it easier for victims to seek redress and recourse for harassment-related behaviours, and by targeting new social trends such as doxxing and increasing incidences of fake news.

That being said, I would like to make some recommendations to better support victims by improving responses of enforcement personnel, and by increasing use of counselling and mediation. I would also like to seek clarifications on the scope of the new offence of doxxing.

Sir, sensitivity and tact are needed when assisting victims of harassment to avoid secondary victimisation by law enforcement.

In the online talk show series "Under the Carpet", Debra Tang highlighted the need to train first responders on the handling of harassment, assault and violence cases. From her interviews on the show, she noted that, "Too often, victims are made to feel ashamed, foolish, or disbelieved. Many go away wishing they had never made a complaint or reached out for help. And, if it should happen again, they will never speak up."

It also emerged through the show that there have been instances where victims felt that they were not taken seriously because they may not have exhibited behaviours that law enforcement deem "typical" of assault victims.

The legislative amendments to strengthen protections under POHA will not amount to much without an environment where victims feel safe to speak up.

Training our law enforcement officers to better manage these cases with tact and empathy is crucial in creating such an environment.

Sir, carving out a separate regime in the form of the new Protection from Harassment Courts (PHC) for those who seek help under POHA implicitly recognises that victims of harassment face unique vulnerabilities.

I am aware that changes have been made by the Singapore Police Force to investigative processes and court procedures, in order to create a safer space for victims of sexual crimes. Can the Minister confirm if such changes apply also to victims of harassment? Do Victim Care Officers who are specially trained in victim care management also handle victims of harassment?

Next, I am heartened that the amendments in this Bill seek to provide quicker relief for victims of harassment by making certain breaches of Protection Orders (POs) and Expedited Protection Orders (EPOs) arrestable offences.

Physically restraining the harasser addresses the immediate threat posed by their harassing behaviour. However, because the harasser will not be detained indefinitely, the victim remains at risk of their harassing behaviour after the harasser is released.

One of my residents had a Personal Protection Order (PPO) against her husband. They were going through a divorce and their relationship was tensed. The PPO was issued in July 2016. In August, she was repeatedly stabbed by her husband in front of her youngest daughter. She later died of her wounds. Her husband was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment but any punishment meted out can never heal the loss of a mother for their two daughters or undo the trauma suffered by the youngest.

The PPO was insufficient to prevent her husband’s attack. While the PPO operates in a separate regime under the Women’s Charter, harassment victims who obtain a PO or EPO under POHA might find themselves in similar threatening situations with the harasser.

Therefore, will the Minister look into immediately attaching a social worker to such cases once a PO or EPO has been issued? A social worker could consistently monitor and assess the case, and identify any worrying irregularities in a harasser’s behaviour in advance to prevent ill-fated cases like that of my resident.

Currently, when ordering POs or EPOs, the Court can include the condition that the respondent and victim attend counselling or mediation. Will the Minister consider making it a mandatory requirement that the Court consider referring counselling and mediation options for parties, and making such an order where appropriate?

Lastly, the Bill introduces a new offence of doxxing which signals the Government’s firm commitment towards addressing new and upcoming forms of harassment. This is especially welcomed in a time where online vigilantism is becoming more rampant in our society.

However, as mentioned by many in this House, there is some ambiguity as to what constitutes doxxing as defined under the Bill. A 2016 incident illustrates this. Many have shared examples and I will share, of course, one about an animal.

In 2016, a story emerged on Facebook of a driver who ran over a dog from a dog shelter and drove off in a hit-and-run. Her vehicle plate number was posted on Facebook with a request for anyone who knew the identity of the driver to text or message a private number. Netizens used the posted plate number to obtain and publish online the woman’s personal particulars.

The car owner and her employer were harassed online by angry netizens. It subsequently emerged that the owner had in fact not been driving the vehicle at the time and did not run over the dog.

This story highlights the dangers of Internet vigilantism and the ambiguities in the definition of doxxing as an offence.

Would the initial action of publishing the woman’s vehicle plate number on their Facebook page be considered doxxing? First, would a vehicle plate number fall under the definition of "identity information"?

The amendments include Illustration (d), which references a situation in which an individual X records a video of Y driving recklessly in a car and posts the video on an online forum. While Illustration (d) goes on to state that no offence to committed because X posted the video with the intent to warn people to drive defensively, it is not clear from the example whether a vehicle plate number alone would constitute "identity information".

Second, was there intent to cause harm, alarm, or distress in the situation where initially they were simply trying to find out who was driving the car and hit the dog? Could the defence that the conduct was reasonable be raised here? While there was a request for help to identify the driver, it was also expressly stated that the information should be sent to a private number.

This story highlights my broader concern about the difficulty in determining whether there was intention to cause harm, alarm, or distress by the publication of identity information, or whether the conduct was reasonable.

Parliament expressed a preference to leave interpretation of POHA to the Courts as POHA offences are highly dependent on the factual matrix.

The Courts have stated that intention being a thought process can only usually be proved by drawing inferences from the surrounding circumstances and the actions of the accused.

Can the Minister shed more light on what the Courts should consider in drawing these inferences? Further, can more examples of permissible and impermissible publication of identity information be provided either in the Minister’s response or through guidelines or informational material from the Ministry?

This will be helpful for guiding the conduct of the public who should not have to be hauled to Court before finding out whether their actions constitute an offence or not.

Third, regardless of intent, should there be a bright-line prohibition on revealing certain categories of identity information such as NRIC numbers, passport numbers, addresses and phone numbers?

These categories of information are very sensitive and anyone who publishes this information must reasonably know of the risk that the information may be abused by the public in ways that might cause the individual harassment, alarm, or distress. Notwithstanding that the publisher did not expressly or specifically intend to do so, he or she should be taken to have acted in wilful disregard of the risk.

The nature of these categories of information mean that they can be misused for nefarious purposes with particularly devastating consequences for the individual. As such, it might be prudent to prohibit publication of these categories of information regardless of intention.

Sir, notwithstanding the above clarifications, I support this Bill which will better protect and offer redress to victims of harassment.

Mr Speaker: Senior Minister of State Mr Edwin Tong.

2.42 pm

Mr Edwin Tong Chun Fai: Thank you, Mr Speaker, and I thank all the Members who have spoken in support of the Bill. I am grateful for the strong support that has been expressed in this house.

Members have shared many examples of how Singaporeans, and animals, some known personally to them, have experienced harassment, both in the physical and the online space. I will do my best to respond but I cannot reply to all the examples that have been cited, some more graphically.

But the stories that you have told, that you have shared in this House, illustrate just how easy it is to spread falsehoods about individuals, about businesses, and how there are serious consequences, immediate and downstream, and why we need this Bill to give redress and recourse for individuals against physical and online harassment.

Assoc Prof Walter Theseira shared a very vivid and, might I say graphic, example of his personal experience of being harassed and spoke passionately about the need for each of us to treat one another with dignity offline as well as online. I cannot agree more with Assoc Prof Theseira.

Members have vividly described, falsehoods which have serious and devastating consequences, and which can also have a deep and long lasting impact. They underscore why we need these laws.

The questions that Members have raised can be categorised into various baskets and I intend to address them as comprehensively as I can.

First, let me address the Court process which various Members have touched on.

Ms Anthea Ong has suggested to allow persons between 16 and 21 years of age, to make applications for Protection Orders without their parents or legal guardians. We recognise that in some cases there are groups of victims who require assistance in seeking legal redress, and for their own reasons, may not want parents to be involved or to be aware of it. That is why clause 24 of the Bill permits prescribed third parties, such as voluntary welfare organisations, to bring civil proceedings on behalf of a victim. The Court will consider each of these applications judiciously.

These third parties, on top of being able to bring their application, can also give practical support to the victim by providing information on court procedures and processes and also help, especially at an important time like this, on lending emotional and moral support to the victim during the process.

Mr Christopher de Souza and Ms Rahayu Mahzam asked whether there are measures in place to ensure victims of harassment and abuse are given sufficient assistance when they approach the Courts. Ms Rahayu, in particular, expressed hope that the PHC will be a "one-stop shop" to provide practical support and help with counselling.

The current laws, augmented by the proposed revisions in this Bill, strive to make the process as easy as possible and as simple as possible for victims.

Currently, there are already court officers at the Harassment Cases Registry to explain the processes under POHA. There is also an assessor stationed there to look at the application, understand the nature of the application, and guide the applicant on the application. On top of that, options are also put to the applicant in the appropriate cases, to consider counselling or mediation. On top of this, on a pro bono basis, law students are available to assist on-site to provide general advice to help with the form filling and also, in the case of more complicated factually involved cases, to assist in the drafting of affidavits in the application. Currently, the Court already has the power to refer parties to counselling and mediation and will continue to do so in the appropriate cases.

The streamlining of procedures and expedited timelines that I mentioned in my earlier speech build on this to enhance the process even more.

In relation to Police's investigations, Mr Louis Ng asked if Victim Care Officers who are specially trained in victim care management also handle the cases involving victims of harassment. The answer is yes, they do. The Victim Care Cadre Programme is available to all victims of crime, who require emotional support throughout the course of investigations. This includes victims of harassment who can avail themselves of victim care services by providing their consent to such services to investigation officers.

Mr Louis Ng asked if it is possible to make it mandatory for the Court to consider referring parties to mediation and counselling. I think I have addressed that. But just to underscore the point, under section 12(2B), in appropriate cases, the Courts already do so. They have the power, and they do frequently arrange for parties to attend counselling or mediation, when it is appropriate in those cases.

Mr Louis Ng also asked if it is possible for social workers to be attached to applicants of POs in certain cases, so that the social worker can consistently monitor and be aware of the development of the case, and also be able to identify worrying trends or changes in the harasser's behaviour.

The case which Mr Ng cited is a tragic one. And I would say that there are already existing avenues of assistance for applicants for POs, to on-site counsellors and also psychiatrists who will be able to assist.

Separately, the amendments will also ensure that the respondent can be ordered to undergo a mental health assessment and the appropriate treatments where necessary. But nonetheless, Mr Louis Ng's suggestion is an interesting one and we will work with the relevant agencies to see how we can further consider this suggestion and also enhance the support to victims.

Ms Rahayu asked if there are plans for the Protection from Harassment Court (PHC) to employ a judge-led approach. The short answer is yes. And clause 24 of the Bill empowers the PHC precisely to adopt a judge-led approach in any civil proceedings before the Court. This will ensure that the judges can exercise greater control over proceedings, taking charge of the proceedings and managing it from the judge's perspective. The overarching objective of this is to ensure that the proceedings are dealt with as efficiently as possible, fairly, but also to ensure that acrimony is kept at as low a level as possible.

Mr Christopher de Souza has asked about the timelines and asked how long the process to apply for a Protection Order (PO) and Expedited Protection Order (EPO) currently takes. He also asked what resources will be deployed to the PHC to ensure that the proposed expedited timelines that we have in mind can be met.

Currently, an application for a PO is fixed for a pre-trial conference about three to four weeks after the applicant's Originating Summons and Affidavit are filed and processed. The hearing for the final PO is generally fixed within four weeks from the last pre-trial conference. So, it will be several weeks or if not, months, downstream from the original application. Applications for EPOs are fixed for a hearing before a judge within three working days from the date these documents are filed.

We will work with the State Courts to ensure that necessary resources are deployed to expedite the hearings of these applications. That is the intention of the PHC in the first place. Having a dedicated court to hear these applications with streamlined procedures, applying them in a way that best suits the case, will make for expedition and also efficiency in managing the cases.

Mr Singh asked about a case where, on occasions, you might need to hear a case in five to six hours because of very pressing demands. No doubt courts will try but I would say that it will be very difficult to do so mainly because to hear a case properly and fully, one will have to ensure that the proper evidence and the right materials are before the courts for the courts to make the proper assessment of the case and decide.

Mr Murali asked about jurisdiction and I would just like to deal with that; the civil jurisdiction. Mr Pillai suggested that our courts should have the jurisdiction to hear civil applications where the victim of harassment is outside Singapore at the material time; and where the act of harassment by the harasser is committed outside Singapore.

The basis of the Court's jurisdiction is as set out in section 17 of the existing POHA. That does not change and we acknowledge that this limits the scope of jurisdiction in respect of acts which may take place overseas.

I would like to turn to the enhanced protection for victims of harassment and related persons. There were questions relating to the measures that are available to enhance protection for victims of harassment, in particular, victims who are intimately related to the harasser. All victims, whether married or not married, of whatever gender, will be protected under POHA. So, to Mr Singh's point, the remedies are gender-neutral.

Dr Chia Shi-Lu asked if it is possible to introduce stronger deterrent measures to enforce Protection Orders (POs). He has also asked if more can be done to prevent subsequent harassments or attacks. The Bill has several measures designed to deal with this. Two of them are deterrent in nature; and a third seeks to try to address the underlying cause or reason for the harassment conduct in the first place. Let me just briefly explain these three.

The first deterrent measure is to make breaches of POs arrestable in prescribed circumstances. I mentioned that in my earlier speech, especially in a case where hurt is involved or where the harassing conduct persists even after the PO has been issued. In these two cases, the breach of the PO is made arrestable. Previously, they were not and that might have accounted for why some victims felt reluctant to step forward.

The second deterrent measure is to have enhanced penalties for offences which involved a second or subsequent breach of the POs and EPOs. Clause 11, in this regard of the Bill, doubles the maximum penalty prescribed if a POHA offence is committed against an intimate partner, or against a vulnerable person.

The third measure seeks to address the underlying root cause of harassment.

As Dr Chia pointed out, there may be cases where the accused could not be acting rationally or thinking straight, or behaving with restraint. We fully agree with this, as it also mirrors the feedback given to us by the various stakeholders.

Currently, separate criminal proceedings have to be brought so that a Mandatory Treatment Order can be granted upon a criminal conviction.

We are now empowering the court to consider, upfront, where appropriate, whether the respondent should undergo psychiatric assessment and treatment after it grants a PO in civil proceedings. So, at the juncture that the Court considers that it is appropriate to grant the Order, it also has to look at whether or not psychiatric assessments and treatments might be necessary for this accused person. In my view, this benefits the accused person, as early psychiatric intervention may help to prevent further harassment where the harassment is due to this underlying psychiatric condition.

Ms Anthea Ong observed that harsher punishments are not necessarily always an effective deterrent and may not serve victims better. We agree that increased punishments alone cannot be the only solution, and indeed, they are not the only solution.

POHA is not only about punishing offenders. And, as I mentioned earlier, apart from the Mandatory Treatment Orders and psychiatric assessments, it provides already for options for mediation and counselling. And these are designed to ensure that as far as possible, the process, where possible, keeps acrimony, keeps the aggravation to a minimum.

Mr Patrick Tay asked for examples of situations where the enhanced penalties might not apply to a harasser in an intimate relationship.

Let me first explain the framework within which the enhanced penalties for offences against victims in intimate relationships are meant to apply.

Clause 11 sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors that the Court may have regard to, when determining whether an accused person and the victim were in an intimate relationship. The list mirrors that introduced by the Criminal Law Reform Bill yesterday in respect of certain Penal Code offences committed in the context of intimate relationships.

This Bill seeks to enhance protection for victims who are psychologically manipulated or intimidated by their intimate partners. For some of these victims, stepping forward to seek help in the context of that relationship is very challenging. And for other victims, sometimes, seeking help is not even an option at all.

On the one hand, there is a need to protect such victims. But equally, and on the other hand, we should ensure that not every offender is subject to enhanced penalties merely by reason of being in an intimate relationship.

So, the Bill strikes a balance. If the accused person can prove that the victim's ability to protect himself or herself from the accused was not adversely affected by reason of their relationship, then the enhanced penalties will not apply. That provision is set out in the Bill.

So, on Mr Tay's example, if there is no evidence before the Court that there was an imbalance of power in the context of the relationship with one party being coercive, the other party being submissive, and no evidence that the victim was unable, by reason of the relationship, to prevent the harm that was caused or will be caused, then if an accused person commits an offence under POHA in this kind of scenario, the enhanced penalties will not apply.

Dr Chia asked for some recent data on the effectiveness of POs, the number of cases of repeated breaches and subsequent injuries or deaths.

Since POHA came into force on 15 November 2014, 406 POs and EPOs have been made. In the same period, 51 Magistrate's Complaints have been filed for alleged breaches of POs and EPOs. In six out of these 51 cases, there was a breach of a PO or an EPO on more than one occasion. These statistics give a snapshot, but in themselves cannot be considered to be an accurate barometer of the effectiveness of the POs.

Mr Murali Pillai has raised a query which also pertains to the effectiveness of POs and let me just try to address that with reference to the example that he has cited. He has shared an example of a female victim who obtains a PO against her ex-boyfriend who has harassed her using intimate recordings that he possesses. He has sought clarification about whether section 12 prohibits the court from making ancillary orders that it deems fit.

The short answer is, section 12(3) provides that a PO may include any requirement necessary for or incidental to the proper carrying into effect of the order. So, it gives the court some flexibility to consider all the facts and determines what is the appropriate remedy in the context of that case, given no two harassment cases will have similar facts.

Mr Tay suggested that the scope of "public service worker" under the Act be reviewed. In particular, I think Mr Tay suggested that private security guards be accorded special protection under POHA. We had considered this point before and I think Mr Tay is aware that this issue has come up in this House previously.

To explain the current position, individuals are considered "public service workers" for the purpose of enhanced protection under POHA if their jobs serve the general public, and not just the patrons of a private business or establishment.

We note the points that Mr Tay has made. The Minister for Law had, in 2014, said that the precise classes of workers covered should evolve as the operating landscape of public service evolves over time.

I would like to assure the Member that with these amendments, there are sufficient measures and remedies under POHA for the protection of everyone. Offenders can also be prosecuted under the Penal Code for egregious cases involving hurt, criminal intimidation or criminal force.

Also on the issue of harassment at the workplace, Ms Ong asked whether entities now have a responsibility to exercise reasonable care to prevent and correct the harassing behaviour of their employees.

In general, employers already have a duty to ensure the safety and health of their employees at the workplace. The amendments that we are proposing in the Bill today do not change that. Indeed, the Tripartite Advisory on Managing Workplace Harassment which was issued in 2015 stands as a practical guide and does so till today for employers and employees to better prevent and manage harassment at the workplace.

I would add to this that the Bill provides that entities can be criminally liable for all the offences under POHA. So, it applies to entities as well as to individuals. And for entities, because they are non-natural persons, the principles of attribution will apply.

For example, if the officers managing a company instruct their employees to carry out acts of harassment, such as harassment in connection with money lending activities, the company itself can be criminally liable for those acts.

The amendments will, therefore, discourage entities from using or allowing their employees or several employees to harass their customers.

Mr Murali Pillai also raised an example of a disgruntled person who harassed the employees of a company by sending them repeated emails and also using threatening language. I think that is the case that went before the Courts some years ago. He has suggested that the company be allowed to commence an action to protect its employees from the harassing conduct of such a person.

The remedy lies in section 12. The starting point is section 3 of POHA which makes it an offence to target a person, which can include a company, and cause any other person, which can also include the company’s employees, to suffer harassment, alarm or distress.

So, as illustrated by Mr Murali’s example, the company and its employees are both victims for the purposes of section 3 of POHA. The company can apply for a protection order under section 12. As the company is an entity, such a protection order would also extend to its employees.

Mr Christopher de Souza asked about the definition of the term, "statement of fact" and if it is meant to be different from how the term is currently understood under section 15. The answer is no. Clause 3, which contains a definition of "statement of fact", is merely intended to make the definition of the term clearer.

I think on this Mr Singh also asked a question about the black metal band. I forgot the precise language that he had used about the phraseology but from what I caught of the statement, it was an expression of an opinion as to the effects of attending black metal concerts. Whether you agree with that or not is a different issue but, as I have mentioned at the start, a statement of fact does not include a statement of opinion or a commentary or even a critique. Stating an opinion, without more, that black metal bands incite people to do violence – I think that was the thrust of the statement you mentioned – would not be a false statement of fact.

Mr Yee Chia Hsing has three queries relating to entities that are the subject of falsehoods. Let me just address them quickly in turn.

First, Mr Yee has asked whether the Protection from Harassment Court may award damages to a victim of a false statement without the victim bringing a civil suit. The answer is no. That is because the remedies available under POHA seek to protect individuals and entities against false statements of fact by preventing or limiting the spread of those false statements. Remedies such as correction orders and targeted correction orders are also available to ensure that the false statements are corrected and made known to those who had viewed the false statement. These remedies are intended to supplement and not replace the existing civil actions for defamation and malicious falsehoods. However, clause 20 of the Bill allows the victim of a falsehood to commence related civil proceedings in the PHC. This will allow the subject of the falsehood to seek the remedies provided under POHA as well as for damages under civil proceedings in one court. So it makes the proceedings a lot more simplified and a lot more convenient.

Second, Mr Yee has asked if a victim of a falsehood only needs to make a Police report and, I think in his words, "piggy-back" on criminal investigations in order to obtain an order in relation to the falsehood. Again, the answer is no and that is because the deeming provisions which allow a respondent to rely on a prior criminal conviction, apply only in relation to applications for POs or EPOs. They do not apply where a section 15 falsehood is concerned.

Finally, the simplified process and quicker timelines, which I spoke about earlier, they are meant to make it less costly, and easier, for a victim to seek redress. And in answer to Mr Yee's third question, that is the purpose of the amendments – to simplify, to expedite, to make it easier and I think to Mr Singh’s point, these simplified procedures also apply to falsehoods.

Mr de Souza asked further whether the word, "harm", in section 16AA is limited to physical harm and the answer is no. For context, a court must first be satisfied in such an application that there is prima facie evidence, amongst other things, that the publication of the specified material has caused or is likely to cause the subject of the false statement harm. An interim order under section 16 can be made only if it is just and equitable to do so in the circumstances. The harm need not be physical; it may be harm to the subject’s reputation or business. It may also encompass emotional harm. And as we know, the nature of online falsehoods is that their effect often extends beyond the realm of physical harm – moving down to reputational or emotional harm. And, indeed, the examples that we have heard in the House today by Members illustrate that where entities in particular are involved, the harm is often to their reputation or business.

Mr de Souza also asked about third party expenses in complying with and adhering to General Correction Orders. Clause 20, which introduces the new section 16CA, allows for costs reasonably incurred by third parties in complying with a General Correction Order to be made against any of the following: the author of the false statement provided that the author authorised or caused the statement to be published; any person or entity that intentionally published the false statement; and the applicant of the order.

I think Mr Singh also asked if this was intended to apply beyond the General Correction Order. The answer is no. The reason for clause 20 is that the General Correction Order brings in third parties – third party platforms which have got nothing to do with the publication, the authoring of the statement and are not the author itself; and it is in that situation that a cost remedy and regime is provided for in this Bill. That is not to say that this, otherwise, takes away the victim's ability under civil law to seek redress and that can include the costs of any suffering incurred by the victim against the publisher or by the author of the falsehood.

I think Mr Singh also asked about liability of third parties and let me just deal with that. I think it is in the context of moderators of social media groups and platforms for posts made by users. The position is that if the user made a post which falls foul of the law on doxxing, the moderator will not ipso facto be liable for doxxing since he himself has not published the information and Mr Singh's own example, as I understood your example having heard it, was that there was also no intention to harass in that case.

I turn now to deal with Prof Lim Sun Sun's queries and there were two queries that I think came through. The first is: what the estimated volume of online falsehood cases that could be brought before the Courts after the Bill is passed? And how significant an administrative cost this will be in the context of Internet intermediaries?

On the first point, the Courts are equipped to deal with any increase in the number of cases brought. In fact, I would say the point goes beyond just numbers. If by these amendments we allow more victims to more quickly and more easily obtain redress, resulting in more cases being brought, then, in some measure, the purpose of these amendments would have been fulfilled.

In terms of the administrative cost on Internet intermediaries, we should first bear in mind the fact that Internet intermediaries already fall within the scope of POHA today. So, it is not a new amendment to bring these intermediaries within POHA. And the starting point is that protection orders as well as orders under section 15 can today already be made against these intermediaries. Given this, we do not expect that the revised regime will impose significant additional administrative cost on these platforms. In any event, we should remember that this Bill deals with harassment, physical and online, and the use of falsehoods to affect and damage people’s lives and livelihoods.

Apparent from the many examples I gave in my speech earlier, and certainly those cited by Members themselves, this kind of conduct has very serious consequences. People’s lives and reputations can be easily and quickly destroyed. Businesses can be ruined, causing economic damage. All of this happens in an online environment, and on platforms where falsehoods travel quickly, and the truth is often left behind. Without redress, and the remedies which this Bill proposes, it would be next to impossible for individuals to protect themselves against this. Internet intermediaries have long been unable, or perhaps unwilling, to take proactive steps to remove such content.

So, the issue here is not so much about cost. It is about a falsehood where it is not only the right thing to do under this Bill to get redress for the individual, but I would say it would also be socially responsible for the Internet intermediaries to remove these falsehoods and ensure that there is proper redress.

This Bill provides legislative solutions to deal with such conduct, and to provide individuals with recourse and redress in an environment where the Internet intermediaries wield such power and control over the medium.

Prof Lim Sun Sun has asked whether the new regulations will harm Singapore’s pro-innovation environment. They will not. Ultimately, the strengthened falsehoods regime under POHA will complement the companies’ interest in running a responsible and positive platform which serves to improve the quality of private discourse amongst their users; and improve the quality of their experiences on the platform. We will no doubt continue to work with the Internet intermediaries to develop operationally feasible solutions that can be taken into account under the new section 16BB(3) in the Bill, which clause 20 introduces.

I turn now to some questions on online harassment and the anonymity of harassers. Mr Tay, in particular, raised the issue of anonymity in cyberspace, the identification of online perpetrators not being so easily done. This issue of identifying such perpetrators was also raised during the Second Reading of POHA back in 2014.

The problem of online anonymity is not unique to offences under POHA. Indeed, it is a serious and growing problem, not just in POHA. Law enforcement agencies, worldwide, have had to face challenges in tackling cybercrimes and cyber-enabled crimes, where criminals have sought to hide behind the relative anonymity of the Internet to cause harm to society. However, a person who uses a fake moniker, or other means to conceal his identity, can still be identified by the investigation efforts of law enforcement agencies.

The amendments to POHA are intended to provide tools to deal with the unique nature of online falsehoods. POHA currently provides that where the respondent or publisher is anonymous, they may be identified by an Internet location address, a website, a username, an account or an email address, or any other unique identifier as the Court may order.

With the amendments, even if the source of the falsehood is, for example, hiding behind a VPN address and cannot be tracked down, is anonymous or refuses to take down the falsehood, the victim has other options, aimed at stopping the falsehood, the spread of the falsehood and also making the appropriate corrections. The victim may apply for a stop publication order to require other parties to stop publishing the false statement or substantially similar statements.

In addition, or in the alternative, he may apply for a disabling order or a targeted correction order depending on what is right correction to deal with and address the false statements. These latter orders can require Internet intermediaries to disable access to the falsehood or to ensure that corrections are distributed to those who access the falsehood.

Ms Rahayu asked questions about challenges involved in preserving evidence, especially online ones where the content could be posted on Instagram stories, where the material is sometimes transient. Features such as what Ms Rahayu has mentioned are ephemeral and cannot be viewed once a certain period of time has elapsed. Again, that is a challenge to preserving the evidence but that is also not unique to POHA.

While evidence can be obtained through the investigation efforts of law enforcement agencies, victims and applicants can obviously also take practical steps to preserve the evidence. For example, if a victim or a victim's acquaintances come across offensive content on such platforms which disappear after a certain period of time, he or she can take a screenshot and try and preserve the nature of the content so that that can be used subsequently as evidence.

I turn now to the "doxxing" provisions and, as I have heard the speeches, there has been unanimous support for these new provisions. Members such as Er Dr Lee Bee Wah, Dr Chia Shi-Lu, Mr Gan Thiam Poh, Ms Rahayu Mahzam, Mr Christopher de Souza, Mr Pritam Singh, Mr Louis Ng, Assoc Prof Walter Theseira and Prof Lim Sun Sun have all spoken about or raised the issue of online vigilantism.

Let me first deal with the question of what constitutes "identity information" which I believe some Members have raised. Briefly, it is information which on its own or with other information, identifies or could be used to identify an individual.

Mr Louis Ng asked, in particular, as an example, if a vehicle plate number could fall under the definition of "identity information". The answer is yes, it could, since it is information that can, on its own or possibly with other information, identify an individual. But, as with all cases before our Courts, the judges will have to look at the specific facts and overall context of each case, to look at the circumstances in which it took place, to look at the holistic context of the facts and circumstances and then make an overall assessment.

Ms Rahayu, Mr Murali Pillai, and Mr Louis Ng as well as Mr Singh have also raised queries pertaining to the ambit of the offences. So, let me address that. I will outline the type of conduct that these offences target as well as conduct that will not breach the law.

The offence of doxxing requires the ingredient of the publisher’s intention or knowledge based on the objective circumstances. It is fact-specific. As is the case with many other intention or knowledge-based offences today, for example even under those which you can find in sections 3 and 7 of the existing Act, the Court must look at all the facts and circumstances before it determines if there was such intention or knowledge. So, it is not looking at an overt act like stalking. So, some examples are set out in the act on stalking, but it is looking at circumstances from which one infers or derives an understanding of the intention behind the act itself.

The law provides in the Bill for a defence of reasonableness. This means that if a person can prove that his conduct was reasonable, he will not be guilty of the offences.

Mr Louis Ng and Ms Rahayu Mahzam asked about the factors which a Court might consider when deciding whether there was intention or knowledge present in a case. As I mentioned earlier and I think you have heard me say, it is fact specific. So, you cannot quite constrain the Court to always be considering a set of facts and circumstances. But to the extent helpful and illustrative, let me set out some of these facts which could be considered in a case to determine intent or knowledge.

For example, words or actions that accompany the publication of someone’s personal information. Overt acts and declarations are essential facts from which the court may infer an intention. For example, if A publishes B’s personal information and encourages others, along with the publication, to harass B or to find a way to incite or to use violence against B, then the Court could infer that there was the necessary intent in this case.

Second, the Court will also look at the context in which the personal information was made available.

So, in another example, if A supplies B’s personal information in an online forum and I think this is close to some of the examples that Members have cited, that is dedicated to hunting down and committing violence against "wrongdoers", the objective circumstances would point to the inference that A knew or had reasonable cause to believe that his post would facilitate the use of unlawful violence against the victim. So, the act itself may be neutral but the act of putting it in a forum which is for the self-declared purposes of trying to seek online vigilantism or to incite violence, that would then be taken together. So, the relevant context behind the act will also be considered.

The provisions do not distinguish between the original publisher and someone who then re-posts the publication. Rather, the law looks at the intention of the person who publishes the personal information or the knowledge that he had when he published that information. To illustrate, the original publisher of the personal information might not have ill-intent but someone who re-posts the same information may then have the malicious objective. The key factor is the intention behind the publication, whether original or the republication, and each case will have to be considered on its own facts.

I think Mr Singh also asked about a hyperlinking occasion. Again, I did not quite get the specific facts. So, please correct me if I am wrong. But I understand Mr Singh's example was if you hyperlink identity information, and in the context of the example, it was a lawyer, and the question that was posed is, "Why is a lawyer behaving in this way?" Then, on those facts, it is not a question of doxxing. It is really a question of trying to show that you might have some queries over the conduct, but there is not otherwise, from your example, an intention to cause harassment to this individual.

I would add that posts which merely state opinions or which are meant to encourage social debate, for example, do not fall within the ambit of offences.

I will conclude my responses to the queries raised regarding the ambit of the provisions by emphasising that the nature has to be very fact-specific. We cannot be overly prescriptive in the Bill. But we want the Court to be able to look at each fact, look at each case, understand the context and circumstances in which it is done. And bear in mind that for a person to be prosecuted under this offence, it has to be established beyond any reasonable doubt that the intention of the posting or the publication was to cause the harassment.

Mr Louis Ng, I think, asked if we could categorise and put together examples of permissible and impermissible publication of identity information, through guidelines or other informational material. As I mentioned, because it is very heavily fact-specific, it may not be meaningful to set them out into a set of compendium of guidelines to try to guide each case. Whether something is or is not an offence will have to depend on the facts, and as I said, the Court has to look at each case on its own. But as I also mentioned at the outset, putting all of these together into one body and to allow a framework within which a prosecution can take place, will in itself over time develop a body of jurisprudence and the application of the provisions will be guided by the Court which looks at each case, and develops the jurisprudence in common law as the cases move along.

Let me deal with a couple of other points. I think Mr Singh asked why does POHA not apply to the Government. The general position in law is that the Government is not bound by legislation unless it expressly provides for that to be so. In the case of POHA, that is the case and the Government has taken a view that it will not avail itself of remedies under POHA. Likewise, it will not be subject to provisions under POHA. As to how officers of the Government can be held accountable, that can always be done in the usual forum like in Parliament as in the usual case. I think Mr Singh is aware of that.

Let me see if there are other queries I had missed out.

Mr Speaker, I believe I have dealt with the queries raised by various Members. I would just like to reiterate that as important as it is to have this piece of legislation to deal with remedies for harassment online and offline, equally important is the social consciousness and, of course, public education to shape behaviour. I have taken note of Members' suggestions which may be outside of the scope of legislation but which are nonetheless helpful as we work towards a society that not just through legislation but as a whole, frowns on harassment and frowns on what is effectively bullying whether online or offline.

We have worked and will continue to work with the media and other stakeholders to raise general public awareness of their rights and remedies under this Bill. Mr Speaker, I beg to move.

Mr Speaker: Mr Pritam Singh.

3.22 pm

Mr Pritam Singh: Thank you, Mr Speaker. I just have one clarification. But before that, I would like to thank the Senior Minister of State for going through the examples that were raised and providing his clarifications for them.

My query is on the definition of a false statement. The example I have used which the Senior Minister of State referred to as an opinion went like this. People who listen to black metal music may commit violence in the real world. Now, I can understand in the context of a false statement, there is the usual objective test is in law and that statement may not qualify as a false statement. But in clause 3, the definition of a false statement includes a misleading statement and that complicates the situation a little bit, vis-a-vis whether that is an opinion or whether that is a misleading statement. Now, if it is a misleading statement, then an individual who made that statement potentially could have action taken against him under the Bill, of course, through the civil route. Can the Senior Minister of State please clarify?

Mr Edwin Tong Chun Fai: I thank Mr Singh. A misleading statement is still a statement of fact and is not a comment or an opinion. The example you cited, "May commit violence if you attend a black metal band concert" is a view that has been formed, is a culmination of various factors which have led a person to come to that conclusion. That is not a statement of fact nor can it be categorised as a misleading statement which is also a statement of fact. So, that statement that you have cited is outside of the realm of this Bill.

What this Bill seeks to do is to look at statements of fact which are directly and positively false. And I think the Courts have clear jurisprudence on this. But also indirectly through omission, otherwise, false or misleading in itself. In my earlier speech, I cited an example as to how if you omit certain key facts which are material to understanding, then the image or the view that is communicated is otherwise false because of the omission, and not so much because of a positive statement. So, the Bill covers both scenarios.

Mr Speaker: Mr Yee Chia Hsing.

Mr Yee Chia Hsing: Thank you, Mr Speaker. In terms of doxxing, I would like to ask the Senior Minister of State if someone is wrongly identified as a person in the viral video, and then he goes on to identify the correct person, is he also guilty of doxxing?

Mr Edwin Tong Chun Fai: Well, it depends on the circumstances in which he went on to identify the actual culprit. But I would imagine in such a scenario, you remember I spoke that there is a defence of reasonableness. So, if you portray someone as being the perpetrator when actually it is not, then I think I would doubt that the Court would say it is unreasonable for the person to then point in the direction of the actual perpetrator. But as I said it is fact-specific. Let the court look at the facts of each case and understand the context and reasons behind the posting even by the second person.

Mr Patrick Tay Teck Guan: Just a point of clarification for the Senior Minister of State. He mentioned about Government being precluded from using the POHA to take action. Just for clarity, individuals, in particular public sector workers or civil servants, they can actually make use of the POHA, vis-a-vis versus perpetrators or they themselves are perpetrators. Am I right?

Mr Edwin Tong Chun Fai: For these individuals, yes. And I think I explained that in my earlier speeches on your example on workers.

Mr Pritam Singh: Just to follow up on that earlier example vis-a-vis the misleading statement, I understand what the Senior Minister of State has said about it. The issue is, in the context that I provided, that statement has caused damage to a certain entity. And that entity seeks to prove in Court that the statement actually in and of itself is misleading, and because of those circumstances loss has accrued to the band. Would they be able to rely on POHA?

Mr Edwin Tong Chun Fai: No, if it is not a statement of fact then POHA does not apply. But that is not to say that should you have a statement that has affected a business entity economically or that might otherwise be defamatory of an individual, those civil remedies still apply. And party can still be avail themselves of that even if the statement does not fall under POHA. I hope that clarifies.

Question put, and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House.

The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. – [Mr Edwin Tong Chun Fai].

Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed.

Mr Speaker: Order. I propose to take a break now. I suspend the Sitting and will take the Chair at 3.45 pm.

Sitting accordingly suspended

at 3.29 pm until 3.45 pm.

Sitting resumed at 3.45 pm.

[Mr Speaker in the Chair]