Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution (Amendment) Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

4.08 pm

The Second Minister for Law (Mr Edwin Tong Chun Fai): Mr Speaker, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."

Sir, Singapore's insolvency and debt restructuring laws have undergone a multi-phase reform process over the years, to ensure that we have a progressive and modern insolvency framework.

Before 2016, it was not mandatory to appoint a private trustee to administer bankruptcy cases as the trustee in bankruptcy. As a result, private trustees were seldom appointed and the Official Assignee, or the OA, was appointed to act as the trustee in over 99% of bankruptcies.

As part of the Ministry of Law (MinLaw)'s ongoing review of the bankruptcy administration regime in Singapore, in 2016, the Government introduced two key initiatives. First, a requirement for Institutional Creditors (ICs) making bankruptcy applications to apply for Private Trustees in Bankruptcy, which I will call PTIBs, to be appointed as the trustee administering the bankruptcy, instead of the OA. Second, a Differentiated Discharge Framework (DDF) was introduced. This serves to streamline work processes, and also creates a more rehabilitative discharge process with clear time frames and conditions for bankrupts to be discharged.

Sir, these changes have helped to streamline and improve the quality of bankruptcy administration, whilst at the same time, ensuring that public resources are better utilised.

As of end-2021, PTIBs administer about 40% of bankruptcy cases, with the OA administering the remaining 60%.

Based on feedback from the industry, the experience of PTIBs undertaking the administration of bankruptcy cases that are filed by ICs has generally been smooth. This Bill will now seek to introduce changes to the bankruptcy regime: to mandate that PTIBs now administer all bankruptcy cases, except those which the OA will decide to administer, having regard to public interest.

To support the shift towards a fully PTIB-administered bankruptcy regime, the Bill introduces an amendment to improve operational flexibility in determining PTIBs' remuneration.

Finally, the Bill also contains miscellaneous amendments that seek to enhance protection of persons dealing with bankrupts in commercial transactions, and also extend the Simplified Insolvency Programme, or SIP, for a further two years.

Let me now elaborate on the key amendments in this Bill.

Private debt recovery lies at the heart of bankruptcy administration. Bankruptcy typically involves the creditor seeking redress for non-payment of a debt, or a debtor seeking relief from overwhelming debts. A PTIB-administered bankruptcy regime aims to reduce the usage of public resources involved in private debt recovery, whilst ensuring that bankruptcy cases in Singapore continue to be managed in an orderly manner.

Sir, there are precedents for such a practice from overseas. For instance, in jurisdictions like the United States and Canada, the law mandates the appointment of the equivalent of PTIBs for every bankruptcy case in those jurisdictions. Clause 2 of the Bill, therefore, amends sections 36(1) and (2) of the Insolvency, Restructuring and. Dissolution Act (IRDA): (a) to mandate the appointment of PTIBs to act as trustees in all bankruptcy cases; and (b) save for cases where the OA consents to be appointed as the trustee in bankruptcy.

Moving forward, the OA will provide consent only in cases where the OA considers them to be in the public interest. Let me give some examples of such public interest cases. Typically, they will include cases where public finances are affected, such as, for instance, cases involving the misuse of public funds or where there are debts owed to the Government. These are not meant to be exhaustive illustrations.

However, I will add that this does not mean that the OA will consent to act as the trustee in every case where there might be elements of public interest. The OA will continue to retain the discretion on whether to take up these cases and the OA will consider whether the public interest element is sufficiently compelling vis-à-vis other considerations, giving the appropriate weight to each of these factors before deciding whether to give such consent.

To complement these amendments, clause 6 introduces a new section 318A to provide that the Court must not make a bankruptcy order if a PTIB or the OA has not consented to act as the trustee in bankruptcy.

Sir, together, these amendments will result in a shift towards a fully PTIB-administered bankruptcy regime. With this new regime, the OA will take on a more regulatory role to ensure the PTIBs' competencies and legislative compliance in bankruptcy administration. Statutory duties, such as the powers of investigation, as well as that of prosecution, will continue to reside with the OA.

We have assessed, at present, that there is sufficient capacity in the PTIB industry to take on the additional cases following these changes. In other words, we made an assessment as to what the likely case load will be after these changes. We looked at the amount of resources in the industry. In our assessment, there is sufficient capacity in the PTIB industry.

My Ministry has engaged industry stakeholders on these proposals. The stakeholders include insolvency practitioners who are eligible to handle, but are not yet currently handling, bankruptcy administration. MinLaw will continue to engage the industry to keep them abreast of the developments and provide the necessary support that may be required for them to take on this role.

Sir, the Bill also provides support to the PTIB industry by improving operational flexibility for determining PTIBs' remuneration.

Currently, section 41(1) of the IRDA states that a trustee's remuneration must be approved in the following manner. First, by agreement between the trustees and the creditors' committee. If there is no such agreement, or if there is no creditors' committee, remuneration has to be determined by a special resolution of creditors at a meeting convened by the trustee. Where there is no determination under either of the previous two modes, then the Court has to determine the PTIBs' remuneration.

In our consultation with industry players, they have pointed out that they face obstacles in forming a creditors' committee for many cases. This includes unsuccessful attempts at convening a creditors' meeting to vote on a trustee's remuneration. There is also a lack of response from creditors in some cases. Those were the feedback that we received from industry players.

This has resulted in extra costs being incurred in bankruptcy administration as the PTIBs will have to appoint solicitors to apply to Court to approve their remuneration. This, in turn, reduces the amount left available for distribution to creditors as costs and expenses of administration are given priority in the distribution of a bankrupt's property.

Therefore, Sir, to simplify the process for determining PTIBs' remuneration and to keep the costs of bankruptcy administration low, clause 3 amends section 41(1) and inserts new subsections (1)(b)(ii) and (4) to provide for an additional means of determining PTIB's remuneration via agreement between the PTIB and all the creditors.

The creditors will be deemed to have agreed if they have not objected to the remuneration sought by the PTIB in the prescribed manner and within the prescribed time.

I would stress that the creditors' rights to object to such renumeration will be preserved. And if indeed the creditors do object, the PTIBs will still have to secure either a special resolution at a creditors' meeting or they will have to go to Court for approval.

These amendments will help PTIBs' fees remain affordable by keeping the costs down, even as they take on more cases and also seek to improve returns for creditors.

Let me now touch on other amendments in this Bill.

First, the enhancement of protection of persons dealing with bankrupts in commercial transactions.

Apart from amendments that allow changes to the current bankruptcy regime, this Bill will also introduce measures to better protect persons dealing with bankrupts in commercial transactions. These amendments address concerns where members of the public were not aware that they were dealing with a bankrupt person, especially when large sums of money are involved.

These measures will be introduced via two amendments.

First, clause 10 introduces a new section 412(1)(d), which makes it an offence for an undischarged bankrupt to receive a deposit of at least $10,000 from any such person if he or she – the bankrupt – does not disclose his or her bankruptcy status to that person. This will complement existing subsection 1(a), which makes it an offence for a bankrupt to obtain credit without first disclosing his bankruptcy status.

For this amendment, what do we mean by the taking of a deposit? What is a deposit in this case? In the amendment, when we say "deposit", it refers to an advance payment for the supply of goods or services. This can be in the form of money or other in-kind consideration. Let me illustrate.

A bankrupt who is an employee of a renovation company collects a deposit of $10,000 from a customer who has engaged the company to perform renovation works. The bankrupt in this case will have to disclose his bankruptcy status at the time he receives the $10,000, even though he might have been authorised by the company to collect deposits.

Clause 10 also includes language which makes it immaterial whether the individual receives the deposit in his or her own account or on the account of another person. So, in the context of my example, the employee receiving it on the account of the company will also be obliged to make this disclosure.

It is also immaterial whether the deposit is received as full or partial payment.

Sir, whilst we set up these mechanisms for protection, we recognise that there also might be circumstances where this new offence might unduly inconvenience some bankrupts performing certain job roles where they may have to receive and handle deposits of large sums on a frequent or day-to-day basis.

Hence, clause 10 also provides that the Minister for Law may exempt any person or class of persons from this new offence by order in the Gazette.

Next, clause 11 will amend section 433(1) to allow the public to obtain information that undischarged bankrupts have submitted to the OA regarding their current employment status and employment history. This allows the public to conduct better due diligence when transacting with persons who are undischarged bankrupts. Such information will be available along with other such existing information in the register of bankrupts that is already publicly searchable upon the payment of a prescribed search fee.

These two amendments will also apply and be in force against bankrupts whose bankruptcy orders were made under the repealed Bankruptcy Act by way of clause 12 of the Bill.

Finally, let me move on to the final set of amendments within this Bill. And the final set deals with amendments which seek to extend the validity period of the SIP for an additional two years, to 28 January 2026.

Sir, as Members might recall, the SIP was introduced on 29 January 2021 to help eligible micro- and small companies – or we call them MSCs – facing financial difficulties due to the COVID-19 pandemic. This was part of the Government's response to COVID-19 and comprised temporary insolvency processes which help eligible MSCs by restructuring the debts of viable companies to rehabilitate the business, or in some cases to wind up the company where the business has ceased to be viable. These processes are meant to be simpler, faster and low-cost in nature to optimise resources and potentially maximise returns to creditors.

As at 31 December 2022, the Official Receiver has completed the liquidation of 27 companies under the SIP.

Under the normal compulsory liquidation processes, the average time taken to complete the liquidation of such a company would be roughly three to four years. In comparison, liquidations under the SIP have been completed within an average of six months from the date the case has been accepted into the SIP.

The validity period of the SIP lasts for only three years presently. Clauses 4 and 5 thus amend sections 72B(1) and 250B(1), extending the validity period for an additional two years to 28 January 2026.

These amendments will allow my Ministry to provide continued support for such MSCs which may face operational challenges, particularly in the context of the current economic environment of rising inflation and interest rates.

In the meantime, I would add that my Ministry is also reviewing the SIP with the view to making certain features permanent. For example, my Ministry is looking at allowing insolvency practitioners and not just the Official Receiver to adopt some of the SIP's simplified and expedited processes for the restructuring or winding up of eligible companies that are under their administration. This would, in turn, benefit more MSCs going forward.

Sir, in conclusion, this Bill will ensure better utilisation of public resources in bankruptcy administration, support the PTIB industry and MSCs, and also enhance protection of persons dealing with bankrupts in commercial transactions. With that, Mr Speaker, I beg to move.

Question proposed.

Mr Speaker: Mr Murali Pillai.

4.23 pm

Mr Murali Pillai (Bukit Batok): Mr Speaker, Sir, I would like to declare that I am a partner of a firm which has an insolvency practice.

I support the aims of the Bill. In my speech, I will focus on one of the aims that the hon Minister articulated, that is, to mandate the appointment of PTIBs in, generally, all bankruptcy cases. The key motivation behind this aim is to provide a more efficient use of the Public Service by focusing on the regulatory role of the Government and decanting non-regulatory service functions to the private sector.

I see this proposal as the final move in an orderly transformation of insolvency and bankruptcy processes that commenced in 2016. The hon Minister has already mentioned it in his speech and I need only mention two milestones.

First, for corporate insolvencies, the Official Receiver has already stopped being the liquidator of last resort. In his place, private liquidators are appointed by the Court. With respect to bankruptcy applications by ICs, such as retail banks, ICs are required to apply for PTIBs to be appointed to administer the bankruptcy, instead of the OA.

Seen against this background, it makes sense to complete the transformation by requiring that for all other bankruptcies – I understand they are about 60% of bankruptcies, in respect of which PTIBs have not been appointed – PTIBs be now appointed too.

Through this, we will be able to gain the full extent of the efficiencies by redeploying resources under the Insolvency and Public Trustee's Office to perform regulatory functions. In essence, we are placing the core of the Government's function within the Civil Service while allow the private sector to take care of some of its service functions.

For this system to work, however, we must be sure that the private sector has the capacity to provide such a function at a high level of competency and at affordable cost. This means that we need to ensure a strong supply of licensed insolvency practitioners who would be willing to undertake such assignments for fees that are not prohibitive.

Both outcomes, of course, can come about purely as a result of the operations of the free market. But this is by no means assured. This is where we need to be mindful about the market conditions and take the necessary steps to strike a proper balance.

On one hand, there should be sufficient commercial incentives to ensure that there is a ready pool of practitioners to tap on for such work. On the other hand, we need to ensure that costs are kept reasonable and the statutory objectives under the IRDA, particularly that those in relation to the investigation of the bankrupt's affairs are met.

Currently, there are several firms providing PTIB services for ICs. Their practice, generally, is not to ask for any deposit from the ICs to cover their costs. They rely on the $1,850 deposit placed with the OA when the person brings a bankruptcy application. The provision of this sum itself is mandated under the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution (Official Assignee's Fees) Regulation 2020.

The idea is to work within the deposit amount. To make the model financially sustainable, the PTIBs engage in what can be described as a volume game. By agreeing to working within the deposit amount, the practitioners can be assured of a significant volume of cases from the ICs for which the practitioners may be appointed as PTIBs.

They can also benefit from being assigned cases which are referred to as "meaty" cases, where there is a good prospect for PTIBs to recover substantial assets and monies that form part of the estate of the bankrupt for distribution to creditors and get their costs to be paid from, as a matter of priority from the estate.

For non-ICs, I believe the considerations will be materially different. They cannot promise large volumes like institutions, such as retail banks. How can we then ensure that the costs of petitioning creditors who are non-ICs are kept reasonable by reason of the privatisation move?

One group of people I am particularly concerned about are debtors who have just cause to apply for bankruptcy to avail themselves of the protection of bankruptcy laws. They may be put in a more difficult position. These debtors who apply to be bankrupts, by definition, do not have much money.

Currently, under IRDA, only creditors are allowed to apply for a practitioner to be appointed as PTIBs. In this Bill, it is proposed that debtors must also get practitioners to be PTIBs. Should the market move against them such that they are required to pay more than the current sum of $1,850 for the appointment of PTIBs, this may stymie the debtors' efforts to get the protection of the bankruptcy laws.

Next, I would be grateful for the hon Minister's clarification on the circumstances in which the OA is expected to administer the estate of the bankrupt. In clause 2 of the amendment Bill, it is provided that the OA may consent to be the trustee of the bankrupt's estate. I did not see any elaboration on the circumstances in which the OA may give consent in the explanatory statement to the Bill. I am glad to note the hon Minister's point, that the OA is expected to give his consent in cases of public interest.

May I ask what would be the considerations before the OA provides consent to be the trustee? The hon Minister gave some examples. I have in mind situations where petitioning creditors or debtors cannot get practitioners to be appointed as PTIBs, despite their best efforts or having regard to their specific financial circumstances. Would the OA be willing to consider, on a case-by-case basis, whether it would be in the public interest to provide consent to be the trustee of the bankrupt's estate?

This question is related to my earlier point on the possible financial hardship on the debtor. If the difficulty relates to debtors facing financial hardship and being unable to pay for the PTIBs, what will be their recourse?

Another area that I seek clarification on is the OA's role where the office of the PTIB becomes vacant, be it as a result of resignation, death and so on. To my understanding, the OA will have to step in to take over as trustee until the vacancy is filled. This provision that requires this – section 45 of the IRDA – is unaffected by the amendment Bill.

Having regard to the objective of this Bill, which is for the OA to exit the arena of administration of a bankrupt's estate, save when it is in public's interest, may I please ask how it is proposed that the OA will deal with such situations?

One final area which I want to touch on before moving to my next point concerns aligning the commercial interests of PTIBs with the aims under IRDA in relation to the administration of the bankrupt's affairs. Currently, under section 22 of the IRDA, the OA has a responsibility to investigate the conduct and affairs of the bankrupt, to check if the bankrupt has committed certain offences. This involves a matter of public interest. When the PTIB takes over these duties from the OA, how do we ensure that the PTIB will reasonably discharge these duties?

This is a general caveat when using the private sector as a partner to provide public services. While the incentive of the public sector is to safeguard the public interest, the private sector has no such incentive. PTIBs are not, prima facie, remunerated on the basis of the efforts expended to check the conduct and the affairs of the bankrupt. Instead, we must ensure that there are rules and incentives in place to ensure that the commercial interests of the PTIBs are motivated to align with the demands of public interest. For example, we could require specific audits and checks to be conducted on PTIBs.

I now turn to the part of the Bill that introduces measures to make it more efficient for PTIBs to conduct their work. This is welcomed. These efficiencies, I believe, will have a direct impact in ensuring that PTIBs' fees will not become excessive. I particularly commend the provision of the default position in clause 3 of the Bill allowing creditors to have deemed to consent to the remuneration sought by the PTIB in the "prescribed manner", if they did not raise objection within the prescribed time. This resolves a big problem in practice, because creditors often tend not to revert timeously on such issues, making it difficult for PTIBs to be paid.

With respect to what is meant by "prescribed manner", I take it that it is intended to be provided in subsidiary legislation.

I suggest that the hon Minister consider prescribing that notices on remuneration may be sent by emails too. This will increase efficiency and reduce disbursements, especially when we have cases involving numerous creditors.

I also note that in the format of proofs of debt that creditors are supposed to file, contact details, such as email addresses are already supposed to be provided. Hence, PTIBs should be able to use this information for notification purposes.

Clause 11 of the Bill provides for the OA to maintain a list of undischarged bankrupts with records of the particulars of the employment history of every undischarged bankrupt, as well as the particulars of his current employment status. The OA may allow any person who needs access to such details, which conceivably will include a PTIB, for the purposes of administering the bankrupt's estate. This is a good move and I support it.

The question that arises is what other information that a PTIB may reasonably need for the proper and efficient administration of the bankrupt's estate. One possible area is the registered address of the bankrupt which can obviously change over time. Currently, under section 399(2) of IRDA, a bankrupt is deemed to have informed the OA of the change of his registered address when he makes a report of the change under section 10 of the National Registration Act 1965 (NRA). There is also a deeming provision in section 399(3) of the IRDA which deems service of notice at the registered address as conclusive evidence of the fact of service.

I may be wrong, but it seems to me that the OA has ready access to the database of registered addresses under the NRA. If I am right, I should point out that PTIBs may not be in a similar position as the OAs.

I wonder if, instead of maintaining a definitive list of information that the OA can allow inspection of it would be better to provide that the list may be expanded to contain information that the hon Minister, in his discretion, may prescribe through subsidiary legislation. In this way, the information that PTIBs need can be provided much faster, which will, in turn, allow for more efficiency and cost reduction. Such information can include the new registered address of the debtor or any other information that may be relevant for the administration of the bankrupt's estate. This information can include names and contact details of related persons for PTIBs to investigate cases of unfair preferences and transactions at undervalue, something that the hon Minister is very well aware of since he was a well-noted lawyer dealing with insolvency work before he joined the front bench.

All the above are minutiae in themselves but added together, these little drops make a mighty sea. They make the administration of the insolvency process leaner, simpler and less costly. As a while, they ensure that the PTIB can go about with their duties efficiently, which will in turn allow their fees to be kept as low as possible. If this cannot be done now, perhaps this is a suggestion that can be explored in the future.

Mr Speaker, Sir, the public interest is served by a fair administration of all the Government's services to its people. If the private sector can carry out some of this in a reliable way, there is good reason for us to consider this as a viable option. The key is to ensure that we set up an architecture of incentives, so that the PTIBs, even as they pursue private commercial ends, bend to the public interest as their key performance indicator.

Mr Speaker: Ms Sylvia Lim.

4.36 pm

Ms Sylvia Lim (Aljunied): Mr Speaker, over the years, I have met several residents who are undischarged bankrupts and whose estates were being managed by the OA. They shared with me their experience liaising with the OA officers for various purposes, ranging from proposing instalment payments of their debts to obtaining permission to leave the country. While they had no complaint about the way they were treated, a common dissatisfaction was the perceived difficulty in contacting the officers or delays in obtaining responses.

This was an issue I first raised a decade ago during MinLaw's Committee of Supply (COS) debates. Since then, I have noted the Ministry's constructive moves to improve the situation, including taking steps to rationalise the OAs workload.

A major change took place in 2015, when the then-Bankruptcy Act was amended to require institutional creditors, such as banks and finance companies to have their bankrupt debtors estates managed by PTIBs. This scheme for institutional creditors to appoint PTIBs would have significantly reduced the number of new bankruptcies under the OAs direct management since institutional creditors accounted for more than 50% of bankruptcy applications.

According to MinLaw's register of insolvency practitioners, today, there are 187 lawyers and accountants registered as potential PTIBs.

The Bill before the House today will move the needle further as it proposes that all creditors, not just institutional creditors, will need to appoint a PTIB if they intend to make that debtors bankrupt. Debtors, too, who wish to voluntarily apply for bankruptcy who also have to appoint a PTIB.

When the scheme in the Bill is implemented, the OA will directly manage only a minority of bankruptcies, which the Ministry has explained would be cases with a public interest element, such as when public funds have been misused.

Sir, from a resource standpoint, it is hard to quarrel with the Ministry's rationale to move towards PTIBs, that taxpayer-funded public resources such as the OA's office should not be tied up enforcing private debts. It should fall to the creditor and the debtor to bear the cost of bankruptcy administration. That said, I have some queries on evaluating our experience with the PTIB scheme thus far and one query on the Bill itself.

First, on evaluating the PTIB experience. Five years ago, Singapore commenced the use of PTIBs in bankruptcy cases involving institutional creditors. Now that the Bill proposes to extend the use of PTIBs to non-institutional creditors and voluntary bankruptcies as well, it is appropriate to ask what can be learned from the past five years. Have there been better outcomes in bankruptcies, not just in terms of freeing up public resources but also better experiences for creditors and debtors?

In the Ministry's media release of 28 November, it was stated that the administration of bankruptcy estates by PTIBs since 2017, "has been smooth and no action has been taken on the PTIBs by the OA and/or the Courts on the PTIBs' management of bankruptcies." This was apparently based on feedback from the industry. While no formal action has been taken, it would be good for the Ministry to elaborate on how the OA has exercised its supervisory role over the PTIBs under section 42 of the Act. For instance, has the OA had to inquire into any complaints by creditors or debtors and if so, what was the nature of those complaints?

Specifically, from the debtors' perspective, I would like to highlight three aspects which I think are important in assessing whether the PTIB system is working optimally. First, on neutrality of administration. Bankruptcy cases are now being handled not by a public officer from the OA's office, but by a PTIB chosen by the creditor whose fees are also underwritten by the creditor. It is sometimes said that he who pays the piper calls the tune. Have there been any complaints from debtors that the PTIBs have been unfair to them?

A second aspect concerns the fees to be paid to PTIBs. From my reading, the fees are not fixed according to a scale but are decided by the creditors in each case. Is there a wide variation in the rates of fees charged? If the range is too wide, this is not desirable. I have also heard Mr Murali's concerns earlier on the possible financial hardship that might be caused if high fees are charged moving forward on non-institutional creditors and debtors.

Finally, on response times to debtors. This was a common grouse of bankrupts in the past. Have PTIBs be able to respond efficiently to debtors' communications and requests?

I also have a query on clause 2 regarding the proposed expansion of the PTIB scheme to non-institutional creditors and voluntary bankruptcies. Given that non-institutional creditors and debtors may not have knowledge and experience in insolvency matters, how will they decide which insolvency practitioner to propose as their PTIB? Will more resources be put up to assist them in making the selection of insolvency practitioner?

Sir, finally, let me say a few words to conclude. We know that bankrupt persons end up in bankruptcy for a myriad of reasons, including misfortune, bad timing and being guarantors for the debts of others. Bankruptcy can be debilitating and disempowering, as bankrupts are stigmatised and disqualified from public office and various professions. I do hope that as we move toward a system of having PTIBs as the default, the bankruptcy experience can be a less painful one.

Mr Speaker: Mr Louis Ng.

4.42 pm

Mr Louis Ng Kok Kwang (Nee Soon): Sir, I support this Bill as it will reduce the use of public resources for what is a private matter between creditors and debtors. I have three points of clarification on the Bill.

First, how will the Ministry ensure the effective oversight and quality of private trustees? While the debts between individuals and their creditors are private matters, we do have a public interest in a well-functioning bankruptcy system as part of our economy. MinLaw has stated that the OA will be taking on a regulatory role over private trustees. What standards will the OA apply when reviewing their performance?

In a recent High Court case of Zhang Hong En Jonathan against his private trustee, the Court found little guidance in the statute over how it should exercise its discretion when exercising its review powers over the trustee. Can the Minister clarify the roles of the OA and the Court in supervising trustees?

Ultimately, in that case, the Court took a view that it would only intervene if the trustee had acted so perversely that no reasonable trustee would have done so. If the OA gives similar deference in exercising its supervisory role, creditors and debtors might find it hard to hold trustees accountable if they disagree with the trustee's decision. Can Minister clarify how creditors or debtors can raise complaints against the private trustee? Should they look to the OA or to the Courts?

My second clarification relates to accessibility to the bankruptcy process. What happens if no private trustee is reasonably available to act in the bankruptcy? For example, if the estate is too small relative to the trustee's fees to be practical, or if there are too few practitioners available. Will the OA step in to act itself in these cases? Does the Ministry consider there to be enough licensed practitioners to meet the needs of the market?

Finally, how does the Ministry ensure our insolvency ecosystem is equipped to keep up with the latest trends in the economy such as cryptocurrency, "Buy Now, Pay Later", or peer-to-peer finance? With cryptocurrency, we saw rapid growth and speculation in new asset classes spanning multiple jurisdictions. Can Minister share whether the Ministry is monitoring and preparing for changing trends in bankruptcies following the collapse of Terra and FTX, especially in a backdrop of high inflation? How will we ensure that trustees can properly manage and distribute digital or other new types of assets?

Notwithstanding my clarifications, Sir, I stand in support of the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim.

4.45 pm

Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim (Chua Chu Kang): Mr Speaker, Sir, I rise in support of this Bill. I am a dispute lawyer in a law firm with an insolvency practice.

The proposed amendments in this Bill will help save public resources and make better use of the OA's involvement in bankruptcy proceedings. I also welcome the Ministry's calibrated approach by proposing these amendments after the learning experiences drawn from the earlier initiatives introduced in 2016, which required institutional creditors to appoint PTIBs. However, I have some clarifications and suggestions.

My speech will cover three parts. First, on the recourse or redress against errant PTIBs. Second, learning lessons from jurisdictions abroad. Third, protection of members of the public from certain transactions with undischarged bankrupts.

The first. I understand that to date, the administration of bankruptcy cases filed by ICs have been smooth and that there has been no action taken against PTIBs by the Court or the OA. However, while there are no actions taken, may I ask if there has been any complaints or investigations against PTIBs during this period? And if so, how many cases have there been since 2017? May I ask the Minister what are the avenues of recourse for redress by aggrieved creditors or those who may have complaints against PTIBs?

The role and oversight of PTIBs will be more important now. Currently, PTIBs handle almost 50% of the administration of bankruptcy cases. With this Bill, they will likely cover almost 100% of those cases except for cases involving public interest.

I thank the hon Minister for clarifying the types of public interest cases and that the OA still retains the discretion on involvement. I hope that this will allay concerns of individual creditors or laypersons who may not have the means to hire PTIBs, from not proceeding with a petition for bankruptcy.

Given the expanded appointment of PTIBs now for all bankruptcy cases, would this overlap with the work done by debt recovery firms or credit counselling firms in the market? Would more creditors or debtors now go directly to these firms instead of undergoing the bankruptcy regime in the Courts?

I appreciate that the Ministry has consulted stakeholders and I appreciate that the Ministry will continue to consult along the way. In this regard, we can still learn from some of the lessons and experience from other jurisdictions abroad.

My second part. In the United States (US), given the high volume of bankruptcy cases and increasing quantum of debt in total, the US General Accounting Office warned that there is a high risk of private trustee fraud if there is no rigorous review of trustee candidates, no proper conflict-of-interest declaration, no enhanced reporting requirements and no sufficient funding for oversight by the Department of Justice (DOJ).

In Canada, their Licensed Insolvency Trustee (LIT) must have the requisite knowledge, experience and skills to be granted a licence from the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy (OSB). LITs are subject to ongoing oversight by the OSB and must adhere to federal standards of practice, including the Code of Ethics for Trustees.

Hence, with the expanded regime proposed in this Bill, would similar standards or codes for PTIBs be implemented or updated in Singapore? Besides overseeing and regulating PTIBs, what are the plans by MinLaw or the OA to ensure the standards and quality of our PTIBs in Singapore? For instance, would there be continuous training or mandatory courses for PTIBs?

Separately, here, there is no solicitor-client privilege between a trustee and a debtor currently. However, in Canada, the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals rules prohibit a trustee from disclosing confidential information to the public unless required by law or with the debtor's permission.

If I may ask the hon Minister, would there be a similar rule of confidentiality here? What are the obligations owed by the PTIB and the debtor, perhaps with the overriding obligation or duty owed by PTIBs to the Court and the OA.

With regard to PTIBs' remuneration, I agree with the additional means of determining such remuneration. For instance, there is a deemed consent for remuneration if no objection is received from creditors within a stipulated period of time.

However, what are the safeguards to ensure that such notice is appropriately given, especially for individual or layperson creditors? I echo the hon Member Murali Pillai's suggestion to include emails as a mode of transmission for such notice.

Separately, there can be more regulation or transparency in terms of remuneration. In Canada, LITs do not typically charge for their first consultation and the remuneration is regulated by the federal government.

The last part of my speech is on the protection of public members.

The new section 412(1)(d) makes it an offence for an undischarged bankrupt to receive a deposit of at least $10,000 from any person if he or she does not disclose his or her bankruptcy status to that person.

I thank the Minister for the useful illustration just now given in his speech. However, what is the rationale behind the quantum of $10,000? What if there is a series of transactions with multiple persons with an aggregate amounting to at least $10,000?

If the undischarged bankrupt takes in several deposits from various people totalling more than $10,000, then for the protection of the greater public, it would make sense for the entire series of transactions to be taken into consideration for the issue of non-disclosure and not just base on the quantum of one single transaction alone.

Next, on the new section 433(1), which enhances the amount of publicly searchable information about undischarged bankrupts. This is most welcomed as it enhances the due diligence when transacting with persons who are undischarged bankrupts.

I would like to humbly suggest including within the current database searchable information for persons who are not only undischarged bankrupts, but also those who are presently undergoing or facing bankruptcy proceedings. This will help with due diligence.

Currently, to do so would require a Court litigation search and this would involve costs, which may be prohibitive for some. The process itself may be too tedious or unknown to laypersons.

Further, if I may humbly suggest a one-stop searchable database which would include pending bankruptcy applications and details of an undischarged bankrupt's PTIB, so as to allow the public member to conduct further due diligence on not only that person, but the PTIB in question.

In conclusion, Mr Speaker, Sir, today, at the Opening of the Legal Year in the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, the Attorney-General and the President of Law Society addressed various issues impacting our legal landscape and profession – none more so important than the access to justice and upholding the rule of law in Singapore.

Borrowing the words used by the President of our Law Society, Mr Adrian Tan, this morning and I may paraphrase a bit, "Justice is not the privilege of a few but a promise made to everyone".

This is our calling for those of us in the legal profession. I want to thank MinLaw for pushing forward this Bill. This Bill will help us to achieve more efficient outcomes and effect justice not just for creditors, not just for members of the public, but also for debtors and bankrupts alike.

Notwithstanding my clarifications, I stand in support of this Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Vikram Nair.

4.54 pm

Mr Vikram Nair (Sembawang): Mr Speaker, the bankruptcy regime is one that balances many competing interests. On the one hand, it tries to protect creditors by ensuring that the assets of a bankrupt can be properly accounted for, realised and distributed in a fair way to all creditors. This prevents creditors from feeling pressurised to act unilaterally or to act faster than the others.

Counterintuitively, it also protects the interests of the bankrupts themselves by taking away the stress and pressure of having to deal with a larger number of creditors and allows them to continue working, earning a salary and meeting their basic living requirements while ensuring that contributions are also made towards the payment of their debts.

Finally, and importantly, a bankruptcy also protects third parties dealing with a bankrupt as they will then be able to make appropriate precautions when extending credit or entering into transactions, because the fact of bankruptcy is a public matter and anyone dealing with the person would be able to check.

In facilitating the administration of a bankruptcy, it is usually helpful to have a professional – often, it is an accountant – involved as this will ensure an orderly realisation and distribution of the assets of the bankrupt. The professional should be disinterested and act impartially as between the debtor and the creditors.

Where a professional is not appointed, the default would be for the OA to administer the estate of the bankrupt. The OA has historically administered a large number of bankruptcies – I think the figures revealed by the Minister were 99% originally and 60% presently. This would be, I believe, especially the case where the assets of the estate are small and the debts are small. This has, naturally, resulted in a heavy case load for the OA's office as well.

In that sense, I can see where this legislation is coming from. It is creating, as a default, that the PTIB will administer all bankruptcies and the burden is on the applicant applying for bankruptcy to identify the professional before the application can be made. This will have the dual benefits of having a professional administering all bankruptcies, by the sound of it, except for the few where public interest is triggered, while at the same time reducing the burden on the OA.

The only concern I have with this proposal is whether it would mean that those with smaller claims and estates would no longer be able to avail themselves of the protections afforded by bankruptcy.

The main downside of requiring a PTIB to be appointed for each bankruptcy is that it may be difficult to find professionals who are prepared to administer smaller estates at an economic price, particularly where the applicant is the bankrupt himself.

If we take the classic example of a small estate – a person without any substantial assets – the estate itself may still take some time to administer, so there is a risk that the professional who is doing this will be liable for the costs in the meantime.

There are also considerable benefits for a person with a small amount of debt to be provided the protections offered by bankruptcy, such as the moratoriums against actions and avoiding the stress of having multiple creditors following him.

His creditors will also be protected by knowing that they will be dealt with equitably rather than each one feeling pressurised to take their own enforcement action if the bankruptcy is deemed to be uneconomic.

Finally, third parties dealing with persons who have financial issues but were not made bankrupt may not know that this person has financial issues. They would then be at risk of dealing with someone who is in substance insolvent but may not have been made a bankrupt because there was no PTIB found who was able to act.

This problem may be particularly acute for those who have, for example, gone into a cycle of debt starting with consumer credit, taking on more credit, say, from licensed money lenders at high interest rates to pay off earlier debts. This borrowing to repay old debts generally leads to the ballooning of debts, which are detrimental both to borrowers and lenders.

I would be grateful if the Minister can share whether there are any safeguards, particularly for those cases where the PTIBs may not be willing to take up an appointment, to ensure that those who otherwise qualify for bankruptcy will still be able to take out the appropriate applications.

Mr Speaker: Minister Edwin Tong.

4.59 pm

Mr Edwin Tong Chun Fai: Thank you, Sir. Sir, I thank the Members for the support of this Bill and I will jump straight into answering the various queries that have been posed.

Mr Murali Pillai, Ms Sylvia Lim, Mr Louis Ng, Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim and Mr Vikram Nair, I believe, asked how we can ensure accessibility to PTIBs.

Sir, there are sufficient insolvency practitioners in Singapore to take on the new cases. I think Ms Lim herself, from her research, found 187 licensed insolvency practitioners. Of this, the vast majority – 183 of them – are eligible to take up bankruptcy administration at present, but only about a third of them – about 56 – currently do so.

So, in other words, out of the 187, 183 of them are qualified to take on this role as PTIB, but only about a third of them are currently taking it up; obviously, under the older regime, where only ICs appoint PTIBs. So, in other words, there is headroom for this to grow into that space. Should there be a need to review these numbers, we will do so.

Ms Lim also asked on whether information about the PTIBs could be made accessible and how would someone who wants to file a bankruptcy claim can access that.

We will put a list of the PTIBs on the Insolvency Office's website. Debtors and creditors will be able to use information that is on the list to discuss with PTIBs about the appropriateness of taking up their cases and which PTIB they might want to go to for the appropriate administration.

Some questions were also raised on the PTIBs' fees. Their fees are based on the work done in a particular case and determined in line with market forces. The fees, which are paid out from the bankruptcy estate, are ultimately approved by the creditors' committee or by the Court, if there is no prior approval by creditors. These mechanisms collectively work in tandem to introduce checks on PTIBs' fees to ensure that they are in line with market and that they are reasonable.

Mr Murali observed that debtors may face problems applying for bankruptcy, I presume, after these amendments. But I want to assure Mr Murali that the threshold for the filing fee, the bankruptcy fee, of $1,850 has not changed with these amendments being introduced. The PTIBs' fees, additionally, may also be recovered from the bankrupts' contributions during the lifespan and the whole duration of the bankruptcy. In other words, you do not need to have had sufficient assets at the outset to meet the fees before the administration can start. Along the way, there might be realisable assets that are called in, and this includes property acquired after a bankruptcy order as well. So, all that collectively comes out of the bankrupt estate and it goes towards the PTIBs' fees.

Mr Zhulkarnain asked whether the PTIBs' work might overlap with the work done by debt recovery firms or credit counselling firms. The answer is no. These firms take on the work pre-bankruptcy – so they might go and recover debts; they might go and issue demands, and so on. But once the bankruptcy takes place, that is when the PTIBs step in. It is on the making of the bankruptcy order by the Court that the PTIBs are appointed and their jurisdiction then begins.

There are various questions on the OA's role. Mr Murali and Mr Zhulkarnain, in particular, sought clarifications on the circumstances under which the OA is expected to administer the estate of the bankrupt.

Sir, the Bill gives the OA the discretion, as I mentioned at the outset, to give consent to take on the administration in a particular case.

But let me just remind Members that this framework is designed to mandate the appointment of PTIBs. In other words, the whole raison d'etre behind this is to ensure that cases are administered by the PTIBs. So, when you asked about what happens when there is no such PTIB, or, in what cases can the OA step in, I would say as a starting point that it has got to be very narrow. That would be in line with the philosophy of this Bill – to keep it narrow so that parties go to the PTIBs. And it is only in the appropriate cases, like what I mentioned at the outset, for example, the public interest examples I cited earlier, or perhaps, given that the powers of investigation and prosecution do not devolve to the PTIBs – they remain with the OA.

Perhaps in a case where you know from the outset very clearly that heavy investigation will be needed, or that there are likely to be prosecutions, in that case, perhaps it might be appropriate for the OA to take on that role from the start.

But really, those are examples: as I mentioned earlier, they are non-exhaustive. Because you got to look at the entire factual matrix, the particular circumstances of each case, to decide whether or not the OA should grant consent or should take on the role itself.

In addition, as provided by statute, the OA will step in to administer the bankruptcy estate in the interim. I think Mr Murali raised this point. So, in cases when an earlier appointment of a PTIB fails to take effect or the office becomes vacant after it has taken effect, then in such scenarios, the OA will step in. The OA will step in and this question of consent or otherwise becomes irrelevant, because the statute mandates that the OA steps in so, that there is no disruption to the administration.

Mr Louis Ng and Mr Zhulkarnain asked how the Ministry will ensure effective oversight and quality of the PTIBs. Sir, the OA has been regulating PTIBs since 2016 when it was made mandatory for ICs bringing bankruptcy applications to appoint PTIBs. The Ministry has put in place a robust regulatory framework to ensure that PTIBs perform their duties faithfully and observe all statutory requirements relating to the performance of their duties.

For example, the law confers powers of oversight over PTIBs on the OA, to whom creditors and bankrupts can also provide feedback on the conduct of the PTIBs. In particular, Members would also be aware that under IRDA, there are obligations to notify; there are obligations to submit a copy of the Statement of Affairs, to submit a report 30 days after the relevant anniversary of the administration date of the bankruptcy and so on. So, this gives the OA the ability to look into the particular administration and for the PTIB to provide information to the OA.

PTIBs are also required to put up security which the OA can forfeit if the PTIB does not fulfil duties and responsibilities in accordance with statutory requirements. Indeed, if there is dissatisfaction with the PTIBs' administration of the estate, the OA, as well as creditors or debtors, may apply to Court for various orders, including orders to modify the PTIB's acts or decisions, or indeed, in extreme cases, to also remove the PTIB.

In this regard, it is important to emphasise that PTIBs have incentives themselves to uphold; they are held to their own high professional standards. PTIBs must either be accountants or lawyers and must comply with the professional standards of their respective professional bodies.

Besides this, they must also pass various checks – including showing that they are fit, they remain fit and proper persons – to obtain their insolvency practitioners' licences. Without these licences, as Members know, they cannot carry out bankruptcy administration and doing so without a licence is an offence.

In terms of ensuring that PTIBs are kept updated on applicable law and practice, the OA conducts regular dialogue sessions with PTIBs and will continue to do so after this expansion, to share best practices and developments in case law and practices.

In addition, MinLaw collaborates with Temasek Polytechnic on a biannual customised training programme on individual insolvency for PTIBs.

Ms Sylvia Lim asked whether there have been better experiences for creditors and debtors since the last bankruptcy amendment in 2016. Sir, over the last decade, the Ministry has steadily reduced the stock of active bankruptcy cases through the earlier mechanism, in particular the DDF.

From 2011 to 2022, the total number of undischarged bankruptcy cases decreased by 63% from 25,028 cases in 2011 to 9,254 cases in 2022.

The bankruptcy experience, Sir, is generally an adversarial one, in the sense that the bankrupt would be looking to ensure that there is less or minimal monthly or annual pay-outs; the creditor wants to enforce, wants more share of the pie and so on. So that is a natural adversarial process, with creditors wanting to maximise recovery, debtors wanting to pay as little as possible.

In addition, undischarged bankrupts are also subject to various disabilities and restrictions. The role of the PTIB, as with the OA before in administering these cases, is to strike a balance in the interests of both the bankrupt and the creditor, to ensure a fair and judicious outcome for both parties in the administration. It is not so much about whether it is a better experience or not, but whether it is a fairer one, whether we can strike a balance and the appropriate outcome for the creditors in all these cases.

Mr Zhulkarnain and Ms Sylvia Lim also asked if there have been complaints against the PTIBs' management of the bankruptcies.

As I mentioned earlier, it is an adversarial process, so there are bound to be cases where interests differ or compete, and it is inevitable that there will be conflicts. There have been complaints raised to the OA on PTIBs' management of bankruptcy cases since 2016. Many of you might well have received complaints in the course of your regular Meet-the-People sessions where it is perhaps said: why is the OA asking for so much to be paid every month, because I only have a job that pays me this much and I have various dependants and so on.

I am sure many of us have come across those cases. We received complaints like that, that the OA or the PTIB is too tough and asking for too much and so on, but we have looked into all of them, and none of them are misconduct cases. We have not found any of these complaints to be valid from a misconduct perspective. Of course, to the extent that there are differing views as to what are the appropriate contributions, there might well be conflicts.

But ultimately, as I said at the outset, I wish to assure Members that, ultimately, the Court – which appoints all trustees in bankruptcy – has the power to make orders in relation to the acts of the PTIBs to address genuine grievances and when the party seek redress, in the administration of bankruptcy estates.

Mr Murali raised concerns over how we can ensure the PTIBs have reasonably discharged duties that involve investigations into the conduct and affairs of the bankrupt, to check if offences have been committed.

I mentioned earlier that these powers of investigation and, indeed, of prosecution are not devolved to PTIBs, and so, that remains within the province of the OA. In a context of a PTIB-administered bankruptcy, if there are instances where such offences might arise or where investigations are needed, then there is no change to the current position where the powers continue to vest with the OA who will carry out such investigations into the offences and make the appropriate prosecutions if any. This is what happens today by the way – the current position.

On PTIB remuneration, Mr Zhulkarnain asked, in relation to the additional means of determining the PTIBs' remuneration, what safeguards to ensure that notices are appropriately given.

Notices are sent to the creditor's last known address, which is also used for other communication between PTIBs and creditors during bankruptcy administration. So, typically, by the time it comes to remuneration, you will have gone some way down the administration, and that would have been the address, or the correspondence by which notices were given. So, it is unlikely that if you have been taking part in the previous administration, receiving part of the proceeds and so on, that it would not be also the appropriate address for remuneration notices.

Mr Murali and Ms Sylvia Lim asked how the PTIBs' fees can be kept reasonable. I had explained that earlier. I would supplement what I said earlier by saying this that the OA does not regulate the fees per se of each particular administration. It is left to the market forces in the manner I mentioned earlier and there are also parts of the legislation which ensure safeguards.

PTIBs' fees also have to be approved by the creditors or the Court. Naturally, creditors have a strong interest to ensure that fees are reasonable because, ultimately, the recovery and the fees come out of the same estate.

But I thank Mr Murali and Mr Zhulkarnain for their suggestions on various things, such as prescribing that notices on remuneration may be sent by emails. We will study them when we prescribe mechanisms.

Next, on measures to protect individuals dealing with bankrupts. Mr Zhulkarnain asked about the threshold. You might recall that I said $10,000 per transaction would be considered an offence if the bankrupt dealing with a person in a commercial transaction does not disclose that he or she is a bankrupt in taking the deposit.

This is an amount that will reasonably exclude most of the petty, lower-value transactions, which itself carries a lower risk signature. So, we determine a threshold. If you did set it too low, it would be too disruptive. Each time you take on a small amount, you have to make a disclosure. If you do not, then there will be an offence and that will be too prohibitive.

So, whilst an offence under the proposed section 412(1)(d) will not be committed so long as each individual deposit collected does not exceed $10,000, but I think Mr Zhulkarnain also knows that if you are a bankrupt and you keep collecting as a habitual pattern smaller amounts under $10,000, there is a pattern of doing so – not disclosing your bankruptcy status, which is not an offence, but then you disguise that fact and you use the deposit for some other purposes, and because you are a bankrupt, it causes a loss to the person who has paid the deposit – then I am sure Mr Zhulkarnain knows that the OA would then have the ability to look into that conduct and there will be offences connected.

So, this enhancement is designed only to deal with notification when you collect the deposit and we set the threshold at $10,000. But that does not mean that should you collect other deposits and indeed enter into other transactions of a lower value. If you behave inappropriately, there could be sanctions by the OA.

Mr Zhulkarnain also asked about information on employment history and status, and I thank him for those suggestions for a searchable bankruptcy database. In accordance with our requirements, the OA allows, upon payment of a fee, inspection of this database for information on undischarged bankrupts, including PTIB details. With the amendments, we will include employment information in this service as well.

The OA is not statutorily empowered to retain or provide information on persons who have not been made bankrupts, but who are only facing bankruptcy applications. I think Mr Zhulkarnain understands why, because it might not come to fruition, that you will be made a bankrupt simply because you are facing a bankruptcy application. And, in these cases, for the OA to have to compile and maintain records of all individuals who are the subject of bankruptcy applications, so much more resources would have to be used. It is not cost-efficient for us to do that.

I think Mr Zhulkarnain also asked about whether information collected by the trustee will be privileged. Mr Zhulkarnain would know that, when a party is bankrupt, the trustee, who looks after the estate, owes a duty to all the creditors. In other words, the bankrupt's estate is owned by the creditors in those cases. And, in that situation, information about the estate should be made available to the creditors, so that they can then decide whether the distribution is sufficient, whether any claims, additional claims ought to be made and so on. But save for this, the trustees in bankruptcy, generally – and we will reiterate this message – keep information quite discreet and it is limited to this pool of people who need to know and who have an interest in the bankrupt's estate.

Finally, Mr Louis Ng asked how the Ministry ensures that our insolvency ecosystem is equipped to deal with the latest trends in the economy. We regularly monitor the latest economic trends, engage our international counterparts, look at the lay of the land and get plugged in, into developments in this field, to ensure that our framework is kept relevant. And indeed, that is why ever so often, we come to this Chamber; to amend, to update the IRDA and other related legislation, to ensure that that we keep up to date. In some cases, having done some market survey, the industry feedback has led to some of these proposals as well.

Sir, I believe I have addressed Members' queries or, at least, the thrust of Members' queries. We will take on board the suggestions that various Members have raised and which we can consider as we implement the Bill.

I would like to thank the Members for the support of the Bill, which will ensure better utilisation of public resources in bankruptcy administration. It will also support the PTIB industry and help the MSCs in the context of the SIP, and enhance protection of persons dealing with bankrupts in commercial transactions. Sir, with that, I beg to move.

Mr Speaker: Mr Murali Pillai.

5.17 pm

Mr Murali Pillai: Mr Speaker, Sir, I seek a clarification from the hon Minister, in his response to a point I made in my speech.

This concerns the role of a PTIB in investigating the affairs of the bankrupt. The point I sought to make, and I apologise if it was not clear, was that when a PTIB gets the statement of affairs, if the commercial interest is not aligned with public interest, he can just file it, even though with some level of due diligence, he could unearth reasonable suspicion of offences, which then the OA may be interested in to formally investigate and prosecute, depending on the evidence.

I wonder whether, in these circumstances, whether PTIBs still have a role. And, if so, how do we align the commercial interests of PTIBs with that of public interest?

Mr Edwin Tong Chun Fai: Fundamentally, the administration deals with the same end outcome – which is better and more efficient recovery of assets from the bankrupt's estate. So, I think that broad architecture will align the interests of both the PTIB and the OA. In the example that the Member cited, perhaps, that might be extreme cases where there will be some element that might interest the OA which might not result in or relate to recovery from the bankrupt's estate.

Mr Murali Pillai knows that the statement of affairs as well as regular reports are provided to the OA. And, in those cases, I am sure the OA will, if his interest is piqued by any of these reports or findings, take steps to further investigate, and the powers of the investigation, and indeed, any other matters which aid the investigations, still continue to lie with the OA.

Mr Speaker: Any other clarifications? No.

Question put, and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House.

The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. – [Mr Edwin Tong Chun Fai].

Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed.

Mr Speaker: Order. I propose to take a break now. I suspend the Sitting and will resume the Chair at 5.45 pm.

Sitting accordingly suspended

at 5.21 pm until 5.45 pm.

Sitting resumed at 5.45 pm.

[Deputy Speaker (Mr Christopher de Souza) in the Chair]