Cross-Border Railways (Border Control Co-Location) Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Second Minister for Home Affairs.

1.06 pm

The Second Minister for Home Affairs (Mr Edwin Tong Chun Fai): Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, I seek to move that the Bill be now read a Second time.

The Johor Bahru-Singapore Rapid Transit System Link (RTS Link) is targeted to commence service this December. With a peak capacity of up to 10,000 passengers per hour per direction, the RTS Link will help relieve congestion on the Causeway.

A key feature of the RTS Link is the co-location of both countries' customs, immigration and quarantine (CIQ) facilities at each station. This allows passengers to undergo both departure and arrival immigration clearance before boarding the train, and no further immigration clearance is required upon disembarkation in the other country.

Co-location of CIQ facilities for cross-border travel is not a novel arrangement and many other countries have this model. For example, France and the United Kingdom (UK) have a longstanding similar arrangement for the Channel Tunnel, from which we took reference. Even so, as this arrangement may be new to some Singaporeans, allow me to sketch out how the process will work for a typical traveller taking the RTS Link from Woodlands North Station in Singapore to Bukit Chagar Station in Malaysia.

After going through the RTS Link fare gate at Woodlands North, the traveller will first undergo security checks and departure clearance by the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority (ICA) officers. The traveller will then proceed for arrival immigration clearance at Malaysia's CIQ zone at Woodlands North, which is located one level below ICA's departure clearance, in the same building. Malaysia's officers will be deployed there to conduct immigration clearance and also conduct selective security checks.

After arrival clearance, the traveller will go to the departure train platform and board the train to Bukit Chagar Station in Malaysia. The traveller will not need to undergo further immigration clearance upon arrival in Malaysia and can just walk off the train straight into Johor Bahru. Nevertheless, Malaysia's officers at Bukit Chagar Station may conduct further selective security checks, inspect customs permits, and collect taxes and duties, where necessary.

For travellers coming into Singapore, the immigration clearance process at Bukit Chagar Station in Malaysia will be identical, with travellers clearing both departure and arrival clearance at Bukit Chagar Station.

Through the co-located clearance arrangement, travellers will experience a more seamless and streamlined journey. For this arrangement to work, each country will deploy its officers to the other country's territory to carry out the necessary CIQ functions. The purpose of this Bill is to give effect to these arrangements concerning the co-location of CIQ facilities as well as the coordination between Singapore and Malaysia in railway security matters and cross-border incident management.

These arrangements were codified in two bilateral treaties: the RTS Link Bilateral Agreement, signed in 2018; and the Supplementary Agreement to the Bilateral Agreement, signed in 2025.

The approach for the Bill is for its provisions in the main body to have application to railways constructed under Singapore's Cross-Border Railways Act 2018 in general, and for the provisions pertaining to specific railways, like the RTS Link in this case, to be contained in Schedules.

The bilateral treaties and provisions specific to the RTS Link are listed in the First and Second Schedules respectively. This allows our laws to accommodate future cross-border railways with a co-located model, should we come to such an arrangement in the future. The Bill, therefore, cannot be read in isolation and we must have regard to the arrangements contained in the Bilateral, as well as in the Supplementary Agreements.

In addition, in order to operationalise the co-located CIQ model, Malaysia must also pass domestic legislation to give effect to the arrangements that are set out in the bilateral treaties. This is because the arrangements are substantively mirrored for both countries.

In addition, reciprocity is a key principle which underpins the Bill's provisions. The privileges and protections that the Bill accords to Malaysia's officers deployed in Singapore are, by design, contingent upon the privileges and protections which Malaysia's legislation accords to Singapore officers deployed in Malaysia. Malaysia's legislation for the RTS Link passed both Chambers of its Parliament earlier this year and provides for these reciprocal privileges and protections.

The provisions of the Bill, Sir, cover four broad areas. First, co-located border control functions, in both Singapore and Malaysia. Second, cross-border incident management, including the establishment of concurrent criminal jurisdiction on board trains in transit between both countries. Third, other matters, such as data protection, as well as protection and immunities for Malaysia's officers deployed in Singapore. Fourth, related and consequential amendments to other Acts.

Let me take this in turn.

I will start with the co-located border control functions in Singapore, addressed in Parts 2 and 3 of the Bill. There are four main aspects to this.

First, the Bill circumscribes the areas in Singapore within which Malaysia's officers can perform their CIQ duties. For the RTS Link, these designated areas lie within the Woodlands North Station. Clause 7 empowers the Minister for Home Affairs to demarcate the designated areas. Clear signages will be displayed at all designated areas at the Woodlands North Station to ensure that the public is aware of the perimeter of these areas.

To be clear, there is no change to territorial boundaries and the designated areas for Malaysia remain Singapore's territory and subject to Singapore's laws. What this Bill does is to provide formal legal permission for Malaysia's officers operating in the designated areas in Singapore, to carry out their border clearance and security checks on travellers departing for Malaysia.

Clause 8 makes clear that Singapore law continues to apply within the designated areas. The list of Malaysian laws which would be allowed to apply within the designated areas are strictly for CIQ clearance and security checks, and these are contained in paragraph 16 of the Second Schedule.

Second, the Bill empowers the Minister to approve which Malaysian officers may be deployed in Singapore. Clause 9 states that only officers whom the Minister recognises as Malaysian preclearance officers in relation to a cross-border railway are allowed to be deployed in Singapore. Clause 11 limits the duration of these deployments, and clause 12 authorises the Minister to withdraw recognition of any Malaysian officer at any time without providing a reason.

Under exceptional circumstances, such as a massive outage or, perhaps, a public health emergency, Malaysia might need to deploy additional manpower in the designated areas in Singapore at short notice. Clause 10 allows for such expeditious deployments for a limited period, provided the Malaysian Government gives written notice under this provision.

Third, the Bill authorises the calibrated exercise of powers by Malaysia's officers within the designated areas in Singapore. Clauses 4 and 5 provide a list of "ordinary", or routine, powers required for the conduct of CIQ duties in the context of a cross-border railway. These include requiring individuals to present travel and import documents, screening checks, such as requiring travellers to put their bags through scanners, and so on.

Clause 13 states that Malaysia's officers are authorised to conduct border clearance and railway security checks to the extent conferred by Malaysian border control laws. Their exercise of powers is subject to limits set out in clauses 14 to 18. This spells out the specific legal powers that Malaysia's officers can exercise within the designated areas and the scope of its application.

Paragraph 4 of the Second Schedule provides for "special", or additional, powers that Malaysia's officers may exercise whilst performing CIQ duties within the designated areas for the RTS Link. These include carrying restraining devices, such as batons and handcuffs when on official duty, and using reasonable force to detain disorderly individuals or those who pose a threat to public security.

When an individual is detained, Malaysia's officers must, as soon as is practicable, transfer custody of the person to an appropriate Singapore officer.

Fourth, the Bill empowers Singapore officers to check for items that are controlled or prohibited under Malaysian law. This is catered for to streamline the conduct of checks between Singapore and Malaysia under the co-located clearance model. Clause 19 enables Singapore officers to check for such items, even if they are not prohibited or controlled under Singapore law. Malaysian officers at Bukit Chagar station are similarly empowered by Malaysia's legislation to check for items prohibited or controlled under Singapore law. If an item that is prohibited or controlled under Malaysian law is found through these checks, clause 20 permits Singapore officers to allow the traveller to voluntarily discard the item as a condition for boarding the train.

There will, however, be exceptions, such as where an item poses a threat to human safety, is a live creature or constitutes evidential material relevant to an investigation. Then in such cases, the item must be removed from the traveller or taken possession of by Singapore officers.

Sir, we are committed to ensuring that Singapore officers deployed to Malaysia to safeguard our borders will be able to do so effectively and with peace of mind. And that is the focus of Part 4 of the Bill. Clause 22 states that, as a precondition for sending Singapore officers to Malaysia, the Minister must be satisfied that Malaysian law allows Singapore officers to conduct their official duties in Malaysia properly, under the orders of their own commanding officers and that they are conferred with the powers, duties and privileges of their counterparts in Malaysia.

This is in addition to the protections and immunities that Malaysia's legislation accords to Singapore officers deployed to Malaysia. Clause 24 makes clear that every Singapore officer deployed to Malaysia in relation to cross-border railways has the same powers, rights and immunities as they do when performing the same duties in Singapore.

The clause also provides the limits to the exercise of powers by Malaysia's officers in Singapore apply similarly to the exercise of powers by our officers in Malaysia. This means, for example, that Singapore officers are not allowed to make an arrest when in Malaysia's territory.

Clause 25 provides for prescribed Singapore border control laws to apply within Singapore's designated areas in Malaysia, to empower our officers to carry out border clearance and security checks. The list of Singapore border control laws applicable for the RTS Link is set out in paragraph 17 of the Second Schedule. This will ensure that the level of checks done is comparable to that at our other checkpoints and that there will be no compromise to our border security.

Besides checkpoint operations, we must also be prepared for contingencies that may occur on a moving train. Safety and security incidents may occur from time to time, due to technical faults or as a result of sabotage, resulting in trains stopping mid-way during the trip. Officers from both countries may then be required to respond, even if the incident occurs within the other country's territory.

For this reason, the Bill includes provisions for managing incidents that occur on the railway tracks or on trains moving between the countries, or what we call "trains in transit", for short. The codification in law provides legal certainty for the officers who will be called upon to respond.

Beyond the Bill's provisions, Singapore and Malaysia have also developed detailed protocols and standard operating procedures to facilitate timely and coordinated responses to such cross-border incidents on the RTS Link. Officers will be trained and empowered to keep travellers safe and secure. Both countries will hold joint exercises prior to the commencement of the operationalisation of the revenue service, and on a regular basis thereafter, to ensure continued operational readiness.

Mr Deputy Speaker, allow me to give an overview of the key principles on which Singapore and Malaysia have agreed for managing cross-border incidents on the RTS Link. These principles form the basis of paragraph 14 of the Second Schedule:

First, where a train is able to complete its journey, any incident on board will be managed by the authorities of the country in which the train stops.

Second, if a train stalls and is unable to complete its journey, the country in whose territory the train is situated will manage the incident.

Third, if a train stalls at the stretch of railway tracks located between the respective administrative boundary markers of both countries, represented by Pier 47 for Malaysia and Pier 48 for Singapore, both countries have agreed to use the nose of the train as the marker to determine the country with primary responsibility to manage the incident.

The country with primary responsibility will be the Incident Manager in this case and will have command and control over incident management. So, in the case of a train bound for Singapore, so long as the nose of the train has not crossed Pier 48, Malaysia will be the Incident Manager. However, once the nose has crossed Pier 48, Singapore will be the Incident Manager. And this is so even if most of the train's length remains otherwise within Malaysia's territory. For a Malaysia-bound train, so long as the nose has not crossed Pier 47, Singapore will be the Incident Manager. Once the nose has crossed Pier 47, Malaysia will be the Incident Manager, and in similar terms, even if most of the train's length remains within Singapore's territory.

Fourth, in the absence of a train, for incidents occurring on the railway tracks between Piers 47 and 48, the country whose officers arrive on the scene first will be the Incident Manager. So, there might be a scenario where you might have persons on the track where there is no train and in such a case, the country whose officers arrive first will take control of the situation and will be designated the Incident Manager.

Fifth, for all cross-border incidents, when one country has assumed the role of Incident Manager, the other country shall render the necessary support upon request.

Last, to ensure coordinated response, when each country's officers need to cross the administrative boundary marker of the other country during incident management, they must obtain prior consent of the other country before doing so. However, if the incident is determined to be a search and rescue operation or a medical evacuation, then each country's officers need only inform the other country before crossing over.

Part 5 of the Bill sets out the scope, duties and powers for officers managing cross-border incidents. Under clause 29, cross-border incident management operations will be limited to the premises where an incident has occurred and its immediate vicinity, as is reasonably necessary for an effective response.

Clause 28 empowers our officers to carry out cross-border incident management duties within the locations prescribed by clause 29, including in Malaysia's territory, if necessary. It also allows Malaysia's officers to carry out equivalent duties in Singapore's territory, if necessary.

Clause 27 spells out the scope of these duties. These include the protection of people from injury or death, and the protection of public property from damage or loss, whether arising from criminal acts or in any other way.

Paragraph 15 of the Second Schedule further sets out the range of powers that Malaysia's officers are allowed to exercise in Singapore's territory for the purpose of cross-border incident management at the RTS Link, and makes clear that these must be exercised with reasonable force.

Clause 30 limits the extent to which Malaysia's officers may exercise these powers, and clause 31 states that Malaysia's officers are not allowed to make any arrest in Singapore's territory during cross-border incident management operations and in the same vein, neither are Singapore's officers allowed to make any arrest in Malaysia's territory during such operations.

Apart from major cross-border incidents, we must also consider routine crimes that may take place on board RTS Link trains, such as theft or perhaps, outrage of modesty. Singapore and Malaysia have agreed that both countries will have concurrent criminal jurisdiction over criminal offences that occur on board trains in transit, as well as over the stretch of railway tracks located between Piers 47 and 48. Otherwise, the respective country in whose territory the offence happens will have criminal jurisdiction.

Clause 39 under Part 7 of the Bill establishes Singapore's jurisdiction over criminal offences on board trains in transit in the general context of cross-border railways, including when the train is in Malaysia's territory and at certain defined zones of the railway tracks.

For the RTS Link, any person who commits an offence under any Singapore law while on a train in transit would be treated as if the person had done so in Singapore. This then enables Singapore to investigate and prosecute offences committed at these locations, even if they might be outside Singapore.

Malaysia, through its legislation, has also established jurisdiction over criminal offences on board trains in transit and on the railway tracks between Piers 47 and 48. Singapore has worked out with Malaysia a method for determining which country has primary right to exercise jurisdiction in any given case.

If someone commits an offence on a moving train, what Singapore and Malaysia have agreed on is that the country where the train completes its journey will be accorded the primary right to exercise jurisdiction. In coming up with this principle, we took reference from the arrangement between the UK and France at the Channel Tunnel. This is also similar to the approach taken towards investigating offences on board airborne aircraft, where the destination country has primary right.

It therefore does not matter whether travellers file a Police report in Singapore or in Malaysia. We also have a referral system in place: if a country receives a report for which it does not have primary right to exercise jurisdiction, it will refer the case to the other country. Should the country without primary right wish to conduct investigations into the matter, it may request for the other country to waive its right. This framework ensures clarity of jurisdiction when the exact location of the offence is unclear. It also allows Singapore to investigate offences where there is public interest to do so.

The Bill also addresses other matters, such as those concerning data protection, as well as protection and immunities for Malaysia's officers in Singapore.

Let me just cover these provisions briefly. With both countries' CIQ facilities co-located in both stations, data protection is a key consideration, and this is the subject of Part 6 of the Bill. Clause 37 provides that all information and data collected or generated by Singapore officers in Malaysia in the course of official duties, whether within the designated areas or during cross-border incident management, these shall all be treated as if they were collected or generated in Singapore and governed by Singapore law.

Clause 38 provides that documents, devices and equipment belonging to the Singapore Government shall be immune from seizure, confiscation or any other form of interference when installed, kept or situated within defined areas in Malaysia. The protection of Singapore's data and the inviolability of our documents, devices and equipment have been provided for in Malaysia's legislation as well.

On a reciprocal basis, clause 35 of the Bill provides for the protection of information and data collected or generated by Malaysia's officers in Singapore, in the course of official duties. And similarly, clause 36 provides for the inviolability of documents, devices and equipment belonging to the Malaysian government when installed, kept or situated within defined areas in Singapore.

Part 8 of the Bill confers protection on Malaysia's officers deployed in Singapore. Clause 42 deems every officer that Malaysia deploys to Singapore, whether for the purpose of performing border control duties or cross-border incident management, to be a public servant for the purposes of specific provisions under the Penal Code and the Protection from Harassment Act. This extends to Malaysia's officers the same level of protection against abuse as Singapore's public servants, in the course of their conducting official duties.

In addition, clause 43 confers immunity on the actions of Malaysia's officers in Singapore from Singapore's criminal, civil and administrative jurisdictions. This is provided those actions are committed in the course of official duties. The Malaysian government may waive this immunity at its discretion.

Mr Deputy Speaker, I mentioned earlier that reciprocity underpins the provisions of this Bill, and we want our officers in Malaysia to be able to work with peace of mind. If it is found that what Malaysia's legislation accords to our officers are substantially less favourable than what this Bill accords to their officers, clause 44 empowers the Minister to issue regulations that disapply or modify any provision of the Bill in relation to Malaysia's officers in Singapore. This is our commitment to our own officers, who work tirelessly to safeguard Singapore's borders.

Sir, the last part of the Bill proposes amendments to other Acts that are consequential upon the enactment of this Bill or related to the purposes of this Bill.

First, amendments are proposed for the purpose of adapting existing laws to the requirements of a cross-border railway. For example, clause 63 amends section 5 of the Immigration Act to empower the Minister to prescribe an area outside Singapore as an authorised point of entry or immigration control post.

For the RTS Link, Singapore's designated areas at Bukit Chagar station will be prescribed as an authorised point of entry.

Another example is clause 51, which amends section 24 of the Coroners Act, so that coronial jurisdiction may be asserted in cases where a death occurs on a train in transit, even if outside Singapore, if the body is transported into Singapore. This allows Singapore to investigate cases of unnatural death that have been reported, where there is public interest to do so.

Second, amendments are proposed for the purpose of allowing the deployment of Singapore officers to Malaysian territory to perform official duties. Clauses 48, 65 and 70 amend the Civil Defence Act, the Immigration Act and the Police Force Act respectively. These amendments empower the Minister to send the Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF), ICA and the Singapore Police Force (SPF) officers to Malaysia for the purpose of performing official duties in relation to cross-border railways, including for cross-border incident management.

Third, Sir, amendments are proposed to extend criminal jurisdiction to Singapore's designated areas in Malaysia's territory for certain offences. These are largely offences under Singapore's immigration laws. For example, if ICA officers in Malaysia detect the use of forged passports, the amendments to the Passports Act under clause 69 would allow them to seize the forged passports.

Some offences under the Infectious Diseases Act and the Regulation of Imports and Exports Act have also been made extra-territorial, to the extent necessary for Singapore officers in Malaysia to enforce public health measures as well as our import laws.

Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, the RTS Link will be a major artery for travel between Singapore and Malaysia. This Bill is a key supporting pillar of the RTS Link. It gives effect to a comprehensive set of arrangements that facilitate co-located CIQ clearance, and also undergirds jointly developed protocols for coordinated management of cross-border incidents. This will help to ensure that the RTS Link experience for travellers is not only convenient and seamless, but also safe and secure. Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, I beg to move.

Question proposed.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Vikram Nair.

1.33 pm

Mr Vikram Nair (Sembawang): Mr Deputy Speaker, I support this Bill. This Bill lays the legal and operational foundation for the Johor Bahru-Singapore RTS Link. The RTS Link will significantly transform the way commuters move between the two countries, and I believe improve the lives of hundreds of thousands of people who cross the Singapore-Malaysia border every day.

More than 300,000 people travel across the Causeway every day, making it one of the busiest overland crossings in the world. Many commuters may spend hours each day in traffic congestion. This is time that could otherwise be spent at work, with family, or at rest. It also imposes a mental and physical toll on commuters, who must cope daily with uncertainty and long waiting times at checkpoints.

The RTS Link will have the capacity to serve up to 10,000 commuters during peak periods, for every hour and in each direction, with a train journey time of only about five minutes between the two stations. Further, passengers travelling in either direction will clear both Singapore and Malaysia authorities at the point of departure and need not go through immigration clearance at the point of arrival. This should significantly reduce congestion at checkpoints and shorten travel times. It will also provide greater comfort and predictability for commuters, which is particularly important for those who rely on cross-border travel for their livelihoods.

Singapore is well positioned to implement such seamless clearance arrangements. Our ICA has already deployed advanced automated clearance systems across our land, sea and air checkpoints. Many travellers today are familiar with biometric clearance lanes, which use facial recognition, iris scans and fingerprints to very quickly identify individuals and have them clear customs. These systems have proven to be efficient and secure. They allow us to process large volumes of travellers while maintaining high standards of border security.

Malaysia, too, has been investing in similar technologies. These developments give confidence that both countries have the technical capability and operational experience to support a smooth clearance process for RTS Link passengers, without compromising on safety or security standards.

I would like to seek clarification on a few points – though I have to acknowledge Minister has answered many of them in his opening remarks.

First, on the purpose of allowing Malaysian border controls to be applied within Singapore. The Bill provides for Malaysian officers to exercise powers under Malaysian border control laws within a designated area in Singapore. At the same time, it makes clear that Singapore law continues to apply within that area.

I think it would be helpful for the Minister to perhaps elaborate on why it is necessary for Malaysian law to have application within Singapore territory, rather than relying purely on Singapore law with the appropriate cooperation mechanisms? And also, if there are potential conflicts between Singapore law and Malaysian law on a particular issue, how will that be managed in practice?

Second, on the extent of powers that Malaysian officers may exercise while in Singapore. The Bill sets out a framework under which Malaysian officers may conduct border clearance and security checks within the designated area. At the same time, it imposes certain limits. For example, Malaysian officers are not permitted to make arrests in Singapore, and any detained persons or seized items must be transferred to Singapore authorities within a reasonable time.

Could the Minister clarify how will accountability and oversight be ensured for actions taken by foreign officers operating in Singapore? In addition, what avenues of recourse will be available to individuals who may have complaints about the conduct of such officers and how will these be investigated and resolved across jurisdictions?

Third, on the handling of routine crimes on board cross-border trains. I think the Minister has clarified exactly which laws will apply – and it appears that where train is stopped, it will be between Piers 47 and 48, the nose of the train that will define which law applies; and on a moving train it will be the destination country's laws that apply.

So, I think these are helpful clarifications and my only further questions are, operationally, will joint patrols or onboard security personnel be deployed in the trains? And if so, which countries will do this? And will those officers have the relevant authority to take action if and when an incident occurs even if it happens to be in the other territory?

Given that the travel time is only about five minutes, it may not be easy to ascertain exactly where an incident occurs and will be important for whichever officer is present to have the authority to deal with an incident, as and when it rises.

Fourth, on the coordination in the event of cross-border incidents. The Bill provides provisions for incident management operations, including the ability of officers – so this was the point I mentioned earlier, operating with the other. I think this is sensible, but it will be good to know exactly what the boundaries are for these officers.

I will also be interested if the Minister can elaborate on how command and control will operate during such incidents? Who will have overall authority of an incident, and how will responsibilities be allocated between Singapore and Malaysian officers? So, say, for example, a train has a destination in Singapore. Malaysian officers spot the incident, who will that Malaysian officer report to and how will the incident be dealt with?

Also, will there be joint exercises conducted ahead of the RTS Link opening to ensure that both sides are well prepared to respond swiftly and cohesively, and any command-and-control issues will be dealt with easily as well.

Finally, on measures to prevent smuggling and the movement of contraband. Given the high volume of passengers expected to use the RTS Link, it is critical that robust safeguards are in place to prevent the smuggling of drugs, vapes, cigarettes and other prohibited items. The Bill provides for screening, inspection and the seizure of dangerous or controlled items, as well as the detention of certain individuals in certain circumstances.

Can the Minister provide more details on how these measures will be implemented operationally? For example, will technologies be used and if so, what technologies for screening and how will Singapore and Malaysian officers coordinate with each other?

Finally, Mr Deputy Speaker, I would like to touch on the broader principle underlying this Bill. The co-location of border controls necessarily involves a degree of legal and operational integration between two sovereign countries. It requires mutual trust, clear rules and strong safeguards to ensure that both security and sovereignty are preserved.

In this regard, I think the Bill strikes a good balance. It seeks to enable efficient cross-border travel while retaining Singapore's legal framework and ensuring that foreign officers cooperate within defined limits. It also provides for reciprocity, so that Singapore officers can exercise similar functions in Malaysia.

As we move towards opening the RTS Link, it is important that both countries get these arrangements right. Done well, this will not only ease congestion and improve the lives of both Singaporeans and Malaysians, but also strengthen the close economic and social ties between Singapore and Malaysia. Mr Deputy Speaker, I support this Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Dennis Tan.

1.41 pm

Mr Dennis Tan Lip Fong (Hougang): Mr Deputy Speaker, the co-location of CIQ facilities for the RTS Link represents a significant step in the long history of Singapore-Malaysia connectivity.

In developing this framework, I believe that the Ministry has looked towards international models like the Channel Tunnel between the UK and France. The 1986 Treaty of Canterbury taught us that for a cross-border rail to succeed, sovereignty must be expressed through clear control zones rather than rigid physical borders.

While the Workers' Party supports the principles of efficiency and bilateral cooperation underpinning this Bill, I have several clarifications regarding legal jurisdiction, officer protection and commuter rights.

One, the mechanics of custody transfer. The Ministry has stated that Malaysian officers who detain an individual must hand them over to Singapore officers as soon as is practicable.

In the Channel Tunnel context, delays in these handovers occasionally led to legal challenges regarding the lawfulness of detention. In a facility designed for 10,000 passengers per hour, practicable is a subjective term. So, what is the physical and operational infrastructure in place at Woodlands North to ensure this transfer happens immediately or as soon as practicable? Will there be a permanent co-located Singapore Police force presence within the Malaysian designated area to ensure there is zero dead time between detention and handover?

Two, jurisdiction and the rights of investigation. The Bill establishes concurrent criminal jurisdiction for incidents on trains in transit and along the tracks, with the country where the journey concludes having the primary right to exercise jurisdiction. The Channel Tunnel model uses a primary jurisdiction rule to avoid confusion, yet it leaves room for the home country to step in for their own citizens.

While my colleague, Aljunied group representation constituency (GRC) Member of Parliament Sylvia Lim will have a more specific query relating to this issue in her speech on this Bill later, I would like to ask the Minister whether he can clarify the specific public interest criteria used to determine when Singapore would waive the jurisdiction, especially if a crime is committed against a Singaporean on a Johor-bound train. We must also ensure a transparent mechanism exists to update victims' families if a case is handed over to foreign authorities.

Three, emergency coordination on the marine viaduct. The RTS Link involves a 25-metre-high marine viaduct across the Straits of Johor. Learning from the 1996 Euro Tunnel fire, we know that seconds are lost if emergency responders face jurisdictional paralysis.

Under Part 5 of this Bill, how will the division of labour between the SCDF and the Jabatan Bomba dan Penyelamat Malaysia be managed and permitted under the bill during a mid-track emergency? Will there be a single unified incident commander to prevent confusion on the viaduct, and how frequently will joint tabletop exercises be mandated by law?

Four, accessibility and inclusion within designated areas. With a heavy reliance on automated e-gates and QR code clearance. We must not overlook vulnerable commuters within the Malaysian designated area at Woodlands North. Will there be a guaranteed minimum quota of manual counters staffed by Singapore officers? This is essential for our seniors and persons with disabilities who may struggle with automated systems in a high-pressure environment.

Five, substantive reciprocity for Singaporean personnel. According to the Ministry of Home Affair's (MHA's) media release on 7 April 2026, for cross-border incidents, such as an incident that occurs on board a train in transit, the Bill provides that Singapore and Malaysia incident management officers may respond to cross-border incidents on or near trains and railway tracks in Malaysia and Singapore respectively, and that both countries' incident management officers will be accorded powers, rights and immunities for this purpose, subject to limitations; no Singapore officer in Malaysia may make an arrest and no Malaysian officer in Singapore may make an arrest in Singapore.

Indeed, for this arrangement to be truly reciprocal, our officers at Bukit Chagar must have the same operational autonomy and protection as the Malaysian officers have in Singapore. For good order, I seek the Minister's confirmation that both the powers accorded and the functional immunity provided to Singaporean officers under Malaysia's RTS Link Act 2026 are substantively identical in scope to the protections we are granting under this Bill.

In its media release, MHA also referred to the Channel Fixed Link. A point of friction in the Channel Tunnel model was the disparity in the powers granted to officers operating in the other's territory. I understand that under the Sangatte Protocol, British officers on French soil lacked equivalent powers to domestic law enforcement and could not execute independent arrest, which led to persistent ambiguity regarding the use of force, such as applying restraints, pending French police's intervention.

Given that MHA has explicitly looked to the Channel Tunnel model for the RTS Link framework, I wonder whether the Ministry has studied the relevance of their operational experience to our RTS Link, and if it is relevant, whether expected similar operational gaps have been or will be addressed.

Six, safeguarding data in inviolable equipment. MHA has noted that Singapore-issued equipment at Bukit Chagar will be inviolable. While the hardware is protected, I seek clarity on the digital data. Will the data collected by our officers in Johor be transmitted via a dedicated air-gapped network back to Singapore to prevent any potential interception vulnerabilities, while operating on foreign soil?

Seven, transparency in revoking recognition. The Minister reserves the power to revoke the recognition of Malaysian officer without giving a reason. While I understand the security necessity, may I ask if there is a predefined framework of red flags agreed upon with our counterparts? Maintaining a stable professional relationship between both border forces is critical to preventing operational friction. Mr Deputy Speaker, in Mandarin, please,

(In Mandarin): Mr Deputy Speaker, the Johor-Singapore RTS is of vital importance to connectivity between Singapore and Malaysia. The Cross-Border Railways (Border Control Co-location) Bill currently before this House is intended to provide the legal framework for this significant project.

The Government has drawn reference from the Channel Tunnel model between the UK and France, where co-location arrangements have improved immigration clearance efficiency. That said, I wish to seek clarification on several legal and operational details.

First, detention and handover procedures. When Malaysian officers detain individuals within the designated zone on Singapore soil, the Bill stipulates that the handover to Singapore Police must occur "as soon as practicable." During periods of extremely high passenger volume, what constitutes "as soon as practicable" may be difficult to define. I would like to ask the Government whether Woodlands North Station will have sufficient facilities to ensure there is no gap in accountability during the handover process.

Second, criminal jurisdiction. The Bill generally gives priority to the destination country in investigating cases. However, if the victim is a Singaporean and the incident occurs on a train bound for Johor, under what circumstances would the Singapore Government cede jurisdiction? We must ensure that the families of victims receive transparent and timely updates.

Third, emergency response on the marine viaduct. The rail track spans the Johor Strait. Should an emergency such as a fire occur in the middle of the track, how would the Singapore Civil Defence Force and Malaysia's Bomba delineate their respective responsibilities? Will there be a unified incident commander to prevent confusion during critical moments of a rescue operation?

Fourth, immigration clearance for vulnerable groups. While automated clearance gates and QR codes are now widely used, many elderly persons and individuals with disabilities may encounter difficulties with these systems. I hope the Government can assure this House that sufficient manned counters will be retained within the Malaysian clearance zone at Woodlands North Station.

Fifth, legal protections for officers and data security. When Singapore officers are deployed at Bukit Chagar in Johor Bahru, Malaysia, do they enjoy the same legal protections and operational autonomy as their Malaysian counterparts enjoy when stationed in Singapore? Furthermore, will the immigration data collected onsite be transmitted back to Singapore via an independent encrypted network to guard against data breaches?

Mr Deputy Speaker, notwithstanding the clarifications I have sought, I remain supportive of this Bill.

(In English): Mr Deputy Speaker, the success of the RTS Link will be measured not just by the speed of the commute, but by the robustness of the legal and operational safeguards that protect it. We must ensure that this milestone project remains a safe and reliable link for generations to come. Notwithstanding my clarifications, I support the Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Dr Neo Kok Beng.

1.51 pm

Dr Neo Kok Beng (Nominated Member): Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, the Cross-Border Railways (Border Control Co-location) Bill is not just logistics, but it is very important to our trust and cooperation between Singapore and Malaysia. We noted that the RTS Link has 10,000-passenger-per-hour capacity. And with such heavy traffic, definitely, something is going to happen, incidents of any nature.

I wish to address some critical areas for discussion.

First, to address incidents, do we intend to post marshals or any of our Public Transport Security Command (TransCom) on board, or are we just going to depend on onboard cameras or station-based deployments to detect such incidents?

Second, if we are deploying security on board, are they allowed to carry firearms? And if they are allowed to carry firearms, how is it being governed in terms of jurisdiction? Because, if you move from one, let us say, leave the Woodlands North Station, which is towards Johor, then basically, by the point of destination, then actually, we do not have jurisdiction on board. So, how do we address that and vice versa for the Malaysians?

Third, when our security reach the Johor station, how does the security transit to the return trip because then, they will be carrying firearms, if that is the intention? So, I think all these need to be addressed carefully.

I would like to pose a scenario, but the Minister has addressed quite a lot and actually improved my understanding, especially for the "nose" between Piers 48 and 47. But I think this scenario is good for discussion.

In the case of, let us say, an "emergency brake" situation. Let us say a train leaves Bukit Chagar Station towards Singapore's Woodlands North Station, the destination on board is under Singapore jurisdiction. However, before we reach Pier 47, that means at Pier 48, there is an emergency brake and maybe, there is an incident on board and our security takes action. If the passengers do not disembark and the train carries on, then I think it is in Singapore's jurisdiction. But if, let us say, the train is being towed back to Bukit Chagar, then what will happen?

So, those are the scenarios that are possible that we have to think through. Maybe we have to do dry runs on it to resolve it.

In spite of this, this Bill is timely and I support the Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Ms Sylvia Lim.

1.55 pm

Ms Sylvia Lim (Aljunied): Mr Deputy Speaker, the RTS Link is expected to start passenger service at the end of this year. This Bill seeks to co-locate border control procedures by both Singapore and Malaysia at the point of departure, enabling passengers to disembark upon arrival without further checks.

Having personally taken the Eurostar train from the UK to continental Europe, I have experienced how the co-location of British and French border Police at the St Pancras station in London saved time for passengers entering Europe by rail. Similarly, to ease travel between Singapore and Malaysia, this Bill to co-locate border controls should be supported.

My party colleague Dennis Tan has asked for clarifications on various aspects of the Bill. On my part, I wish to make brief observations on Part 7 of the Bill dealing with criminal jurisdiction.

According to the Ministry's media release of 7 April, there will be concurrent jurisdiction between Singapore and Malaysia for incidents on trains in transit and on the railway tracks between the two countries. This is reflected in clause 39(1) of the Bill.

As both countries could potentially exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed in these locations, the Ministry states that there are arrangements on which country has precedence. It has explained that, in general, the country in whose territory the train journey is completed has the primary right to exercise jurisdiction. Earlier, the Minister confirmed this in his Second Reading speech. Thus, if the journey is completed in Johor, Malaysia would have primary jurisdiction, and vice versa, if the journey is completed in Singapore.

These arrangements mentioned in the media release are not reflected in the language of Part 7 of the Bill. In contrast, the Malaysian law on this matter is more explicit. Section 19(2) of Malaysia's Johor Bahru-Singapore Rapid Transit System Link Bill 2026 states that, and I quote, "The government in whose territory the train journey is completed, shall have the primary right to exercise its criminal jurisdiction." Is there a reason why our Bill does not say this expressly?

The Ministry's media release goes on to state that the country with primary jurisdiction may waive its right if there is a request by the other country to take over the case on the ground that there is greater public interest for the requesting country to investigate and prosecute. We are thus given to understand that there would be situations where, even though the train was travelling to Singapore, Singapore may give up its primary jurisdiction to Malaysia.

When Singapore may give up its primary jurisdiction to Malaysia is found in clause 39(2) of the Bill. Clause 39(2) contains three cumulative conditions. First, the person must be subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the country the conduct was engaged in, in this case, Malaysia. Second, Malaysia must not be subject to any obligation to cede jurisdiction to Singapore. And third, Malaysia must have brought criminal proceedings. If my understanding is correct, when all these three conditions are met, Singapore cannot prosecute the offender, even if the conduct occurred on a trip completed at Woodlands.

Sir, the second pre-condition is not clear to me. Under what circumstances would Malaysia be obligated to cede jurisdiction to Singapore? Could the Minister please clarify where these obligations are from and in what situations would they arise?

Additionally, I note that the Bills of both countries do not mention an important consideration highlighted in MHA's media release – that one country may waive its jurisdiction at the request of the other if there is greater public interest for the requesting country to investigate and prosecute. Perhaps, the omission is because it is difficult to codify how a greater public interest should be assessed.

Nonetheless, there will be cases whereby both countries have real stakes in curbing the criminal activity and be equally interested to handle the case. For example, someone who is bringing controlled drugs from Malaysia to Singapore through the RTS Link would be simultaneously committing offences under the laws of both countries. What would be the protocol here? Who will determine whether there is greater public interest for Malaysia to prosecute, and how would this determination be made?

In that regard, I would like to make an observation about potential bilateral sensitivities that may arise. From my brief research into Malaysian law, it is clear that while we share a colonial heritage and had similar laws at one time, the criminal laws of our two countries have evolved to show significant differences. For example, while the offence of theft in both countries is still criminalised under section 379 of the Penal Code of both countries, the punishment for theft in Singapore carries a maximum of three years, while in Malaysia, the maximum jail term is up to seven years.

As for our drug laws, in Singapore, the mandatory death penalties still exist for certain offences under the Misuse of Drugs Act, while under Malaysia's Dangerous Drugs Act, the mandatory death penalty has been abolished.

Sir, regardless of which country may have primary jurisdiction over a particular case, both governments may feel pressured to retain cases involving their own nationals. This could be for various reasons, such as the differences in law and punishments or to give their nationals better access to justice in their home countries.

I personally do not think we need to harmonise the laws of both countries as each country is sovereign, has its own priorities and determines its own laws. Nevertheless, it would be useful to know if the Ministry foresees that such bilateral tensions may arise and whether there are any protocols in place to manage them.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Ms Cassandra Lee.

2.01 pm

Ms Cassandra Lee (West Coast-Jurong West): Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, the Bill is timely as we gear up for the highly anticipated opening of the Johor Bahru-Singapore RTS Link. This Bill deals with the technical aspects of jurisdiction and law, yet it has very practical impact for the everyday commuter seeking to cross the border; shaping the way immigration is experienced at the checkpoints.

For the commuter, the questions are straightforward: when I make this journey, do I understand what rules apply, and can I rely on them being applied clearly and consistently? When Singaporeans tap in at Woodlands North, are they already subject to Malaysian law? If Singaporeans unknowingly carry something that is not allowed into Malaysia, will they be stopped on our side? If an incident happens mid-journey, who investigates and under which law? If there is an accident, a dispute, a lost item or even a medical emergency on the train, which country’s officers should we approach for help?

I support the Bill and I would like to seek clarification on several aspects of the Bill hoping to cover some of the practical concerns that commuters may have arising from the Bill. Let me begin with the broader legislative framework.

Co-located border control is not new globally. But each of these systems is shaped by its own legal and bilateral context. So, my first question is this: how does our framework differ from those models and what were the specific design choices made for Singapore and Malaysia? Understanding this will help us better appreciate the safeguards embedded in our system and whether there are lessons we have consciously adopted or chosen to depart from.

The Bill also envisages multiple zones as a commuter moves across the border: the designated areas, the defined zone and the train in transit. Across these zones, laws may shift or apply concurrently.

From a commuter's perspective, this raises a practical question: at what point do Malaysian cross-border laws apply within the Malaysia designated areas located in Singapore and how does this interact with the continued application of Singapore law? For example, where a traveller carries an item that is unregulated in Singapore but regulated under Malaysian law will the traveller be stopped within the Malaysia designated area located in Singapore? Will there be an opportunity to dispose of the item? Or will enforcement proceed regardless?

Or to use another example, if a traveller carries the same amount of cash, will he face different obligations depending on where they are in the journey: where Singapore laws apply, a declaration is required if the traveller is entering or leaving Singapore with cash above S$20,000, whereas in areas where Malaysia laws apply, the threshold is US$10,000.

Will differences in the laws that apply have any practical impact on commuters, of course, beyond what is already encountered at conventional checkpoints and how will these situations be managed operationally?

This leads me to my next point on concurrent criminal jurisdiction. Matters such as public disorder, voluntarily causing hurt, molestation and drug‑related offences in transit areas are not hypothetical concerns; they will need to be dealt with if and when they arise. I therefore wish to seek clarity on the precise circumstances and locations in which concurrent criminal jurisdiction is contemplated under the Bill and on the mechanisms by which competing jurisdiction is intended to be managed.

Clause 39 in substance provides that if an offending conduct is committed while the train is in transit, or within the defined zone, it is treated as if the offending conduct took place in Singapore. Such cases can be tried in our Courts unless the other country has criminal jurisdiction, is under no obligation to cede such jurisdiction to Singapore and decides to commence criminal proceedings.

Clause 40 then adds that if criminal proceedings are sought to be brought in Singapore Courts on the basis that criminal jurisdiction under section 39, the Public Prosecutor's consent is required before such proceedings may be instituted. This raises a number of questions.

First, where the same conduct is an offence under both Singapore and Malaysian law, and both countries have jurisdiction, how will it be decided which side will take the lead in the prosecution?

The Minister earlier mentioned that the country for which the train is bound will take the lead. Is this coded in our legislation? Will there be exceptions? For example, what if there is a disagreement on the proviso under clause 39(2)? If Singapore disagrees that there is no obligation to cede jurisdiction, for example?

Second, on clause 40, could the Minister clarify how the Public Prosecutor's consent mechanism will operate in practice? More broadly, how will this safeguard ensure that individuals are not exposed to the risk of double prosecution for the same conduct?

My next point relates to enforcement powers of preclearance officers. Clauses 15 and 18 make clear that the Malaysian preclearance officers in Singapore may remove items or detain individuals for the purposes of border control but they must transfer the custody to Singapore officers, and they do not have arrest powers.

I would like to understand what happens after that handover. If the Malaysian authorities intend to assume custody of the items or the individual, how will this be carried out? Will this be done through existing legal frameworks such as mutual legal assistance, operational cooperation or extradition processes?

Once the individual or item is in custody with Singapore authorities, will the case then proceed fully under Singapore's evidence laws and the criminal procedure?

Clause 24 is a mirror provision in that it provides the same limits on the powers of a Singapore preclearance officer in the Singapore designated area in Malaysia.

I would like to similarly understand what happens once the Singapore preclearance officer hands over the custody of the item or individual to his or her Malaysian counterpart.

On this note, how would Singapore criminal law apply in the designated area? In particular, I would be grateful if the Minister could explain the effects of the clauses 26(3) to 26(6). These provisions in substance provide that conduct committed outside Singapore but within a designated Singapore area of the cross-border railway, which is Bukit Chagar, is treated as though it has occurred in Singapore if it would be an offence under Singapore border control laws. Such conduct can be prosecuted and punished by Singapore Courts, regardless of whether it is an offence under Malaysian laws. However, Singapore officers cannot arrest the person for that conduct until the person is physically within Singapore. In this vein how does clause 26(6) apply since clauses 39 and 40 which deal with concurrent criminal jurisdiction does not expressly reference the designated area?

My next point relates to the powers, privileges and immunities of the officers. Clause 43 provides certain immunities to the Malaysian preclearance and incident management officers in the discharge of their duties. Could the Minister clarify what happens if those powers are exceeded? What channels of redress are available to affected individuals?

On clause 44, this provides for a reciprocity mechanism, where regulations may be made if the protections accorded to Singapore officers in Malaysia are substantially less favourable.

I would like to ask: has the Government reviewed Malaysia's corresponding legislation? And how will it assess whether the duties, powers and protections are, in law or in practice, substantially less favourable?

I am heartened that the Bill expressly addresses cross-border incidents, including security, public order and medical emergencies within the transit areas. There is a considered and well-structured approach in doing this.

But I would like to seek clarification on the operational aspects. For example, in the event of a train breakdown in transit, how will repairs, recovery or towing be handled? Will these arrangements be set out in subsidiary legislation, bilateral agreements, or operator-level protocols? How will we ensure that the experience of the traveller continues to be of good quality?

Second, on major incidents, where an incident extends beyond defined zones or requires coordinated response from both sides, how will the coordination be carried out in practice? What are the protocols for joint operations, and how will command and responsibility be determined in such situations? How will this impact response times to these major incidents? Much will depend on the ability of our officers on the ground to deal with the matters or seek or grant consent quickly. Clarity on these operational points will be important to ensure the framework works effectively on the ground.

On my final point, on data protection, the Bill provides that the collection and handling of biometric and other personal data within Singapore-designated areas in Malaysia. I would like to understand how this will be operationalised. How will such data be stored, processed and transmitted back to Singapore? What safeguards including infrastructural guardrails are in place to prevent unauthorised access or breaches? In the event of a data breach, what avenues of accountability and redress will there be?

I will conclude on a brief point on operational readiness. This Bill is a significant step forward. It supports a more efficient approach to cross-border movement between Singapore and Malaysia. But legislation alone is not sufficient. Much will depend on how these arrangements are implemented on the ground. Officers will need to be clear on the scope of their powers, the limits of their authority and the zones within which they operate. Processes must be consistent. Checks must be carried out with diligence. And information must be handled securely and responsibly.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Yip Hon Weng.

2.12 pm

Mr Yip Hon Weng (Yio Chu Kang): Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, for hundreds of thousands of people in Singapore, the journey across the Causeway is not simply for leisure. It is a routine. It is a lifeline. It is part of how families manage their time, how workers earn their livelihoods and how businesses stay connected.

I have seen this journey. I have spoken to residents who make it. I have heard the stories of parents, workers and small business owners who depend on it.

The Johor Bahru-Singapore RTS Link promises to transform this experience. It promises to turn what is today sometimes a long commute into a seamless transit. It promises to turn uncertainty into predictability.

I support this Bill because for the RTS Link to succeed, the border clearance process must be as efficient as the journey itself. But a border made seamless for convenience must never become invisible for accountability. I have four areas of clarification.

First, Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, accountability and sovereignty in practice. Under section 35, certain data is governed by Malaysian law. Under section 36, some materials are immune from Singapore's legal processes. Under section 43, Malaysian officers are granted immunity for acts done in the discharge of their duties.

So, I ask: how is an ordinary resident able to distinguish between a legitimate official act and an abuse of power that results in harm? And if that line is crossed, who determines that? Where such powers are exercised, accountability must be real and accessible. If a Singaporean suffers harm or has their data mishandled, what is their practical recourse? Will they be expected to navigate a foreign legal system? For residents, this is not about legal theory. It is about whether help is real, accessible and within reach when something goes wrong.

I acknowledge that, in law, an officer acting outside the proper discharge of duty may not be protected by immunity. But for residents, the question is whether there is a clear and workable path to seek redress. This concern extends to international visitors. If something goes wrong on our soil, people must know where to turn to and who will answer. Will the Government consider a dedicated liaison mechanism to assist Singaporeans and visitors in navigating these cross-border issues?

I also return to reciprocity. Our officers will operate in Malaysia under similar arrangements. What support will they receive if they face disputes or accusations while carrying out their duties? Clause 44 allows the Minister to act if reciprocity fails. However, that is reactive. How will we monitor conditions proactively?

I also seek clarification on the practical limits of these arrangements. While Malaysian officers exercise powers within designated areas, can the Government clarify how Singapore law applies if they step outside these areas in a personal capacity? Similarly, if offences, such as bribery or misconduct, occur within the Malaysia designated area in Singapore, can Singapore authorities investigate and take action where conduct falls outside official duties? On Singapore soil, accountability cannot stop at the boundary line of a designated area.

Second, Mr Deputy Speaker Sir, the privacy and dignity of travellers. The Explanatory Statement suggests that strip and body searches require consent. Yet, the Second Schedule allows such searches in certain situations. Can the Government clarify the thresholds clearly, particularly when non-consensual searches may be carried out based on reasonable suspicion?

Security must be firm, but it must also be understood. Malaysian officers may detain individuals and use reasonable force. To be clear, they cannot make arrests in Singapore. They must transfer custody to Singapore officers as soon as reasonably practicable. This is an important safeguard. This also applies reciprocally. The issue is not whether powers exist. The issue is whether safeguards are consistently applied. Under section 16, questioning can take place without a Singapore officer present. For vulnerable individuals, this may be intimidating. What protections are in place? Can a resident request a Singapore officer?

Clause 15 requires detainees to be handed over without undue delay. But what does this mean operationally? Will the Ministry provide clear, public-facing guidelines so that travellers understand both their rights and the limits of these powers? Trust is built not just on what powers exist, but on how clearly they are explained and how fairly they are exercised.

Third, Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, incident response and safety. In a cross-border incident, seconds matter.

Clause 28 allows officers to operate across borders. But in the first critical minutes, who is in charge? Is there a single incident commander? In a crisis, clarity is not procedural. It is lifesaving. Clause 32 allows incident management officers to bear arms, subject to legal limits. Can the Minister clarify the rules governing the use of firearms and how accountability will be ensured if force is used? How will criminal jurisdiction under section 39 interact with immunity provisions under section 43?

When force is used, there must be no doubt about the answers and under which law. On clause 10, deemed recognition allows additional officers during serious incidents. How are these officers identified? What safeguards are in place? What are the time limits? Finally, once the immediate emergency is over, we must address legal accountability. If someone is harmed or an offence occurs on a train in transit, both countries hold concurrent jurisdiction. How will victims and their families know which country takes the lead in the investigation? In a crisis, ambiguity is not neutral. It is a risk.

Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, I raise one final point on enforcement. If a serious offence, such as drug trafficking, occurs within the Malaysian designated area in Singapore, which law applies? If an offence occurs in the Singapore designated area in Malaysia, when does Singapore law take effect? For offences committed in transit, how will section 39 be applied? Designated areas must not become legal grey zones when enforcement becomes uncertain. Clarity is essential to deterrence.

In conclusion, Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, I return to the journey I spoke about at the beginning. The worker waiting before dawn. The parent planning the day around the crossing. The small business owner managing uncertainty.

This Bill will change that journey. I support that change. I support making movement faster and more predictable. But I have also raised important clarifications on accountability, dignity, crisis response and the application of the law. Because this Bill does not operate in isolation. When travel becomes easier, behaviour changes. When the border becomes faster, decisions become faster. And when cost pressures rise, people respond.

We are already in a period of global uncertainty. Rising costs are affecting households. Businesses are under pressure. In this environment, making Johor effectively next door will accelerate how Singaporeans respond to these pressures. When the border becomes easier to cross, spending becomes easier to shift.

This is why we must look beyond convenience. We must ask how this will affect our heartland businesses. We must ask how small and medium enterprises (SMEs) will compete. We must ask how local demand will evolve.

A faster border must not become a slower erosion of our heartland economy. Connectivity creates opportunity but it also creates competition. So, the question is not whether we should build this link. The question is whether we are ready for what it will bring, ready to ensure accountability remains clear, ready to ensure protections remain strong and ready to ensure our local economy remains resilient. Because in uncertain times, convenience alone is not enough. Confidence is what matters. And if we get this right, we will not only build a more efficient crossing. We will build a system that is fair, trusted and resilient. Mr Deputy Speaker, I support the Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Minister Edwin Tong.

2.21 pm

Mr Edwin Tong Chun Fai: Mr Deputy Speaker, I thank the various Members for their speeches, their thoughtful comments and their strong support of the Bill. As some Members have noted, I have already covered some of the points in my opening speech, so I do not propose to repeat them, but nonetheless, there are quite a number of process questions which I thought I will just take in turn.

Mr Vikram Nair, Ms Cassandra Lee and Mr Yip Hon Weng asked about the implications arising from the application of Malaysian laws at Woodlands North Station. This is an important point, so, let me just take some time to clarify this.

First, the application of Malaysian border control laws is restricted to only the designated areas within Woodlands North Station. These designated areas will be clearly demarcated with signages, as required by clause 7 of the Bill. LTA will work closely with its Malaysian counterparts to ensure that there is clarity and there are sufficient signages, and that they are prominently displayed and presented in our official languages.

Second, I had mentioned that the application of Malaysia's border control laws in the designated areas in Woodlands North Station is for the sole purpose of empowering the Malaysian officers to conduct the necessary border clearances and security checks on travellers departing for Malaysia.

Members might recall that it is because they have their border control located within Singapore, so we need to give them legal effect for them to do the work that they do to clear, so that we also have a corresponding arrangement on the Bukit Chagar side. The effect of applying these laws in the designated areas would be similar to what travellers would encounter at the usual checkpoints in Malaysia when travelling to Malaysia. So, the experience is not altogether dissimilar, it is just that we put these powers and the framework into the checkpoint at Woodlands North Station and correspondingly, on the other side, Bukit Chagar.

As I mentioned earlier, the list of Malaysian laws that would apply in the designated areas is set out in paragraph 16 of the Second Schedule. Without these laws in place in the framework that we have proposed in this Bill, in the designated areas in Woodlands North Station, Malaysian officers, who operate here, would have no legal backing to carry out their duties here, and then, in that respect, the co-located CIQ model would not work.

Third, there is no change to Singapore's territorial boundaries. Clause 8 of this Bill makes this point clear.

Mr Deputy Speaker, I want to emphasise this point. Singapore law remains in effect over the entirety of Woodlands North Station, even within the designated areas. Singapore officers are available to assist travellers if needed. If travellers encounter issues or need help in the designated areas, they should act similar to how they would anywhere else in Singapore and where necessary, seek help from Singapore authorities.

Mr Vikram, Ms Lee and Mr Yip also asked about the recourse available if Malaysia's officers operating in Singapore exceed the scope of what they are allowed to do. Let me just reiterate a few points, some of which I have covered earlier.

The Bill sets clear limits to the powers that the Malaysian officers have when they exercise their duties in Singapore. For example, on the power to take possession of dangerous or controlled items uncovered during checks and detain individuals in connection with the above, clause 15 provides that Malaysian preclearance officers transfer custody of these items or individuals to a Singapore officer as soon as is practicable. Do not forget, they are located in the same space, in the same checkpoint, in both Bukit Chagar as well as in Woodlands North Station.

This means that if a Malaysian officer detects such items, he is required to contact ICA officers without undue delay, for ICA officers to then deal with in accordance with our domestic standard operating procedures and in accordance with Singapore law. Additionally, clause 18 makes clear that Malaysian officers are not allowed to make an arrest on Singapore's territory.

Second, and this also speaks to some of the questions that Mr Yip had raised, the immunities which the Bill confers on the actions of Malaysian officers are not unconditional. They are contingent on those actions being undertaken as part of their official duties in the designated areas. Actions taken outside of that or which exceed the scope of these duties would then not be protected by the immunities.

Finally, the Singapore Minister for Home Affairs has the power to withdraw recognition for any Malaysian preclearance officer at any time without giving any reason. We do this for obvious reasons. We want to have the flexibility and ability to determine, on a case-by-case basis, and depending on what the facts might present at that location, whether we need to exercise this power.

I should make clear, for completeness, that we should distinguish the powers set out under the main provisions of the Bill and those under the Second Schedule. There might have been some conflation and so, I thought I will take some time to explain this.

The main body of the Bill is focused on what I called earlier, the "ordinary" powers. These are the baseline powers that are necessary for the day-to-day work of conducting border clearance and security checks. Basically, CIQ work. These include the powers to require travellers to present their passport, refuse entry of persons or goods and perform screening and other searches, such as body searches. These are powers that are already provided to our own officers today for routine border clearance and security checks.

The Second Schedule, however, contains "special" powers, or what I called "special" powers in my speech earlier. These are the powers that equip officers with the legal basis to manage non-routine situations and ensure travellers' safety and security. They are also no different from the powers that ICA officers already have today for managing incidents at the existing checkpoints. These powers have been codified in the bilateral RTS Link Supplementary Agreement entered into with Malaysia.

The circumstances in which these powers will be used are limited. For example, officers are allowed to use reasonable force for purposes of detaining an individual who behaves in a disorderly or threatening manner. And to Mr Yip's point, conducting of strip or body searches without consent is strictly limited to individuals who present a danger to human life or safety.

Mr Yip asked whether Singapore officers deployed to Malaysia will be able to do their jobs effectively under adequate legal protection. The Bill contains several provisions and safeguards to this effect. Let me just reiterate them.

First, no Singapore officer will be deployed to Malaysia for cross-border railway duties unless the Minister is satisfied that Malaysian law allows the Singapore officer to do their official duties in Malaysia properly, under the command of their own commanding officers, and that they are conferred with the necessary powers, duties and privileges equivalent to their counterparts in Malaysia. That is made clear in clause 22 of the Bill.

As mentioned earlier, Malaysia's legislation, which is accessible online, affords protections and immunities to our officers based in Malaysia, similar to what this Bill accords to Malaysian officers based in Singapore. To Mr Dennis Tan's point about there being substantive reciprocity in powers and immunities, I will confirm to him that the answer is yes.

Second, clause 24 makes clear that every Singapore officer deployed to Malaysia in relation to cross-border railways has the same rights, powers and immunities as they do when performing the same duties in Singapore.

Third, the protections and immunities conferred on Malaysian officers in Singapore are conditional on our officers being accorded similar treatment when operating in Malaysia. Clause 44 of the Bill provides for the Minister to disapply any of these protections and immunities if there is a change in the level of protection and immunities afforded to our officers in Malaysia.

Mr Vikram asked about operational measures to prevent smuggling of prohibited or controlled items across the border. The co-location of CIQ facilities provide convenience for travellers, as many of my colleagues in this House have articulated. But we have worked hard to ensure that this does not come at the expense of border security. So, let me just reiterate these steps. First, there will be multiple layers of checks. Under the Bill, Singapore officers have the powers to conduct selective checks within the designated areas at Bukit Chagar Station. So, we can do so in Malaysia. This is on top of the checks that Malaysian officers would have done and conducted on all travellers before they are granted departure clearance at the Bukit Chagar Station.

Second, when these same travellers arrive at Woodlands North Station, they may then also be subject to further selective security checks.

Third, as I have mentioned in my opening speech, Singapore and Malaysia have jointly developed a comprehensive set of standard operational procedures (SOPs) for the purposes of conducting border clearance and security checks in a co-located CIQ arrangement. These SOPs will ensure smooth coordination between each layer of checks and mitigate the risk of threats slipping through.

And I believe earlier, a Member asked whether we are in contact, whether there will be joint exercises, the answer is, yes, there are. There are planning exercises as well also ground operational readiness exercises that we will conduct – not just before the start of the operationalisation of the RTS Link, but also subsequently as we continue to run both CIQs and the RTS Link.

Ms Cassandra Lee and Mr Yip asked how Singapore officers in Malaysia would handle individuals found to be carrying items controlled or prohibited under Singapore law, such as drugs or vapes. If our officers at Bukit Chagar Station detect attempts to bring in vapes or drugs, Malaysian laws would apply. The traveller in question would be handed over to the Malaysian authorities and the case would then be handled in accordance with Malaysian law and their position on offences on drugs and non-compliant vapes.

But regardless of how Malaysian law deals with such attempts, our focus is to harden our borders against such items and prevent them from coming into Singapore. And so, we will do so when we have the ability to do checks, both at Bukit Chagar Station as well as at Woodlands North Station.

As Singapore officers are not granted powers of arrest when they are performing their duties in Malaysia, Ms Lee is correct to say that our officers would need to seek assistance by leveraging existing mechanisms and channels between both countries' law enforcement agencies. This is a reciprocal arrangement. We cannot arrest in Malaysia and Malaysian officers cannot arrest in Singapore. Should drugs be found or, in fact, any other illicit items be found during checks done in Singapore, Singapore law would then apply. And Singapore's zero-tolerance approach to drug trafficking will not change.

Mr Yip asked about deployment of officers to the other country during what paragraph 7 of the Second Schedule refers to as "serious unplanned incidents". As I have mentioned earlier, this is a contingency, with the intention to provide for an expeditious but a controlled way of deploying additional manpower in appropriate cases. I understand the point that Members have made about the urgency of the situation: Mr Tan mentioned fires, Mr Yip mentioned incidents and every second counts. We agree with that. We endeavor to strike a balance between that urgency and the propriety of both officers who respond to such incidents from both sides.

So, for example, during a major outage causing downtime on border clearance systems, it is in both countries' interests to ensure that there is additional manpower to maintain business continuity to continue the flow and clearance, security checks and so on, and also to minimise congestion. Such deployments should not exceed three days in the ordinary course, as provided for under paragraph 8 of the Second Schedule, unless the Malaysian Government puts in a request for a longer duration and the Minister approves this request.

Ms Lee asked how the co-located CIQ model of the RTS Link compares with co-located border control in other countries. One distinct feature of the RTS Link is where immigration clearance takes place. For the RTS Link, the traveller goes through departure and arrival clearances before embarkation. This is similar to the experience at the Channel Tunnel, which connects the UK and France, which Ms Lim also alluded to.

A different approach, however, is taken for the Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link. In that case, a traveller departing Shenzhen goes through departure and arrival clearances only upon disembarkation in Hong Kong. To return to Shenzhen – the reverse journey – he goes through departure and arrival clearances in Hong Kong before boarding the train.

I wish to assure this House that the model adopted for our RTS Link is the subject of quite extensive deliberations. We looked at different models. We discussed internally, as well as bilaterally with Malaysia. Obviously, the system has got to find consensus on both sides to be able to be equally applicable on both sides for this to work.

Ultimately, I want to assure the House that the aim is to provide a travel experience that is smooth and seamless, as many have articulated, but at the same time, strictly without compromising on safety and security, especially of our border controls.

Mr Vikram and Dr Neo Kok Beng asked whether there will be security personnel on board the RTS Link trains. There are no plans to deploy our enforcement officers on board the trains, but there will be comprehensive CCTV coverage of the interior of the train cabins that will be monitored back-end in real-time. The rail operator also has the option of deploying roving staff on board trains, as and when they decide necessary and they will be able to contact the operations control centre and provide any necessary assistance during the five-minute journey.

A few Members raised questions about concurrent criminal jurisdiction and cross-border incident management. In particular, Ms Lee, Mr Yip and Ms Sylvia Lim, asked about the method by which Singapore and Malaysia would determine the country with primary right to exercise jurisdiction over criminal offences on board a train in transit.

The country where the train completes its journey will be accorded the primary right to exercise jurisdiction. I mentioned this earlier in my opening speech, but I thought I will just repeat some of these points. So, therefore, if an offence is committed on a train that is journeying from Bukit Chagar Station to Woodlands North Station, then Singapore would have primary right; and the converse is true. Earlier, a Member said, what happens if you break down halfway and you are towed back to your original station, then I suppose the destination will be where you are towed back to. And in that scenario, that would be the country that has the primary jurisdiction.

Should the offence be committed on a reverse journey, I think I do not need to repeat that, Members understand that it will be the converse on what I have just said earlier. Then Malaysia would have primary right. However, where there is public interest for us to conduct investigations into the matter, Singapore may request for Malaysia to waive its right.

We have not hard-coded what public interest might look like, because each scenario could well be different and it depends on the context, the different circumstances on which the case arises and the way in which we might view our interest in a particular offence or the individual concerned. So, we have not hard-coded that into the framework here, but there is an arrangement within the Bilateral Agreements. I would say also that it is not only in the context of such an arrangement where we have co-located the CIQs, that issues of public interests might arise. In fact, it arises all the time when there are cross-border incidents. And Members know that we have one of the busiest cross-border land checkpoints at the Causeway and we have been managing this with the Malaysians consistently. So, there will be no change to that.

The law enforcement agencies of the country with the primary right to exercise jurisdiction will work closely with the rail operator to gather and preserve any available evidence. For what we term as, "live cross-border incidents", such as a train stalling on the tracks, both countries have agreed that the country assigned as incident manager would also have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction and carry out investigations.

That is the method and I want to emphasise that both countries have discussed and agreed on in the RTS Link Supplementary Agreements; and both sides have an obligation, under those agreements, to abide by it. There are situations where one country may well want to assert jurisdiction, but there is also a process for countries to discuss, if both assess that there is public interest in prosecuting the case. As I mentioned earlier, we come across these occasions not infrequently.

So, as long as both sides adhere to this agreement, it is unlikely that anyone will be exposed to double prosecution for the same conduct.

Ms Lim had asked, in particular, why the detail of these arrangements as to jurisdiction, have not been spelt out in this Bill. I would just like to remind this House that our Bill applies to cross-border railways generally. It is not just limited to giving effect to the bilateral arrangements for this particular RTS Link with Johor, with Bukit Chagar. It is purpose-built to accommodate similar treaties for other cross-border railways, if and when they arise.

We cannot foresee the precise details of those cross-border railways, whether there might be a co-location of CIQ or how the parties might take jurisdiction of the trains in the manner which I have articulated earlier; and therefore, our approach has been to espouse the broad principles on criminal jurisdiction in the Bill itself. And as I have mentioned earlier, some of the specifics that relate to the RTS Link in this case appear in the two Schedules that I have taken Members through earlier.

Malaysia, which Ms Lim had taken the trouble of looking up the legislation, has taken a different approach. Members will see that, in fact, the Malaysian Bill specifically mentions Singapore-Johor Link and it is designed specifically for this Link only. And that is why they have enacted an RTS-specific legislation which codifies the specific arrangements that we have agreed to bilaterally in our agreements in their Bill. So, they have taken a different approach from us.

Mr Vikram, Ms Lee and Mr Yip also asked how both sides would coordinate responses to major cross-border incidents and whether certain operational aspects would be addressed separately under other arrangements.

Sir, I had spoken earlier on the principles of cross-border incident management that both sides have agreed to abide by. These are important principles and they help determine the country that would have overall command and control of the management of a cross-border incident and ensure that both countries' responses are coordinated and do not pose unnecessary risk to friendly forces.

Both sides have also addressed other operational aspects of cross-border incident management via a comprehensive set of joint SOPs. These were developed with the rail operator's involvement, so that all the relevant stakeholders around such an incident that might occur, can work in tandem to respond effectively to such incidents.

Operational agencies from both countries, along with the rail operator, will conduct joint exercises later this year, ahead of the RTS Link service commencement, both to test as well as to validate the application of these SOPs.

Mr Yip had an additional question on ensuring officers' accountability during cross-border incident management. Sir, every officer has to adhere to the established procedures and limits in the exercise of the powers conferred upon them. I had taken Members through earlier, what these limits would look like in my opening speech as well as earlier in my reply speech. When discharging their duties, be it managing cross-border incidents or even carrying out routine duties at the CIQ zone, all officers remain under the order of their commanding officers. This is provided for under clauses 13, 22, 30 and 34 of the Bill.

Turning now to data protection, Ms Lee asked how the provisions regarding data protection would be operationalised. As I mentioned, the Bill will keep the data collected or generated by Singapore officers in Malaysia under the governance of Singapore law, and provide for the immunity of our equipment and devices in Malaysia from seizure and also from other forms of interference.

Let me assure this House and all Members that the stringent requirements imposed on the handling, processing and storing of data in Singapore are similarly applicable to any data or information Singapore officers in Malaysia collect or generate in the course of their work.

Mr Dennis Tan had asked whether the data that we collect, when transmitted back to Singapore, would be protected or secured and he asked whether it would be air-gapped. The answer is yes, it would be. So, we have a secure line that transmits that data.

Ms Lee also asked how the Government would hold relevant parties accountable in the event of a data breach. Since the data is collected, transmitted, kept and governed under Singapore law, any data breach would, therefore, be dealt with in accordance with Singapore law – something we are familiar with.

If the incident is a result of bilateral obligations relating to data protection and inviolability of equipment not being complied with, then the Government will consider all available legal and diplomatic options, in accordance with the bilateral RTS Link treaties, as well as the relevant international law.

Sir, I believe I have covered Members' queries and questions, so, let me conclude.

I thank the Members for underscoring the point that this Bill is a key supporting pillar of the RTS Link and will bring convenience of travel to several segments of society. This Bill gives effect to a very comprehensive set of arrangements that facilitate co-located CIQ clearance and undergirds jointly developed protocols for coordinated management of cross-border incidents. This will, in turn, help to ensure that the RTS Link experience for travellers is not only convenient and seamless, but also safe and secure.

On that note, I thank the Members' support of this Bill, and Mr Deputy Speaker, I beg to move.

2.45 pm

Mr Deputy Speaker: Are there any clarifications arising out of the Minister's response? Dr Neo, a short clarification, please.

Dr Neo Kok Beng: Yes, very short. I would just like to ask the Minister what is the main reason of not having security on board? Is it because the timing of the ride is very short?

Mr Edwin Tong Chun Fai: It is a five-minute journey across both ways; and with the availability of closed circuit television coverage and the real-time monitoring that will be done by the officers on both sides, we did not think that this will be necessary.

But as I mentioned in my reply speech, there is a provision and an option to activate personnel to be on the trains, if necessary, as a precaution. But as a default, we do not propose to start with having dedicated security personnel on the trains.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Ms Sylvia Lim, a short clarification, please.

Ms Sylvia Lim: One clarification for the Minister. This is in relation to when Singapore may have to give up its primary jurisdiction to Malaysia to investigate incidents and particularly on clause 39(2). As I mentioned in my speech, there are three conditions to be satisfied if we were to give up primary jurisdiction and one of them is that it must also be the case that Malaysia has no obligation to cede jurisdiction to us. So, what does that mean?

Mr Edwin Tong Chun Fai: Thank you, let me explain that. In fact, I had turned it up to the same page; I thought the Member might ask that question.

Clause 39, if the Member has it with her, deals with a scenario where we take jurisdiction. So, if you look at clause 39(1), "Any conduct engaged in by a person [whether] on board a...train... [in a] defined zone [and so on],... if engaged in within Singapore, would constitute an offence... [and it will be] treated... as if the person engaged in that conduct in Singapore." So, clause 39(1) is a provision that takes jurisdiction.

Clause 39(2), which the Member referred to, is a scenario where if a person is found – if you look at b(i) and b(ii) – where the authorities in that country, meaning Malaysia, "not subject to any obligation to cede jurisdiction to...Singapore authorities."

To the Member Ms Lim, I remember that I had said that in the RTS Link Bilateral Agreements, we have come to an arrangement bilaterally on which countries would assume primary jurisdiction. The Member might recall that I talked about the trains, which direction, where the nose was and so on. And so that is the framework that determines the jurisdiction. So, it is in that context that we put in a provision that talks about a reference to when they might cede jurisdiction. Because otherwise, they would have jurisdiction over all matters. But that framework provides for when they will cede that to Singapore; and correspondingly on our part, when we might cede that to Malaysia.

So, if that scenario happens and not just that, but then plus the other condition, which is that criminal proceedings are then brought in a country – that means no person would, on account of these provisions, not be prosecuted. So, even if it appears that an incident happened within the framework of what might be Malaysia's jurisdiction, but if the individual or the offence is not a subject of proceedings, then the conditions are not satisfied. So, I hope this makes it quite clear.

2.48 pm

Mr Deputy Speaker: There being no further clarifications, I will put the question to the House.

Question put, and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House.

The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. – [Mr Edwin Tong Chun Fai].

Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed.