Courts (Civil and Criminal Justice) Reform Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

7.11 pm

The Second Minister for Law (Mr Edwin Tong Chun Fai): Mr Deputy Speaker, I beg to move, that the Bill be now read a Second time.

Sir, Singapore is internationally recognised for having a justice system that is fair, transparent and effective. We have a world-class judiciary that is known for its competence, independence and utmost integrity.

The sound justice system has brought about many tangible benefits to Singaporeans.

The value of our legal industry and jobs in the legal sector have grown in tandem with our status as a legal hub. A reputation for being an efficient dispute resolution centre and respect for the rule of law have also enhanced Singapore's attractiveness as an investment destination.

But we cannot afford to rest on our laurels. We have to constantly look ahead and improve on what we have to stay relevant and competitive. So, this Bill represents the latest of our continual efforts to improve our justice system. Let me now take Members through the key aspects of this Bill.

First, I would like to touch on the digital transformation of the Courts.

As Members will appreciate, the COVID-19 pandemic has necessitated a reduction in the level of person-to-person contact.

In April 2020, we introduced a temporary remote hearing framework under the COVID-19 (Temporary Measures) Act to maintain access to justice amidst safe distancing measures. These measures have brought convenience to court users and also increased administrative efficiency. We are now looking to enact a permanent framework that will facilitate the use of technology in Court proceedings.

Under the Bill, Courts will be generally empowered to conduct hearings remotely, using appropriate electronic means such as video-link. For example, we may have hearings where one party is physically present before the Judge while the other party appears via video-link. We may also have hearings that take place entirely online.

Regardless of the specific remote hearing arrangements, the Court's overriding duty in each case will be to ensure that proceedings are conducted fairly to all parties. There will also be statutory powers to exclude certain types of matters from being heard remotely, should this prove necessary.

Where witness testimony is concerned, the Courts have existing powers under the Evidence Act to allow witnesses to give evidence remotely in civil matters. The Bill will now amend the Evidence Act to enhance safeguards relating to remote testimony.

For example, matters which the Court must consider before it allows witnesses to give evidence remotely can be prescribed.

For criminal matters, the Courts already have existing powers under the Criminal Procedure Code to allow a witness to give evidence via video-link if the witness is in Singapore. The Bill seeks to expand this in two ways.

First, the Court may now allow an expert witness or a witness of fact to give evidence via video-link even if the witness is not in Singapore. There will, of course, be appropriate safeguards for this.

For example, in the case of a witness of fact, all parties, including the defence, must agree to the witness giving evidence from outside Singapore. Where parties do not agree, the witness will only be allowed to do so if he is unable to give evidence in Singapore and has set out in writing the evidence which he proposes to give to the Court. This provides advance notice to the other parties so that the veracity of the witness' evidence can be adequately investigated.

Second, the Court may allow an accused person to appear or give evidence via video-link from a stipulated location in Singapore, such as in Court or from a prison. The Court may also allow an accused person to appear or give evidence via live video-link from another place in Singapore if all parties agree.

In both cases, the Court must be satisfied that allowing the witness or the accused person to give evidence remotely will be in the interests of justice. The Court must also be satisfied that there are sufficient administrative and technical arrangements in place in order to facilitate the taking of evidence. For proceedings relating to contempt of court, a framework similar to that in the CPC will be introduced.

The Bill will also empower the Courts to decide any matter based on written submissions and documents tendered by the parties, without any oral hearing. This is commonly known as a "paper hearing". A paper hearing can improve efficiency in the conduct of administrative pre-trial matters and can also save time and costs when it comes to the disposal of substantive matters that are document-centric. Appeals can also be heard on paper where appropriate.

Next, let me touch on asynchronous hearings. The Bill will also make clear that parties can address the Court and make their arguments via an "asynchronous" exchange in appropriate cases.

The intention is also to adopt, what we call an “omni-channel” approach. So, lawyers and judges will be able to log in to the e-Litigation system or use the new SG-Courts application to communicate with the Court. They will be able to give information to the Court such as the number and availability of witnesses, or other pre-trial preparatory matters, whilst they are “on the go” and from remote places.

This would also reduce the need for litigants, lawyers and the Court to schedule fixed timeslots when they must all appear together at the same time and at the same location to deal with a matter. This will bring about increased convenience and improved productivity.

Overall, the amendments will empower our Courts to conduct their proceedings in a flexible manner, through the use of technology.

However, technology is but a means to an end. The foremost consideration for the Court in all cases will be to ensure that the proceedings are conducted fairly for the parties, including, and perhaps, in particular, for litigants-in-person, and that justice is done.

In considering what a suitable mode of hearing might be in each case, the Court may consider matters such as whether the case is a civil or criminal one, the complexity of the case and the kind of and the degree of fact-finding that might be required in each case. The stage of proceedings would also be an important consideration. For example, the Court may consider it appropriate to deal with administrative pre-trial matters via an asynchronous hearing. The Court may also decide that certain interlocutory issues can be dealt with on paper but may direct parties to appear in-person when it comes to other matters.

Let me add that if at any point, the Court assesses that a remote hearing would unfairly prejudice any party to the proceedings, then a remote hearing would not be ordered. Litigants-in-person who find it difficult to cope with technology can also request for an in-person hearing and make their reasons known to the judge.

Let me now move on to some other amendments under this Bill.

First, related amendments to the Administration of Justice Protection (AOJP) Act.

Part 2 of the Bill will update the AOJP Act to ensure consistency in the way physical and remote court proceedings are treated. Therefore, unauthorised recordings of court proceedings which are conducted by electronic means, or publication or transmission of such proceedings, will constitute contempt of court. This will safeguard the sanctity of remote hearings in the same manner as physical hearings. In other words, what you could otherwise not have recorded or transmitted in a physical setting in court, you cannot also do in a remote, online court proceeding.

Next, the Bill also introduces amendments to modernise and simplify court terminology. The aim is to make it easier for court users and the general public, who are not legally trained, to understand our laws and Court practices without the jargon. This is part of the overall effort to simplify legal processes and also enhance access to justice.

This Bill will modernise archaic Latin terms – terms which perhaps lawyers are most familiar with – and also technical legal jargon across more than 150 Acts.

Let me now touch on another amendment, which stems from the recommendation of the Civil Justice Commission that parties ought, where possible, to consider resolving disputes amicably. If the Court is not satisfied that parties have made efforts on this front, the Court will be empowered to order parties to attempt amicable resolution before continuing with litigation.

The learned Chief Justice, in a 2019 speech, said that there is a need to challenge the longstanding assumption that disputes are inherently confrontational and therefore, solutions must also be adversarial in nature.

The Chief Justice opined and I agree, that justice must be more than the enforcement of legal rights and obligations. Justice can also be about the maintenance of peace and the promotion of compromise, conciliation and closure between parties.

As a litigator myself for many years, I agree with the Chief Justice’s observation that maintaining relationships is sometimes even more valuable than vindicating one’s legal rights in court.

This amendment will, therefore, give force to that exhortation and will hasten a shift in mindset as to how justice may be achieved by focusing on the common interests of the litigants and reaching common ground through mutual agreement and compromise.

Let me now move on to the next bucket of amendments under the Bill.

Part 4 of the Bill amends the Attorney-General (Additional Functions) Act to provide a statutory framework for the Attorney-General (AG) to intervene in court proceedings to fulfil his duty as guardian of the public interest.

This statutory framework is based on the well-established role of the AG as the guardian of the public interest. The AG has a right and a duty to represent and safeguard the public interest.

The AG does not intervene in court proceedings with a view to advancing the interests of any litigant. Rather, the AG intervenes to represent the public interest and to place before the Court, a non-partisan perspective on public interest issues. This strengthens the integrity of proceedings before the Court, especially in cases where the Court's decision may have ramifications on the wider public good.

Let me touch on the framework briefly.

First, the AG may apply to the Court for permission to intervene in any court proceeding, if he is of the opinion that the proceedings raise a question of public interest and the intervention is necessary in the public interest. To be clear, this will not affect the AG’s right to intervene in court proceedings under any other written law.

If the Court is satisfied that the AG has adequately set out the reasons in support of the application, then the AG is made a party to the proceedings. In deciding whether to grant permission, the Court does not at that stage enquire into the merits of the AG’s application or opinion.

An existing party to the proceedings may still apply thereafter to set aside the intervention on the basis that this would be in the interests of justice. But pending the resolution of the setting aside application, the AG remains a party to the proceedings. This ensures that proceedings do not come to a standstill once an application to set aside is made.

The Court has the power to order costs for or against the AG, as it thinks fit.

Overall, the amendments in the framework that I have just outlined will provide greater clarity to the process for the AG to intervene in court proceedings and also minimise uncertainty and satellite litigation.

Next, let me touch on Part 5 of the Bill which deals with freestanding interim relief. This Part amends the Civil Law Act to enable the General Division of the High Court to grant interim relief in aid of foreign court proceedings, even if there are no substantive proceedings in Singapore. This is commonly known as a "freestanding interim relief".

Under these amendments, the General Division may grant any type of interim relief which it has the power to grant, in proceedings within its own jurisdiction. In other words, the Court is circumscribed by the power it already has within its jurisdiction to grant in those proceedings. For example, a Mareva injunction, which is quite typical, or a search order or an Anton Piller order. However, warrants for the arrest of property and provision for obtaining evidence are excluded.

The amendments are consistent with the approach in the UK and Hong Kong, and will support our efforts to promote Singapore as a leading international dispute resolution hub.

Mr Deputy Speaker, let me now touch on four other proposals quickly under the Bill, which collectively aim to harmonise and enhance the court process.

First, on summary dismissal. At present, the Court of Appeal and the Appellate Division have powers to summarily dismiss unmeritorious appeals. The Bill will introduce amendments to empower the General Division, the State Courts and the Family Courts to also summarily dismiss appeals that arise from the lower Courts, or from a decision of the Registrar. To avoid doubt, the Courts have the ability to exercise their powers of summary dismissal without hearing oral arguments.

The summary dismissal powers are narrowly scoped and are intended to manage frivolous appeals that are a drain on judicial resources.

We have also provided that the Court must consider representations made by the appellant and must also give the appellant a reasonable opportunity to show cause, before exercising its summary dismissal powers.

Sir, at this stage, I would like to highlight that my Ministry will be moving a Notice of Amendment during the Committee Stage to address two other issues relating to summary dismissal.

First, to make drafting changes and align the phrasing of the summary dismissal provision for the Family Court at clause 25 of the Bill with the equivalent provisions that apply to the General Division and to the State Courts. These provisions are intended to have the same effect.

Second, to ensure that the Court has the power to summarily dismiss certain unmeritorious criminal applications on its own motion. For example, these could be applications brought without any sufficient ground or where in a particular case where the Court has no jurisdiction. This power will apply to criminal matters, such as an application for criminal revision or a criminal motion, where the existing summary dismissal provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code do not currently apply.

Next, Agreements not to Appeal. We will align the position across all the Courts for Agreements not to Appeal by introducing a clear and simple framework that the parties may use to restrict their right of appeal.

This already exists to some extent in the State Courts Act and the Family Justice Act today.

Under these amendments, Agreements not to Appeal must be in writing and signed by or on behalf of all parties. This ensures that parties' attention is drawn to the implications of their agreement and minimises ensuing satellite litigation over whether there was in fact an agreement or not.

Third, flexibility in the size of the coram. Currently, proceedings in the General Division are usually disposed of by a single Judge. Clause 53 of the Bill introduces amendments to allow the Chief Justice to convene a coram of three or more Judges to hear any civil or criminal matter before the General Division, if he considers appropriate. This may be the case where, for example, there are novel or important questions affecting the public interest, which could benefit from the collective wisdom and insight of a larger coram.

Let me now touch on one final amendment in this Bill.

Proceedings under the Arbitration Act and International Arbitration Act. Today, proceedings under the current Arbitration and the International Arbitration Act, are heard in open court by default, unless a party applies for the matter to be heard otherwise than in open court, in camera, for instance.

We have considered feedback from various stakeholders, practitioners, that as a matter of practice, it will be common for parties involved in proceedings, involving arbitration, such as in those two Acts, to make applications, for the matter to be heard in private. Given that these applications relate to arbitrations, such applications are often allowed by the Court.

Hence, to better reflect the prevailing practice and streamline the process for parties, clauses 8 and 30 of the Bill will amend the Arbitration Act and the International Arbitration Act respectively, to provide that proceedings under these Acts are to be heard in private by default, unless the Court orders that the proceedings be heard in open court.

This is in line with the overall confidential nature of such arbitral proceedings and will result in cost and time savings for parties who now do not have to apply for such proceedings to be heard in private.

Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, our Courts play a critical role in upholding the rule of law, through the fair administration of justice in Singapore.

This Bill is the culmination of years of effort to re-design our Court system to enable it to be future-ready and well-equipped to meet the evolving needs of society. The Bill also implements the recommendations of the Civil Justice Commission and the Civil Justice Review Committee.

I would like to end by thanking the Judiciary, members of the Bar and all stakeholders who have worked with MinLaw, on shaping the future of the legal system. Sir, I beg to move.

Question proposed.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Pritam Singh.

7.29 pm

Mr Pritam Singh (Aljunied): Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, the Courts (Civil and Criminal Justice) Reform Bill proposes amendments to several statutes. The Workers' Party supports the Bill and the majority of the proposed amendments such as the ones related to supporting the digital transformation of the Judiciary, the simplification of court terminology, civil justice reforms and the empowerment of the High Court to grant interim relief in aid of foreign court proceedings.

In addition to these, however, there are proposed amendments to the Attorney-General (Additional Functions) Act.

I seek clarification on Part 4 of the proposed Bill. In MinLaw's factsheet on the technical amendments to this Bill, the objective is to, "clarify the scope of the Attorney-General's right to intervene". I have some questions on this part, as I alluded to earlier.

I will first summarise the proposed amendments in Part 4, then discuss the current position in Singapore law and finally, briefly compare Singapore's position with those and other common law countries.

First, the proposed amendments.

The Bill proposes a statutory framework for the Attorney-General, or AG, to intervene in proceedings where the AG is of the opinion that the question of public interest has arisen and the AG is of the opinion that it is necessary to place information or make submissions before the Court.

A critical element of the proposed amendments is that the Court is not to examine the merits of the AG's grounds for intervention – essentially, the public interest grounds – before granting permission. The Court is only to look at whether the grounds for intervention are adequately set out with a supporting affidavit.

So, although the proposed amendment say that the AG must apply for permission to intervene, in reality, there would be very little room for the Court to deny certain application.

If the existing parties to the proceedings disagree with the AG's intervention, the proposed amendments place the onus on those existing parties to apply to set aside the permission to intervene after it has been granted to the AG. But while the Court may consider matters such as the stage the proceedings have reached, prejudice to the parties, yet again, the Court cannot examine the merits of the AG's grounds as to the public interest the AG is protecting.

This onus placed on parties reverses the usual order of things in Court and the common law position on the AG's right to intervene where it is the party who wants something who should apply for it and justify it.

The changes proposed by this Bill are extended to all civil proceedings. The proposed clause 4A(3) allows the AG to intervene in any proceedings and I emphasise the word "any". They are not criminal proceedings and are proceedings to which the AG is not a party or representing any party.

Clause 4A(4) spells out that the AG may intervene in proceedings such as judicial reviews, any civil proceedings, family proceedings or quasi-criminal proceedings appeals and proceedings before Judges under the Legal Profession Act and the Medical Registration Act, although clause 4A(4) is careful to point out that this list does not limit subsection 3, which as I have said, allows intervention in any proceedings.

Mr Deputy Speaker, the Workers' Party has no issue with the established position that it is the AG who is the guardian of the public interest in matters where there is a public interest component to a civil dispute or criminal matter.

However, in a private law dispute, the Bill before us today would allow the AG to intervene, with the Courts having no scope to assess the merits of the AG's submission as to what public interest the AG is protecting and in the event an application is made, to set aside the order granting permission for the AG to intervene.

Can the Minister confirm that these amendments effectively represent a significant shift or a shift to the common law position on the AG's right to intervene?

There is already a process under common law for the AG to apply to intervene and for the Courts to consider the merits of the AG's application. It is a well-established procedure and there is no case law in Singapore to suggest that the AG is fettered from intervening in the public interest. Quite simply, the current intervention process under common law appears to work well.

Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, to give this House the context of the changes, let me talk about the AG's interventions under current law and the AG's interventions in other common law jurisdictions.

In Singapore, the AG may currently intervene through the authority of legislation or via common law.

First, the AG has the right to intervene where a statutory right is given. For example, section 46 of the Charities Act entitles the AG to be heard in appeals to the High Court against decisions of the Commissioner of Charities. Other statutes that give the AG the right to intervene in specific situations are the Industrial Relations Act and the Women's Charter.

Second, the AG may also intervene at common law, as I intimated earlier. This process can be seen in action in the cases of Deepak Sharma v Law Society of Singapore and ARW v Comptroller of Income Tax, both of which are referred to in the Explanatory Statement.

In the ARW case, the High Court Judge stated in his judgment in 2017 that an intervener must establish his standing. He said that in public law matters, the standing of the AG to intervene is not usually in question but that in a civil suit based on private law rights, the AG's role may not be immediately apparent and must be properly established.

From what the Judge said, it does seem clear that, conceptually, at least, a distinction is currently made between matters of public law and private law.

In matters of private law such as in Deepak Sharma and ARW, the AG currently has to justify his application to intervene and the Court decides on the merit of the application.

The Government now seeks to replace the Court's function of deciding on the merits of an application to intervene with the proposed amendments to the Attorney-General (Additional Functions) Act that are before the House.

Let me move on to the positions in a few other common law countries.

In Australia, at common law, the AG has the right to intervene in cases affecting the prerogatives of the Crown. This right has been extended by statute to cases involving, for example, the interpretation of the Constitution and the Migration Act. For other types of cases, the Australian AG can seek leave from the court to intervene.

In New Zealand, the position is similar. The AG has the right to intervene in proceedings affecting the Crown's rights, property or profits. Otherwise, the AG must seek leave from the court to intervene in other cases.

In Canada, the AG can intervene in constitutional matters without obtaining leave but on non-constitutional matters, the AG must apply for leave.

These positions are broadly similar to Singapore's current position. Distinction is drawn between public law cases and private law cases, even those private law cases that may involve the public interest.

Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, the Government needs to clarify the basis of the proposed amendments in part four, both because there is already a common law procedure in place and the AG's right to intervene on matters of public and even private law has not been questioned by the judiciary.

More specifically, I would like to ask the Minister the following questions.

Number one: what triggered the proposed amendments? Have there been civil cases in Singapore recently that the Government wishes it could have intervened in without having the Court examine the merits of the grounds for the Attorney-General's opinion as to the public interest under the proposed amendments?

Number two: are there possible cases which have not occurred in the past, which the Government is preparing for as a contingency? And if so, what are these possible scenarios?

More generally and as an extension of the above two questions: are there new areas of public interest that have hitherto not come up, which the Government is trying to protect?

Number four: how actively is the AG looking to be in applying these proposed amendments.

Finally, the answers to the above questions do not adequately address this: why does the current procedure, which is well accepted and widely practised in common law countries, have to be changed?

Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Murali Pillai.

7.37 pm

Mr Murali Pillai (Bukit Batok): Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, I rise in support of the general aims of the Bill which, inter alia, are to support the digital transformation of the Courts and to enable the Attorney-General to safeguard public interest in Civil Court proceedings.

On the first point, one silver lining to the COVID-19 pandemic is that it has hastened the digital transformation of the administration of justice in Singapore.

Thanks to the efforts of MinLaw, led by the hon Minister Edwin Tong, which launched the Legal Industry Technology and Innovation Roadmap in October 2020, law firms are supported in their endeavour to develop legal tech solutions, manage and mitigate risks that come with increasing digitalisation and benefit from the eCourt model, which has enhanced functions such as system integration, speech to text technology and leverages on AI.

The Courts transformed quickly to regain lost ground in terms of lost hearing days arising from the circuit breaker in April and May last year when it pivoted to remote hearings.

I would like to draw from my own experience over the past year. I have attended numerous virtual Court hearings and online dispute resolutions as counsel.

The productivity gains and cost savings arising from the usage of digital platforms are significant and acknowledged by all Court users. Hearings nowadays are also more focused in that the parties would have made full written submissions and the Courts, at all levels, would generally take the lead in asking pointed questions of counsel before making decisions.

All these translates to efficiencies in the administration of justice and provides litigants with higher value.

For these reasons, I fully support the move to enact a permanent framework that will empower the Court to conduct remote hearings or even paper hearings. This will ensure that these hard-won costs savings and productivity gains will endure beyond the pandemic.

One concern I have though is how to ensure that litigants-in-persons (LIPs) who may not be familiar with or do not have access to video conferencing technology or have concerns about expressing themselves in writing are not disadvantaged by remote or paper hearings.

The hon Chief Justice in his address in the Opening of the Legal Year this year sounded a cautionary note on the impact of technology on such persons. He said, "As we embrace and explore the greater use of technology, we must remain keenly sensitive to the needs of Court users who are less technologically equipped or inclined and ensure that technology is an enabler rather than an impediment."

In light of the Chief Justice's observations, may I please ask what measures will be put in place to help LIPs so that the interests of justice would be met?

The hon Minister did mention that the raison d'etre of Court proceedings would be to ensure fairness. Clearly, at one level, the remote hearing requirement can be waived for LIPs. But I am just wondering whether there could be avenues for LIPs to learn how to have access to remote hearings, how to use the remote hearing functions or even draft submissions for paper hearings.

Another associated question I have is with respect to the intention to allow accused persons to appear and give evidence remotely from prisons.

Again, conceptually, I have no issue. May I ask, however, how is it being proposed in such situations where they would continue to have access to their lawyers during these proceedings? How is it being proposed that conversations between the accused persons in prisons and their counsel joining in from another location in the course of remote proceedings will be kept strictly privileged and confidential?

I now move to my second point on the matter of the AG's right to intervene in Civil Court proceedings.

I note that the provisions dealing with the right is premised on the standing of the AG as a guardian of public interest under common law. This standing does not stem from the duties of the Attorney-General as set out in article 35 of the Constitution.

I am aware that the AG's standing as the guardian has been recognised by the Court of Appeal on several occasions. Notwithstanding that, it seems to me desirable that the AG' role as the guardian of public interest should be codified in our Constitution.

[Mr Speaker in the Chair]

As acknowledged by the Court of Appeal, the AG's office is a high constitutional office equal in status to the judiciary. His power over prosecution stems from a constitutional grant under article 35(8) of the Constitution. His role as the Government's legal adviser is also constitutionally entrenched.

It is also important to entrench his role as the guardian of public interest so that whatever steps he may take to safeguard public interest in civil proceedings is derived from an exercise of a power that is not only independent but constitutionally protected. In this way, his power cannot be trumped by ordinary legislation.

My other questions are on the mechanics of the two-step procedure that is being contemplated when the Attorney-General applies to intervene.

In this regard, I heard the hon Leader of the Opposition mention that the power of intervention is based on common law. Based on my understanding, that is not the case. Under common law, the AG's position as the guardian of public interest is established. But as far as the powers of intervention are concerned, they are provided for under the rules of the Court and in particular, Order 15.

Sir, I note that at the first instance, the AG here is proposed to be permitted to apply to the Court to intervene without notice to other parties. In the event the Court allows the AG's application, then at the second instance, parties may apply to set aside the intervention.

May I please ask when the AG applies at the first instance, does he have a duty of full and frank disclosure?

As the hon Minister who spent a lot of time in private practice would be aware, such responsibility is usually assumed by litigants making Court applications without notice and to some extent, it may address some of the concerns expressed by the hon Leader of the Opposition as well.

On the twin threshold questions of (a) whether a question of public interest has arisen and (b) whether it is necessary in the public interest for the AG to intervene, I seek clarification as to what is meant by the words "has arisen".

Sometimes, public interest issues may be not part of the key issues as framed by the private parties to the proceedings.

There could also be a situation, as was discussed in the Court of Appeal case of ARW v Comptroller of Income Tax, where the core decision of the Court may not trigger a public interest issue although the issue may have been discussed but not perhaps being germane for the disposal of the case.

My next question is whether it is intended that when a Court decides that it is necessary for the AG to intervene, it would still have a discretion to consider all factors which are relevant to the balance of justice in the particular case, before it makes its decision whether or not to allow the intervention.

This is the power that is provided for with the Courts under the Rules of Court when hearing the usual joinder applications. I seek the hon Minister's clarification as to whether it is intended that the same approach will apply to the AG. And in this regard, I will say that it is not unusual for AGs to apply to intervene in civil proceedings because there could be situations where, for example, in my own experience, documents may be sought and these documents may be something that is subject to state immunity. And in those circumstances, in safeguarding public interests, sometimes, the AG may wish to intervene. So, from my own experience, it is not unusual.

Sir, I would like to conclude now.

My two points may appear separate, but they are in fact, intertwined. The first relates to a key moral imperative, that in the administration of justice, the means of administration must not disadvantage any group. This speaks to the principle of fairness as put by the hon Minister. My second point is also a moral imperative, that in the administration of justice, the source of power for the guardian of public interest, the hon AG, must derive, not just from common law, but from the highest law of the land, our Constitution. This speaks to the need for legitimacy. I welcome the hon Minister's views on my suggestions. With that, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Louis Ng.

7.47 pm

Mr Louis Ng Kok Kwang (Nee Soon): Sir, this Bill will support the digitalisation of proceedings and signal a focus on amicable dispute resolution, among other changes.

The Courts have shown remarkable resilience in this pandemic, adapting to ensure that the judicial system remains open to users and that justice is both done and seen to be done. I thank the Registry and judicial officers who have worked tirelessly to ensure the continuity and integrity of judicial processes.

I have three points of clarification to make.

First, I seek clarification on the Court's new power to order parties to attempt amicable resolution in civil proceedings.

Amicable resolution, such as negotiation and mediation, work best when parties participate in good faith. Good intentions are critical. This point is underscored in the Rules of the Court. The Rules allow the Court to consider how parties acted during their attempts at alternative dispute-resolution when making its decision on costs orders.

However, with the new paragraph 23 of the First Schedule of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, the Court can now order parties to attempt an amicable resolution. In such cases, the process is no longer voluntary and it raises four sets of questions about effectiveness and implementation.

One, has the Ministry studied what cases are amenable to amicable resolution? Clarity on such situations will help the Court decide on what circumstances to order an attempt at an amicable resolution.

Two, what constitutes an attempt at amicable resolution? Will there be clear requirements to verify such attempts? For instance, it may be useful to require that parties attempting mediation go through an accredited mediator.

Three, how will the Court ensure that parties participate with good faith in attempts at amicable resolution? I can imagine a bad-faith party relying on the Court's order of amicable resolution as a strategic manoeuvre by parties to prolong litigation and financially wear down opponents.

Four, will there be consequences of non-compliance with such an order?

The Minister's answers to these questions will help ensure that Court orders for amicable resolution do not get undermined by bad-faith actors.

My second clarification is on the new section 79, which gives legal immunity to the Court registrars and Court-appointed mediators for actions that they take as part of mediation or alternative dispute resolution for the Supreme Court. The immunity is limited to actions done in good faith and without any fraud or wilful misconduct.

This appears to mirror section 68(4) of the State Courts Act, which provides similar protections for judicial officers and Court-appointed mediators for alternative dispute resolution in the State Courts.

Alternative resolution processes, such as mediation and conciliation require different skills from hearing a case as an adjudicator. These specialised skills are honed by professional mediators and conciliators over years of training and experience. For this reason, judicial officers in the State Courts are required to undergo basic training in mediation.

With the extension of immunity to officers in the Supreme Court, will the Registrar, Deputy Registrars and Assistant Registrars be required to undergo training in mediation and other alternative resolution processes?

Will there be a minimum requirement that officers and mediators at both State Courts and Supreme Court must meet?

High quality training will ensure that alternative resolution is a realistic and cost-effective alternative to litigation. Accreditation is offered by the Singapore Mediation Centre, Singapore International Mediation Institute and International Mediation Institute, just to name a few.

In addition, who will be the Court-appointed mediators in the Supreme Court? Are there plans to set up an equivalent of the State Courts' Court Dispute Resolution Cluster in the Supreme Court?

How will the Ministry also support the growth of the private mediation service providers? Private mediation service providers stimulate our mediation sector with innovation and competition. With the expanded reliance on mediation and similar processes in Singapore, we should integrate and regulate such private providers carefully.

My third and final point is a proposal. Today's Bill amends the law to allow various proceedings at the State Court and Supreme Court to be heard by a live video link. This is a welcomed move that mirrors changes which have already taken place on the ground due to COVID-19.

However, with more proceedings taking place by live video link, there is also greater risk of issues which may undermine the security and integrity of Court proceedings. These include, for instance, unauthorised recording of Court proceedings, witness coaching or poor Internet connection affecting the quality of evidence presented to Court.

Will the Court consider implementing a protocol for proceedings conducted by way of a live video link to standardise the way video link hearings are conducted? Such protocol should address issues from the testing of the video link to the arrangements that should be in place for witnesses to give evidence remotely.

Sir, notwithstanding these points, I stand in support of the Bill.

7.52 pm

Dr Shahira Abdullah (Nominated Member): Mr Speaker, Sir, the Courts (Civil and Criminal Justice) Reform Bill aims to improve the accessibility of legal services for everyone. On the whole, I do support the Bill. However, I would like to bring up certain concerns and suggestions which I hope can be addressed in this debate.

Firstly, under paragraph 4, the amendments that will be made to section 5 is broader in scope than the existing contempt provisions for unauthorised audio or visual recordings. Anyone who makes such recordings, even if they were not the source of the original recording or was present in Court at the time, would be penalised. If this is the intention of the legislature, would educational campaigns be held to notify the general public of this substantial change in contempt laws?

Could I also clarify if lawyers and litigants-in-persons will also be prohibited from making their own non-official audio transcripts of court proceedings, trials and hearings? Such recordings can facilitate understanding for proceedings that may take several days and are information intensive.

Moreover, I would also like to welcome the amendments introduced under paragraph 6 through the new section 26A. The new amendments will allow for the presentation of evidence via video or television links. Expert witnesses from other countries can now provide testimony through live video link without having to come to Singapore. This will make litigation not only more efficient but cost-effective as well. Additionally, in the midst of a pandemic, this is a necessary amendment to navigate the new realities of border closures.

Secondly, I applaud the move to simplify court terminology to make our laws more accessible and understandable to the general public. Lay people would be unfamiliar with legal phrases that are often not used in everyday life. This move will improve the accessibility of legal due process for in-person litigants.

That said, I would also like to highlight some concerns I have. There are inconsistencies in the terminology used for the civil and criminal courts and for the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC). Moreover, these new terms do not apply to the family division of the High Court, or Family Court, or a youth court. This inconsistency may be confusing for both laypersons and lawyers and may cause both legal practitioners and laypersons to talk at cross purposes given that similar sounding words have different meanings.

Also, some of the terms considered archaic and to be removed by the SICC are now used as the new simplified expressions for the civil and criminal courts. This anomaly suggests a lack of agreement by the Courts and Legislature over whether such terms are archaic or not.

Lastly, paragraph 10 introduces amendments to the Attorney-General (Additional Functions) Act, which enable the AG to intervene in any proceedings, even those that are not criminal proceedings, to which the AG is neither a party nor representing a party and retrospectively, in the public interest. These include proceedings that are often personal and private in nature. Then these powers are extensive.

May I ask what prompted this change? May I also clarify when it would be of public interest for the AG to interfere with the legal process of matters that do not concern the AG's office? For example, when would an element of public interest arise in issues of civil or family proceedings? Could the Minister also provide us with the types of scenarios contemplated that would require the exercise of the AG's new powers?

The above queries are rooted in real-world concerns about the implications of the AG's new powers for parties to proceedings. For example, under the new section 4A(9), once the AG is granted permission by the Courts to intervene in any proceedings, he is deemed a party to the proceedings and inter alia, has the same right of appeal in the proceedings. Who will bear the burden of cost of the appeal if neither original party to the proceedings had sought for or wanted the appeal?

Also, would the Minister be concerned about the chilling effect of these new powers on the rule of law and litigants given that, it is possible under the new laws, for almost every proceeding now to have an element of public interest?

Mr Speaker, Sir, all in all, I believe the amendments will allow the Courts to carry out their functions more effectively and therefore, I support the Bill.

7.57 pm

Mr Desmond Choo (Tampines): Mr Speaker, Sir, I rise in support of the Bill. The cornerstone of our legal system has always been access to justice for all. In pursuit of this aim, the judicial system must be constantly reviewed to remain relevant, robust and efficient.

Digital transformation and a citizenry increasingly aware of its legal rights necessitate our legal system to evolve accordingly. The key amendments in this Bill are in the right direction to meet these evolving trends.

I will highlight three key areas of the amendments along with a few clarifications.

First, I applaud the Ministry's efforts in advancing access to justice for all. Over the years, the Ministry has simplified complex Court processes and improved accessibility to such information. For example, the Insolvency Office's website offers a comprehensive, one-stop suite of information for bankruptcy applications. The information provided on the website is reader-friendly and tailored for laypersons.

I fully support the Ministry's move to simplify court terminology within the amendments. An example of such simplification is changing the expression of "subpoena" to "an order to attend court". The simplification of legal terminologies is similar to those undertaken in jurisdictions, such as Britain and Canada. Academics have also advocated for such changes. Complex legal terminology in statutes can exclude the layperson from fully exercising their right of self-representation as they are less able to be cognisant of their legal rights. As we move towards a more accessible judicial system for litigants-in-persons, we must work towards continually revising our laws to ensure that they are easily understandable by an average layperson.

Secondly, the digital transformation wave has not spared the judicial system. COVID-19 has accelerated the use of technology and the Courts are now better prepared to leverage technology in legal proceedings. Perhaps, the most important change is that of the advent of remote hearings.

While remote hearings were practically unheard of in the justice system before the pandemic, it is now a ubiquitous feature in various jurisdictions. The amendments formally legislate the practice of remote hearings. This allows the judicial system greater flexibility to dispose of matters efficiently.

Evidence may also be given via electronic means, such as live video and television links. This is beneficial for both the Court and litigants. For example, obtaining testimonies from expert witnesses, especially those of experts located out of Singapore, can be extremely costly. The admission of evidence via video links can significantly reduce the costs of calling upon experts.

Furthermore, with crimes and civil matters becoming increasingly borderless, witnesses may sometimes be located overseas. The amendments will similarly ensure that matters at hand can be disposed of expediently and reduces costs on litigants in bringing witnesses to Singapore.

Notwithstanding the benefits leveraging technology brings to the judicial system, I have one area of concern. As with all forms of technology, the benefits of it are followed by risks of misuse. My concern lies within the rising prevalence of Deepfake Artificial Intelligence. Deepfakes are created using artificial intelligence whereby an existing image or video is manipulated and replaced with someone else's face. While deepfakes have been primarily contained to the manipulation of pre-recorded images and videos, there has been new software, such as Avatarify. Unlike traditional deepfake software, it enables users to impose anyone else's face on their own in real-time within applications, such as Zoom.

I worry that such software will become increasingly sophisticated with time. This increases the likelihood of manipulation during remote hearings where witnesses, or even parties, may be impersonated. It is thus imperative to ensure the highest level of technical standards in conducting such processes to preserve the integrity of the judicial system.

Considering the rapidly evolving forms of such disruptive technologies, how robust are the current technical safeguards within our judicial system in countering such threats? How can video links be protected such that vulnerable persons’ identities would not be revealed via hacking?

Lastly, on the Court’s power to order parties to attempt to resolve disputes by amicable resolution under the proposed section 23 in the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, or SCJA. Alternative dispute resolution, or ADR, mechanisms are much more cost-effective in resolving disputes, compared to litigation. Parties can, more often than not, reach an amicable settlement without the need to commence litigious proceedings. It also prevents Singapore from becoming increasingly litigious.

However, I would like to clarify if the Court should consider the intention of parties in exercising its powers to order parties to attempt to resolve disputes by amicable resolution. There may be situations where one or both parties do not want to participate in these ADRs in good faith. In such circumstances, ordering parties to do so might be counter-productive.

Sir, despite Singapore being consistently ranked highly in the WJP’s Rule of Law Index, we must continue to build on our efforts thus far. At its core, the Bill modernises the form of our judicial system, while retaining its substance and core objective: accessibility to justice for all. I stand in support of the Bill which ensures our judicial system remains highly receptive to the needs of its users.

8.03 pm

Mr Speaker: Deputy Leader. Adjournment of Debate.

Resumption of Debate on Question [13 September 2021], "That the Bill be now read a Second time." – [Minister for Law].

Question again proposed.

Mdm Deputy Speaker: Ms Hany Soh.

Ms Hany Soh (Marsiling-Yew Tee): Thank you, Mdm Deputy Speaker. I would, first, like to declare that I am a practising lawyer.

As per the hon Justice Lee Seiu Kin in his opening speech at the launch of the Law Society’s Technology Roadshow in 2017, he shared his view that the world today is faced with "more frequent and unpredictable disruptions", and "Technology holds the promise of greater productivity and effectiveness. We must seize the opportunity to leverage this to higher quality legal services and cost savings for law firms, and ultimately, for the clients and society at large.” I agree wholeheartedly with his Honour.

One of the major components of this Courts Reform Bill is set to empower the Courts to conduct proceedings more flexibly by leveraging on the use of technology.

My speech today will, therefore, focus on the potential impact of this digital transformation and explore possible ways to utilise this transformation to reduce the costs of litigation and enhance convenience for Court users.

Over the past few years, we have begun to see a gradual modernisation of the legal industry: from law firms going paperless with the adoption of cloud-based data management systems to smaller set-up firms moving away from traditional law firm premises and towards contemporary co-working spaces, with shared meeting rooms and lounges.

The COVID-19 pandemic has undoubtedly accelerated the pace of digital transformation. By now, most of the workforce, including lawyers, have become familiar with the concept of working from home in compliance with safe distancing measures. Many client interviews as well as Court hearings are now conducted virtually, which has allowed more flexibility for lawyers in terms of their daily working schedules while managing other personal obligations.

One of my fellow members of the Bar shared with me that she had initially thought of giving up breastfeeding her baby after returning to work from maternity leave, but she has since been able to continue doing so due to the work-from-home arrangement. Another of my peers also remarked that remote working has provided him with more opportunities to spend more quality time and attend to the needs of his aged parents.

This reform Bill reaffirms remote working as part of the new norm. But whilst the adoption of newer technology to conduct legal matters is the way forward, it is prudent to take heed of the downsides that come along with it as well, such as the loss of in-person communication.

Before the start of the pandemic, it was not uncommon for lawyers to bump into our peers in places such as the Court’s Bar Room or the waiting area outside the Courts’ Pre-Trial Conference chambers. For years, these ad hoc meetings have helped to foster the productive discussions concerning the day’s pressing agendas, or aid in the gathering of fresh perspectives on a particular subject. It has also served as an informal way of maintaining connections amongst those in the legal industry.

In contrast, most correspondence these days occurs online via video-link meetings and emails, and even the actual Court hearings are isolated virtual spaces where lawyers are each segregated into their own waiting areas, unable to see or hear those who may be waiting for their own hearings to proceed.

Aside from the lack of social interaction brought about by this new norm, the rigidness of the virtual hearings has their shortcomings.

The currently used video-link platform tends to begin its sessions without prior warning and regard for the attendee’s presence, which means that lawyers, aside from signing in for their session, do not have knowledge of the current status of the Courts, unless otherwise informed by the Court on when their hearing is likely to begin.

[Mr Speaker in the Chair]

Worse still, in the event of delays – which may sometimes last for longer than 30 minutes at a time – the litigant-in-person or lawyer is forced to sit and wait in front of their computer at all times, unable to visit the restroom or make proper use of the downtime for other obligations.

To address these issues, I understand from Minister’s earlier speech that features on the existing E-Litigation system will be further improvised. In this regard, I would like to propose whether the Ministry can facilitate, after taking into account the feedback of users from the Courts as well as members of the Bar, to tap on the expertise of GovtTech in improving the features of the E-Litigation system or creating a new virtual Court platform that is equipped with an integrated chat function and a dynamic queue system.

With these features, one would be able to know when their case is slated to be heard upon logging in. With an SMS alert system for the queue, users can manage their waiting time more effectively and efficiently. A private message function will enable users to communicate with the Court’s admin clerk on the possibility of jumping the queue due to the need to be present for another Court matter soon.

The chat function would also allow the ability to see other counsel who may be online at the same time and to chat or start a video call with them. This would return some measure of communication between lawyers whereby counsel can take the opportunity while waiting, to explore settlement terms.

Although most hearings are now online affairs that require the relevant parties to attend in separate locations, many clients still prefer to do so at their lawyers’ office premises. This is common, particularly for the mediation sessions conducted by the Family Justice Courts, where the client still prefers the physical presence and in-person support from their lawyers to ease their anxieties.

This arrangement is typically not a problem for medium or large-sized firms, as they have multiple meeting rooms with adequate space at their office to accommodate the lawyer and their client. For smaller law firms, however, the realities of limited work spaces and meeting rooms represent a significant challenge in addressing similar needs for their clients.

In light of the disadvantages faced by lawyers practising in sole proprietorships or small partnerships, I would like to ask if the Ministry can look into offering some assistance schemes that enable the affected law firms to purchase the necessary equipment to attend such virtual hearings and whether the Courts can provide more spaces that will allow small law firm practitioners to communicate with their clients in person whilst adhering to safe distancing measures.

Over the years, I understand that the Government, along with the Law Society of Singapore, has come up with several initiatives, such as the "Tech-celerate for Law", being subsidy assistance schemes that aim to help defray costs for law practices, particularly smaller firms, and enable them to remain competitive.

However, these schemes have so far focused mainly on helping law firms to obtain, what I would call, the “software”, such as online data management, databases and establishing online presence through marketing portals. In this context, would the Ministry be looking into more ways to help these smaller law firms gain access to the equipment or “hardware” with the aid of these same schemes, so that they can fully transition into the digital era without transferring the cost of such implementation on their clients? In Mandarin please.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] To many, litigation is a costly and time-consuming process. I support the recommendations made in this reform Bill, such as simplifying Court terminology across our statute books, to ensure that our laws are accessible to the public and easy to understand; as well as leveraging on technology for Court process with a view to reducing the costs of litigation. Parties that can benefit from the reform include those SMEs whose financial situation is affected by the pandemic; they can leverage on digital platforms to save time and money to resolve disputes.

Apart from that, I hope the Ministry can further consider reviewing and reducing the Court filing and hearing fees. These improvements will be very helpful for those litigants who have financial difficulties, and victims who are wrongly accused.

(In English): Mr Speaker, it is my opinion that in order to enhance access to justice, the relevant stakeholders will have to look into and work on the three "hows".

Firstly, how we can make the law easier to understand for a layperson; secondly, how we can simplify the Court process to avoid unnecessary wastage of time and resources; and finally, how to achieve cost efficiency by acting on the first two points.

But the last point is, more often than not, the primary concern, because affordability of the costs to be incurred is often the paramount consideration for litigants when contemplating whether or not to pursue a matter further in the interest of justice.

I am hopeful that the implementations to be rolled out subsequent to the passing of this Courts Reform Bill aims to address these points. I stand in support of Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Sharael Taha.

12.45 pm

Mr Sharael Taha (Pasir Ris-Punggol): Thank you, Mr Speaker, Sir. The amendments will enable legal proceedings to be more accessible to everyone by simplifying the language used in Court and support our overall digital transformation plans, keeping our legal system efficient and ready to meet the evolving needs of society in the future. I am in support of these amendments. However, I would like to raise three clarifications.

Firstly, simplification of words used in Court must not compromise on common understanding of terms; secondly, there are potential implications of simpler language and accessibility of the legal system; and, finally, clarity on when remote hearings are allowed should be considered.

Firstly, while it is laudable that we want legal proceedings to be more accessible to the public, we must ensure that words, especially new words used, should be properly defined. There should be a clear definition of terms such that all those involved in the proceedings are clear of their meanings such that it is not open to different interpretations and, subsequently, become a point of contention in the proceedings.

An illustration is the use of the word "claimant" instead of "plaintiff". The word "claimant" is used in many contexts, such as a claimant in insurance claims or, in the US, a claimant for welfare or tax benefits. "Plaintiff" is more widely used in the Courts. It may be the case where it is just not possible to simplify legal terminologies and to change for the sake of accessibility may prove to be detrimental to the due process of law.

Secondly, with easier access to the Courts and better understanding of legal terms and proceedings, laypersons may seek to defend themselves in Court. Unless the person is well-read in Singapore law and familiar with due legal processes, the desire to defend oneself in Court may, ultimately, prove detrimental.

In the recent case of the individual publicly known as the "MBS badge lady”, the defendant's initial attempt to represent herself in Court was met with various challenges. Subsequently, her family had to step in, engaging a lawyer to finally represent her in Court.

While we want our legal system to be more accessible, we should also be careful not to develop the mindset of engaging legal representation only after attempts at self-representation had resulted in getting themselves into a deeper legal predicament.

Another cause for concern is the public's misunderstanding of our legal system. This is in light of our exposure to the American legal system and, lately, even the Korean legal system, from popular media.

Obviously, there are differences between our legal systems. However, members of the public sometimes misunderstand that and expect our legal proceedings to be similar. The Miranda warning, for example, is used in the American system, where a citizen's right to remain silent is read to the person being arrested. However, in our legal system, remaining silent could draw adverse inferences.

Importantly, our changes should be recognised internationally as we are well accepted as a leading global dispute resolution hub. We cannot afford to make changes at the expense of the rest of the world's legal fraternity not understanding us. We must avoid changes that make our legal system overly localised as we are too small a country to change the norms and nomenclature of the international legal fraternity.

Lastly, while we understand the need to have remote Court hearings and sentencing during the pandemic, we must be very clear, during normal circumstances, as to when we could allow remote hearings.

We cannot discount the fact that in some cases, it is important for the judge to be able to physically see the plaintiff or defendant and even witnesses, as it allows the judge to assess their demeanour and to see if the person is being prompted to respond. All these may have an impact on the eventual sentencing and, hence, should not be taken lightly.

Hence, we must be very clear as to when we can utilise remote Court hearings and not compromise the legal process for the sake of conveniences afforded by the use of technology.

We must also be mindful to not be perceived as being too cold or inhumane when employing remote hearings. As an example, the remote sentencing of Punithan Genasan where he was handed the death penalty via Zoom in May 2020 was understandable at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, in normal circumstances, it may seem very detached and procedural for capital punishment to be meted out via Zoom.

Mr Speaker, Sir, in summary, the amendments will enable legal proceedings to be more accessible to everyone by simplifying the language used in the Courts and also support our overall digital transformation plans, keeping our legal system efficient and ready to meet the evolving needs of society in the future. Notwithstanding the clarifications above, Sir, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Minister K Shanmugam.

12.50 pm

The Minister for Law (Mr K Shanmugam): Mr Speaker, Sir, I thank the Members who spoke in support of the Bill. Let me address their questions now.

First, on the protocols for proceedings via video-link.

Mr Louis Ng asked whether the way that live video proceedings are conducted can be standardised. He mentioned the need to maintain the security and integrity of Court proceedings.

The specific ways for participation in remote hearings are published in the Registrar's circulars and set out on the Courts' websites. The specific protocol that applies may vary, depending, for example, on the type of case and the litigants involved.

On the security and integrity of proceedings, the Courts have protocols in place. We will take the point and emphasise this to the Courts.

Mr Murali Pillai asked how conversations between accused persons in prison and their counsel joining in from another location will be kept confidential and how accused persons will continue to have access to lawyers during remote proceedings.

The Singapore Prison Service (SPS) has a set of purpose-built video-link facilities. In the course of a remote hearing, over Zoom or tele-presence, SPS will facilitate the private consultation sessions between accused persons and their lawyers. These can be done through the telephone, a virtual breakout room on Zoom or a separate cubicle with a Zoom session between the accused person and his lawyer.

Mr Desmond Choo expressed concern with the rise of deepfake technology and the impersonation of parties or witnesses.

The actions mentioned by Mr Choo are, of course, criminal offences. In terms of safeguards, the Courts are considering adopting new identification technologies. They are planning for them under the National Digital Identity project.

Ms Hany Soh proposed the creation of a virtual Court platform with an integrated chat function and a dynamic queue system and she explained the benefits of it.

The Courts are working on several improvements that are aligned with Ms Soh's suggestions.

First, there will be a new queue management system. It will allow the judge to re-sequence parties according to some specified criteria. There may also be a forecast of the number of cases which are pending, which can be made visible to all.

Second, the Courts are also enhancing the SG Courts app to allow for formal "on the record" discussions between lawyers and the Court.

Ms Soh has also asked about assistance schemes for smaller law firms to defray the cost of purchasing virtual hearing equipment. She has also asked whether filing fees can be reviewed and whether the Courts are able to provide more spaces for practitioners to communicate with their clients in-person.

She did mention that MinLaw has been working on initiatives to help law firms, especially the smaller ones, ramp up their use of technology. These efforts include Tech-celerate for Law and Tech Start for Law, as Ms Soh has pointed out.

We will build on these to further help law firms adopt technology and transit to remote hearings. This will also help with their transition onto the electronic Court systems.

Major initiatives that law firms can look forward to will be a Legal Tech Platform which will enable, in an affordable way, law practices and lawyers to work anytime, anywhere.

This is a matters management tool designed specifically around legal workflows. My Ministry is actively working on this.

We aim to integrate the platform with commonly used technology solutions like practice management solutions, document management solutions, communication tools like WhatsApp and Microsoft Teams and Government systems like LawNet, eLitigation and ACRA that lawyers commonly interact with.

This platform will be a one-stop shop to help lawyers access key functions from such solutions and systems more seamlessly.

We aim to introduce the platform to the industry in phases, starting from the first quarter of 2022.

We are also putting together an Industry Digital Plan, which will provide a step-by-step guide for lawyers to assess their own digital readiness and provide information on the technology solutions commonly used by lawyers, which will be mapped to different stages of digital maturity.

The industry digital plan will be launched in tandem with the legal technology platform.

On Ms Hany Soh's question about defraying hardware costs, generally, the Government does not favour any particular group, say, lawyers and so on, to buy equipment for their practices. But we made an exception last year because of COVID-19. We worked to provide 80% funding support for all SMEs, including law firms, to procure laptops and commonly used software, such as Microsoft Office.

On the provision of physical space, there are already many spaces within existing courthouses which lawyers can utilise to meet with their clients.

As for filing fees, we agree. Filing fees should be reasonable. We will pass the feedback onto the Courts.

Moving on to paper hearings, Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim sought clarifications on paper hearings. Let me take each of his questions in turn.

First, whether parties can opt in for paper hearings. If parties prefer the matter to be heard on paper, they can inform the Court. The Court, ultimately, has the final say but it will take this into account when considering whether to proceed with a paper hearing.

Second, on the benefits of paper hearings. It, obviously, saves costs and time, provided the matter can be dealt with through a paper hearing.

Third, Mr Zhulkarnain asked whether there can be a fast track for the case management of paper hearings. That, really, has got to depend on each case, its nature, complexity and how prepared parties are for a speedier management of the case.

Fourth, Mr Zhulkarnain asked about paper hearings in criminal proceedings. In the context of remote hearings, Mr Sharael Taha also underscored the need to be mindful of the human aspect in criminal matters. So, we have to make sure the use of paper or asynchronous hearings do not undermine the accused's right to be heard.

This Bill protects the accused's right to be heard. The Courts will exercise the discretion to conduct paper or asynchronous hearings judiciously.

Mr Murali Pillai also raised a query on how the Courts will ensure that litigants-in-persons (LIPs) are not disadvantaged by remote or paper hearings.

LIPs who have concerns with using remote technology or with a paper hearing can notify the Courts. LIPs will be encouraged to take advantage of remote or paper hearing processes but, ultimately, it is an option for them.

If a litigant does not have the equipment or Internet connectivity, he can, of course, come to Court to use in-Court facilities that do cater for remote hearings.

The Courts have published detailed guidelines on the conduct of remote hearings. Users may also reach out to the Courts to get help.

Dr Shahira Abdullah mentioned that under the amendments to the Administration of Justice Protection Act, litigants and lawyers will now be prohibited from making their own non-official audio transcripts of Court proceedings.

The amendments under this Bill do not change the underlying position today. Today, it is already contempt of the Court to record physical Court proceedings. The amendments simply update the provisions so that unauthorised recordings of remote Court proceedings will likewise be in contempt.

Mr Louis Ng asked a number of questions.

One, on the scope of the Court's powers to order parties to attempt amicable resolution. An attempt at amicable resolution may be appropriate where strict legal remedies may not necessarily address the underlying concerns and interests of parties or where litigation is not cost effective.

Second, where parties have gone through formal processes, such as mediation, neutral evaluation, settlement negotiations with exchange of draft settlement agreements, these are all likely to constitute clear attempts at amicable resolution.

Third, Mr Louis Ng asked how the Court will ensure that parties will make good faith attempts at amicable resolution and what would be the consequences of non-compliance with the Court's direction to attempt such amicable resolution. Mr Desmond Choo also sought clarification on whether the Court will consider the intentions of the parties before exercising the powers.

The short answer to Mr Louis Ng's question is that it is not easy to ensure good faith negotiations. But in deciding whether to order parties to attempt amicable resolution, the Courts will take into account all the facts before them, including whether any of the parties have refused to attempt to resolve the dispute by amicable resolution, and why. Where necessary, the Courts may require the parties or their counsel to explain why the matter cannot be settled amicably.

Mr Louis Ng asked whether Registrars will be required to undergo training in mediation and other alternative dispute resolution processes (ADR), and whether there will be a minimum requirement that must be met and who the Court-appointed mediators will be.

In the State Courts, mediation may be conducted by specially-trained District Judges or Court Volunteer Mediators. The District Judges are experienced trial judges. They have extensive experience in mediation and other ADR processes, and they undergo continuous training in ADR.

As for Court Volunteer Mediators, they must minimally be an Associate Mediator with the Singapore Mediation Centre with at least three years of mediation experience. Alternatively, they should minimally hold a Level 3 qualification as a Singapore International Mediation Institute Accredited Mediator.

For the Supreme Court, a Registrar conducting ADR, or a Court-appointed mediator, will similarly be trained in the particular ADR processes.

Mr Louis Ng asked if there are plans to set up an equivalent of the State Courts' Court Dispute Resolution Cluster in the Supreme Court. Given the nature of the disputes and the value of the claims filed in the Supreme Court, there are no immediate plans to do so.

Lastly, on Mr Louis Ng's question on how MinLaw supports the growth of private mediation service providers, MinLaw's role is to ensure a conducive environment for our dispute resolution ecosystem to thrive. We work closely with mediation service providers, such as Singapore Mediation Centre (SMC), Singapore International Mediation Centre (SIMC) and so on, to ensure that their service offerings address the different user needs and complement the Court-based dispute resolution mechanisms.

We also have the Singapore International Mediation Institute (SIMI). It looks at accreditation and mediation standards to support professionalising mediation.

Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim asked about security for costs in the context of an application for freestanding interim relief. A defendant may apply for security for the defendant's costs of the action, on the basis that the applicant has no nexus or assets in Singapore.

On vessel arrests, these fall outside the scope of freestanding interim relief that the General Division can grant. This is consistent with the UK position.

Mr Zhulkarnain sought clarification regarding the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC)'s jurisdiction. He asked when the action, and the counterclaim taken as a whole, would still maintain an international and commercial character. The assessment cannot be a purely quantitative one. The Court will have to consider all the relevant facts and circumstances, assess whether the counterclaim, third-party proceedings change the nature or substance of the action in such a way that the action, seen as a whole, no longer maintains an international or commercial nature.

Mr Zhulkarnain also asked about the consolidation of proceedings under SICC and whether similar considerations would apply if one proceeding is in a different Court from SICC. The consolidation of proceedings under SICC may require different considerations, as parties would have already commenced separate proceedings. If proceedings are not before the same Court, but a party believes that an application for consolidation is necessary, then a transfer application should be taken out to bring the proceedings before the same Court, before applying for any consolidation.

Mr Zhulkarnain also pointed out the joinder of a non-consenting party to SICC proceedings, and spoke about the enforcement of an SICC judgment in a foreign jurisdiction. It is possible for a party to be joined to existing proceedings before SICC without that party's consent; just like it is possible for a party to be joined to existing proceedings before the High Court or the State Courts without that party's consent. There are rules on how that takes place. But, of course, the requirements for proper service on that party will still apply.

With regard to enforcement, the enforcement of a SICC judgment against a party, who has been properly served, but has not submitted to SICC's jurisdiction, will be similar to the enforcement of a judgment issued by the General Division of the High Court against a party that has not submitted to the jurisdiction of the General Division.

As with any judgment of the General Division of the High Court, an SICC judgment is likely to be enforceable in major commercial jurisdiction and many other regional ones. There are standard laws on how this takes place.

Mr Pritam Singh, Ms Shahira Abdullah, Mr Zhulkarnain and Mr Murali Pillai have raised a number of queries regarding the Attorney-General (AG)'s right to intervene. Let me make some broad points before addressing the specific queries.

First, as my colleague Minister Edwin Tong mentioned in Parliament yesterday, the statutory framework is based on the established role of the AG. He is the Guardian of the public interest. This has been recognised by our Courts as well as by Members who have spoken on this Bill and previously. The proposed amendments are consistent with that principle.

The Court of Appeal, for example, has noted that the AG intervenes on a non-partisan basis. He is disinterested in the interests of the parties to the litigation. The issues that he raises most logically, must have a discernible impact beyond the specific parties and the specific dispute before the Court.

Second, it is important to understand the context in which this proposal arises. Let us say you have a civil case between two parties. Prima facie, nothing to do with the state, or the public. But in the course of the dispute or from the pleadings, or in the course of the arguments, issues arise which, potentially, are detrimental to the public interest.

For example, the AG has intervened on the applicable legal test for negligence in relation to the provision of medical advice, in the case of Hii Chii Kok v Ooi Peng Jin, between two parties. But the test that is laid out by the Courts on what amounts to negligence will impact on future claims on the basis of medical negligence. So, it will impact both patients and doctors, and they cannot come forward and intervene in this case. The only party who can do so in the public interest is the AG. So, this relates to the provision of medical advice.

To take another example, the AG has intervened on the nature and scope of professional and ethical duties. For example, in Deepak Sharma v Law Society of Singapore, on what duties are owed by lawyers in making claims for costs. In such cases, it is sensible, obvious, that the AG must have a right to intervene, to protect the public interest and put forward arguments. Ultimately, of course, it is up to the Courts to decide on the validity of the arguments.

So, the amendments provide for the right of the AG to intervene for that purpose but, ultimately, the Court decides on the merits of the substantive case. The AG's presence assists the Court and also informs the Court of the possible broader implications on the public interest.

Third, the AG's application to intervene is only an intermediate step in the dispute. Broadly, there is a two-stage process. At the first stage, the Court will check to ensure that the AG has set out adequate details, the basis, grounds for his request to be added as a party. Only if the Court is satisfied that the AG has explained the reasons for his intervention sufficiently, then the Court will grant permission for the AG to intervene. Of course, that is prima facie.

If anyone wishes to oppose the AG's intervention, then they may apply to set aside the Court's permission.

This brings us to the second stage, which will involve the AG and the other parties, because the first stage is ex parte. At this stage, the parties can raise any concerns they might have about the AG's addition to the proceedings. If any party objects to the intervention, the Court will assess whether the permission that has been granted to the AG should now be reversed.

The Court's assessment will be made based on the interests of justice. It can take into account and balance various considerations, including the possible inconvenience, costs to a party, if AG is added; and the potential benefits if AG is allowed to join the proceedings, to add his perspectives on the matter.

Any Court will proceed on the basis that the AG is a Guardian of the public interest, and if he comes to Court and says there is an important matter of public interest here, it is, generally, not assumed that the AG is being frivolous. There must be a serious point and it is a matter of public interest. When someone comes in, particularly the AG, to put forward the arguments, the Court knows that it will be of tremendous assistance to the Court. Ultimately, how it decides is for the Court, but the Court gets tremendous assistance from the AG.

Mr Pritam Singh asked if this is a shift in the common law position. He has asked why not we just stick with the existing position, why do we need a new framework. The common law position does allow AG to intervene. For example, in the case of ARW v Comptroller of Income Tax, the Appellant was a private company, which applied for specific discovery of internal documents belonging to IRAS. So, this is a taxpayer, I believe, who sought documents from IRAS, but it goes beyond that to a broader principle of when you can apply for documents against a Government agency. Whether it should be allowed or it should not be allowed is a matter for the Court. Whether such a principle should apply to all public departments in the context of a private civil dispute, albeit against IRAS, is a matter of public interest. The AG should be entitled to put forward his position why it is or it is not in the public interest to make a particular order. And that is for the Courts to decide.

So, the AG applied to intervene to make representations on the issue of public interest privilege under the Evidence Act. Application for intervention was filed in the High Court. The company resisted the application. There was dispute on the addition of the AG to the proceedings. It was resolved by the Court of Appeal 20 months later.

The Court of Appeal allowed the AG to intervene, affirmed the AG's position as Guardian of public interest and it further held that if the AG does not intervene despite taking the view that there are issues of the public interest, then the AG would, in fact, be in dereliction of his public duty.

All that is good, but 20 months have been lost. Taking into account what the Court of Appeal had said and the fact that you do not want these things to be unnecessarily delayed, I will say this to Members. As in the cases cited, parties to civil litigation are often seeking to interpret the rules in their own favour. If they succeed, sometimes, it is the man in the street who will pay the bill, ultimately, if it is against the public interest. The AG is intervening to protect the man in the street – the common man.

We are moving to enact a clear statutory framework for the AG's right to intervene, to lend certainty to this area of law, so that parties can proceed expeditiously to the substantive issues in the case.

As I have said, the addition of AG to the proceedings is a procedural step. It does not mean that either of the original parties has somehow "lost" or "won" the original lawsuit, though I can understand, they may not like what the AG is going to say. In that sense, they would prefer if the AG is not present, but that is not the way hearings and arguments should go.

Mr Pritam Singh has cited various statutes which expressly provide for the AG's right to intervene: Charities Act, Industrial Relations Act. And he is right. In those pieces of legislation, the AG has an unqualified entitlement to intervene in the specified categories of proceedings. It is broadly similar principles, but unqualified. Here, the proposal is that even the addition itself, the parties can oppose if they wish; then, the Court has got to decide after hearing both sides.

Let me now turn to some of the specific queries. Mr Murali Pillai had a suggestion that the AG's role as Guardian of the public interest be codified in the Constitution. As mentioned, the AG's role as Guardian of the public interest has been affirmed by the Court of Appeal in a number of cases. It has also been recognised by this House yesterday by Mr Murali Pillai and Mr Pritam Singh. My Ministry will study this suggestion whether we should put it in the Constitution the AG's established role in this respect, taking into account how this area of law and the jurisprudence develop.

Mr Pritam Singh asked if the amendments are intended as a contingency or whether there are new areas of public interest that the Government is concerned about.

I am not sure what Mr Pritam Singh is concerned about; or that we always think ahead and are planning something else that he is concerned about. The short answer is, the amendments say what they say on the face of it. They are meant to lend clarity to the procedure for the AG to intervene and to minimise satellite litigation and delays. But it is not going to be possible to predict how other areas of laws in which such interventions may be required in the future, might take place. And what questions of public interest may arise, will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.

Mr Zhulkarnain also asked whether there will still be a need for AG to intervene if a party to the proceedings can put forth an opposing view to the Court.

The AG's role is not to put forward supporting or opposing views but to represent the public interest and what, in his view, is best stated in terms of the public interest, whereas the views of parties to the proceedings will obviously be influenced by their respective interests. And, sometimes, there cannot be a substitute for the non-partisan views of the AG. The parties to a civil litigation are not there to advance public interest. They are there to advance or forward their own case. Sometimes, it is necessary that somebody else is there to protect the public interest.

Mr Zhulkarnain also asked whether the Court can instead invite the AG to make submissions as an independent counsel under the Legal Profession Act. The role of an independent counsel is to address the Court on specific issues of law, at the invitation of the Court. Whereas the AG's submissions on issues of public interest may well go beyond specific issues of law. Unlike an independent counsel, the AG will be deemed a party to the proceedings if he is added on. And when he intervenes as Guardian of the public interest, like other parties, he will be able to make applications, file affidavits and will also have the right of appeal.

Mr Murali Pillai asked whether the AG has a duty of full and frank disclosure, since he will be making an ex parte application when applying for permission of the Court to intervene. The AG will have a duty to disclose properly his grounds for intervention to the Court.

Dr Shahira asked who should bear the costs where the parties choose not to appeal the Court's decision but the AG decides to do so. These are properly matters for the Courts. The Courts, generally, understand that the AG does not act frivolously, vexatiously or egregiously in pursuing the public interest, but, ultimately, it is a matter of discretion for the Courts.

Mr Sharael Taha and Dr Shahira spoke in support of the terminology amendments. Laws must be clear and easy to understand. The new rules of Court will contain a clear list of definitions upfront. Dr Shahira had highlighted the differences in terminology amendments that will apply across the Courts and said that this might cause confusion. For the Family Justice Courts (FJC), the rules are being reviewed and will be revamped in due course. The terminology changes will be effected with the revamp and the majority of which are aligned with other Courts.

However, because of the unique nature of family proceedings, some terminology amendments will be specific to the FJC. For example, the terminology of parties in a divorce. The naming of parties as "applicants" and "respondents" is intended to avoid calling them "claimants" and "defendants". Calling someone a "defendant" sometimes could be seen as pejorative. So, this is really in line with FJC's move towards therapeutic justice.

For the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC), the differences are relatively limited. They, generally, relate only to two items. These differences arise as a result of the differences in Court procedure in SICC and the General Division. The procedure in SICC is specifically tailored to facilitate international commercial litigation. We, therefore, do not think that this will give rise to confusion since the respective rules of Court will make clear the procedures that should be used.

On legal representation, public education, building a world-class legal system raised by Mr Sharael Taha, these are issues which my Ministry is working on. And I would say our legal system is, generally, highly regarded.

That, Sir, brings me to the end of my responses to the questions raised. I believe I have answered all the questions raised by Members. And with that, I beg to move, Sir.

Mr Speaker: Clarifications? Mr Pritam Singh.

1.20 pm

Mr Pritam Singh (Aljunied): Thank you, Mr Speaker. I thank the Minister for addressing some aspects of the speech I made on this Bill. My fundamental interest was to try and understand whether the common law position would change with regard to the two-stage process.

I listened very carefully to Minister Edwin Tong's speech at the Second Reading and when Minister Edwin Tong went through the various clauses that pertain to Part 4 of the Bill, insofar as Part 4 section 4A(4) was concerned, it reads in the Explanatory Statement: "In considering whether to grant permission to intervene, the Court need only be satisfied that the grounds for intervention are adequately set out in the affidavit. The Court is not to examine the merits of those grounds." But the Minister added in his speech the words "at that stage", and my concerns about at what point the merits of the AG's arguments would be assessed by the Court is the subject matter of my query.

Let me go into the specific query. For example, at paragraph 56 of Deepak Sharma v Law Society of Singapore, the Court of Appeal noted that if the Court takes the view that the issues that the AG raised do not pertain to the public interest, it is open to the Court to refuse a cost order in favour of the AG, even if the AG considers his intervention and submissions were warranted in the public interest.

Although this point pertains to costs and not the subject of an order to set aside the order for the AG to intervene as envisaged by clause 488, is it not incongruous for the Court to consider the public interest rationale for the AG's grounds for intervention at one stage of the proceedings, but not at the point of application of leave to intervene as it is the case under the common law today?

There is an expectation that you can assess the public interest grounds when you look at costs but, earlier on, for example, an opposing party applies to intervene to challenge the entry of the AG, the Court cannot look into the merits of public interest grounds. So, my suggestion, number one, is that, is that not incongruous?

To further this point, and I agree with the Minister, AG is to act in a non-partisan way and that is the expectation and it is important that we record that in the Hansard. But in Deepak Sharma v Law Society of Singapore, the Court of Appeal also notes the prospect of an adverse Court order against the AG. And it is actively contemplated, albeit exceptionally.

And there, the Court says, "in cases where the AG has intervened with improper motives such as to deliberately advance the interests of one of the parties to litigation, that would take the AG out of his capacity as a non-partisan advocate of the public interest and into the shoes of a de facto party to the litigation."

This again aligns with the earlier question I had. If the prospect of an AG acting in a partisan manner can be contemplated at one stage of the proceedings – this is the determination of costs – would the Minister not agree that the Courts should be empowered to consider the public interest grounds at the point of the AG's intervention in proceedings?

Mr K Shanmugam: I think both questions actually come back to one: is it two stages? Is it one stage? Just to be clear, what is being done is nothing new. It is the standard process when there is an ex parte application. When there is an ex parte application, the Courts hear the party making the ex parte application. It has got to be prima facie. And if, on the face of it, it is completely clear that there is no basis, then they will throw it out. But when it moves on to the substantive hearing, these issues will arise in much greater detail. And that is when the Court then goes into it in-depth.

But I think this is fairly standard, it happens all the time. For example, the parties can, as I have said, oppose the AG having been added. And they can raise a number of grounds for the AG having been added. After the AG has been added ex parte, the parties can oppose that procedure and the process. The Court will then consider if such an application is made. If the Court confirms that the AG has been rightly added, then the next step is to deal with the substantive issues, the point or principle that AG makes and how it impacts one or the other parties' arguments or the outcome itself.

Mr Speaker: Leader of Opposition.

Mr Pritam Singh: Sir, I appreciate that explanation. I understand the parties can oppose the ex parte application. But what the Bill –

Mr K Shanmugam: Let me explain. When the ex parte application is made, the Court makes the order for the AG to be added but the parties can then subsequently say, that should not have been done.

Mr Pritam Singh: So, at the stage where the party says that should not have been done, what the Bill does is to confirm that the Court cannot look into the public interest ground in assessing that application. This is the nub of my concern.

I am suggesting that, in view of the earlier point I made about costs, if the Courts can look into the substantive arguments later on, why not just allow them to do so earlier?

Mr K Shanmugam: I think this simply takes from the principle, Mr Singh, and Members will accept, really, that the AG is a senior Legal Officer, the Guardian of the public interest. If he says that, "I am saying this as a matter of public interest", we do not want an extended argument, trying to delay proceedings by the parties, by saying whether there is or there is no public interest. It should be dealt with on the more substantive points.

If, subsequently, the Court finds that the AG case has got no basis or he contributed in the ways that the Courts have identified in very, very narrow categories, they have powers to deal with it.

Mr Speaker: Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim.

Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim (Chua Chu Kang): Thank you, Mr Speaker, for allowing me to participate in this debate. I thank Minister Shanmugam for answering the queries that I have made previously and directly with you.

I just have one clarification in respect of the documents-only hearing. I agree that it depends on the case and, especially given our current context of a docket system, whether there would be an internal tendency to decide on documents only hearing at the earliest possible opportunity, so that we can save much time and cost for the cases.

Mr K Shanmugam: As I have said, this is a matter that can be taken up with the Courts. Make the application and then they will have to make a decision. It is difficult for me to set it out in broad terms today.

Question put, and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House.

The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. – [Mr K Shanmugam].

Bill considered in Committee.

[Mr Speaker in the Chair]

Clauses 1 to 12 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 13 –

The Chairman: Clause 13. Minister for Law.

Mr K Shanmugam: Sir, there are two amendments to clause 13, as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement. As the amendments are related, may I seek your permission to move them together?

The Chairman: Please proceed.

Mr K Shanmugam: Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move the amendments* standing in my name, as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement be moved. The reasons for the amendments have been explained in the speech by Minister Edwin Tong yesterday.

*The amendments read as follows:

(1) In page 22: to leave out “ ”. ” at the end of line 23.

(2) In page 22: after line 23, to insert —

“Summary dismissal of applications

238B.—(1) Any application may, without being set down for hearing, be summarily dismissed by a written order of the Court, certifying that the Court, having perused the application and any accompanying material, is satisfied that the application has been brought without any sufficient ground.

(2) Before summarily dismissing an application, the Court —

(a) must consider the applicant’s written submissions (if any); and

(b) may, but is not required to, consider the respondent’s written submissions (if any).

(3) Where the Court comprises more than one Judge, the decision of the Court to dismiss the application summarily under subsection (1) can only be made by a unanimous decision of all the Judges sitting in

(4) Notice of the dismissal must be served on the applicant.

(5) If, within 14 days after the service on the applicant of a notice of the dismissal of an application by the General Division of the High Court in the exercise of its appellate or revisionary jurisdiction or the Court of Appeal under subsection (1), the applicant gives to the Registrar of the Supreme Court —

(a) notice of an application for permission to amend the application so as to raise a question of law; and

(b) a certificate signed by an advocate specifying the question to be raised and undertaking to argue it,

the Chief Justice (in the case where the application is made to the Court of Appeal) or any Judge sitting in the General Division of the High Court (in the case where the application is made to the General Division of the High Court) may grant permission to the applicant to amend the application accordingly and restore the application for hearing.

(6) In this section —

“application” means any application under this Code and includes a criminal motion and an application under section 400 or 404, but does not include —

(a) an appeal, an application for permission under section 394H(1), a review application or an application under section 397(1); or

(b) an application under section 417(1) for an order for review of detention;

“review application” has the meaning given by section 394F(1).”

Amendments agreed to.

Clause 13, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 14 to 24 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 25 –

The Chairman: Clause 25. Minister for Law.

Mr K Shanmugam: Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move the amendments* standing in my name, as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement be taken and, again, the reasons for the amendments have been explained yesterday.

*The amendments read as follows:

In page 35: to leave out line 27 to the end of line 13 in page 36, and insert —

“29B.—(1) A District Judge sitting in a Family Court may, on his or her own motion, summarily dismiss any appeal made against a decision of the Registrar relating to civil or quasi criminal proceedings, if the District Judge is satisfied of any of the following:

(a) every issue in the appeal has already been decided by a Family Court or a higher court in an earlier matter in which the appellant was involved, and the appeal therefore has no merit;

(b) such conditions as may be prescribed by the Family Justice Rules are met.

(2) Before summarily dismissing any appeal under subsection (1), a District Judge sitting in a Family Court must —

(a) give the appellant a reasonable opportunity to show cause why the appeal should not be summarily dismissed; and

(b) consider any representations of the appellant.

(3) In this section, “appeal” includes part of an appeal.”

Amendments agreed to.

Clause 25, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 26 to 229 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill.

The Chairman: Consequent amendments* to be made will be made.

*Consequential amendments:

(1) In page 22, line 3: to leave out “section 238A”, and insert “sections 238A and 238B”

(2) In page 22, line 5: to leave out “section:”, and insert “sections:”

Bill reported with amendments.

Mr Speaker: Third Reading, what day?

Mr K Shanmugam: Now, Sir. I beg to move, that the Bill be now read a third time.

May I put one matter on record, Sir. A number of Members have raised questions and even if they did not speak, I have decided to respond, like Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim. He had given his points to me and I made sure that we have responded on the record. Thank you.

Mr Speaker: I apologise to Mr Zhulkarnain for not calling on him.

Bill read a Third time and passed.