Administration of Justice (Protection) (Amendment) Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

2.53 pm

The Minister of State for Law (Mr Murali Pillai) (for the Minister for Law): Mr Speaker, Sir, on behalf of the Minister for Law, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time".

This Bill is intended to safeguard the administration of justice in Singapore by clarifying that egregious abuse of the court process will amount to contempt of court. In my speech, I will, first, provide the background to the Bill. I will explain why we have assessed that it is necessary to proactively act to introduce these amendments. I will, then, take Members through the details of the proposed amendments. In doing so, I will share how we carefully scoped the proposals to achieve a balance between the public interest in guarding against abuse of process and the rights of litigants to ventilate genuine claims before the Courts.

Starting with the background. In 2016, this House passed the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act, or AOJPA in short. The AOJPA consolidated the law of contempt of court, which was previously set out in multiple cases, in a single piece of legislation. The fundamental aim of our contempt of court laws is to protect our Courts and our justice system.

The justice system is critical to Singapore's continued success. It benefits all of us in various ways. For example, our criminal justice system ensures law and order and a safe Singapore. Our commercial law regime provides a stable platform for investment and economic growth and allows for the expedient resolution of commercial disputes. In the community sphere, we have set up specialised tribunals and introduced simplified judge-led processes, that allow for the effective resolution of community disputes. Our family justice system aims to find timely and enduring solutions to family disputes by applying therapeutic justice. The AOJPA protects the justice system across all these spheres.

The AOJPA has become even more important in recent years, as we have taken significant steps to improve access to justice. These steps include setting up the Protection from Harassment Court and the Community Disputes Resolution Tribunal (CDRT). These reforms provide simplified processes intended to allow Singaporeans to enforce their rights more easily.

Promoting access to justice is part of the Government's mission. We need to have good laws on our statute books and the public must be able to enforce their legal rights in practice. However, improving access to justice does not mean enabling vexatious litigants to mount abusive and unmeritorious legal claims.

There are existing levers to address the risk of abuse of process in specific contexts, which we regularly review.

For criminal proceedings, we passed legislation in 2018 and 2022, to provide clear procedures for applications filed after a concluded criminal appeal, including post-appeal applications in capital cases. Thresholds were included to make clear that such late-stage applications must be premised on persuasive, new material to guard against persistent delays and the constant re-litigation of issues in criminal matters.

There are also existing levers available in other proceedings. For instance, the Protection from Harassment Court has powers to deal with unmeritorious or frivolous cases by striking out such claims and imposing costs consequences. However, we have received feedback that there is still a risk of harassment proceedings being misused for collateral purposes. As such, this is an area we continue to monitor and review.

Similarly, for community disputes, the CDRT may award costs in cases involving an abuse of process. Under the Community Disputes Resolution (Amendment) Bill, which was passed yesterday, the Tribunal will be further empowered to issue civil restraint orders to curb claims or applications that are an abuse of process.

More broadly, the AOJPA provides that interference with court proceedings, or the administration of justice may amount to contempt of court and attract criminal sanctions. This is a general protection that applies to all court proceedings in Singapore. Contempt by interference with the administration of justice may be committed in various ways, including by abusing the process of the court in an egregious manner.

Examples of such egregious abuse include: (a) commencing civil proceedings to seek financial damages, despite knowing that the claim is without foundation, for the ulterior motive of oppressing the defendant; (b) filing fictitious claims for the improper purpose of delaying criminal proceedings; and (c) persistently commencing actions and making applications that are totally without merit.

The impact of egregious abuse of our court system can be serious, very serious. Individuals are forced to bear the financial and psychological burden of undergoing court proceedings for matters that should not be going to court. Limited public and court resources are diverted away from other deserving, meritorious cases and our court system is strained and weakened as a result. If we do not act, over time, trust in Singapore's justice system will be eroded.

We have observed notable examples of abuse of the court process in Singapore and overseas, as parties engage in what is referred to as "lawfare", commencing unmeritorious claims to oppress others or for ulterior purposes. With your permission, Mr Speaker, Sir, may I ask the Clerks to distribute a handout with some examples?

Mr Speaker: Please proceed. [A handout was distributed to hon Members. Please refer to Annex 1.]

Mr Murali Pillai: Thank you, Sir. Members may also access these materials through the MP@SGPARL App.

I will proceed, Sir. In the handout, you will see that in the United States (US), lawfare has taken various forms. This includes misuse of court proceedings by individuals against their intimate partners, who may be survivors of domestic violence or sexual abuse, as a means of controlling, harassing or intimidating them long after the relationship has ended. It also includes unscrupulous lawyers and litigants commencing abusive or bogus claims with the main incentive of forcing a monetary settlement or to "make a quick buck".

In Europe, the European Union parliament is studying the rising phenomenon of strategic lawsuits against public participation, also known as "SLAPPs". SLAPPs are legal actions, typically brought with the intention of harassing or intimidating opponents via improper use of the legal system for purposes other than genuinely vindicating a legal right. The United Kingdom (UK) government also proposed legislative action in this area earlier this year in March 2024.

In Singapore, we have also observed notable cases of egregious abuse of process. In an extra-judicial lecture delivered in 2023, our Chief Justice spoke about the phenomenon of truth decay: the proliferation of disinformation and devaluation of truth in our societies. He observed that "a number of recent examples suggest that truth decay is spreading into court proceedings". He cited "the conduct of some advocates, who have in some cases attempted to conceal facts from the courts, or to delay proceedings on spurious grounds."

One example of such conduct is the 2022 case of Mohammad Farid bin Batra v Attorney-General. The applicant had been sentenced to life imprisonment and caning for possessing drugs for the purposes of trafficking. After his appeal had been dealt with, he filed two subsequent applications to the Court of Appeal, which were dismissed. Thereafter, the applicant filed another application to the General Division of the High Court on an urgent basis. The Court dismissed the application. In doing so, the Court found that the claim was completely baseless and brought to delay, and ultimately avoid, caning. The Court also noted that it "would have to leave it to the Executive and the Legislature to consider whether and what action can be taken in future instances of abusive applications by litigants and those advising, assisting or egging them on."

Having observed these trends, we have decided that it is time to proactively act to safeguard the administration of justice in Singapore. It is the Government's responsibility to act to protect the judicial system, especially when we have repeated pronouncements from our courts on the abuse of their processes.

The current provisions of the AOJPA, in principle, already cover egregious abuse of process. Specifically, section 3(1)(e) of the AOJPA, which relates to contempt by interference with the administration of justice, captures: "Any person who…intentionally does any…act that interferes with, obstructs or poses a real risk of interference with or obstruction of the administration of justice …if the person knows or ought to have known that the act would interfere with, obstruct or pose a real risk of interference with or obstruction of the administration of justice."

However, the language of the current provision, which I have just read, is broad. We have decided that the legal position can be made clearer on how the general standard set out in section 3(1)(e) applies to the context of abuse of process. The amendments which we are proposing are, therefore, clarificatory in nature. They do not lower the current threshold for contempt of Court.

Besides providing legal clarity, our intent is also to send a clear signal to deter abuse of the court process. The amendments will make it clear to the public and potential court users that egregious cases of abuse of process will amount to contempt of court and that such conduct can attract criminal sanctions.

This is also in line with the established legal position in other jurisdictions. In the UK, the Supreme Court has emphasised that serious cases of abuse of process involving false claims ought to be sanctioned as contempt of court. The Court noted that such claims undermine the system in a number of serious ways, including imposing a burden upon honest claimants and damaging the system of adversarial justice which depends upon openness, transparency and honesty.

The Indian Supreme Court has also recognised that abuse of process that is calculated to hamper the due course of judicial proceedings or the orderly administration of justice amounts to contempt of court. The Court noted that such conduct extends its influence beyond the parties to the action and affects the public's interest in the administration of justice.

Having set out the background and the policy rationale, I will now take hon Members through the details of the proposed amendments. The key point to note is that the provisions reflect what is already the current law.

Under clause 2 of the Bill, the proposed new sections 3(1)(da) and (db) of the Act clarify what kinds of conduct would amount to contempt by interference with the administration of justice.

The new provisions apply to all court proceedings in Singapore, whether conducted by a self-represented person or a lawyer. Three categories of egregious abuse of process are set out: first, the conduct or commencement of a court proceeding, which the person knows, or ought to have known, involves a deception on the court, is fictitious or constitutes a mere sham.

Second, the conduct or commencement of a court proceeding, which the person knows or ought to have known is manifestly groundless or without foundation and involves the process of the court being used for an ulterior or improper purpose. These requirements are cumulative. Under this category, it is not sufficient just to have a manifestly groundless claim, or to have found an improper purpose. You must have both.

Third, the conducting or commencing of multiple or successive court proceedings, which the person knows or ought to have known are manifestly groundless or without foundation.

Deceiving the court, abusing the court process by filing baseless claims for an improper purpose, or launching multiple baseless court proceedings – these are acts of abuse that are clearly egregious and which cannot be condoned. These are also acts which would already fall within the current section 3(1)(e) of the AOJPA, as acts which interfere with the administration of justice.

Our amendments, therefore, do not change the current legal standard. Rather, they provide clearer signposting in setting out the types of conduct that would amount to contempt of court.

We have also considered that there may be also persons, who are causing or abetting others, to engage in the contemptuous conduct before our courts. The usual levers of striking out and costs orders will not deter them, as they are not involved in the court proceedings. To deter such behaviour, clause 2(d) of the Bill provides that persons who cause or abet egregious abuse of our court process as provided for under the new section 3(1)(da) and (db) will also be liable for contempt.

In developing these proposals, we were keenly aware of the need to strike a balance between the need to guard against abuse of process and the rights of litigants to ventilate genuine claims before the courts. Our policy intent is that litigants and lawyers who act with reasonable care and in good faith should not be penalised. We looked at past examples of conduct which amounted to abuse of process. We also examined the leading case of Chee Siok Chin v MHA, where the Court had set out the categories of abuse of process at common law. To ensure that we only capture egregious cases as contempt, the provisions in the Bill specify narrower categories than what was set out in Chee Siok Chin.

The approach we have taken ensures that the amendments will not cover the typical case of a civil matter that is struck out for the sole reason that it has no merit. Such cases can continue to be adequately dealt with by striking out and cost orders. The Court will be able to examine the circumstances of the case, when considering whether the conduct constitutes contempt.

In scoping the proposals, we spoke to key stakeholders, including the Judiciary, to ensure that we achieved the right balance.

We also spoke to members of the Bar on these amendments. There is consensus that lawyers must be held to high standards. At the same time, some members of the Bar have expressed concern whether these amendments may discourage lawyers from taking up difficult cases and arguments, where the merits of the case or the evidence may be borderline or unclear. They ask whether the amendments will prevent them from robustly representing the interests of their clients.

Let me make a few points to directly address these concerns. First, I reiterate that the amendments are clarificatory in nature and do not lower the current threshold for contempt of court.

The elements of the new provisions, particularly the mental element that the person must have "known or ought to have known" that the proceeding would amount to contempt, are consistent with the current section 3(1)(e) of the AOJPA.

The new provisions are also consistent with the pre-AOJPA case law on other forms of contempt of court, under which it was not necessary to prove an intention to undermine public confidence in the administration of justice. The new provisions do not affect the procedural protections under the existing AOJPA. The standard of proof remains that of proof beyond a reasonable doubt under section 28 of the AOJPA. Consent of the Attorney-General is also required under section 30 of the AOJPA before contempt proceedings are instituted.

Second, lawyers and litigants are already held to high standards. To reiterate, those who exercise reasonable care and act in good faith will not be caught and have nothing to fear. Let me illustrate this with an example. An accused person who has been convicted and had his appeal dismissed approaches a lawyer, shortly before the accused is to start serving his sentence. The accused presents new evidence that the lawyer is unsure whether is genuine. The lawyer needs more time to investigate the matter and makes an urgent court application so that the accused person does not have to immediately start serving sentence. Eventually, after due investigation, it transpires that the allegedly new evidence is not genuine and the application is duly withdrawn.

In such a circumstance, if the lawyer had acted in good faith and had taken reasonable steps before filing the court application, considering the limited time available to him, the lawyer will not be caught by the elements of the proposed amendments. This is because the standard of what the lawyer knew or ought to have known is contextual and the Court will have to examine carefully the factual matrix of each case. The standard also allows the Court to take into account the practical challenges faced by the lawyers.

However, in the same scenario, if the lawyer had failed to take reasonable steps – for example, by ignoring obvious red flags, or had carried on conducting the application even after discovering that the new evidence was fabricated – then, he may well be caught by the amendments. Rightly so, as we expect high standards from lawyers who owe paramount duties as officers of the Court. Again, much will depend on the particular context of each case.

This is why I say that lawyers and litigants who act with reasonable care, and in good faith, have nothing to fear. On this point, as hon Members sitting in this House, we are ultimately concerned with the public good and must act in the best interest of all Singaporeans. As I mentioned at the start of my speech, our justice system is a key pillar of what has made our country successful. It is precious and must be protected.

All of us – the Courts, lawyers, lawmakers and members of the public – have an interest in ensuring that we have an effective justice system that is focused on enforcing our laws and resolving genuine disputes. We also have a duty to ensure that our processes are not weaponised or abused.

The proposed amendments will help us deter egregious cases of abuse of process and safeguard our justice system so that it continues to benefit and serve all of us.

As I have elaborated in some detail in going through the amendments, they are clarificatory and are not intended to lower the threshold for contempt. I have also taken some time to explain the rationale behind the amendments.

So, while hon Members may have brought prepared speeches, I would ask that you may want to consider the explanations I have already given, so that the response I may provide later can be more efficient.

Mr Speaker, Sir, on behalf of the Minister for Law, I beg to move.

Question proposed.

Mr Speaker: Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim.

3.16 pm

Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim (Chua Chu Kang): Mr Speaker, I rise today in support of this amendment Bill. These amendments clarify that severe cases of abuse of court process, where proceedings are knowingly initiated with deceit, as shams or based on baseless claims, these will be treated as contempt of court. I welcome the hon Minister of State's assurance that this Bill does not lower the threshold for contempt, but it is meant to deter abuse of our Courts, and thus preserving the Courts' integrity for those with genuine claims. These amendments are welcome in light of the observations from the High Court in the recent case that the Minister of State mentioned, where an applicant filed for judicial review with the ulterior aim of delaying his punishment of caning. This Bill addresses situations where litigants or their advocates knowingly file abusive applications. It reinforces that the Court is a place for genuine grievances, not tactical delays or gamesmanship.

[Deputy Speaker (Mr Christopher de Souza) in the Chair]

This sends a strong message that our Courts will not tolerate misuse of judicial process for ulterior motives. Importantly, less severe abuses will continue to be handled through existing measures, such as cost orders, dismissal and disciplinary action, as these remain the appropriate responses for less serious infractions.

Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, at the outset, I believe that the Bill is not imposing anything new in terms of professional conduct standards in dealing with abuse of process through multiple baseless claims and in the abetment of contempt of court.

Firstly, on legal professional conduct, these amendments reinforce the standards already enshrined in the Singapore Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules which state that a lawyer's paramount duty is to the Court, meaning justice, truth and fairness must come first, above the client’s interest. As a lawyer, our role is not to win at all costs but to uphold the integrity of the judicial process.

Specifically, the new sections 3(1)(da)(i) and (ii) require that lawyers refrain from initiating cases that they know are baseless, deceptive or meant to deceive the Court. These standards are consistent with expectations from current case laws. Already, lawyers are prohibited from knowingly misleading the Court and cannot simply accept clients’ instructions at face value without reasonable scrutiny and are already liable for costs if they advance frivolous or ill-conceived applications. Ultimately, lawyers also have the opportunity to respond to allegations of misconduct before facing any personal cost orders.

Secondly, in respect of multiple or successive groundless claims, section 3(1)(db), targets litigants who engage in successive or repeated meritless claims. Currently, such behaviour is already recognised as an abuse of process, with Courts authorised to issue civil restraint orders or general restraint orders, preventing cases from proceeding without the Court’s permission. Since 2019, the Supreme Court of Judicature Act have been amended to formalise these powers, even though Courts have historically exercised such powers through its inherent jurisdiction. The Attorney-General also has the authority under section 74 of the SCJA to bar vexatious litigants from filing further claims without prior permission.

I do, however, have four sets of clarifications.

Firstly, on the knowledge of the lawyer. The phrasing used in this Bill, particularly the terms "ought to know" and "manifestly groundless or without foundation." These terms are somewhat subjective. When the Bill states that a lawyer who “ought to know” his or her client’s claim is groundless will be sanctioned, it places lawyers in a precarious position, especially when clients insist on pursuing claims that may be weak or challenging. While a lawyer may suspect that a claim is weak, they may still present it for the Court's consideration if it contains legitimate legal questions.

To address this, may I suggest a possible carve-out for lawyers who have already advised clients of the poor merits of their case but are instructed to proceed nonetheless. In such cases, personal sanctions should not apply, as the cost regime already functions as a penalty mechanism. This approach would allow lawyers to uphold their duty to both their clients and the Court without fear of sanctions for attempting legitimate, albeit difficult, claims.

Secondly, on the new provisions of the Bill addressing third parties who abet or cause contemptuous actions. Under existing common law, third parties can already be held liable for aiding and abetting contempt of court if their actions threaten to prejudice justice. My question is: why is there a need for this to be explicitly legislated? Is the Bill seeking to modify the existing common law position and, if so, in what ways? Furthermore, does this extend to those who are funding frivolous cases with malicious intent, whether based locally or from outside of Singapore, particularly those who are engaging in "lawfare" to create discord within our legal system? Can the hon Minister of State also clarify if this provision would also apply to crowdfunding sources and, if so, whether a member of the public who participates in crowdfunding activity to fund a baseless or frivolous claim will also be held in contempt of court?

Thirdly, on the definition of abuse of process for multiple filings of claims. This Bill reinforces the four categories of abuse of process already established in case law. The Minister of State mentioned this as the Chee Siok Chin case. In that case, the hon Justice of Appeal VK Rajah classified abuse of process into four categories involving deception, ulterior motives, baseless claims or vexatious multiple filings. However, the new section 3(1)(db) departs from prior case law by not requiring that multiple proceedings cause “improper vexation or oppression” to qualify as abuse. I would appreciate if the hon Minister of State can clarify whether this omission was intentional or if successive meritless filings alone per se are deemed inherently vexatious.

Fourthly and finally, I have some suggestions on public awareness. The prevention of frivolous or repeated claims serves a dual purpose: first, safeguarding judicial resources; and second, protecting the public. Frivolous litigants sometimes seek public donations under misleading pretenses, potentially duping well-meaning supporters. It may be beneficial for the judiciary to establish a publicly accessible database of debarred litigants, enabling members of the public to verify claimants before contributing financially. I also suggest that the judiciary provide transparent data on the resources expended on frivolous cases, allowing the public to appreciate and understand the importance of safeguarding judicial resources.

Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, the Courts and our Judiciary are not just providers of public service but a key Organ of State and essential branch of the Westminster System. In this regard, I quote from the president of the supreme court of the UK, the Right Hon Lord Reed, on the key role of the Courts: “At the heart of the concept of the rule of law is the idea that society is governed by law. Parliament exists primarily in order to make laws for society... Courts exist in order to ensure that the laws made by Parliament, and the common law created by the courts themselves, are applied and enforced… In order for the courts to perform that role, people must in principle have unimpeded access to them. Without such access, laws are liable to become a dead letter, the work done by Parliament may be rendered nugatory, and the democratic election of Members of Parliament may become a meaningless charade. That is why the courts do not merely provide a public service like any other.”

In conclusion, Sir, it is essential to protect our justice system from exploitation by vexatious litigants, whose actions deplete valuable judicial resources and erode public confidence in our legal system.

However, this Bill must not deter legitimate advocacy or prevent lawyers from fearlessly defending their clients within the bounds of the law. A lawyer’s duty is to balance loyalty to the client with an unwavering commitment to justice and fairness. Quoting from Robert Kennedy: "Courage is the most important attribute of a lawyer. It is more important than competence or vision. It can never be an elective in any law school. It can never be delimited, dated or outworn. And it should pervade the heart, the halls of justice and the chambers of the mind."

When we enhance our legal system by deterring abusive practices, we must still preserve the principles of fearless yet responsible advocacy, as lawyers are not mere agents of clients’ desires but officers of the Court who must advocate responsibly and ethically. Mr Deputy Speaker, I stand in support of the Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Ms Sylvia Lim.

3.27 pm

Ms Sylvia Lim (Aljunied): Mr Deputy Speaker, my understanding is that this Bill was motivated by certain matters that came before our Courts. Two matters come to mind. First, there were the two claims filed by a spurned boyfriend, which a Court found were commenced with the ulterior motive of pressuring a girlfriend not to terminate the relationship.

Second, there was a criminal case where a convicted drug trafficker was found to have filed a meritless court application for the purpose of delaying his sentence of caning till he reached 50 years of age when he could not be legally caned, the Farid Batra case. This case was referred to by the Minister of State earlier and is also listed in the handout that he distributed.

In Farid Batra's case, he was initially sentenced to death for drug trafficking but was later certified by the Prosecution to be a courier who had rendered substantive assistance, which led to the Court re-sentencing him to life imprisonment and 15 strokes of the cane. Since then, he has filed several applications for review of his conviction, as well as to bring a prisoner to Court, which were dismissed by the Court of Appeal either as speculative or an abuse of process.

In the latest application in 2022, he applied for permission to commence a judicial review on the basis that a co-accused person should have faced an additional charge and received a heavier punishment. The Court found that Mr Farid Batra did not have sufficient interest to start that action and that his real purpose was to delay his sentence of caning till he passed his 50th birthday and could not be caned.

The Judge there expressed frustration that he did not have any options to punish Farid Batra for his abuse of court process, as he was a prisoner already serving life imprisonment, for whom there was no downside in mounting meritless applications.

The Court further stated that he "would leave it to the Executive and Legislature to consider whether and what action can be taken in future instances of abusive applications by litigants and those advising, assisting or egging them on". So, there appears to be a gap that needs to be addressed. What does this Bill provide then?

Clause 2 of the Bill introduces a new section 3(da), which will make it a contempt of court for any person to conduct or commence a court proceeding when he knows or ought to know that the proceeding involves a deception of the court, is fictitious or constitutes a mere sham. It would also be a contempt if the proceeding is manifestly groundless and involves the process of the court being employed for an ulterior or improper purpose. The spurned boyfriend comes to mind here.

The Bill also introduced a proposed section 3D(b), where it will also amount to contempt if a person conducts or commences multiple or successive court proceedings when he knows all to know that such proceedings are manifestly groundless and without foundation. Farid Batra's case appears to possibly fall within this provision.

Sir, in assessing whether this Bill is needed, it is useful to take stock of the tools already available to handle court applications that amount to an abuse of process. In this light, I have four queries on the Bill.

First, on capital cases. Two years ago, Parliament passed the Post-Appeal Applications and Capital Cases Act, or PACC, which came into effect in June this year. Under PACC, strict conditions have been imposed on when additional applications can be made to the Court in capital cases where the usual avenues of appeal have been exhausted.

As this Act has just been operationalised, it is only fair to wait and see whether it is adequate to manage court proceedings in capital cases. This Bill provides a factual scenario in Illustration 4 where the offender is convicted of rape, which is a non-capital offence. Is this an indication that the provisions are really targeted at non-capital cases?

Secondly, on how the Bill will solve the problem in cases like Farid Batra's. As mentioned earlier, Farid Batra was sentenced to jail for life. Even if he were to be convicted for contempt of court, an additional jail term imposed may not have any deterrent effect. How will the new contempt provisions discourage the filing of meritless applications in such situations?

Third, the impact on civil cases. No doubt, the use of lawfare to oppress defendants is a concern. At the same time, MinLaw recognises that there are existing court procedures that enable typical civil cases to be struck out for lacking merit and for the losing party to be ordered to pay legal costs. So, where do we draw the line as to which cases are tantamount to a contempt of court and which are better off being dealt with by the usual rules of civil procedure?

One must remember that contempt of court is a very serious matter which carries a heavy punishment. For example, a contempt of the High Court carries a potential fine of up to $100,000 and a jail term of up to three years. Therefore, these provisions must not be triggered lightly and the bar must be set very high.

MinLaw has stated that the contempt law will not cover cases where litigants and lawyers have acted with reasonable care and good faith. Neither should the contempt laws be invoked in cases where existing procedures to deal with the situation are adequate. Would it not be preferable to codify these carve-outs so as to give further confidence to those acting in good faith?

Sir, my fourth and final query relates to why lawyers are being specifically included in the provisions. Here, I declare that I am an advocate and solicitor. As we know, lawyers are officers of the Court and already subject to the control of the Supreme Court through the Legal Profession Act. We see this disciplinary aspect exercised every day in various ways.

For instance, whenever lawyers are assessed by the Court to have conducted a case in a way that amounts to an abuse of the court process, the Court may order them to pay costs personally, that is, out of their own pockets. Alternatively, lawyers are periodically referred by the Courts or the Attorney-General to face disciplinary proceedings for any misconduct. The outcome of such proceedings could be a striking of the role, suspension, financial penalties and so on. These are hardly trivial.

In the case of Farid Batra, who had no lawyer representing him in the latest case, the Judge observed that if he were represented by a lawyer and I quote the Judge here, "The lawyer could expect substantial severe consequences." This appears to be an acknowledgement by the Court that there are already sufficient disciplinary and deterrent measures against lawyers.

Earlier in the handout, the Minister of State highlighted an extrajudicial lecture by the Chief Justice where he spoke about truth decay and how lawyers might be complicit in that process. But it is not clear from the extract that the Chief Justice was actually calling for additional measures against lawyers. So, I would like the Minister of State to clarify this point.

MinLaw has stated in its October press release that key stakeholders had been consulted on the Bill, including the Judiciary. Earlier, the Minister of State mentioned that he spoke to several members of the Bar as well. But I would like to ask whether the Law Society was specifically consulted and, if so, what were its views? Could the Ministry further clarify why the existing framework for disciplining lawyers is not adequate to handle the scenarios emphasised by the Bill?

Sir, in summary, I do not oppose this Bill, but the clarifications I have sought would be useful and necessary.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Yip Hon Weng.

3.35 pm

Mr Yip Hon Weng (Yio Chu Kang): Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, this Bill provides a timely and necessary response to the increasing misuse of our court processes. These abuses squander public resources and judicial time. They also hurt genuine victims who need fair and prompt resolutions. I am confident that the provisions in this Bill will booster the integrity of our judicial system.

While I endorse the intent and spirit of this legislation, I would like to seek further clarifications on four key areas.

Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, my first concern is how stricter contempt of court laws might affect those with valid grievances. While I support the need to curb abusive litigation, we must be careful not to discourage individuals with genuine grievances from seeking justice. This requires a delicate balance. We must deter bad faith actors without dissuading those with sincere, if ultimately unsuccessful, claims.

Take for instance, a recent case under current contempt laws. A blogger was charged with contempt for making unfounded accusations against the Judiciary. He implied that the Judiciary was swayed by the Government. The Court found that his statements had the potential to erode public trust in our Judiciary. This led to a contempt charge.

I believe this case was ultimately shown to be a good use of the law. It highlights the fine line we tread between maintaining the integrity of our Courts and protecting freedom of expression. Addressing harmful and unsubstantiated allegations is undoubtedly important. Yet, we must be cautious that the tightening of contempt provisions does not stifle legitimate discourse.

Thus, Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, I seek clarification on how the amendments will differentiate between genuine claims, if even unsuccessful, and those deemed contemptuous. What safeguards are in place to protect individuals who may unintentionally bring forward claims, later classified as groundless? Could these legislations deter residents, especially those with limited legal knowledge, from exercising their right to justice? And might these amendments dissuade pro bono lawyers from supporting disadvantaged residents due to potential repercussions? It is essential that as we curb misuse of the Court's time, we do not inadvertently silence legitimate cries for justice due to fears of unintended legal consequences.

Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, my second point concerns the potential impact on vulnerable residents. Stricter contempt provisions may disproportionately affect those who face financial or legal challenges, as they may feel the chilling effects of these amendments most acutely. Navigating the legal system can be daunting, even for those with resources. The risk of contempt charges may discourage self-represented litigants, especially those with sincere claims, from coming forward.

How will these amendments protect those who lack the resources to fully understand legal complexities? Are there plans to conduct public education campaigns to help residents understand what constitutes a manifestly groundless claim? Additionally, how can community legal clinics and support services help mitigate this risk for residents? Ensuring access to justice requires that we balance curbing misuse while maintaining protections for the vulnerable. This is essential to uphold equitable access to our legal system for all residents.

Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, my third concern addresses the role of legal advisors and the implications of holding them accountable for pursuing groundless claims. Accountability is vital, but we must consider how this might affect lawyers' willingness to take up pro bono or challenging cases, particularly those with a public interest angle but uncertain outcomes.

A case in 2022 illustrates this dilemma, where two lawyers were ordered to pay personal costs due to their conduct in a case. Their approach was deemed problematic as they introduced evidence piecemeal and at the last minute. These examples highlight the tension lawyers may face when advocating passionately for their clients. The Court's reaction highlights the necessity of adhering to procedural rules. However, it is also important to acknowledge that in critical cases, legal counsel might be driven to explore every possible option to advert potential miscarriages of justice.

Should there be clearer guidelines for legal advisors on what constitutes "ought to have known" when assessing case merit, could heightened liability raise legal costs for residents as lawyers factor in greater risk? What recourse will residents have if they feel their lawyer has not accurately represented the risk of contempt under this amendment?

Clarity is essential, not only for those seeking justice, but also for the legal professionals who guide them. This will help ensure fair, accessible and equitable representation for all.

Finally, Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, I wish to address public perception and trust in our legal system. While the amendments are well-intentioned, they could unintentionally create a sense of reduced access to justice amongst the public. Maintaining public confidence in our Court's accessibility and fairness is paramount.

The blogger case I mentioned earlier sparked considerable debates, both locally and internationally, on freedom of expression and fairness in our legal system. Human rights organisations and international media outlets cited the case as an example of perceived suppression of free speech. This shows that striking a balance between upholding respect for the Judiciary and preserving public trust is not only delicate but essential.

Therefore, what steps will the Government take to ensure these changes do not undermine public confidence in our justice system? Could more detailed public reporting on cases deemed manifestly groundless help clarify the rationale for these amendments? Transparency in how these provisions are applied could reinforce the public's understanding and trust in the system. A just society is built not only on the laws we enact, but on the public's trust in those laws and their fair and transparent application.

In conclusion, Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, I stand in strong support of the Administration of Justice Protection (Amendment) Bill. Its aims are praiseworthy. I believe these amendments will reinforce the backbone of our legal system. But to ensure its full impact, we must address the potential challenges it brings. As we implement these changes, let us make sure that they achieve a fair and balanced system, one that deters abuse without discouraging genuine claims, supports vulnerable residents, respects the role of our legal advisors and strengthens public trust in our Judiciary.

This is a call for a justice system that is not just efficient, but compassionate and accessible to all Singaporeans. I urge the Ministry to provide the necessary clarifications and safeguards so that this Bill can truly protect the integrity of our courts while honouring the rights of our residents. Let us, together, build a justice system that inspires confidence and upholds the principles we all stand by. I support the Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Louis Ng.

3.42 pm

Mr Louis Ng Kok Kwang (Nee Soon): This Bill clarifies that egregious abuses of court process amounts to contempt of court. While the amendments are intended to prevent abuse of judicial processes through frivolous and vexatious litigation, we should also minimise any potentially unimpeded impact.

I have three points of clarification to raise.

My first point is on what constitutes deception of the court. The new section 3(1)(da) makes it contempt of court to conduct or commence proceedings if they involve a deception of the court, are fictitious or constitutes a mere sham. It is fair litigation strategy to commence court proceedings even if a party's intention is to amicably settle the matter. Starting court proceedings is a commonly used tactic to signal to the other party the seriousness and strength of the other party's case.

Commencing court proceedings with the intention of settling the case could be, in the strictest sense, a deception of the court or fictitious, in the sense that the party had no intention of seeing the proceedings all the way through to trial. Can the Minister of State elaborate on how it would distinguish between cases that would be deemed deception of the court and the use of court proceedings as part of fair litigation strategy?

My second point is on what constitutes court proceedings that are manifestly groundless or without foundation. It is not unusual for lawyers and their clients to disagree on whether certain claims have merit or are supported by evidence. In certain cases, clients might instruct their lawyers to proceed with claims, even if they have been advised that the claims are weak. In other cases, clients may instruct their lawyers to file claims in the hope that more evidence will emerge through discovery to support their initially unsupported claims.

There are existing mechanisms, such as striking out and cost orders, to deal with unmeritorious claims. However, as MinLaw has clarified, the amendments are not intended to cover typical cases that are struck out for the reason that it has no merit. Can the Minister of State clarify the qualitative difference between a case that is manifestly groundless or without foundation and a case that simply has no merit?

Given that the test is that the individual know or ought to know, the standard is an objective one. Uncertainty on how the objective test is set leads to the concerns of parties pursuing an aggressive litigation strategy, unwittingly committing contempt of court.

My third and final point is on the expansion of contempt liability to non-parties. Under the new section 3(7), individuals who cause or abet parties or advocates to file sham or groundless proceedings may be accountable for contempt of court. Can the Minister of State provide specific examples of influence by third parties that fall under the scope of section 3(7)?

It is not unusual for litigants to seek advice and support from acquaintances and advisors on the conduct of their litigation. For some litigants, support from non-government organisations is very important in helping them in navigating the legal system. This is the reason why the State Courts have its Community Courts and Tribunals Clusters Friend Scheme. Section 3(7) may cause these well-meaning individuals to be fearful of providing much needed support for litigants to pursue justice.

Sir, notwithstanding these clarifications, I stand in support of the Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Minister of State Murali Pillai.

3.46 pm

Mr Murali Pillai: Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, I thank the hon Members who spoke on the Bill for their questions, suggestions and support. I am heartened that hon Members agree on the importance of safeguarding our court system.

Before I respond to the specific questions, let me reiterate a key point which I made in my opening speech. The amendments in the Bill reflect what is already the current law and are clarificatory in nature. The primary effect of the amendments is to signpost the types of abuse of process which would amount to contempt of court. Some of the questions posed by hon Members assume that the Bill makes our contempt of court laws stricter or tighter. That is not the intent. The amendments do not lower the current threshold for contempt of court. I ask hon Members to keep this broader point in mind, as I provide my responses to the specific questions raised.

I start with the balance between promoting access to justice and the need to deter abuse of process. The hon Member Mr Yip Hon Weng asked how the amendments might affect those with valid grievances, including vulnerable residents and self-represented persons. He also asked whether the amendments could create a sense of reduced access to justice.

The Government, as hon Members would be aware, has taken significant steps in recent years to improve access to justice. I spoke about some of these steps in my opening speech, such as the setting up of specialised Courts with simplified processes. Needy Singaporeans can also access legal aid through the Legal Aid Bureau and the Public Defender's Office. We also work closely with partners, like ProBono SG, to promote access to justice in the community. This includes supporting ProBono SG in setting up community law centres in the heartlands – at the Tian De Temple in Hougang last year and in the Realm of Tranquility in Woodlands earlier this year. If any member of our community has a genuine claim and requires legal assistance, there are resources available.

The amendments we are introducing in the Bill will not affect such genuine claims. Rather, they are targeted at egregious abuses of the court processes, such as the filing of fictitious claims or commencing baseless proceedings motivated by an improper purpose. One does not need to be a lawyer to know that such conduct is wrong.

I should add that deterring abuse of process and promoting access to justice are, in fact, complementary goals. This is because abusive claims drain the limited resources of our Judiciary, thereby reducing access to justice for genuine litigants. In other words, deterring abusive claims is necessary to maintaining access to justice and public trust in the legal system.

Next, I move on to the specific issues raised by hon Members.

Ms Sylvia Lim asked what kinds of cases this Bill is targeted at. As I have stated earlier, the Bill will apply to all cases before our Singapore Courts, including criminal and civil cases. So, it is of general application. The hon Member Ms Sylvia Lim also noted that there are some persons, such as offenders serving a life sentence, who would see no "downside" in making multiple court applications. We acknowledge that the deterrent effect of the amendments may be limited in such cases. However, in the case of Mohammad Farid bin Batra v Attorney-General, which the hon Member mentioned, the Court also referred to third parties who advised, assisted or egged on the offenders to commit such conduct, and these amendments are still important to deter such persons.

I next turn to questions raised on the legal elements of the new provisions. Mr Louis Ng asked what constitutes deception on the court and the definition of the phrase "manifestly groundless or without foundation". These phrases are based on the current case law on abuse of process, and the leading case of Chee Siok Chin v MHA, as I mentioned earlier in my speech. It would not be possible for me to make detailed pronouncements on how these standards should be applied by the Courts. Whether these thresholds are met will depend on the particular facts. However, let me share some general points.

On the ground of deception on the court, the cases that have been found to have transgressed this limb typically involve egregious conduct, such as claims which are founded on a fictitious factual premise. To put it simply, where the claim is based on a falsehood. Our intention is not to capture fair litigation strategy. This is something for the Court to assess in each case.

On the phrase "manifestly groundless or without foundation", an important point for hon Members to note is that even if the case is found to be without merit, that, in itself, is insufficient to amount to contempt of court under the amendments. There must be other abusive factors present, such as the bringing of the claim for an improper purpose under the new section 3(1)(da)(ii) or the filing of multiple or successive claims under the new section 3(1)(db). This is the reason why I stated in my opening speech earlier that the amendments are not intended to cover the typical case that is struck out for the sole reason that it has no merit.

The hon Member Mr Zhulkarnain asked about section 3(1)(db). The section covers the conduct of multiple or successive proceedings which the person knows or ought to have known is manifestly groundless or without foundation. Specifically, Mr Zhulkarnain asked why the section does not also contain the requirement that the proceedings would cause "improper vexation or oppression".

As I explained in my opening speech, the provisions in the Bill are different from the categories of abuse of process at common law. We have carefully scoped our proposals to capture egregious abuses of process that would interfere with, or obstruct, our administration of justice. This is conduct that would already be captured under the current section 3(1)(e) of the AOJPA. But our amendments provide clarity on how the general standard applies to specific contexts. In particular, the purpose of the new section 3(1)(db) is to address the harm to the court system, as a whole, caused when a person files multiple or successive proceedings that are manifestly groundless. A multiplicity of such baseless proceedings diverts precious resources away from deserving cases and the harm is not limited to the vexation or oppression of the other party.

In addition, there could be other culpable motivations for a person to file multiple or successive proceedings besides improper vexation or oppression. For instance, the person may file successive baseless claims to delay proceedings. Again, this is harmful to our administration of justice, which ought to be deterred.

I move on to liability of non-parties. The hon Member, Mr Zhulkarnain, observed that third parties can already be liable for contempt in certain circumstances. He asked whether the new section 3(7), which covers persons who cause or abet abusive conduct represents a change in the current position. The answer is no. As with the other new provisions, section 3(7) is clarificatory in nature. In particular, section 3(1)(e) of the Act already covers "any person" who does "any other act that interferes with, obstructs or poses a real risk of interference with or obstruction of the administration of justice in any other manner". This may include persons who cause or abet other forms of contempt of court.

Hon Members Mr Louis Ng and Mr Zhulkarnain also asked about the scope of third-party liability. Mr Louis Ng asked whether the amendments may inadvertently capture well-meaning individuals. Mr Zhulkarnain also asked if the provisions would extend to those who fund frivolous actions, including members of the public who participate in crowdfunding. Under the Bill, non-parties will only be caught under the new section 3(7) if the Court finds that the non-party: one, caused or abetted the types of abuse of process set out in sections 3(1)(da) and 3(1)(db); and two, knew or ought to have known of the abusive nature of the court proceeding.

To give an example, this would cover third parties who instigate others to commit egregious abuse of process. The Court will examine the particular facts, including what the non-party knew or ought to have known, when considering whether the non-party is liable for contempt of court.

I next turn to the impact of the amendments on lawyers. Hon Member, Mr Yip Hon Weng, asked whether there could be guidelines on what lawyers ought to know when assessing the merits of a case. Mr Zhulkarnain suggested a carve-out if the lawyer advises his client that he or she has a bad case, but the client nevertheless instructs the lawyer to proceed.

As Mr Zhulkarnain rightly noted in his speech, lawyers are already held to high professional standards. They owe paramount duties as officers of the Court. They are also bound by obligations under the Professional Conduct Rules. Thus, we are not changing the standards that lawyers need to uphold when dealing with clients or assessing the merits of the case. As I elaborated in some detail in my opening speech, lawyers who act with reasonable care and in good faith have nothing to fear.

I should also stress that the amendments only capture egregious abuse of process. Where the client insists on proceeding with an abusive claim against the lawyer's advice, the standards and expectations are clear. As the Court of Three Judges noted in a recent disciplinary proceeding, the duty of the lawyer is, and I quote: "to dispense his professional duties with moral courage and independence in the face of pressures from his clients. It is open to the solicitor to inform his client of the conflicting duty on account of the instructions and, if necessary, to discharge himself from acting for the client." The fact that the client insists on proceeding is not, and cannot be, an excuse for the lawyer to commit an egregious abuse of process.

The hon Member, Ms Sylvia Lim, asked why the existing levers available for lawyers, including disciplinary proceedings, are inadequate. Disciplinary proceedings and contempt proceedings serve different purposes. Contempt of court serves a broader purpose than other levers, as it is aimed at protecting our justice system as a whole. Thus, contempt proceedings are instituted by the state, unlike the other levers, which are sought by individuals in the case of cost orders, or professional bodies in the case of disciplinary actions. The existing levers, such as cost orders, may be appropriate for less serious cases, but may not be adequate for egregious cases of abuse of process. Proceedings for contempt of court, which carry criminal sanctions, are also meant to protect the administration of justice, which goes beyond just one case.

The hon Member Ms Sylvia Lim also suggested that it should be codified in the Bill that provisions do not cover persons who act with reasonable care and good faith. It is inherent in the elements of the provisions that such persons would not be caught in line with our policy intent. Let me explain.

The mental element provided for in the provisions is that the person must have known or ought to have known of the abusive nature of the application. In cases where a person acted with actual knowledge, then it is self-evident, they could not have acted in good faith. On the standard on "ought to have known", the question for the court to assess, is whether the person could have reasonably known of the abusive nature of the application. This is a contextual standard of reasonableness, which would not capture those who act with reasonable care and good faith. So, in a sense, we are ad idem on the net effect, because the point about codifying a defence is already embedded in the ingredients provided for in the amendment Bill.

Mr Zhulkarnain also suggested having a database of frivolous litigants and that the public be provided with more information on the resources and costs involved in such cases. Mr Yip Hon Weng likewise suggested more detailed public reporting. I thank the hon Members for the suggestions. We will consider if more can be done to raise public awareness in this area. However, I should add that cases involving contempt of court are already publicly reported when the Court issues its judgment.

Finally, the hon Member Ms Sylvia Lim asked if the Law Society has been consulted on this Bill and what its views were. As I mentioned in my opening speech, key stakeholders were consulted. These include the Judiciary and the Attorney-General’s Chambers. We also spoke with the representatives from the Law Society. These were senior members of the Bar across various practice groups with extensive experience in litigation.

There was consensus on the importance of safeguarding our justice system. And as I mentioned in my speech, there were also concerns from some lawyers as to whether these amendments will hamper them from doing their best for their clients, particularly in difficult cases. I promised them I would deal with their concerns in my opening speech and that is what I did.

Conversations like these help us find the appropriate balance to promote an effective justice system. That is why we have regular, ongoing, conversations with our key stakeholders, including the members of the Bar. As always, the Ministry is open to further feedback on our policies.

With that, Sir, I conclude my round up speech and I once again thank the hon Members again for their support for the Bill. Sir, I beg to move.

4.02 pm

Mr Deputy Speaker: Are there any clarifications? None? I shall put the question to the House.

Question put, and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House.

The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. – [The Minister of State for Law (Mr Murali Pillai)].

Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Order. I propose to take a break now. I suspend the Sitting and will take the Chair at 4.30 pm.

Sitting accordingly suspended

at 4.05 pm until 4.30 pm.

Sitting resumed at 4.30 pm.

[Mr Speaker in the Chair]