Safeguards to Prevent Entry into Singapore by Individuals Using Fraudulent Documents or Data

2 Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim asked the Minister for Home Affairs in light of the case of a foreign preacher who entered Singapore using a passport with a different name, what are the lessons learnt to increase border security, including the usage of biometric data or other technological tools.

3 Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim asked the Minister for Home Affairs in light of the recent case of a foreign preacher delivering an illegal sermon in a dormitory in Tuas, what are the rules governing the use of foreign worker dormitories for events involving speakers or religious preachers.

4 Mr Yip Hon Weng asked the Minister for Home Affairs in view of the undetected entry of an extremist preacher on 9 August 2024 (a) how does the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority (ICA) mitigate the risk of individuals using fraudulent documents to enter Singapore, especially with increased automation at immigration checkpoints; (b) beyond the use of biometrics, what other safeguards, such as equipping frontline personnel with lists of individuals of concern, are in place to identify dangerous individuals; and (c) what concrete steps will ICA take to enhance the detection of such individuals.

5 Mr Melvin Yong Yik Chye asked the Minister for Home Affairs (a) how effective are the measures deployed by the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority to detect and prevent undesirable travellers from entering Singapore by using a valid passport but with a different name; and (b) how prevalent have such attempts been made in the past three years.

6 Mr Pritam Singh asked the Minister for Home Affairs whether the Bangladeshi religious preacher who entered and delivered a sermon in Singapore on 9 August 2024 is on any watchlist in the possession of Home Team security agencies.

7 Mr Ang Wei Neng asked the Minister for Home Affairs (a) whether the Ministry can provide an update on the investigation into the case of a Bangladeshi preacher giving illegal sermons at a dormitory in Tuas; (b) whether any person has been detained in relation to the said incident; and (c) how many times has the Bangladeshi preacher entered Singapore in the last 10 years and how many times has he preached in Singapore.

8 Mr Neil Parekh Nimil Rajnikant asked the Minister for Home Affairs (a) whether the Ministry will be taking steps to ensure that dormitory owners comply with all rules and regulations before permitting foreign speakers from conducting talks or programmes to migrant workers residing in their dormitories; (b) to date, how many cases of foreign visitors who have conducted an event without valid permits have been detected in foreign worker dormitories; and (c) what are some of the penalties in place to deal with the dormitory owners when such incidents occur.

The Minister for Home Affairs (Mr K Shanmugam): Sir, with your permission, can I take together the questions relating to the case of the foreign preacher, Amir Hamza? The questions are from Mr Yip Hon Weng, Mr Neil Parekh, Mr Melvin Yong, Mr Ang Wei Neng, Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim and Mr Pritam Singh.

Mr Speaker: Please proceed.

Mr K Shanmugam: Thank you, Sir. My reply will also address a similar question raised by Mr Sharael Taha¹ for a subsequent Sitting.

Amir Hamza was invited by a dormitory operator. He came into Singapore on Independence Day, 9 August 2024. He preached to a group to Bangladeshi migrant workers on the same day at a dormitory. And he did so without a permit – that was unlawful.

In his sermon, he made statements which were extremist and segregationist. He left Singapore next day, on 10 August 2024.

Members have raised a number of questions, whether Amir Hamza was on the watchlist of the security agencies and, more broadly, the way in which persons come through Singapore’s borders.

There are a number of steps taken at our borders, as many Members will be aware. Nationals of some countries are required to apply for visas even before they come in – Bangladesh is one such country. Applications from those on our watchlist or otherwise raise some questions, will usually be rejected.

All travellers are also required to submit an SG Arrival Card before arriving in Singapore. The Immigration and Checkpoints Authority (ICA) uses that information, other information it receives and information from advance passenger lists from airlines, including flight manifests, and other sources of information, to conduct a pre-arrival risk assessment of the travellers.

When the travellers come into Singapore, they are screened against a watchlist of persons, even as they undergo immigration clearance. Those on the watchlist or are identified to be of higher risk by ICA’s backend data analytics will be checked further. ICA officers also look out for persons' reasons for visiting Singapore that may appear dubious or for other reasons that may require further checking, and these travellers might be required to undergo further checks.

In July 2020, we also introduced the Multi-Modal Biometric System. First-time visitors will have their facial, iris and fingerprint images captured at immigration clearance, and that allows us to better detect repeat visitors who may try and come in using multiple identities or impersonated identities. For foreign visitors, this is usually done on the first occasion they visit Singapore. Our automated gates are generally able to detect forged passports as well.

Since 2022, every month, about 30 visitors with legitimate passports but containing a different identity from ICA’s records were detected and refused entry. In all, for various reasons, about 2,500 visitors are refused entry at our checkpoints every month.

Amir Hamza was on our watchlist. The Internal Security Department (ISD) had put him on the watchlist and that is because he had made statements promoting religious intolerance and for a few other reasons. He applied for a visa to enter Singapore using a passport with a name that was different from what we had in our database and therefore, that other name was not our watchlist. And he used that passport on 9 August to come into Singapore. As this was his first visit to Singapore, we did not have his biometrics. If he tries to come back again, regardless of what other passports he uses, he will be picked up because we now have his biometrics.

Members have asked questions, broadly, about the security at our borders. There are about 600,000 travellers every day coming and going across all our checkpoints. Members will appreciate – we have to develop a framework for picking up some people of concern while allowing the vast majority to clear as quickly as possible. We need to strike a balance between security and facilitation at our borders. It is not possible nor practicable to subject every visitor, obviously, to stringent, detailed checks and interviews. No country has a comprehensive database of every criminal or person of security concern across the world. Certainly, Singapore does not have such a database.

So, in summary, in terms of persons coming in, the majority of persons who are perceived to have dubious reasons or purposes for coming into Singapore are picked up either through the visa scheme or even without visas, through other information that we have at various levels. And as I have said, about 2,500 are rejected every month – some of them with visas, some of them without visas. But it is always possible that a small number will get through despite the several levels of checks. Members must also understand that the levels of checks and our information-gathering varies depending on the type and extent of risks. Obviously, ISD together with its foreign counterparts will have a closer awareness of persons who may want to do us physical harm in Singapore. I will not go into operational considerations, but there are a number of ways in which those persons would be picked up more easily. No system is foolproof, but there are different levels of checks.

Members have also asked about the rules and regulations governing events at migrant worker dormitories and the actions the Government has taken to ensure that dormitory operators comply.

The Public Order Act requires event organisers to apply for a Police permit for cause-based events that are open to the public. The speech at the dormitory would be one such event. It applies to events involving religious teachings, regardless of whether the event takes place within a dormitory or elsewhere.

Specifically for foreign worker dormitories, the Foreign Employee Dormitories Act imposes licence conditions that require operators to keep updated records of all non-residents, including visitors or contractors, who enter the living areas of the dormitories.

Third, foreigners who wish to speak at public events that are religious, cause-based or political in nature are required to obtain a Miscellaneous Work Pass under the Employment of Foreign Manpower Act. The Ministry of Manpower consults relevant agencies, including ISD, in its assessment when such applications are received.

In this case, investigations are ongoing. No arrests have yet been made. The offences that are being looked into include participation in an unlawful assembly under the Public Order Act and not obtaining a Miscellaneous Work Permit required under the Employment of Foreign Manpower Act.

The dormitory operator was also the event organiser. He is being investigated for several offences including those under the Public Order Act, Employment of Foreign Manpower Act and Foreign Employee Dormitories Act.

Mr Neil Parekh Nimil Rajnikant asked how often such illegal events occur within our migrant worker dormitories. I assume he meant events without authorisation. Based on our records and assessments, this sort of event does not usually take place. It is very rare because somebody will have to be actively in breach of all of these requirements. And of course, if we detect it, swift action will be taken.

We will continue to educate and remind our dormitory operators to ensure that they obtain the relevant approvals before conducting such activities in the dormitories. And of course, our best safeguard is a public that stays vigilant and reports these sorts of individuals and activities to the agencies.

Mr Speaker: Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim.

Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim (Chua Chu Kang): Thank you, Speaker. I thank the Minister and our Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and ISD officers for the swift actions taken. I have two supplementary questions.

Firstly, on exploring new technologies to help our ICA security officers at the borders, according to international studies, on the average, typically, border security officers have about 12 seconds to decide whether the traveller is allowed to cross the border. Can the Minister explain how MHA is committed to continue adopting artificial intelligence (AI) or new technologies like gait recognition technology, the way we walk, or reverse facial recognition tools to detect someone?

Secondly, I understand that further investigations are ongoing for this particular case. But for context, do Bangladeshi nationals visiting Singapore require visas and letters of introduction (LOIs) from a local contact here and also go through a list of authorised visa agents there? Given this incident, would MHA investigate the local contact on the LOI issued, review the process of the list of authorised visa agents and perhaps require biometric data to be provided and review, generally speaking, the process for visa applications?

Mr K Shanmugam: On the first question, we have to use technology, and we are using technology and people have gone through our borders. We see increasingly more and more technology being introduced; multimodal biometric is one example. Singaporeans can now pretty much walk through. For foreigners, once they enrol, they can also use the systems.

We want to make the airport and checkpoint experience smooth because, remember, the vast majority of persons who are coming into Singapore are coming in for business, tourist or social reasons, for valid purposes. And we cannot make their experience a difficult one. So, this is what I meant by balance between security and Singapore's economy, well-being and as a welcoming place for tourists and others who are coming into Singapore. A very small number come with bad intentions and our systems have so far been robust enough to pick most of them up.

Mr Zhulkarnain spoke about gait and movements, those are all items, part of data that have long been used. There are technologies, there are techniques, it is some sort of science, and we work with other agencies across the world to study these and train our officers on these.

To the second question, yes, there would normally be a visa. There would have to be a sponsor and there will have to be an agent. But in this case, there was a visa, there was a sponsor, but there is no agent because the person who sponsored is related to the dormitory operator and that person is being investigated as well.

Mr Speaker: Mr Pritam Singh.

Mr Pritam Singh (Aljunied): Mr Speaker, just a single question for the Minister. With regard to the visa application process, I seek the Minister's confirmation whether a photograph also was required to be submitted by the preacher in the course of his visa application and whether there are particular processes by which that individual, as he is pictorially represented or represented in the picture, is cross-checked with the watchlist. And if there is no such process, can the Minister confirm whether, beyond my supplementary question, improvements are being considered to capture individuals who are already existing on a watchlist and clearly present a different level of threat, as compared to the average person who walks through our immigration gates?

Mr K Shanmugam: Visas require photographs. Photographs, I believe, were submitted, I have not checked on this case. The normal process would be that it would be cross-checked against the watchlist. It depends on the type of photograph that is submitted and the quality of the photograph. It may not always pick up against the database that we have and, without going into details, I think the Member also assumes that in our database, there will be photographs of all those who are listed in the watchlist.

As I said, no country in the world has such a comprehensive set of data on all potential persons who might have to be excluded. Sometimes, we will only have names without photographs. As for the ability to cross-check, my understanding is that our systems are very advanced and if there is a broad match in the photographs, they would have picked it up. But the question assumes that we had a photograph to cross-check against.

Mr Speaker: Mr Yip Hon Weng.

Mr Yip Hon Weng (Yio Chu Kang): Mr Speaker, I thank the Minister for his reply. My question pertains to immigration. While automation and biometrics are vital in modern immigration processes, there may be concerns about over-reliance on technology. Can the Minister elaborate on the rationale behind the current level of automation and how does it ensure that human judgement remains integral in identifying potential threats?

Mr K Shanmugam: I have explained the need for technology. Let us do a thought experiment. Let us do away with technology. Every single person, the 600,000 persons who are crossing our borders, will then have to be checked individually. And I think Members can appreciate that we might as well take a big hit on our economic sector. This is just not workable. You have to use technology.

But I think the Member's real question is to what extent is technology supplemented by the assessment by our officers and that is a fair question. It is supplemented to a significant degree. We use AI, we use other techniques. They help us but, in the end, there is also an assessment by officers on selected and specific cases. There are also officers at the various checkpoints assessing people as they are walking through, going through and some are picked up for additional checks.

Some are picked up based on information or documents submitted, while some are picked up based on our assessment of the individuals. And there have been a number of cases where the visas do not throw up anything and the passports are fine, but our officers, through their training, are able to assess that some individuals require further checks and quite often, that throws up persons who are carrying contraband, bringing in drugs or otherwise coming in with intentions that we do not agree with.

Mr Speaker: The Minister's response covered Parliamentary Question Nos 2 to 8 in today's Order Paper.