Proposal for Review of Operational Risks with Consolidation of RSAF's Assets in Fewer Airbases
Ministry of DefenceSpeakers
Summary
This question concerns MP Kenneth Tiong Boon Kiat’s inquiry on whether relocating Paya Lebar Air Base increases operational risks and vulnerability to drone attacks due to the consolidation of air assets. Coordinating Minister and Minister Chan Chun Sing stated that Singapore manages its lack of strategic depth through robust intelligence, early warning systems, and asset dispersal. He highlighted mitigation efforts like expanding Tengah and Changi Air Bases, lengthening the Pulau Sudong contingency runway, and enhancing detection capabilities against emerging drone threats. The Minister noted that the relocation decision factored in evolving risks and that the SAF continually assesses infrastructure requirements to ensure resilience and survivability. Most operational efforts remain confidential to ensure security and maintain a credible deterrent posture.
Transcript
12 Mr Kenneth Tiong Boon Kiat asked the Coordinating Minister for Public Services and Minister for Defence (a) whether the Ministry has conducted a strategic review of the decision to relocate Paya Lebar Air Base in light of recent global conflicts demonstrating the vulnerability of concentrated air assets to mass drone attacks and long-range munitions; and (b) whether such consolidation of the RSAF’s assets into fewer air bases significantly increases operational risks during a first-strike scenario.
The Coordinating Minister for Public Services and Minister for Defence (Mr Chan Chun Sing): Mr Speaker, Sir, as a small island with no strategic depth and hinterland to absorb an attack, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) needs to develop operational concepts and solutions that are uniquely suited to our security needs, while taking into consideration the competing needs for Singapore's limited land and finite human resources.
Broadly speaking, our circumstances require us to have a robust intelligence and effective threat detection and early warning systems at range, so that the SAF can mount timely and decisive responses with a suite of diversified capabilities across multiple layers and distances where necessary.
Even then, we may not be able to prevent all threats from reaching our shores. For this reason, our critical infrastructures and facilities are hardened against potential attacks, and our key assets can be dispersed in peace time and especially during contingencies. We have also factored in reserve capacities to ensure resilience for scenarios where some of our assets may be destroyed or damaged.
The decision to relocate Paya Lebar Air Base to free up land for national development purposes was a carefully considered one, taking into account the factors I have just mentioned, as well as then-emerging and now-evolving threats.
There are certainly trade-offs involved. We have undertaken a series of additional measures to manage the risks and challenges. For example, in terms of available airbases and runways, we have invested significant resources in expanding Tengah Air Base and Changi Air Base, and lengthening the contingency runway at Pulau Sudong. Tengah Air Base and Changi Air Base are also being upgraded with better detection, response and resilience capabilities, including against the emerging threats posed by drones. Enhancements are also being made in other parts of the SAF.
The SAF will continually assess our operational, infrastructure and capability requirements, taking into consideration the threats on the horizon and available technologies, while carefully weighing the costs and risks to Singapore. For good reason which Members will appreciate, many of our efforts are conducted out of the public eye and not disclosed. We will make public announcements at appropriate junctures should there be good operational and deterrence reasons to do so.
Mr Speaker: Mr Tiong.
Mr Kenneth Tiong Boon Kiat (Aljunied): Thank you, Speaker. Eleven days ago, the United States (US) conducted "Operation Absolute Resolve" in Venezuela. In two-and-a-half hours, the US forces struck four air bases with Kamikaze drones, destroyed Venezuela's Russian-supplied Buk-M2E air defences and eliminated aircraft on the ground.
By 2030, I believe these sorts of capabilities will become more widely distributed. So, what is the Ministry's assessment of our post-2030 posture's survivability against this type of strike? And does the Ministry believe that there are concentration risks to be mitigated?
Mr Chan Chun Sing: Mr Speaker, Sir, I will make two points in response to the Member's comment.
First, I have said that based on our geography, the risk of any strike on Singapore is always very high because we lack hinterland or depth – which is why our operational concepts are quite unique for our own operational needs. And I think I will not need to go into details on how we execute our operational concepts.
My second comment is in response to, not just Mr Kenneth Tiong's, but I sense many other Members' interest in the latest evolving technologies on the battlefield. Much has been said about drone warfare. It is not something new. It is something that we have been looking at for many years, even since I was an active member of the SAF.
Maybe to illustrate this point, I will just share a little vignette which Members may be aware of. In 2017's National Day Parade (NDP) – I wonder whether Members will remember the 2017 NDP – many people were impressed by the SAF's dynamic display. The most memorable scene from the 2017 National Day Display was the final act towards the end of the parade and ceremony, where we had our fireworks. Members may recall there was a display put up where we had 300 drones in the sky performing and forming a heart shape.
To many, this was a wonderful conclusion to a very nice NDP. To the informed observers who are in this line of business, we already knew what that meant for the nature of warfare.