Probe into Recent Disruptions of DBS' Digital Bank and Physical ATM Services and Preventive Measures Implemented
Prime Minister's OfficeSpeakers
Summary
This question concerns the cause of the DBS Bank service disruption on 5 May 2023 and measures to enhance bank reliability, as raised by Dr Tan Wu Meng. Senior Minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam explained that the disruption resulted from human error in coding during system maintenance, which significantly reduced system capacity for various banking services. He noted that the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) found the incident unacceptable and directed DBS’s Special Board Committee to conduct an independent review. MAS has imposed additional capital requirements on DBS and may take further regulatory actions depending on the findings of the ongoing comprehensive investigations. All retail banks must ensure mission-critical systems are resilient and undergo regular MAS inspections to verify adherence to regulatory requirements and recovery capabilities.
Transcript
35 Dr Tan Wu Meng asked the Prime Minister (a) what is the cause of the disruption to DBS Bank's digital banking services and physical ATM services on 5 May 2023; and (b) what is being done to strengthen the reliability and resilience of retail banks with significant market share in Singapore, especially with regard to digital banking services.
Mr Tharman Shanmugaratnam (for the Prime Minister): My response will cover the questions raised by both Dr Tan Wu Meng in today’s Order Paper and by Mr Desmond Choo filed for 4 July 2023’s Sitting.
The disruption of DBS Bank’s digital banking services on 5 May 2023 intermittently affected customers’ access to Internet and mobile banking, electronic payment and automated teller machine (ATM) services. DBS fully restored affected services after 6.5 hours. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has stated publicly that it regards this second disruption within a period of two months as unacceptable and that DBS had fallen short of MAS’ expectation for banks to deliver reliable services to their customers.
DBS’ preliminary investigations showed that the disruption was due to human error in coding the programme that was used for system maintenance. The error led to a significant reduction in system capacity which, in turn, affected the system’s ability to process Internet and mobile banking, electronic payment and ATM transactions. According to DBS, the cause of the incident was unrelated to the earlier March 2023 disruption, which was caused by inherent software bugs.
Following the March 2023 incident, DBS convened a Special Board Committee to oversee the root cause investigation and a comprehensive review of the bank’s IT resilience. Following the May 2023 disruption, MAS has required the Special Board Committee to extend its review to cover the latest incident and to use qualified independent third parties for the review. More details on the disruptions will be provided by the bank publicly when the review is completed.
The imposition of capital requirements on DBS reflects the seriousness with which MAS views the recent disruptions and the impact that they have had on customers. MAS may vary the size of the additional capital requirement imposed on the bank and take other regulatory actions depending on the outcome of ongoing reviews.
MAS requires all retail banks in Singapore to ensure that their mission critical systems supporting digital banking are resilient. This includes having the ability to recover quickly from any system disruptions.
Banks are subject to regular inspections and off-site reviews by MAS to ensure their adherence to regulatory requirements and expectations. Further details on MAS’ supervisory approach have been explained to this House on 21 April 2023. [Please refer to "Banking Disruptions That Have Lasted More Than an Hour in Last Five Years", Official Report, 21 April 2023, Vol 95, Issue 101, Written Answers to Questions for Oral Answer not Answered by End of Question Time section.]