Online Falsehoods in Recent News Reports Alleging Singapore’s Involvement in 1MDB Deals
Ministry of LawSpeakers
Summary
This question concerns the Ministry of Law's views on deliberate online falsehoods from States Times Review alleging Singapore's corrupt involvement in 1MDB deals, as raised by MP Murali Pillai. Senior Minister of State for Law Edwin Tong Chun Fai debunked the claims, highlighting that Singapore was the first jurisdiction to take enforcement actions, including shutting banks and seizing $240 million in assets. He detailed how the campaign reached 800,000 users via orchestrated social media shares and expressed disappointment with Facebook's refusal to remove the libellous content despite government requests. The Senior Minister of State for Law Edwin Tong Chun Fai noted that the Info-communications Media Development Authority subsequently directed internet service providers to block the offending website. He concluded that the incident reinforces the Select Committee’s recommendations for legislative powers to protect Singapore from disinformation, as voluntary cooperation from service provider platforms remains insufficient.
Transcript
3 Mr Murali Pillai (Bukit Batok) asked the Minister for Law what is the Ministry's views on the deliberate online falsehood appearing in recent news reports published in States Times Review, China Press and elsewhere alleging that Singapore is involved in corrupt 1MDB deals.
The Senior Minister of State for Law (Mr Edwin Tong Chun Fai) (for the Minister for Law) : Mr Deputy Speaker, with your permission, may I ask the Clerks to distribute two handouts which I will refer to, in the course of addressing this question.
Mr Deputy Speaker: Yes, please. [Handouts were distributed to hon Members]
Mr Edwin Tong Chun Fai: On 5 November 2018, an article was published on the website, the States Times Review (STR), stating that agreements with Malaysia on the supply of water and on the high-speed rail, favoured Singapore. These arguments have been raised by Malaysia previously and dealt with before in this House and elsewhere.
This time, however, STR added a malicious twist. It took the old points on the agreements and concocted a conspiracy theory about how our Prime Minister and the Singapore Government corruptly allowed moneylaundering of 1MDB funds in exchange for terms favouring Singapore.
Mr Deputy Speaker, the suggestion that we were helping launder 1MDB monies, or were reluctant to investigate is quite untrue. Singapore was the first jurisdiction to take strong action against the financial institutions and individuals involved in the 1MDB scandal. Investigations commenced in March 2015, and have since led to serious action taken against wrongdoers.
The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) undertook a two-year investigation of both foreign and local banks. This was the most extensive supervisory review it has ever taken. As a result of these investigations, it shut down two banks – BSI Bank Limited Singapore and Falcon Bank. BSI Bank was also hit with a financial penalty of S$13.3 million. MAS also imposed financial penalties totalling around S$29.1 million on eight other banks.
MAS also worked to bring wrongdoers to justice. It seized assets amounting to S$240 million, of which S$120 million belonged to Jho Low and his immediate family. Arrest warrants for Jho Low and his proxy Tan Kim Loong were issued. Singapore also requested Interpol Red Notices to be put out for Low and Tan.
We are the first – and it seems, the only – country to-date of at least 10 jurisdictions involved, that has secured convictions of individuals who facilitated the laundering. Five individuals have been charged and convicted for offences relating to the 1MDB scandal. Investigations are continuing into several other suspects in Singapore.
On 8 June this year, officers from the MAS, the Attorney-General's Chambers and the Commercial Affairs Department met the Malaysian 1MDB Taskforce led by Tan Sri Abdul Gani Patail. Singapore has been providing Malaysia information on 1MDB-related fund flows since March 2015, and this has been acknowledged by Malaysia.
The information I have referred to is all publicly available. And obviously there is no basis for the claims of corruption being made against our officials.
I move on now to the curious circumstances in which the falsehoods were then further perpetuated. A few months ago, in May 2018, a similar article was published by STR. On 5 November 2018, the same article was re-packaged. It used a quote from the Sarawak Report as a peg to reiterate the falsehoods first published in May. As at 8 November, this article had been shared around 1,600 times on Facebook.
Some of these shares resulted from a concerted effort by a small group of users to spread the article across multiple Facebook groups; including groups that ostensibly cover unrelated subjects. The shares by this small group of just seven users accounted for the falsehood potentially seen by over 800,000 users who were members of these Facebook groups.
Some of these facts and figures are set out in the handouts. If I may refer Members to the first handout (Annex 1) which has the "ST Review" on the left-hand side, you will see that seven Facebook users shared the article collectively 45 times, over three days, to 39 unique Facebook groups. In this three-day period, about 800,000 potential viewers had been given access to this article.
If you go to the second page of that handout, to illustrate a different point, this post was shared to five different groups within a span of just one minute and you will see the timings on the left-hand side of the extract on the second page.
On the third page of the same handout, to illustrate the spread of the article, the reach on Facebook, just to these four illustrative groups amounted to about 380,000. And you will see in the top left-hand box, the number of members in that group was close to 350,000.
So, very quickly and very widely, this was spread.
On 7 November, this re-packaged article was reproduced on Malaysian website The Coverage. This report was then picked up by Malaysian Chinese-language newspaper China Press where it was viewed 45,000 times by 8 November, just one day later. Two YouTube videos were also put up, translating the allegations into Mandarin.
It is interesting that in this case, the spread of disinformation followed a pattern that has been established elsewhere – a falsehood first appears on an obscure site, and then gets picked up by mainstream media, which lends credence to the claims. I will cite two examples in the report of the Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods, which demonstrate these tactics in action. And as I go through the next few paragraphs, Members can refer to the second handout (Annex 2) by way of illustration.
The first, highlighted by Mr Ben Nimmo of the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, was a false claim about the vulnerability of the United States Navy. The false claim was first posted on an obscure website, then re-published by a foreign mainstream media outlet. It eventually began trending on social media and was then published by a significant number of prominent news outlets and tabloids in other countries. It took just seven days for the falsehood to go from an obscure website to international news.
The second example, also cited to the Committee by Mr Nimmo, related to a disinformation campaign against Morgan Freeman, after he had said that a foreign country had attacked the US using online activity during the 2016 US Presidential Election. An obscure website run by trolls first initiated a hashtag #StopMorganLie, while publishing the claim that he was lying.
This hashtag was then amplified on social media, including by a group claiming to be independent activists from the foreign country. It was finally picked up by the mainstream media of the foreign country, who claimed that the counter-movement against Morgan Freeman’s assertion was a “big Twitter outcry”, even though online traffic using the hashtag amounted to only about 1,000 posts. It was later discovered that the accounts of the so-called activists were actually controlled by a troll factory in the foreign country. What appeared to be an organic movement was really an orchestrated campaign. That is the evidence of Mr Ben Nimmo, when he came before the Select Committee.
Now, turning to the Government's response. On the evening of 8 November, MAS lodged a police report in relation to the STR article. Action will be taken against the wrongdoers, based on the outcome of Police investigations and on the advice of the Attorney-General’s Chambers.
We also took active steps to debunk the falsehoods, and stem their dissemination. The Singapore High Commission in Malaysia stated categorically that the article was “clearly libellous”. And this was carried in a number of mainstream media outlets in Malaysia. Notably, STR did not carry the clarification.
IMDA issued a request to STR on 9 November to take down the article. STR declined to do so. IMDA proceeded to direct the Internet Service Providers to block the STR website, and they have since done so.
IMDA also asked Facebook to deny access to the post on STR’s Facebook page, on the basis that the post contains material that is contrary to the public interest, thereby constituting prohibited content under the IMDA’s Internet Code of Practice. Facebook declined to do so.
This is surprising. First, the post is clearly false as I have explained above. The Sarawak Report on which the STR post was based and quoted, itself published a Facebook post calling the article on The Coverage, which had reproduced the STR article, “misleading” and “erroneous”. It later published another post debunking the false claims. Many Malaysian publications, including the China Press, took down their articles after our High Commission in Malaysia issued the clarification.
Second, as the IMDA has made clear – the post contains material that violates Singapore law.
Despite the clear falsehoods attacking Singapore, Facebook did not consider that there were sufficient grounds for it to remove the post. Because of this, Facebook's post with the false claims continues to be available on Facebook.
Facebook’s reluctance to remove the post is surprising. In April 2017, it had said that it is “committed to doing everything [it] can to reduce the spread of false news to as close to zero as possible.” In its written representation to the Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods, Facebook said that it “believe[d] that reducing the spread of misinformation and false news is a shared responsibility between public authorities, tech companies, newsrooms and classrooms.” Facebook has also given assurances that it would work closely with the Singapore authorities to swiftly address online falsehoods. And yet, when there is an actual falsehood that attacks Singapore, Facebook refuses to remove the content.
Facebook has said, in response to media queries on its decision, that it does not “have a policy that prohibits alleged falsehoods, apart from in situations where this content has the potential to contribute to imminent violence or physical harm.” There are many situations where serious harm is caused even though there is no potential for “imminent violence or physical harm”. And as Members will appreciate, the slow drip of poison, over a period of time, can one day result in and burst into violence. And Facebook will do nothing about it, despite the various statements made in Singapore and elsewhere. It will allow itself to be a platform for the spread of lies, falsity, to poison and divide societies through such lies, encourage xenophobia, and profit from that.
This incident, therefore, demonstrates why we cannot rely on the goodwill of service provider platforms to protect Singapore from disinformation campaigns. It reinforces the Select Committee’s recommendations that legislative powers are needed to protect us from deliberate online falsehoods.
In conclusion, this incident demonstrates once again the insidious nature of deliberate online falsehoods. When STR failed the first time to gain traction, it simply re-packaged the same falsehoods. That was then sought to give credibility by mainstream media. Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker.
Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Murali.
Mr Murali Pillai: Mr Deputy Speaker, I thank the hon Senior Minister of State for the detailed explanation. There is an old saying, "untruths travel halfway round the world when the truth is just putting on its boots". But on the basis of what the hon Senior Minister of State had shared, it seems that untruth has picked up pace since. I have two supplementary questions.
One, in relation to Facebook's action, did Facebook demote the news, the fake news, pursuant to its protocol dealing with fake news? And number two, a more general question, dealing with the social media giants, does the hon Senior Minister of State think the attitude of these giants would be different if the direction were made by an independent body, for example, the judiciary instead of a Government agency?
Mr Edwin Tong Chun Fai: I reiterate that we have been disappointed with Facebook's failure to remove the clear falsehood. And let me just reiterate that STR had made the publication quoting directly from a report in the Sarawak Report, and quotes an interview granted by the editor of the Sarawak Report. The Sarawak Report itself, having seen the STR version of the article, published a very clear statement, not once but twice, calling out the STR report as being “false”, “erroneous” and “misleading”. Despite that, Facebook has not seen fit to remove its content or block the STR Facebook page. As we have seen, the spread is not just quick, it is wide. So, at this point in time, there are limited options to stem the spread and influence of such online falsehoods. It is difficult to curtail them.
And so, to answer your second question, yes, perhaps so but there is probably a need for levers to be given so that these can be arrested, can be stopped. And we have seen the proliferation rate and speed and the reach. So, something has to be done and the Select Committee has made recommendations to consider precisely this, the appropriate measures to be taken so that these falsehoods and the proliferation of these falsehoods which, as Mr Murali said just now, travels faster, can be stemmed.
On your second point, as to whether there has been a demotion or downranking of the article, it does not appear to us to have been so but, as I said, our primary assessment is that rather than being demoted or downranked, it ought not even have been put up in the first place.
Mr Deputy Speaker: Minister Chan.
CLARIFICATION BY MINISTER FOR TRADE AND INDUSTRY
The Minister for Trade and Industry (Mr Chan Chun Sing): Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, if I may just make one clarification to Mr Png's question just now. Mr Png asked whether PA had qualified accounts before. Right?
The hon Member indicated assent.
Mr Chan Chun Sing: In fact, this question was asked by Mr Dennis Tan on 17 August 2015 and we have since answered it. Mr Png might want to check the record of the answer given by Mr Heng Swee Keat to Mr Dennis Tan.
Prior to fiscal year 2013, the auditor made a comment to say that the PA accounts on the grassroots organisation should be consolidated. And because prior to 2013, it was not consolidated, that was why they said that it did not fully comply with the standards. In the case of PA, as explained in Parliament on 17 August 2015, we have since taken steps to consolidate all 1,800 grassroots accounts into PA's financial statements to be in full compliance with the accounting standards. And PA has since received an unqualified audit opinion since 2013. Prior to 2013, we did not consolidate statements and that is not the same, that qualification is not the same as that being a material impact that accounts are not correct or cannot be trusted. It was a technical issue because we did not follow the accounting standards to consolidate all the accounts.
And if Mr Png wishes, he can refer to the parliamentary answer given to Mr Dennis Tan in 2015.
Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Png.
Mr Png Eng Huat (Hougang): I thank the Minister for reminding about the adverse opinion but I can tell you that when auditors issue an adverse opinion, it means something. It means they could not see, they could not verify the accounts of the grassroots. And those are not hundred thousands dollars. Those are millions of dollars. So, that is why they issued an adverse report. An adverse report means something, actually. If it is a technical issue, I am sure the auditors can do something about it though.
Mr Chan Chun Sing: Mr Deputy Speaker, I do not want to belabour the point. Can I make a distinction? Can I just ask Mr Png whether you understand this, and if you do not understand, I can explain it during tea break time. Do you understand the difference between qualified accounts and unqualified accounts?
Mr Png Eng Huat: Yes, I do.
Mr Chan Chun Sing: You do. Do you understand what is the difference between qualified accounts and unqualified accounts? And the reason is that there is a material impact on the reliability of the financial statements? Do you agree with me? You agree.
The hon Member indicated assent.
Mr Chan Chun Sing: Do you agree with me that even for unqualified accounts, you can have observations?
The hon Member indicated assent.
Mr Chan Chun Sing: You agree. So, thank you very much. So, there are qualified accounts where, fundamentally, the issue is whether the accounts can be trusted. There are unqualified accounts, which, fundamentally, means that the accounts can be trusted. But can there be observations, where rules are not followed? The answer, as you have said, is yes.
Unqualified accounts means that structurally, the accounts can be trusted, in good order, but there are still observations and those observations need to be acted upon to be improved.
So, I hope I have clarified the difference between qualified accounts and unqualified accounts. And I have clarified why before 2013 – what was the qualification? It was a qualification on the basis that the accounts were not consolidated. And we have since consolidated that and we have put right.
Mr Png Eng Huat: It was an adverse opinion.
Mr Chan Chun Sing: Sorry. You used the word "adverse opinion". On which set of accounts?
Mr Png Eng Huat: From 2007 to 2013.
Mr Chan Chun Sing: Which set of accounts? Was it from AGO?
Mr Png Eng Huat: No, it was not. It was from the auditor of PA. Who was auditing —
Mr Chan Chun Sing: Maybe the Member can show me the exact words of what was said.
Mr Png Eng Huat: It is just in the opinion page, if you look into the records of 2007 to 2012. In the first financial statement, they will put the phrase there —
Mr Chan Chun Sing: Which years again?
Mr Png Eng Huat: 2007 to 2012.
Mr Chan Chun Sing: And what was the word?
Mr Png Eng Huat: Opinion was adverse.
Mr Chan Chun Sing: I think you can check the record. As I have clarified, before 2013, it was not consolidated. After 2013, we have since taken steps to consolidate them, all 1,800 accounts under the PA accounts. And we have not got a qualified account. And I want to make a distinction, and I repeat again, between qualified accounts and unqualified accounts. Unqualified accounts with observations and unqualified accounts without observations; and there is a material difference.
Mr Deputy Speaker: Order. I think we have spent enough time on this. Miss Cheng.