Scams (Countermeasures) and Other Matters Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

Mr Speaker: Senior Minister, Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs.

7.02 pm

The Senior Minister of State for Home Affairs (Mr Goh Pei Ming) (for the Senior Minister, Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs): Mr Speaker, on behalf of the Senior Minister, Coordinating Minister for National Security and the Minister for Home Affairs, I move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time".

Sir, Singapore's scams situation has improved since 2025. After consecutive years of increases, both scam cases and losses fell in 2025. This improvement continued into the first half of 2026, where reported scam cases fell by 14.4% to about 16,800 cases, while losses fell by 17.9% to about $411 million, compared to the same period last year.

This progress is a result of our strong public-private collaboration, robust enforcement and legal framework, and the adoption of technology. I would like to thank Members of this House for your strong support in our anti-scam efforts, and your personal contributions to spreading anti-scam public education to your constituents.

Our fight, however, is far from over. We still receive on average about 90 reported scam cases, involving about $2 million lost, every day. Globally, the scam situation continues to worsen, as syndicates evade international enforcement action. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimated that scam losses in East and Southeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand approximately tripled between 2023 and 2025. Scammers are also using increasingly sophisticated technologies to deceive victims.

Singapore's wealth density makes us an extremely lucrative target and scam syndicates spare no effort in adapting and attempting to overcome our safeguards. This is why addressing scams remains a top priority for the Government. This Bill advances our fight against scams in three ways.

One, it supports information exchange between the Police and various service providers for scam disruption; second, it enhances the Government's legal levers to combat scams on online platforms; and third, it strengthens the Police's ability to disrupt the supply of scam accounts and conduct anti-scam operations.

Sir, I will first touch on amendments supporting information exchange.

Scammers rely on enablers, such as phone lines, online accounts and bank accounts, to reach victims and carry out their schemes. These enablers are provided by different service providers, including banks, digital payment token service providers, telecommunications companies and online service providers. When scammers register for or use these enablers, they leave behind digital footprints that can serve as scam signals. These signals allow us to identify and disrupt other parts of the scam infrastructure. For example, a phone number detected by a telecommunications company as being used for scams, may also be linked to a bank account used to receive scam proceeds.

Today, scam signals are not being shared widely or quickly enough to disrupt scams effectively. To overcome technical limitations on this front, I announced during the Ministry of Home Affairs' (MHA's) Committee of Supply debate earlier this year, that the Police and the Home Team Science and Technology Agency (HTX), are developing the National Scams List (NSL).

The NSL is a platform to facilitate the exchange of information on suspicious scam accounts between the Government and service providers at speed and at scale. This Bill, in turn, provides the legal powers to enable and safeguard such information exchange on NSL and other information-sharing platforms. Information-sharing platforms, like the NSL, allow the Police to disrupt scam accounts early and facilitate information disclosure. To empower the Police to operationalise such platforms, clause 7 introduces new orders into the Protection from Scams Act 2025.

First, we will introduce Account Disabling Orders (ADOs). ADOs will empower the Police to direct a service provider to disable an account, if the Police suspect or have reason to believe that the account has been or will be used preparatory to or in furtherance of a scam-related offence. This threshold is lower than the existing threshold for disruption under the Criminal Procedure Code. This is necessary for the Police to proactively disable the account even before the scam takes place. This allows a shift in approach from reactive to proactive. The Order may identify the specific account to be disabled or specify conditions for identifying suspicious accounts that should be disabled.

Accounts may be disabled under ADOs for up to 30 days, with one possible extension of up to another 30 days. Clauses 8 and 9 amend the Protection from Scams Act to allow persons affected by ADOs to appeal to the Commissioner of Police. The Commissioner may designate an officer not below the rank of Superintendent, or its equivalent, to hear and determine the appeal. Non-compliance with an ADO will be a criminal offence.

Second, we will introduce Disclosure Orders (DOs). DOs will allow the Police to direct service providers to disclose information relating to an account provided by the service provider. The Police will need to be satisfied that the disclosure is necessary or expedient to prevent the commission of a scam-related offence and believe on reasonable grounds that the service provider is capable of disclosing the information. The wilful and reckless submission of false and misleading information pursuant to a DO, as well as the non-compliance with a DO, will be an offence.

Service providers have raised concerns that participating in information-sharing platforms could expose them to additional liability, especially where they act voluntarily. For example, civil liability could arise from breaches of confidentiality obligations. This Bill balances these considerations by providing immunity from liability, while limiting it to actions taken for the prevention and detection of scam-related offences.

Clause 10 introduces protections for service providers from criminal and civil liability for actions done, or omitted to be done, in good faith and with reasonable care to comply with an ADO or DO. Clause 11 introduces protections for prescribed service providers for voluntarily disclosing information. These service providers may voluntarily disclose information to a specified officer or a prescribed Singapore public service agency. This is despite confidentiality obligations, including under the Personal Data Protection Act and the Banking Act. Certain circumstances need to be met, including:

First, the information is disclosed to a specified officer or a prescribed Singapore public sector agency in the prescribed form and manner. Second, the information is disclosed for the purpose of preventing a scam-related offence. Third, the information disclosed was obtained by the service provider in the course of complying with, or on the basis of information contained in an ADO or DO, that was issued to the service provider. And lastly, the disclosure was done in good faith and with reasonable care.

Clause 11 also introduces protections for service providers from civil liability for voluntarily preventing the use of an account for up to 30 days. Similarly, certain circumstances need to be met, including first, the service provider suspected or had reason to believe that the account has been or will be used for a scam-related offence; second, this suspicion or belief was wholly or partially based on information shared via an ADO or DO; and third, it was done in good faith and with reasonable care.

To protect the confidentiality of shared information, clause 7 makes it an offence for the unauthorised disclosure or use of information obtained through an ADO or DO. Service providers will also be required to implement safeguards, prescribed through subsidiary legislation, to protect the confidentiality of such information. Failure to do so will be an offence.

Let me now move on to changes to the Online Criminal Harms Act 2023 (OCHA). OCHA was passed in Parliament in July 2023 and since its commencement in February 2024, the Police have used OCHA to fight scams in two main ways.

One, to issue ex-post directions to online service providers to take down scam-related content; and two, to issue ex-ante Codes of Practice or Implementation Directives, to require designated online service providers to impose preventive anti-scam measures on their platforms. Today, the designated online services are WhatsApp, Telegram, WeChat, Apple, Google, Carousell, Facebook, Instagram and TikTok.

After two years of operationalisation, MHA is now proposing three amendments to ensure that the law remains an effective tool in our fight against scams.

First, we will empower the Competent Authority to impose financial penalties on designated online service providers for non-compliance with the Codes of Practice or Implementation Directives.

Today, platforms that fail to comply with a Code of Practice requirement may be issued with a Rectification Notice. Non-compliance with a Rectification Notice or Implementation Directive is an offence punishable with a fine not exceeding $1 million, and to a further fine of $100,000 for every day or part of a day during which the offence continues after conviction. These fines are imposed by the Courts upon conviction.

While criminal prosecution remains necessary in serious cases, charging non-compliant platforms in Court may not be an efficient way to deal with less egregious cases. This Bill empowers the Competent Authority to issue an administrative financial penalty to more swiftly address and deter non-compliant behaviour.

Clauses 21, 23 and 27 amend the framework in OCHA for non-compliance with Codes of Practice and Implementation Directives. Going forward, for each instance of non-compliance with the Code of Practice, the Competent Authority may impose a penalty of up to $10 million, or issue a Rectification Notice to rectify the non-compliance with the Code of Practice. Where the non-compliance relates to an Implementation Directive, the Competent Authority may similarly impose a penalty of up to $10 million or issue a compliance order to the Implementation Directive. Failure to comply with a Rectification Notice or compliance order is a criminal offence. The Courts may impose a fine not exceeding $10 million and in the case of a continuing offence, to a further fine not exceeding $300,000 for every day or part of a day during which the offence continues after conviction.

Let me make two points about these changes.

First, this approach retains criminal prosecution as an option, alongside the new financial penalty regime. The Competent Authority will decide which is appropriate, based on the facts of each case, considering factors which include the nature and severity of scam harm caused by the non-compliance, the culpability of the platform, and its antecedent.

Second, we have set the maximum administrative financial penalty and fine that the Competent Authority and the Courts respectively can impose at $10 million. This maximum penalty will be the highest fixed quantum financial penalty in Singapore's statute book.

We do not take this decision lightly. But it is necessary to provide an adequate deterrent against non-compliance by online platforms, commensurate with the scale of the challenge we are facing, and the severity of harm that scams delivered through online platforms can cause. Members will recall that a scam victim lost $4.9 million from a single scam case involving the impersonation of senior Government officials on several online platforms, including WhatsApp. Imagine what the scam losses would be had this modus operandi been executed at scale.

As the new penalty regime will allow the Competent Authority to impose administrative financial penalties directly on designated online service providers without going through the Courts, we will introduce safeguards to ensure due process. Clause 23 will require the Competent Authority to inform the designated online service provider of its intent to impose penalties, and to allow the designated online service provider to make written representations explaining why the penalty should not be imposed.

The designated online service provider will have at least seven days to make these representations, and the Competent Authority may decide, after assessing the written representation, whether to proceed, vary or withdraw the penalty. If the Competent Authority decides to proceed to impose financial penalties, the designated online service provider may appeal to the Minister for Home Affairs, whose decision is final.

While we fully intend to continue our collaborative approach of consulting and working with designated online service providers, the Government will not hesitate to take firm action against errant online service providers that allow their platforms to be exploited by scammers.

The second key amendment to OCHA is in clause 19, which will allow OCHA directions to be given by the operation of a computer program, including those leveraging AI or machine learning technologies. Members will be aware that scammers have been using sophisticated technologies, including generative AI, to create highly convincing scam content, faster and at lower cost.

To stay ahead, we too must leverage AI more extensively in our scam disruption efforts. We want to use AI not just to assist in human decision-making, but also to issue OCHA directions in situations where scam content has been identified with a high degree of confidence.

To ensure human accountability for the issuance of OCHA directions, clause 19 provides that a direction can be given by a computer program for which the head of the agency using the program is responsible. For example, this could be the Permanent Secretary of a Ministry or the Chief Executive of a Statutory Board.

The existing appeal mechanism for OCHA directions continues to apply. Appellants may apply to a designated officer for reconsideration and thereafter, to an independent Reviewing Tribunal comprising a District Judge or Magistrate.

We will also ensure that AI systems are implemented with the appropriate safeguards, such as human assessment for lower confidence decisions and regular audit checks.

The last key amendment to OCHA will support a more comprehensive approach to scam prevention.

Clause 20 will allow the Competent Authority to impose requirements on designated online service providers, which indirectly counter the commission of scams or malicious cyber activity, such as public education initiatives. This allows the Government to direct the online platforms to work with us on scam education initiatives, which are a vital component of our whole-of-society anti-scam strategy.

Clause 22 makes clear that measures imposed by an Implementation Directive are to be implemented until the Implementation Directive is cancelled or substituted.

Clause 26 makes clear that the Competent Authority can require a designated online service provider to provide information to assess their compliance with any Code of Practice or Implementation Directive, or to assess whether a Code of Practice or Implementation Directive should be issued to the service provider. This allows the Government to evaluate the performance of online service providers vis-à-vis requirements set by the Competent Authority.

Mr Speaker, the amendments I have shared so far focus on legislative amendments that underpin our collaboration with service providers to combat scams. I will now move to amendments directed at those who facilitate scams.

Let me first turn to those who misuse online accounts, such as Carousell or WhatsApp accounts, to facilitate scams. We have observed instances where individuals sell their online accounts to scammers. These accounts may even have been Singpass-verified, and can be very convincing to potential victims, luring them into a false sense of legitimacy. We must take a firm stance against such misuse of online accounts.

Clause 16 introduces new offences against those who misuse accounts from designated online services, to facilitate criminal activity. In particular, under the new sections 39GA and 39GC of the Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act 1906 (MOA), it will be an offence for a person to supply or offer to supply a designated online account to another person; or provide or offer to provide personal information to another person, or consent or offer to consent to personal information being used by another person for the purpose of opening a designated online account if the person knew or had reasonable grounds to believe that the designated online account will be used for an unlawful purpose.

Like other scam-related offences, such as the misuse of SIM cards and bank accounts, we expect the Police to face evidential difficulties in proving the offender's criminal intent. Scam mules often claim that they acted because they were paid and were unaware of the serious consequences of their actions. To address this, going forward, a person is presumed to have known that the designated online account will be used for an unlawful purpose in any of the following scenarios: one, the person supplied the designated online account or provided or consented to the use of his/her personal information for any gain; two, the person failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain the identity and the physical location of the person receiving the designated online account, or using the personal information to open a designated online account; or three, the person failed to take reasonable steps to find out the recipient's purpose for obtaining the designated online account, or using the personal information to open a designated online account.

Under the new section 39GB of MOA, it will also be an offence for a person to receive or offer to receive a designated online account; or retain control of a designated online account opened using another person's personal information if the person does so with the intention to use or supply the designated online account for an unlawful purpose.

Similarly, a person who receives a designated online account is presumed to have intended to use or supply the account for an unlawful purpose, if the person received the account for any gain. This is intended to address the challenge of proving criminal intent.

The penalties for the new offences for misuse of online accounts will be pegged to the misuse of SIM cards under MOA. Offenders who are individuals will be liable for a fine not exceeding $10,000, or imprisonment not exceeding three years, or both. As for the offences under the new sections 39GA and 39GB regarding supplying designated online accounts; receiving designated online accounts; and retaining control of designated online accounts opened using the personal information of others, the prescribed penalty for a second or subsequent conviction in respect of an individual person is a fine not exceeding $20,000, or imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or both.

In addition, discretionary caning of not more than 12 strokes will apply where the individual knew or intended, that the designated online account would be used to commit or facilitate any scam offence. All the new offences will also apply to corporations and unincorporated associations. As such entities cannot be subjected to imprisonment or caning, the maximum fines for entities will be double the amount for individuals.

Similar to the offences for the misuse of SIM cards, the offences for the misuse of online accounts will also apply extraterritorially, as long as there is a proven link to harm in Singapore. This is necessary, as most scam syndicates operate from overseas. The offences for the misuse of online accounts will also be arrestable.

To be clear, we do not intend to catch those who use designated online accounts for a lawful purpose. A person who receives, supplies or retains the control of a designated online account or provides personal information to another to open a designated online account will not be liable for an offence, if the person has reasonable grounds to believe that the purpose of the act was to facilitate the use of or access to the designated online account for a lawful purpose. So, what constitutes such reasonable grounds to believe, would depend on the facts of the case.

For example, if a person sets up a WhatsApp account for his or her parent or child thinking that it is solely for their legitimate personal daily use and is able to provide a credible explanation as to why he or she was led to think so, reasonable grounds to believe may be established. On the other hand, if a person does so for a stranger with no questions asked as to the purpose of the stranger, or was paid by the stranger to do so, reasonable grounds to believe would likely not be established. Ultimately, this would have to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

Next, we will empower the Police to impose restrictions on certain individuals' access to services that could be exploited to facilitate scams.

In October 2025, the Singapore Police Force (SPF), the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) and the Government Technology Agency (GovTech) implemented the Facility Restriction Framework. Under the framework, scam mules who: one, have been warned, issued with composition sums, prosecuted or convicted of mule-related offences; or two, are under investigation for mule-related offences and are assessed to be at risk of further facilitating scams may face targeted restrictions on their access to facilities and these facilities may include digital banking, card and automated teller machine (ATM) services, the subscription of new telephone lines and the use of SingPass. These restrictions are risk-calibrated and take into account these individuals' basic financial and communications needs.

Service providers, such as banks and telecommunications companies, today comply with the restrictions imposed under the Facility Restriction Framework either voluntarily or pursuant to requirements determined by their sectoral regulators. The Police today cannot compel service providers to impose such restrictions on persons.

Clause 7 of the Bill introduces a new set of orders, Service Limitation Orders (SLOs) under the Protection from Scams Act 2025. SLOs empower the Police to require service providers to restrict the provision of services to a person for a period of up to three years. The Police may issue an SLO if the Police suspect, or have reason to believe, that the identified person will use the service specified to commit or facilitate a scam-related offence.

Service providers that do not comply with an SLO will be liable for an offence. Service providers that comply with an SLO in good faith and with reasonable care, will be protected from criminal and civil liability. Individuals subjected to restrictions pursuant to an SLO may appeal to the Commissioner of Police, and the Commissioner of Police may designate an officer not below the rank of Superintendent or equivalent to hear and determine the appeal.

Finally, I will touch on two legislative amendments that will be introduced to support Police operations.

First, with the launch of the Cyber Command in July 2026, SPF will be recruiting civilian talent with the right aptitude and skillsets to the Cyber Command. To support this and the Police's future manpower needs, clause 31 amends the Police Force Act to empower the Minister for Home Affairs to appoint Civilian Specialist Officers (CSOs). CSOs will be accorded the necessary powers to investigate any suspected offence which appears to him or her to have been committed under any written law. These include the powers to search, arrest, seize and request for documents. SPF may also deploy CSOs to support other Police units, requiring specialist skillsets in the future.

Second, clause 6 amends the Protection from Scams Act 2025 to empower specified officers, including Police Officers, Commercial Affairs Officers and CSOs, to obtain information on persons who must be notified of the issuance of a Restriction Order under the Protection from Scams Act. This is necessary as banks are today unable to provide information necessary for the Police to notify persons affected by the Restriction Order, given the banking confidentiality obligations under the Banking Act.

Mr Speaker, before I conclude, let me say a few words in Mandarin.

(In Mandarin): Mr Speaker, scam cases and losses in Singapore have fallen significantly since last year, but scams continue to pose a serious threat to our people. At present, the Police has received an average of about 90 scam reports every day, with average daily losses amounting to S$2 million. Scammers are relentless and their methods are constantly evolving. They constantly exploit new technologies to find new ways to swindle our people out of their hard-earned money. As a highly developed economy, Singapore is naturally an attractive target for scam syndicates.

This Bill will strengthen Singapore’s ability to combat scams in three ways.

First, we will continue to take firm action against money mules and those who facilitate scams. Scammers often misuse other people’s accounts to conceal their identities and move criminal proceeds. We will further strengthen our laws to combat the misuse of online accounts and impose severe penalties on those who sell or hand over their accounts to others. I urge everyone not to provide others with your online accounts, passwords or personal information. What may appear to be a small favour or an easy way to earn money could cause immense harm to others and expose you to serious legal consequences.

Second, we will enhance our capabilities to disrupt scam networks more swiftly and proactively. Scammers rely on networks of various accounts and services to perpetrate scams. This Bill will help the Police and service providers exchange scam-related information more quickly, identify suspicious accounts and take steps to disrupt them before more people fall victim. By intervening early, we can reduce the number of victims and, we hope, the losses suffered. At the same time, we will put in place robust safeguards and appeal and review mechanisms to ensure that enforcement powers are exercised carefully and fairly.

Third, we will require online platforms to shoulder greater responsibility. Online platforms remain the main channel through which scammers reach victims. In the first half of this year, about 90% of scam cases involved online platforms. The Government will therefore increase the penalties for designated online service providers that fail to fulfil their anti-scam obligations. For platforms that breach a Code of Practice or Implementation Directive under the Online Criminal Harms Act, the maximum penalty for each instance of non-compliance will be raised to S$10 million.

Everyone has a part to play in combating scams. Government agencies, businesses, families and individuals all have important roles. By not selling our accounts, heeding anti-scam warnings and proactively sharing anti-scam advice with our seniors, each of us can contribute to scam prevention.

Scammers do not just take away money. They can destroy years of savings, erode trust between individuals and rob our seniors of their peace of mind. The Government will continue to strengthen our relevant laws and enhance our capabilities to combat scams so that Singapore remains a safe, secure and trusted home to live and work in.

(In English): Mr Speaker, Sir, every scam is more than a statistic. Each case involves a victim who may have lost his hard-earned life savings, destroyed his confidence in digital transactions, or demolished his trust in the people around him. Scams strike not only at individual victims, but at the very trust underpinning our digital economy and our way of life.

The measures in this Bill are firm, but they are also calibrated. They preserve accountability, provide safeguards and appeal mechanisms, and support constructive collaboration with service providers. This balance is important – we must act decisively against scammers and their enablers, while maintaining public confidence that powers will be exercised carefully and fairly.

The improvement in our scam situation shows that our efforts can make a tangible difference. But scammers will continue to adapt and so must we. Our response must be sustained, coordinated and always forward-looking. The Government will continue to review our laws and strengthen our operational capabilities against scams, so that Singapore remains a trusted, safe and secure place to live, work and transact. Sir, I beg to move.

Question proposed.

Mr Speaker: Ms Jessica Tan.

7.36 pm

Ms Jessica Tan Soon Neo (East Coast): Mr Speaker, scams today are not just crimes of deception. They are crimes of exploitation. They target people at their most vulnerable. Seniors who struggle with digital interfaces, young people navigating online spaces, migrant workers far from home, families who simply want to trust that the messages they receive are safe and even digitally literate individuals who fall prey because the scam looks legitimate or because they are caught off guard in a moment of urgency or distraction.

These are ordinary people going about their daily lives. And scammers exploit not just digital gaps, but human moments – trust, fatigue, routine and instinct. The Scams (Countermeasures) and Other Matters Bill is fundamentally about protecting these groups. It strengthens our ability to detect scams early, disrupt them quickly, and hold accountable those who enable them, whether individuals or large online platforms.

So, why is this Bill necessary? Scam losses have risen sharply in recent years. Behind every statistic is a person who has lost savings, confidence and often, dignity. Many victims tell us they feel ashamed, even though they did nothing wrong. They were simply targeted at a moment of vulnerability.

Scammers today operate across multiple platforms – bank accounts, e-wallets, SIM cards, social media, messaging apps. They exploit gaps between systems and the Bill closes these gaps. It gives the Police practical tools to act faster: (a) the DO that compel banks, telcos and platforms to share information quickly when an account is suspected to be involved in scams; (b) ADOs that allow the Police to temporarily disable scam linked accounts for up to 30 days, extendable once; and (c) SLOs that limit access to digital services for individuals assessed to be enabling scams.

These powers are designed for speed. They allow intervention at the earliest signs of suspicious activity, before more victims are drawn in. While this Bill is necessarily reactive, it comes into play when scam activity has already surfaced, but it is still essential because frauds continue to occur despite preventive safeguards, and we need swift powers to minimise harm once they are detected.

For many scams, timing is everything. Once a fraudulent account or phone line is identified, every hour that passes means more people may be deceived. The Bill's new Orders, especially the ADOs, allow the Police to act within hours, not days. This is crucial for seniors who may not recognise scam patterns until it is too late and for families who may respond instinctively to urgent messages.

We should also look at how advanced artificial intelligence (AI)-driven and multi-layered protection can stop scam activity and financial fraud before it reaches businesses and users. Instead of relying only on rigid, reactive, rule-based systems, many technology companies today are already using global threat intelligence and machine learning models to deliver real time, proactive risk assessment at scale. I hope that our Government agencies will continue working closely with industry players to tap these capabilities for faster detection, quicker escalation and rapid takedowns.

I also urge us to pay closer attention to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). SMEs often do not have the same resources as large corporations to invest in sophisticated cyber defences, fraud monitoring tools or dedicated response teams. As scammers increasingly target weaker links in the ecosystem, helping SMEs strengthen their safeguards is not only important for business continuity, it also protects consumers, employees and the wider supply chain.

Many vulnerable groups rely heavily on trust – trust in banks, trust in Government messages and trust in online platforms. By raising penalties for non- compliant platforms from $1 million to $10 million, the Bill compels platforms to invest in better verification, clearer warnings and faster takedowns of scam content. This is especially important for those who may not know how to distinguish between legitimate messages from fraudulent ones.

Reducing the shame and stigma of being scammed. When the system responds quickly and visibly, victims feel supported rather than blamed. The Bill signals that responsibility does not fall solely on individuals, it is shared across institutions, platforms and regulators.

The criminalisation of online account mule activity is a significant step. We know that youths are increasingly targeted to sell or to lend their online accounts, often without understanding the consequences. This Bill sends a clear message: online accounts are gateways to harm and misuse will be taken seriously. But it also allows early intervention before young people are drawn deeper into criminal networks.

With stronger powers must come stronger safeguards. The Bill provides avenues for appeals, limits the duration of account restrictions and requires clear evidence before orders are issued. For vulnerable individuals who may be wrongly flagged, these safeguards are essential. They ensure that the enforcement is firm but fair and that trust in the system is maintained.

But could this Bill have gone further in enabling faster disruption?

Mr Speaker, the Bill makes meaningful progress. But as scams evolve, we must ask whether more can be done to act faster. There are three areas where enhancements could be considered.

One, real time cross platform alerting. Today, DOs allow information sharing when the Police initiate action. A future step could be automated, real time alerts between banks, telcos and platforms when suspicious behaviour is detected, without waiting for a formal order. This would mirror how fraud detection works in financial institutions and could stop scams within minutes.

Pre-emptive restrictions for high-risk accounts. Some accounts show repeated patterns of suspicious behaviour but do not yet meet the threshold for disabling. A tiered system of preventive friction, such as temporary limits or mandatory identity re-verification could prevent losses while investigations continue.

Third, mandatory rapid response protocols for platforms. This Bill increases penalties for non-compliance, but it does not yet specify response time standards. Setting clear expectations, for example, requiring platforms to act within a defined number of hours within notification of scam content, could significantly reduce exposure time for victims. These are areas for future consideration and I raise them because vulnerable groups benefit most when intervention is not just strong, but swift.

Ultimately, this Bill is not just about enforcement. It is about building a digital environment where people, especially those who are vulnerable, feel safe to participate, transact and communicate. It strengthens coordination across agencies. It compels platforms to step up and it gives the Police the tools they need to act decisively.

Scams and fraud must also be tackled collectively, both domestically and internationally, because the infrastructure of deception rarely respects national boundaries. I hope we continue to deepen partnerships with industry and overseas counterparts, including through global signal exchange, priority flagging, and rapid takedown arrangements for phishing sites, impersonation accounts, and other scam enablers.

But legislation alone is not enough. We must continue investing in public education, in community outreach and in digital literacy programmes. Vulnerable groups need not just protection, but empowerment.

At the same time, these measures should not lead citizens to become over-reliant on Government's safeguards. Protection must go hand in hand with personal vigilance, sound judgement, and responsibility for the choices we make online, including the accounts we lend, the links we click and the information we share.

Mr Speaker, scams erode trust, trust in institutions, trust in technology, and trust in one another. This Bill helps rebuild that trust. It protects those who are most at risk, holds accountable those who enable harm, and strengthens Singapore's resilience against evolving digital threats. I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Ms He Ting Ru.

7.47 pm

Ms He Ting Ru (Sengkang): Mr Speaker, scams are a scourge on our society. There has been progress made in public education efforts, but an unfortunate situation has arisen where most of us know someone who refuses to answer phone calls from unknown numbers or decide against using Internet banking services out of an abundance of mistrust for fear being scammed.

This is against a decline in the number of reported scam cases and amounts lost to scams, breaking the upward trend recorded from 2021 to 2024.

SPF's 2025 Scams and Cybercrime Brief reported a 27.6% drop in scams compared with 2024 and an approximately 17.92% decrease in the total amount lost to scams within that same period. Yet, the problem is still sizeable.

As Second Minister for Home Affairs Sim Ann pointed out during the Second Reading of the Criminal Law (Miscellaneous Offences) Bill last year, between 2020 and the first half of 2025, scams comprised approximately 60%, an outright majority of all crimes reported to the Police.

The scam mitigation and enforcement efforts set out in this Bill are important. But we have to ensure, at the same time, that we tackle the problem on all fronts and that the measures enacted, especially those which involve law enforcement intervention are fair, transparent and understandable to the public. Crucially, our anti-scam efforts should do more to target dismantling the networks and systems that fuel such crimes, providing restitution to victims, and ensuring that communities are well-equipped to guard themselves against scams.

This Bill strengthens the Government's arsenal of anti-scam enforcement tools.

Clause 7 introduces two new orders which law enforcement can issue to service providers, whether they are banks, payment services, telecommunications companies, or online service providers. An account disabling order requires service providers to disable specific accounts for anti-scam purposes, while a service limitation order, which builds on the provision set out in the facility restriction framework, mandate service providers, restrict a specific user from using a scam enabling service.

At the same time, clause 19 of the Bill allows a responsible officer to use computer programs to issue a Part 2 directive under OCHA. Such programs may also involve the usage of artificial intelligence (AI) to flag suspicious accounts.

This matches the call in the Workers' Party's 2025 manifesto, which specifically asked for AI to be used to detect suspicious transactions. The idea is that such programs increase efficiency in combating scammers who themselves turn to technology to perpetuate their crimes, and it is one which should be supported.

Such identification of potential cybercrime, enabling accounts via AI tools can aid authorities in their fight to limit or prevent damage being dealt, but necessary guardrails and ultimately, human oversight must be put in place.

Any usage of AI tools, especially within law enforcement contexts, must be done in cognisance of the potential for unfair bias against marginalised groups, an issue that I previously raised when debating the Motion on Singapore's AI transition. Such AI-enabled tools are also known to throw up false positives. For instance, the New York Times reported in July this year that when Meta deployed AI tools to detect accounts flouting its terms of service, many accounts belonging to small business owners and even non-profits were wrongfully banned, and some deleted with their appeals turned down. This affected livelihoods and operations, with Meta eventually acknowledging that mistakes were made and restored some accounts after the times inquired after the incidents.

This example highlights a potential pitfall of purely using AI to enforce any rule or regulation, especially when it appears that no human oversight was available to appeal against decisions that those affected claimed were erroneous.

In the case of clause 19, although it is explicitly noted that responsibility for the results and actions taken by the computer program would be borne by a responsible officer, could the Minister elaborate on the processes in place to ensure that the deployment of such computer programs would be fair and accurate? And also clarify about how human oversight and review plays into the operations of such decisions.

The powers granted to law enforcement, while having the well-intentioned aim of tackling scams and cybercrime, should also be open to independent scrutiny by both Parliament and members of the public. In this vein, would the Government release a report annually detailing key metrics and indicators, such as total numbers of service limitation, account disabling and disclosure orders issued, as well as the error rates of automated directives, appeal volumes and the average resolution timelines for false positives, for citizens to better understand the action and efforts behind our efforts against scams?

Clause 6 of the Bill expands on the provisions of the Protection from Scams Act by granting law enforcement the ability to order banks to furnish information, such as the name, contact details and residential addresses of users whose accounts are subject to a restriction order, something that was previously disallowed under the Banking Act.

The new subsection 5(ac) also allows for the disclosure of any other prescribed information. Could the Minister clarify what other information is envisioned by this catch or flip clause, and more generally, how does this new power balance against our wider financial ecosystem, in particular, the principle of banking secrecy?

Moving to enforcement and the new powers under clause 7, introducing service limitation and account disabling orders to the Protection from Scams Act, even as we assume that executive powers would be exercised carefully and responsibly, these orders imposed on an innocent party or unwitting mule would at least be a mild inconvenience, and at worst, debilitating to daily life.

Individuals who have their accounts frozen might end up unable to receive salaries or to foot the cost of their daily necessities and medical bills, if their sole bank account or E-wallet account is completely frozen. In the case of businesses, especially smaller proprietors, this might cause business operations to grind to a halt and result in the non-payment of employees.

On this specific concern, a Parliamentary reply from September last year noted that persons whose accounts are blocked under the facility restriction framework could still have access to basic banking services, receive payments, such as their salary and government benefits, as well as withdraw and deposit money at physical bank branches. Would this principle be retained with the enactment of this Bill into law?

The Minister also stated in another Parliamentary reply this year that graduated restrictions are not being prioritised due to the need for significant system upgrades and changes. The same reply noted that banks expeditiously review and facilitate each request by holders of accounts subject to a restriction order to withdraw funds, and that the Police approved all requests made to withdraw money for daily use.

Could the Minister shed light on the average processing time for approved requests to withdraw funds from bank accounts subject to a restriction order, and how would the Government work with banks towards eventually developing a system that allows for graduated restrictions?

Our anti-scam efforts should also be more victim centred. For instance, the current Shared Responsibility Framework (SRF) requires banks and telecommunications companies to bear the full cost of losses arising from a scam, should they fail to carry out their responsibilities according to the framework, else the costs would be fully borne by the victim. This is not considered enough, that other parties within the ecosystem, such as social media and messaging service companies, also play a very crucial part in stamping out scams. SPF's brief on scams and cybercrime noted that social media and messaging services were the highest and second highest methods of contact adopted by scammers.

While the code of practice governing social media and messaging services was recently updated, this Bill raises the penalties for service providers who fail to comply. We can and should do more to hold social media and messaging services responsible for their action or inaction in our fight against scams. Additionally, the SRF also needs to be more sensitive to the needs of the consumer, who is likely to be in a far weaker position should they have to bear losses arising from the scam.

In a multi-pronged approach, jurisdictions worldwide are looking to victim reimbursement systems. For instance, the United Kingdom (UK) has mandated that payment service providers refund banks up to £85,000 if a victim reported that they were subject to a scam unless the victim was grossly negligent or did not provide the payment service provider with all the information required for the investigations. The victim might also have to foot a £100 excess, depending on which provider they came from.

Australia is also planning to implement a similar scheme with a lower cap of AUD3,000, and with responsibility shared equally between the banks, telecommunications companies and social media platforms. Such an approach seems to be working.

An independent study of the UK system found a decrease in the number of fraud cases and the total amount lost to fraud involving faster payment or fast equivalent transfers. This also forced banks to step up their anti-scam measures by hitting them directly in the wallet.

Therefore, I would like to repeat the call contained in the Workers' Party's 2025 manifesto to have an insurance scheme to cover losses from scams with a consumer liability cap of up to $500, and to look into a scam victim restitution fund financed by recovered funds.

Mr Speaker, while the provisions under this Bill are largely centred around mules, we must dedicate more of our energy and resources towards dismantling the vast money laundering infrastructure that enables scams to flourish.

According to the latest Financial Action Task Force (FATF) mutual evaluation report on Singapore's Anti-Money Laundering (AML) efforts, domestic low ranking money mules comprise the majority of Singapore's AML investigations and convictions, despite other stakeholders within the wider ecosystem facilitating and benefiting from such ill-gotten gains, such as professional enablers and the masterminds playing a significant role in such operations.

I believe this is best summed up by a young money mule who was apprehended back in 2021 when he was just 17 years old. He noted that, "I am just a pawn, but there is always a queen and a king. They are never going to get caught because they are going to have people before them that will get caught." I could not have put this better myself.

It is also concerning that the task force report noted that sanctions against natural persons convicted on money laundering, consisting of either a fine of up to S$500,000, 10 years jail time, or both, while proportionate, were deemed neither effective nor dissuasive. I hope that this will be addressed when the Government studies the implementation of the FATF's recommendations.

Another recommendation prescribed by the report is for the authorities to diversify sources of false scam detection. The report notes that 82% of Singapore's money laundering investigations arose from Police reports filed by victims of cyber-enabled fraud, a stark contrast to the 2% from financial and other intelligence sources.

In view of this, can the Minister clarify how our law enforcement agencies intend to step up their proactive identification of money laundering offences via financial intelligence?

We can also work towards strengthening our financial intelligence sharing capabilities, especially amongst banks. Since its inception in 2024, the Collaborative Sharing of Money Laundering/TF Information and Cases (COSMIC), MAS' customer information sharing platform aimed at curbing financial crime, has helped in closing over 1,000 suspicious customer accounts, with suspicious transaction reports filed for up to $1.6 billion in aggregate fund flows, according to a response to a Parliamentary Question I filed just last month.

As we look to expand COSMIC, participation in the programme by all financial institutions should eventually be mandatory rather than voluntary, thus strengthening our corpus of financial intelligence.

Finally, beyond enforcement our anti-scam efforts should also target segments of the population such as those who are less digitally savvy. Despite accounting for about 14.8% of victims in 2025, elderly scam victims lost an average of approximately $42,347 from scams during the first half of 2026, up from $35,374 over the same period in 2025, leaving them in a financially precarious state.

The Minister in May this year noted that approximately 40% of senior scam victims fell victim to impersonation scams where scammers posed as Government officials and prominent figures to extort money from victims. In one instance, over S$6.1 million was lost to scammers impersonating the Immigrations and Checkpoints Authority (ICA) or Chinese officials, while another case involved a scammer extorting around $600,000 by posing as Elon Musk.

Given this, could the Minister clarify how the Government is reviewing anti-scam efforts such as SG Cyber Safe Seniors Programme to ensure that it is up to date with the latest developments and to maximise its reach amongst the elderly in particular.

In conclusion, as we step up our anti-scam enforcement efforts, the expansion and use of these law enforcement powers, while helpful, should be made clear to the public. We must look beyond mules, target the complex money laundering infrastructure that sustains scams and adopt a multi-pronged approach towards tackling scams beyond enforcement.

Members of the public rely on law enforcement to defend and take action against scams. Knowing and understanding how these powers are used will only bolster public confidence in our law enforcement and go towards addressing the many concerns that the public has about the scams that currently plague our society. Mr Speaker, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Abdul Muhaimin Abdul Malik.

8.02 pm

Mr Abdul Muhaimin Abdul Malik (Sengkang): Mr Speaker, Sir, scams are no longer a small problem in Singapore. They are the most prevalent type of crime in Singapore, and account for greater losses than all physical crime combined. The mid-year statistics released on 26 August show some hard won progress. But they also point to a stubborn reality.

Losses fell to about $410.6 million in the first half of 2026, down some 18% from $500.2 million lost in the same period a year before. And the number of cases fell too. That is real progress and it reflects the combined effort of the Government, the industry and the community, but in the same breath, the police told us that about around eight in 10 victims still handed their money over voluntarily, meaning they were manipulated, not hacked.

Since 2019, Singaporeans have lost more than $4 billion to scams. So, while the trend line is encouraging, no one in this House should mistake it for victory.

Sir, behind every one of those figures is a person. Our older residents in particular are being targeted, and the losses they suffer are severe. Statistics from the police show that the average amount lost per elderly victim rose from about $35,000 in the first half of 2025, to over $42,000 in the same period this year. What should trouble us most is that so many of these victims are not hacked but manipulated. They were befriended by strangers with ill intentions and subsequently coaxed and deceived into transferring their own savings. In some cases, they continue paying even after they begin to suspect that something is wrong.

This is not a story about foolish people. These are our parents and grandparents. It is a story about how sophisticated the manipulation has become.

This Bill tackles that framework from several directions at once, amending five separate statutes, the Protection from Scams Act, the Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act, the OCHA, the Police Force Act and the Banking Act.

I will confine my remarks to a few provisions where I believe the powers are welcome, but where the House should press for safeguards. The service limitation orders and account disabling orders under the new Part 2(A) are, I believe, powers that most Singaporeans will welcome. The logic is sound if we can freeze an account or cut off the line the moment there is reason to believe it is being used to move scam proceeds, we interrupt the crime while the money is still in reach.

The condition-based account disabling order, which lets an officer disable a whole class of accounts meeting specified criteria, is a sensible response to syndicates that operate at scale through networks of mule accounts.

But I must raise one concern that I suspect every Member will recognise from our Meet-the-People Sessions (MPS). My concern is not with the freezing of accounts. It is with how quickly they are unfrozen when the account holder turns out to be innocent and in particular, with the longer suspensions that fall outside the 30-day limit this Bill sets.

Sir, we must remember that innocent people can be caught in the middle of these schemes through no fault of their own. A person may find funds transferred into their account by a scammer or may have unwittingly dealt with someone who turned out to be a fraudster and suddenly find their own account frozen.

For a working person, losing access to the account is not a minor inconvenience. The impact can be disproportionately high on lower-income earners. It can mean rent going unpaid, installments being missed, and real strain on the family.

So, my questions to the Minister are these: first, how was the 30-day period for an account disabling order arrived at? And is there a scope to make it shorter still?

I welcome that this new order carries a hard limit of 30-days, extendable once, because a defined cap is itself a safeguard, and it disciplines the exercise of the power. But that welcome cap prompts a larger question. The hardship my residents bring to our MPS rarely comes from a 30-day freeze. It comes from accounts suspended for many months under banks' own processes or during ongoing investigations where no equivalent statutory limit applies. That is where the strain is felt most keenly.

So, I will ask the Minister what service standards govern the lifting of these longer suspensions once an innocent party is cleared and what records does that person have to have their account restored sooner?

I say candidly to this House with these powers, we should expect more MPS cases from residents whose accounts have been frozen, asking us to help appeal for the orders to be lifted. When that happens, they should be able to get a swift response and a fair process.

Sir, one of the most significant features of this Bill, to my reading is the creation of civilian specialist officers under the new sections in the Police Force Act. These officers will be granted police grade powers of investigation and arrest. To my understanding, these powers would be comparable to those of officers of the Commercial Affairs Department (CAD), with an initial focus on cyber-crime.

I have two questions. First, where will this new body sit? The powers mirror those of a CAD officer, but the Bill does not make clear whether these officers will operate under CAD, under some new unit or elsewhere within the force. I would like some clarity on the command structure and importantly, who will be accountable for these powers.

Second, I put this plain plainly. The Bill states that it will not involve the Government in any extra financial expenditure. If that is so, I will ask the Minister from where is the manpower for this civilian specialist officers to be drawn? Are they to come from existing SPF, MHA, or wider public service establishments?

If we are asking existing officers to take on this work, we should also be clear about what may have to give elsewhere. We need to be confident that we are not stretching our enforcement capacity too thin, especially when we are asking more of it.

Sir, I want to flag clause 19, which allows a Part 2 direction, which may include a direction to take down an online location. This direction could be issued by the operation of a computer program with a responsible officer accountable for it.

If I read this correct correctly, this is among the first times that our enforcement framework, expressly contemplates an automated system making such a decision. I understand entirely why. Malicious websites are spun up faster than any human team can act.

In the first half of this year alone, the police disrupted tens of thousands of scam-related mobile lines, WhatsApp lines and malicious websites. Automation is how we keep pace, but precisely because this is a novel step, I will ask the Minister to set out the safeguards. What human oversight sits behind the responsible officer? What audit and review mechanisms will apply? And what records exist where a legitimate site is caught by mistake? Speed and due process need not be in tension, but we must design for both.

Sir, the Bill introduces caning for those who traffic in the tools of scams, those who sell, buy or supply designated online accounts or hand over their personal particulars to open them knowing they will be used for scams. I expect it will be hard for any Member to speak against this, and I do not intend to.

Scams have imposed a heavy toll on affected Singaporean households. Savings have been wiped out and victims left with nothing but the shame and embarrassment they will have to endure. Given the toll, I believe most Singaporeans will support firmer deterrence against those who knowingly enable this trade.

I will only observe that the Bill wisely targets the knowing enabler, with evidential presumptions that a person who does this for any gain, or who fails to check who they are handling their credentials to, is presumed to have known. We saw recently how this trade operates in practice. A young man charged with buying e-wallets from work permit holders, paying them around $50 each, through which nearly $10,000 in scam proceeds flowed. The $50 seller and the syndicate buyer are both links in the chain and it is the right that the law reaches both.

I will ask the Minister only to confirm that our enforcement and our public education will continue to distinguish clearly between the syndicate operative and the naive and desperate individual who is themselves being exploited.

Sir, if I may broaden the lens for a moment, part of protecting Singaporeans is being clear about what these numbers include and what they leave out. In an earlier sitting. I ask how the police classify a case as a scam, where a seller fails to complete a transaction and multiple buyers lose money, and what distinguishes such cases from ordinary civil or commercial disputes.

The Minister's answer was instructive, where a seller deceives buyers into paying with no intention of ever delivering, that may amount to cheating under the Penal Code. But where a seller simply fails to deliver without fraudulent intent, no cheating offence is disclosed, and the buyer's recourse is a civil one.

The police assess each case on its facts, for instance, where the seller impersonated a legitimate shop or become uncontactable the moment payment was received. I raise this not to quarrel with the distinction, which is legally correct, but to make a point about the resident's experience. To a buyer who is out of pocket, the line between scam and civil disputes feels academic. The money is gone either way and a civil claim for a few hundred dollars is rarely worth pursuing.

As we build this formidable apparatus against scams, I will ask the Government not to lose sight of these residents who fell into the gap. Those cheated of smaller sums or left to the civil courts for whom our new powers offer little. Consumer protection and accessible redress for small value e-commerce disputes must advance alongside our anti-scam enforcement, not lag behind it. Mr Speaker, in Malay, please.

(In Malay): Mr Speaker, scam cases are no longer a minor problem in Singapore. They are the most prevalent form of crime and have resulted in greater losses than all other physical crimes combined.

I welcome the new enforcement orders under Part 2A. However, there are several issues I would like to raise, based on feedback from Meet-the-People Sessions (MPS). Prolonged account freezes often affect scam victims adversely. I would like to ask the Minister to consider putting in place regulatory processes and the right to appeal for the lifting of freezing orders for those who have been proven not to be involved in the scam.

The establishment of Civilian Specialist Officers under a new section in the Police Force Act gives them investigative and arrest powers equivalent to those of police officers of the same grade. I would like to ask the Minister where this new organization will be located, and where the manpower for these new officers will come from.

I would like to draw attention to Clause 19, which allows an order to take down a website or online location to be issued directly by a computer programme under a “responsible officer”. Will there be human oversight in this process, and will there be audit and review procedures?

I strongly support the introduction of caning as punishment for those who traffic in scam equipment. However, I would like to ask the Minister to look at scam cases and distinguish enforcement between syndicate masterminds and individuals who may be desperate or may themselves be victims.

We need to be mindful of the distinction between something that is considered a “scam” and a “civil dispute”. Consumer protection and easy access to channels for seeking compensation for small-value e-commerce claims must develop alongside our anti-scam enforcement efforts.

(In English): Mr Speaker, Sir, this Bill grants the authorities broad and in places sweeping powers and it mandates firmer punishments. Given what scams have done to this country, that is not surprising, and on balance, I support it. Powerful tools are warranted against a threat of this scale, but powerful tools demand equally serious safeguards. The measure of this Bill will not only be how many syndicate accounts we freeze. It will be how quickly we free the innocent ones we freeze by mistake, how transparently our new officers and our new automated system are held to account and whether residents who loses their money in the grey zone still finds a door open somewhere in Government.

I hope the Minister can address the concerns I have raised on the lifting of orders on the manpower, the placement of CSOs, and on the oversight of automated decisions. Sir, notwithstanding the questions and clarification I have raised, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Jackson Lam.

8.16 pm

Mr Jackson Lam (Nee Soon): Mr Speaker, Sir, last year, for the first time in several years, the number of scam cases in Singapore fell by almost a quarter, to under 38,000. That is encouraging.

But Singaporeans still lost $913 million to scams in 2025. That is about $29 lost every second. And while there were fewer cases, the median loss increased from $1,389 to $1,644. So, the scam threat remains serious. This is the backdrop against which we consider the Scams (Countermeasures) and Other Matters Bill.

Scams have also changed. In the past, it could be a phone call followed by a request for money. Today, scams operate through bank accounts, payment accounts, digital tokens, telephone lines, online accounts and digital platforms. Our laws must keep up.

Last year, the costliest scams were not random. Investment scams, Government official impersonation scams, job scams, phishing and business email compromise accounted for the bulk of the money lost. These are not simple tricks. They are well-organised operations that study how Singaporeans think and behave.

I would like to raise three points.

The first point, we must disrupt scams earlier and faster. I welcome the expansion of our anti-scam powers beyond banks. The Bill allows authorities to restrict services and disable all related accounts and platfoms that may be used for scam-related offences. This is important because when it comes to scams, speed matters. Once money has moved through several accounts, recovering it becomes much harder. Our approach should therefore be: "Detect early. Disrupt quickly. Stop the scam before the victim loses his or her money."

I would like to ask the Minister: once the Police flag a suspicious account, telephone line or online account, how quickly will service providers be expected to act? And will there be common response standards across banks, telcos and online platforms?

A strong power is only useful if we can act quickly enough. I would also like to raise the cross-border nature of this problem. Between March and May this year, Operation FRONTIER+ III saw Singapore and nine other jurisdictions arrest more than 3,000 people and froze more than $200 million in scam-linked funds across the region. Singapore's own Anti-Scam Centre accounted for $35 million of that total. This tells us that many of the people behind these scams sit beyond the reach of our domestic laws alone. I would also want to ask the Minister whether this Bill strengthens our ability to cooperate with regional partners and whether Singaporeans can expect more joint operations of this kind.

Second point, we must protect innocent users. I understand why we need strong powers to disable accounts. But there may be situations where an account is wrongly identified. For an individual, losing access to a bank account could affect his daily needs. For a business, it could affect payments and operations. Many small businesses and SMEs operate on a single account. They do not have the reserves or the alternative banking relationships that larger companies do. A few days of being locked out could mean not paying suppliers and being unable to pay staff on time.

The Bill provides an appeal mechanism to the Commissioner of Police, which I welcome. But could we also have a fast review process for genuine cases where an account has been wrongly disabled There should be a clear channel for affected persons to provide evidence quickly and have their accounts reviewed. The principle should be simple: act fast against scammers, but correct mistakes just as fast when innocent people are affected.

I would also ask whether the Ministry will track the number of accounts disabled, the number of appeals and how many orders are subsequently changed or overturned. This will help us understand how accurate the system is.

My last point, online platforms must do more. The Bill creates new offences relating to the misuse of designated online accounts, including supplying such accounts where there is knowledge or reasonable grounds to believe they will be used for criminal activity. I support this. We have tackled money mules and SIM-card misuse. But online accounts are increasingly another tool used by scammers.

A single social media or messaging account can potentially reach thousands of victims. However, we should not only go after the individuals providing these accounts. The platforms themselves must also take responsibility. The amendments to OCHA allow significant financial penalties against designated providers that fail to comply with certain requirements.

For large global technology companies, the penalties must be meaningful enough to change behaviour. More importantly, we should focus on outcomes. Are scam advertisements being removed faster? Are fake and impersonation accounts being detected earlier? Are suspicious accounts being stopped before they reach Singaporeans? These are the outcomes that matter to Singaporeans.

I would also ask how this framework deals with content generated using AI. Scam advertisements and fake profiles can now be produced automatically and in large numbers, making them harder to distinguish from genuine content. I would ask whether platforms will be required to detect AI-generated scam material specifically and whether the codes of practice under OCHA will be updated as this technology develops.

The Bill also allows certain directions under the OCHA to be issued through a computer program. I understand the need for this. Scammers operate at speed and scale, and technology can help us respond faster.

But I would ask the Minister: what human oversight will there be? How will false positives be identified? And how will we ensure these automated systems remain accurate? Technology can help us move faster, but accountability must still rest with our people.

Finally, the Bill allows for the appointment of CSOs with significant investigative powers. This makes sense as cybercrime becomes more specialised. But I would also like to ask how these officers will be selected, trained and supervised, given the powers they will exercise.

I would also suggest that the Government consider a statutory review of this Bill, perhaps after three to five years, to assess whether these powers remain proportionate and effective as scam tactics continue to evolve.

Mr Speaker, Sir, scammers will continue to adapt. When we close one channel, they will look for another. Our laws, therefore, cannot stand still. I support this Bill because it allows us to go beyond targeting individual scammers and disrupt the wider infrastructure that enables scams. As we implement these stronger powers, three principles should guide us: speed in stopping scams; safeguards for innocent users; and accountability from Government and service providers.

Every dollar lost to scams represents someone's savings, salary or retirement funds. If we can stop the money before it reaches the scammers, we would have protected not just someone's money, but often years of hard work and savings. Mr Speaker, Sir, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Fadli Fawzi.

8.25 pm

Mr Fadli Fawzi (Aljunied): Mr Speaker, last year, Singaporeans lost $913.1 million, down from more than $1.1 billion the year before. The Police, the Anti-Scam Centre and our banks have made real progress against an adversary that adapts faster than most of our institutions can. I would like to acknowledge the recent formation of the cyber command by the SPF as another important step towards combating scams and other cybercrimes.

Nevertheless, I want to direct our attention to clauses 7 and 8 of the Bill, which introduces the account disabling orders that allow the Police to disable bank accounts that may be facilitating scam-related offences. An account disabling order will be kept at 30 days, extendable once and no further, while clause 8 gives the user of a disabled account a right of appeal.

I welcome this procedural protection for those affected by account disabling orders. I also understand that these account disabling orders are primarily targeted at accounts implicated in scam-related offences. However, can the Minister clarify how the Police will use these orders in cases where the bank accounts belong to vulnerable individuals, for example, the elderly, the young adults or migrant workers who may have been manipulated by criminal syndicates into allowing their accounts to be used for money laundering?

It is my hope that the Police and banks will always be circumspect and judicious when exercising their powers to freeze the bank accounts of individuals, whether under the provisions of today's Bill or otherwise. The freezing of bank accounts, and bank restrictions more generally, can cause considerable difficulties and hardship for individuals affected, especially given the pervasiveness of digital banking and e-payment services in our society.

Sir, I acknowledge that in terms of banking restrictions, the introduction of account disabling orders is not new. There are many other circumstances in which an individual's bank account may get frozen. For instance, this House passed the Protection from Scams Act last year, which empowers the Police to step in and issue restriction orders to banks if there is reasonable belief that account holders will be making transfers to scammers.

However, such account holders are still permitted access to funds for essential daily living expenses and bills. In response to the Parliamentary Question from my Honourable friend, Mr Kenneth Tiong, MHA revealed that as of February 2026, only 12 restriction orders have been issued under the Protection from Scams Act. The Police approved withdrawals for daily expenses in 10 of the 12 cases, while no requests for withdrawal were made in the remaining two cases.

And beyond the powers conferred in today's Bill and the Protection from Scams Act, section 35 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) allows an officer of, or above, the rank of inspector to direct a bank to allow no dealings with an account, and I quote, "for such period as may be specified in the Order".

Unlike restriction orders and account disabling orders, section 35 of the CPC contains no maximum period, no automatic review and no duty to give reasons. Moreover, accounts frozen under section 35 have no mechanism for appeal at all. Instead, affected individuals have to make an application to Court, to release the money for, and in the words of the statute, "foodstuffs, rent, the discharge of a mortgage, medicine, medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges."

In November 2025, my hon friend Mr Dennis Tan asked whether restrictions would remain on a person the Courts had acquitted and whether there was any recourse where a restriction had harmed the livelihood. The hon Member Mr Cai Yinzhou also asked how many of those investigated had unknowingly lost the control of their accounts and what interim support they would be given.

In response, the Minister pointed to his reply of 15 October 2025, where he said that restrictions are lifted when they are no longer required or when where a person is acquitted in Court. In that reply, the Minister also added that individuals subject to banking restrictions will still have access to basic banking facilities and can continue to receive incoming payments, including salaries and Government benefits.

I recognise that today's Bill does not seek to amend section 35 of the CPC but rather introduces a different form of banking restriction to address bank accounts involved in scams. In light of this, I would like to ask the Minister whether the Police intends to continue using the section 35 of the CPC against bank accounts that may be facilitating scam-related offences or if the Police would consider issuing ADOs against these bank accounts instead as a first resort once the Bill is passed.

Sir, I hope the House takes the point that losing access to basic banking facilities, for whatever reason, can cause severe hardship to anyone affected. Hence, if the relevant authorities receive report of cases where individuals subject to banking restrictions report losing their access to basic banking facilities or encounter difficulties as a result, I hope that such reports will be taken seriously and that the claims will be investigated thoroughly.

I also have two specific suggestions in this regard: one, the Government can consider legislating provisions to simplify the process for modest sums to be released automatically from frozen bank accounts for subsistence so that an ordinary person need not file a Court application or seek Police permission to buy groceries or pay for public utilities; two, the Government should also consider extending a guarantee of basic banking to Singapore citizens, permanent residents and all holders of work passes so that no resident is left without an account, he or she can use in the event that their bank account is frozen under the provisions of the Bill or otherwise.

The idea can be modeled after the European Union's Payment Account Directive, which guarantees residents with the right to access to a basic payment account since 2014. Banks are given 10 working days to reach a decision and must provide written reasons if they want to refuse a customer.

On a related note, Mr Speaker, I hope the Government can share more details about how many bank accounts have been frozen and on what basis. I understand that the Anti-Scam Command froze more than 15,000 accounts last year and more than 16,700 accounts were frozen in 2022. Can the Minister provide a breakdown of the number of bank accounts that have been frozen, including for non-scam related reasons. In each of the past two years, under which statutory provision and the average and median duration that these accounts were frozen?

Finally, Mr Speaker, section 6A of the Bill will let the Police limit a person's access to financial and telecommunications services for up to three years. This may be well justified for those who sell their identities to syndicates, but I hope that hardship will not be caused to anyone unknowingly or wrongly caught up by these provisions.

Can the Minister reassure the public that such an SLO will be levied sparingly and carefully. Also, can the Minister clarify how the Police will ensure that such Orders will only be issued against those who are truly deserving of such a punishment?

Mr Speaker, I am fully supportive of the Police being equipped with every tool necessary to protect Singaporeans from scams. However, I hope that the Government can also consider the suggestions that I have offered to strengthen the procedural safeguards for those whose accounts are frozen under the provisions of this Bill or otherwise. Thank you, Mr Speaker, and I await the Minister's clarifications.

Mr Speaker: Mr Gabriel Lam.

8.35 pm

Mr Gabriel Lam (Sembawang): Mr Speaker, Sir, in May this year, a Singaporean businessman received a WhatsApp message from someone claiming to be a Cabinet Secretary. He was invited to a Zoom call with the Prime Minister. The call looked real. Prime Minister Wong appeared on screen, so did the President and a Minister. They spoke about an urgent request for funds linked to the Straits of Hormuz. But what the businessman saw on that call had been fabricated using deepfake AI technology. By the time the businessman realised what had happened, he had transferred at least $4.9 million.

This happened this year, here in Singapore, to someone who had every reason to believe he was being careful. It shows us how quickly technology is changing. Scammers are now able to make something look and sound real enough to fool even people who are cautious.

Scam victims. Scams cost victims in Singapore $913.1 million last year. That figure is already known to this House. What I want to focus on today is not just the amount of money lost, but how we can respond better.

I think this Bill is an important step forward. The Bill gives the Police stronger powers to act earlier.

DOs will allow the Police to require service providers to provide information linked to specified accounts and scam-related activities. ADOs will allow accounts suspected of facilitating scam-related offences to be disabled for up to 30 days, with one possible extension of up to another 30 days. SLOs will allow scam-enabling services to be restricted for identified persons for up to three years.

The Bill also creates four new offences to deter the misuse, supply and receipt of online accounts for criminal activity on designated platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Telegram, WeChat, TikTok, Carousell, Google and Apple.

Scammers have not given up on SIM cards. That is why Parliament tightened the rules on the misuse of local SIM cards, after losses involving local mobile lines used in scams and other cybercrimes nearly tripled between 2021 and 2023, reaching $384 million.

But scammers have also moved beyond SIM cards. They are using chat apps, social media, shopping accounts and other online services. The number of scams perpetrated on TikTok rose by 37.8% last year. Losses from cryptocurrency scams now account for about one-fifth of all scam losses. So, even when we close one door, scammers will look for another.

That is why I think this Bill is the next step in how we deal with scams. The Protection from Scams Act gave the Police powers to intervene when a victim remains deeply at risk of transferring money to a scammer.

As of 15 February 2026, 12 ROs had been issued. One had been lifted, two had ended after reaching the statutory limit and nine remained in effect. Ten of the 12 recipients had also asked for withdrawals for daily expenses, which the Police approved.

This Bill allows us to step in even earlier. Instead of waiting until a victim is targeted, the Police can act against the accounts and services that scammers rely on. I think that is the right direction. But as we give the Police stronger powers, we should also make sure that innocent people are protected.

I have three points.

First, open data. The Ministry has already been providing regular updates on ROs under the Protection from Scams Act. I would ask that similar information be provided for the new powers under this Bill. For example, how many DOs, ADOs and SLOs are issued? How many are challenged or withdrawn? How long do these orders usually remain in place? This information will help us understand whether these powers are being used properly and whether they are working as intended. If we are giving the Police stronger powers, we should also give the public confidence that these powers are being used properly.

Second, speed for innocent users. There is another side to this. Some of the accounts affected by these new Orders may belong to innocent people. They could be victims whose accounts have been hacked. They could be people whose identities have been stolen. They could also be accounts wrongly linked to scam activity.

Under the Protection from Scams Act, 10 of the 12 people placed under ROs had asked the Police for permission to withdraw money for their daily needs, and these requests were approved. This shows that there is already a process to help people who are affected. I would ask the Ministry to explain how the existing appeal mechanisms for the new Orders will work in practice, and whether additional safeguards are needed.

Where an innocent person can show that an account has been wrongly affected, the process to review the case should be clear and fast. Once it is clear that there is no longer a risk, access should be restored in hours, not days. This is important because for an innocent person, being locked out of an account can itself cause real harm.

Third, shared responsibility. The Police have an important role, but preventing scams cannot be the responsibility of the Police alone. Banks, telcos and online platforms are also part of the system through which these scams take place. In fact, the Bill's definition of service providers already covers financial institutions, telecommunications service providers and providers of online services.

This Bill also provides for financial penalties of up to $10 million for each instance of non-compliance by designated online service providers. Where a direction to rectify the breach is not complied with, there can also be a further fine of up to $300,000 for every day or part of a day that the offence continues after conviction.

I would ask the Ministry to say more about how these powers will be used. I would also ask whether the Government intends to set different duties or standards for the different types of service providers covered by the Bill, given that a bank, a telco and an online platform may see different parts of the same scam.

If one part of the system can see that something is wrong, should it have a duty to step in? I think this is something we should continue to look at. This does not mean shifting all responsibility away from individuals. Public education will remain important. Singaporeans will still need to be careful about the links they click, the people they speak to online and the money they transfer.

But scams are becoming more convincing. When a fake Prime Minister can appear on a video call, we cannot simply tell people to be more careful and leave it at that. We also need to make it harder for scammers to operate.

Mr Speaker, I began with the businessman who lost at least $4.9 million after receiving a fake Zoom call. Law alone may not have been able to show him that the person on his screen was not real. But the law can help us disrupt the accounts, phone lines and online services that scammers use. And the earlier we can step in, the more victims we may be able to prevent. This is especially important for our seniors, who last year suffered the highest average loss per scam victim among all age groups, at $37,053 each.

Education will continue to matter. But education alone is not enough. We need to act earlier, protect innocent users and make sure that everyone in the scam system plays a part in stopping scams.

Overall, I think that this Bill is a step in the right direction, and I hope the Ministry will continue to strengthen our approach, especially in the areas of open data, protection for innocent users and shared responsibility. Mr Speaker, Sir, I support the Scams (Countermeasures) and Other Matters Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Gerald Giam.

8.44 pm

Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song (Aljunied): Mr Speaker, scams continued to inflict immense financial and emotional distress on Singaporeans, and I welcome the Government taking actions to strengthen our legislative toolkit. I am heartened to see that the Scam (Countermeasures) and Other Matters Bill reflects key principles I advocated for during the Second Reading of the Protection from Scams Bill in January 2025.

To begin with, I had previously highlighted the need for a centralised mechanism to share threat intelligence and disrupt scam vectors across sectors.

The Bill moves in this direction by establishing statutory powers for DOs, enabling crucial information sharing across banks, telcos and digital platforms to facilitate cross-sector fraud prevention.

I had urged the Government to prioritise real-time intervention before stolen funds vanish. This Bill tackles these high-speed scenarios by empowering specified officers to issue swift account disabling orders and service limitation orders to freeze suspect bank accounts, crypto wallets and communication channels. We have already seen the value of proactive real time action in the recent joint Police operation with crypto exchanges, which successfully foiled almost $9 million in scam losses through rapid detection and data sharing.

I stress the importance of greater accountability from digital platforms and service providers. This Bill strengthens the deterrence by increasing maximum administrative financial penalties for non-compliant online providers to $10 million, alongside targeted measures to crack down on money mules who surrender their credentials.

However, there are several critical areas that require further strengthening to build a more comprehensive framework.

First, the Government should establish a clear statutory victim compensation framework that holds financial institutions, telcos and digital platforms accountable when their anti-scam measures failed to protect customers.

Second, a dedicated independent investigative body should be set up to handle claims under the Shared Responsibility Framework (SRF). Under the current SRF guidelines, the financial institution acts as the overall point of contact and conducts the initial assessment to determine whether it met its duties. While these are internal investigation teams independent of business units, this remains an internal process operated by the bank itself, presenting an inherent conflict of interest as the bank acts as both the investigator and the interested party with the financial incentive to deny liability.

Furthermore, while dissatisfied customers can escalate disputes to the Financial Industry Disputes Resolution Centre (FIDReC), FIDReC is a dispute resolution and mediation body, rather than a dedicated investigative agency with direct statutory powers to extract system logs, fraud detection records or independently audit technical records.

Third, MAS and IMDA should introduce a standardised public rating system to regularly assess and publish the anti-scam performance of financial institutions, telcos and online platforms. These public ratings need not disclose specific technical vulnerabilities. Rather, clear and standardised ratings would serve as a powerful incentive for entities to continuously improve their anti-scam measures. Public transparency enables consumers to make informed choices and vote with their wallets, creating healthy market forces that drive a race to the top.

Fourth, regulators should build upon the account disabling powers in this Bill by mandating real time fraud monitoring for digital wallet transactions after setup, as well as expanding algorithmic anomaly detection across retail stock brokerages and flag messaging channels. Scammers routinely exploit social engineering to trick victims into approving initial digital wallet setups on services, like Apple Pay or Google Pay, after which subsequent draining transactions can proceed without triggering multi-factor authentication.

Similarly, in stock ramp and dump schemes, scammers lure victims through chat groups to buy foreign microcap stocks on licensed exchanges, requiring real-time patent monitoring, such as flagging sudden coordinated retail buy orders or reported scam invitation links, will better ensure proactive intervention before funds are lost.

Fifth, a dedicated scam victim restitution fund should be established. As I raised in a Parliamentary Question on 28 February 2025, such a fund could be financed by confiscated assets so that local scam victims can receive a portion of recovered proceeds. While I acknowledge the operational complexities raised, establishing a structured fund would demonstrate tangible solidarity with victims who currently face low fund recovery rates.

During that exchange, then-Minister of State Sun Xueling mentioned that various proposals were being considered to see how best to return recovered scam proceeds to victims. Could the Minister update this house on what proposals are currently being considered or implemented?

Mr Speaker, while this Bill provides vital emergency breaks, we can build greater resilience against scams by incorporating these structural safeguards. I urge the Government to address these proposals in future legislation and regulations to better ensure protection and recourse for Singaporeans who are victims of scams.

Notwithstanding these concerns, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Prof Kenneth Poon.

8.50 pm

Prof Kenneth Poon (Nominated Member): Mr Speaker, I rise in support of the Bill.

Scams have become increasingly sophisticated and the harm they cause can be devastating. I, therefore, support the stronger powers in this Bill to disrupt the services and accounts through which scams are facilitated. These are significant powers. SLOs can restrict access to scam-enabling services for up to three years, while ADOs can restrict the use of bank and payment accounts, telephone lines and online accounts.

I would like to raise one consideration about their implementation: how we protect people from harm while preserving their agency as far as possible.

Mr Speaker, we often think about scams in terms of two groups: the scammer and the victim. But human behaviour can be more complicated. A person whose bank or online account is being used to facilitate a scam may knowingly participating in criminal activity. However, there may, as highlighted by other Members this evening, also be individuals who themselves have been manipulated into facilitating a scam.

Some people may have cognitive limitations that make it more difficult to recognise deception, understand the consequences of their actions, or disengage once they have become involved. People with intellectual and developmental disabilities are one group whom this may be relevant, although there may be others who, because of their circumstances, are especially susceptible to manipulation.

I am not suggesting that such individuals constitute a significant population of persons affected by these provisions. I would like, however, to raise a broader principle, that the person through whom a scam operates may sometimes also be a person who has been manipulated by the scammer.

Our implementation framework needs to be capable of recognising this possibility. I therefore ask the Minister how proportionality and individual vulnerability will be considered when these powers are exercised.

Where someone presents a genuine risk of facilitating further scams, intervention is clearly warranted. However, where the risk can be adequately managed through a more limited intervention, I hope that we will preserve as much of the person's agency as possible.

The Bill already provides some flexibility. An ADO may be varied to permit particular transactions, subject to appropriate limits or conditions. This could be especially important for a cognitively vulnerable person who has been manipulated into allowing an account to be used by another. Restricting the account may be necessary to prevent further harm, but that person may depend on it to receive wages or benefits or meet ordinary living expenses. Could the Minister elaborate on how such circumstances will be assessed and how continued access to essential services will be addressed for persons with particular vulnerabilities?

More broadly, will operational guidance help officers distinguish, between someone deliberately facilitating a scam and someone whose involvement reflects manipulation or significant cognitive vulnerability?

Mr Speaker, protection and agency need not be opposing principles. Good protective systems should and can intervene decisively, when necessary, while preserving a person's ability to conduct their ordinary life wherever that can safely be done. It is thus that I hope that the implementation of this Bill will combine strong protection against harm with sensitivity to vulnerability, proportionality and individual agency. Mr Speaker, I support the Bill.

8.56 pm

Mr Speaker: Senior Minister of State Goh.

Resumption of Debate on Question [8 September 2026],

"That the Bill be now read a Second Time." – [Senior Minister, Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs].

Question again proposed.

Mr Speaker: Mr Victor Lye.

12.01 pm

Mr Victor Lye (Ang Mo Kio): Mr Speaker, Sir, I support the Bill but seek proportionality when banking facilities are restricted, whether pending investigations or under the Account Disabling Order (ADO).

I note the Police only freezes bank accounts when there is reasonable suspicion that the accounts involved are involved in illicit activities such as scams. While safeguards exist, I hope we can make these safeguards proportionate and consistent in the extent to which banking access can be restricted.

A person whose account is frozen or disabled may apply for another bank account, but the new bank remains entitled to decline the application based on its own risk assessment. If all banks decline, what avenue does that person have to obtain basic banking facilities to receive salaries, Government payments and pay essential bills? Does the appeal to the Commissioner address this situation and if not, should there be an escalation mechanism for such cases?

Some residents have sought my help after their bank accounts were frozen. Some had only one bank account. They had difficulty opening another account at the same bank or a new account at another bank. Some are not fluent in English. They could not understand the new banking terms and conditions, nor navigate digital channels to seek redress.

I can understand that each bank may have legitimate risk reasons for declining the customer. But if every bank independently reaches the same conclusion, the person can effectively become excluded from basic banking services, with significant consequences for everyday life.

According to the Singapore Police Force's (SPF's) 2025 Scam and Cybercrime Brief, more than 15,000 bank accounts were frozen. Scams involving self-effected transfers form the majority of reported scams. According to SPF's 2026 Mid-Year Scam and Cybercrime Brief, scams involving self-effected transfers rose to 80.8% in the first half of 2026, up from 78.8% in the same period last year.

In most cases, scammers did not gain direct control of victims' accounts but manipulated victims into making monetary transactions through deception and social engineering. Presumably, there are victims whose bank accounts may be frozen. Investigations can take a while. Banking access may be cut off.

Sir, I have three suggestions.

First, define the minimum essential banking access for every person. Given that the facility restriction framework already preserves basic banking access, even for persons assessed to present mule-related risks, could a similar principle apply to any person who cannot obtain an account anywhere? Regardless of which anti-scam or investigative mechanism causes the restriction, can we define the basic services that should remain available, such as receiving verified salary and Government payments, paying essential bills, and reasonable access to money for daily expenses?

Second, set up clear resolution channels to avoid the situation when every bank says no. In this way, we ensure that every person will have at least one functioning bank account based on a minimum standard of essential banking access.

Third, monitor the situation to track proportionality. I suggest that we track: one, the number of persons who become unbanked or restricted because their bank accounts are frozen; and two, how long it took for them to remove the restrictions or how long they were unbanked.

Sir, the Bill creates sophisticated ways to restrict financial access. Our safeguards, similarly, should become equally sophisticated so that restricting risky banking functions does not unintentionally become exclusion from our banking system all together.

We should take a broad risk-based approach and ask ourselves such questions: what banking functions create that risk and what minimum access can safely be allowed in the interim? That allows us to protect the public while allowing for essential banking and livelihoods.

Sir, notwithstanding my concerns, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Ms Gho Sze Kee.

12.05 pm

Ms Gho Sze Kee (Mountbatten): Mr Speaker, I support the objectives of this Bill. Scams move quickly and we want to stop scams before losses actually happen. I agree that the authorities too must be able to intervene quicker and earlier.

But as we move further upstream to keep ahead of the scammers, we find ourselves moving ahead of the traditional thresholds of proof that normally apply in the judicial process. This Bill moves us onto grounds where suspicion alone can trigger consequential action and those consequences can be serious.

We live in a highly connected and digitalised society. Being denied a banking account, phone line or online services is a major handicap. For a business, it can be an outright disaster. It is therefore very important for us to look closely at the evidential threshold for suspicion, the guardrails against excesses and the safeguards around getting things wrong. There is a real potential for excesses and abuse in this Bill if we are not careful.

Sir, in the conventional judicial process, we usually talk about two different thresholds of proof. The prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases and facts are generally proved on a balance of probabilities in civil proceedings. These differing standards reflect, among other things, the different consequences of factual error, particularly the need in criminal proceedings to minimise the risk of wrongful conviction. [Please refer to the hon Member's clarification later in the debate.]

Clause 7 of the Bill introduces a new Part 2A into the Protection from Scams Act. It inserts new sections providing for Disclosure Orders (DOs), ADOs and Service Limitation Orders (SLOs).

The wording of the new sections 6A and 6B is telling. An officer may act where he suspects or has reason to believe that a service or an account will be or has been used to commit or facilitate a scam-related offence. These are not the conventional standards of proof we ordinarily associate with the determination of civil liability or criminal guilt. They are lower, preventive standards designed to allow intervention before harm is completed.

In that sense, the lower threshold is understandable. The purpose here is not to determine guilt but to prevent or disrupt scams before further loss is caused.

Of course, the threshold for preventive intervention need not be the same as the threshold for establishing liability or guilt. That is not in itself unreasonable. But we must recognise that this cuts both ways. As we strive to intervene faster and earlier to prevent losses, the information that we base our decisions on is necessarily less complete and the risk of getting it wrong becomes correspondingly higher. It makes the safeguards around such powers all the more important. This is where my concern begins.

Mr Speaker, I am concerned that there appears to be more provisions in this Bill that enable rather than guard against excesses in this Bill. For example, there will be two types of ADOs: an order against specific accounts and a criteria-based order against accounts that match a set of given conditions. Under subsection 6A(B) of the new section 6B, we see the disabling conditions of criteria-based ADOs. An account can be disabled if it has carried out a transaction with a specific account or, in the case of a telephone or online account, simply having communicated with the wrong person.

This is concerning because it is essentially the possibility of suspicion by association alone.

It is easy to think of many scenarios where this may fail. A person could have won a World Cup bet with the wrong friend and received his winnings on PayNow from the friend's account or he could have simply had some phone calls or interactions with the wrong friend. There is no way for him to know that that friend might have been a scammer or a mule.

A business too could easily have legitimate transactions with an alleged scammer or mule. And one can easily imagine scenarios where a party could be both a victim and an unwitting accessory to a scam.

Sir, if I may anticipate the Minister's response to this. Yes, it is true that there are some safeguards built into the Bill such as time and extension limits to the orders. And yes, an appeal mechanism exists for both ADOs and SLOs. And I agree too that we can and indeed we should trust our Police officers to perform their duties professionally and impartially.

But that is not the real concern here. My concern is primarily not the checks and the balances on the authorities, but rather the lack of checks and balances on the banks, financial institutions, telecommunications companies (telcos) and platforms that receive these orders.

Let us consider the new section 6F, which sets out punishment for non-compliance with a given order, with clause 10, which gives immunity to service providers against civil and criminal liabilities in complying with orders. This, together with the new sections 9A and 9B of the Protection from Scams Act.

Section 9B is of particular concern. It allows a bank, telco or platform to take action on its own initiative, without the Police having to issue an order against that specific account so long as its suspicions are drawn, even partly from information obtained from another order. Taken together, it is essentially an encouragement to unilateral action. It is clear that the Bill nudges banks, telcos and service providers to over, rather than under, action.

This is yet another point in the Bill where suspicion alone is sufficient for consequential action, but with an important distinction. In this case, the discretion to act lies not with the authorities, but with private business entities.

Can we ever, in all fairness, expect profit-driven private entities to act with the same fairness and impartiality that we expect of the authorities? The answer is clear to me.

Such a pattern is not unfamiliar in our regulatory environment. Under the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) Notice 626, a binding directive to counter money laundering, for example, banks are required to take action when they have suspicions about a customer. Retaining the customer is the exception, rather than the default. If a bank chooses to retain a suspected customer, it has to justify that decision in writing. It does not have to justify simply letting the customer go.

Sir, my point is not that this is unreasonable, but that the incentives are already tilted towards caution. It is reasonable to expect our banks, telcos and platforms to play their part in combating scams. But precisely because we ask this of them, we must be honest and recognise the stark differences between their motivations and considerations and those of the authorities. Under such a regulatory regime, Sir, if you were a bank compliance officer, the path of least resistance would be to freeze and terminate first, and to ask questions later.

As they say in Mandarin: "宁可杀错，不可放过". It is much easier to be safe than sorry. If a service provider decides to simply terminate a customer or refuse service, there may be little anyone can do because it simply remains, in most circumstances, within the business' prerogative to do so.

Which brings us, Sir, to that big elephant in the room – the National Scams List (NSL). The NSL is an operational tool. It sits outside the Bill and does not appear at all in the Bill's text. But the DO, ADO and SLO enabled by this Bill are symbiotic with the NSL. We cannot examine one without considering the other.

There are a lot of clear and obvious operational questions that come to mind when we think of the relationship between these orders and the NSL, but I shall not go over what others will have surely covered.

Instead, considering what we have examined thus far, I want to ask one fundamental question.

What stops the NSL from becoming a unilateral and de facto blacklist for our banks, telcos and platforms? We have already seen how there are strong incentives for them to err on the side of caution. With the NSL, we are giving them information on suspected scam enablers.

What do we expect they will do with it? Will they simply do what an ADO or SLO requires them to do? Or will they use the information independently to freeze accounts, terminate relationships, refuse new accounts or deny services?

When someone successfully appeals against an ADO or SLO, will service providers simply restore the position, or can they still decide that they no longer wish to provide services to that person? What are the consumer safeguards that are in place?

When someone is cleared of any suspicions of wrongdoing and removed from the NSL, what stops the service providers from still erring from the side of caution and continuing to exercise their business prerogative to continue to refuse service? When an ADO or SLO lapses, what stops the consequences from continuing beyond the life of the order? In fact, what safeguards do we actually have to ensure that attracting an order, or appearing on the NSL, justified or otherwise, does not become a life sentence?

These are uncomfortable questions that the bill does not address, Mr Speaker, and there are many more. It is clear there are scant guardrails in place against excessive action by service providers. I support this Bill because I recognise the overarching importance of the fight against scams. But this is a serious shortcoming that must be addressed.

Mr Speaker: Dr Charlene Chen.

12.18 pm

Dr Charlene Chen (Tampines): Mr Speaker, in Mandarin, please.

(In Mandarin) Mr Speaker, during the Meet-the-People Sessions, from time to time, we encounter residents who have fallen victim to scams. Some were deceived by strangers, others placed their trust in friends, acquaintances or people they have only recently met. By the time they realise something is wrong and make a Police report, the money has already been moved through different accounts or even transferred overseas.

The Police will do their utmost to trace the funds, but the scammers are familiar with the law enforcement methods. They use different bank accounts, telephone numbers, online platforms and intermediaries to move the funds quickly. Most distressingly, some residents lose their life savings and money lost is very difficult to recover.

I therefore support this Bill so that the Police will be able to obtain information more quickly and disable accounts involved in scams. But whether these new powers can truly protect residents depends on three implementation issues.

(In English): First, can we detect scams early enough? The new section 6G allows the Police to issue DOs requiring service providers to disclose information about bank, payment, digital-token, telephone and online accounts.

This addresses a common difficulty. At the beginning, a scam may not look like a scam. An online platform may see messages from a suspicious profile. A telco may see calls from a particular number. One bank may see an unusual transfer. Any one of these clues may be insufficient to justify intervention. But if several victims report the same telephone number, online identity or beneficiary account, the pattern becomes clearer.

My first question is therefore about detection. How will weak or inconclusive signals from different sources be brought together so that an emerging scam can be identified before the losses accumulate?

Section 6G allows a DO to prescribe when information must be provided or how frequently it must be shared. Will there be common response standards across service providers? Where an initial report is inconclusive, will its identifiers still be retained and matched against subsequent reports? The test is whether the system can turn scattered warning signs into an actionable picture early enough.

Second, once detected, can we disrupt the whole network? Detecting a scam and disrupting it are two different operational tasks. Information sharing helps us see the network. Account disabling must then help us break it.

The new section 6B(1) allows the Police to disable a particular account. Section 6B(2) goes further by allowing accounts that meet specified disabling conditions to be disabled. This matters because scammers do not normally depend on only one account. If one beneficiary account is frozen, they may give the victim another. If one online profile is removed, they may create a new profile or move the conversation elsewhere. They may also shift the money through several mule accounts before sending it overseas.

My second question is therefore about disruption: can the intervention dismantle the scammer's operating network or does it merely remove one replaceable account?

The Bill allows disabling conditions to capture transaction patterns and links to specified persons or accounts. Section 9B may also allow a provider to act voluntarily against another related account.

How will these powers be used to identify replacement accounts and recurring scam actors? After an account is disabled, will the authorities monitor whether the same scammer, victim or pattern reappears through another channel? The test is not simply whether one account was closed. It is whether the scam was stopped.

Third, how will accuracy and effectiveness be evaluated? A conditions-based order under section 6B(2) could affect multiple accounts. If the conditions are too narrow, scammers may escape. If they are too broad, legitimate users may be affected. Sections 6D and 6E allow orders to be cancelled or varied, and affected persons may appeal. But these safeguards will be meaningful only if errors are reviewed and corrected quickly.

Will the Ministry set service standards for reviewing potentially wrongful disabling and restoring legitimate accounts? More broadly, I hope the Ministry will publish aggregate indicators covering the time from detection to disclosure and disabling; false-positive and restoration rates; estimated losses prevented and evidence that scammers migrated to replacement accounts or services.

The number of orders issued measures enforcement activity. It does not, by itself, tell us whether residents' money was saved. Mr Speaker, in Mandarin, please.

(In Mandarin): Mr Speaker, this Bill provides the legal tools needed to trace and disrupt scam networks.

The key next step is to ensure that different agencies can connect the clues in a timely manner; that after one account is disabled, the scam network behind it can continue to be traced and that any wrongful impact on legitimate users can be corrected quickly. For residents, what matters most is not how many orders are issued, but whether action can be taken before the money is transferred away. What we must stop is not merely the next transfer but the same scam continuing through a different account or a different platform.

I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Ms Elysa Chen.

12.25 pm

Ms Elysa Chen (Bishan-Toa Payoh): Mr Speaker, scams are an abhorrent, reprehensible crime. I hate how scammers prey on the most vulnerable. They wipe out the retirement savings of hardworking Singaporeans. They go after the lonely. They exploit the very decency that makes us who we are: our willingness to trust, to help, to believe.

I hate how they keep coming back like zombies – we shut one account down and two more spring up within the hour. I hate how they hide behind others who may be less educated, those who may be deceived and even some who may be coerced.

There are many heart wrenching stories in my own constituency.

A senior who is now estranged from her daughter after having fallen prey to a love scam. The senior refuses to listen to her daughter, grassroots leaders, and even myself because she refuses to accept that the scammer could have been anything but sincere in his affections towards her.

One of my Meet-the-People Sessions (MPS) cases involves a widow whose husband died from a terminal illness, who had transferred large sums to a scammer, thinking that he was investing money to leave more for his wife and children. And I read with horror how a police full-time national serviceman shot himself with a gun after he fell prey to a scam. He was 21 years old.

Last year alone, there were 37,308 scams cases, with losses totaling $913.1 million. This Bill is a necessary response and I support it. Given its reach, I will organise my observations under three headings: fairness, gaps the Bill has not yet closed and checks on the new powers it creates.

Let me begin with what I support. Like I said earlier, dealing with scammers today can feel like dealing with a horde of zombies. We can close one account but two more spring up again. But clause 7's new orders, reaching bank, payment, telecom and online accounts, in Singapore or overseas, give our officers the speed to keep pace. I likewise support clause 19, allowing AI to help issue Online Criminal Harms Act (OCHA) directions at the scale this problem now demands and clause 21's financial penalties on platforms that shirk their duties.

My first concern is that the machinery built to catch scammers is not overly punitive, particularly for those who have been deceived or coerced.

I would like to start with the threshold. Under the new sections 6A and 6B, a specified officer may issue a service limitation order for up to three years, or an account disabling order for up to 30 days extendable once to 60 days, whenever he suspects or has reason to believe that a person will use, or an account has been used, to facilitate a scam. This threshold is not unfamiliar – OHCA already permits the same low bar for scam-related directions.

But there, the consequence is that a post comes down or a social media account falls silent online. Here, it is a bank account, phone line or credit facility – basically, what someone needs to navigate daily life, that may be switched off for far longer, even reaching into overseas services.

Might reasonable suspicion, the higher bar used elsewhere in our statute book, be a better threshold that justifies the exercise of such power?

Alternatively, I would ask the Minister to place on record, as the Police's own September 2025 statement on the Facility Restriction Framework did, that the intended targets are those already flagged as high-risk – persons previously dealt with for mule offences, or under investigation and showing a continued pattern of facilitating scams – not a thin, first suspicion.

Next, the kind of restrictions that can be imposed.

Clause 7 already permits an account disabling order to target specific functions, a transfer, a withdrawal, rather than freeze an account outright; and section 6E allows a service limitation order to be varied for continued, conditional access.

Can there be clarity on how these powers will be exercised? To the extent possible, I would urge specific countermeasures be adopted rather than a blanket freeze of an account that this become the default. For instance, a daily transfer cap, well below what a scam typically demands, preserves a person's ability to pay for groceries and school fees while still blunting the syndicate's playbook, with a full freeze kept for the clearest, highest risk cases.

Next, providing opportunities for review. Clauses 8 and 9 allow an appeal only to the Commissioner of Police, or an officer he designates, with no fixed time for a reply, and only for the identified person himself. What if someone was genuinely misled or coerced into handing over his account? I would like to ask for a review avenue outside the Police, or at minimum, a prescribed response time in subsidiary legislation.

The same gap appears in the NSL that I understand the Home Team Science and Technology Agency (HTX) and the Police are developing to share information on flagged accounts with service providers. A person subject to a formal order under this Bill can appeal it; a person merely placed on this List, without being the direct subject of an Order, does not clearly have the same right, even though a bank or telecommunication companies (telcos) seeing that name may simply decline to serve them on the strength of the listing alone.

Who administers this List, how does a name get added and will the person even be told that their name is on this NSL? Being placed on it should carry the same rights of notice and review as a formal order.

Next, the reverse presumption in the new sections 39GA to 39GC of the Miscellaneous Offences Act. I support criminalising the sale of accounts to scam syndicates, but the presumption that a person acted "for any gain" casts a wide net. Take, for example, an elderly aunty deceived into handing over her bank login for a small token payment she believed was legitimate. She would be presumed, until she proves otherwise, to have had reasonable grounds to believe her account would be misused, a presumption she may not have the ability to rebut on her own.

In fairness, caning under these sections requires the prosecution to separately prove actual knowledge or intent, not merely satisfy the presumption, and this safeguard deserves to be on the record. Even so, I would ask for a minimum gain threshold before the "for any gain" limb applies, so a token sum does not sweep in those who have been deceived alongside those who are complicit.

Last, the restriction of access to Singpass. Will this Bill inadvertently cut members of the public off from it? Under the Police's own Facility Restriction Framework, which came before this Bill, Singpass and Corppass access can already be restricted alongside banking and mobile line services. Singpass today is not just one more online account. It is how many of us book a doctor's appointment, apply for a flat or check our Central Provident Fund (CPF).

If a person's Singpass access is switched off for months or years, while they are still merely suspected, they may find themselves locked out of the very Government services they need to sort out their affairs, appeal a decision or simply get on with life. Are there measures in place to guarantee that access to the most essential civic services – voting, healthcare and CPF matters among them – is preserved even while we disable the networks that scammers use to commit their crimes, or for the resulting inconvenience to the individual to be mitigated by way of a more contained restriction on the use of Singpass?

My second concern is that for all its new powers, the Bill leaves at least three gaps where harm can still get through – one at the point of prevention; one at the point of enforcement; and one at the point of redress.

The prevention gap: SPF's Annual Scam and Cybercrime Brief, published in February this year, tells us that 81.8% of last year's scam cases involved victims transferring their own money, having been deceived into doing so willingly. Disabling a mule's account after that transfer has happened does little to bring a victim's money back. Our Shared Responsibility Framework, which places duties on banks and telcos, was built for a narrower problem – unauthorised transactions, where a scammer hijacks someone's credentials – and does not reach the investment, loan or "Government official" scams that persuade a person to click "transfer" themselves.

Neither, as far as I understand, does it yet place duties on digital payment token providers, even though cryptocurrency now accounts for roughly a fifth of all scam losses, some $182 million last year. As we strengthen the back end by disabling mule accounts, will the Government also widen the Framework's front-end duties to match?

The enforcement gap: the new mule offences only apply to accounts on a service designated under OCHA, and that list remains a limited one. This limits our ability to fight scams because syndicates are adaptable: if a designated platform is used only as a funnel, to make first contact before steering a victim toward to some unlisted platform, does the mule who supplied that first account escape these offences simply because the harm was completed elsewhere? If the mischief we are trying to stop is the supply of an account for criminal use, liability should turn on the conduct not which platform the account happens to sit on.

The redress gap: clause 21's financial penalties on non-compliant platforms are welcome. But they flow to the state, not the victim. Will the Government consider a private right of civil action for scam victims against offenders and non-compliant service providers, so that a victim's recourse does not rest on the state's initiative alone? And going further, will the Government consider restitution for victims of scam harm as a result of non-compliant platforms from the monies gathered from these fines, as a form of economic redress. What I am asking for is, under the spirit of fairness and justice, can we consider redistributing the fines collected to the victims of the very scams the platforms were fined for.

My third and final concern is accountability. This Bill hands the state two significant new instruments, and I would ask what checks accompany each.

Clause 19 lets a computer program issue OCHA directions on a responsible officer's authority, and I understand the appeal of this given the volume of scam accounts our officers now face. But will a human review a batch of directions before, not only after, they are issued, so a pattern-matching algorithm does not sweep an innocent account into this net on a false positive?

Clause 31 creates a new corps of civilian specialist officers, with powers of arrest, search and entry similar to a Commercial Affairs Officer. How will they be disciplined and held to account, given they sit outside the disciplinary provisions that apply to police officers?

Mr Speaker, I began by saying I hate scammers, and nothing in the three concerns I have raised changes that. This Bill gives our officers real speed against a threat that regenerates faster than we can strike it down, and a speed that is worth having. But speed and fairness need not be in tension.

The measures must strike at the right targets. A syndicate's account can still be disabled without a grieving widow, a deceived aunty or a frightened young man losing their life that they are trying to hold together. I have asked the Minister to consider where the presumption falls too widely, where the gaps let harm slip through at prevention, enforcement and redress, and where new powers need new checks to match. These are not objections to the Bill's purpose, but conditions for its success – because a Bill that stops scammers only to catch the vulnerable in the same net will have solved one injustice by creating another.

Mr Speaker, notwithstanding my clarifications, I support this Bill.

Mr Speaker: Ms Hazlina Abdul Halim.

12.39 pm

Ms Hazlina Abdul Halim (East Coast): Mr Speaker, I support the Bill's intention – it allows for faster tools to detect, disrupt and deter scams. But let me make three points today.

First, scam prevention efforts must be tailored to different vulnerabilities. Second, platforms must share responsibility to keep their users safe. Third, safeguards for Account Disabling and Service Restrictions.

Mr Speaker, when we refer to "a scam victim" and "the scam" as though there is one archetype. But Members will know, through the appeals and the assistance requests that we receive, this cannot be father from the truth.

Seniors may be targeted through Government-official impersonation or investment scams. Young adults may be targeted through job scams, e-commerce scams, investment scams as well as phishing. Parents may be targeted through fake messages involving their children. Small business owners, meanwhile, may be targeted through impersonation of suppliers, customers or business partners.

The tactics are different because the vulnerabilities are different. And if scammers tailor their approach to their victims, our prevention efforts should also do the same.

For our seniors, scams often exploit fear, authority and trust. A resident may receive a call from someone claiming to be from a Government agency or financial institution. He or she is told that their bank account has been compromised, that he or she is under investigation; or maybe, his or her money needs to be transferred immediately for protection.

The scammer creates urgency. The victim is then told not to speak to anyone else. And sometimes, by the time the family finds out, the money is already gone.

Last year, those aged 65 and above accounted for about 15% of scam victims. But what concerns me a little bit more is the scale of their losses. The average amount lost by an elderly victim was more than $37,000 in 2025, and rose to $42,000 in the first half of the year.

Just earlier this week, my Fengshan resident Mr T was really distraught and sought help to recover $40,000 he had inadvertently paid for what he believed was a hire-purchase commitment. He was really nervous and anxious because the investigations were taking time and in the meantime, he still remains the primary caregiver and sole breadwinner in the family, and he still has responsibilities to cater to.

For some seniors, the scams may wipe out their life savings – losing that $40,000 is not a financial hit, it is losing their means to living and their security.

So, I ask the Minister whether we can make our anti-scam education more targeted for seniors? Instead of telling seniors just "to be careful", how do we increase efforts to show examples of what these scams look like and sounds like in their vernacular languages?

What does a fake investment advertisement look like? How do we make them realise "too good to be true" is often the case is? How does an impersonation call sound like? What will a legitimate Government agency never ask them to do? On that note, I appreciate there is a lot more intentionality to have these disclosures and disclaimers, but I do believe they exist more online, where our seniors are more real life.

The objective should also be to make the warning familiar before the scammer makes contact. There is also a role for families and trusted community networks.

We know that some victims – or many victims – may be embarrassed to tell their children that they have been scammed. Others may be persuaded by the scammer not to speak to their family at all.

Could the Government consider how do we involve trusted family members, caregivers and community partners when there are strong indicators that elderly persons may be under scam manipulation? I understand that this involves a very delicate balance.

We want to protect seniors without undermining their agency and also, uplifting their dignity. But perhaps the principle should be to intervene early enough to prevent irreversible harm, but carefully enough to respect the dignity and independence of the individual.

For young adults though, the approach must be different. Last year, those aged 20 to 29 accounted for almost one in five scam cases. They are not necessarily less digitally savvy. In fact, their familiarity with technology may create a different vulnerability.

They look for jobs online. They buy and sell things online. The young also communicate through messaging platforms, and discover products and opportunities through social media. The same digital familiarity creates convenience but also create opportunities for scammers. So, anti-scam education should be incorporated more systematically into curriculums, career preparation programmes and perhaps, familiar youth platforms?

Digital literacy cannot only mean knowing how to use technology but also knowing when not to trust what technology is showing us.

Platforms must also carry responsibility, Mr Speaker. Responsibility for scams cannot rest only on individuals.

Last year, online platforms were used by scammers to reach victims in around more than 84% of all scam cases. This tells us something important. The environment in which scams take place matters.

A person can exercise caution. Families can look out for one another. The Government can do its best to educate the public. But if fraudulent accounts, scam advertisements and impersonation pages can be created faster than they can be detected and removed, then individual vigilance will always be fighting an uphill battle.

This is why I support the Bill's strengthening of OCHA. The Bill raises the maximum financial penalty for certain non-compliance to up to $10 million for each instance. These are significant penalties.

They send an important signal: protecting users from scams must be treated as a core responsibility for operating a digital platform, and not simply as another cost of doing business.

But I would also like to understand how these penalties will work in practice. What factors will the Competent Authority consider when determining the quantum of penalty? For example, will it consider the scale of exposure, duration of non-compliance, and whether the provider had previously been warned and how quickly this corrective action was taken? And how will an "instance of non-compliance" be assessed where a systemic failure affects thousands of users or pieces of scam content?

Clear expectations matter. They matter not only for enforcement, but also for platforms that genuinely want to comply.

I also support the SLO framework. Scams frequently rely on interconnected digital services operating at speed and across multiple channels. The ability to act against services that facilitate scam activity is therefore an important complement to existing enforcement powers. In being firm with platforms, we should also be precise about what we expect from them. It is a partnership.

Mr Speaker, the proposed DOs, ADOs and SLOs will allow the authorities to act quickly against scam enablers. This is important because scammers move money and shift platforms at extraordinary speed. But speed must not come at the expense of accuracy.

Under the Bill, an account disabling order may last for up to 30 days, with a further extension. For someone operating a business online, an account may not simply be a social media profile. It could be their livelihood. It could be how they communicate with and serve customers. It could be how they receive income.

So, I ask whether there will be an expedited review mechanism for someone who believes that an account has been wrongly disabled. What would be the expected timeframe for such a review? Where an account is found to have been wrongly disabled, what steps will be taken to minimise the harm caused and to support the user?

The same principle also applies to automated enforcement. Scammers can generate fraudulent accounts, websites and advertisements at a scale that humans cannot realistically review one by one. We need technology to fight technology. But the more powerful our automated systems become, the more important human accountability also becomes. If an automated system gets something wrong, who reviews this decision? How quickly can the affected party seek human review? How will the authorities ensure that these systems remain accurate, fair and within the law?

The answer should not be to avoid automation. The answer should be to build responsible automation.

Mr Speaker, I would also like to suggest that we think carefully about how we measure the success of the Bill. We should certainly track the number of accounts disabled, directions issued and enforcement actions taken. But these are inputs and outputs. Ultimately, it is the outcome we care about.

The outcome we should care about is whether fewer Singaporeans lose their hard-earned savings, whether scam content is removed before it reaches thousands of people, and whether suspicious accounts are detected before money is transferred. Whether an elderly resident keeps their retirement savings that took decades to build, whether a young person does not lose his first month's salary to a fake job offer and whether a working professional does not lose significant capital to an investment scam, which may then have knock-on effects, including defaulted mortgages, arrears and bills.

We cannot simply tell Singaporeans to be more careful. We must also make the digital environment around them safer, and this responsibility, Mr Speaker, Sir, must be shared. Mr Speaker, in Malay please.

(In Malay): Scams do not take place through just one channel or platform. Today, their methods are becoming increasingly sophisticated. For example, a scam may begin with the victim being contacted through social media, before the conversation is moved to a messaging app. The victim is then asked to transfer money to a bank account, while phone numbers registered under other people's names may also be used. As a result, the trail left by a scam may sometimes reveal only a small part of the overall picture.

I therefore support the amendments that will enable the Police to obtain information more quickly and block accounts used for scam activities.

In combating scams, time is critical. If each organisation acts separately, the victim's money may already have been transferred several times or moved out of Singapore. However, I would like to highlight one important point.

Not all scam victims are vulnerable in the same way. Seniors are certainly a high-risk group, as I mentioned earlier in my English speech. However, we must not assume that young people are immune.

Nearly 20% of scam victims are between 20 and 29 years old. Many are vulnerable to job scams, online shopping scams and phishing because they spend much of their lives online. So, what safeguards should we put in place to protect these different groups effectively?

For seniors, anti-scam education needs to be more practical. It should go beyond reminders and provide more examples of how scams work – whether through advertisements or scammers impersonating government representatives, for example. For youths and young people, anti-scam education should begin earlier, from their school years, so that they are not too trusting when looking for jobs or interacting online and learn to think more critically.

Mr Speaker, the responsibility for combating scams cannot be borne by any one party alone. It is a shared responsibility.

Last year, more than 84% of scam cases started online. Digital platforms that fail to fulfil their responsibilities can face penalties of up to $10 million. This is not simply about punishment. It is about ensuring that user safety is a fundamental responsibility of platforms, rather than merely a cost of doing business.

May I also ask the Minister to explain the factors considered in determining the amount of the penalty, including the duration of the offence, the number of users affected and the corrective action taken?

Finally, Mr Speaker, I turn to the use of automated systems to speed up action against scam content. I recognise that scammers move at the speed of technology and therefore, enforcement must be able to move just as quickly. However, it is also increasingly important to have an appeals framework in place where necessary. The same applies to ADOs. These powers are important, but I suggest an expedited review process for those who believe their accounts have been blocked incorrectly.

I often receive appeals from my Fengshan residents who find themselves in difficult situations because they are unable to access their funds. At the same time, for victims who are left in dire straits by scams, where can they turn for help? Several Members of Parliament who spoke earlier offered suggestions which I support, including providing an avenue for victims to access temporary funds.

Mr Speaker, effectiveness should not be measured simply by the number of accounts blocked or orders issued. True success is when scam content can be removed earlier, when fewer Singaporeans lose their hard-earned money, and when families no longer lose savings accumulated over a lifetime.

Scammers will continue to change their tactics. Our laws must therefore continue to evolve – supported by more targeted education, more responsible platforms and systems that can act quickly without compromising fairness.

(In English): Mr Speaker, scammers are constantly adapting. Today, it is a phone call. Tomorrow, a convincing social media advertisement, a deepfake video, a fraudulent website or even a message from someone we know. Our laws must therefore keep pace.

But laws alone will not be enough, Mr Speaker, Sir. We need smarter prevention, more targeted education, greater responsibility from platforms and faster intervention. And more importantly, support to victims when a scam inadvertently takes place.

Ultimately, the fight against scams is a fight to protect something very human – trust. Trust in our institutions, trust in our digital spaces, trust in the people around us, and trust that when something goes wrong, our systems will be there to protect and help Singaporeans. Mr Speaker, Sir, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Ms Diana Pang.

12.53 pm

Ms Diana Pang Li Yen (Marine Parade-Braddell Heights): Mr Speaker, Sir, I rise in support of the Scams (Countermeasures) and Other Matters Bill.

Scams today are sophisticated, organised and constantly evolving. In minutes, scammers can wipe out what a family take years, decades to save – money meant for retirement, medical expenses or a child's education.

The harm is not just financial. Victims often blame themselves, lose confidence in their judgement and become afraid to trust even genuine phone calls and messages. Our authorities therefore need stronger tools to intervene earlier, act faster and disrupt the network supporting this crime.

I support the measures in this Bill. But stronger powers must also come with practical safeguards.

At the heart of every successful scam is one objective – to move the victim's money into the hands of the criminal. Stopping the first transfer is therefore critical. But our efforts cannot end here. We must also dismantle the wider money laundering networks that make scams profitable by enabling criminal proceeds to be transferred, layered and concealed.

This requires a framework that can trace and disrupt suspicious fund flows across banks, payment providers and digital asset platforms in near real time.

At the same time, our law should distinguish between passive money mules and those who knowingly recruit other account holders, manage a network of accounts, and professionally layer and conceal the scam proceeds. The latter are not just participants. They are key enablers of criminal enterprises and should face appropriate, severe consequences.

However, in pursuing money mules, we must guard against being overzealous. Not every person whose account receives suspicious funds have the same degree of knowing or culpability. Restrictions should therefore be proportionate to the person's conduct and the risk he or she continues to pose. There should be clear avenues for affected persons to seek review, demonstrate that they were deceived and have ceased their involvement, and regain access to essential financial services where appropriate.

Our response must be firm against against deliberate facilitators without permanently excluding the unwittingly vulnerable or rehabilitated into ordinary financial life. An account may be frozen, but life goes on. Life does not freeze.

At my Meet-the-People Sessions in Geylang Serai, I have met residents who are unable to access their existing bank accounts or open new accounts due to scam-related transactions being performed on their accounts.

One resident's account had been frozen for a prolonged period. He did not understand why and how to resolve it. Another had served his sentence for a scam-related offence and found employment. He is trying to rebuild his life and yet he cannot open a basic bank account.

A bank account is not just convenient, it is essential for daily life. Singapore's moving rapidly towards digital and cashless payment. Today, we use electronic payments to buy meals, take transport, pay bills, purchase groceries and many other everyday transactions. Salaries and Government payouts are also credited directly into the bank account.

In an increasingly cashless Singapore, how is someone without access to a bank account expected to live? An account may be frozen, but like what I said, life does not freeze with it. Rent and bills remain due. Children still need food and transport. A person still needs to get to work.

When I previously raised this issue in this House, I was told that an affected person could apply to Court for access to funds for basic living expenses. But one resident who came and see me with this problem could not even afford a lawyer, precisely because his money was frozen. He needed money to apply for access for the money that he could not use.

This can effectively cut off not only access to banking, but also access to justice.

Could there be a simpler, more accessible and expedited process for people in such situations? Where it is operationally safe, could verified salaries and Government payouts be released for essential expenses? If one account is suspected of receiving scam proceeds, should a separate account used for salary and household expenses automatically be affected? Can safeguards be applied before such accounts are restricted or frozen?

We must stop suspicious funds from moving, but restrictions should be calibrated to the actual risks posed, not wider or longer than necessary.

Where a bank independently restricts an account, will the customer be told, as far as investigation permits, whether the restriction comes from the Police or the bank? Whom can they approach and when can they expect a review?

While information sharing is vital, mistakes can also spread quickly. A resident may resolve an issue with one bank, only to find that another institution is still relying on the outdated information. If the information is found to be inaccurate, there must be a coordinated way to correct it across every institution that receives or relies on it.

Banks and financial institutions must clearly distinguish between a person in an investigation, the person being charged and the person who is being convicted. These are distinct legal statuses that should not be treated as interchangeable.

Any restriction imposed on an affected person's banking services should be proportionate to their circumstances, conduct and assessed risk. Longer strictions should also require regular review.

Service limitation orders may last up to three years. That is a very long time for someone trying to remain employed, support a family or rebuild a life.

Will there be periodic reviews to assess whether the restriction remains necessary instead of leaving it entirely to the affected person to seek reconsideration repeatedly? When an investigation concludes or new evidence emerges, will the need for restriction be assessed promptly? When the basis no longer exists, how quickly will access be restored?

Residents facing immediate hardship also need one clear point of contact. They should not be sent repeatedly from the banks to the Police, with neither side able to help to solve the problem.

For those who have served their sentences, reinstating their basic banking access is also part of the process of rehabilitation. We cannot expect people to find work and rebuild their lives while denying them the means to receive a salary and participate in an increasingly cashless society.

I support using technology to respond faster to scam websites, advertisements and online accounts. But automated systems can also reproduce mistakes at scale. For a small business, even a short, small, wrongful restriction on its online account can disrupt orders, revenues and customer relationships. As a small and medium enterprise owner myself, I understand how damaging this can be.

When an automated direction is challenged, will there be meaningful human review of the outcome, of the evidence? Will systems be audited for recurring errors? If a flawed rule is discovered, will the authorities proactively review other cases affected by it?

Technology can make enforcement faster, stronger. But clear human responsibility must remain. We can automate parts of enforcement, but we must never, ever automate accountability out of the process.

I also support bringing specialised technical expertise into the Police. However, CSOs may exercise significant powers, including arrest, search and seizure. How will members of public verify that such an officer is genuine? Especially when impersonation of public officers itself is a common scam tactic. This officer should carry clear identification and residents should have a simple and independent way to verify them. No one should feel that asking for verification is being uncooperative.

Technical expertise alone is not enough. I therefore hope that there will be a vigorous training, clear operational standards, effective supervision and accessible complaints process for anyone who believes that a CSO has acted improperly. These safeguards protect not only individuals but also public confidence in the system. If the Civilian Specialists are given police-like powers, the public must trust that those powers must be exercised lawfully, proportionately and accountably.

Mr Speaker, Sir, scams cause enormous financial and emotional harm. They also erode trust in our financial and digital systems. They exploit speed, technology and gaps in between institutions. We must respond with equal speed and coordination. I therefore hope this framework will deliver four outcomes.

First, faster tracing of scam proceeds across the financial institutions. Second, restrictions that are calibrated to allow persons to access funds needed for essential living expenses where it is safe to do so. Third, meaningful human review and prompt correction whenever computerised issued directions are imposed mistakenly or are no longer justified. Fourth, rigorous training and proper accountability for a Civilian Specialist Officer entrusted with significant powers under this Bill.

To conclude, let me say this. Access to banking facilities is a privilege and not a right. This privilege carries responsibilities. It must not be abused to facilitate scams or launder their proceeds. I support this Bill for reinforcing the message and for giving our officers a tool to stop scammers quickly and follow the money effectively.

Singaporeans deserve protection from malicious scams. We must therefore come down hard on these scammers and those who knowingly assist them. At the same time, we must also ensure that innocent people, victims and those who genuinely rehabilitated do not fall through cracks created by these stringent measures. A strong system must be capable, not only on imposing restrictions swiftly but also putting matters right just as swiftly when the restriction is mistaken or no longer necessary. With these observations, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Senior Minister of State Goh Pei Ming.

1.04 pm

The Senior Minister of State for Home Affairs (Mr Goh Pei Ming): Mr Speaker, I thank Members for their thoughtful questions and their strong support for this Bill. Across the House yesterday and today, there has been broad agreement that scams continue to cause serious harm in Singapore, to Singaporeans and their families, and more must be done to protect Singaporeans. Members also raised important points on how we ensure that these powers are exercised responsibly and fairly.

Let me now address the key issues. There were several questions relating to ADOs, DOs and SLOs. These fall in three broad categories: one, on information exchange between the Police and service providers; two, on the issuance of, and obligations imposed by, these Orders; and three, on the safeguards to ensure speedy recourse for persons whose accounts are disabled or restricted under these orders, but who may be victims themselves and who require access to their accounts for their basic needs.

First, on information exchange. Dr Charlene Chen asked how weak or inconclusive signals from different sources will be used to identify emerging scams. She also asked whether there will be common information disclosure standards across service providers, and whether information disclosed will be retained even if it was initially inconclusive.

Where the Police receives weak or inconclusive scam signals, the Police will draw on information shared by service providers and its own data sources, including Police reports and ScamShield reports, to piece the whole picture together. We will work together with service providers to implement robust information disclosure standards that are operationally feasible. We will only retain information for as long as it is operationally necessary.

Ms Elysa Chen asked who will administer and disseminate information to service providers on the NSL and whether an individual whose name has been shared with service providers will be notified. The Police will issue and inform service providers of ADOs, DOs and SLOs. We will not notify individuals that their details have been shared with service providers. Doing so would be counterproductive as it may prematurely inform or alert scammers and their mules that their criminal activities have been detected.

Ms Diana Pang asked if the exchange information framework will strengthen our ability to track the flow of scam proceeds across financial institutions in real time. Fund tracing is critical to the recovery of scam proceeds. However, the primary purpose of the information exchange supported by this Bill is to intervene upstream to identify and disrupt scam linked accounts even before they are being used to receive scam proceeds. Meanwhile, I assure the Member that we are actively working to improve our fund tracing capabilities.

Many Members may be familiar with the Anti-Scam Centre, which has co-located banks with the Police since 2019 to facilitate real time coordination in fund recovery efforts. Since March 2025, the Anti-Scam Centre has operationalised the crypto-tracing team to address the emerging threat of scam proceeds being rapidly dissipated via cryptocurrencies. In 2025, the crypto-tracing teams successfully recovered $22.8 million worth of virtual assets across 1,800 cases and helped prevent $8.8 million in losses through 360 victim interventions.

Second, Ms Diana Pang and Ms Elysa Chen asked about the thresholds that will be applied before an ADO or SLO is issued. An ADO may be issued if there is suspicion or reason to believe that an account has been or will be used preparatory to, or in furtherance of, scam-related offences. SLOs may be issued if the Police suspect or have reason to believe that an identified individual or entity will use a scam-enabling service to commit or facilitate a scam-related offence. The threshold of suspicion or reason to believe strikes the right balance between enabling early intervention to prevent scams, while maintaining a sufficiently high evidentiary threshold.

The Police will independently assess the facts and circumstances of every case to ensure that the legal threshold is met before issuing an order. I would like to emphasise that this is no different from assessments that the Police make today when exercising existing powers under the Criminal Procedure Code.

To Ms Elysa Chen’s and Mr Fadli Fawzi's queries, SLOs will be used only against mules under investigation who are at risk of further facilitating scams, and mules who have been warned, issued composition fines, prosecuted, or convicted.

Ms Diana Pang asked if individuals whose bank accounts have been disabled will know that the account was disabled pursuant to an order from the Police or voluntarily by the service provider. The Police will inform affected account holders of an ADO through appropriate channels as soon as practicable after it is issued. We are working with sector regulators to operationalise this. An appeal channel will also be made available.

Mr Jackson Lam asked how quickly service providers will be expected to act against suspicious accounts flagged by an Order, and whether there will be a common standard across service providers. The turnaround time for Orders will be determined in consultation with service providers, balancing the need for swift response with operational feasibility for our industry partners.

Mr Abdul Muhaimin asked why the Government decided to set the duration of an ADO at 30 days. The period of 30 days is operationally necessary for scam disruption. This includes providing enough time for the Police to assess if further action on the account is required. To be clear, ADOs can impose a requirement to disable the specified account for up to 30 days. Depending on the circumstances of the case, the Police may specify a shorter duration or cancel the ADO ahead of its expiry if it is no longer necessary.

I agree with Dr Charlene Chen that merely targeting individual accounts via ADOs is insufficient to effectively dismantle a scammer’s network. The data sharing ecosystem that this Bill supports goes beyond that. When the Police issues an ADO to a service provider, the Police may also share information relating to that account with other relevant service providers. Service providers can in turn identify and review associated accounts within their own ecosystems for any scam-related activity, such as accounts which may have transacted with the disabled account. If a service provider identifies an associated account that meets the conditions specified by the Police in a DO, it is required to provide the relevant information to the Police. The Police will then assess the information, and if appropriate, share it further with other service providers for review and action.

This process will continue and can continue to repeat as we map out and take down the scammers' entire ecosystem of enablers. This ‘fanning out’ process strengthens our ability to uncover and dismantle wider scam account networks beyond disabling individual accounts.

Third, I will touch on the recourse available to those whose accounts were disabled or restricted. However, before that, allow me to reiterate why we need to take a firm stand on this. Members are right to ask about the risks of moving quickly against suspected scam activity and the corrective measures that will be in place. No one wants to inadvertently affect or inconvenience persons who may not have been involved in scam activity.

Sir, at the same time, disrupting scams quickly and decisively is essential. In a recent case, scammers deceived a 68-year-old victim into believing that he was working remotely under the employment of a legitimate company. By the time officers engaged the victim, the victim had already transferred 80 percent, eight zero, 80 percent of his life savings, or approximately S$128,000 in cryptocurrency to the scammer. He was also on the verge of transferring another S$64,000 of borrowed funds to the scammer. The money was not recovered.

Such cases remind us that scam losses are often deeply personal and can have lasting consequences for the victim and their families. On average, about S$2 million was lost to scams every day, in the first half of this year. Members would have heard and have heard similar cases when engaging your residents or within this House over yesterday and today. The orders enable us to constrict the supply of scam enablers and disable them before they can be used. This is ultimately to protect our citizens. Our task here is to intervene early while ensuring adequate safeguards against innocent accounts being affected by these orders.

Ms Diana Pang rightly pointed out that even as we enhance information sharing on scam intelligence across institutions, we must correct erroneous information and inform relevant institutions of the correction quickly. We will work with service providers to operationalise this.

Ms Diana Pang also asked if there will be periodic reviews to assess whether restrictions remain necessary. Mr Kenneth Poon and Mr Fadli Fawzi also asked how legislative levers will be applied to individuals who were manipulated into being scam mules. The Government takes a firm stand, a firm approach towards scam mules. Those who enable or facilitate scams will face the full force of the law.

That said, we agree that penalties must be proportionate to the level of culpability. In relation to SLOs, although three years is the maximum duration allowed by law, the actual duration will depend on the individual's circumstances and assessed scam risk. First-time mules will generally face one year of restrictions, while longer durations may be warranted for repeat offenders or those assessed to pose a sustained scam risk.

Let me share one example, in 2024, before the introduction of the current Facility Restriction Framework, one individual received a conditional warning after allowing her bank account to be used for the receipt and transfer of scam proceeds. After the case concluded, she then allowed her accounts with two other banks to be used in a similar manner, with one of these accounts later receiving $8,000 in proceeds from another scam victim. Placing such individuals on SLOs not only better protects the public from scams, but also prevents these individuals from being drawn further into unlawful activities by scammers and getting themselves into further trouble.

Mr Gabriel Lam, Mr Jackson Lam, Dr Charlene Chen, Ms Diana Pang and Ms Hazlina Halim asked if an expedited appeal mechanism can be established where an ADO or SLO materially affects a person's livelihood, or where an innocent person's account was disabled. Ms Elysa Chen suggested having an independent appeal channel outside the Police or having a prescribed appeal response time in subsidiary legislation.

A swift and decisive approach to disrupting scams networks is necessary to protect Singaporeans and at the same time, we recognise that some individuals may genuinely require and depend on these accounts affected by the Orders for their livelihoods or daily expenses. It is thus important that we assess appeals fairly and as quickly as possible. We will share more details on the appeal mechanism, including the appeal timeline before operationalisation of these Orders. This needs careful consideration as we have seen cases of scammers coaching victims on what to say to bank staff to evade detection when they transfer money to the scammer. We should similarly expect scammers to coach mules to file a successful appeal to regain access to their accounts.

Mr Victor Lye, Mr Fadli Fawzi and Ms Diana Pang asked about having stronger safeguards to ensure that individuals who are subject to banking restrictions continue to have access to basic banking services for daily living. Ms Diana Pang and Mr Kenneth Poon asked if restrictions to stop suspicious transactions will still allow essential living needs to be met and if arrangements could be made for verified payments to go through while suspicious transactions are restricted. Mr Fadli Fawzi and Ms Elysa Chen suggested that as a default, these individuals should still be allowed to make basic transactions subject to a daily cap, with a full freeze reserved only for clearly high-risk cases. Ms He Ting Ru asked about the banking restrictions imposed on individuals whose accounts have been restricted under the Facility Restricted Framework.

I wish to reassure the House that we will not prevent individuals from accessing funds that they genuinely need for daily living. Individuals subject to banking restrictions under SLOs may still transact personally at the bank, over the counter. We will only restrict access to self-service banking services, like Internet banking, mobile banking or ATM services, which are more prone to being exploited for scams. Incoming transactions, such as salaries and Government payouts, will continue to be processed as usual.

Where the individual needs access to funds in an account disabled by an ADO, the individual may apply to the Police for access for a reasonable amount of money for daily expenses. This individual may similarly apply to the Police for access to additional amounts of money for necessary expenses, such as utilities and rental payments. Requests will be assessed on a case-by-case basis, and may be submitted and assessed independently of an appeal against the Order.

We are mindful that if the individual is a scam mule, the funds within the disabled account may in fact not belong to him, but to other scam victims. Nevertheless, once the Police have assessed that the individual should be allowed access to funds, the Police will work with banks to enable this as quickly as possible.

MAS is also working with banks to preserve access to basic banking services for individuals whose accounts have been closed. In 2025, major retail banks offered close to 8,300 Limited Purpose Banking Accounts (LPBAs). We will enhance this from October 2026. Going forward, the local banks will offer an LPBA or an alternative basic bank account to every affected Singapore Citizen or Permanent Resident, except in very limited cases. Examples of such exclusions include individuals who are subject to financial sanctions imposed by the United Nations, have been involved in terrorism financing or refuse to cooperate with banks' customer due diligence processes. MAS will continue to monitor instances of unbanked individuals and work with banks to minimise undue financial exclusion.

Ms Gho Sze Kee asked about safeguards against service providers refusing service to individuals who have appeared on the NSL, or who have been the subject of an ADO or SLO. Ms Elysa Chen and Ms Diana Pang also asked whether such individuals will have the same right of appeal as subjects of ADOs or SLOs.

Members have rightly pointed out that service providers may voluntarily decide to disable the accounts of individuals whose details have been shared with them. We strongly encourage service providers to proactively act against scam accounts, without waiting to be compelled by a formal Order.

We understand Members' reservations about encouraging private entities to take voluntary action. Indeed, these entities may not be held to the same fiduciary duties or public accountability that Government agencies have. But let me make two points here.

First, the sharing of an individual’s information with a service provider for the purpose of crime prevention is not new. Under the Criminal Procedure Code, the Police may already freeze bank accounts or phone lines. The possibility of service providers denying service to individuals linked to such accounts or phone lines on their own accord, even after the conclusion of their case, therefore already exists. What the Bill does is to lower the threshold for sharing such information with service providers, and to act swiftly against suspected scam activity.

Second, the question before us is fundamentally whether we are prepared to intervene early enough to prevent harm. If we are serious about doing this, we cannot expect the Police or Government to do this alone. Service providers are often best placed to detect suspicious activity first because they operate the platforms, systems and accounts that are being exploited by scammers.

In an NSL pilot trial conducted with the banking sector, every suspicious bank account shared with participating banks led, on average, to the proactive detection of one additional suspicious account by the banks. This shows how much more we can do together if industry, too, plays a more proactive and upstream role in detecting and acting against suspected scam activities, with appropriate safeguards in place for sure.

The proposed provisions in the Bill are intended to strike a careful balance between giving service providers sufficient latitude to act against scams without fear of liability, while providing guardrails to prevent abuse. For example, the protection from civil liability for voluntary actions only apply where the service provider acts in good faith and reasonable care; and for the purpose of preventing or detecting scam-related offences. This means service providers cannot act arbitrarily or with improper motive and still claim protection.

Service providers also remain subject to the oversight of their respective sectoral regulators, such as MAS for financial institutions and the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) for telcos. Any pattern of abuse or reckless handling of consumers' data or information may still attract regulatory scrutiny and where appropriate, enforcement action under the relevant sectoral regime.

To the Members' question on appeals, if a service provider decides to disable an account on its own accord, the service provider may review and decide whether to reinstate the account.

Ms Elysa Chen asked whether Singpass restrictions imposed under the Facility Restriction Framework may inadvertently lock individuals out of key Government services. I assure the Member that this is not the case. The Singpass restrictions will only be targeted at services that are at higher risk of being exploited for scams, such as opening a bank account. Services listed by the Member, namely voting, healthcare and CPF matters, remain fully accessible. Even for restricted services, individuals are not locked out entirely. It is possible to open a bank account without Singpass.

Mr Gabriel Lam, Dr Charlene Chen, Ms He Ting Ru and Mr Jackson Lam asked if statistics on ADOs and SLOs, and on appeals filed against these Orders, will be published. Mr Fadli Fawzi asked if statistics on bank accounts frozen by the Police could be published. Mr Victor Lye suggested collecting data on the number of individuals who become unbanked or remain subject to banking restrictions following the Police's intervention measures, as well as the duration of such restrictions. I thank the Members for the suggestions, which we will consider.

Next, on the new offences targeting misuse of online accounts.

Dealing with the network of scam accounts is a crucial anti-scam strategy since these accounts are essential for scammers. Criminalising the misuse of online accounts addresses a scam modus operandi that we are already seeing in practice. In one case, a 30-year-old man came across a post on Telegram, soliciting Carousell account holders who were willing to let their accounts be used for "business purposes". Enticed by the promise of fast cash, he contacted the buyer and subsequently converted his Carousell account into a professional account, which required the completion of verification by linking his Singpass account. He also replaced the registered email address of the Carousell account and subsequently surrendered the login credentials to the buyer. The account was subsequently misused to facilitate scams.

Ms Elysa Chen suggested setting a minimum gain threshold, such that the presumption will only apply if the person provided their personal information or supplied an online account in exchange for gain that exceeds this threshold. We have concerns with such an approach. Whatever gain threshold that we set, scam mules are likely to endeavour to go below it to escape liability and frustrate law enforcement efforts. The Government's view is that the presumption should apply so long as there is gain, no matter how small.

Ms Chen also asked if a situation where a mule supplies an account on a designated online service to a scammer, but where the account is only used to establish contact with the victim but not for the actual commission of the scam, and would that be covered by the new offences. Section 39GA criminalises the supplying of a designated online account if the person knew or had reasonable grounds to believe that the account would be used to commit or facilitate the commission by any person of any offence. It is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that a specific offence occurred.

Ms Diana Pang asked if the penalties are tiered based on the degree of the offender's involvement and if the penalties are sufficiently deterrent. The Ministry of Home Affairs' (MHA's) assessment is that the current penalties are adequately tiered and sufficiently deterrent. We enhanced the penalties in October 2025, when MHA introduced caning as a penalty for scam mules, with higher penalties for scammers and members or recruiters of scam syndicates.

The Sentencing Advisory Panel has also published sentencing guidelines for scams related offences to provide clarity on the recommended sentences for scam related offenders. To send a strong deterrent signal, the guidelines recommend that custodial sentences should be the norm and lay out the aggravating factors that will warrant an uplift in sentencing.

Let me now move on to the questions relating to OCHA.

First, on the amendment allowing a computer program to issue OCHA directions. Ms Elysa Chen, Ms Diana Pang, Ms Hazlina Halim, Ms He Ting Ru, Mr Abdul Muhaimin and Mr Jackson Lam asked about the safeguards in place to ensure that the computer program operates accurately, fairly and according to law. The program has been trained on clear criteria for identifying scam content and tested in parallel with human supervision to ensure a high level of accuracy. Any future program that we may use will need similar levels of rigour, if not higher. Post-deployment, we will maintain oversight of the program through measures such as human intervention on low-confidence cases, audit checks on blocked websites, and periodic reviews of the program’s performance based on metrics such as precision rate, to ensure that it continues to operate as intended. Designated Officers remain responsible and accountable for the directions issued by the program.

We are confident that the program will be able to continue maintaining a high level of accuracy when issuing OCHA directions. The number of reconsideration requests received for OCHA directions presently is very low. Out of over 70,000 website blocking directions issued in 2026, the Police only received six reconsideration requests. Six out of 70,000. Seeing this 70,000 number, I cannot help but be reminded of Ms Elysa Chen's zombie analogy, that when you kill one, more pop up. Therefore, we need to be able to use AI technology to be able to fight this scourge.

The Government has been exploring the application of AI for scam disruption for a long time now, before this was raised in the Workers' Party manifesto in 2025. For example, the AI powered classifier for ScamShield was developed in the first quarter of 2024 and operationalised a few months later. This has helped identify scam content submitted by users with a high precision rate and gives us confidence as we explore expanding AI use cases in scam disruption in areas where speed and scale are critical.

Several Members asked about the review process for appeals against any OCHA direction, including those given by a computer program. The existing appeal mechanism continues to apply.

We understand OCHA directions can have a serious impact on affected individuals and businesses, and we are committed to reviewing appeals expeditiously. While the time taken for appeals depend on the nature and complexity of the appeals, the review can be expected to be completed within seven days for straightforward and unambiguous appeals. For more complex cases, a longer timeline may be required.

Ms He Ting Ru asked if the Government would publicise performance indicators on directions issued by computer program in the future. I thank her for the suggestion, which we will consider.

Next, I will address queries relating to enhance penalty regime for the Codes of Practice and Implementation Directives. Mr Jackson Lam asked how the Code of Practice framework deals with content generated using AI. I agree with the Member that we must take an outcome-based approach, and indeed our Codes of Practice prescribe outcomes which designated online services are required to meet. We have taken care to prescribe these outcomes in a technologically neutral manner so that they remain relevant regardless of whether a scam is conducted using AI.

Mr Gabriel Lam asked how the powers under the enhanced enforcement regime will be used in practice. Ms Hazlina Halim asked about the factors that the Competent Authority will consider in deciding the quantum of the financial penalty. The decision to issue a financial penalty or direct the platform to rectify the non-compliance, as well as the quantum of financial penalty to impose, will depend on a variety of factors. This includes the nature and severity of the non-compliance, and the culpability and compliance track record of the platform. Our objective is for platforms to rectify their non-compliance, and the appropriate course of action will be determined on a case-by-case basis.

Mr Gabriel Lam also asked if we have considered a shared-responsibility model where banks, telcos and online platforms each have statutory duties to prevent scams within their own ecosystems. I agree that tackling scams must be a shared responsibility. This principle underpins our anti-scam strategy and is reflected throughout this Bill. The Government, banks, telcos, online platforms and individuals all have a role to play in preventing scams and reducing harm. While the enhanced OCHA enforcement regime applies to designated online services, we already have legal powers to take enforcement action against banks and telcos if necessary, whether through criminal offences or through MAS' and IMDA's regulatory regimes.

Ms Hazlina Halim asked how an instance of non-compliance will be assessed in practice. This will depend on the requirement in question. For example, if a service provider is required to meet a certain outcome, each failure to meet the outcome may be considered a separate instance. Designated online service providers should therefore rectify non-compliance as quickly as possible, to avoid new penalties arising from further instances of non-compliance.

Allow me to now move to the next set of issues on Civilian Specialist Officers (CSOs).

Mr Abdul Muhaimin asked where CSOs will be deployed and where CSOs will be recruited from. I thank the Member for recognising the strain that our law enforcement resources are placed under. CSOs may be recruited directly from the market, or may be seconded from other public agencies, such as the Cyber Security Agency. CSOs will be deployed to complement police resources in existing units, starting from the Cyber Command. CSOs will fall under the prevailing police command structures and will be recruited through established channels to bring in specialised civilian expertise that can augment Police's operational capabilities.

Ms Elysa Chen, Mr Jackson Lam and Ms Diana Pang sought assurance on safeguards to ensure that CSOs can be entrusted with sensitive investigations. Similar to Commercial Affairs Officers today, CSOs will undergo the necessary operational and investigative training and will be carefully selected based on their suitability for investigation work and relevant technical expertise. They remain subject to the same oversight, accountability and command structures as other investigation officers.

To Ms Diana Pang's further query, members of the public can identify CSOs by their warrant cards, similar to plainclothes police officers and Commercial Affairs Officers today. If unsure, members of the public may call the police hotline to verify the CSO's legitimacy.

Ms He Ting Ru asked what additional prescribed information banks may be required to provide under clause 6 of the Bill. The provision allows Police to obtain necessary information to notify persons who have been issued a restriction order. These persons have been identified to be at risk of falling prey to a scam, so any prescribed information will be in service of this narrow intent of preventing harm to a potential scam victim. The wider principle of banking secrecy remains unaffected.

Finally, allow me to address questions relating to other aspects of our anti-scam strategy.

Mr Abdul Muhaimin asked if there are any service standards governing the lifting of accounts frozen for investigations pursuant to the Criminal Procedure Code. The duration for which an account is frozen varies from case to case depending on the duration required for investigations or court proceedings.

As a safeguard, the Criminal Procedure Code requires that the police make a report of seizure to the relevant Court once the property is no longer required for investigations or court proceedings, or within one year after the date of seizure, whichever is earlier. Once the freeze is no longer required, the Police will apply to the Court for an order to lift the freeze. Banks are expected to give effect to court orders as soon as practicable upon receipt. Individuals whose bank accounts are frozen can also apply to the Courts for the release of funds to pay for basic living expenses or other essential spending.

Mr Fadli Fawzi asked if the Police intend to continue using Criminal Procedure Code powers to freeze bank accounts, or if the Police will use ADOs instead. We see ADOs as complementary to Criminal Procedure Code powers. Criminal Procedure Code powers are primarily investigative in nature and are generally exercised when there is sufficient evidence linking an account to an offence. On the other hand, ADOs can be exercised at a lower threshold to allow the police to keep pace with the speed at which scam syndicates can create and replace accounts.

Ms He Ting Ru asked about the average processing time for request to withdraw funds for accounts subjected to a restriction order today, and whether the Government will work with banks to develop a system that allows for graduated restrictions. To the former, request relating to funds for legitimate purposes, such as daily expenses and bills are processed quickly to minimise inconvenience to restriction order recipients. To the latter, I will refer her to MHA's response to a similar Parliamentary Question filed by Mr Kenneth Tiong for the Sitting on 4 March 2026.

Recipients of restriction orders may access funds for legitimate purposes amid safeguards against further transfers to scammers. We have therefore assessed that graduated restrictions are not necessary for now.

Ms Hazlina Halim and Ms He Ting Ru asked if anti-scam public education is tailored for different demographic segments such as seniors and young adults. Ms Jessica Tan also spoke about the importance of investing in public education, community outreach and digital literacy programmes. The Government has rolled out targeted public education efforts. For example, to make anti-scam public education material more elderly-friendly, the Police have published material with bite-sized messages in vernacular languages, using larger fonts and clear visuals. The Police have also worked closely with Government agencies such as the Agency for Integrated Care to deliver anti-scam public education through touch points frequented by the elderly. We even inject scam messages into getai performances and we have similar outreach efforts for other groups such as our youths.

We also recently concluded the National Simulated Scams Exercise held between March and August this year, which involved the use of robo-callers to simulate calls from scammers to strengthen participants’ anti-scam resilience. We will continue to invest in anti-scam public education as a key safeguard against scams as this is what we need to do to protect our population. And a vigilant population is ultimately the most important safeguard.

1.43 pm

Mr Speaker: Senior Minister of State Goh, if I may interrupt you, and this is not a scam message. You are approaching close to 40 minutes, so if you are able to finish soon, I will let you continue. If not, I will get Leader to move a Motion. Are you able to finish soon?

Mr Goh Pei Ming: I will request for an extension.

Mr Speaker: Alright. Leader.

Debate resumed.

Mr Speaker: Senior Minister of State, you may proceed.

1.45 pm

Mr Goh Pei Ming: Thank you. Mr Jackson Lam asked if the Bill strengthens our ability to cooperate with regional partners, and whether we will be conducting more joint operations with our counterparts following the success of Operation FRONTIER+ III. International cooperation is critical in disrupting scams and recovering assets, and I assure Members that we are working actively in this area. FRONTIER+ now covers 15 jurisdictions, with the United States and the Philippines joining earlier this year. We are encouraging more jurisdictions to join and work together on cross-border enforcement and asset recovery.

The passing of this Bill also allows us to demonstrate to our international counterparts Singapore's national resolve to combat scams.

Ms Elysa Chen asked if the Government will consider widening the scope of the Shared Responsibility Framework to cover more variants of scams as well as cryptocurrency platforms, whether the Government will consider a private right of civil action for scam victims against offenders and non-compliant service providers, and whether financial penalties imposed on non-compliant platforms can be redistributed to scam victims. Mr Gerald Giam suggested that the Government explore setting up an independent investigative mechanism under the Shared Responsibility Framework to complement internal bank assessments and provide a neutral dispute review for customers. Mr Giam further asked the Government to consider establishing a statutory victim compensation framework. Ms He Ting Ru also suggested a scam victim restitution fund as well as an insurance scheme to cover losses from scams.

These queries fall outside the ambit of the Bill and will require an involved answer. Regardless, let me assure Members that the Government is committed to helping scam victims recover their losses wherever possible. The key challenge is one of asset recovery as scam proceeds are often dissipated quickly and it is not always possible for the Police to recover and return victims all monies lost by them.

I invite Ms Chen, Ms He and Mr Giam to file separate Parliamentary Questions on their queries. Regarding expanding the Shared Responsibility Framework, a related Parliamentary Question has been filed by Dr Hamid Razak for the sitting on or after 10 September. I invite Ms Chen to look out for the response.

Mr Gerald Giam also asked if there was an update on MHA's assessment of the establishment of a scam victim recovery fund following his Parliamentary Question in February 2025.

There are several operational challenges that need to be carefully considered, including the co-mingling of criminal proceeds, the fact that the amount of funds recovered is but a fraction of the amount lost, and the potential for moral hazard.

Mr Giam further asked the Government to study the feasibility of a standardised public anti-scam rating system by MAS and IMDA to encourage the industry to enhance security measures and consumer transparency. MAS and IMDA already work closely with the industry to enhance their anti-scam safeguards even without such a rating. Publishing such a rating also risks inadvertently exposing the weaknesses of industry players, which could be exploited by scammers.

Ms Jessica Tan also suggested that the Government continue to work with industry to tap on advanced technologies to disrupt scams before they reach businesses and users. She also suggested stepping up information sharing between the Government and service providers further to allow for automated real-time alerts of suspicious behaviour, implementing pre-emptive restrictions for high-risk accounts, and mandatory rapid response protocols for service providers.

These are good suggestions. The Government will indeed continue to work closely with industry to disrupt scams quickly and with precision.

Mr Speaker, Sir, we have come some way in our fight against scams. But as I mentioned earlier, about $2 million of our citizens' hard-earned money is still lost to scammers every single day. We still have much to do.

This Bill gives the Government the tools to enable swifter, more proactive and decisive action against scams. This builds on the comprehensive anti-scam strategy that we have developed in recent years. We are working to disrupt and counter scams on all fronts – legislation, industry and international cooperation, leveraging cutting-edge technology, public education, and the list goes on. We will leave no stone unturned.

But the Government cannot do this alone. Service providers must do more to protect their platforms and their users. Individuals must remain vigilant and take responsibility for protecting themselves and those around them.

The Government, industry and the public must stand together. When we do, scammers have fewer places to hide, fewer tools to exploit and fewer opportunities to cause harm.

I seek Members' support on this Bill, to move decisively and reflect this House's commitment to fight scams and better protect our people.

Mr Speaker, I beg to move. [Applause.]

Mr Speaker: Any Members have any clarifications? Mr Fadli Fawzi.

1.50 pm

Mr Fadli Fawzi (Aljunied): Thank you, Senior Minister of State, for the comprehensive reply. I just have a minor point. Can I clarify whether the people subject to SLOs can be allowed to pay their bills online? Given that many banks are reducing their counter transaction facilities, this may help facilitate legitimate bill payments by those who are subject to SLOs.

Mr Goh Pei Ming: Mr Speaker, I thank the Member for his clarification. SLOs are imposed on individuals on a case-by-case basis. Depending on the circumstances of the case and what services are being restricted to the individual, he may or may not be able to do the online payments that he is talking about. It has to depend on what the case entails.

Mr Speaker: Mr Giam.

Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song (Aljunied): Sir, I thank the Senior Minister of State for his update on the Government's response to my proposal for a scam victim restitution fund.

Does the Senior Minister of State agree that it is fundamentally unsatisfactory for any seized scam assets which are not dissipated to eventually be forfeited to the Government, simply because it is difficult to attribute proceeds to individual victims? While I acknowledge there are genuine forensic challenges in tracking co-mingled proceeds, as he mentioned just now, can the Ministry commit to developing a structured restitution mechanism so that victims who have lost their life savings do not go home empty-handed while seized criminal proceeds end up in public coffers?

Mr Goh Pei Ming: Mr Speaker, in response to the Member's question, actually, he has asked this question many times in different ways.

I hope the Member understands and appreciates the difficulty we have in terms of establishing such a restitution fund. One factor indeed is that amounts recovered are but a fraction of the overall amounts lost. But in terms of how the funds have been co-mingled, often times, we see multiple fund streams going into common accounts and thereafter going out to multiple accounts again. The process cycles itself and repeats a few times before it actually reaches the destination the scammers want it to be.

This co-mingling makes it very difficult for us to trace and identify whose monies are where. In terms of attributing how much to return to every victim that we are talking about, it becomes very difficult for us to be equitable in this sense.

The other question here is also about moral hazard. If we establish that there is a certain baseline amount – I think the Member has asked this question before, whether we are able to have a certain minimum repayment amount for every scam victim – the overall awareness and vigilance of members of the public may fall, because they will get the sense that buying the next concert ticket, they have certain protections, up to a certain amount for scam protection.

I think there are many questions that we need to deal with in terms of how we can operationalise such a restitution fund.

But on the Member's other point about some of the funds that we have recovered which have gone back to the Consolidated Fund for the Government, I want to put out the point that these monies do not go back to the Government's coffers and just stay there. The Government spends a huge amount of our Budget, including funds that come from this Consolidated Fund, in our efforts to develop the technologies, to develop all our workstreams to fight scams across all the various fronts that I highlighted earlier. It goes directly or indirectly back to our efforts to fight scams and prevent the next scam from taking place.

Mr Speaker: Ms Gho.

1.54 pm

Ms Gho Sze Kee: I would just like make a clarification, Mr Speaker. I misspoke just now when I talked about the standard of proofs when it comes to the thresholds, on the balance of probability. It should be for civil proceedings and not criminal proceedings. Thank you, Mr Speaker.

Mr Speaker: Noted. Any other clarifications for the Senior Minister of State? No?

Question put, and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House.

The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. – [Mr Goh Pei Ming].

Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed.