Immigration (Amendment) Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

4.13 pm

The Second Minister for Home Affairs (Mrs Josephine Teo): Mr Deputy Speaker, I beg to move, “That the Bill be now read a Second time”.

The Immigration Act (IA) regulates residents and visitors’ entry into Singapore, their stay here, and exit from Singapore. The last major amendment to IA was in 2012.

Since then, the security threat has heightened significantly, including at our checkpoints, which are, unfortunately, attractive targets for terrorists. The checkpoints are also our first line of defence against terrorist threats, which emanate from outside Singapore. For example, overseas airports have been targeted. In March 2016, a suicide bombing at Brussels Airport killed 17 persons. Just three months later, gunmen armed also with explosive belts, attacked Ataturk Airport in Istanbul, killing 45 persons. In addition, traveller volumes at our various checkpoints have been increasing. We now expect over 200 million people to go through our air, land and sea checkpoints each year. Checkpoint operations have thus become increasingly complex and challenging.

To enhance border security and optimise Home Team resources deployed at the checkpoints, the Integrated Checkpoints Command (ICC) was introduced in 2015. ICC strengthens coordination among Home Team departments by putting them under a unified command at the respective checkpoints, that is, all Home Team officers working at the checkpoints report to the same Commander. This arrangement facilitates joint operations at the checkpoints, communications and information sharing and allows synergies to be reaped.

To enhance the Home Team's operational effectiveness at the checkpoints, Immigration and Checkpoints Authority (ICA) officers will play a bigger role to support Police Officers to provide protective security. This will enable the Home Team to more effectively prevent security incidents at the checkpoints and respond more swiftly when they do occur. To achieve this, we need to expand the range of powers available to ICA officers to discharge their duties effectively at the checkpoints.

Clause 4 of the Bill introduces a new section 51AA, which will provide ICA officers with enhanced powers relating to search and seizure, arrest and security screening, within or in the vicinity of Authorised Areas. Authorised Areas, as defined in the IA, generally refer to the air, land, and sea checkpoints in Singapore. These include Changi and Seletar Airports, Woodlands and Tuas Checkpoints, Singapore Cruise Centre and the Marina Bay Cruise Centre.

Currently, ICA officers mainly rely on existing powers under the IA and Customs Act to conduct searches of vehicles, trains, vessels or persons, examine individuals, seize evidence and arrest persons.

Police Officers, on the other hand, are empowered to conduct searches on an individual only if the person has been arrested, or if there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the person has committed certain offences where the laws specifically allow for searches. These include possession of arms and explosives, possession of an instrument likely to cause hurt and possession of controlled substances or evidence of drug offences.

However, existing powers are not sufficient to protect the checkpoints in today’s security climate. For example, ICA officers are not able to search a person suspected of carrying an offensive weapon if he or she is not in the authorised area but is instead in public areas of Changi Airport, or at the bus stop outside Woodlands Checkpoint. To be more effective, the powers have to be expanded so that ICA officers can intervene in any suspected security incident within or in the vicinity of the checkpoints. On the ground, this will allow any ICA officer nearest to a security incident at the checkpoints to be the first responder.

Furthermore, ICA and Police Officers need to have wider powers of search to intervene more decisively to deal with criminal and security incidents. For example, Police Officers today are not empowered to search suspected vandals even if surveillance cameras or other security sensors at the checkpoints have been damaged; the suspect must first be arrested before he can be searched. That is the existing law. Clause 4 will, therefore, expand and allow ICA officers and Police Officers to search individuals if there is suspicion of the commission of any offence within or in the vicinity of the Authorised Areas. This is necessary for an ICA and Police Officer, whoever is nearest to an incident at the checkpoints, to pre-emptively and more effectively detect and address criminal and security threats at the checkpoints.

The other powers in clause 4 which will be extended to ICA officers operating within and in the vicinity of Authorised Areas are similar to existing powers accorded to Police Officers under the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC).

[Deputy Speaker (Mr Lim Biow Chuan) in the Chair]

ICA officers will be empowered to arrest the individual if he is reasonably suspected to have committed an arrestable offence under Singapore laws. Similar to what I have explained earlier, this will enable ICA officers to respond to any security threat without having to wait for the arrival of Police Officers.

For non-arrestable offences, ICA officers will only be able to arrest an individual if the person refuses to give his or her name and residential address, or if the person gives a name or residential address believed to be false or gives an overseas residential address. This is similar to section 65 of the CPC.

Post-incident investigations, including the prosecution of the arrested persons in the Courts, will remain the Police’s responsibility. Under the new section 51AA (12), once ICA officers have made an arrest, they will have to hand over the accused to a Police Officer as quickly as possible for the Police to commence their investigations.

I will now move on to clause 5. Clause 5 of the Bill amends section 55(1)(ga) to allow ICA to collect personal identifiers, such as photographs, from travellers transiting through Singapore. This will allow ICA to screen transit passengers more effectively, to better detect travellers of interest. Clause 5 will also make clear that ICA has the powers to collect personal identifiers from Singapore visa applicants, including photographs and other biometric identifiers. In addition, clause 5 amends section 55(1)(k) to increase the quantum of penalties that the Minister may prescribe for the breach of regulations under the IA.

Both the National Registration Act (NRA) and IA govern the proper registration of persons in Singapore for identification and security purposes. However, the maximum penalties that the Minister may prescribe for the breach of regulations under the IA are significantly lower than those under NRA.

Clause 5 of the Bill will thus amend section 55(1)(k) of the IA to increase the maximum quantum of penalties that the Minister may prescribe for the breach of regulations, to an imprisonment term not exceeding two years, or a fine not exceeding $3,000, or both. This will align the maximum penalties for breaches of regulations under the IA with that under NRA.

Mr Deputy Speaker, in conclusion, this Bill will strengthen the security of our checkpoints by enhancing the overall operational effectiveness of the Integrated Checkpoints Command. Mr Deputy Speaker, I beg to move.

Question proposed.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Assoc Prof Fatimah Lateef.

4.22 pm

Assoc Prof Fatimah Lateef (Marine Parade): Mr Deputy Speaker, I support the enhanced proposals for ICA officers to perform security screenings, searches, seizure duties and appropriate arrests, as stipulated in the Bill. I support the evolution and stepping up of the ICA officers’ job description as well.

With the increasing numbers of people passing through all the points of entry and checkpoints in Singapore daily, we have to certainly ensure we are ever ready any time of the day, night or under any conditions.

However, can I understand the following a bit further? What kind of enhanced training will these ICA frontline officers be provided with in order to empower them? Will there be some form of psychological preparedness training, briefing and counselling that they would be put through as well?

My concern is that Police Officers have been prepared for these types of work from the beginning of their career, but these ICA officers may not. Thus, the need to prepare them well with relevant skills, mindset and manage their psychological states as well in anticipating any possible acts or challenges in any form.

Since 2015, the ICC brings in the various Home Team agencies operating at our checkpoints under one command, and this is good. Can the Minister elaborate on this a bit more for our understanding? Also, I feel that this ties in very well with this Bill’s implementation. Can the Minister explain how they will be synergistic in terms of Singapore’s preparedness as well, and how will it enhance our plan to ringfence our safety and security?

I would also like to understand further how the coordination between ICA officers and staff at all our entry points will happen and how it will be coordinated. How fast can information be shared and, in terms of action, how rapid can the execution be when facing certain crises? In the case of a planned multi-site entry point incident, how fast and how well can our information sharing and coordination be? This is important because this is the current trend that we are seeing in terms of terrorist attacks.

Sir, we live in uncertain times and we must never let our guard down at any time. The enhanced security proposed in this Bill is taking us in the right direction. But besides policy, technology and infrastructure, there is also the human element and the human factors for us to consider. So, therefore, the buy-in, commitment and collaboration from the staff involved are highly important as well. I support the Bill, Sir.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Patrick Tay.

4.25 pm

Mr Patrick Tay Teck Guan (West Coast): Mr Deputy Speaker, I rise in support of the Bill and agree that there is a need for security incidents to be dealt with promptly at our borders, given that we are living in a highly globalised world with more people moving in and out of Singapore’s borders and in the face of threats of terrorism.

Under the Bill, ICA officers will have the authority to perform security screenings, carry out search and seizure duties and arrest suspects within and in the vicinity of immigration checkpoints. They would also be able to respond to incidents, conduct preliminary investigations and take steps to contain the situation when Police Officers are not yet at the scene. The Bill will also allow ICA officers to collect personal identifiers, such as photographs, passport details and fingerprints.

While the intent is to enable the Home Team to deal with security incidents at the checkpoints more promptly by having ICA officers perform protective security functions in support of Police Officers, I have some questions on the expansion of the role of ICA officers and how they are being prepared to take on these additional duties. This is given that the ICA officers are empowered under this Bill to carry out search and seizure duties and arrest suspects for offences under any written law.

First, the ICC policy was launched in 2015 to achieve greater operational coordination and provide clearer lines of responsibility and command for the officers from ICA, the Singapore Police Force (SPF) and Central Narcotics Bureau (CNB) working together at the checkpoints, for example, faster operational responses and more successful interceptions of persons and vehicles of interest. With ICA officers taking on duties of the Police, how would this impact the lines of responsibility across the various elements of the Home Team in carrying out their work at our checkpoints?

Second, ICA officers are already dealing with large numbers of travellers daily while under expectations from travellers for timely clearance at checkpoints. Would arrangements be made to ease ICA officers into their new duties so that the additional duties are not too onerous?

Third, a Direct-Entry Sergeant in ICA would have undergone a 16-week non-residential ICA Basic Course (Sergeant) at the Home Team Academy while a Direct-Entry Sergeant in the Police Force would have undergone six months of residential training, including lessons in criminal law, physical training, community policing, as well as leadership development. Males are required to be Physical Employment Standard (PES) A or PES B1L1 in order to qualify as a Direct-Entry Sergeant in the Police Force whereas only a PES A or B grade is required for ICA officers. What measures are being taken to better prepare our ICA officers so that they are able to carry out their new functions under the Bill?

Lastly, the starting salary range for a Direct-Entry Sergeant in ICA is lower than the starting salary range for a Direct-Entry Sergeant in the Police Force. The starting monthly salary for a Higher National Institute of Technical Education Certificate (NITEC)/NITEC/GCE "O" level qualified Direct-Entry Sergeant in ICA is between $1,670 to $1,880 per month, while the starting monthly salary for a Higher NITEC/NITEC/GCE "O" level qualified Direct-Entry Sergeant in the Police Force is between $1,820 and $2,170 per month. Would the salaries of ICA officers be adjusted to take into account the additional duties that they are expected to perform?

Mr Deputy Speaker: Ms Thanaletchimi.

4.29 pm

Ms K Thanaletchimi (Nominated Member): Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, I rise in support of the Bill. The amendments provide greater empowerment to ICA officers critical in dealing with any cross-border threats. In order to perform their duties better in their expanded role, the ICA officers need to be well-trained in protective security, especially during emergency situations. With the enhanced responsibilities comes the need for upskilling. As such, would the career path for ICA officers be similarly enhanced? Will there be a review of their career progression?

Second, it is commendable that the ICC would be better equipped to deal with any checkpoint incidents with minimal delay. This is essential to manage threats against Singapore, and citizens, too, would realise the importance of being vigilant against security threats. It is, indeed, the joint responsibility of both authorities and our citizens to ensure and enforce stringent checks at the border.

On this note, how can civilians play their part in identifying and reporting potential threats? How can we better train them to be, by passing information that is relevant?

The collection of information of transit passengers is of significant importance for security and traceability. How will the information be shared readily, responsively and constructively with the other agencies to circumvent threats and adverse incidents? Are there cross-border collaborations to better optimise data use and information?

On the inclusion of the new section 51AA, subsection 10(b), the ICA officer may use all reasonable means necessary to make the arrest if the person to be arrested forcibly resists or tries to evade the arrest. I would like to seek clarification on what is considered as "reasonable" or what constitutes "reasonableness"? Are the officers given sufficient training to help them better handle the expanded and enriched responsibilities?

On protection for the officers, are the officers better protected against complaints and legal actions from a suspect who may be injured as the officers restrain the suspect? And so, how much and how well are the officers protected? Will there be a consideration to enhance workplace insurance or workplace injury compensation for the officers with this enhancement of job responsibilities? Sir, notwithstanding this, I support the Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Saktiandi Supaat.

4.31 pm

Mr Saktiandi Supaat (Bishan-Toa Payoh): Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, it is timely that we review the IA to empower our ICA officers as they work to strengthen our border security.

We are giving ICA officers more authority to perform security screenings, conduct search and seizure duties, as well as arrests, and I think it is a good move. With the relevant training that comes with these new duties, this will not only aid in improving security and efficiency, it can boost the officers' morale as they can carry out their tasks more efficiently. However, I note that when a suspect is arrested by ICA, the ICA officer is required to inform a Police Officer of the arrest. And he has to wait for the arrival of the Police to hand over the suspect under section 51AA, clause 12. I would like to ask why this cumbersome procedure is required. And why cannot ICA be given the authority to detain the suspect for investigation for more than 24 hours and carry out whatever investigations required if it is a simple offence.

With the terrorism threat becoming more prevalent, police and security forces around the world are shouldering heavier responsibilities to protect the community. Hence, I feel ICA officers could be counted on to handle more responsibilities as befit their training. This would, in turn, free up the Police for other responsibilities.

So, my second question is in relation to investigation work. Can the Minister enlighten the House on the training for an ICA officer compared to a Police Officer? In regard to the enhanced powers for ICA officers, can the Minister also share plans to ensure that the officers have the prerequisite training to handle the enhanced powers and search authority that they have now with these changes. This also includes the proper handling of individuals and suspects as part of the search but also taking into consideration the sensitivities and communication skills needed with the extra responsibilities.

Border security, Mr Deputy Speaker, is of paramount importance, and it is certainly not the sole responsibility of ICA. More must be done to educate the masses and obtain everyone's support and cooperation, so that we can close any gaps in our security network. Sir, I support the Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Louis Ng.

4.34 pm

Mr Louis Ng Kok Kwang (Nee Soon): Sir, while I understand the overriding security necessity of responding swiftly to incidents at the checkpoints, allowing ICA officers to exercise certain Police powers are an expansion of executive powers, which should be done cautiously. We should thus closely scrutinise the powers this Bill gives to ICA officers to ensure that there are sound bases and sufficient checks for an extension of power.

As was noted in the Ministry of Home Affairs' (MHA's) press release on the Bill, the intention of giving ICA officers such powers is to enable them to respond to incidents and contain situations before Police Officers arrive. The powers that are granted to ICA officers should be constrained insofar as they are necessary for that purpose.

The amendments will give ICA officers the power to take statements from persons who appear to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the relevant offences. The language of section 51AA(6) and (7) is similar to section 22 of the CPC which allows the Police to take long statements.

Unlike section 23 of the CPC, the amendments do not expressly require persons being questioned to be given notice that choosing to remain silent may have a bad effect on their case in Court. Can I clarify whether adverse inferences can be drawn from a statement taken under section 51AA(5) should the person choose to remain silent?

If so, is there a duty to inform the person being examined of their privilege against self-incrimination under section 51AA(6) and does the failure to inform the person of their right to remain silent affect the admissibility of the statement or the ability to draw adverse inferences from the statement?

Laypersons may not know that they have such a right and it seems only fair that they should be informed of this right if the privilege against self-incrimination is to have any substance. The right to remain silent under section 51AA(5) would be very weak in practice if there is no need to inform an individual of their right to do so. It is those who are ignorant of the law and the most vulnerable who would suffer the most. Further, section 51AA(7) sets out requirements, which are intended to be procedural safeguards for the person's whose statement is taken. Will a failure to comply with the requirements under section 51AA(7) affect the admissibility of the statement?

Next, the exercise of Police powers is governed by CPC and the Police General Orders (PGO) issued by the Commissioner of Police. Will rules or guidelines similar to PGO be issued for ICA officers?

Lastly, is it necessary for ICA officers to be given the power to detain a person for up to 24 hours under section 51AA(12) before handing them over to a Police Officer?

As highlighted earlier, these powers are only transitory in that they are intended for ICA officers to be able to contain the situation until the Police arrive. In line with the spirit of unifying the command and control structure that underlies the ICC concept, surely closer coordination between the Police and ICA officers could be expected in responding to these incidences. Sir, notwithstanding the above clarifications, I stand in support of the Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Christopher de Souza.

4.37 pm

Mr Christopher de Souza (Holland-Bukit Timah): Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, I stand in support of this Bill as it is an important piece of legislation that strengthens our border security.

There are three main facets of this Bill. The first is the expanded role of ICA officers. The second is the provision for the collecting of personal identifiers of transit passengers. And the third is the increased penalty for breach of regulations.

The expanded role of ICA officers promotes synergy and collaboration of the ICC. Started in 2015, the ICC organises Singapore's borders into three domains: air, land and sea. One domain head oversees operations of all Home Team officers in that domain, whether they be Central Narcotics Bureau (CNB), Police or ICA officers.

This was a further step to optimise the organisation of our Home Team resources. Back in 2003, the ICA was born with the merging of Singapore Immigration and Registration and the Checkpoints Operations of Customs and Excise Department. Today, this Bill seeks to confer certain Police's powers on ICA officers so that we are able to respond to situations promptly and effectively. This move in this Bill keeps our Home Team agencies nimble, flexible and able to address the changing needs in these changing times.

The new section 51AA (1) and (2) under clause 4 of the Bill seeks to allow ICA officers to stop and search any vehicle, train, vessel or person or any aircraft for evidence of criminal offences being committed in or around the protected area. This includes security screening under subsection (4) of the new proposed section 51AA under clause 4.

Coupled with pass to intervene to prevent a crime and to cordon off an area to preserve a crime scene under subsections (13) and (14), these powers allow for a prompt response and would aid with the investigation process of crimes committed near the border. Through prompter collection and preservation of evidence of an act at or near the crime scene, there may be more evidence and more cogent, reliable and accurate evidence collected. It is hoped that this will greatly enhance the administration of justice in Singapore.

Further, through the powers of arrest under clause 4 of section 51AA(8) to (10), ICA officers' presence at the borders will strengthen deterrence of the Home Team officers there. The procedural safeguards are in subsections (11) and (12), with subsection (12) playing an important signal that the Police are still primarily in charge of these policing duties. Subsection (12) requires the ICA officer to inform the Police immediately of the arrest and await the Police's arrival for handover, detaining the person in a suitable place for not more than 24 hours.

As the ICA officers' powers are restricted to offences committed in the authorised area and its vicinity, an arrested person has to be ultimately handed over to the Police, the relationship between the ICA officers is clearly delineated for effective collaboration. Rather than abrogating from the Police's primary duty, these expanded powers further promote prompt and effective responses to a situation at our borders. Even with a strong uniformed presence near the borders, there are some who still dare to commit offences in the area. ICA officers will be equipped, through training, and they will not be hamstrung if they witness or have reason to believe that an offence is being committed before their very eyes. This supportive role will enhance the ICA's powers to protect Singapore and strengthen security at our borders.

The second main feature of this Bill is the collection of personal identifiers from passengers transiting through our airport. What has happened in some countries previously is that illegal immigrants travel using forged documents, staying in the airport lounge to connect to their next destination. Alternatively, illegal immigrants cleared immigration using genuine documents but switch to forged documents or even took other persons' boarding passes inside the travel lounge. By collecting personal identifiers from those transiting through Singapore airport, it will be harder to commit identity fraud.

Furthermore, there has been a proliferation of fraudulent documents that facilitate travel. It is not just boarding passes that can be faked. Lost passports and faked IDs have increased in number. As of July 2013, Interpol had nearly 38 million lost or stolen travel documents. According to a Political article, EU passport fraud epidemic, which refers to EU passport fraud epidemic in January this year, the number of lost and stolen documents in the EU has doubled in five years. There are 250,000 stolen or lost Syrian and Iraqi passports, including blank documents, very easily utilised.

A report by the University of East London entitled "Mining the dark web, drugs and fake IDs" showed that whilst counterfeit documents make up a smaller percentage of the market compared to drugs, they are readily available. According to the January issue of S Rajaratnam's School of International Studies and titled "Counter terrorist trends and analyses", a small percentage of combat-hardened fighters use forged, adapted and fraudulently-obtained genuine documents to travel home to conduct attacks.

So, this is real. The collection of personal identifiers adds to the Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record programmes which Singapore had committed in the 2016 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) counter-terrorism action plan in October last year to secure and facilitate legitimate travel within the region.

The collection of personal identifiers of transit passengers is now more common in today's increasingly globalised world. Such countries include New Zealand and the United Arab Emirates. Currently, travellers who remain in the transit area do not need a visa. Clause 55B, which provides for collection of personal identifiers, covers both those who remain in transit and those who apply for or hold a Singapore visa. This is needed. Such a provision is necessary and timely to ensure security in our airports and it should be implemented with the utmost care to stringently secure the information collected. If such personalised data gets into the wrong hands, the cure may be worse than the ill.

As the number of travellers at our airports has been increasing, hitting the record 60 million mark last year, it is important that those who travel through Singapore for legitimate reasons not be afraid of the collection of important personal identifiers, such as fingerprints and even irises. Rather, through stringent and high-quality implementation, our position as a travel elite hub and Singapore airports' reputation will grow stronger by being more secure and lowering the possibility for identity fraud and a safer transit area.

We need to ensure that our security measures are tight and kept up to date or even ahead of the technologies used by criminals to manoeuvre their way around the proper safeguards.

Another feature of the Bill is the increased maximum penalty for breach of regulations. Originally set at imprisonment of six months or a fine of $1,000, clause 5(C) of this present Bill increases it to imprisonment of two years or a fine of $3,000. This update of the maximum penalty ensures that inflation does not rob the penalty of its punitive effect.

In conclusion, Mr Deputy Speaker, this immigration amendment Bill is a welcome addition to the tools in the weaponry that our ICA officers need to secure effectively in these changing times. By empowering Home Team officers to respond promptly and by enhancing security measures, this Bill is a further step forward towards a synergistic and comprehensive move against terror threats in Singapore. I, therefore, strongly support the Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Desmond Choo.

4.46 pm

Mr Desmond Choo (Tampines): Mr Deputy Speaker, the ever-present threat of terrorism makes it imperative for us to find ways to boost the level of security in Singapore. Our Tuas and Woodlands checkpoints handle a high volume of people daily. During festive periods, the numbers can go up to half a million a day. Changi Airport handled more than 50 million passengers last year and looks set to increase its passenger load with Terminal 5 (T5) on the way. We clearly need to future-proof our security coverage and provisions.

With volume, potential perpetrators of harm seek vulnerabilities during busy periods. It is not merely a matter of volume. The nature and essence of threats evolve quickly. This makes timely and efficient intervention critical. With Singapore seeking to continue our position as a top transit hub, we must be at the top of the game with our security without losing our hallmark efficiency. This Bill widens the powers of ICA officers to search and arrest suspects for some offences, which currently come under the authority of the Police. Being at the frontline of security incidents, our ICA officers required powers to quickly intervene and resolve issues. Empowering them with greater authority will boost the level of safety and security and be efficient.

One important measure included in this Bill is to allow ICA to collect personal identifiers from travellers in transit at Changi Airport where necessary. This contrasts with the current situation where the information is obtained only from travellers at immigration counters. Transit passengers make up about a third of Changi Airport’s passengers. We cannot allow terrorists to use Changi as a transit stop. Yet, we cannot allow this extra layer of checks to cause transit passengers to encounter delays in the process of transferring from one flight to another. What measures will be taken to ensure that inconveniences are minimised, even as security steps are being increased? How is new biometric technology used to handle the increasing load?

With increased responsibilities coming their way, we must also ensure that our officers are equal to the task. The law is, after all, only as effective as the officers using them. They must be trained to enhance their knowledge, skills and capability. How can SPF officers be involved in helping their ICA colleagues to take on the new powers? Interagency capabilities and operabilities are even more critical. We need to ensure that our officers operate well together as one unit.

Other than training on their “hard” skills that are directly related to their profession, are ICA and SPF officers provided with "softer skills”, such as cultural intelligence, as their job requires them to deal with people from different cultures and nationalities?

Another aspect of manpower and human capital, security work cannot be easily substituted with technology and enhanced legislation. Experience and street knowledge are essential elements built up over time. The Ministry must continue to leverage such strengths of our officers, especially when more powers are vested in them to meet our ever-evolving security threats. This might require buttressing our competencies with experienced officers from SPF and other enforcement agencies.

Notwithstanding the above, the Bill is important to harden our borders without sacrificing on our efficacy and efficiency. Deputy Speaker, I support the Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker: Minister Josephine Teo.

4.50 pm

Mrs Josephine Teo: Mr Deputy Speaker, I thank the Members who have spoken in support of the Bill. They raised many useful points which I shall try to address.

Several Members asked about the ICC. Assoc Prof Fatimah Lateef asked for a further elaboration of the ICC concept, and how the Bill will enhance Singapore’s preparedness for emergencies. Mr Patrick Tay asked how the Bill will impact the lines of responsibilities across the various Home Team agencies working at the checkpoints.

Under the ICC, the checkpoints are clustered into three domains, namely, the Land Domain, Sea Domain and Air Domain, which were progressively launched in 2015.

An ICA Domain Commander now helms all Home Team operations in each of the three domains. So, we have a unified command structure under a single commander. With this, the lines of responsibility as well as accountability are very clear and will help in ensuring that the security and operations in each domain are properly taken care of. By doing so, we have also strengthened the coordination amongst the officers from the various Home Team departments deployed at the checkpoints because there is a unified command structure.

Another potential benefit of the ICC is in joint operations as compared to operations mounted separately by each Home Team Department. In fact, it did not take long for the benefit to be realised. In 2016, a joint operation at Woodlands Checkpoint detected four male Indonesian travellers who had plans to enter Singapore to make their way to Syria to fight for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The timely sharing of information and exchange of analyses made the critical difference. The subjects were eventually repatriated to Batam and handed over to the Indonesian counter-terrorism unit.

Assoc Prof Fatimah Lateef also asked about the coordination among ICA officers at the various checkpoints, and how prepared we are for a planned multi-site incident. Any terrorist incidents involving multiple checkpoints will be coordinated by the Police. This is again clear. The Home Team has developed joint operation plans for such scenarios and we have been exercising them. And some of these exercises were publicised earlier. For example, Exercise Northstar, held in October 2017 at Changi Airport, involved Home Team agencies as well as the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), the Ministry of Health (MOH), Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS) and Changi Airport Group (CAG). Exercise Quicksilver, which is a series of regular internal exercises, involves scenarios of multiple attacks at the land and sea domains where officers are not notified beforehand. In other words, it is a surprise exercise. One of these surprise exercises was held in October 2016 and it involved more than 3,000 officers across the Home Team and SAF. So, it is a very large-scale exercise.

The aim of these exercises is, of course, to prepare ourselves to respond to security incidents as soon as possible. But I should stress that it is not just speed. It is also the quality and the effectiveness of the response that matter. And that is why we are making these amendments to ensure that, when we respond, the response is an effective one.

All Members who have spoken felt it was important for the ICA officers to be properly trained to exercise the enhanced powers, and I fully agree. Before I outline our training approach, let me clarify what is expected of the ICA officers under this Bill, something that Mr Christopher de Souza had also talked about. The ICA officers are not expected to become Police Officers. What this Bill seeks to do is to empower ICA officers, who are usually the majority at the checkpoints, to respond to security incidents within and in the vicinity of the checkpoint. This will further enhance the ICC concept, where the nearest Home Team officers to a security incident at the checkpoint will be the first responders acting swiftly to mitigate the situation instead of waiting for the Police Officers to arrive.

Once the Police Officers arrive at the scene, there is a clear understanding that they will take over management and investigation of the incident, including the recording of statements from arrested persons and working with the Attorney-General's Chambers (AGC) to prosecute the person in Court. The training for ICA officers is, therefore, designed specifically for them to be the first responder rather than full-fledged Police Officers.

With this consideration in mind, ICA has been working with SPF to develop appropriate training courses for ICA officers. We need courses for newly appointed as well as current serving officers who are selected to perform protective security functions. There are modules on the legislative provisions, management of protective security incidents, interview skills and search techniques. Classroom training is also complemented by on-the-job training with Police Officers serving as coaches, a point which addresses Mr Desmond Choo’s observation that the Police Officers have much that they can share to help ICA colleagues get up to speed. In addition, ICA officers will join Police Officers for relevant protective security training courses, such as the Public Security First Responder Training, where officers are given tactical movement training to augment their existing competencies in firearms.

ICA officers will be assessed to a similar standard as Police Officers in these areas before they are deployed for protective security duties. Today, more than 900 ICA officers have undergone the training and ICA will progressively cover all those selected for protective security duties. All new ICA officers will also undergo the ICC training to equip them to operate effectively at the ICC. Besides training, ICA will issue guidelines and directives to ICA officers on the proper exercise of their enhanced powers, similar to directives and orders governing Police Officers today. This is something Mr Louis Ng asked about.

Assoc Prof Fatimah Lateef also asked if ICA officers will be prepared psychologically for their enhanced roles. During their basic training, ICA recruits already undergo psychological training to boost their resilience and prepare them for the challenges in their work. Frontline supervisors are trained on how to look out for distressed officers and to provide support. At the same time, selected ICA officers are trained as para-counsellors to look out for and support their fellow colleagues. The officers are further supported by the ICA Psychological Services Branch, which provides staff counselling services.

As part of the ICC training programmes, ICA officers will be exposed to challenging situations that they may face in the course of duty and trained on how they can respond to such circumstances. These range from managing security incidents, such as travellers attempting to dash through without immigration clearance, to dealing with possible bomb threats. Scenario-based trainings, along with on-the-job training with Police Officers, will help to prepare ICA officers for their new roles.

Mr Desmond Choo asked if ICA officers and Police Officers are provided with training on soft skills, in particular on cultural intelligence.

As part of their training, ICA and SPF officers learn how to manage members of the public in a professional and tactful manner. Officers are trained to be mindful and sensitive towards cultural differences when interacting with members of the public. This is reinforced through in-service training and reminders on the job.

The very nature of ICA's work at the checkpoints involves interactions with people from all nationalities. Our officers have generally done well, with our security-focused, service-conscious approach. ICA officers deployed at Changi Airport also undergo a programme to further equip them with skills to deliver to be part of the "Changi Experience" for travellers.

Let me now deal with Mr Louis Ng's question on why it is necessary to allow ICA officers to detain suspects for up to 24 hours. To be clear, the intent is to minimise the time ICA officers will detain an individual before handing him over to Police Officers. This is why the new section 51AA(12)(a) in clause 4 requires the ICA officer to immediately inform a Police Officer of the arrest. However, there may be instances where the Police need more time to take over custody of the person, such as during major emergencies. To cater to such circumstances, the provision allows an ICA officer to detain the person for up to 24 hours.

Mr Saktiandi Supaat has asked whether it was necessary for the ICA officer to hand over an accused to the Police immediately, and if ICA officers can perform the required investigations instead, to free up Police resources. As I have explained earlier, the intention is not for ICA officers to take over the Police's duties, and Police Officers are still best placed to carry out the post-incident investigations.

Mr Louis Ng spoke about the need for safeguards when ICA officers take statements under the new section 51AA. He pointed out that the provisions of section 51AA(6) and (7) were similar to section 22 of the CPC but unlike section 23 of the CPC. I would like to clarify that under section 22 of the CPC, a statement can be recorded from any persons acquainted with the facts of a case, and this could include witnesses as well as suspects. As for section 23 of the CPC, the statement is recorded from an individual after he or she has been charged with an offence and will be prosecuted in Court. So, there are material differences between the two types of statements provided for under the different sections of the CPC.

The intent behind providing ICA officers with the powers of examination under the new section 51AA of the Bill is to allow ICA officers to conduct preliminary fact-finding and checks during or immediately after an incident. On this basis, the new section 51AA(5) to (7) of the Bill is modelled after section 22 of the CPC, rather than section 23. As to the admissibility of such statements, existing case laws interpreting section 22 of the CPC will similarly apply and be followed by the Courts.

If I may reiterate, post-incident investigations, including the recording of statements under section 23 of the CPC and prosecution of individuals in Court, remain the responsibilities of the Police. After ICA officers hand over the accused person to the Police, the investigation processes, as well as the safeguards, will be no different from today’s processes.

Ms Thanaletchimi asked what it means for ICA officers to use reasonable force within the new section 51AA(10)(b) to make an arrest. The usage of the term "reasonable" can also be found in section 75 of the CPC, which is applicable to Police Officers and from which this new section is adapted. Generally speaking, reasonableness will entail using only as much force as is appropriate to effect arrest and one that is proportional to the level of the perceived threat. For example, officers should not use firearms to shoot an unarmed person who may be trying to evade arrest. It would not be proportional. As I have explained earlier, ICA officers will be trained to use their enhanced powers appropriately which, of course, include the proper use of force.

Mr Patrick Tay asked if the salaries of ICA officers will be adjusted to take into account the additional duties that they are expected to perform. Ms Thanaletchimi also asked if the career progression for ICA officers will be enhanced. MHA regularly reviews the salaries of Home Team officers, including ICA and SPF officers, to ensure that they remain competitive, taking into account the job demands, the risks, as well as specialised skills requirements. I assure Mr Patrick Tay that it is in our interest to assess these factors holistically and whether any expansion of duties or work conditions warrant adjustments, so that the officers are reasonably remunerated, whatever the roles they perform and we continue to be able to retain them.

Similarly, the career progression paths for ICA officers are regularly reviewed. As recently as July last year, a new scheme was introduced to provide officers with a more seamless progression into the senior ranks. We will continue to keep these schemes of service updated.

Ms Thanaletchimi asked if ICA officers will be better protected against complaints and legal actions from suspects who had been restrained by ICA officers. There are existing mechanisms within the Home Team departments to investigate complaints or allegations of misconduct, and officers are empowered to carry out their duties without fear as long as they act in good faith and in accordance with established protocols.

Where insurance is concerned, ICA officers enjoy the same coverage as all other Home Team officers, such as the Police. All officers who sustain injuries during the course of work will have their medical expenses fully covered when they receive treatment at Government or restructured hospitals.

Let me turn now to transit security screening.

Mr Christopher de Souza spoke about the importance of transit passenger screening and emphasised the need to handle data collected with care. Ms Thanaletchimi asked how data collected from the screening will be shared and if there are cross-border collaborations to optimise data use and information. Transit passengers are currently not required to present themselves for immigration clearance. The screening of transit passengers will thus allow ICA to detect travellers of interest or those who may be using stolen or lost passports. That is why we need the personal identifiers.

There are existing provisions in the IA that enable the sharing of such information with law enforcement agencies and other agencies for the purposes of investigation and for the prevention and detection of threats. But there are also strict protocols governing the sharing of information and safekeeping of data, and they will continue to apply.

On cross-border collaboration, passport information of selected transit passengers will be screened against the Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD) database, which is an international database administered by the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and, as Mr Christopher de Souza informed us, that database is a long one. It has 38 million entries, and we will screen selectively against this database.

Mr Desmond Choo asked what measures will be taken to ensure that inconveniences to transit passengers can be minimised even as we step up security measures. In introducing transit security screening, MHA and ICA work closely with the Ministry of Transport (MOT), CAAS and CAG, as well as airlines, to minimise the impact on passengers. We conducted field trials to test the procedures and those resulted in several process refinements. They were very useful. So, we now assess that the minimum connecting times that can be maintained for most of the instances will remain unchanged. We are also working with CAG on protocols to clear passengers with very short connecting times.

Ms Thanaletchimi asked how members of the public can also play their part to identify and report potential or possible threats. I really want to thank her for raising this very important point about citizens' active participation because that can be the crucial difference in ensuring Singapore’s security.

We started the SGSecure movement in 2016 precisely to raise public awareness of the threats we face and to increase their level of preparedness in the event of a terror attack in Singapore.

Members of the public can certainly play their part in identifying potential threats in their neighbourhood or surroundings. At the checkpoints, they should not hesitate to inform the ICA officers and the Police if they come across anything suspicious. Members of the public can also report suspicious activities to the authorities via the SGSecure app, and I am glad to say that we regularly get such alerts.

Mr Deputy Speaker, I hope I have addressed our MPs' questions and concerns.

In conclusion, the Immigration (Amendment) Bill will strengthen the security of our checkpoints by enhancing the overall operational effectiveness of the ICC. With the support of this House, Mr Deputy Speaker, I beg to move.

Question put, and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House.

The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. – [Mrs Josephine Teo.]

Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed.