Hijacking of Aircraft and Protection of Aircraft and International Airports (Amendment) Bill

Mr Speaker: Minister for Transport.

2.30 pm

The Senior Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Transport (Mr Baey Yam Keng) (for the Minister for Transport): Mr Speaker, on behalf of the Minister for Transport, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."

The threat of terrorism to Singapore remains high. According to MHA, global terrorist groups such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Al-Qaeda, remain resilient and adaptable, despite losing key leaders and strongholds in recent years. The complete withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in August 2021 may also facilitate the resurgence of Al-Qaeda and ISIS-Khorasan using it as a safe haven.

Terrorists continue to pose a real threat to civil aviation. In December 2020, a Kenyan member of Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda's East African affiliate, was charged in the US for plotting to conduct a 9/11-style attack in an unnamed US city. More recently, the Islamic State in Khorasan Province, an entity affiliated with Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da'esh) claimed responsibility for the attacks near the Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul on 27 August 2021, which resulted in the death and injuries of dozens of civilians, including children. Just less than a month ago, on 17 January 2022, terrorist attacks left three dead and others injured near Abu Dhabi International Airport. On 1 February 2022, the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization deplored the targeting of civil aviation infrastructure, in flagrant violation of international law and the ongoing threat to international peace and security caused by these terrorist acts.

In our ongoing efforts to further strengthen our defence against such terrorist attacks, especially against civil aviation corporations, we intend to accede to two international aviation security treaties: the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation, also known as the Beijing Convention 2010, and the Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, also known as the Beijing Protocol 2010.

The reasons are as follows: one, the threat of terrorism to Singapore remains high. Due to the cross-border nature of the threat, international cooperation is necessary to combat such threats; two, the Beijing Convention 2010 and Beijing Protocol 2010 will strengthen Singapore's ability to deal with terrorism-related threats to the safety and security of civil aviation; three, the two Beijing treaties will enable us to better protect Singaporeans, by providing a clear basis for us to exercise our criminal jurisdiction as provided for under the two treaties; and four, the Beijing Convention 2010 and Beijing Protocol 2010 will also facilitate the extradition of offenders and provision of mutual legal assistance. This would enhance Singapore's capabilities to carry out enforcement actions against offenders who have committed acts that threaten Singapore and Singaporeans locally and abroad.

The two Beijing treaties modernise the legal framework for aviation security, targeting unlawful seizure of aircraft and unlawful interference against civil aviation. They require state parties to criminalise a number of acts which have emerged as threats to the safety and security of civil aviation, including those manifested in the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 when civil aircraft were used as weapons of mass destruction.

The Beijing Convention modernises and consolidates two earlier aviation security treaties, namely, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, also known as the Montreal Convention 1971, and the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, also known as the Montreal Protocol 1988.

The Montreal Convention 1971 criminalises certain acts of violence against aircraft, including persons therein, or air navigation facilities, while the Montreal Protocol 1988 supplemented the Montreal Convention 1971 to criminalise certain acts of violence against an international airport, including persons therein.

In addition to those already criminalised under the two Montreal treaties, the Beijing Convention criminalises the following acts: one, using an aircraft for the purpose of causing death, serious bodily injury or serious damage; two, releasing or discharging from an aircraft, or using on board or against aircraft any biological, chemical or nuclear (BCN) weapons or explosive, radioactive or similar substances; three, transporting, causing to be transported, or facilitating the transport of BCN weapons or explosive, radioactive or similar substances, and so on, on board an aircraft; and four, cyber attacks on air navigation facilities.

The Beijing Protocol 2010 supplements the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, also known as the Hague Convention 1970. The Hague Convention 1970 criminalises acts relating to unlawful seizure of aircraft, while the Beijing Protocol 2010 expands the scope of the offences in that Convention to cover additional forms of unlawful seizure of aircraft, including through modern technological means.

Both the Beijing treaties make it an offence to make a threat or unlawfully cause someone to receive a threat to commit offences under circumstances which indicate that the threat is credible. Both treaties also provide for the criminal liability of other persons, such as accomplices, the directors and organisers of an offence, persons who knowingly assist an offender to evade investigation, prosecution or punishment, and persons who contribute or agree to contribute to an offence. Both treaties further provide the option for Contracting States to provide under their domestic laws for the liability of legal entities where a person responsible for its management or control commits a relevant offence.

Similar to its predecessor instruments, the Beijing Convention 2010 and Beijing Protocol 2010 facilitate the extradition of offenders and provision of mutual legal assistance. For example, the treaties provide that state parties shall, subject to the laws of the requested state, afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect of the offences under the treaties. The Beijing Convention 2010 and Beijing Protocol 2010 additionally provide that a request for extradition or mutual legal assistance based on an offence under the treaties may not be refused on the sole ground that it concerns a political offence, or an offence connected with a political offence, or an offence inspired by political motives.

By expanding the scope of offences and grounds of jurisdiction and removing a ground for refusal for extradition and mutual legal assistance, the Beijing treaties strengthen state parties' capacity to deter these offences under civil aviation, and to prosecute and punish those who commit them.

Singapore is a party to and has ratified the earlier treaties, namely, the Montreal Convention 1971 on 12 April 1978, the Montreal Protocol 1988 on 22 December 1996 and the Hague Convention 1970 on 12 April 1978. The Beijing Convention 2010 and Beijing Protocol 2010 entered into force on 1 July 2018 and 1 January 2018 respectively, for those states that are party to it. Singapore intends to accede to the Beijing treaties, for the reasons I have explained earlier.

The Hijacking of Aircraft and Protection of Aircraft and International Airports (Amendment) Bill will give effect to the Beijing treaties and facilitate Singapore's implementation of the obligations under these treaties when we accede to them.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I will now highlight the key provisions of the Bill.

Clause 4 amends section 3(1) which relates to the offence of hijacking. Before the amendment, the offence of hijacking can only be committed in relation to an aircraft in flight. With the amendment, the offence of hijacking can also be committed in relation to an aircraft in service. This will include the duration of the pre-flight preparation of the aircraft by ground personnel or by the crew for a specific flight until 24 hours after any landing, in addition to the period when the aircraft is in flight. The amendment further expands the scope of the offence of hijacking to include the unlawful seizure of an aircraft using any technological means.

Clauses 6, 8(d) and 9 also amend the Act such that certain provisions of the Act do not apply to any act committed in relation to an aircraft used in military, customs or Police service unless: one, the act is committed in or over Singapore; two, where the act is committed outside Singapore, but the person committing the act is a citizen of Singapore; or three, the aircraft is used in the military, customs or Police service of the Republic of Singapore.

Clause 7 inserts new offences sections 5A to 5D. These provisions address new categories of acts that have emerged over the past two decades as potential threats to the safe operation of, or the safety of persons in an aircraft, an aerodrome or an aerodrome facility. These include the events of 9/11, where aircraft were hijacked and used as weapons for terrorist attacks, and as mentioned earlier, just last month on 17 January where there was an attack near the Abu Dhabi International Airport.

The new section 5A criminalises the use of an aircraft in service for the purpose of causing death, serious bodily injury, or serious damage to property or the environment.

The new section 5B criminalises the release or discharge from an aircraft in service any BCN weapon, or any explosive, radioactive or similar substances, in a manner that causes or is likely to cause death, serious bodily injury or serious damage to property or the environment.

The new section 5C criminalises the use against or on board any aircraft in service any BCN weapon, or any explosive, radioactive or similar substances, in a manner that causes or is likely to cause death, serious bodily injury or serious damage to property or the environment.

The new section 5D criminalises the transport of, causing to be transported, or facilitating the transport of, certain proscribed items on board an aircraft. Examples of these proscribed items include any explosive or radioactive material, any BCN weapon and any source material or special fissionable material.

The new sections 5A to 5D apply regardless of whether any act constituting the offence under any of those sections is committed in Singapore or elsewhere, whatever the nationality or citizenship of the person committing the act or whatever the state in which the aircraft is registered.

Similar to the new sections 5A to 5D, clause 8 amends section 6 on "Other acts endangering or likely to endanger safety of aircraft". The amended section will apply regardless of whether any act constituting the offence is committed in Singapore or elsewhere, whatever the nationality or citizenship of the persons committing the act or whatever the state in which the aircraft is registered.

Clause 10 repeals section 8 and substitutes a new section 8.

The new section 8(1) makes it an offence for any person who makes a threat to commit certain offences, or unlawfully and intentionally causes any person to receive such a threat, under circumstances which indicate the threat to be credible. The new section 8(2) makes it an offence for a person A to unlawfully and intentionally assist any other person B to evade investigation, prosecution or punishment, when A knows that B has committed certain acts, or is wanted for any criminal prosecution, or is sentenced for certain offences.

Clause 11 repeals and re-enacts section 9 and inserts new section 9A and 9B.

The new section 9 stipulates the penalties for the various offences under the Act.

The new sections 9A and 9B deal with offences committed by corporations, unincorporated associations or partnerships and also attribute criminal liability to certain officers of such corporations, unincorporated associations or partnerships.

Clause 12 repeals and re-enacts section 11 and inserts a new section 12. The new section 11 to extend the provisions relating to extradition under the Act and the Extradition Act to the new offences inserted by the Bill, and provides that the Beijing treaties and their predecessor treaties may be used as the legal basis for extradition in the absence of an extradition treaty.

The new section 12 provides that in the provision of mutual legal assistance to any state which is a party to the Convention for a criminal matter involving an offence in that state corresponding to a relevant offence, that offence in the state will be deemed not to be an offence of a political character. Mr Speaker, I beg to move.

Question proposed.

Mr Speaker: Mr Louis Ng.

2.46 pm

Mr Louis Ng Kok Kwang (Nee Soon): Sir, this Bill gives effects to Singapore's obligations under the Beijing Convention.

The Bill proposes to criminalise certain dangerous actions relating to aviation, including the use of aircraft as a weapon. Even in this time of reduced air travel, it is a necessary update to our law and helps enhance aviation safety. With the passage of this Bill, Singapore is once again standing with the international community and showing its commitment to the international rule of law.

I have just two short clarifications on how we can help the airline industry comply with the requirements under this Bill.

My first point has to do with the technical guidance to assist compliance by the airline industry. The Bill introduces offences relating to the transport of certain dangerous materials and BCN weapons.

Airlines routinely transport dangerous goods. This is why the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has in place Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air. When drafting the Beijing Convention, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) had proposed to deem an airline carrier as compliant with the Beijing Convention as long as they can show compliance with the Technical Instructions. This was not accepted by the delegates at the Beijing Diplomatic Conference where the Beijing Convention was drafted.

Nevertheless, to provide guidance to airlines in navigating the implementation of this Bill, can the Minister share if and how the ICAO's Technical Instructions should be considered by the Courts in Singapore in the interpretation of this Bill?

My second point is on support extended to the airlines to ensure compliance with the provisions in this Bill. This Bill tackles serious crimes and exposes airlines to significant criminal liability. Can Minister share if the Government has worked with the airline industry to ensure proper review of their cargo processes so that airlines do not inadvertently expose themselves to criminal liability under the Bill?

Sir, notwithstanding these clarifications, I stand in support of the Bill.

2.49 pm

Ms Poh Li San (Sembawang): Mr Speaker, Sir, I declare my interest as an executive staff with the Changi Airport Group.

Please allow me to recount a chilling event that could have gone horribly wrong during the early days of Changi Airport. On 26 March 1991, Singapore Airlines Flight 117 was hijacked. There were 114 passengers and 11 crew on board. The plane was hijacked mid-air while enroute from Subang, Malaysia, to Singapore Changi Airport, by four Pakistani terrorists who were armed with explosives and knives.

Eight and a half gruelling hours after the hijacked plane landed at Changi Airport, the hijackers gave a last five-minute deadline for their demands. They issued a threat to kill one passenger every 10 minutes if their demands were not met. With three minutes to go, the SAF Commandos stormed the plane and within just 30 seconds, killed all four hijackers, with no injuries to hostages. The commandos not only secured the plane, rescued all 125 people on board but also safeguarded the future of our Changi airhub.

It has been 31 years since that first and only hijacking of a Singapore aircraft. The rescue operation was testament to our capabilities to keep Changi Airport safe and secure. As a global aviation hub, a core fundamental for success is the ability to maintain the highest level of security at all times, so as to deter potential perpetrators and facilitate the smooth and secure running of daily operations. To do so, we not only need stringent aviation security processes, valiant and capable security forces but also effective international aviation law and cooperation with other countries.

Ten years after SQ 117, in 2001, the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States happened. The terrorists had used the aircraft itself as weapon of mass destruction. It was the single and most destructive event that had changed the nature and future of air travel permanently.

Indeed, over the years, the tools deployed by terrorists and hijackers have become even more destructive, sophisticated and harder to detect. Our security forces will have to stay abreast of the latest developments happening on the dark side, gather intelligence on a global network and ensure that security measures are updated and tightly-enforced. We will also need to work with other nations due to the cross-border nature of such threats. This is why it is so important for us to support this Bill.

The Hijacking of Aircraft and Protection of Aircraft and International Airports Amendment Bill will pave the way for Singapore's accession to the Beijing Convention 2010 and Beijing Protocol 2010. In summary, the Convention criminalises the use of civil aircraft as a weapon and the illegal transport or discharge of dangerous materials, including explosive, radioactive, biological, chemical or nuclear (BCN) weapons to attack aircraft or other targets.

In addition, provisions for extradition among Convention and Protocol partners will be useful in the event of the absence of extradition treaties between affected countries for the listed offences. Take for example, the terrorist attack on Korean Airlines Flight 858 in 1987. The perpetrator, Kim Hyon Hui, a North Korean spy, was caught and extradited from Bahrain to Seoul for trial, for planting the bomb which killed 115 people on that flight. Such cases can potentially involve multiple jurisdictions.

Hence, as a leading international air hub, Singapore will need to ensure that in the worst-case scenario of a terrorist attack, we have done all we can to be able to extradite perpetrators from most parts of the world, so that they can be tried for their crimes and to be meted punishments, and the criminal trial and punishment may also provide a form of closure for the families of the victims.

Mr Speaker, Sir, given the importance of this Bill, I would like to seek some clarifications from the Minister for Transport.

Firstly, why has it taken Singapore more than a decade to accede to this treaty? From the perspective of our aviation security operations, the stated activities and listed items are already forbidden. We already have in place measures to protect the cockpit and prevent unlawful interference of an aircraft, and security screening to detect and remove prohibited items which may be used as weapons to threaten flight crews. Biological, chemical or nuclear items are already included in the International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) technical specifications of Dangerous Goods. Hence, accession to the treaty will not have an onerous impact on our existing ground processes.

Second, I would like to ask how many other countries are signatories to the Convention and Protocol. Also, how do these numbers compare to the other three international agreements relevant to aircraft hijacking, namely, the Tokyo Convention, the Hague Convention and the Montreal Convention? What are the main reasons for the differences in response and support from the international community?

Finally, in the context of rescue operations of hijacked aircraft, such as in the case of SQ 117, what is the legal liability for unintended injuries or deaths inflicted on innocent hostages by our security forces? Will the security forces be subjected to legal actions too? I hope that the security forces would be accorded immunity because they are risking their own lives while neutralising terrorists, in order to save innocent passengers and crew.

Mr Speaker, Sir, terrorist threats are evolving and Singapore remains a target. Securing our civil aviation system is not just the job of the security agencies. Everyone has a part to play. We must all remain vigilant and continually strengthen our defences against threats that may undermine the safety and security of our civil aviation system.

Notwithstanding my clarifications, I support the amendment Bill.

2.57 pm

Mr Yip Hon Weng (Yio Chu Kang): Mr Speaker, Sir, the amendments to this Bill are introduced to give effect to the 2010 aviation treaty signed in Beijing. With the demand for air travel set to pick up over the next few years, this Bill is imperative. I have several queries on it.

First, Mr Speaker, Sir, does the Bill cover all forms of technology, especially those recently developed and enhanced technology, which could be used for purposes of warfare and terrorism?

For instance, there has been reports about the suspected use of electronic warfare and methodologies. These include microwave frequencies or directed, pulsed radio frequency energy from portable microwave weapons, to disrupt neurological function, also known as the Havana Syndrome.

With experts on the subject matter suggesting the possible development of non-kinetic tools and other forms of electromagnetic pulse weapons, should we not be concerned that terrorists may discharge such components from planes? They could also use them to turn planes into weapons of destruction. Some of these technologies may not cause death or serious injury upon application. However, they could impair the judgement of pilots and aircrew or incapacitate them to the point where they are unable to maintain controlled flight. The sensitivity of electronic interference to aircraft navigation systems has been recently brought to light due to the introduction of 5G near some US airports.

Second, Mr Speaker, Sir, does the Bill consider that hackers could control an aircraft by hacking an aircraft's systems? In 2016, the US Department of Homeland Security conducted a hacking exercise. They were able to penetrate the system of a passenger plane without insider help or being on board. Today, many aspects of aviation are digitalised, from the sale of air tickets, to inflight systems, to the management of jet fuel and air traffic control. The importance of software in civil aviation is paramount. For example, seemingly minor software issues eventually led to Boeing's 737 Max crisis. The expanded cyber footprint exposes aircraft and airports to the possibility of more cyberattacks. As such, the failure to adequately address such issues may have dire consequences.

According to Eurocontrol, at least 1,260 cybersecurity breaches against airlines and other aviation bodies were reported in 2020. Last year, Singapore Airlines also suffered from a data breach. While experts believe the potential for hackers to gain control of a plane through such cybersecurity breaches is low, we should not discount any weak links. All it takes is one successful attempt to endanger an entire aircraft.

Thirdly, Mr Speaker, Sir, does the Bill cover all forms of aircraft, including unmanned aerial vehicles and drones and such development in unmanned technology? In recent years, drones have become increasingly sophisticated. Its application has become more widespread through Government, commercial and personal use. A quick Internet search reveals that poorly secured drones can be easily hacked by the layman. Drones are already in use by terror outfits for the delivery of arms, explosives and targeted attacks. They do not have to be complex or carry explosives in order to terrorise or kill. The simple act of spraying water over a group of people or nose-diving into a crowd is enough to cause fear and a potentially fatal stampede. More needs to be done in the form of stricter penalties and regulations in drone use and security measures to prevent the abuse of drones for terror-related activities.

Fourthly, Mr Speaker, Sir, would the Bill also apply to the unlikely scenario that a military, customs or Police service plane is used in the commission of an offence against civil aircraft and aerodromes? I note that clause 9 amends section 7(4) by providing that subsection (2)(a)(ii) does not apply to any act committed in relation to an aircraft used in military, customs or police service, unless the aircraft is used in the military, customs or Police service of the Republic of Singapore. What is the reason for the distinction, if any? To be comprehensive, would these types of aircraft be covered in other legislation, and what would these be?

Next, Mr Speaker, Sir, how can we ensure that cross-border collaboration with other countries and collaboration between involved Ministries to enforce this Bill will be well-integrated and seamless?

Domestically, a number of Ministries and agencies would be involved.

MOT, MHA and the Cyber Security Agency deal with domestic terror issues relating to aviation, complicated by cybersecurity. MINDEF oversees our national defence and security, while MFA engages with international organisations. I am simplifying this network of relationships for the purposes of this speech. But, in reality, this cross-Ministry collaboration would be much more complex and possibly involve a greater number of agencies.

Last month, Singapore and Indonesia signed a set of agreements on a number of critical bilateral issues, including the realignment of the boundary between the Jakarta Flight Information Region, or FIR, and the Singapore FIR. The agreement has been described to meet the civil aviation needs of both countries. It will ensure that our Changi Airport is able to operate efficiently and safely and uphold the safety and efficiency of the air traffic control in the region. International and regional cooperation is always essential to protect the safety of international air spaces and I congratulate the Prime Minister and the team for securing the new agreement. I would like to clarify whether the realigned FIR is covered under the Bill.

Finally, Mr Speaker, Sir, can the Minister clarify what are the penalties for the newly-added offences 5A to 5D, which would see offenders using aircrafts to cause death and destruction or abetting the act of it? Section 9 of the Act lists the penalties for offences under the Act, namely, life imprisonment or a fine not exceeding $1 million. Do these penalties apply if the offender was successful in their attempt and caused death and destruction? Would capital punishment be more appropriate to match the severity of the crime?

In conclusion, Mr Speaker, Sir, the September 11 attacks were the first time we saw an aircraft turned into a weapon of mass destruction by terrorists. More than 3,000 people were killed. It sparked a war on terror, which is still ongoing. Closer to home, as what Member Poh Li San has shared, many would remember the hijacking of SQ Flight 117. The reason why I am speaking on this Bill is because, with COVID-19 turning endemic, our aviation sector will pick up again. Our neighbours in Asia are building and expanding their airports, which could pose as a serious competition to our aviation industry. Aviation is thus important to Singapore. I would further argue that our status as an aviation hub is not only essential, but existential for our survival as a country. We must ensure that our aircraft, airports and airspaces are safe, if we are to continue to be a global aviation hub.

Since 9/11, the nature of terrorism has evolved rapidly. Newer aviation technologies, some which are accessible to the layman, are being deployed. Warfare is moving from the conventional to the unconventional, to non-state adversaries. The lines are being blurred. Today, domestic terrorism is well on the way to become a much bigger threat than before, as widening disparities and misinformation threaten the unity of a nation. This Bill is thus important to ensure that our laws are relevant, comprehensive and in time for the future.

Mr Speaker, Sir, notwithstanding all these queries, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Senior Parliamentary Secretary Baey Yam Keng.

3.05 pm

Mr Baey Yam Keng: Mr Speaker, I thank Mr Louis Ng, Ms Poh Li San and Mr Yip Hon Weng for their comments and support for this Bill. Let me address the points raised.

The amended section 3(1) provides that "a person who unlawfully and intentionally seizes or exercises control of an aircraft in service by the use of force or by threats of any kind, or by any technological means, commits the offence of hijacking, whatever his nationality or citizenship, whatever the state in which the aircraft is registered and whether the aircraft is in Singapore or elsewhere."

Depending on the facts and circumstances, this provision could potentially cover acts by malicious hackers to take control of an aircraft by hacking into the aircraft systems.

The broad wording of this provision also helps to ensure that the Act continues to remain relevant and keeps pace with modern technological developments, including the use of new technological means, to endanger the safety and security of aviation.

I would like to provide some clarifications on the provisions of the Bill. The Bill provides for Singapore to exercise criminal jurisdiction on broad grounds and allows Singapore to prosecute offenders for various offences regardless of where the offence was committed, in line with international law. The realignment of the Flight Information Region (FIR) boundaries relates to aviation safety and efficiency of air traffic and not sovereignty. It does not affect the provisions of this Bill and, in general, is not relevant to criminal prosecution matters.

Mr Yip Hon Weng raised a pertinent point that the prevalence of drones and unmanned technology certainly brings about aviation safety and security concerns. The Act can apply to certain types of unlawful and intentional acts involving unmanned aerial vehicles, such as drones. For example, depending on the circumstances, the flying of a drone to intentionally collide with a landing aircraft may potentially fall under the scope of section 5(1)(a) of the Act, which covers acts, regardless of the means used, which damage an aircraft so as to render it incapable of flight or as to be likely to endanger its safety in flight.

MOT had consulted other agencies on the penalties mentioned in the new section 9. In relation to the penalties for the offences under new sections 5A to 5D, MOT is of the view that by benchmarking the penalties against the existing penalties in section 9 of the Act, it is commensurate with the severity of the newly introduced offences. Singapore stands ready against current and future safety and security threats to Singapore's civil aviation system. Should there be a need for a stronger deterrent effect in future, we can introduce new or amend existing legislation.

I would now turn to the query regarding the applicability of the Bill to military, customs or Police aircraft. The offence creating provisions in the Bill apply to aircraft used in military, customs or Police service in certain circumstances. For example, under the amended section 3, the offence of hijacking can be applied to such aircraft if (a) the person seizing or exercising control of the aircraft is a citizen of Singapore; (b) his act is committed in or over Singapore; or (c) the aircraft is used in Singapore's military, customs or Police service. This approach balances the immunity enjoyed by the state aircraft of other countries under international law, with the need to protect Singapore and Singaporeans in certain situations. Nonetheless, the Government stands ready to detect, handle and neutralise any safety and security threats to our civil aviation system, including in relation to any aircraft used in military, customs or Police services, in accordance with domestic and international law.

I would like to share with Ms Poh Li San that, as of today, 42 countries have agreed to each of these treaties. However, it will be difficult to benchmark the response of the international community towards the Beijing Convention 2010 and Beijing Protocol 2010 against the earlier treaties as those had been concluded and came into force much earlier.

I believe other States are also seriously considering the provisions of these treaties, just as we did, and, in due course, we should see more countries becoming party to both treaties.

Ms Poh Li San has also noted that Singapore has robust existing security measures and procedures for transporting dangerous goods in place to ensure the safe and orderly operation of Singapore's aviation industry. However, these are separate matters and we have been working to ensure that we are ready to accede, including ensuring that under our domestic laws, Singapore can implement what is required when the Beijing Convention 2010 and Beijing Protocol 2010 come into force for Singapore after accession.

The civil aviation industry plays a significant role in the global economy. Therefore, aviation safety and security continue to be the highest priorities for states and the global aviation community to ensure the undisrupted and reliable operations of the aviation industry. States that have ratified or acceded to the two treaties have already indicated their commitment to collaborate with like-minded states, as provided for in the treaties.

Mr Yip Hon Weng has queried how collaboration between the involved Ministries to enforce this Bill will be well-integrated and seamless. Indeed, working across multiple agencies, administrative boundaries and organisation priorities are challenges that public officers face daily. This is one of the key reasons why the Singapore Public Service adopted the whole-of-Government (WOG) approach to improve collaboration among officers when working on cross-agency projects. I would like to assure Mr Yip Hon Weng and the House that our public officers will work together closely with the WOG mindset to achieve the collaboration necessary to enforce this Bill.

Mr Louis Ng had earlier queried how the International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) Technical Instructions should be considered by the Courts in Singapore in the interpretation of this Bill and was concerned that airlines might inadvertently expose themselves to criminal liability under this Bill. Similarly, Ms Poh Li San also expressed concern that our security forces may be subject to legal actions should there be unintended injuries or deaths to innocent parties during their operations. Let me address both concerns.

The Technical Instructions are published by ICAO to ensure that dangerous materials are subjected to the necessary acceptance, packaging, documentation and loading processes for safe transport by air. We have to keep in mind that the Act, as amended by the Bill, is intended to address the separate matter of unlawful acts which intentionally endanger aviation safety. Therefore, the Technical Instructions are not, in themselves, relevant for the purposes of assessing such criminal liability.

Singapore also implements a rigorous cargo screening regime that is compliant with international standards. Our public agencies work closely with the industry stakeholders to ensure that the required safety and security standards are met.

If the industry partner was found to be non-compliant with the relevant standards during the course of the investigation, they can be taken to task based on appropriate legislation, but not the provisions of the Act as amended by the Bill.

Similarly, for our security forces executing high-risk rescue operations, with the intention to neutralise the threats posed by the perpetrators, the provisions of the Act, as amended by the Bill, are not relevant for assessing liabilities.

Mr Speaker, Sir, Singapore's security agencies have, over time, worked on the implementation of security measures to both detect and deter terror-minded individuals. With the provisions of this Bill, the effectiveness of these measures would be enhanced further through international cooperation, including allowing Singapore to prosecute such individuals once they are apprehended.

To safeguard our reputation as a safe and secure air hub, Singapore has to continue its role as an active and responsible global citizen through our participation in the international aviation safety and security initiatives. Mr Speaker, I beg to move.

Question put, and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House.

The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. – [Mr Baey Yam Keng].

Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed.

Mr Speaker: Order. I propose to take a break now. I suspend the Sitting and will take the Chair at 3.40 pm.

Sitting accordingly suspended

at 3.18 pm until 3.40 pm.

Sitting resumed at 3.40 pm.

[Deputy Speaker (Mr Christopher de Souza) in the Chair]