Impact on Singapore of Phase Three of US Rebalancing Strategy
Ministry of DefenceSpeakers
Summary
This question concerns the security implications of Phase Three of the US Rebalancing Strategy and the Government’s assessment of its impact on Singapore and the region. Mr Dennis Tan Lip Fong inquired about the strategy’s details and how Singapore would mitigate potential risks arising from changes in US regional involvement. Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen stated that Singapore’s policies are based on its own sovereign interests and a commitment to regional peace through inclusive frameworks like the FPDA and ADMM-Plus. He noted that Singapore facilitates transit for various international militaries and maintains key bilateral agreements with the US to support regional security. Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen emphasized that the Government focuses on making friends with all countries to ensure Singapore’s survival and competitive progress regardless of external shifts.
Transcript
1 Mr Dennis Tan Lip Fong asked the Minister for Defence (a) what does Phase Three of the US Rebalancing Strategy entail for Singapore and the region in terms of security; (b) what is the Government's assessment of the associated security benefits, costs, and risks; and (c) how does the Government intend to maximise these gains while addressing the costs and mitigating the risks.
The Minister for Defence (Dr Ng Eng Hen): Mdm Speaker, as an independent and sovereign nation, Singapore pursues policies for its own interests for all matters of state, including defence, with the goal to attain the right and best conditions that ensure our survival and progress in this competitive world. We, Singaporeans, are ultimately responsible for our own security but we will partner like-minded countries that pursue common objectives of peace and stability for our region.
For this reason, Singapore joined the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) in 1971 which imposes an obligation on the five nations to consult in the event of an external attack on Malaysia and Singapore. In the past decade, we have also worked with other ASEAN countries to build a security architecture that is inclusive and based on the rule of law; where peaceful settlement of disputes, dialogue, cooperation and non-provocation are the norm for countries within that framework. This led to the set-up of ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM)-Plus in 2010, which includes, apart from the ASEAN member states, China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand from Asia, as well as the US and Russia.
As a matter of policy, Singapore will continue to partner like-minded countries to pursue peace and stability for our region. We seek to be friends with all militaries and encourage them to use our port and airbases for transit. Indeed, military ships and submarines from many countries, both from ASEAN-Plus countries like US, China, India and Japan, as well as from other continents like Europe, South America, Oceania and Africa, stop and use facilities at Changi Naval Base.
US ships and planes are more frequent users since the 1990 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed by our founding Prime Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, and then-US Vice President Dan Quayle. That MOU facilitated the US' presence in this region and provided the security umbrella under which emerging economies in Asia thrived. The MOU was updated by the Strategic Framework Agreement by Prime Minister Lee and then-US President George W Bush in 2005. And recently, we enhanced the Defence Cooperation Agreement with the US in 2015.
Mr Dennis Tan Lip Fong (Non-Constituency Member): I thank the Minister for the reply. I would like to ask how the Minister would propose mitigating the costs and risks for Singapore should there be a major American departure from the current Rebalancing Strategy. The rationale for my question is this: I am essentially asking with respect to our plans if (a) the US' alliances with its existing allies will weaken or be less involved, or (b) if the US becomes even more active or more involved. These scenarios will affect Singapore quite differently. I am seeking to understand the Government's forward-planning in these respects. I feel that it is important that Singaporeans know the Government's plans to deal with the different scenarios.
Dr Ng Eng Hen: Madam, the main thrust of my response to the Member's questions is that Singapore must dictate its policies based on its own interests. That is our starting point. Our policy must work to the best interest of Singapore and Singaporeans.
Now, obviously, we have to watch what other countries do with foreign policy. Singapore is a small country and, as I have said in my answer, we will work with like-minded partners who pursue peace and stability in our region. In this framework, we have facilitated and pushed for ADMM-Plus. We push for joint cooperation and exercises with other countries and we want to seek to have as many friends as possible. We encourage countries to use our facilities, whether it is Changi Naval Base or the airbases.
There are specific agreements that we have entered into. I mentioned the FPDA in 1971; there is a historical basis, but it also falls in line with this overarching principle that we will work with like-minded countries that seek peace and stability in our region.
We also have an MOU, a Strategic Framework Agreement and an enhanced DCA with the US, which facilitates the use of their ships and planes in our airbases.
To answer the many theoretical scenarios which the Member has raised, which I do not propose to address, I think our starting point is whatever the calculations of other countries, whatever their foreign policy, we start from this important fundamental – we seek to make sure that Singapore benefits the most. Our foreign policy or defence policy is predicated on making sure that we position ourselves in the best possible position to survive and to compete. We want to make friends with as many militaries and countries as possible.