Impact of Houthis' Attacks in Red Sea on Singapore's Maritime Security

The following question stood in the name of Mr Desmond Choo –

9 To ask the Minister for Defence (a) whether the Houthis' attacks on shipping in the Red Sea impacts Singapore's maritime security; and (b) noting that the US and other nations have announced the creation of a multinational maritime security initiative to secure the Red Sea, whether the SAF will be contributing to this effort.

Mr Patrick Tay Teck Guan (Pioneer): Question No 9.

The Minister for Defence (Dr Ng Eng Hen): Mr Speaker, the Red Sea, which connects the Suez Canal and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, is the shortest sea route linking Asia and Europe. It is a major Sea Line of Communications (SLOC) with approximately 12% of global trade by volume and 30% of global container traffic.

As of 7 January 2024, the Yemen-based Houthi forces have unlawfully attacked 15 merchant ships in the Red Sea through firing of missiles, drones and hijack attempts. There have been 20 such attacks, including one on a Singapore-flagged vessel MAERSK Hangzhou. As a result, all five of the world's largest global shipping companies, namely the Mediterranean Shipping Company, Maersk, CMA CGM, COSCO, Hapag-Lloyd and other shipping lines, had earlier announced that they would suspend transits through the Red Sea.

Prior to the attacks, around 60 ships passed through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in the Red Sea daily, but the number has dropped by about a third in recent weeks. Singapore-registered ships have also been affected, with the number of daily transits through the Red Sea now approximately halved.

The disruption of the Red Sea SLOC will have an impact on global supply chains. However, based on the current situation, the immediate impact on Singapore is expected to be limited, as the majority of our critical supplies, such as food and pharmaceuticals, are delivered via air freight or do not pass through the Red Sea. Our local manufacturers also seem to have sufficient spare inventory to hedge against supply disruptions, though they are worried about increases in business costs.

Nonetheless, it is in our interest for Singapore to join cause with the international community to protect and ensure that key SLOCs around the world remain open, especially if threatened by unlawful acts by non-state actors or terrorist groups. We have previously articulated key principles that govern the Straits of Malacca and Singapore when this key SLOC was threatened by piracy and sea robbery. I think some Members would remember those incidents, that resulted in insurance premiums for ships that traverse the Straits of Malacca and Singapore to increase manyfold. These principles were articulated in the 2005 Shangri-La Dialogue.

There are three. First, the primary responsibility of maritime security lies with the littoral states. Second, the international community and agencies, such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO), have a role to play. Third, all measures have to be in accordance with international law and respect the sovereignty of the littoral states.

As Mr Desmond Choo mentioned, the United States has announced the launch of the multinational Operation Prosperity Guardian to ensure maritime security in the Red Sea. This operation aligns with the key principles that I have just articulated. In this regard, Singapore hopes that the littoral states that surround the Red Sea step up efforts to end the unlawful Houthi attacks.

The international community of user states also has a role to play. In particular, there is the 39-nation Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), of which Singapore has been a member since 2009. The CMF's Combined Task Force (CTF) 153: Red Sea Maritime Security has been tasked to keep the Red Sea SLOC open and safe. The launch of Operation Prosperity Guardian aims to restore international confidence and the free flow of maritime shipping through the area.

Singapore will participate in Operation Prosperity Guardian and contribute to CTF 153's efforts. The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) had similarly participated in the Combined Task Force 151. That was a counter piracy effort in the Gulf of Aden, where we deployed assets for quite a long time from 2009 to 2023.

For CTF 153 and the current Operation Prosperity Guardian, the SAF will deploy a team of planners, to work with international partners at their headquarters to formulate plans; a team from the Republic Singapore Navy's (RSN's) Information Fusion Centre to support information-sharing and engagement outreach with the commercial shipping community; and a Senior National Representative to the Combined Maritime Forces in Bahrain.

Separately, Singapore and the SAF, together with our international partners, have continued to monitor developments in the region, including the ongoing need for humanitarian assistance. Some of you will remember that the SAF has been supporting Singapore's humanitarian contributions to Gaza and we were doing this through our Changi Regional Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Coordination Centre's information, networks and resources.

Most recently, the SAF delivered relief supplies on 30 November last year to the Egyptian Red Crescent. Further to this effort, the French Armed Forces has invited the SAF to provide two medical personnel to serve on FS Dixmude, now docked at the El-Arish port in Egypt. This is a reconfigured hospital ship and has been treating casualties from Gaza. The SAF has accepted the offer and plans are underway to deploy this medical team to aid civilian casualties there.

Mr Speaker: Mr Desmond Choo.

Mr Desmond Choo (Tampines): I would like to thank the Minister for his comprehensive reply about how Singapore will support the efforts. Does he also foresee that if the situation does not improve or the tension at the Red Sea escalates, that Singapore will also similarly increase our support to international task forces or supporting humanitarian support in the area?

Dr Ng Eng Hen: Thank you, Mr Speaker. I do not want to pre-empt the situation, it is a complex situation. I would just make two general points and then perhaps a specific one.

As I took pains to elaborate, our contribution to CTF 153 has been consistent with the principles that we have articulated. In other words, it is focused primarily on keeping key sea lines of communication free, which is in our interest because if the same thing happens, as it did in the Straits of Malacca, we would want the international community for assistance as well, if that was necessary.

Nonetheless, we recognise and we have articulated that the littoral states have the primary responsibility and there must be sufficient efforts there. That is why we encourage the littoral states and other countries, to work towards a diplomatic solution so that the Red Sea problem can be mitigated.

If the problem gets worse, we will assess it. Apart from that, we are also watching, as I said, the humanitarian situation unfolding and where we can contribute and, we think, meaningfully, we will do so.