Adequacy of AML Controls for Financial Institutions Penalised for Breaching AML Requirements in 2016/2017 and 2025
Ministry of FinanceSpeakers
Summary
This question concerns the adequacy of anti-money laundering (AML) controls for financial institutions penalized in 2016/2017 and 2025, as raised by Mr Fadli Fawzi. Minister of State for Trade and Industry and Culture, Community and Youth Alvin Tan explained that while 2016/2017 breaches involved systemic failures, 2025 penalties focused on customer risk assessment and source of wealth corroboration. Although some recent breaches involved transaction monitoring, these resulted from inconsistent staff implementation rather than the systemic deficiencies remediated after 2016/2017. Minister of State for Trade and Industry and Culture, Community and Youth Alvin Tan stated that the institutions have accepted the findings and are strengthening oversight of staff implementation. The Government emphasized that financial institutions must continuously adapt their controls as criminals shift tactics to evade anti-money laundering requirements and regulatory systems.
Transcript
122 Mr Fadli Fawzi asked the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance in relation to the same financial institutions which are penalised for breaching anti-money laundering (AML) requirements in 2016/2017 and 2025 (a) how do the breaches differ for each incident; (b) whether the Government considers these institutions to have sufficiently strengthened their AML controls after 2016/2017; and (c) if so, why are these institutions penalised again in 2025.
Mr Alvin Tan (for the Prime Minister): As announced on 4 July 2025, nine financial institutions (FIs) which have breached their anti-money laundering obligations were subject to Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) regulatory action.
In respect of FIs that were penalised in both 2016/2017 and 2025, their earlier breaches were largely due to their failures in transaction monitoring, arising out of deficiencies in their relevant systems and controls. Following the issuance of financial penalties in 2016/2017, they have remediated these deficiencies. In 2025, MAS found breaches by these FIs in other areas, such as customer risk assessment, establishment and corroboration of customers' source of wealth and post-suspicious transaction report follow-up. While MAS also found some breaches relating to transaction monitoring, they were due to inconsistent implementation by the FI's employees. MAS noted that that the FI's transaction monitoring systems and controls were generally in place.
The FIs involved have accepted that they had fallen short and have implemented remediation measures, including stronger oversight of staff tasked with implementing controls and checks.
Criminals continuously shift their tactics to evade controls and FIs must adapt their control measures in tandem.