Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Amendment) and Other Matters Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

2.33 pm

The Minister of State for Law (Mr Murali Pillai) (for the Minister for Law): Mr Speaker, Sir, on behalf of the Minister for Law, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."

Sir, as this House is well aware, the Government is committed to upholding Singapore's status as an international financial centre and key trading and transhipment hub, built on a clean, robust and credible system. Our system would be undermined if criminals were to abuse our system to carry out illicit activities.

Singapore thus needs to be vigilant. To this end, Singapore has taken a resolute stance against money laundering, terrorism financing and proliferation financing. The measures which have been taken include:

(a) adopting the three key pillars of prevention, detection and enforcement, as set out in the report by the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Anti-Money Laundering published recently in October 2024. These three strategies are also used to combat terrorism financing and proliferation financing;

(b) continuously reviewing our processes and updating our laws to ensure that they remain effective and in line with international standards. For instance, the Government has passed the Anti-Money Laundering and Other Matters Act 2024, which will enhance the ability of the Government to detect and act against money laundering with enhanced data sharing and strengthened prosecutorial levers; and

(c) supporting global trends to combat money laundering, terrorism financing and proliferation financing. To this end, Singapore has been an active member of the Financial Action Task Force, or FATF for short, since 1992. The FATF sets the international standards for tackling money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing. Singapore has been assessed by the FATF to have a strong legal and institutional framework and we are determined to maintain our good standing.

This Bill is in line with the Government's consistent approach, as it seeks to strengthen our international cooperation regime and framework for trusts. There are two main components to this Bill.

First, Singapore's international criminal cooperation regime will be updated to ensure it remains efficient, effective and in line with international standards. This will enhance our ability to cooperate with other jurisdictions to combat crime. Second, the Trustees Act will be updated to better support Singapore's legal regime by revising the trustees' obligations and imposing effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.

I will take hon Members through these two components of the Bill.

First, let me begin with the changes to the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, or MACMA for short. Mutual legal assistance is a process where states seek and provide assistance to one another for the purposes of criminal investigations, prosecution and other proceedings.

A strong international cooperation framework is especially vital in our world today, as crime is increasingly transnational in nature. In this regard, it is in our interests to ensure that our laws are updated to allow us to cooperate effectively with other countries to prevent and punish crime.

Mr Speaker, the feedback that we have received from FATF is that our quality of assistance is generally high, often supporting complex investigations and helping to secure convictions. We, however, do not rest on our laurels. The Bill will further improve our processes and capabilities to assist. I will highlight four key amendments that the Bill will make to the MACMA.

First, the Bill will empower our law enforcement authorities to take statements from persons for the purposes of assisting foreign criminal investigations.

Currently, section 21 of the MACMA requires that criminal proceedings have commenced in the foreign country before a witness may be compelled to give evidence to aid in those proceedings. This generally means that prosecution must have been initiated. As such, if the foreign country is still investigating and has yet to commence proceedings, then Singapore would be unable to assist with the taking of evidence under section 21 of the MACMA. In contrast, our domestic authorities are empowered, under our Criminal Procedure Code, to take statements from persons for the purpose of domestic investigations, before the matter reaches our courts. A new section 21A will address this issue to ensure that powers available for domestic authorities are also available for use in response to requests for mutual legal assistance.

Second, with this Bill, Singapore can assist to identify, freeze, seize or confiscate property "intended to be used" in connection with the commission of a foreign offence. This will add to our current powers, which pertain to property "used" in the commission of such offence. This expands the scope of property covered under the MACMA and strengthens our ability to deprive criminals of their property. This is in line with FATF's definition of "criminal property", which covers instrumentalities used and intended for use in money laundering and other offences.

Third, the Bill will clarify when foreign proceedings are deemed concluded for the purposes of enforcement of a foreign confiscation order. While the MACMA already contains examples of when proceedings are considered concluded, such as discontinuance of proceedings or acquittal, the Bill will further clarify that proceedings are concluded when there is no right of appeal following the acquittal, for example, or that all rights of appeal have expired or are exhausted. This clarifies a grey area in determining when proceedings are concluded, such as where the defendant has been acquitted but the foreign state is still pursuing an appeal.

Fourth, Singapore will be able to enforce foreign confiscation orders made by "a competent authority", in addition to such orders made by a Court. A foreign confiscation order is an order made in connection with the foreign offence for the recovery, forfeiture or confiscation of any payment or property. Currently, we can only enforce foreign confiscation orders made in judicial proceedings. However, not all countries follow this system.

A number of jurisdictions, especially those with civil law systems, have confiscation orders which may be issued by an authority other than a Court. There is thus a need to take a broader approach. Recognising confiscation orders made by a "competent authority" will enhance Singapore's ability to deprive criminals of their illicit proceeds.

Mr Speaker, in addition to amending the MACMA, the Bill also covers a couple of amendments to the Extradition Act. We have updated the amendment of "foreign state" to clarify that it is within Singapore's sovereign power to make an extradition request to any territory and not only those listed in the Third Schedule.

The Bill also contains other technical amendments, all intended to improve Singapore's international cooperation regime – to make it clearer, smoother and more efficient. For example, the Bill will allow an overseas document to be deemed, to be authenticated under the MACMA or the Extradition Act, when it is sealed with an official or public seal, or stamped with an official stamp of that country, or of a minister, a department or official of the government of that country. This is in line with our intent, as mentioned earlier, to take into account the varying practices of foreign countries, where processes for sealing or stamping may differ.

Sir, we will continue to review Singapore's international cooperation regime to ensure that our processes remain relevant and effective. As we continue to do so, we will ensure that robust safeguards are in place to ensure that Singapore will only act in meritorious cases.

With that, I conclude the first part of my speech on international criminal cooperation. I now turn to my next part on key changes to the trust regime.

I will first explain the background of how trusts may be misused. I will then detail how our legal regime aims to combat such misuse. I will end by going through the amendments that the Bill seeks to make to bolster our legal regime.

Generally, a trust is created when a person, the settlor, transfers legal title of certain identified property to another person, the trustee. The trustee is obliged to deal with that property for the benefit of another, the beneficiary. Trusts can be used for a wide variety of legitimate purposes, including succession planning, protection of vulnerable persons and charitable giving.

However, trusts can also be misused by criminals. While the trustee is the legal owner of the trust assets, the trust assets are held for the benefit of the beneficiary. Trusts can thus be used to conceal the person who is ultimately entitled to benefit from the asset, particularly when they are used as part of a complex structure.

How do we combat such misuse? As part of our three-pillar framework, we have enacted laws which require gatekeepers of the financial system, such as banks and other financial institutions, to obtain information as part of customer due diligence or CDD checks, thereby detecting and preventing misuse.

Where the customer is a trustee, the CDD checks should also be applied to persons with ownership or control over the trust, such as the settlor and the protector, as well as the beneficiaries, or persons who will benefit from the trust. These CDD checks would include enhanced measures, such as checking on the source of funds for the settlor, in cases of higher money laundering or terrorist financing risks.

For these CDD checks to work and for the banks to be able to obtain the information needed to prevent money laundering, financing of terrorist and proliferation activities, trustees must be required to obtain and hold information about the trust that they administer.

Similarly, if a law enforcement agency is conducting an investigation and wishes to find out more about the source of certain funds, and who the ultimate beneficiary is, their investigations would be facilitated if trustees are required to hold the relevant information. Thus, an obligation on trustees to hold such information complements the gatekeepers' CDD obligations and the powers of investigation of the law enforcement agencies.

The obligations imposed on trustees depends on the type of trust and their risk profile. Some trustees, such as trust companies that are in the business of providing trust services professionally, are licensed and regulated by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS). This is to ensure that the trust companies adhere to high standards of integrity, professionalism and business conduct, and observe anti-money laundering and counter-financing of terrorism requirements similar to other financial institutions providing wealth management services.

Trust companies may be involved in administering complex trust structures and dealing with high value assets and transactions, which exposes them to greater risk of being used for money laundering and other financial crimes. Trust companies' obligation to obtain and hold relevant information is found under the Trust Companies Act, the supporting subsidiary legislation and binding Notices issued by the MAS.

The risk profiles of trustees that are not regulated by MAS are normally lower. These lower risk trusts are typically not complex, as setting up a complex structure would typically require the assistance of professionals such as a trust company. To illustrate, a trust set up by an aged parent by transferring assets to a trusted family member to provide for a disabled child would fall under this category. Such trustees' obligations are generally found in the Regulations introduced under Part 7 of the Trustees Act. The amendments to the Trustees Act being moved today are primarily to Part 7 of the Trustees Act.

I will now turn to detail each of the key amendments to the Trustees Act: first, the scope of information which the trustees will need to obtain; second, an update to the sanctions for non-compliance with the obligations introduced under Part 7 of the Trustees Act; and third, on the powers to investigate trustees that breach their obligations introduced under Part 7 of the Trustees Act.

On the first point of the scope of information. Part 7 of the Trustees Act requires trustees to obtain and hold information on each person who is a "relevant trust party". This includes the settlor, the trustee, the beneficiaries and any person who has any power over the disposition of any property that is subject of the trust.

The amendments to the Trustees Act will expand the scope of the information to be collected. With the amendments, the Trustee will now be required to collect the basic information of the trust. This includes the identifier of the trust, for example, the name of the trust, or its tax reference number. It also includes the trust deed and the place where the trust is administered.

The term "relevant trust party" will be expanded to include the "class of beneficiaries" and "natural persons exercising ultimate effective control over the trust". A "class of beneficiaries" refers to a group of individuals who are not yet known or identified in a trust instrument. One example of a group may be the future descendants of the settlor.

Trustees will likely already have such information. This information will usually be set out in the trust instrument which the trustees would likely have in their possession. The trust instrument is the document setting out the terms of the trust and how the assets of the trust are to be managed or administered for the beneficiaries.

On the second point on sanctions for non-compliance, the Trustees Act currently provides that any contravention of the obligations introduced under Part 7 shall be punishable by a fine not exceeding S$1,000. However, the maximum fines that may be imposed for comparable breaches in other pieces of legislation are higher. In the Accountants Act, as well as other pieces of legislation that this House has passed – the Companies and Limited Liability Partnerships (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act and the Business Trusts (Amendment) Act – the maximum fine for similar breaches is S$25,000.

To ensure alignment with the maximum fine for other similar offences and that the sanctions for breaches of obligations introduced under Part 7 of the Trustees Act are dissuasive and effective, we will update the maximum fine provided for in Part 7 of the Trustees Act to S$25,000.

The amendments also introduce the power of composition. Thus, in appropriate cases, a composition sum of up to one-half of the amount of the maximum fine may be levied in lieu of prosecution.

The third set of amendments will grant a public officer called the Commissioner of Trust Enforcement (CTE) under the Ministry of Law the power to investigate offences under Part 7 of the Trustees Act. Previously, this power lay with the Police. With these amendments, the CTE and any authorised officers he may appoint will be empowered to investigate any breach of the trustees' obligations, introduced under Part 7 of the Trustees Act.

This transfer of investigative functions from the Police to MinLaw will develop MinLaw's subject matter expertise and allow investigators to more effectively address any breaches of the obligations introduced under Part 7 of the Trustees Act.

Beyond this, the CTE will also be empowered to issue codes of practice, guidelines or standards of performance if and when required. These codes and guidelines or standards, if issued, will help to guide trustees of relevant trusts on how best to comply with their obligations.

Collectively, these amendments will bolster Singapore's national strategy for anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism and proliferation financing by preventing trusts from being misused by criminals.

In conclusion, Sir, the Bill will strengthen Singapore's international cooperation regime, bolster its national strategy against money laundering, terrorism financing and proliferation financing, and align itself with international standards. Sir, I beg to move.

Question proposed.

Mr Speaker: Mr Yip Hon Weng.

2.52 pm

Mr Yip Hon Weng (Yio Chu Kang): Mr Speaker, Sir, this Bill represents another critical step forward in strengthening our enforcement against complex financial crimes. However, the Bill needs examination to ensure we balance effective crime control with the rights of Singaporeans. Today, I would like to raise several clarifications.

First, Mr Speaker, Sir, I have concerns regarding privacy and safety. The proposed changes, particularly those broadening cooperation and permitting statements for foreign criminal probes, raise important questions. How can we ensure that we balance international cooperation with our citizens' fundamental right to privacy? Striking this balance is challenging. We need strong assurances that the privacy rights of Singaporeans will not be compromised.

Additionally, what is the plan for cooperating with non-prescribed foreign countries? While broad cooperation can be beneficial, it must come with reciprocity and robust safeguards. Moreover, how will the Government protect sensitive information shared with foreign authorities, ensuring it is used only for its intended purpose? Can the Minister of State outline these safeguards and explain how they will be enforced?

It is important that residents are informed if and when their information is shared, and that they have avenues for recourse if they believe their rights have been violated.

Cooperation is key to tackling cross-border crime. However, it should not come at the expense of our residents' privacy. I urge the Minister of State to address these concerns to alleviate the worries of Singaporeans and ensure that the right safeguards are in place.

Mr Speaker, Sir, my second point addresses the confidentiality of banking information. The updated regulations permit financial institutions greater access to customer data, which can be a sensitive matter for many residents. What protections are in place for Singaporean and Permanent Resident customers when their financial data is requested by foreign entities? There is considerable variation in data protection standards globally. How can we ensure that our citizens' financial data will be safeguarded, regardless of the requesting country?

Additionally, the Bill must promote transparency. There should be a clear and transparent process for residents to be informed of any data requests involving their accounts. Ideally, they should have the right to contest these requests. Singaporeans place great trust in our financial system. We must not allow unchecked access to customer data by foreign entities to erode that trust.

Residents deserve assurances that their privacy and financial security are protected. Furthermore, as Singapore is recognised as a safe haven for global investments, can the Minister of State confirm that our banks have the authority to refuse financial disclosures if complying would harm their reputations? We need to understand whether they can decline unjust requests.

Mr Speaker, Sir, my third point pertains to property confiscation orders. This is an issue that directly affects Singaporeans with assets or ties overseas. What safeguards exist to protect residents from unjust foreign confiscation orders? Given that foreign legal standards can vary widely, how can Singaporeans contest potentially unfair seizures based on foreign laws? I also propose implementing a cap or stricter criteria for enforcing foreign confiscation orders. Will there be a review process to ensure that foreign orders are sound or even in line with our local laws? This additional layer of protection could prevent disproportionate or unjust seizures originating from other jurisdictions.

Supporting international justice is essential, but we must also safeguard Singaporeans from potentially unjust claims on their property. I urge the Minister of State to address these concerns and confirm that the fundamental property rights of our citizens will not be compromised.

In conclusion, Mr Speaker, Sir, over the past two years, we have witnessed an alarming rise in money laundering cases, not only globally, but right here in Singapore. I have consistently advocated for stronger measures against financial crime, both inside and outside this House. I appreciate the Government's firm stance demonstrated through recent Bills like the Anti-Money Laundering and Other Matters Bill and the Corporate Service Providers Bill.

With each of these Bills, I have raised questions in Parliament regarding major financial crimes and our strategies for tackling them. Tightening our laws, collaborating closely with international partners and enhancing due diligence are vital in today's landscape. Staying vigilant and proactive is our only means to ensure Singapore remains a trusted financial hub. Protecting their integrity is paramount.

This is why I am glad this Bill is being tabled. It represents another critical step forward in our enforcement against complex financial crimes. I fully support our fight against cross-border crime. These issues are significant concerns for all Singaporeans, especially as criminals grow increasingly sophisticated. If implemented with care, these amendments will substantially bolster our enforcement efforts.

However, I have raised several clarifications. Firstly, maintaining a balance between international cooperation and privacy, safeguarding customer data held by financial institutions, ensuring protection against unjust foreign confiscation orders and lastly, reinforcing transparency in how residents' data and property are managed in international criminal cases. As we move forward, it is essential to uphold the delicate balance between justice and privacy. I hope the Government will carefully consider my clarifications.

Let us work together to build a system that not only strengthens our defences, but also respects and protects the rights of every Singaporean. Only then we can truly create a secure, resilient and trusted nation. I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Neil Parekh.

2.58 pm

Mr Neil Parekh Nimil Rajnikant (Nominated Member): Mr Speaker, Sir, thank you for allowing me to speak on this Bill. The amendments in this Bill aim to bolster Singapore's framework for international cooperation on criminal matters. Sir, earlier this year, this House discussed Ministerial Statements on this matter and subsequent legislation to strengthen our detection of financial crimes and the recovery of ill-gotten gains.

The Bill before us further demonstrates the commitment of the Government and policing authorities to exhaust every effort in combating financial crimes. By aligning with the updated FATF recommendations, the Bill strengthens Singapore's position as a compliant and cooperative jurisdiction in the global fight against financial crimes. This, in turn, can reinforce the country's position as a trusted financial centre, attracting investors and multinational corporations looking for a secure and transparent business environment.

The amendments also enable quicker and more effective cooperation in criminal matters with other nations. Singapore's capacity to support international law enforcement in asset confiscation, extradition and information sharing can make it a key player in global financial crime investigations. Stricter regulations on trustees and asset management enhance Singapore's defense against money laundering, promoting a stable and secure financial system.

However, we must also acknowledge the challenges these changes may bring. Compliance and operational costs are likely to rise, particularly for financial institutions and businesses. These sectors will face increased administrative and regulatory burdens, which could necessitate investment in staffing, technology and legal resources.

Also, the balance between privacy and cooperation is another challenge we must carefully manage. Heightened obligations to share information with foreign authorities may raise privacy concerns, particularly for clients who prioritise confidentiality. While we are committed to international cooperation, we must also ensure that we protect the data privacy of our clients to maintain Singapore's attractiveness as a financial hub.

There is also the issue of international reciprocity. While Singapore is committed to fulfilling international requests for assistance, these amendments will only be effective if there is a reciprocal commitment from other jurisdictions. If other countries fail to uphold their side of the bargain, Singapore could find itself disproportionately bearing the burden of international cooperation.

Finally, we must remain mindful of the impact on smaller financial entities. Smaller firms, particularly those with limited compliance resources, could find it difficult to meet the new standards, leading to a possible consolidation of the market. We must ensure that these changes do not inadvertently push smaller players out of the market, as diversity in our financial ecosystem is essential to the continued growth of our economy.

I have some clarifications for the Minister of State. First, as international cooperation is critical for tackling cross-border crimes, how would Singapore streamline communication and operational procedures with foreign authorities to maintain swift collaboration?

Secondly, it would be helpful to have more details on the Attorney-General's specific powers and responsibilities in transmitting certified evidence to foreign authorities, along with the safeguards for managing sensitive data.

Third, what processes and procedures can be implemented to address potential imbalances if other nations do not reciprocate Singapore's efforts in cooperation and resource allocation?

Fourth, clause 6 refers to providing assistance to non-prescribed foreign countries under certain conditions. I would request clarification on the process the Attorney-General would use to verify compliance guarantees from these countries.

By fostering a transparent and secure financial environment, this Bill can increase confidence among international partners and clients. I believe strengthening guidelines around the handling and transmission of sensitive information will require businesses to adhere more closely to best practices in data security, and help prevent breaches and supporting overall client confidence.

Mr Speaker, Sir, notwithstanding my clarifications this Bill has my full support.

Mr Speaker: Minister of State Murali Pillai.

3.03 pm

Mr Murali Pillai: Mr Speaker, I thank hon Members Mr Yip Hon Weng and Mr Neil Parekh who spoke in support of the Bill. I commend them for their advocacy to make sure that Singapore has a high bar, preventing it to be a place for financial crime and also, in relation to providing cooperation to other foreign jurisdictions in the fight against financial crime.

I will respond to address the questions that hon Members raised on the Bill, which relate to the topic of mutual legal assistance.

Mr Yip has raised concerns relating to privacy, confidentiality and transparency. I note that the pith of Mr Yip's questions is whether the MACMA and the amendments to it, strike the right balance between these concerns and the need for international cooperation in order to combat crime. These are understandable concerns.

Mr Parekh also raised similar queries, with specific emphasis on the processes and procedures for mutual legal assistance. These are important questions.

When it comes to striking the right balance, we regularly grapple with such considerations when designing laws that confer powers over information and property belonging to private individuals and entities. In the context of mutual legal assistance, it is critical that we do not, and indeed we will not, blindly accede to every request that we receive. I propose to respond in two parts. First, to address the general point about maintaining the right balance, I will broadly explain the existing safeguards set out in the MACMA, which ensures that the right balance is struck between the interests of the private individuals and entities on the one hand, and the demands of justice on the other. Second, I will further address Mr Yip and Mr Parekh's specific queries.

But before turning to the safeguards in the MACMA and responding to the Members' queries, I would like to make a brief aside to address Mr Parekh's point about the compliance and operational costs in the trusts sector.

The amendments to the Trustees Act are unlikely to raise financial and operational costs significantly. As stated earlier, the Trustees Act already imposes obligation on trustees to obtain and hold information on each "relevant trust party". Insofar as the amendments also require the trustees to collect additional information, including the basic information of the trust, this information should be readily available from the existing documentation which the trustee will already have.

Sir, as mentioned in my speech earlier, we will ensure that we have robust safeguards in place to ensure that Singapore acts only in meritorious cases.

Let me elaborate on the safeguards set out in the MACMA. In the first instance, section 19 of the MACMA sets out a list of requirements, such as a description of the offence and the relevant facts, that the foreign country must provide in order to make a request for assistance to Singapore. This ensures that every request will contain the relevant information that would enable the Singapore authorities to carry out a full assessment to determine if assistance can and should be granted in each case.

Next, section 20 of the MACMA sets out several grounds under which assistance must or may be refused. I will highlight a few as examples. For instance, a request must be refused if it relates to the investigation, prosecution or punishment of a person in respect of any conduct which, if it had occurred in Singapore, would not have constituted a Singapore offence. This reflects the requirement of dual criminality, which generally applies to forms of assistance that are coercive in nature, including those seeking to obtain information or confiscate property from persons in Singapore. In other words, if the conduct in question would not have constituted an offence, had it occurred in Singapore, then we will not assist.

Other examples where we must refuse assistance include: (a) where there are substantial grounds for believing that the request was made for the purposes of investigating, prosecuting, punishing or otherwise causing prejudice to a person on account of the person's race, religion, sex, ethnic origin, nationality or political opinions; or (b) where the thing requested is of insufficient importance to the investigation or could reasonably be obtained by other means; (c) there is also a general ground for refusal where it is contrary to public interest to provide the assistance sought. These grounds for refusal, and many others that you will find in section 20 of MACMA, will ensure that we only act in meritorious cases.

In addition to assessing whether any ground for refusal under section 20 may apply, under section 41 of MACMA, the Minister acts as a further check to ensure that the taking of any action is in the interests of the sovereignty, security or public order of Singapore.

Our courts act as a final safeguard, including where the request pertains to the obtaining of information or confiscation of property of persons in Singapore.

Under the MACMA, the court has to be satisfied that the relevant legal requirements are met. For instance, to obtain a production order for information in the possession of a financial institution, the court must be satisfied that:

(a) there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a person has carried on or benefited from a foreign offence;

(b) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the thing is likely to be of substantial value to the criminal matter, and is not subject to legal privilege; and

(c) it is not contrary to public interest for the thing to be produced or that access to it be given.

To summarise, Mr Speaker, Sir, MACMA contains robust safeguards, to ensure that assistance is provided only in meritorious cases, even as we seek to enhance our international criminal cooperation regime.

Sir, I will now deal with the specific queries from Mr Yip and Mr Parekh.

Mr Parekh's first query was how Singapore would streamline communication and operation procedures with foreign authorities.

Amending our laws and regulations would only go so far when interfacing with foreign authorities. Singapore regularly engages with our foreign counterparts, not only bilaterally, but also in multilateral and regional settings such as at FATF, the United Nations and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Singapore is also a member of informal networks, such as the Southeast Asia Justice Network, or SEAJust, which is a cooperation network that provides an informal platform facilitating direct contact and communication between central authorities for mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. As of 2024, there are 22 members to SEAJust, which go beyond those in Southeast Asia, such as Australia, China, France and the United States of America. Such international engagements and networks allow us to share with other countries our respective laws, procedures and practices, including amendments such as those being considered today. This in turn creates a better understanding of each other's requirements and facilitates assistance both ways.

Mr Yip and Mr Parekh asked how we cooperate with non-prescribed foreign countries, which are countries that we do not have a mutual legal assistance treaty with. Based on section 16 of the MACMA, we will require the country to give an undertaking of reciprocity and the same safeguards in the MACMA will apply to its request.

We also keep records of the foreign requests that we receive, including the undertakings that these countries provide. Thus far, we have not encountered a situation where a foreign country has refused to honour its undertakings.

Mr Yip further asked about what recourse is available to persons affected by a foreign request, such as a production order or an application to enforce a foreign confiscation order. For production orders, Mr Yip may wish to note that under our laws, the person required to comply with an order may contest the order. In the case of, for example, bank records to trace the movement of funds, the person or entity would be the bank. As for confiscation orders, section 30 of MACMA provides that the Court must be satisfied that the person affected by the foreign confiscation order would at least have had the opportunity to defend himself in a foreign court.

The Third Schedule of MACMA further provides that the Court is not to exercise its powers to realise property in Singapore unless a reasonable opportunity has been given to persons holding any interest in the property to make representations to the Court. In the same vein, our Bill will also provide that in cases where property is to be handed over to the requesting country, such persons must similarly be given a reasonable opportunity to make representations to the court.

Mr Speaker, this goes towards striking the right balance between privacy, confidentiality and transparency and our ability to provide international assistance to combat crime, which I have mentioned at the beginning of my reply.

Mr Yip also asked how the Government will ensure that sensitive information will be used only for its intended purpose. In a similar vein, Mr Parekh asked about the Attorney-General's powers and responsibilities in transmitting evidence to foreign authorities, along with safeguards for managing sensitive data.

Under the MACMA, foreign authorities must undertake that the information or thing requested will not be used for a matter other than the criminal matter in respect of which the request was made, except with the consent of the Attorney‑General. The Attorney-General may also request that the thing requested would be returned upon completion of the criminal matter. In the course of assessing the request, the Attorney-General would ensure that the relevant undertakings are provided. If they are not provided, the request would be refused.

Clause 8 of the Bill will give the Attorney-General more options to decide how a thing is to be handled or disposed of. For instance, where it pertains to digital information, the foreign authority may be required to delete the information when it is no longer required for the criminal matter. This provides Singapore with more options and greater control over the management of sensitive data, after it is handed over to the requesting authority.

Mr Yip asked about safeguards that protect residents from unjust foreign confiscation orders and proposed to implement a cap or stricter criteria for enforcing foreign confiscation orders.

I would first clarify that our foreign confiscation order regime would only affect assets located in Singapore and would not apply to assets located overseas. Next, I would reiterate that the MACMA contains robust safeguards, as well as stringent criteria – and I would also highlight that these are in line with international standards. These protect our citizens and our residents from any unjust foreign confiscation orders.

I do not think it would be advisable to introduce a cap on foreign confiscation orders, as this might lead to arbitrary results. Furthermore, FATF recommends that powers that are available to domestic competent authorities should also be available for use in response to requests for mutual legal assistance. In other words, parity is key and it would be difficult to justify why a cap should apply to foreign confiscation orders, especially if this could constrain international efforts against money laundering.

Once again, I thank the hon Members who have spoken and supported the Bill. In summary, this Bill is about strengthening our regime for international cooperation, and our trusts framework. It ensures, in line with our consistent approach for, prevention, detection and enforcement, that Singapore's processes for international cooperation remains relevant and effective, with robust safeguards, and that the misuse of trusts will be curtailed. Mr Speaker, with that, I beg to move.

3.18 pm

Mr Speaker: Are there any clarifications for Minister of State? I do not see any.

Question put, and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House.

The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. – [Mr Murali Pillai].

Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed.

Mr Speaker: Order. I propose to take a break now. I suspend the Sitting and will take the Chair at 3.40 pm.

Sitting accordingly suspended

at 3.21 pm until 3.40 pm.

Sitting resumed at 3.40 pm.

[Deputy Speaker (Mr Christopher de Souza) in the Chair]