Info-communications Media Development Authority (Amendment) Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

Mr Speaker: Minister for Digital Development and Information.

7.25 pm

The Senior Minister of State for Digital Development and Information (Mr Tan Kiat How) (for the Minister of Digital Development and Information): Mr Speaker, Sir, on behalf of the Minister for Digital Development and Information, I move that "The Bill be now read a Second time."

The Bill proposes amendments to the Info-communications Media Development Authority (IMDA) Act. Principally, the amendments align the regulatory framework for the media sector with that for the telecommunication sector. The Bill also makes related amendments to the Telecommunications Act.

Let me first set out the context of the Bill and how the proposed amendments fit within the broader regulatory frameworks. I will then bring Members through the two key amendments: firstly, those relating to the ownership and control of key media entities; and secondly, amendments that facilitate regulatory actions by IMDA, together with a number of administrative updates.

As the amendments are technical in nature, let me first set out the background and context. IMDA was established in 2016 through the IMDA Act. The observation then was that the lines between how content is produced, how it is carried and how it is consumed were starting to converge. IMDA was formed through the merger of the Info-communications Development Authority and the Media Development Authority to become the single regulator and industry developer for both the telecommunication and media sectors.

IMDA relies on the Telecommunications Act as the main legislation for the telecommunication sector. The Telecommunications Act covers the licensing of telecommunication systems and services, as well as competition and consumer interest matters.

Unlike the telecommunication sector, a few regulatory frameworks come together to form IMDA’s toolkit for the media sector. The Broadcasting Act and Newspaper and Printing Presses Act (NPPA) determine who is a broadcasting licensee or a holder of a newspaper permit respectively, and such entities may be specified as regulated persons under the IMDA Act and be subject to the competition and consumer protection framework within it.

Therefore, the proposed amendments under this Bill deal primarily with the IMDA Act, that is, the competition and consumer protection aspects of our regulatory framework for the media sector.

Let me now turn to the first set of amendments that relate to the ownership and control of key media entities, or regulated persons as referred to under the IMDA Act. The amendments look at the media market structure and practices. They aim to ensure fair competition and market conduct, and that consumers of media services are protected.

Sir, we care about who owns and controls regulated persons. These are companies that shape the information environment for our citizens, especially in the age of AI and disinformation.

Clause 9 of the Bill will replace the existing section 65 of the IMDA Act. The intent is to broaden IMDA’s oversight of ownership and control changes. Under the amended framework, changes in ownership or control that can allow any person to direct the actions of regulated persons will require IMDA’s prior approval. Specifically, this would apply where a person acquires 30% or more interest in a regulated person, obtains effective control over its operations, or takes over its media business as a going concern. The 30% threshold in the Bill serves as a benchmark for when someone would presumably have control over the entity’s decisions and operations. This is consistent with the 30% voting control level under the Monetary Authority of Singapore's Take-Over Code as well.

With this change, IMDA's approval would now be needed if an entity that is not a regulated person wishes to acquire 30% or more of our Pay TV operators, SingNet or StarHub Cable Vision, for example.

This requirement is in place today for the telecommunication sector, where acquisitions by any party, crossing certain thresholds, such as 30% ownership or control of key telecom entities require IMDA's prior approval. We are adopting this practice for the media sector.

I should add that under the Broadcasting Act and NPPA, a person must not become a substantial shareholder, which is defined in the Companies Act as having not less than 5% of the total votes attached to all voting shares in the company, a 12% controller or an indirect controller of a broadcasting company and newspaper company without the Minister’s prior approval. These 5% and 12% thresholds give the Government oversight and control over persons who have significant stakes in our media companies to ensure that these companies are not subject to undue influence.

The proposed change under the IMDA Act with the 30% controller threshold will add to these safeguards. IMDA will have the powers to assess such changes with additional market conduct and consumer protection considerations.

Let me now turn to the second set of amendments. Broadly, they consist of amendments to facilitate regulatory actions by IMDA and several administrative updates.

Clause 6 of the Bill empowers IMDA to issue directions for the purposes of maintaining fair and efficient market conduct or to safeguard consumers' interests by promoting fair, transparent and reliable provision of media services. Under the current Act, IMDA's powers to give directions to regulated persons is limited to cases where there is non-compliance with competition or consumer protection rules under the IMDA Act and the Telecom and Media Competition Code. However, there may be instances where actions of licensees may result in outcomes that are detrimental to consumers or undermine fair market competition, despite there being no breach of the IMDA Act or the Code.

Just to illustrate based on a past telecom sector example. It is unfair to you, as a consumer, if your provider abruptly changes the price or the terms and conditions of your subscription during the contractual lock-in period to your disadvantage. To protect consumers, IMDA prohibited such practices in 2015 and could do so quickly through a direction. IMDA subsequently formalised the requirements in the Code.

IMDA does not have such powers to act in this manner for the media sector. IMDA will need to first revise and reissue the Code of Practice before it can act. This takes time and consumers will be worse off during the interim period. With this amendment, IMDA can take similar quick and targeted actions for the media sector through the issuance of directions.

This Bill also makes a few other amendments that are administrative in nature.

First, the new section 65B introduced by clause 9 and the new section 71A introduced by clause 16 of the Bill enable IMDA to obtain specific information to support regulatory decisions. These information-gathering powers are to ascertain a person’s equity interests or voting power in a regulated person for the purposes of assessing ownership changes and gather information relating to the potential designation of a media service as an essential resource.

Second, clause 15 provides that the powers to order structural separation of a regulated person is vested in the Minister rather than IMDA. We recognise that a structural separation is a significant regulatory intervention and it is appropriate that a decision of this gravity is taken at the Ministerial level. This mirrors the existing position in the Telecommunications Act.

The basis for these powers is meant as a last resort, to eliminate barriers to competition created by the control of bottleneck media resources or the possession of significant market power, after existing and potential regulatory actions by IMDA are deemed to be ineffective to enhance competition and where the Minister is satisfied it is in the public's interest to issue a separation order.

Third, clause 3 updates the definition of parties who can be designated as regulated persons to address potential gaps. To illustrate, the current definition of “regulated person” in the IMDA Act covers a “newspaper company” for the purposes of section 65. A newspaper company is defined in the NPPA as a public company limited by shares in compliance with section 10, which provisions includes, among others, a requirement for all directors to be Singaporean citizens. This requirement was in place when the NPPA was enacted in 1974.

Sir, the media landscape has significantly evolved over the years. Other forms of corporate structures could similarly hold newspaper permits and their publications may have similar reach and influence, even if the entities do not fall within the narrow definition of a “newspaper company”, such as having Singaporean citizen-only directors. The updated definition will allow these entities to be captured as regulated persons.

On the broadcasting side, the current definition of a regulated person in the IMDA Act covers only holders of broadcasting licences. Structures, like business trusts, that hold broadcasting assets are not covered under the current definition. We are updating the definition to cover such trust structures. This is aligned with the approach for the telecommunication sector.

Fourth, clause 5 allows IMDA to approve documents prepared by a person other than IMDA as a code of practice or standard of performance for the media sector. This is a practice informed by our experience with the telecom sector, where international standards have been considered and adapted for setting relevant standards for Singapore, such as the use of standards by the International Telecommunications Union and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute for mobile handsets and terminals.

This is a practical, industry-friendly amendment. To illustrate, where there are already good industry standards developed by professional bodies or industry associations, IMDA would have powers to require compliance with these industry-developed standards. It avoids duplicate rule-making and it builds on industry buy-in because the rules are ones that industry itself has developed.

Fifth, in a similar spirit for our regulations to be practical, clause 9 of the Bill deems it sufficient for persons to notify IMDA, instead of seeking IMDA’s approval, for immaterial transactions to be set out in subsidiary legislation. The intention is to prescribe transactions which do not have an impact on equity interests or control of voting power held by shareholders of key media entities, for example, due to a transfer of shares between a corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary as part of a corporate restructuring. This amendment will lighten the regulatory burden and align the approach taken for the telecom sector.

Lastly, clause 18 makes related amendments to the Telecommunications Act itself. Sir, these are for alignment purposes. The amendments update drafting, terminology and cross-references so that the two Acts use consistent languages and terms.

In conclusion, Sir, the amendments in this Bill ensure that our regulatory frameworks remain relevant and align the good practices across the telecommunication and media sectors. Sir, I beg to move.

Question proposed.

Mr Speaker: Mr Sharael Taha.

7.39 pm

Mr Sharael Taha (Pasir Ris-Changi): Thank you, Mr Speaker, Sir. Mr Speaker, this Bill equips IMDA with significant preemptive and structural powers. The question before us is not whether these powers are needed but how we ensure they are exercised with clarity, with consistency and with proportionality. I rise in support of this Bill to strengthen competition, protect consumers and ensure that our media ecosystem remains fair, vibrant and resilient. As chairperson of the Government Parliamentary Committee (GPC) for Digital Development and Information, allow me to briefly summarise the GPC's approach towards this Bill.

Collectively, members of the GPC recognises the need for Singapore's regulatory framework to evolve alongside the growing convergence of digital platforms, telecommunications and media ecosystems. Our speeches will focus on three broad themes.

First, I will focus on ensuring that a stronger regulatory and preemptive powers are matched by stronger safeguards, greater proportionality and clearer regulatory frameworks. Second, Member Ms Jessica Tan will focus on strengthening fair competition, protecting consumers and ensuring that SMEs and local creators continue to have fair access to essential digital and media resources. And third, Dr Choo Pei Ling will focus on how market influence today increasingly arises through ecosystem dependencies, platforms and infrastructure, not just ownership alone, and why regulation must therefore become more forward-looking and structurally aware.

Taken together, we support empowering IMDA with the tools necessary to act decisively in a rapidly evolving digital landscape while ensuring these powers are exercised transparently, predictably and proportionately. And it is on this principle that I would like to begin my speech.

Let me start with a simple principle. When regulatory powers become broader, the guardrails must become clearer. This Bill introduces a significant expansion of IMDA's toolkit, pre-emptive directions, tighter ownership controls and even the ability, as a last resort, to restructure parts of the market. These are not incremental changes. These are structural tools that can shape the market itself.

So, we must ask three very practical questions, questions that any business investor or even members of the public would naturally ask. What triggers an intervention? How will decisions be explained clearly and consistently? And will uncertainty create a regulatory overhang that deters investment? Because in Singapore, one of our key strengths is that we are predictable, transparent and rules-based.

Investors are not afraid of regulation, but they need to understand the operating boundaries. They need the confidence that decisions are made consistently and not unpredictably. Therefore, I would encourage the Ministry to consider providing clearer guidelines and decision frameworks and ensuring transparent reasoning for major decisions and assurance that these powers are applied in a proportionate and consistent manner.

Mr Speaker, the second point is this; we must recognise the scale of the shift that this Bill represents. We are moving from regulating behaviour to shaping market structure itself or potentially shaping market itself. Traditionally, regulators act when something goes wrong, when there is a breach, when there is harm. Under this Bill, IMDA can act before harm occurs or even reshape ownership structures, where necessary. This is a fundamental shift from reactive enforcement to proactive market structure.

And with this shift, an important question arises. Is IMDA ready for this expanded role? Does it have sufficient data and market visibility to identify risk early? Does it have the economic modelling capability to assess long-term impact? And does it have the institutional strength to make, explain and defend these decisions, which will undoubtedly be legally challenged?

More importantly, how will IMDA strike the right balance between competition, innovation and media sustainability? Because in a small market, like Singapore, this balance is delicate. Too much intervention may discourage investment and innovation. Too little intervention may allow dominance to take root. The challenge is not choosing one over the other but balancing all three carefully.

Mr Speaker, I am also mindful that with stronger powers come questions, not specifically pertaining to this Bill but particularly around media independence, regulatory overreach and the role of the state. This Bill is definitely not about influencing editorial decisions. It is about addressing market power – who owns, who controls and whether others can compete fairly. The provisions on this Bill deal with ownership structures, access to resources and competitive conduct. They do not deal with editorial content or journalistic decisions.

In fact, we should recognise an important point – a more competitive and contestable media landscape can actually strengthen this ecosystem. Because when no single player dominates, there is greater diversity of voices, perspective and viewpoints. The objective here is to ensure that no one can control the market unfairly.

Mr Speaker, while the intent is sound, there are also assumptions behind this Bill that we should carefully test.

First, the assumption that market power can be clearly identified early. But in digital markets, conditions change very rapidly. Today's dominant player may not remain dominant tomorrow.

Second, the assumption that intervention will always lead to better outcomes. But markets respond, businesses adapt. Sometimes, the outcome may differ from what it was intended.

Thirdly, the assumption that more intervention necessarily leads to more competition. But over-intervention can sometimes reduce incentives to invest or innovate.

Therefore, while the powers in the Bill are necessary, their application must be disciplined, evidence-based and carefully calibrated.

Mr Speaker, let me illustrate why pre-emptive powers necessary, especially in Singapore's context. Imagine a digital platform widely used by Singaporeans to access news and content has just gained immense popularity all of a sudden. A small change is made to its recommendation algorithm. Some local publishers, especially the smaller, independent ones, suddenly become less visible. Their viewership drops significantly and within weeks, some may struggle to survive. But the time the harm is clearly visible and proven, it may already be irreversible. In a small market, like Singapore, once it is lost, it is very difficult to be rebuilt.

This is why in fast-moving digital markets, waiting for harm to occur is sometimes not an option. But equally, this example highlights why such powers must be exercised with clear thresholds, strong evidence and careful judgement.

Mr Speaker, let me now focus on three areas where further clarity will strengthen this Bill.

Under sections 59, 60A and 60B, the definitions of control and association are broad. This is important to prevent circumvention. However, there is also a risk that these definitions may over-capture legitimate business relationships, for example, a venture capital firm investing in multiple media companies or a strategic partnership by multiple firms without the intent to control or a collaborative ecosystem that supports innovation. So, the key question is: how will IMDA distinguish between genuine collaboration and hidden control?

To strengthen confidence, it will be helpful to provide clearer guidelines on safe harbour principles or clarify what constitutes effective control in practice and focus on substantive influence rather than technical relationships.

Under section 61A, IMDA can act in the public interest, even without a breach. This is forward-looking and necessary. But the concern is straightforward. How do we ensure preemptive action does not become premature action?

To address this, we may consider clear evidentiary thresholds, demonstration of credible and eminent risk, and the possibility of review mechanisms to reassess decisions over time. This ensures that the action is based on real risks, not just theoretical concerns.

Under section 69A, the Minister may order structural separation. This is one of the most powerful tools in the Bill and it must remain exactly what it was intended to be – a last resort. The Bill already provides that other measures must have failed or are likely to fail. But further clarity will strengthen the confidence. What constitutes failure of prior measures? How do we demonstrate that less intrusive options are insufficient? How do we ensure accountability in such decisions? Because once exercised, structural separation is difficult to reverse.

Mr Speaker, in closing, this Bill is necessary. It reflects a simple but important reality: that in today's digital age, market power can emerge quickly and sometimes, invisibly. If we wait too long, the damage may already be done. But with stronger power must come stronger responsibility. We must empower IMDA to act decisively, but we must also ensure it acts predictably and proportionately.

Ultimately, this Bill is not about controlling the media, it is about ensuring that no one controls the media unfairly. If we get this balance right, we will not only strengthen competition, we will strengthen trust, resilience and diversity in Singapore's ecosystem. I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Fadli Fawzi.

7.49 pm

Mr Fadli Fawzi (Aljunied): Mr Speaker, this Bill seeks to do three main things: one, enhance the provisions relating to fair and efficient market conduct and effective competition in the media industry so that they are aligned with that in the telecommunications industry; two, reduce the regulatory burdens on the media industry; and three, provide IMDA with additional powers.

The Bill is a necessary and timely update to harmonise regulations within a converging digital market.

While the direction of travel is broadly understandable, the Bill does grant the Government significant powers. Sir, I believe that there must be stronger safeguards that accompany such significant powers.

One change in the Bill is clause 15, which amends the law to vest the power to issue a separation order, which can require a company to restructure or divest parts of its business to address competition concerns, directly in the Minister rather than IMDA.

While it may align with the existing practices in the telecommunication industries to place such powers directly in the hand of the Minister, this also raises important questions about the concentration of decision-making authority within the hands of political officeholders.

Structural remedies are complex and technical. They have far-reaching implications for markets, investors and consumers. It is therefore important that such decisions are guided by clear objective criteria and that they be seen to do so.

The Bill does not currently require the detailed publication of reasons for such decisions. Without this, there may be concerns about transparency and predictability. Businesses need clarity on how decisions are made and the public needs confidence that such powers are exercised in a fair and consistent manner. We suggest that the Minister should make public a detailed reasoning behind a separation order before one is made.

Additionally, the Bill introduces a dual track appeal mechanism, allowing affected parties to seek reconsideration by the authority or appeal to the Minister. While this adds procedural flexibility, it does not address a broader structural concern – the absence of an independent appeals body which is not under the executive.

In other areas of competition law, appeals are heard by independent tribunals. This provides a layer of separation between the regulator and adjudicator, enhancing confidence in the system. Here, both the separation order and the appeal are issued and heard respectively by the executive. While there may be practical reasons for this arrangement, the Government should explain why an independent appeal mechanism is not being adopted, particularly given the increasing complexity of digital market regulation.

Sir, another area of concern relates to transparency. The Bill allows for certain regulatory determinations, such as the designation of dominant players to be communicated through private notifications rather than public gazetting. While this may streamline administration, it reduces public visibility into how market power is assessed and regulated.

In sectors as critical as media and telecommunications, transparency is not merely a procedural matter. It is the cornerstone of public trust. Consumers, competitors and investors all benefit from understanding who holds significant market power and how that power is being managed. The Government should, therefore, clarify how it intends to balance efficiency with transparency in implementing these provisions. How will we ensure that the relationship between the regulator and the companies does not become even more opaque and hidden from public view?

The Bill also introduces broad concepts, such as control and essential resources, which underpin many of its new powers. While flexibility is useful in a fast-moving digital landscape, overly broad definitions may create uncertainty. Businesses may find it difficult to assess whether routine commercial arrangements fall within the regulatory scope.

Similarly, the category of regulated persons can be expanded by the Minister. These raises questions about how emerging digital platforms, such as streaming services, will be treated. Clear guidance will be important to ensure that regulation remains targeted and proportionate, without inadvertently discouraging innovation or investment.

The Bill is also framed as promoting competition. Yet in practice, Singapore's media landscape has long been characterised by structural concentration, particularly in sectors, such as free-to-air broadcasting and print. The Bill clearly strengthens the regulatory tools available to the Government to structure the media industry to promote competition. However, these additional powers granted to the Government by the Bill should not inadvertently result in the further erosion of media pluralism.

For example, the expansion of merger controls to any person acquiring a 30% stake in clause 3 gives the Government a virtual veto over the financing of media entities. How will the Government reassure Singaporeans that the expanded merger controls will not be used to block legitimate investment in independent or alternative media platforms?

Sir, the Bill affords the Government with a broad swathe of discretionary powers to regulate the industry. Such discretionary power cannot be left unchecked. We need clear statutory safeguards to ensure these powers are exercised fairly, transparently and in the public interest. However, notwithstanding my clarifications, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Yip Hon Weng.

7.55 pm

Mr Yip Hon Weng (Yio Chu Kang): Mr Speaker, Sir, I declare that I work in a global investment firm that owns assets in the media industry.

We debate this Bill at a critical juncture in the global digital landscape, where infrastructure, platforms and data are increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few. For a small, open nation, like Singapore, our media landscape is not just an industry. It is a strategic asset. It is where our national stories are told, where perspectives are shaped and where trust is built. A market dominated by a single player is not merely an economic risk. It is a vulnerability to our social resilience.

I support this Bill. It is a necessary step to strengthen competition, align our media framework with the telecommunications sector and equip IMDA with the tools to act when markets do not function well.

But the power to intervene is also the power to reshape an industry. To ensure these powers deliver real benefits to Singaporeans without unintended consequences, I seek clarifications in three areas: affordability, worker protection and opportunities for smaller players.

First, Mr Speaker, Sir, affordability. Heartland families today are navigating rising cost-of-living pressures. If media markets are not truly competitive, the consumer ultimately pays through bundling, limited choice and rising subscription costs. Competition policy must not just rearrange ownership. It must reduce prices that families actually feel.

The Bill strengthens IMDA's powers over market conduct and structure. Under section 61A, IMDA may issue directions to ensure fair and efficient market conduct. But how will these interventions translate into tangible price relief for the average family?

Next, I note and support the effort under section 65 to reduce regulatory burden by exempting certain immaterial transactions from prior approval. However, for major acquisitions, approvals remain necessary. This is a significant shift as approval is now required regardless of whether the acquiring party is a media entity or not.

Can the Minister elaborate on how IMDA will assess such acquisitions, particularly where new entrants may bring innovation and capital but are not traditional media players? Can the Minister also clarify how IMDA will ensure that approval processes remain timely and predictable so that we do not inadvertently deter investments that could lower costs through innovation and scale?

Further, under section 65A, IMDA has powers to require the disposal of shares or the relinquishment of control. These are significant interventions that may carry legal and operational costs. Can the Minister assure this House that such powers will be exercised judiciously and that any resulting costs will not ultimately be passed on to consumers?

Finally, under section 69A, the Minister may order the structural separation of a regulated entity. While this can promote competition, it may also reduce economies of scale and increase duplication of costs. I note that this power is vested in the Minister rather than IMDA, given the significant impact of such decisions. Can the Minister elaborate on how this higher threshold of decision-making will be exercised and what considerations will guide such interventions?

How does the Ministry evaluate the trade-off between fostering competition and preserving efficiency so that affordability for households is not compromised? If competition improves on paper but prices do not fall, residents will not feel the benefit. A competitive market must also be an affordable market.

Second, Mr Speaker, Sir, worker protection. Our media industry is powered by people: journalists, producers, technicians and increasingly, freelancers. While I acknowledge that employment protections fall under the Employment Act and the Ministry of Manpower (MOM) guidelines, the interventions in this Bill can have real and immediate consequences for workers.

Under section 69A, a separation order may require the transfer of business to another entity. Such restructuring can create uncertainty for employees. Can the Minister clarify how IMDA will work with MOM and unions to ensure that workers affected by such changes are adequately supported and that transitions are managed fairly?

Further, under section 65A, IMDA may direct the disposal of business units. Has the Government assessed the potential employment impact of such interventions? Will considerations of workforce stability form part of the broader public interest assessment?

Beyond immediate restructuring, I would also like to understand the longer-term effects. In an environment where structural interventions are possible, firms may adopt a more cautious approach to long-term workforce commitments. While formal employment protections apply, the practical response may still be a preference for leaner organisational structures and more flexible staffing models. Will increased competition in this sector lead to better jobs, or more fragmented and less secure employment?

A more competitive market must also be a more secure job market. A healthy market must also be one that provides stability and dignity for workers.

Third, Mr Speaker, Sir, the impact on local small media players and freelancers. These independent creators are vital to innovation, diversity and the vibrancy of our media ecosystem. While the Bill is rightly targeted at regulated entities and anti-competitive conduct, I seek clarification on whether there may be indirect compliance implications for smaller players who interact with these entities.

The Bill introduces detailed definitions of control and associate under sections 59 and 60B. These are structured around equity interests and defined relationships. However, given that they include arrangements and coordinated actions, can the Minister clarify how IMDA will ensure that ordinary commercial collaborations, especially among smaller players, are not inadvertently captured?

I also note that the definition of regulated persons has been expanded to close potential gaps, including for entities structured through trusts or other arrangements. Can the Minister clarify how this expanded scope will be applied in practice, particularly to avoid unintended capture beyond key media entities?

Further, under sections 65B and 71A, IMDA is empowered to require information from any person for investigative purposes. While necessary for enforcement, can the Minister assure that these powers will be exercised proportionately, particularly where smaller businesses or individuals are involved?

I am also concerned about barriers to entry. If compliance requirements become complex or uncertain, smaller players may feel compelled to incur legal costs simply to ensure they remain compliant. While the Bill reduces burden for certain pro-forma transactions, it also expands investigative and compliance powers. Can the Minister clarify how, on balance, this results in a net reduction of regulatory burden, particularly for smaller and emerging players? If regulation becomes too complex, it risks disproportionately favouring larger players with greater compliance resources.

I also note that IMDA may approve documents prepared by third parties as Codes of Practice. Can the Minister clarify how IMDA will ensure that such externally developed standards remain robust, transparent and aligned with public interest, particularly where industry interests are involved? Regulation should be a ladder for growth, not a hurdle to entry.

In conclusion, Mr Speaker, Sir, this Bill is a necessary evolution of our regulatory framework. In an age of global media consolidation, we must have the tools to ensure that our market remains fair, competitive and resilient.

But residents will not judge this Bill by its legal provisions. They will judge it by outcomes. Will media remain affordable? Will jobs remain stable? Will opportunities remain open to new and diverse voices?

While this Bill focuses on market structure and not content, we should recognise that in the media sector, structure and trust are closely related. As we strengthen regulatory powers, it is important that confidence in editorial independence and the diversity of voices continues to be maintained.

Residents do not consume regulation. They experience outcomes in their bills, in their jobs and in their opportunities. If we strengthen control over the market without delivering clear improvements in affordability, jobs and opportunities, we risk building a system that is more regulated, but not necessarily better for Singaporeans.

Let us ensure that as we reshape our media industry, we deliver not just stronger rules, but better outcomes for families, for workers and for the next generation of creators. Mr Speaker, Sir, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Andre Low.

8.05 pm

Mr Low Wu Yang Andre (Non-Constituency Member): Mr Speaker, the Workers' Party does not dispute the administrative case for this Bill. The IMDA already regulates both the media and telecommunications sectors. Drawing on a common framework across both is defensible on efficiency grounds and harmonisation grounds. We accept that.

But the argument goes further than that, because digital delivery has converged, because newspapers and broadcasters now reach audiences over the same networks as telephone companies, the Government says that they should be subject to the same regulatory powers.

I find this difficult to accept this prima facie without deeper scrutiny. The delivery mechanism may be shared, but the nature of what is being regulated is not.

The Bill introduces three significant new powers: a proactive directions regime under the new section 61A, an ownership approval regime under the new section 65 and the Ministerial separation order under new section 69A. My concern is this: this Bill may not be about the media landscape as it exists today. It is about the one that has not yet arrived – a future where genuinely independent media may grow in reach and maturity. And my fear is that this Bill is written to foreclose that future before it has the chance to arrive.

Mr Speaker, the case for regulating telecommunications carrier ownership rests on a concrete fear. The infrastructure – cables, spectrum, exchange points – this is neutral. If a single actor controls it, others are locked out. Regulating ownership is proportionate to that.

Press regulation is different. Newspapers and broadcasters make editorial choices: what to investigate, what to publish, whose voice to amplify. The power to shape public discourse is categorically different from the power to route a data packet.

A press regulation regime needs press safeguards, editorial independence on the face of the statute, so that the regime cannot reach what a publication chooses to investigate or publish.

Plurality conditions on ownership approvals designed to protect diversity of voice. Higher proportionality when restricting a press entity than a telecommunications operator. Independent review on the merits when a media entity is singled out by the executive. Transparency around designations. This Bill contains little of these. It takes the structural toolkit or design for network operators – ownership approvals, proactive directions, separation orders – and applies it to entities that produce speech.

Mr Speaker, the Government is likely to say that this Bill is about promoting competition. In fact, they have. Let me examine that framing. Our two major media companies today, SPH Media Trust and Mediacorp, are both Government-linked. Both already within the Government's orbit, whether it is formally or informally. Extending regulatory powers over entities already in that orbit makes little sense and does not meaningfully change the competitive dynamics.

The more significant read of this Bill, and my read, is that this is a pre-emptive measure, not about managing existing players, it is about ensuring that no new actor, perhaps a well-capitalised private investor or a media group with genuine editorial independence, can build a meaningful presence outside the Government's reach.

Think of Apple Daily in Hong Kong, or the Washington Post, both funded by individuals with deep pockets of their own and strong political convictions. Jimmy Lai and Jeff Bezos are not politically neutral figures, but their convictions were their own, not the Government's. That is precisely what made their publications independently powerful. They could ask hard questions without needing permission from whoever held office.

The designation power in section 59(1) is the instrument for pre-empting that possibility here. The Minister can designate any newspaper publisher or broadcaster as a "regulated person" on no published criteria and bring the full weight of this regime to bear. Singapore does have independent media that falls outside the state's orbit.

Among them is Jom, founded in 2022. It publishes long-form journalism on Singapore's society, politics and policy. As of October last year, it had around 8,000 paying subscribers. I am one of them. It is not funded by advertising or any Government-linked body. It scrapes by because readers choose to pay for serious journalism. It has yet to flourish. It remains small.

Jom is an online publication. On a wide reading, it may well fall within the scope of this Bill. If Jom were ever designated under section 59, all three new powers would apply. Any investor acquiring 30% or more of Jom would need IMDA's prior approval. IMDA could issue proactive directions to Jom on "public interest" grounds left undefined in the statute, with no proportionality test and consultation waivable at IMDA's discretion. And the Minister could order its business transferred to another entity – with compensation the Minister determines, subject to no independent review on the merits.

This Bill is not written for Jom as it stands today. It is written for what Jom, or another publication like it, might become in 10 years. A publication with the reach to shape conversations, to hold power to account, and to be read by Singaporeans because it has earned their trust.

That is the future that I fear this Bill is designed to foreclose. A future where Singapore has a genuinely independent press – publications that owe their survival to the readers, not to the goodwill of any government and that can ask hard questions of whoever holds power, including us. So if this is not the Bill's intent, I urge the Government to clarify.

Mr Speaker, the Bill's three new powers rest on a common foundation: designation. Under section 59(1), the Minister may designate any newspaper publisher or broadcasting licensee as a "regulated person" and then bringing it within the scope of all three powers. The Minister selects who is regulated, at their discretion. The selection is the gateway to everything that follows.

First, section 61A – proactive directions. The IMDA may issue proactive directions to regulated persons to ensure fair market conduct, effective competition and simply, "in the public interest". That last ground is left undefined, and a direction under that section may require a regulated person to do or refrain from doing anything specified. There is no limit on subject matter in the text. Consultation may be waived whenever IMDA considers it "not practicable or desirable". There is no proportionality requirement and no obligation to give written reasons.

During the consultation process on this Bill, two law firms filed responses on these gaps. Their concerns have not been substantially addressed.

Moving on, section 65, ownership approvals. Any person acquiring 30% or more of a regulated media company now requires IMDA's prior approval. The definitions of "control" and "associate" are broad, capturing informal arrangements, oral agreements and trusts. There are no materiality thresholds. A standard minority investor protection is treated the same as an acquisition of effective control. The chilling effect on investment in small, independent publications is not incidental to this drafting. It is a foreseeable consequence.

And finally, the "nuclear" option, a separation order in section 69. The Minister may compel a media company to transfer its entire business to another entity. Compensation is discretionary. The Minister "may" award it, not "must". It may be denied entirely if the Minister finds that anti-competitive conduct took place – a finding the Minister also makes. The separation order is also final.

So, there is one decision-maker, at every stage, on every question. No independent check on the merits of any of it. When we debated the Online Safety (Relief and Accountability) Act last year, I raised a structurally similar concern. In that Bill, the powers at least sat with a statutory Commissioner, not a Minister. I proposed an appeal to the High Court on three limited grounds. The Government declined.

The same structural choice, or at least a similar one, appears here: compulsory restructuring of a media businesses, with the Minister at every decision point and no appeal on the merits available to any Court.

The powers inscribed in this Bill will not belong to this Government alone. They sit on the books for every future Government, every future Minister, in every future Parliament. Parliament should ask itself whether it is comfortable with that, whoever holds power.

Mr Speaker, let me explain the mechanism by which this Bill forecloses the future I described. Without a single direction ever being issued, without a single separation ever being ordered. These powers do not need to be exercised to do their work.

A rational investor who wants to fund serious, independent journalism in Singapore, they will read this Bill and they will ask, "Can IMDA issue a direction to this publication on public interest grounds? I cannot define in advance and with no proportionality test and no written reasons and no independent appeal on the merits."

The answer appears to be yes. Can the Minister order the business transferred determining compensation unilaterally on the finding of anti-competitive conduct that the Minister himself also makes? If the entity is designated, again, yes.

At that point, investment does not happen. The newsroom does not expand, the publication does not grow. And this is how unconstrained statutory powers work. They do not need to be exercised, they only need to exist in plain language for any investor doing a risk assessment to conclude: not here, not now, not under these conditions.

IMDA acknowledged the weight of this in its own 2022 consultation note. It stated that structural separation requirements may impose significant costs and should only be exercised in very exceptional circumstances. Senior Minister of State Tan has also assured us today that this would be used as a matter of last resort. The proof will be in its application.

So, I have six questions for the Senior Minister of State.

First, on designation. Section 59 allows the Minister to designate any newspaper publisher or broadcasting licensee as a regulated person on no published criteria. What criteria will the Government use to determine which entities are designated? Will these criteria be published before any designation is made? And will the same criteria apply equally to Government-linked and independently owned entities?

Second, and related, on the scope of designation. A regulated person under section 59 includes the holder of a broadcasting licence. I would like the Minister to clarify if this reaches social media companies, including large foreign players with a local presence? Furthermore, would blogs, social media accounts, podcasts and so on, be covered? If so, will the Government publish the criteria that would govern such designation?

Third, on "in the public interest". Section 61A permits IMDA to issue proactive directions simply in the public interest. The term is undefined. Will the Minister commit to publishing criteria for when this ground will be invoked?

Fourth, on transferee selection. When the Minister issues a separation order under 69A, the Minister may direct transfer to a separate entity which need not be an independent media entity. Given the structure of Singapore's media market, the realistic candidates for transference are today, Government-linked bodies. What constraints govern the choice of transferee? Can the Minister confirm that the compulsorily separated media business will not be directed to a Government-linked entity without the agreement of the regulated person?

Fifth, on compensation. Compensation under section 69A is discretionary. It may be denied entirely if the Minister finds anti-competitive conduct under section 69A, a finding that the Minister makes themselves, having already ordered the separation. What principles govern this determination of compensation and what safeguards exist to, against the finding being used to deny compensation to an entity whose business the Minister has already compelled, to transfer?

Six, and finally, on the newspaper permit. Following separation, the new entity must reapply for a newspaper permit under section 69A, 3B(2). The existing permit does not automatically transfer. The Government decides whether to grant the new one. Can the Minister confirm that a permit will not be withheld from an entity that has already been compulsorily separated under Ministerial Order, and will there be published criteria governing when the permit application following separation may be refused?

Mr Speaker, I earlier said I hope for a day when Singapore has a genuinely independent press of scale and stature. That day has not come, but the conditions that will make it possible are things that Singapore can build. It will not happen automatically. It will only happen if we make deliberate choices to build safeguards into our legislative architecture and not simply rely on the goodwill of whoever holds office.

That is why I hope that the Senior Minister of State can give us reassurance today that this Bill is intended to build regulatory architecture for the press that is designed to make a future of independent trusted journalism more reachable and not to close it off before it has the chance to arrive.

Mr Speaker: Dr Choo Pei Ling.

8.20 pm

Dr Choo Pei Ling (Chua Chu Kang): Mr Speaker, this Infocomm Media Development Authority (Amendment) Bill responds to a structural shift already underway: the convergence of broadcasting digital platforms and telecommunications.

At one level, this is a technical update to thresholds, approvals and enforcement tools. But at a deeper level it is about how Singapore regulates market power in a system where influence is increasingly exercised through dependency, not just ownership. That distinction matters because in a converged digital ecosystem, control does not always appear at the point of acquisition. It can accumulate quietly through minority stakes, infrastructure dependencies and control over distribution systems that sit beneath what consumers actually see and once embedded, these structures are difficult to reverse. Mr Speaker, in Mandarin.

(In Mandarin): The media regulation we face today is undergoing a crucial shift. In the past, we understood market structure primarily through the lens of "who owns the company." However, in today's digital ecosystem, influence often stems not from ownership itself, but from "dependencies" within the system.

When a platform, infrastructure, or data distribution channel becomes irreplaceable, market power may already be concentrated within the system, even without obvious monopolistic practices. Therefore, the key shift in regulatory thinking is: not just looking at "who owns," but identifying "who is becoming irreplaceable" earlier. If we only intervene after problems emerge, we often miss the opportunity to adjust the structure.

(In English): I support the extension of IMDAs prior approval requirement to any acquisition crossing the 30% threshold in regulated media entities, including non-licensees. This reflects a necessary recognition that market influence today is not confined within sectoral boundaries. Capital is cross-platform, strategy is ecosystem-based and influence can be indirect but still structurally significant.

The key implementation question is this: how will IMDA distinguish between capability-enhancing investment, competitive concentration risk and longer-term dependency creation within the ecosystem? These effects are often not separable at the point of approval; they emerge over time.

Mr Speaker, the transfer of structural separation powers to the Minister is a significant institutional design choice. This is not routine competition enforcement. It is an exceptional intervention that can reshape market structure itself. The question is therefore not only about authority but about regulatory signalling.

Will the Ministry set out broad guiding principles on when structural separation is considered appropriate? Not to constrain discretion, but to strengthen predictability in a domain where investment confidence depends on clarity of risk boundaries.

On the reconsideration mechanism, I note the "either-or" structure between IMDA reconsideration and Ministerial appeal. Could the Ministry clarify the policy intent behind this design? Is the primary objective speed, finality, or avoidance of parallel processes? Because the structure of review pathways ultimately shapes how regulatory legitimacy is perceived, not just how quickly decisions are resolved.

The Bill adopts broad, technology-neutral definitions of "control" and "essential resource". That is appropriate in a rapidly evolving environment. But flexibility must still be operationally legible.

Would the Ministry consider issuing illustrative guidance, not fixed thresholds, but examples of what constitutes material influence in practice and what types of infrastructure or systems may be treated as essential resources in a converged media ecosystem? Because interpretability affects not only compliance, but also investment timing and market entry decisions.

Finally, tighter approval requirements will inevitably affect transaction timelines. That is a trade-off the system is making.

In that context, would the Ministry consider over time, publishing non-binding guidance or anonymised aggregated decision patterns, particularly around recurring assessment factors and common risk indicators?

This would not reduce discretion, but it would improve predictability where regulatory patterns are already structurally consistent. Mr Speaker, in Mandarin, "竞争让市场保持活力，但真正让系统长期稳定的，是信任与透明。两者缺一不可。" (In English): "Competition keeps the market dynamic, but what truly ensures the long-term stability of the system is trust and transparency. Both are indispensable."

Mr Speaker, Singapore is now managing a new form of concentration risk, not only in ownership structures, but in dependency relationships embedded across platforms, infrastructure and digital distribution systems.

Regulation must therefore do two things at once: remain firm enough to intervene early and remain clear enough for good actors to navigate confidently. That balance between firmness and legibility is what this Bill begins to strengthen. I support this Bill.

Mr Speaker: Dr Hamid Razak.

8.27 pm

Dr Hamid Razak (West Coast-Jurong West): Mr Speaker, Sir, I rise in support of the IMDA (Amendment) Bill.

This Bill strengthens fair and efficient market conduct and effective competition in the media industry, reduces regulatory burden in prescribed areas, provides IMDA with additional powers and align certain provisions with the Telecommunications Act. In plain terms, it strengthens oversight of ownership control and strengthens IMDA's ability to act when market conduct harms competition or consumers.

Mr Speaker, Sir, my first point is that harmonising media and telecommunications regulation is no longer merely administrative. It is now a policy necessity. In the past, telecommunications could be understood as infrastructure and carriage.

Media was understood as content and publishing, but today consumers do not experience them separately. A citizen watches news, entertainment and commentary over data networks. Digital platforms operate across both infrastructure and content ecosystems, and a small number of major gatekeepers can influence both access and visibility.

In such an environment, if our frameworks remain too fragmented, we create uneven rules for functionally similar activity that can encourage regulatory arbitrage, where firms structure themselves to exploit gaps between regimes rather than compete on service quality, innovation and value.

The Bill's effort to bring media competition and conduct provisions closer to the telco model is therefore a necessary response to technological convergence.

In this regard, can the Minister clarify how IMDA will ensure consistent principles across telecommunications and media competition regulation while still accounting for the media sector's distinct public interest considerations?

Mr Speaker, Sir, my second point concerns media ownership and control, and why it matters. The Bill strengthens IMDA's framework around ownership, control and regulated persons, including powers linked to controllers and essential resources. It also tightens oversight of significant controls and transactions, including where a party crosses key voting control thresholds.

This matters because media ownership is never just a corporate matter. It affects the diversity of voices, the resilience of public discourse and the range of perspectives available to citizens in a small and highly connected media market like Singapore's, concentration of ownership or opaque influence can have outsized effects. So, when we review ownership rules, we are asking a wider societal question. How do we preserve a media environment that remains trusted, diverse and resilient in an age of consolidation and digital concentration?

For the ordinary citizen, this is not abstract. It affects whether one receives information from a range of credible sources or from an ecosystem that is overly shaped by a few dominant actors. It affects whether media remains plural enough to support informed citizenship and it affects whether public trust in information ecosystems can be maintained. In that sense, stronger ownership safeguards are not only about control. They are about protecting the quality of the information space that citizens inhabit every single day.

At the same time, these powers must be exercised with clarity and discipline. In a globalised environment, the framework must be robust without becoming unnecessarily rigid. The objective is to guard against harmful concentration and opaque influence, while allowing legitimate investment, innovation and sectoral development.

Mr Speaker, Sir, my third point relates to the public impact of anti-competitive conduct, which the Bill seeks to address more effectively. When markets become concentrated, or when certain players can unfairly leverage control over essential resources, harm flows directly to our citizens. Anti-competitive conduct can lead to fewer choices, weaker incentives to innovate, poorer service quality and higher costs over time. It can also create barriers for smaller or newer players, reducing dynamism and entrenching incumbents.

The Bill gives IMDA stronger tools to intervene in relation to market conduct and essential resources in the media industry.

Competition policy is not merely about punishing bad behaviour. It is about preserving healthy market conditions so that consumers are not disadvantaged by structural imbalances. And in the media space, competition issues are not just economic. They can shape who gets distribution, whose content reaches audiences and which firms survive. In other words, competition shapes openness.

On the new power to issue directions for fair and efficient market conduct, can the Senior Minister of State clarify what procedural safeguards will apply where practicable, such as notice, representations and review avenues, so that speed is balanced with due process?

Mr Speaker, Sir, I would add that the success of these powers will depend on how transparently and consistently they are applied. Industry players will need clear signals about the thresholds, obligations and enforcement expectations. The public, too, should be able to see that these interventions are designed not to over-regulate, but to preserve fairness, openness and resilience in a converged digital landscape. With these observations, Mr Speaker, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr Patrick Tay.

8.33 pm

Mr Patrick Tay Teck Guan (Pioneer): Mr Speaker, Sir, I rise to speak on the IMDA (Amendment) Bill. I declare my interest as Assistant Secretary-General of the National Trades Union Congress (NTUC).

The Labour Movement welcomes this Bill. Stricter merger approval requirements, clearer direction powers for IMDA against anti-competitive conduct and a more coherent framework as our telecoms, broadcasting and newspaper sectors converge are timely and important. I support the intent of the Bill. And I would like to raise three areas where we can strengthen the worker dimension so that the sector remains competitive, while our workers and PMEs have confidence through change.

Under this Bill, IMDA must give prior approval before any party acquires a 30% or larger stake in a regulated media company. That prior-approval gate is also the right point to look beyond market structure and ask what the transaction could mean for the workers and workforce impacted and affected.

Major consolidation in the infocomm and media sector often comes with restructuring, role rationalisation and changes to how work is organised. In this sector, many of these job roles are undertaken by professionals, managers and executives (PMEs). They include engineers, operators, content and production professionals and thus the impact on livelihoods can be significant.

MOM’s Labour Market Report for 2025 identified information and communications as one of the sectors where resident employment declined in 2025, even as Singapore’s economy grew more than 5%. This is why worker confidence and timely support matter in any major sector restructuring.

It is important that the powers in this Bill are exercised in ways that are pro-competition and pro-worker, so that a "market win" does not become a "social loss". In that spirit, can the Minister consider whether IMDA’s assessment framework should formally incorporate workforce impact alongside market competition impact? This is particularly important as in the course of consolidation, employees may be moved to a different employing entity involving changes to their roles and job scope when the new parent group's competitive model is built on doing more with fewer people.

Singapore’s labour management relations are stable and our tripartite framework has served us well. My ask is that we extend that spirit more deliberately into sector consolidation processes so that where livelihoods are affected, issues, like collective agreement continuity and union representation, are addressed early, and the workers' voice remains present.

In this spirit, I have three questions which I hope the Senior Minister of State can address.

First, how does the Government intend for IMDA to consider workforce impact as part of merger assessments, and can tripartite partners have a formal role in significant transactions?

Second, will the Government develop clear guidelines, in consultation with MOM and NTUC, on collective agreement continuity, union recognition and representation where consolidations or structural separations result in workers moving to a new employing entity especially if only the property is transferred to a new entity under section 69A(3)(a)(ii), and the workers have to move as well?

Third, would the Government consider putting in place a formal tripartite platform for the infocomm and media sector, so that the workforce issues arising from restructuring and consolidation can be addressed early and systematically?

The Labour Movement stands ready to work with the Government and industry as a constructive partner. We are not asking to oppose change but for clarity, contemporaneous communication, equitability and assurance so that impacted workers will not be left behind. In short, a fair and just transition. I hope today's debate helps move us in that right direction. Mr Speaker, Sir, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Ms Jessica Tan.

8.37 pm

Ms Jessica Tan Soon Neo (East Coast): Mr Speaker, this Bill is fundamentally about updating our regulatory framework so that the oversight of the media sector is aligned with clearer, more established competitive safeguards that has guided the telecom sector for years. I support this Bill because it will help Singapore keep pace with how quickly the digital and media world is evolving.

Today, the services we rely on – our mobile plans, streaming platforms, online news and even everyday communication apps – are deeply interconnected. This Bill modernises the media framework through several important updates: the new section 61A, which gives IMDA stronger and earlier intervention powers; expanded definitions in section 2 to capture modern, non-shareholding forms of influence; the new section 72A, which requires mandatory approval when an acquirer crosses the 30% ownership threshold; and the new section 69A, which empowers the Minister to order structural separation in serious cases of entrenched dominance.

These changes recognise that influence in today’s media environment no longer comes only from equity stakes. It increasingly arises from data access, exclusive content arrangements, platform prioritisation and algorithmic control. The Bill ensures that IMDA has the tools to address these realities in a fair and future-ready way.

A key thrust of this Bill is strengthening fair competition. The amendments in section 2 broadens the definitions of "arrangement", "control" and "essential resources" so IMDA can act when a company uses its position – formally or informally – to block others from entering the market.

This matters, because in the digital world, dominance can form very quickly. A platform can become the default choice for millions almost overnight. Clearer rules help ensure that competition remains healthy and that companies compete on quality and innovation, and not locking others out. The Bill ensures that no single player can accumulate influence in the ways that reduces competition or harm consumers, keeping the market open, diverse and competitive.

This has real implications for everyday Singaporeans. More families now depend on digital services from news consumption to seniors staying connected, children learning online and households streaming entertainment. When one company becomes too dominant, consumers may face higher prices, fewer choices, weaker service quality and unfair practices like being locked into bundles or platforms.

Section 72A ensures that large acquisitions cannot take place quietly or without scrutiny, it requires IMDA's approval once a party crosses the 30% ownership threshold, thus preventing companies from using control over key digital or media resources to limit choice or raise barriers for others.

While this Bill does not set new standards for service quality or reliability, section 61A allows IMDA to intervene early if anti-competitive conduct threatens the continuity or reliable provision of media services.

SMEs and local creators are vital to our media and digital ecosystem. They bring fresh ideas, local stories and innovative services but often face higher barriers when competing with large platforms.

The new section 61A strengthens fair access to essential resources, such as content libraries, distribution platforms and advertising inventories. It empowers IMDA to issue directions to ensure non-discriminatory access and prevents any player from using control as an essential resource to block competitors. This means that smaller players cannot be denied access or priced out simply because a large competitor controls a key resource.

When SMEs can access essential resources fairly, they are more willing to experiment, invest and innovate. This leads to more diverse content, more home-grown digital services and more opportunities for local talent.

Mr Speaker, while the Bill is timely and necessary, there are areas that require further clarity.

The Bill strengthens IMDA’s regulatory toolkit through section 61A on early intervention, broader definitions under section 2, mandatory approval for acquisitions at the 30% threshold in section 72A, and the new section 69A on structural separation. These powers are necessary to address modern forms of influence in a converged media digital environment. But at the same time, the breadth of these powers mean that clear guidance and transparent processes will be essential to avoid over-correction, ensure business certainty and to maintain a pro-innovation environment.

So, while the expanded definitions in section 2 are important to capture modern forms of influence, their breadth does introduce risks. Companies and investors may become overly cautious about partnerships and innovative business models, for fear of inadvertently triggering regulatory scrutiny. Routine commercial arrangements may be perceived as falling within scope, increasing compliance costs and slowing investment decisions. Clear guidance on how these definitions will be applied in practice will help maintain a pro-innovative environment.

Section 69A, which gives the Minister authority to order structural separation, is a powerful remedy – and I am glad that the Senior Minister of State had also raised this point and said that it would be a power that would be used as last resort. But even if it is rarely used, the existence of this power may affect investment decisions if criteria are unclear. Clarity on the circumstances under which structural separation may be considered will give industry confidence that it will be used proportionately and predictably.

Mr Speaker, this Bill strengthens competition in concrete ways. It protects consumers and supports SMEs and local creators. It reinforces a fair, open and diverse digital environment. At the same time, increased oversight always carries the risk of over correction if applied too broadly. This Bill itself does not restrict innovation. In fact, by preventing harmful consolidation and ensuring fair access to essential resources, it helps create an open and competitive environment that innovation depends on. But clear guidance from IMDA will be important to ensure that these expanded powers truly support innovation rather than inadvertently discouraging it. I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Mr David Hoe.

8.45 pm

Mr David Hoe (Jurong East-Bukit Batok): Mr Speaker, Sir, I am speaking in support of the IMDA (Amendment) Bill. While this Bill might appear technical, it matters because media is not just another industry. It shapes what people see. It shapes what they know. It shapes who they trust and also how we understand one another as a society.

I do not intend to speak on every single clause in this Bill but I wish to focus on three specific areas: first, whether preventing excessive concentration of control will also help to facilitate new entrance and create jobs; second, whether the new powers will be exercised with sufficient clarity and predictability, so that Singapore remains trusted and investable; and third, whether fairer market conditions will translate to better outcomes for consumers.

My first point is on aspirations and employment. A media ecosystem that is open and contestable should, in principle, create more opportunities. But this Bill does not directly create those opportunities. Rather, it seeks to prevent a market structure where opportunities become too concentrated in the hands of a few dominant players.

This is important because when the market becomes too concentrated, smaller firms might find it harder to enter, new ideas may struggle to find distribution and our young workers might find fewer employers to choose from. Workers would then have fewer pathways into the industry. For our young and our workers, this matters because the media content and ecosystem industry today brings work, such as production and design data, advertising technology, communication and platform-facing businesses.

This is especially important given our current job climate. We encourage Singaporeans to upskill, sign up for SkillsFuture, stay relevant to industrial needs. But if Singaporeans were to upskill, they must also feel that the real opportunities exist at the end of their effort. So, the question is not really about whether this Bill prevents excessive concentration of control, but the question is whether preventing such concentration of control can translate into a more vibrant ecosystem where more players can enter, grow and hire. With this Bill, I hope to be able to say to every Singaporean, if you choose to build your skills in this sector, Singapore is working to keep the media and ecosystem open, contestable and future-ready.

However, there is a tension that we must manage carefully. This Bill introduces strong controls over ownership, voting power, acquisition, effective control and the use and sharing of essential resources. These powers may be necessary to prevent dominance and protect public interest, but if applied without sufficient proportionality, they may create uncertainty for legitimate growth or even fundraising. This is particularly relevant for smaller players or emerging media businesses that may grow in the regulated space over time. Will the unintended consequences then be that new and small players find it harder to enter or scale?

So, my question to IMDA is this: how will we ensure that a framework designed to prevent unfair dominance does not unintentionally reduce vibrancy and entry that competition depends on? Where smaller players or emerging players fall in the regulated space, will IMDA also adopt a proportionate approach to compliance? Will there be clear guidelines for simple processes or differentiated expectation between large incumbents and smaller entrants?

I raise this because competition regulation should not prevent unfair dominance alone. It should also preserve innovation, entry and space for new players to grow. In plain English, we should not protect competition in a way which makes it harder for future competitors to emerge.

My second point is on Singapore's relevance and investability. Singapore's strength has always been not just only stable, but we are clear, predictable and trusted. And these are important reasons why investors choose to invest here. And investability is not an abstract concept because when companies invest in Singapore, they bring capital, they bring capabilities, regional functions and jobs. They create opportunities not just for senior executives but also Singaporeans working in content, marketing, production, communication and many other roles.

You see, investors and business do not expect a market to be unregulated. In fact, good regulations can strengthen confidence. It tells serious players the following things: one, the rules here in Singapore are fair; two, that dominant players cannot abuse their position; and three, that the system will not allow unfair concentration of control.

In this regard, this Bill sends a positive signal. It shows that Singapore is committed to fair and well-governed markets in the media industry. I understand, for example, the Bill closes a gap that says that if any party, including a non-media company, seeks to acquire 30% or more of equity interest or voting power in a regulated person, IMDA would have oversight. This is sensible because media ownership is not just commercial matters, because it affects competition, consumer interest and public trust.

See, at the same time, the powers introduced in this Bill are significant. The Bill strengthens control over ownership and effective control. It allows IMDA to issue directions in relations to regulated person and essential resources. It provides a stronger intervention where competition or the public interest is at stake. These are meaningful powers.

But precisely because such powers are significant, the basis for exercising them should be clear. So, I would like to ask how the Government intends to provide clarity on key concepts, such as public interest, effective control, substantial leasing of competition and essential resources? Will IMDA also publish clear decision frameworks or guidelines on how these concepts will be applied? Will businesses and investors be given sufficient clarity on the types of transactions or conduct that may raise such concerns?

This is important because investors are not just asking whether this system is fair. They are also asking whether this system is predictable. A system can be interventionistic, if needed or when needed, but if the basis for intervention is not well understood, investors may hesitate.

I also note that the Bill provides for reconsideration request to IMDA and appeals to the Minister. This is important. But could the Minister also clarify how does this safeguard works in practice? My point is simple. Strong regulatory power should match with strong clarity. This is how we preserve Singapore's reputation as a place where markets are well-governed, trusted and investable.

My final point is on outcomes for consumers and our residents. The Bill seeks to promote competition in the media industry. More precisely, it seeks to prevent unfair dominance, regulate control and ensure important media resources are not used in ways that harm competition or the public interest. In this principle, this should lead to more choices, better services, fairer access and greater innovation.

But from the perspective of the ordinary resident, the issue is not really how many media companies exist. The issue is whether the media environment, whether what they experience is diverse, reliable, accessible and trustworthy. A person may have access to many sources but still see a narrow slice of content. A young person may consume a lot of media but encounter very little local content. So, when we assess whether market-level competition has improved, I hope IMDA would also consider whether residents actually experience more choice, better service quality and greater discoverability of local content. I would like to ask IMDA how would we assess whether this Bill is delivering better outcomes for the consumer?

Mr Speaker, let me conclude. I support this Bill. It is right that our regulatory framework keeps pace with the changes in the media landscape. But as we do so, we must uphold three balances carefully: first, preventing dominance and allowing new firms to enter; second, regulatory strength and investability; third, market competition and consumer trust. Getting this right would help us to be a more open, vibrant, trusted and future-ready media ecosystem for Singapore.

8.55 pm

Mr Speaker: Senior Minister of State Tan.