Communicable Diseases Agency Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

5.10 pm

The Minister of State for Health (Ms Rahayu Mahzam) (for the Minister for Health): Mdm Deputy Speaker, on behalf of the Minister for Health, I move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."

In March 2023, during the Parliamentary debate on the White Paper of Singapore's response to COVID-19, the Minister for Health announced that Singapore will set up the Communicable Diseases Agency, or CDA.

Our current capabilities in managing communicable diseases reside in several entities. For example, the Ministry of Health (MOH) sets policy, the National Centre for Infectious Diseases (NCID) administers the public health control measures as part of the national programmes and the Heath Promotion Board (HPB) does public education. By consolidating into a dedicated agency, it will help us systematically build up strong public health expertise and organisational capacity and establish international linkages, to better tackle future pandemics.

[Mr Speaker in the Chair]

Over the years, we have seen severe infectious disease outbreaks occur with increasing frequency. Since the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) global outbreak, the World Health Organization (WHO) has already declared seven Public Health Emergencies of International Concern (PHEIC). These included the 2009 Influenza A (H1N1) pandemic, COVID-19 pandemic, 2022 mpox global outbreak, 2016 Zika global outbreak, all of which affected Singapore.

This increasing frequency of infectious disease outbreaks takes place amidst a complex ecological environment, with external forces driving the emergence and re-emergence of infectious diseases.

First, unplanned environmental encroachment has resulted in an increase in interaction between humans and animals, including the diseases they might carry. This has increased the risk of infections crossing the species barrier and infecting humans, sparking outbreaks of zoonotic diseases like Ebola Virus Disease and Marburg Virus Disease in Africa. Urbanisation has contributed to more dense human-to-human interactions and increased the risk of spread of infectious disease within communities.

Second, globalisation and cross-border travel greatly accelerates the speed at which infectious diseases spread internationally. Singapore, as an aviation air hub, is especially vulnerable.

Third, climate change is influencing and changing our environments. Increases in temperature allow disease vectors like the Aedes mosquitos which spread dengue fever, to expand their geographical range, placing more regions and people at risk of infection. Aedes aegypti, present in Singapore, becomes more efficient at transmitting dengue at higher temperatures.

Fourth, inappropriate antibiotic use drives the development of antimicrobial resistance, which render previously-effective drugs useless against these resistant forms. An example of such drug-resistant disease is multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis, which is much harder and takes much longer to treat than normal tuberculosis. When these drug-resistant diseases spread, they may cause more severe disease and even death because they are more difficult to treat.

Finally, the vaccine hesitancy movement undermines vaccination efforts to protect the population from infectious diseases that could cause severe illness and death. As a result, some countries where vaccine-preventable diseases like measles were previously eliminated have seen resurgences and outbreaks due to the declines in vaccination uptake. For example, measles has resurfaced in the United States since 2019 and in European countries since 2023, despite ready access to vaccines in these countries.

We are fortunate that our vaccination coverage for diseases like measles and diphtheria remain sufficiently high to maintain herd immunity, but we must not rest on our laurels. We must do what we can to maintain these high rates of vaccination coverage, such as addressing misinformation and disinformation on vaccines and provide evidence of their safety, efficacy and importance to individual and public health.

It is against this backdrop that CDA is being set up. CDA will be the frontline agency to safeguard Singapore by preparing for, preventing, detecting and responding to infectious diseases.

The COVID-19 White Paper put forth a few key recommendations to consolidate our learnings and better prepare ourselves for future pandemics.

First, we must systematically build strong expertise and organisational capacity to tackle future pandemics. During the COVID-19 response, we developed and deepened capabilities in areas like data analytics and epidemic modelling to support policy decisions and response. These must not be lost and must be maintained and developed to better prepare Singapore to manage future pandemics. CDA will do this by bringing together the expertise in the Ministry of Health (MOH), the Health Promotion Board (HPB) and the National Centre for Infectious Diseases (NCID), and leveraging academia and international technical networks to further develop CDA's capabilities.

Second, the White Paper recommended that we institutionalise the use of science and technology in responding to infectious disease threats. This involves tapping on the research ecosystem to coordinate and promote public health research that inform and guide public health actions and policies. With rapid technological advancements, new tools are continuously being developed, which must be evaluated and adopted to better prevent, prepare for, manage and respond to infectious diseases.

Lastly, we must strengthen the structures and capabilities for forward planning and preparedness to respond to the next pandemic in a more agile and fluid manner. In consolidating the public health functions for the control of infectious diseases, CDA will oversee end-to-end disease prevention, surveillance and risk assessment, preparedness and response, and disease and outbreak management. This will allow the Government to quickly respond to disease outbreaks as one concerted public health effort.

CDA is the response to the three key recommendations above. It will bring together public health functions under one roof. There are five areas of responsibility: prevent, prepare, detect, respond and enable.

First, prevent. This combines public education with robust vaccination policy and implementation, building and promoting infection prevention and control capabilities and practices across different settings, and combating the threat of antimicrobial resistance through a collaborative One Health approach. CDA seeks to prevent infections from taking root in the first place.

Second, prepare. Our COVID-19 experience has reinforced the need to invest in preparedness and readiness measures. The next pandemic can occur at any time and we must be prepared and stand ready to respond swiftly, flexibly, decisively and effectively. The groundwork for this must be laid during peacetime, drawing upon lessons from past experiences and anticipating future ones; developments and learnings from across the world; and, continuously reviewing and updating our plans and strategies so that they remain relevant.

COVID-19 demonstrated that pandemics can last much longer than previously anticipated. It lasted three years, much longer than the three-months-long response for 2003 SARS and H1N1. It also caused massive societal and economic disruption, far beyond the health sector. We must, therefore, prepare and be ready for a protracted, inter-sectoral, whole-of-Singapore response.

To do this, CDA will lead and coordinate public health preparedness and readiness efforts. It will work with stakeholders from various sectors and agencies to build sectoral readiness against infectious disease crises and to safeguard national interests, such as vaccine and therapeutics development and access. CDA will also work with MOH and healthcare institutions to build capabilities and capacity in key areas, such as laboratory testing and clinical management.

Third, detect. Surveillance is key to this, as continuously monitoring the infectious disease situation locally and internationally allows us to sense-make and identify unusual developments. Early detection of warning signs allows us to respond promptly to mitigate the impact of an outbreak. CDA will strengthen our surveillance capabilities, including exploring the use of new modalities of surveillance, such as through genomic testing and wastewater testing to supplement traditional surveillance approaches, and explore data analytics and artificial intelligence to enhance our ability to make sense of large volumes of data.

Fourth, respond. CDA will investigate and respond to cases and outbreaks of infectious diseases in Singapore. This takes place routinely for endemic diseases and during potential crisis. During a pandemic, the approach and strategy will be driven by MOH, or the equivalent of a Multi-Ministry Taskforce during COVID-19. CDA will provide policy and scientific recommendations, and also work with MOH and other agencies to carry out the operations. These will include a calibrated combination of public health and social measures that include case investigation, contact tracing, masking, physical distancing and border control measures.

Finally, CDA needs to support its function with strategic enablers. One important enabler is research. Research is an important aspect of preparation to ensure a scientifically robust, data-driven response to infectious diseases. For instance, research conducted during COVID-19 allowed us to determine the duration people infected by COVID-19 were likely to remain infectious. This, in turn, informed the duration of isolation for these individuals so as to prevent transmission. CDA will coordinate and conduct public health research. It will make use of the findings from local and international studies and translate research findings into public health and clinical actions and policies.

Another key enabler is international cooperation. The next pandemic is likely to come from abroad. CDA will also engage overseas stakeholders and counterparts to enable Singapore to respond swiftly to rapidly evolving global disease situations. This allows us to access and share information, expertise and the latest developments and best practices in infectious diseases control. This will also allow us to detect international emerging situations of concern earlier and buy us invaluable time to prepare for and implement mitigating measures.

I will now highlight the significant elements of the Communicable Diseases Agency Bill.

Part 1 of the Bill introduces the terms used in various provisions of the Bill. Part 2 establishes CDA as a body corporate with a structure similar to major statutory boards. Within it, clauses 5 and 6 describe the functions and powers of CDA, which are based on what the consolidated MOH, HPB and NCID units do today and what we envisage CDA will do after it is established, which I have described earlier.

Parts 3 to 6 lays out CDA's governance structures and requirements, which are aligned with the requirements under the Public Sector (Governance) Act 2018. They cover the membership, appointment and decision-making procedures of CDA's Board as well as personnel and financial matters.

Part 7 covers miscellaneous provisions necessary for the administration and enforcement of the Bill. Part 8 allows for the transfer of assets, liabilities and employees from relevant MOH and HPB departments or divisions, as laid out in the Schedule, to CDA. As NCID today is part of Tan Tock Seng Hospital, which is a corporate entity, NCID assets, liabilities and employees will be consolidated under CDA through other means, such as via contract novations or direct employment by CDA.

Part 9 will make consequential amendment to other Acts. The key amendment will be to the Infectious Diseases Act 1976, where relevant provisions on vaccinations notifications and vaccination exemptions will be amended to replace HPB with CDA. This reflects the transfer of these functions related to the National Immunisation Registry from HPB today to CDA, after it is established.

Mr Speaker, the Bill presented today sets out the legislative framework to establish the Communicable Diseases Agency. If the Bill is passed, the CDA will be established in the first half of 2025. It will be the lead agency in Singapore to prevent, prepare for, detect and manage infectious diseases and will play a pivotal role in safeguarding Singapore from infectious diseases threats. Sir, I seek to move.

Question proposed.

Mr Speaker: Mr Yip Hon Weng.

5.24 pm

Mr Yip Hon Weng (Yio Chu Kang): Mr Speaker, Sir, I rise to seek clarifications on the Bill establishing the CDA, a move aimed to bolster Singapore's defences against infectious diseases.

First, Mr Speaker, Sir, how can Singaporeans be assured that the CDA will achieve results greater than the sum of its parts? By consolidating critical public health functions from three key institutions under one agency, we aim for efficiency and effectiveness. But the question remains. Will this restructuring translate into tangible public health benefits?

Each of the existing entities hold deep expertise in areas like policy development, surveillance and operational responses. What mechanisms will ensure that the strengths of these institutions are fully leveraged under the CDA's umbrella?

The CDA’s role as a coordinating authority is critical. On-the-ground work will continue to involve multiple players, including public institutions and private contractors. How will the Ministry ensure that CDA has the authority, resources and the tools to harmonise these efforts?

Second, Mr Speaker, Sir, I have queries about the transfer of employees to CDA. A disruption in essential health services during this transition could have severe repercussions, especially if a disease outbreak occurs. What measures are in place to retrain and upskill employees for the broader mandates of CDA? Ensuring that the workforce is equipped with new skills will be vital for tackling emerging and complex diseases.

The preservation of institutional knowledge is equally important. Employees who have led critical public health initiatives, such as vaccination drives, carry invaluable experience. How will their expertise be retained and their morale maintained during this transition? Additionally, how will union representation be addressed as employees move from the civil service to a statutory board? How many will be affected? What safeguards are in place for those who may decline the transfer? Will their benefits be matched with continuity? How will the National Trades Union Congress be involved?

Third, Mr Speaker, Sir, public health is not the sole responsibility of a single agency. It requires a whole-of-Government approach. CDA must work seamlessly with other agencies, like the National Environment Agency (NEA) to tackle challenges like dengue, which has both environmental and medical dimensions. How will the CDA and NEA collaborate? Could we see the formation of joint task forces or integrated data systems to enhance early detection and coordinated responses? Clear public communication is also critical during outbreaks. Will there be a single, unified messaging platform to ensure that Singaporeans receive accurate and timely information without confusion?

Fourth, Mr Speaker, Sir, infectious diseases know no borders. We know from SARS and, most recently, COVID-19. I am glad to hear from the Minister of State just now that CDA will play an active role in global health initiatives to protect Singaporeans from external threats.

How will the CDA work with international organisations, like the WHO, to share insights and access critical information? Will it participate in joint surveillance systems to identify emerging threats directly and early? Beyond immediate measures, will CDA advocate for stronger international regulations and lead global efforts in pandemic preparedness, including vaccine research and diagnostics?

In conclusion, Mr Speaker, Sir, the COVID-19 pandemic and other crises have taught us the devastating impact of infectious diseases on lives, healthcare systems and economies. Resilience in public health is not just desirable, it is essential. The establishment of the CDA offers an opportunity to elevate Singapore’s public health defences. However, we must ensure it delivers on its promise.

The CDA must unite and strengthen public health functions to benefit Singaporeans, ensure a smooth and morale-boosting transition for employees, retaining their expertise, collaborate effectively with agencies, like NEA, to address multi-dimensional health challenges and engage globally to stay ahead of emerging threats.

The current health situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo underscores the urgency of proactive measures. Stricter health screenings and quarantine protocols for travelers from Africa or transit hubs in the Middle East are critical in shielding Singapore from potential risks. Over the past week, an outbreak of HMPV in China and Malaysia have also raised alarms globally.

Most importantly, CDA must prepare Singapore to face "Disease X", a potentially unknown pathogen with pandemic potential. Our goal should not just be to respond effectively when the time comes but to anticipate, plan, and build a robust system which mitigates the worst outcomes. CDA must act with foresight, anticipate risks, coordinate responses and build trust with Singaporeans. This agency should not merely serve as a safety net, but as a proactive force that protects lives and inspires confidence. Let us seize this moment to set a new standard in public health. Mr Speaker, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Assoc Prof Jamus Lim.

5.29 pm

Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim (Sengkang): Sir, the CDA Bill will establish a combined body to oversee communicable diseases. It was one of the key recommendations of the Government's COVID-19 White Paper and its formation was already alluded to in Health Minister Ong Ye Kung's speech during the related debate. I do not propose to revisit the arguments that were made by the Workers' Party then but let me state at the outset that we support this present Bill. We will, nevertheless, offer three additional suggestions on the scope and objectives of the new institution as it commences its service to Singapore.

First, we believe that the emergency preparedness and response mandate of CDA has to be sufficiently broad. This means that the institution should not only be focused on the most stereotypical public health emergencies, which have to do with disease outbreaks like epidemics and pandemics. The CDA should also regard disaster management as a key part of its scenario planning parameters.

While Singapore, thankfully, rarely encounters the standard range of natural disasters, such as earthquakes, tsunamis or wildfires, flooding remains common in spite of advances in our water management infrastructure. While communicable waterborne diseases, such as cholera, are, thankfully, very rare in modern Singapore, cases do sporadically arise as they did in 2009. By a similar token, man-made disasters, such as chemical or, perhaps in the future, radiological incidents, would also potentially have associated disease transmission risks and have to be planned for.

Perhaps more crucially, CDA should also consider the implications of bioterrorist threats, such as smallpox or engineered virus strains. While the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Home Affairs would undoubtedly be tasked with how best to counter such attacks, the management of the aftermath of a bioweapons outbreak would logically fall under the scope of the new CDA.

But CDA should not confine its mandate to emergencies alone. Many communicable diseases are ongoing and, possibly, seasonal, such as dengue or influenza. Their routine nature should, however, not diminish their risks. After all, recorded dengue cases island-wide amounted to 13,564 in 2024; and in 2009, an outbreak of the H1N1 strain let to an estimated 270,000 infections and 18 deaths.

This would mean enfolding seemingly mundane tasks, like the provision of educational and informational advisories on communicable disease prevention, into the priorities for the new agency. CDA should be leading public informational campaigns ranging from things that seem mundane like annual flu shots to prevention strategies for HIV. Indeed, it is sometimes the non-clinical aspects of such diseases – ensuring the undisrupted supply chain of masks and other critical medical supplies or regulating appropriate safeguards for close quarter living spaces, which was an acknowledged oversight in our COVID-19 response – that may be the most critical.

We understand, of course, that many of these roles currently fall to different agencies and Ministries. Dengue and Zika, for example, are overseen by NEA; while the various strains of influenza are currently monitored directly by MOH. The Ministry of Trade and Industry will almost inevitably be involved in supply chain matters and foreign worker dormitories currently fall under the purview of the Ministry of Manpower. Research funding for vaccine research would be naturally administered by the National Research Foundation.

Perhaps the Minister of State would be willing to explain how the different roles will be re-allocated going forward if, indeed, the new CDA will have frontline oversight over all communicable diseases. If the new agency will draw on expertise across the whole breadth of Government functions, should clauses 51 through 53 of the Bill, which currently limit employee transfers to only MOH and HPB, should it be more general?

Sir, the mixed tapestry of interlinked Government agencies will mean a whole-of-Government effort. And this, in turn, will mean the need to establish constant channels of communication and coordination, insofar as infectious diseases are concerned. The new CDA must be proactive in this process.

Most evidently, this would be within Singapore, both between Government bodies, but also with allied institutions, such as clinics and hospitals or university research centres. It would also entail coordinating the process of international knowledge and information exchange, an important objective that the Government itself acknowledges and Minister of State Rahayu just alluded to, so that we do not necessarily re-invent the wheel or go down unproductive paths in our scientific and policy decisions.

One common complaint during the COVID-19 pandemic was how information and guidance from MOH seemed to change by the week and releases were often confusing. While we appreciate that the management of an ever-evolving disease is necessarily dynamic, it should not preclude the deployment of simple and reliable communication strategies.

After all, successful communication and coordination was, directly or indirectly, a theme for four of the seven main lessons from the COVID-19 White Paper. With recent lapses in interagency communication surrounding the failed Allianz-Income deal, multiple MRT service disruptions and the most recent Bizfile NRIC leak, it behooves us to ensure that similar breakdowns do not recur in times of crisis when we can least afford it.

Mr Speaker: Dr Wan Rizal.

5.36 pm

Dr Wan Rizal (Jalan Besar): Mr Speaker, I rise in support of the Bill. The Bill represents a significant step in strengthening our nation's capabilities to prevent, manage and control infectious diseases. Its importance is underscored by the growing complexity of global health challenges as we saw during the COVID-19 pandemic and the ongoing need to combat diseases, like dengue and influenza.

During COVID-19, for instance, the rapid spread of the virus and the pressure on our healthcare system highlighted the critical need for a robust, centralised agency to manage such crises effectively. The Bill aims to establish CDA, a centralised body coordinating infectious disease management, research, surveillance and public health education.

While I fully support the intent behind this Bill, I would like to raise some questions and seek clarification on key provisions.

First, I would like to address the potential impact of this transition on our existing public health services. The transfer of functions from MOH and HPB to CDA is a significant organisational shift. What measures will the Ministry put in place to ensure that critical services, such as vaccination programmes, epidemiological studies and disease monitoring, continue seamlessly during this period of change? Can the Ministry share a detailed transition plan to mitigate any disruptions or any risks of disruptions? These services are the backbone of our public health framework and any gaps, even temporary ones, could have severe implications for our citizens' health and well-being.

Second, on transparency and accountability. The Bill outlines broad powers for CDA, including managing significant resources and overseeing critical public health functions. Transparency will be essential for maintaining public health in this new agency. What systems will be implemented to ensure CDA operates transparently and is held accountable for its decisions and use of public funds? Secondly, will CDA be required to publish regular performance reviews, financial audits and annual reports for public scrutiny? Public trust in CDA is paramount, especially when it is new and these measures will go a long way to ensure accountability and trust.

Third, on budget allocation and resource prioritisation. CDA's broad mandate raises important questions about the prioritisation of its resources. Balancing immediate needs with long-term growth is critical. I would like to ask: how will the Ministry ensure that CDA allocates resources effectively to meet both immediate outbreak responses and long-term objectives, such as vaccine research and public health education? Could the Ministry provide an outline of its initial funding allocations and provide for CDA to align public expectations with operational realities. Effective resource management will be critical to the success of this agency and clarity in this regard will help in aligning public expectations with operational realities.

Fourth, on employee welfare and transition. I also wish to highlight the importance of protecting the welfare of employees who will be transferred from MOH and HPB to CDA. Our healthcare workers have been instrumental in safeguarding our nation's health, especially during the pandemic.

Beyond the assurances provided in the Bill, what steps will the Ministry take to address long-term concerns around career progression, job security, work benefits and the morale of these employees? Will there be a structured consultation process to address employees' concerns during this transition? These employees are the foundation of CDA's operations and their welfare should remain a top priority to ensure a smooth transition and continued excellence in public health services.

Finally, on international representation. The Bill empowers CDA to represent Singapore internationally on matters related to infectious diseases. This international engagement is crucial for fostering global partnerships and ensuring our policies are aligned with best practices worldwide.

During the pandemic, a multi-agency task force was set up to coordinate responses across various sectors. How will CDA's international engagement impact or complement such multi-agency efforts? To avoid overlap or misalignment with existing strategies, could the Ministry clarify how CDA's international engagements will complement ongoing work by MOH and other agencies? Could the Ministry also share the specific coordination mechanisms that will be established to ensure streamlined communication and unified representation on the global stage? Such protocols will enhance our credibility and effectiveness in global health matters.

Mr Speaker, in closing, CDA represents a significant step in enhancing our public health infrastructure. The establishment of CDA offers an opportunity to not only strengthen our infectious diseases management capabilities but also reaffirm our commitment to transparency, accountability and the welfare of those who will serve in this critical agency.

Let us take a moment to acknowledge the dedication of our healthcare workers who have tirelessly protected our nation. Their resilience during the COVID-19 pandemic exemplifies the spirit we aim to preserve and enhance with CDA.

Notwithstanding the clarifications raised, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker: Minister of State Rahayu.

5.42 pm

Ms Rahayu Mahzam: Mr Speaker, I thank Members for their support and for their comments and questions on the Bill.

Mr Yip Hon Weng asked about the mechanisms to ensure that CDA will be able to leverage the strengths of MOH, HPB and NCID fully, given that each of these entities already hold deep expertise in various aspects of public health.

CDA will harness the collective expertise of MOH, HPB and NCID, fostering closer teamwork and synergy. We will create an ecosystem where public health practitioners can share knowledge and solve problems together. We will also be strengthening both our capabilities and capacities for communicable disease prevention, control and response. Under CDA, these talented professionals will have greater opportunities to grow, learn from one another and raise standards in public health practice.

We are focused on continuity of operations. As Dr Wan Rizal rightly pointed out, critical public health functions must continue seamlessly.

Since the Minister for Health's announcement of CDA's formation in March 2023, we have ensured a smooth transition, with our public health operations remaining robust and effective throughout this period of change. In end 2023, we established the interim CDA as a pre-operations structure, where critical functions, including disease surveillance, monitoring and investigations, can steadily transit and continue to operate effectively. We have also worked on refining our work processes to enhance critical public health functions and activities.

Next, I will move on to other questions posed by Members.

Dr Wan Rizal and Mr Yip Hon Weng asked about the measures in place to protect and develop staff. We have been conducting regular engagement sessions with staff and unions to provide information and seek feedback. Throughout this transition, we have consulted with the respective organisations and the Public Service Division.

The new CDA scheme is designed to support the professional growth, career progression and development of CDA's officers. To grow expertise, CDA will provide structured learning opportunities to equip officers with the relevant competencies to perform their jobs effectively. CDA officers will also be given opportunities to rotate to other roles and functions within CDA, across the wider healthcare or public service family, and even obtain international exposure.

Dr Wan Rizal, Mr Yip Hon Weng and Assoc Prof Jamus Lim also asked about CDA's role in multi-agency coordination. As part of the transition, we have ensured that CDA's work aligns with national policies. CDA will continue to work closely with MOH and other public agencies. For instance, today we work closely with NEA to mitigate the impact of vector-borne diseases like dengue fever, with the Singapore Food Agency on food safety and with the National Parks Board on diseases that may affect both animals and humans.

These collaborations are part of a multi-agency cooperation framework termed "One Health". CDA will continue to work with the One Health agencies as part of a multi-sectoral, integrated approach to prevent, detect and respond to new and emerging public health threats.

Our preparedness and response plans for "Disease X", as asked by Assoc Prof Jamus Lim, also includes tapping on the whole-of-Government agencies. This recognises the wide impact of outbreaks and pandemics, and the need for a multi-pronged effort.

Working with other Ministries and agencies is not just during a crisis, but also during non-crisis periods. This is part of our efforts to enhance Singapore's preparedness and readiness for pandemics, and also for the control of endemic diseases.

To enhance communication and coordination, CDA will build upon existing platforms and strengthen information exchanges with all stakeholders, including timely sharing of important information with the public.

Both Dr Wan Rizal and Mr Yip Hon Weng have asked about CDA's role in the area of international engagement, including working with organisations, such as WHO to advance our public health interests. As diseases know no borders, CDA will represent Singapore on infectious diseases at relevant fora to establish strategic collaborations with our bilateral and multilateral counterparts, and to bolster global disease preparedness and response.

CDA will also contribute actively to international scientific and surveillance networks to facilitate the exchange of disease information and sharing of expertise. This will allow Singapore to detect and understand novel pathogens faster, which can buy us time to respond. For instance, as the National Focal Point for WHO's International Health Regulations, CDA will be the primary point of contact for WHO and other countries on disease outbreak, notification and information sharing.

Upon establishment, CDA will also be a national member of the International Association of National Public Health Institutes to closely engage and collaborate with other national public health institutes worldwide.

On Assoc Prof Jamus Lim's point about expanding to disaster management, the CDA's aims is to focus on communicable diseases, as its expertise is in this area. For natural or man-made disasters, MOH and other Ministries already have the capabilities to respond to them. CDA will work together with these Ministries and agencies on the communicable disease issues that will arise.

Given CDA's mandate for end-to-end disease prevention, preparation, detection and management, it will need sufficient support for its manpower and resources to achieve its objectives. As a Statutory Board under MOH, the CDA will be accountable to the Minister for Health in the performance of its functions. CDA will also comply with the financial governance requirements under Public Sector (Governance) Act 2018.

Mr Speaker, to conclude, CDA will play a vital role in strengthening our nation's preparedness and resilience against future infectious diseases threats. With that, Sir, I seek to move.

5.49 pm

Mr Speaker: Any Members have clarifications for the Minister of State? None.

Question put, and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House.

The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. – [Ms Rahayu Mahzam].

[Mr Speaker in the Chair]

The Chairman: The citation year "2024" will be changed to "2025", as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement.

Clauses 1 to 55 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Bill reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed.